As per case facts, the petitioner's name appeared incidentally in a NDPS case as the husband of a respondent, despite having no role in the proceedings. He sought de-linking of ...
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 1 of 144
$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
+
Judgment pronounced on: 29.05.2026
LAKSH VIR SINGH YADAV .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 1021/2016, CM APPL. 4449/2016 &4263/2017
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Respondents
+
JORAWER SINGH MUNDY @ JORAWAR SINGH MUNDY
W.P.(C) 3918/2021, CM APPL. 19941/2021
.....Petitioner
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
ASHUTOSH KAUSHIK .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 6790/2021, CM APPL. 21682/2024
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
SHEKHAR SINGH JADAUN .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 8209/2021
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
JAIDEEP MIRCHANDANI & ANR. .....Petitioners
W.P.(C) 8557/2021
versus
UNION OF INDIA MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION AND IT &
ORS. .....Respondents
+
MOHAMMED UMAR ASHRAFI .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 12620/2021
versus
UNION OF INDIA THROUGH MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING & ORS. .....Respondents
+
ATUL DIKSHIT .....Petitioner W.P.(C) 11553/2021, CM APPL. 35651/2021
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+ W.P.(C) 14360/2021, CM APPL. 45255/2021, 2897/2022
&59113/2023
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 2 of 144
ANTRIKSH JOHRI .....Petitioner
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
+
MOLEESHA .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 1671/2022, CM APPL. 4805/2022
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondent s
+
DHAWAL KUMAR .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 8658/2022, CM APPL. 26071/2022
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
MR. SATINDER SINGH BHASIN .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 11372/2022, CM APPL. 33466/2022
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
DR. ASHOK KUMAR CHOUDHARY .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 12567/2022, CM APPL. 38058/2022
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
+
DR. ISHWARPRASAD GILADA .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 2134/2023, CM APPL. 8060/2023
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. .....Respondents
+
SANJEEV SEHGAL .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 2353/2023
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
SHAKTINIDHI BAKHSHI .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 4094/2023, CM APPL. 15925/2023
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
SK .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 5400/2023, CM APPL. 21149/2023
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
D G .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 9824/2023, CM APPL. 37746/2023, 37747/2023,
27142/2024
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 3 of 144
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
MR. SJ . .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 5608/2023, CM APPL. 21997/2023
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
RAKESH KUMAR TIWARY .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 13461/2023, CM APPL. 53143/2023
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. .....Respondents
+
SHAMSHER GURJUR & ANR. .....Petitioners
W.P.(C) 15523/2023, CM APPL. 62165/2023
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
NARESH KUMAR JANOO .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 16447/2023
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
HH .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 16476/2023, CM APPL. 66342/2023
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
MR. X .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 13192/2024, CM APPL. 55091/2024, 55092/2024,
57965/2024, 71767/2024
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS .....Respondents
+
PRITAM ASHOK SADAPHULE .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 6695/2024, CM APPL. 52989/2024, CM APPL.
71778/2024
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
X .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 2887/2025, CM APPL. 16505/2025
versus
Y & ORS. .....Respondent s
+
AK & ANR. .....Petitioner s
W.P.(C) 3687/2024, CM APPL. 15177/2024
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 4 of 144
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
X AND ANR .....Petitioners
W.P.(C) 6047/2024
versus
REGISTRAR GENERAL DELHI HIGH COURT AND OTHERS
.....Respondents
+
DEEPTI SHARMA .....Petitioner
versus
W.P.(C) 7763/2024
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
P P MADHAVAN .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 9940/2024
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR .....Respondents
+
PRANAV GUPTA .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 12179/2024, CM APPL. 50680/2024, 50681/2024
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
+
X .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 30/2025, CM APPL. 71/2025
versus
Y .....Respondent
+
X .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 1567/2025, CM APPL. 7657/2025, 12985/2025
versus
Y & ORS. .....Respondents
+
X .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 9929/2025, CM APPL. 45429/2025
versus
INDIAN KANOON.ORG AND ORS .....Respondents
+
JASPREET SINGH .....Petitioner
versus
W.P.(C) 11714/2025, CM APPL. 47988/2025
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
MITHILA MURADA .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 11862/2025
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 5 of 144
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
MNK .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 14696/2025, CM APPL. 60270/2025
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. .....Respondents
+
PISCESIA POWER TRANSMISSION PRIVATE LIMITED
W.P.(C) 18962/2025, CM APPL. 78965/2025
.....Petitioner
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
+
R.K. BHARDWAJ .....Petitioner
W.P.(CRL) 1861/2022, CRL.M.A. 16127/2022
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Presence
Mr. Akhil Sibal, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. Rahul Kumar,
Ms. Alisha Roy and Mr. Krishnesh Bapat, Advs. for
Petitioner in W.P.(C) 1567/2025 .
: Mr. Rohit Madan and Mr. Akash, Advs. for petitioner in
W.P.(C) 1021/2016.
Mr. Arvind Nigam, Sr. Advocate along with Ms. Mamta R.
Jha, Mr. Rohan Ahuja, Ms. Shruttima Ehersa, Ms. Amishi
Sodani, Ms. Aiswarya Debadarshini, Mr. Ankit Tripathi, Ms.
Sanya Sehgal, Ms. Vareesha Irfan, Ms. Sugandha Chhibbeer
and Ms. Jahanvi Agarwal, Advocates for Google LLC in
W.P.(C) 3918/2021 to W.P.(C) 7763/2024, W.P.(C) 30/2025,
W.P.(C) 11714/2025, W.P.(C) 14696/2025, W.P.(C)
18962/2025, W.P.(CRL) 1861/2022.
Ms. Aditi Mohan, Mr. Sparsh Goel, Advs. for Registrar
General, DHC in W.P.(C) 1021/2016.
Ms. Nidhi Raman, CGSC for UOI along with Mr. Nikunj
Bindal, Advs. for UOI in W.P.(C) 11372/2022 .
Ms. Smriti Sinha, Mr. Satyam Thareja, Ms. Vasundhara
Nagrath, Ms. Aleena and Mr. Nikhil Gupta, Advocates for
Petitioner in W.P.(C) 9824/2023 .
Mr. R. Venkat Prabhat, SPC along with Ms. Kamna Behrani,
Mr. Ansh Kalra and Mr. Neeraj Raj, Advs. for UOI in
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 6 of 144
W.P.(C) 2887/2025.
Mr. Kumar Sameer, Adv. for Petitioner in W.P.(C)
2887/2025.
Mr. Sanjeev Sehgal, Mr. Vivek and Ms. Tulika, Advs. for
Petitioner in W.P.(C) 2353/2023 .
Ms. Radhika Bishwajit Dubey, CGSC along with Ms.
Gurleen Kaur Wariach, Mr. Kritarth Upadhyay, Mr. Vivek
Sharma and Mr. Amulya Dev Mishra, Advocates for R-1 in
W.P.(C) 8557/2021, W.P.(C) 5400/2023, W.P.(C) 30/2025,
W.P.(CRL) 1861/2022.
Mr. Sirish Gupta, Advocate for Petitioner in W.P.(C)
11714/2025.
Mr. Varun Pathak, Mr. Yash Karuna Karan, Ms. Amee Rana,
Mr. Vishesh Sharma, Ms. Prasidhi Agrawal and Ms. Sana
Banyal, Advocates for R- 3 in W.P.(C) 13192/2024 and for R-
4 in W.P.(C) 11714/2025.
Mr. Saurabh Seth, SC for Delhi High Court along with Ms.
Neelampreet Kaur, Mr. Abhiroop Rathore, Mr. Kabir Dev
and Mr. Sukhbir Singh, Advocates for R-2/DHC in W.P.(C)
2887/2025 and W.P.(C) 11862/2025.
Mr. Rakesh Kumar, SPC along with Mr. Sunil, Adv. for UOI
in W.P.(C) 5608/2023.
Mr. Rishabh Kumar, Advocate for R-4 in W.P.(C)
3687/2024.
Mr. Rajiv Mohan, Ms. Shalini Sinha and Ms. Aranya Sinha,
Advs. for Petitioners in W.P.(CRL) 1861/2022 .
Mr. Jagdish Chandra and Ms. Maansa Saxena, Advocates for
Respondent in W.P.(C) 8209/2021.
Mr. Kapil Sankhla, Mr. Saurabh Gangwar and Mr. Vipul
Grover, Advs. for Petitioner in W.P.(C) 3687/2024 .
Mr. Deepraj, Adv. for Petitioner in W.P.(C) 18962/2025 .
Mr. Sanjay Vashishtha, Mr. Siddhartha Goswami, Mr. Aditya
Sachdeva, Mr. Krish Bhatia, Advs. for Petitioner in W.P.(C)
12567/2022.
Mr. Himanshu Pathak, SPC along with Mr. Chetan Sharma,
Advocate for UOI in W.P.(C) 9824/2023 .
Mr. Rakesh Kumar, SPC along with Mr. Sunil, Adv. for UOI
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 7 of 144
in W.P.(C) 5608/2023.
Mr. Kaushik Moitra, Mr. Divyam Sharma and Ms. Manya
Dudeja, Advs. for R-4 in W.P.(C) 16447/2023.
Mr. Ankit Sahni, Adv. along with Ms. Kritika Sahni, Adv.,
Mr. Chirag Ahluwalia, Adv., Mr. Mohit Maru, Adv. for the
Petitioner in W.P.(C) 12179/2024 .
Mr. Rakesh Taneja, Adv. for Petitioner in W.P.(C)
6695/2024.
Mr. Vikas Tiwari, Mr. Kumar Deepraj, and Ms. Palak
Agrawal, Advocates for the Petitioner in W.P.(C)
18962/2025.
Mr. Rohit Anil Rathi, Mr. Yashas RK, Ms. Niharika Singh
Advocates for the Petitioner in W .P.(C) 2134/2023.
Mr. Rudra Paliwal, GP for UOI in W.P.(C) 2887/2025 .
Mr. Bharat S. Kumar, Adv. for Petitioner in W.P.(C)
16447/2023.
Mr. Samiron Borkataky, Adv., Mr. Ikshvaaku Marwah, Adv.
and Ms. Madhupreeta Nayak, Adv., for R-24 and 26 in
W.P.(C) 1567/2025.
Counsel for Respondent No. 24 - Dow Jones.
Mr. Kanishk Kumar, Ms. Deepika Pokharia and Mr. Priyansh
Kohli, Advs. for R-3 in W.P.(C) 6695/2024 , for R-5 in
W.P.(C) 1567/2025.
Mr. Ajit Warrier, Mr. Angad Kochhar and Ms. Sakshi
Agarwal, Advocates for R-7 in W.P.(C) 11372/2022.
Mr. Himanshu Pathak, SPC along with Mr. Chetan Sharma,
Advs. for UOI in W.P.(C) 9824/2023.
Mr. Amit Bajaj, Adv. for R-10 in W.P.(C) 6790/2021 ,
W.P.(C) 2887/2025, for HT Digital Stream Ltd (URL No.3(i)
in CM APPL.59113/2023) in W.P.(C) 14360/2021, for R-10,
11 and 14 in W.P.(C) 1567/2025.
Mr. Vikas Kumar Sharma, Senior Central Govt. Counsel for
the Respondent No.1 in W.P.(C) 14696/2025 .
Mr. Aditya Agarwal, Adv. for Petitioner in W.P.(C) 30/2025 .
Mr. Ajit Warrier, Mr. Angad Kochhar, Ms. Sakshi Agarwal,
Advs. for R-7 in W.P.(C) 11372/2022.
Mr. Shivam Gupta, Adv. for Petitioner in W.P.(C)
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 8 of 144
5608/2023.
Mr. Rajat Joneja, Mr. Anmol Kumar, Ms. Cheshta Dalal,
Advs. for R-1.
Ms. Shagun Shahi Chugh, SPC along with Mr. Varun Chugh
and Ms. Ayushi Agarwal, Advs. for Respondents in W.P.(C)
15523/2023.
Ms. Rose Maria Sebi & Ms. Simran Jain (Advs.) for Yahoo
India in W.P.(C) 5608/2023, W.P.(C) 6695/2024, W.P.(C)
11372/2022, W.P.(C) 1567/2025.
Mr. Vikas Chhabra, Adv. for Petitioner in W.P.(C)
16476/2023.
Mr. Rohan Rai and Ms. Amisha Ray, Advocates for
Petitioner in W.P.(C) 12620/2021 .
Mr. Trideep Pais, Sr. Adv. along with Neha Rathi, Adv, Ms.
Kajal Giri, Adv., Ms. Saloni Ambastha, Adv., Ms. Somya
Kumari, Adv., Mr. Prateek Yadav, Adv. for Petitioner in
W.P.(C) 13192/2024.
Mr. Tishampati Sen, Ms. Riddhi Sancheti, Mr. Anurag
Anand, Mr. Mukul Kulhari, Advocates for R-5 in W.P.(C)
16447/2023.
Mr. Jitendra Kumar Tripathi, Adv. for UOI in W.P.(C)
4094/2023.
Ms. Abhiti Vachheer, Mr. Akshat Vaccher, Ms. Poonam
Nagpal, Advocates for Petitioners in W.P.(C) 8557/2021 .
Mr. Piyush Beriwal, Ms. Ruchita Srivastava and Ms. Neha
Kamboj, Advs. for R-1 in W.P.(C) 2353/2023.
Ms. Arunima Dwivedi, CGSC along with Ms. Himanshi
Singh and Ms. Monalisha Pradhan, Advocates for UOI in
W.P.(C) 12620/2021, W.P.(C) 12567/2022, W.P.(C)
4094/2023.
Mr. Dhruv Rohatgi, Panel Counsel, Ms. Chandrika Sachdev,
Mr. Dhruv Kumar, Advs. for R-2 in W .P.(C) 15523/2023.
Ms. Anushka Sharma and Mr. Madhay Khosla, Advs. for R-6
in W.P.(C) 13192/2024.
Mr. P.R. Rajhans, Mr. Vivek Singh, Mr. Tarun Kumar, Ms.
Pratibha and Mr. Abhishek, Advocates for Respondent no.6
in W.P.(C) 12620/2021, W.P.(C) 16447/2023 and W.P.(C)
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 9 of 144
18962/2025.
Mr. Shoumendu Mukherji, SPC, Mr. Aniruddha Ghosh, Ms.
Megha Sharma and Ms. Surbhi Tuli, Advs. for UOI in
W.P.(C) 16447/2023.
Mr. JiveshKumar Tiwari, CGSC, Ms. Nandini Aggarwal and
Ms. Samiksha, Advs. for UOI in W.P.(C) 12620/2021.
Mr. Jitendra Kumar Tripathi, Adv. for UOI in W.P.(C)
4094/2023.
Ms. Shiva Lakshmi (SPC) along with Mr. Madhav Bajaj,
Adv. for respondent in W.P.(C) 3918/2021 , W.P.(C)
6790/2021 and W.P.(C) 13192/2024.
Mr. B.S. Shukla (CGSC) along with Ms. Jiniya Saha, Mr.
Praveen Gupta, Advs. for Respondent in W.P.(C) 1021/2016 .
Mr. Bhagwan Swaroop Shukla (CGSC), Mr. Mukesh Kumar
Pandey along with Ms. Jiniya Saha, Mr. Praveen Gupta, Adv.
for Respondent in W.P.(C) 6047/2024.
Ms. Rose Maria Sebi, Ms. Simran Jain, Adv. for respondent
in W.P.(C) 5608/2023, W.P.(C) 6695/2024, W.P.(C)
11372/2022 and W.P.(C) 1567/2025.
Mr. Jai Shankar, Ms. Nandita Rao, Ms. Lochan Rajput, Mr.
Manoj Makhija, Advs. for petitioner in W.P.(C) 11862/2025 .
Mr. Ruchir Mishra, Mr. Sanjiv Kumar Saxena, Ms. Reba
Jena Mishra and Ms. Poonam Shukla, Advs. for UOI in
W.P.(C) 8658/2022 and W.P.(C) 2134/2023.
Mr. Neeraj, SPC, Mr. Rudra Paliwal, GP and Mr. Soumyadip
Chakraborty, Adv. for UOI in W.P.(C) 1671/2022 & W.P.(C)
2887/2025.
Mr. Nitinjya Chaudhary, CGSC and Mr. Rahul Mourya, Adv.
for UOI in W.P.(C) 13192/2024 .
SI Praveen, PS EOW in W.P.(C) 15523/2023.
Mr. P.R. Rajhans, Mr. Vivek Singh, Mr. Tarun Kumar, Ms.
Pratibha and Mr. Abhishek, Advs. for R-6 in W.P.(C)
12620/2021, W.P.(C) 16447/2023, W.P.(C) 18962/2025.
Mr. Amit Tiwari, CGSC, Ms. Ayushi Srivastava, Mr. Ayush
Tanwr, Mr. Arpan Narwal and Mr. Kushagra Malik, Advs.
for UOI in W.P.(C) 15523/2023 & W.P.(C) 9940/2024 .
Dr. Abhimanyu Chopra, Mr. Kushagra Jain and Mr.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 10 of 144
Akhilesh, Advs. for R-16 in W.P.(C) 1567/2025 .
Mr. Farman Ali, CGSC and Ms. Usha Jamnal, Adv. for UOI
in W.P.(C) 11553/2021 and W.P.(C) 11862/2025.
Mr. Pratima N. Lakra, CGSC and Ms. Upanita
Soumyadarshini, Advs. for R-2 and 3.
Mr. Mukul Singh, CGSC, Mr. Aryan Dhaka and Mr. Vikrant
Badesra, Advs. for UOI in W.P.(C) 3687/2024, W.P.(C)
12179/2024, W.P.(C) 11714/2025 and W.P.(C) 18962/2025.
Mr. Rohan Rai and Ms. Amisha Ray, Advs. for petitioner in
W.P.(C) 12620/2021.
Ms. Tara Narula and Ms. Shivangi Sharma, Advs. for
petitioner in W.P.(C) 4094/2023 .
Mr. Rishi K. Awasthi and Mr. Ishaan Raj, Advs. for R-6 in
W.P.(C) 6790/2021.
Mr. Saurabh Seth, SC, Ms. Neelampreet Kaur, Mr. Abhiroop
Rathore, Mr. Kabir Dev and Mr. Sukhvir Singh, Advs. for R -
2 in W.P.(C) 2887/2025 & W.P.(C) 11862/2025.
Mr. Shiven Varma, Panel Counsel, GNCTD for R-2 in
W.P.(C) 14696/2025.
Mr. Chinmaya Sejwal, Adv. for petitioner in W.P.(C)
14696/2025.
Ms. Avshreya Pratap Singh, CGSC, Mr. Ankit Khatri, Ms.
Usha Jamnal and Mr. Nyasa Sharma, Advs. for respondent in
W.P.(C) 7763/2024.
Ms. Manisha Agarwal Narain, CGSC, Mr. Navneet Sharma
and Mr. Aakash Pathak, GP for R-1 in W.P.(C) 6695/2024.
Mr. Joydeep Sharma and Mr. Kaushal Kapoor, Advs. for R-
14 in W.P.(C) 2887/2025.
Mr. Ajay Bhargava, Mr. Abhisar Bairagi and Mr. Milind
Sharma, Advocates for R5 in W.P.(C) 12620/2021.
Mr. Shri Singh and Ms. Tusharika Mattoo, Advocates.
Mr. Shivanshu Bhardwaj, Adv. for petitioner in W.P.(C)
9940/2024.
Ms. Abhiti Vaccher, Ms. Poonam Nagpal and Mr. Akshat
Vaccher, Advocates in W.P.(C) 8557/2021.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 11 of 144
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA
JUDGMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. FACTUAL MATRIX…………………………………………. ....15.
PAGE NO.
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS. ……..37.
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS…. ...40.
• Google Inc./Google LLC and Google India Private Ltd………. 40.
• Union of India / Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology
(MEITY)…………………………………………………… .…..43.
• The Media Houses………………………………………… ……46.
• ikanoon Software Development Private Limited………………. 47.
• X Corp (formerly known a s Twitter)……………………..….... .49.
• Microsoft Corporation India Private Limited………………. ..... 51.
• The Registrar General, Delhi High Court …………………. …...52.
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION ……………………… ….......54.
I. MAINTAINABILITY………………………………….. ......54.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 12 of 144
II. ON MERITS…………………………… ……………. …....59.
• The Right to Privacy and Informational Privacy under Article 21……. 59.
• The Right to be Forgotten as a Facet of Informational Privacy ……….
73.
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF ‘OPEN JUSTICE’………………… 78.
• ‘Open Justice’ and its Limitations in the Digital Age………………… 80.
• Karthick Theodore v. Registrar General, Madras High Court (W.A.(MD)
No. 1901 of 2021)……………………………………………………
84.
• Vysakh K.G. v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 7337……...
85.
• The Role and Character of Search Engines……………………………
87.
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT……………… …….93.
V. DE-LINKING / DE-INDEXING……………………. .......104.
• The legal parameters/ Tests for directing ‘de -indexing’……..……. 106.
• Cases where de-indexing may not be appropriate………….……...
110.
• De-indexing where proceedings have abated………………..…….
111.
• The Territorial Scope of De- indexing……………………….…….
111.
VI. MASKING: JURISDICTION, ENTITLEMENT AND
PARAMETERS……………………………………. ……112.
• Legal parameters for granting the relief of masking…………....... 115.
• Liberty to Seek Masking from Concerned Courts…………..……. 118.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 13 of 144
E. APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES TO THE
PRESENT PETITIONS…………………………………… ……… 118.
• Petitions Involving Acquittal, Discharge and Quashing…... 119.
• Petitions Involving Settlement and Compounding………...129.
• Petitions Involving Purely Private Civil and Matrimonial
Disputes…………………………………………………… 130.
• Other Petitions……………………………………………. .133.
F. FURTHER DIRECTIONS ………………………………… ..143.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 14 of 144
1. The present batch of petitions raises a question that stands at the
intersection of constitutional law and the digital age, viz. whether an
individual whose name appears in judicial records that are accessible
through internet search engines is entitled, by virtue of the right to
informational privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, to
seek de-indexing of those records from name-based search results and
masking of personal identifiers (including names) from publicly accessible
digital versions of those records.
2. The petitioners range, int er alia, from persons who have been
acquitted of criminal charges, to parties to matrimonial disputes, to persons
whose names appear incidentally in judicial records of proceedings to which
they were not parties. The petitioners share a common grievance that the
continued availability and name -based searchability of judicial records
bearing their names in the digital public domain causes disproportionate and
continuing harm to their reputations, dignity, and life prospects, excessive to
any legitimate public interest served by such continued accessibility.
3. The present petitions have been filed by the petitioners invoking the
“right to be forgotten”. T he relief sought is anchored in the fundamental
right to life and liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, which
has been judicially recognised to encompass the right to privacy and dignity
of the individual. These petitions, while emanating from diverse factual
backgrounds, share certain overlapping features and converge upon the
invocation of the “right to be forgotten”.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 15 of 144
A.
4. The factual matrix set forth by the petitioners in the present batch of
petitions is as follows:
FACTUAL MATRIX
5. The petitioner in W.P(C) 1021/ 2016 seeks de-linking of the order
dated 13.10.2015 passed by the Special Judge, NDPS, South District, Saket,
in CR No.1/15. It is submitted that the petitioner’s name appears therein
only incidentally, as the husband of respondent no.1, and that he had no role
in the criminal proceedings. The petitioner contends that since the Trial
Court is not a court of record, de-linking the concerned page from search
results will not affect public interest. The petitioner further contends that
inclusion of the URL in search results associated with his name is
prejudicial, creating a false impression of involvement in criminality and
thereby infringing his right to life and personal liberty.
6. In W.P(C) 3918/2021, the petitioner, stated to be an American citizen
of Indian origin, seeks removal of case details/judgment/URL pertaining to
the judgment dated 29.01.2013 passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.
14/2013 from the respondent platforms/ Google search engine and Indian
Kanoon. It is submitted that although the petitioner has been acquitted in the
said matter, the continued appearance of the said judgment upon a
name-based search has led to irreparable prejudice, with acquaintances and
professional contacts perceiving him as a criminal. The petitioner submits
that his social life, marriage prospects and career have been adversely
affected, notwithstanding his acquittal affirmed by concurrent findings of
two courts.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 16 of 144
7. In W.P(C) 6790/ 2021, the petitioner, who claims to be a public
figure, is aggrieved by the continued availability of posts, videos and articles
depicting incidents of drunken behaviour said to have occurred more than a
decade ago. The petitioner seeks removal of such content, contending that it
has no relevance in the present time and continues to tarnish his reputation.
8. In W.P.(C) 8209/2021, the petitioner, a medical doctor, seeks
removal of the judgment dated 08.04.2019 passed by the SCJ-cum -RC
(South), Saket Courts, New Delhi in CS SCJ 1194/18. It is submitted that
the petitioner in 2010 sought to change his name, which was duly published
in the UP Gazette. Subsequently, while applying for the United States
Medical Licensing Examination, the petitioner was advised to rectify
discrepancies arising on account of change in name through a court decree.
Acting upon such advice, the petitioner obtained a declaratory decree dated
08.04.2019. The petitioner contends that publication and continued
availability of the said judgment, containing his personal details, infringes
his right to privacy.
9. In W.P (C) 8557/ 2021, the petitioners are aggrieved by the uploading
of the orders dated 24.12.2016 and 08.08.2017 passed by the CMM and the
Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Patiala House Courts, New Delhi,
(respectively), as also the related articles, on respondent platforms including
Google and Times of India. The petitioners submit that despite acquittal, the
continued availability of the said materials has adversely affected their
professional prospects and subjected the petitioners to social stigma,
particularly due to misinformed and factually incorrect reportage suggesting
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 17 of 144
involvement in smuggling or illegal activities. The petitioners seek removal
of the concerned orders and articles in exercise of their right to privacy.
10. In W.P(C) 12620/ 2021 , the petitioner seeks removal of URLs,
articles, blogs and photographs pertaining to his conviction dated
19.02.2015 for the offence of ‘one count of blackmail and fifteen counts of
fraud’ by the Leicester Crown Court, United Kingdom. The petitioner was
convicted in a jury trial and sentenced to imprisonment for 9 years. After the
petitioner served his sentence, he was released on 15.03.2021. It is
submitted that mass reporting of the conviction has caused continuing loss
of reputation, business, mental stress and social stigma to the petitioner and
his family.
11. In W.P(C) 11553/ 2021, the petitioner seeks removal of the judgment/
order dated 07.10.2017 passed by the Special Judge-03 (PC Act) (CBI),
Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, in CC No. 13/2015, whereby, the
petitioner was acquitted of all charges in RC No. 21A/2015/ CBI/ACB/ND.
It is submitted that the acquittal has attained finality upon dismissal of
CRL.L.P. 565/2018 on 26.05.2025. The petitioner further seeks removal of
the aforesaid judgment dated 07.10.2017 and judgment dated 22.09.2021
passed by the Special Judge (PC Act), CBI-17, Rouse Avenue Courts, New
Delhi in CC No. 01/2021, whereby a closure report qua the proceedings
against the petitioner was accepted.
12. The petitioner submits that despite acquittal and closure of
proceedings, the inclusion of these orders in search results linked to his
name and that of his children is prejudicial, particularly as the order dated
22.09.2021 contains personal details including educational qualifications,
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 18 of 144
employment particulars and family information. The petitioner seeks
removal of the concerned judgments and related reportage in exercise of his
right to be forgotten under Article 21.
13. In W.P.(C) 14360/2021, the petitioner seeks removal of news
pertaining to FIR No. 2172017A0008 dated 23.05.2017. It is submitted that
in the week following registration of the FIR, derogatory news articles were
published without awaiting the outcome of investigation, resulting in severe
damage to reputation. Pursuant to investigation, the CBI filed a closure
report stating that no case was made out against the petitioner. The same
was accepted by the Special Judge (PC Act), CBI-13, Rouse Avenue Courts,
New Delhi by order dated 25.11.2019. The petitioner further seeks that the
respondents be directed to publish/ broadcast news regarding the said
judgment dated 25.11.2019.
14. In W.P (C) 1671/2022, the petitioner herein had filed an application
before the Mahila Court, Dwarka, New Delhi seeking monetary relief and
relief of residence. Vide order dated 01.05.2018, monetary relief was granted
to the petitioner. The same was assailed by the husband of the petitioner,
which came to be dismissed vide order dated 09.08.2018. The petitioner
seeks removal of the said order dated 09.08.2018 passed by the Special
Judge (PC Act), CBI-03, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi from respondent
platforms, including Indian Kanoon and Google. It is submitted that the
order contains personal details of the petitioner, and its continued
availability in the public domain violates the petitioner’s right to privacy.
The petitioner asserts that disclosure of such personal information causes
grave injury to the petitioner's right to privacy.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 19 of 144
15. In W.P.(C) 8658/2022, the petitioner seeks the removal/un-publishing
of the articles, search links and other content pertaining to the demise of the
petitioner’s wife, as also directions restraining respondents from further
dissemination. It is submitted that information regarding the death of the
petitioner’s wife in 2015 holds no public interest value, being purely private
in nature or serving only to instigate gossip. Continued publication is said to
impede the petitioner’s personal and professional life, thereby infringing his
fundamental right to privacy under Article 21.
16. The petitioner in W.P.(C) 11372/2022 seeks removal of posts, tweets,
videos and articles linking him to the Bike Bot Scam, Project Grand Venice
and Mist Avenue and his arrest in context thereof. It is submitted that after
detailed investigation by the concerned authorities, it was revealed that one
of the investor’s funds were channeled in the Petitioner’s project. It is
submitted that due to the same, the petitioner got roped into the said scam
and was subject to judicial custody for seven months, but was subsequently
granted bail by the Allahabad High Court. It is submitted that multiple
online platforms have disseminated inaccurate and misconceived
information suggesting his involvement and arrest, accompanied by
sensational headlines and images. The petitioner contends that such material
creates a false impression of established criminality, violates the rights
guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India
and causes irreparable harm to the petitioner’s livelihood, trade and
reputation. The petitioner asserts that he is subjected to speculation in the
eyes of the media and public at large, and seeks removal of the impugned
content in exercise of his right to privacy and dignity.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 20 of 144
17. The petitioner in W.P. (C) 12567/2022 , an Associate Professor at the
Institute of Liver and Biliary Sciences, seeks removal of the judgment dated
19.04.2022 passed by ASJ-02, South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, in
CR No. 140/2020, whereby, the SHO PS Malviya Nagar was directed to
register an FIR on the petitioner’s complaint. It is submitted that the said
order contains sensitive details of incidents where the petitioner was
allegedly falsely accused of being the biological father of a child born to a
former colleague, who also extorted money from the petitioner. The
petitioner contends that availability of the order in the public domain causes
grave and irreparable damage to his professional reputation and social life,
and infringes his right to privacy by exposing private information to
unrestricted access.
18. The petitioner in W.P.(C) 2134/2023 , removal of news items and
articles pertaining to his arrest on 23.04.1999 in connection with an FIR
alleging, inter alia, illegal procurement of medicines from abroad and
mishandling of HIV patients. The petitioner, a p racticing doctor, stated to be
an internationally recognized figure in the fight against HIV-AIDS, submits
that the material is no longer relevant, as he was discharged by judgment
dated 04.08.2009 passed by the Ad Hoc Additional Sessions Judge, City
Sessions Court, Sewree, Bombay. The petitioner further submits that on
account of continued circulation of the said articles, grave prejudice is being
caused to the dignity and reputation of the petitioner.
19. In W.P. (C) 2353/2023, the petitioner seeks removal of posts, videos
and articles associating his name with Crime No. 420/20, his arrest and
consequential judicial proceedings. It is submitted that the petitioner was
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 21 of 144
acquitted in the said proceedings vide order dated 17.09.2021, thereby the
said information is rendered irrelevant in the present times and causes grave
injury to his dignity and reputation. It is his case that in the digital age, the
right to privacy must extend to information available on the internet.
20. The petitioner in W.P. (C) 4094/ 2023 seeks removal of the judgment
dated 21.10.2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-I (East),
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in SC No. 28/2009, whereby the petitioner was
acquitted of offences under Sections 498A, 306 and 34 IPC. It is submitted
that the said judgment contains personal details and its availability upon a
name-based search violates the petitioner’s right to privacy, guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner contends that
continued accessibility is prejudicial to his reputation and adversely affects
his personal, professional and social life. It is further submitted that since the
Trial Court is not a court of record, de-linking will not affect public interest.
21. In W.P.(C) 5400/2023, the petitioner seeks removal of the judgment
dated 04.07.2018 passed by the ASJ, Rohini Courts, Delhi, and directions to
the Registrar General, Delhi High Court to grant only limited access to the
said judgment on the e-courts portal. It is submitted that by way of the
aforesaid judgment, the petitioner was acquitted of the charges of rape and
criminal intimidation. It is the case of the petitioner that despite acquittal,
the continued availability of the judgment upon a name-based search is
gravely prejudicial, causing loss of reputation and humiliation. The
petitioner urges that the identity of persons accused of sexual offences ought
to be concealed upon acquittal, to prevent stigma and societal prejudice.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 22 of 144
22. The petitioner in W.P.(C) 9824/2023 , seeks removal of the judgment
dated 04.12.2019 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate (NI Act), East
District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in CC No. 58734/2016, as also the
order sheets, from the website of the Delhi District Courts and Indian
Kanoon. It is submitted that the petitioner was convicted under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and sentenced on 06.12.2019 to
simple imprisonment of four months and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, with a
direction to pay Rs. 9,70,000/- to the complainant therein. During pendency
of appeal, however, the parties arrived at a settlement before the Mediation
Centre, recorded vide order dated 15.09.2022 by the ASJ-02, East District,
Karkardooma Courts. The petitioner contends that continued availability of
the conviction judgment, despite compounding of the offence in light of
settlement, is adverse to his reputation and infringes his right to be forgotten.
23. In W.P.(C) 5608/2023, the petitioner seeks removal of articles
pertaining to FIR No. 293/2021 and his arrest pursuant thereto, which appear
in search results linked to the petitioner’s name. It is submitted that the
matter was settled between the petitioner and the complainant vide MOU
dated 29.09.2021, recorded by order dated 02.06.2022 in CRL.M.C.
1207/2022, and the FIR was quashed. The petitioner asserts that continued
circulation of the articles is prejudicial to his reputation and causes
irreparable loss, warranting removal in exercise of the right to be forgotten.
24. In W.P.(C)13461/2023, the petitioner seeks removal of URLs
pertaining to FIR No. 29/2022 alleging offences under Sections 354, 376
and 511 IPC. Upon investigation, the Investigating Officer filed a closure
report, noting no case was made out. The Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 23 of 144
House Courts, dismissed the protest petition on 23.12.2022, and the revision
petition against that order was dismissed on 09.02.2023 in CRL.REV.P.
129/2023. The petitioner submits that despite closure, search engines
continue to display news articles and videos reporting allegations of rape
and sexual assault, which are stigmatic and defamatory, maligning his
credibility and goodwill. The petitioner seeks removal of such content to
protect his dignity and reputation.
25. In W.P.(C) 16447/ 2023, the petitioner seeks removal of web pages
and links pertaining to Suo Moto Application No. 262/2015 before the
National Green Tribunal. It is submitted that consequent to a news report
dated 03.07.2015, alleging that a report was sent by the then Chief
Conservator of Forests to the U.P Government, claiming that the petitioner
had unauthorizedly cut 8000 trees in Babarpur and 4000 trees in and around
the 500-metre radius of the Taj Mahal, an eco-sensitive zone, the National
Green Tribunal took suo moto cognizance. The matter was disposed of on
13.07.2018, with the Tribunal noting the affidavit of the Division Forest
Officer, Agra, recording that the Supreme Court and the Central Empowered
Committee had found no unauthorized tree felling. The petitioner contends
that continued publication of reports linking his name to the allegations,
despite closure of proceedings, blemishes his image and character, and seeks
removal of such content.
26. In W.P.(C) 16476/2023, the petitioner seeks the masking of party
names in the judgments/orders as listed in paragraph –8 of the present
petition. The petitioner also seeks that the judgments rendered by the
Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 6827/2015; Criminal Appeal No.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 24 of 144
487/2015; and SLP (C) 25871/2013, be removed from the website of the
Supreme Court of India. Further, the petitioner seeks that the links to the
legal material/orders/judgments pertaining to the matrimonial dispute
between the petitioner and her ex-husband be removed from the public
domain.
27. It is submitted that proceedings in the said matters attained finality on
03.09.2015 when the Supreme Court, with the consent of the parties vide
Civil Appeal No. 6827/2015 granted a decree of divorce and all the pending
criminal proceedings between the parties, were quashed and all the pending
civil proceedings were deemed to have been disposed of.
It is the case of the petitioner that availability of the aforementioned
orders/judgments, with the name of the petitioner in title thereof, has caused
social stigma, humiliation and constant hampering of the petitioner’s
personal and professional life, and is therefore, violative of her right to
privacy as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
28. In W.P.(C) 13192/2024, the petitioner, inter alia, seeks removal of
content/ URLs pertaining to the news articles/ content drawing a linkage
between the petitioner and the incident/s in context of which FIR No.
486/2021 was registered. It is submitted that the petitioner is in no way
related to the said incidents; he is neither an accused, neither the
complainant, nor a witness in the said matter.
29. The petitioner further seeks that the respondent/ Ministry of
Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY) be directed to take action
as regards the complaints dated 19.07.2021, 05.08.2022 and 12.09.2023,
addressed by the petitioner, raising grievance against the aforesaid news
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 25 of 144
articles/ content. It is submitted that the concerned publishers, in featuring
the said news articles, have been remiss in ensuring genuineness and
correctness of the information so published and have failed in abiding by the
Norms of Journalistic Conduct, 2022 published by the Press Council of
India and Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDA), 2023.
30. In W.P.(C) 6695/2024, the petitioner, stated to be an Overseas Citizen
of India, seeks the content/details/URLs/judgments etc. pertaining to the
matrimonial disputes involving the petitioner, available on the platforms of
the respondents herein, be removed from the search engines and internet
platforms, or the petitioner’s identity be masked therein. It is submitted that
the said disputes now finally stand concluded in terms of the order dated
03.09.2015 passed in SLP (Civil) No. 19646/ 2014.
31. It is submitted that the personal details and identity of the petitioner
and his former wife also form part of the judgments/ orders passed in the
proceedings of matrimonial nature between the petitioner and his erstwhile
wife, and the content/articles pertaining thereto, reveal the details of
allegations raised by both the parties against each other and also reveal the
petitioner’s private information, thereby, violating the petitioner’s
fundamental right to privacy.
32. The petitioner in W.P (C) 2887/2025 seeks the removal of the
URLs/web-links pertaining to the petit ioner in context of the FIR No.
227/2019, registered at P.S. Hauz Khas. The petitioner further seeks
directions to respondent/ Google LLC to block access to the aforesaid. The
petitioner also seeks that the respondents, Registrar General, Delhi High
Court and Indian Kanoon, be directed to mask the petitioner’s identity and
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 26 of 144
personal details from the judgment dated 30.05.2024 passed by this Court in
Crl Rev 745/2023, whereby, the order on charge and framing of charge was
set aside by the Court and the petitio ner was discharged. It is pointed out
that SLP (Criminal) Diary No. 41864/2024 filed against the aforesaid
judgment dated 30.05.2024 was dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order
dated 15.10.2024.
33. It is the case of the petitioner that despite being discharged, due to the
continuation of appearance of petitioner’s name in association with the
criminal matter, in the context of which the judgment dated 30.05.2024 was
passed; grave prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. It is submitted that
the said judgment dated 30.05.2024 contains the petitioner’s name and
personal details, thereby revealing his identity, therefore, the availability of
the said judgment in public domain is violative of the petitioner’s right to
privacy.
34. In W.P (C) 3687/2024, the petitioners seek that in recognition of their
right to privacy enshrined under Article 21 of the C onstitution, the
respondents (except respondent no.5 therein) be directed to remove the
following judgments/ orders from their platforms; and that respondent no.5/
Registrar General, Delhi High Court be directed to grant limited access
thereto :
- order dated 18.03.2017 passed by ASJ (Special Fast Track Court -01),
West, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi;
- judgment dated 06.08.2018 passed by ASJ (Special Fast Track Court- 01),
West, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in Sessions Case No. 12/17;
- judgment/ order dated 12.09.2017 passed by this Court in CRL.REV.P.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 27 of 144
504/2017;
- orders dated 04.02.2019 and 18.02.2019 passed by this Court in W.P.
(CRL) 354/2019;
- orders dated 22.04.2016, 04.08.2016, 01.09.2016 passed by this Court in
BAIL APPLN. 811/2016.
35. It is the case of the petitioners that the aforesaid judgments/ orders
were passed in proceedings pertaining to allegations of sexual offences (u/s
376 and 506, IPC), of which the petitioners have been acquitted; therefore,
their availability in public domain, is prejudicial, humiliating and violative
of the petitioners’ right to privacy.
36. The petitioners in W.P(C) 6047/2024 seek that their name/s and
address/es be masked/ removed from the judgment dated 02.04.2024 and
orders passed in MAT. APP. (F.C.) 321/2018. The petitioners further seek
that the respondents be directed to remove/delete the content pertaining to
the matrimonial/ private details of the petitioners.
37. It is submitted that the aforesaid judgment dated 02.04.2024 contains
details of private incidents/events of petitioner no.1 and her former husband,
who is a public figure (renowned chef). Availability of the said judgment in
public domain is violative of her fundamental right to privacy guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution.
38. The petitioner in W. P(C) 7763/2024 seeks the removal of the
judgment/ order dated 30.05.2023 passed in MAT.APP.(F.C) 49/2023, from
the search engines/ platforms of the respondents. It is submitted that the said
order/judgment contains personal and private information/ details of the
petitioner and her former husband, including the details of the petitioner’s
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 28 of 144
matrimonial relationship with her former husband, details of the matrimonial
dispute between them, litigation in context thereof, the settlement arrived at,
list of assets etc. It is further submitted that the said judgment appears upon
a search of the petitioner’s name on the respondent platform/s.
39. It is the case of the petitioner that dissemination of the aforesaid
judgment/ order in public domain when it contains sensitive and private
details of the petitioner and is of no concern to the public, is violative of the
petitioner’s fundamental right to privacy.
40. In W.P (C) 9940/2024, the petitioner, who is stated to be a public
figure, seeks removal of the content, including articles/ news reports,
pertaining to the FIR No.0418/2022, from the platforms/ search engines of
the respondents. Further, the petitioner seeks that the concerned respondent/s
be directed to ensure removal of inaccurate/ misleading/outdated personal
data as per the request/representation furnished by the petitioner in terms of
the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.
41. It is submitted that pursuant to the registration of the aforesaid FIR
alleging offences under sections 376 and 506 of the IPC , the petitioner
approached this Court by way of CRL. MC. No. 5294/2022. Subsequently,
the petitioner and the complainant entered into a settlement dated
09.11.2023. Vide order dated 06.02.2024 passed in CRL.MC. No.
5294/2022, this Court while recording the submission of the complainant
(respondent no.4 therein) in paragraph –4 of the said order, quashed the
aforesaid FIR and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom
against the petitioner, subject to the deposit of cost of Rs.1,00,000/-.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 29 of 144
42. It is submitted that despite the said order dated 06.02.2024, several
articles and news reports, containing defamatory content pertaining to the
aforesaid, continue to be available on the internet platforms/ in public
domain, adversely affecting the petitioner’s reputation, privacy and career
prospects, thereby being in violation of the petitioner’s fundamental right to
privacy.
43. In W.P(C) 12179/2024, the petitioner seeks the removal of the
details/ judgment/ URLs pertaining to the judgment dated 06.04.2013 passed
by Civil Judge-02, South District, Saket Courts, Delhi, in Civil Suit No.
380/12, from the platform of the respondent/ iKanoon Software
Development Private Limited.
44. It is submitted that upon a search of the petitioner’s name on the
respondent’s platform/search engine, the said judgment dated 06.04.2013
appears in the search results. It is further submitted that the said judgment,
which was passed in context of a private family dispute gives an adverse
impression about the petitioner’s conduct towards his now deceased father
and the petitioner’s relationship with his wife, and that the same adversely
affects the petitioner’s reputation.
45. In W.P(C) 30/2025, the petitioner, stated to be an Overseas Citizen of
India, holding a British Passport, seeks the removal of the orders/ judgments
(including order dated 22.08.2024 passed by this Court) passed in context of
the FIR No. 303/2024 registered at Police Station Pahar Ganj, available on
the respondent platforms. It is submitted that pursuant to the registration of
the said FIR, the petitioner filed an application for anticipatory bail,
however, vide order dated 03.07.2024, the said application was dismissed by
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 30 of 144
the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC)-01, Central Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court and the petitioner’s
application seeking anticipatory bail was allowed vide order dated
22.08.2024.
46. It is further submitted that in the meantime, in terms of the mutual
agreement arrived at between the complainant and the accused (petitioner
herein), the dispute which primarily arose in the backdrop of a business
transaction, was settled and a closure report was filed. In this conspectus, the
proceedings were taken to their logical conclusion vide order dated
07.11.2024 passed by the Reliever JMFC (Central) in Cr. Case 13895/2024.
47. It is the case of the petitioner that upon a search of the petitioner’s
name on the respondent search engine/ Google LLC, the appearance of the
aforesaid order dated 22.08.2024, as available on the platform of the
respondent/ iKanoon Software Development Pvt. Ltd., creates a misleading
impression of the petitioner’s involvement in a criminal matter. The
petitioner asserts that such continued availability of the aforesaid order
adversely affects his personal and professional reputation.
48. The petitioner in W.P(C) 1567/2025 , inter alia, seeks removal of the
content, including articles, posts and orders pertaining to the investigation/
proceedings instituted by the CBI. It is submitted that in 2010, certain
proceedings were instituted by the Central Bureau of Investigation, inter
alia, against the petitioner, viz. Special (CBI) Case Nos. 9 / 2011, 65 / 2011,
66 / 2011, 71 / 2011 and 72 / 2011. Upon investigation, a chargesheet was
filed. However, vide orders dated 17.06.2015 and 22.06.2015 passed by the
Special Judge, the petitioner was discharged.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 31 of 144
49. It is the case of the petitioner that there are several articles, posts,
orders and other content pertaining to the aforesaid proceedings instituted by
the CBI, are available on the internet/ respondent platforms, which though
were relevant at a certain point in time, hold no relevance in the present
especially in light of the aforesaid orders dated 17.06.2015 and 22.06.2015.
50. In W.P(C) 9929/2025, the petitioner, inter alia, seeks the removal of
the judgments/ orders passed by the concerned courts in proceedings arising
out of FIR No. 50/2022, registered at Women’s Police Station, Srinagar,
wherein, the petitioner accused Mr. Nadeem Ahmad Ganai @ Nadeem Nadu
of committing offences punishable under sections 376, 384 and 506 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860.
51. It is the case of the petitioner that during the course of proceedings in
the said context, certain orders/judgments, containing personal
details/identity of the petitioner have been uploaded on the respondent
platform/ Indian Kanoon without redaction or making of her name/identity.
It is submitted that despite multiple representations, seeking
masking/redaction, the respondents have been remiss in taking any action.
52. It is further submitted that the continued availability of the aforesaid
orders/judgments revealing the petitioner’s identity in public domain,
particularly upon conducting an internet search of her name, has subjected
the petitioner to social stigma, loss of dignity, psychological trauma,
harassment and defamation. It is asserted that in view of her status as a
victim of sexual offences, such disclosure constitutes a violation of her
fundamental right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 32 of 144
53. In W.P (C) 11714/2025 , the petitioner, inter alia, seeks the removal/
delisting of the judgment dated 13.11.2024 passed by the ASJ (FTSC)(RC)-
02/West/Tis Hazari Courts, in SC No. 534/23 and related content, including
in the form of articles, posts, news, videos, URLs, websites, web -links etc,
available on the platforms of the respondents. It is submitted that FIR No.
167/2021 was registered against the petitioner and certain other individuals,
accusing them of committing offences punishable under sections
328/342/376/34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860. Subsequently, vide order
dated 02.08.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, the accused,
except the petitioner, were discharged and charges were framed against the
petitioner.
54. Ultimately, vide judgment dated 13.11.2024, passed by the ASJ
(FTSC)(RC)- 02/West/Tis Hazari Courts, in SC No. 534/23, the petitioner
herein was acquitted of the charges framed against him. It is further
submitted that during the pendency of trial, certain content, pertaining to
said ongoing trial of the petitioner were published on the respondent
platforms.
55. It is the case of the petitioner that despite acquittal, the content
published on the respondent platforms, in the name of the petitioner, during
the pendency of the trial, is still available in the public domain, and such
content while also being stigmatic, has an adverse impact on the petitioner’s
personal life, career and future prospects, causing irreparable prejudice.
56. The petitioner in W.P(C) 11862/2025 seeks the removal of the
content in the name of the petitioner, viz. certain proceedings of matrimonial
nature, available on the respondent platforms, including in the form of
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 33 of 144
articles, news, journals. Further the petitioner seeks that the respondent/
Registrar General, Delhi High Court be directed to redact/mask/delete the
name of the petitioner from publicly accessible digital records, including
those pertaining to:
- MAT.APP (F.C.) NO. 297/2024;
- W.P (CRL.) NO. 1206/2024;
- CRL.MC.236/2024;
- MAT.APP. (F.C.) NO. 148/2025;
- CONT.CAS (CIVIL) 313/2025;
- W.P (CRL.) 1844/2024;
- W.P (CIVIL) 17733/2024;
- CM (MAIN) 4113/2024;
- CM (MAIN) 1930/2023.
57. It is submitted that the publication/ continued availability of the
aforesaid contents in public domain is bringing upon the petitioner, social
stigma and loss of privacy. It is also submitted that publication of her
personal information is now redundant and serves no purpose.
58. In W.P (C) 14696/2025, the petitioner seeks removal/de-indexind of
the URLs/web-links pertaining to the FIR No. 67/2006, registered at PS
Lajpat Nagar, from the platform of the respondent/ Indian Kanoon. The
petitioner also seeks for its name and personal information to be masked
from the aforesaid content.
59. It is submitted that the petitioner was arrayed as an accused in the FIR
No. 67/2006. The said FIR was, however, quashed in terms of the order
dated 04.05.2023, passed by this Court in CRL.M.C. 1460/2023. Despite the
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 34 of 144
quashing of the said FIR, respondent platforms continue to publicly display
judicial records associated with the said FIR, including the petitioner’s name
and other personal details, causing grave prejudice to his privacy and
business interests, posing a serious threat to the petitioner’s professional
credibility and social standing. It is further submitted that the aforesaid
details lack present-day legal relevance and serve no public interest.
60. The petitioner in W.P(C) 18962/2025 , is stated to be a company
engaged in the power transmission sector. It is submitted that in the year
2022, several digital news platforms published reports pertaining to the
petitioner and its directors, alleging, inter alia, large scale financi al fraud
and criminal conspiracy. The said reports were premised on certain FIRs
arising out of internal disputes among the shareholders of the petitioner. It is
further submitted that the said reports, published on the respondent
platforms, created a false narrative that portrayed the petitioner as being
involved in serious criminal wrongdoings . Subsequently, all disputes
between the concerned shareholders/ directors were amicably resolved. In
view of the settlement, the parties jointly approached the High Court of
Allahabad, seeking quashing of the FIRs registered in relation to these
disputes. Thereafter, vide order dated 29.07.2024, passed by the High Court
of Allahabad, in view of the said settlement deed, quashed the concerned
FIRs. The National Company Law Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, vide order
dated 27.02.2025 passed in IA No. 09/2025, in view of the said settlement
deed, disposed of the Company Petition being CP NO.32/ALD/2021.
61. It is the case of the petitioner that despite the conclusion of concerned
judicial proceedings, the availability of the content pertaining thereto, on the
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 35 of 144
respondent platforms, upon a search of the petitioner’s name , has materially
affected the petitioner’s business reputation and social standing and violates
its fundamental right to privacy and dignity under Article 21. In the above
conspectus, the petitioner seeks that the respondents be directed to
remove/de-index the aforesaid news reports pertaining to the petitioner.
62. In W.P (Crl.) 1861/2022, the petitioner seeks the removal of the order
dated 21.10.2019 passed by this Court in BAIL APPLN. 1393/2019 &
CRL.M.A. 35670/2019, pertaining to his deceased son- in-law, from the
platforms of the respondents. Further, the petitioner seeks de-linking of the
name and other information regarding his deceased son-in -law in the context
of the said anticipatory bail order; and masking/redaction of the deceased’s
identity from the aforesaid order as available on the respondent platforms.
63. It is submitted that FIR No. 105/2019 was registered accusing the
petitioner’s son-in-law of offences punishable under sections
376/323/506/509/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Consequent thereto, the
son-in-law approached this Court seeking anticipatory bail and he was
granted interim protection. However, vide aforesaid order dated 21.10.2019,
the said interim protection was revoked and the Bail Application (BAIL
APPLN. 1393/2019) was dismissed. Thereafter, the now deceased son-in-
law surrendered and moved a regular bail application being in BAIL
APPLN. 591/2020, wherein, vide order dated 22.05.2020 passed by this
Court, he was released on interim bail. The said interim bail was extended
by subsequent orders dated 13.07.2020, 24.07.2020 and 24.08.2020 passed
in W.P. 3037/2020. On 15.11.2021, the petitioner’s son- in-law suffered a
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 36 of 144
cardiac arrest and passed away, rendering the criminal trial (Case No.
SC/515/2019) abated.
64. The petitioner contends that upon conducting a search based on the
name of his son- in-law, on respondent search engines, the order dated
21.10.2019, which elaborately sets out the allegations levelled against the
deceased, appears prominently within the first few search results. It is
submitted that such continued availability causes social stigma, grave
prejudice, and loss of future prospects to the family of the deceased,
including his wife and children. The publication of the aforesaid order on
respondent platforms is violative of the right to privacy of the petitioner’s
family.
65. In W.P (C) 15523/2023, the petitioners seek the removal of all the
content (including in the form of articles and social media posts) pertaining
to the arrest of the petitioners in the context of FIR No. 187/2021 registered
at PS EOW, Mandir Marg, New Delhi, available/ published on the
respondent platforms. It is submitted that the aforesaid content, published on
the respondent platforms creates an impression of the petitioners being
guilty of the allegations in terms of the aforesaid FIR and omit the fact that
the petitioners were granted interim bail vide order dated 29.08.2022 passed
by the CMM, Saket District Court.
66. Further, it is submitted that vide order dated 14.09.2023, passed by
this Court in CRL. M.C No. 1274/2023 the said FIR No. 187/2021 has been
quashed. Despite the said order dated 14.09.2023, the aforesaid content
pertaining, inter alia, to the petitioners’ arrest continues to be available on
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 37 of 144
the respondent platforms, thereby being prejudicial to the petitioners’
reputation and also violating their right to privacy.
B.
67. Learned counsel for the petitioners, relying upon the judgment
rendered by the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy -9J.) v. Union
of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, submitted that once any information is made
public and shared on the internet, it remains accessible across the world
without any expiry date. The radically unrestricted spread of personal data
across the web deprives individuals of control over how, by whom, and in
what context their personal data is viewed. The apparent immortality of
information on the internet has compelled the petitioners to assert their
“Right to be forgotten”.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
68. Relying upon K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), wherein privacy was
recognized as an intrinsic facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, it was
further submitted that privacy assures dignity, and dignity is the core which
unites fundamental rights. Informational privacy, as part of this right,
reflects an individual’s interest in preventing dissemination of personal
information. Learned counsel emphasized that privacy also includes the
right to protect reputation not only against falsehoods but also against
certain truths, since individuals have a right to control how their image is
portrayed to the world.
69. To further substantiate the above contentions, learned counsel referred
to the European Union Regulation of 2016, which expressly recognized the
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 38 of 144
Right to be forgotten to effectuate an individual’s right to control his
existence on the internet. In terms of the said 2016 regulations, this right
means that an individual, who no longer wishes his data to be processed or
stored, should be able to remove it from the digital domain.
70. It was contended that the extensive availability of personal
information in the public domain possesses limited inherent value; however,
its unrestricted accessibility may engender severe adverse consequences,
including the frustration of employment opportunities, impairment of
creditworthiness, diminution of professional and social standing, or erosion
of personal dignity.
71. Individuals should not be indefinitely reminded of past mistakes, even
where information was lawfully in the public domain or shared with
consent. The law already recognizes this principle in relation to “spent
convictions,” and the same rationale ought to apply in the digital
environment.
72. Reference was made to Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Mario
Costeja González [C-131/12], where the Court of Justice of the European
Union permitted de-indexing of articles that were “inadequate, irrelevant or
no longer relevant.” Following this decision, the European Union enacted
the General Data Protection Regulation, codifying the Right to be forgotten.
Learned counsel also referred to Justice Kaul’s concurring opinion in K.S.
Puttaswamy (supra), wherein the contours of the Right to be forgotten, were
articulated as a facet of privacy.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 39 of 144
73. Further, it was contended that the deletion, de-indexing, masking, and
redaction of personal information, including one’s name and identity, in
exercise of the ‘Right to be forgotten,’ is indispensable, as it facilitates the
effective realization of the right to reputation. In support of this contention,
learned counsel placed reliance upon the following judgments to assert that
the right to reputation has long been recognized as enforceable under Article
21 of the Constitution of India :
Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P.,(2013) 10 SCC 591
State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani, (2003) 8 SCC 361
Vinod Kumar Bindal v. CIC, (2025) 2 HCC (Del) 459
DejoKappan v. Deccan Herald, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6494
74. The petitioners’ rights to privacy, reputation, and presumption of
innocence under Article 21 must be balanced against the respondents’ right
to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). Reliance was placed on Sahara
India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEBI (2012) 10 SCC 603, where the
Supreme Court held that Article 21 protection is a valid restriction on free
speech.
75. It was emphasized that the Right to be forgotten is not antithetical to
the freedom of information, but rather a balancing mechanism between
privacy and freedom of expression. Courts must adopt a two-pronged
approach: first, treating ‘ Right to be forgotten ’ as the default and second,
carving out a narrow public interest exception, with clear standards for
removal when information is no longer necessary, excessive, or irrelevant.
Where personal data storage is no longer necessary or relevant for the
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 40 of 144
original purposes of processing, the removal of such links does not
tantamount to deletion of content.
76. Relying upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Central
Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra
Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 48, it was submitted that the measures sought in the
present proceedings, i.e. removal, masking, and de -indexing of prejudicial
content, are narrowly tailored to protect the petitioners’ rights without
unduly infringing upon the freedom of speech and the right to know.
Continued availability of such content serves no public purpose, and mere
curiosity or amusement cannot justify invasion of privacy.
77. Reliance is placed upon Kaushal Kishore v. Sate of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors., (2023) 4 SCC 1, to contend that rights under Article 21 can be
enforced against non-S tate actors such as search engines, and that the
present writ petitions are maintainable on account of the absence of effective
alternative remedies.
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
78. A preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the
petitions has been made by the respondent. It is contended Google is a private entity and does not fall within the definition of “State” under Article
12 of the Constitution. Being neither a public authority nor discharging any
public function, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Any petition alleging
violation of Article 21 cannot be maintained against a private entity .
GOOGLE INC/GOOGLE LLC and GOOGLE INDIA PRIVATE LTD.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 41 of 144
79. It is submitted that ‘Google Search’ merely operates as an automated
search engine which indexes webpages available on third-party websites
through automated crawlers, performing a passive and neutral function akin
to a library index. Search results are generated dynamically through
algorithms, and the search engine does not create, publish, modify, or
control the underlying content. Google is neither the creator, nor the
uploader, nor publisher of the impugned content and has no prior knowledge
of its existence. The impugned material has been authored and published by
an independent third parties. It is submitted that the directions for removal
of online content ought to be issued against the original publishers or
uploaders, since removal at the source automatically results in de-indexing
from search engines.
80. It is further submitted that the impugned material pertaining to
judicial orders, criminal proceedings, FIRs, arrests and related reporting,
forms part of public records and therefore cannot be suppressed. Reliance, in
this regard, is placed upon R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6
SCC 632, wherein it was held that where information forms part of public
records, the right to privacy no longer subsists. This principle has been
affirmed in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), which recognized privacy under
Article 21 but clarified that it is not absolute and must be balanced with
competing rights.
81. It is submitted that publication or reporting of judicial proceedings
and court orders is lawful and forms part of the principle of open justice.
Truthful reporting of court proceedings is statutorily protected under the
Fourth Exception to Section 499 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Freedom of
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 42 of 144
speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, freedom of
the press, and the public’s right to know are integral constitutional values.
Permitting removal or delinking of search results relating to court orders or
public records would undermine the principle of open justice.
82. The respondent submits that under Indian law, it is necessary to first
establish through judicial determination that a particular publication violates
the right to privacy before any direction restraining its publication or
dissemination can be issued and in the absence of such adjudication, the
accessibility of such material through search results cannot be restricted.
83. The respondent submits that there exists no enforceable “right to be
forgotten” under the present framework of Indian law and courts have
consistently held that such a right cannot be invoked in relation to judicial
records in the absence of statutory backing. The respondent further submits
that even the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 does not recognise
any statutory right to be forgotten and in fact provides exemptions for
processing of personal data for judicial functions and legal proceedings.
84. The respondent submits that foreign jurisprudence including the
decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Google Spain v.
Mario Costeja (supra) cannot be imported into Indian law as the doctrine of
the right to be forgotten in Europe is based upon statutory frameworks such
as the European Union Data Protection Directive and the GDPR which have
no equivalent statute under Indian law. The respondent further submits that
even under European law, the right to be forgotten is subject to several
exceptions including freedom of expression, legal obligations and matters of
public interest.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 43 of 144
85. The respondent further submits that Indian law recognizes masking or
anonymity of parties in judicial records only in limited statutory
circumstances such as protection of victims of sexual offences under Section
228A IPC, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act,
2012 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
86. Learned counsel for the UOI submits that the right to privacy has been
recognized as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution by
the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), and that the doctrine of the
“right to be forgotten” is an evolving concept. Its applicability has been
acknowledged by the Indian Judiciary in Subhranshu Rout v. State of
Odisha, 2020 SCC OnLine Ori 878,Vasunathan v. Registrar General, 2017
SCC OnLine Kar 424, Jorawer Singh Mundy v. Union of India, 2021 SCC
OnLine Del 2306, P. Nithish Vs. Union of India and Ors [WP (MD) No.
17228 of 2022], Zulfiqar Ahman Khan v. Quintillion Business Media (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8494.
UNION OF INDIA / MINISTRY OF ELECTRONICS &
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (MEITY)
87. It is further submitted that judicial orders/ judgments form part of
public records and judicial documents within the common law system,
therefore, cannot ordinarily be treated as confidential information merely
because they contain personal details relating to individuals. In this regard
the respondent relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
R.Rajagopal (supra), which was affirmed by the Constitution Bench in K.S.
Puttaswamy (supra), wherein it was held that once information forms part of
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 44 of 144
public records including court records, the right to privacy no longer subsists
in respect of such information and such records become legitimate subjects
of publication and comment.
88. It is pointed out that courts have also emphasized the principle of
open justice and public access to judicial proceedings and judgments as an
important component of transparency in the administration of justice, as
recognized by the Supreme Court in Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of
India, (2018) 10 SCC 639.
89. The respondent submits that the Digital Personal Data Protection Act,
2023 defines statutory concepts such as “data”, “data principal”, “data
fiduciary”, “data processor” and “processing” and that digital court records
containing identifiable information may constitute personal data capable of
protection under the statutory framework. The respondent further submits
that in the context of digitized judicial records, the individual concerned
may be regarded as the data principal, the court system hosting the order
may function as the data fiduciary and platforms that capture or index such
information may operate as processors of that personal data. The respondent
also submits that search engines which locate, index, store and display
information relating to identifiable individuals perform activities that
amount to processing of personal data and therefore play a significant role in
the dissemination of such information on the internet.
90. The respondent submits that under Section 69A of the Information
Technology Act, 2000, (hereinafter, IT Act, 2000) the Central Government
is empowered to direct blocking of information accessible through computer
resources only on limited statutory grounds such as sovereignty, and
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 45 of 144
defense of the country, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign
States, public order or prevention of incitement to the commission of
cognizable offences, and therefore issues relating to the doctrine of the right
to be forgotten do not fall within the statutory scope of Section 69A of the
IT Act, 2000.
91. The respondent further submits that the framework governing
intermediary liability is provided under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000, read
with the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital
Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, (hereinafter, IT Rules, 2021) which
prescribe due diligence obligations and grievance redressal mechanisms
relating to unlawful information hosted on intermediary platforms. Under
Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, intermediaries are
required to remove or disable access to information only upon receiving
actual knowledge through an order of a Court of competent jurisdiction or
notification by the appropriate Government.
92. The respondent submits that the Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology (MEITY) is the custodian of the IT Act, 2000 and
administers Part II of the IT Rules, 2021 which relates to the due diligence
obligations of intermediaries and the grievance redressal framework
applicable to them. The respondent further submits that Part III of the said
Rules is administered by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and
establishes a regulatory framework for publishers of news and current affairs
content on digital media and publishers of online curated content platforms
including adherence to a Code of Ethics and a three-tier grievance redressal
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 46 of 144
mechanism consisting of complaints at the publisher level, review by a self-
regulating body of publishers and oversight by the Ministry through an
Inter-Departmental Committee.
93. The respondent submits that since the relief sought by the petitioner
pertains to removal, masking, delisting or restriction of access to
information available through intermediary platforms or search engines, any
directions, if required, may appropriately be issued directly to the concerned
intermediary platforms or search engine operators. It is further submitted
that the respondent does not directly host, publish or control such content
and therefore is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the present
proceedings.
94. The respondents, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
R. Rajagopal (supra), submitted that once information forms part of public
records or relates to events occurring in the public domain, the right to
privacy cannot ordinarily be invoked to restrain publication or reporting of
such information. It is submitted that reporting based on judicial proceedings
or public records therefore, cannot be restrained merely because the
information is adverse to the petitioner or affects his reputation.
THE MEDIA HOUSES
95. The respondents further submit that the press performs an essential
role as a public watchdog in a democratic society and dissemination of truthful information relating to judicial proceedings and matters of public
concern is necessary to maintain transparency and accountability in public
life. The respondents further submit that the principle of open justice permits
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 47 of 144
fair and accurate reporting of court proceedings and judicial decisions and
that any direction restraining publication of judicial proceedings or judicial
records would undermine the principle of open courts and adversely affect
the public’s right to know.
96. The respondents submit that the petitioner cannot seek erasure of
accurate facts of the past, relating to his conviction merely to avoid
reputational consequences arising from his own acts. The respondents
further submit that reputational harm, if any, arises from the petitioner’s own
conduct rather than from the fair reporting of such conduct by the media,
and that recognition of an unrestricted right to be forgotten enabling
selective erasure of unfavourable information would distort public memory
and undermine the principles of transparency, accountability and freedom of
the press essential to a democratic society.
97. It is further submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable against
private media entities as they do not perform any public function or public
duty and therefore a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India cannot ordinarily lie against them.
98. The respondent submits that reliance on foreign jurisprudence relating
to the doctrine of the “right to be forgotten” is misconceived as such
principles arise from statutory frameworks such as the EU Data Protection
Directive and cannot be applied in India in the absence of corresponding
legislation.
iKANOON SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE LIMITED
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 48 of 144
99. The respondent further submits that directing removal or de -linking of
information relating to an individual from search indices would amount to
permitting private censorship of public documents and would therefore be
violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
100. The respondent further submits that the legal framework governing
blocking or removal of online information is already provided under Section
69A of the IT Act, 2000 and the allied blocking rules and therefore
additional removal mechanisms cannot be created through writ jurisdiction.
101. It is submitted that the respondent functions merely as an intermediary
providing searchable access to publicly available statutes and judicial
decisions and does not author, control or modify the underlying content.
Intermediaries cannot be required to adjudicate competing claims between
privacy and freedom of expression as such determinations must be
undertaken by the competent judicial forum that authored the underlying
record.
102. The respondent further submits that information forming part of
judicial records cannot be claimed as private information against which a
right to privacy or a right to be forgotten may be asserted.
103. The right to information forms an integral part of the freedom of
speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) as recognised by
the Supreme Court in Assn. for Democratic Reforms (Electoral Bond
Scheme) v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 1.
104. The respondent further submits that restrictions on the freedom of
speech and expression can only be imposed through legislation enacted by
the State and cannot be judicially created beyond those enumerated in
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 49 of 144
Article 19(2) of the Constitution, as observed in Kaushal Kishor v. State of
Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 4 SCC 1 and K.S. Puttaswamy (supra). The
right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution extends to
access to information necessary for participatory democracy and democratic
transparency as recognised in Assn. for Democratic Reforms (Electoral
Bond Scheme) (supra).
105. The respondent submits that the present writ petition is not
maintainable against the answering respondent as it is a private entity
incorporated under the laws of the United States of America and does not
fall within the definition of ‘State’ or ‘other authority’ under Article 12 of
the Constitution, and therefore a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the
Constitution cannot ordinarily be issued against it. The respondent further
submits that the grant of a writ of mandamus requires the existence of a
legally enforceable right in favour of the petitioner and a corresponding
statutory duty imposed upon the respondent, and petitioners have failed to
demonstrate the existence of any such statutory duty requiring the
respondent to remove or disable access to the impugned content.
X CORP. (formerly known as Twitter)
106. The respondent further submits that disputes involving alleged
reputational harm, mental distress or defamatory publication necessarily
involve adjudication of disputed questions of fact, including determination
of the truthfulness or defamatory nature of the content complained of and
such questions cannot appropriately be determined within writ jurisdiction
under Article 226.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 50 of 144
107. The respondent further submits that the statutory framework
governing intermediary liability has overriding effect by virtue of Section 81
of the IT Act, 2000, thereby limiting the circumstances in which
intermediaries may be held liable for third party content hosted on their
platforms. The respondent submits that requiring intermediaries to
independently adjudicate complaints relating to allegedly offensive,
defamatory or unlawful content would effectively impose a judicial function
upon private entities, which would be inconsistent with the legislative
framework governing intermediary liability and contrary to the principles
laid down by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal (supra).
108. It is submitted that the doctrine of the “right to be forgotten” is not
presently recognised as an enforceable constitutional or statutory right under
Indian law, notwithstanding observations made by the Supreme Court in
K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), recognising the broader right to privacy. Even
assuming the existence of such a right, it cannot be invoked to restrict access
to information forming part of public records, including judicial records
relating to criminal convictions or matters of public interest.
109. Further, it is submitted that the respondent is neither a necessary nor a
proper party to the present proceedings as the petitioners have failed to
establish any enforceable legal duty requiring the respondent to remove the
impugned content, and that any grievance relating to allegedly defamatory
or unlawful content must be pursued against the actual originators or
publishers of such content.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 51 of 144
110. The respondent submits that any alleged reputational harm suffered
by the petitioner arises, if at all, from statements published by third party
authors or media outlets and liability for such content lies exclusively with
the original publishers rather than with a search engine intermediary that
merely indexes publicly available information.
MICROSOFT CORPORATION INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
111. The respondent submits that the determination of whether any
particular content is defamatory requires detailed factual and legal analysis which can only be undertaken by a competent C ourt of law and therefore an
intermediary cannot be required to unilaterally adjudicate upon the legality
or defamatory character of third party content. The respondent further
submits that the petitioner cannot circumvent the statutory remedies
available under defamation law, including civil proceedings against the
authors or publishers of the impugned articles, by invoking writ jurisdiction
against intermediaries who have no role in the creation or publication of the
disputed content.
112. It is further submitted that even where de-indexing is undertaken
pursuant to lawful directions, if the underlying source websites continue to
host the content, similar links may reappear in search results through
subsequent automated crawling and indexing processes. The respondent
therefore submits that effective relief in respect of the petitioner s’ grievance
would require directions against the original publishers or source websites
hosting the content, including removal or masking of the petitioner s’
identity, as only such measures would prevent the continued availability and
re-indexing of the impugned material.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 52 of 144
113. The respondent submits that intermediaries are entitled to statutory
safe harbour protection under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000, which protects
intermediaries from liability for third party information made available
through their platforms, where they do not initiate the transmission, select
the receiver of the transmission or modify the information contained therein.
114. The respondent further submits that an intermediary is required to act
against allegedly unlawful content only upon receiving actual knowledge of
its illegality, which under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000 and the IT
Rules, 2021, arises only upon receipt of an order from a competent Court or
notification by the appropriate government or its authorized agency.
115. Learned counsel appearing for the Registrar General submits that the
right to privacy is an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty
under Article 21 of the Constitution. Reliance is placed upon K.S.
Puttaswamy (supra), wherein the Supreme Court declared privacy to be a
fundamental right and acknowledged that such right would include facets
such as the “right to be forgotten.”
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT
116. Reference is made to Vysakh K.G. v. Union of India, 2022 SCC
OnLine Ker 7337, wherein the Kerala High Court affirmed the open court
principle but acknowledged statutory exceptions protecting privacy in
sensitive matters such as family law, matrimonial disputes, child custody,
and adoption. Further reference is made to Karthick Theodore v. Registrar
General, Madras High Court (W.A.(MD) No. 1901 of 2021), wherein, the
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 53 of 144
Madras High Court ordered removal of a judgment from an online legal
database on the basis of the “right to be forgotten.” However, the Supreme
Court has stayed the operation of that judgment in iKanoon Software
Development Pvt. Ltd. v. Karthick Theodore (SLP(C) No. 15311 of 2024),
which remains pending final adjudication.
117. It is submitted that consistent with this reasoning, this Court has
directed redaction or removal of records in sensitive matters, including those
under matrimonial laws, the Juvenile Justice Act, and the POCSO Act,
where privacy is expressly or implicitly recognised. The Delhi High Court
Information Technology Committee (DHCITC) has played a central role in
overseeing compliance. Minutes of meetings dated 07.12.2016, 18.03.2021
and 06.07.2022, document instances where the Registry acted in compliance
with judicial orders.
118. It is further submitted that pursuant to directions dated 29.07.2021 in
Crl. M.C.1655/2021 &Crl. M.C. 1657/2021, the DHCITC considered
mechanisms to detect and address cases requiring identity protection from
inception. In its meeting on 30.05.2023, the Committee approved
development of a software module enabling masking of names when
ordered by the Court. The module was demonstrated and approved on
04.10.2023 after a security audit, and has since been made operational.
119. It is submitted that the masking software allows advocates and
parties- in-person, at the time of e-filing, to select an option requesting
identity protection. This tool has been integrated into the Court’s Online
E-Filing System, ensuring sensitive cases can be masked at the threshold.
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D.
I.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
120. Several respondents have raised a preliminary objection that a writ of
mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot lie against private
entities that do not perform any public function or discharge any public duty
and that these proceedings are therefore not maintainable against Google,
iKanoon Software Development Private Limited (“Indian Kanoon”), Media
Houses, X Corp. (formerly known as Twitter) and Microsoft. In this regard,
reference has been made to Radhey Shyam & Anr. v Chabbi Nath & Ors.
(2015) 5 SCC 423, wherein the Court has observed as under:
MAINTAINABILITY
“27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are
not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also
in agreement with the view [Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5
SCC 616] of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not
lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope
of Article 227 is different from Article 226.”
121. This objection is required to be dealt with at the threshold. The
general principle that a writ of mandamus lies only against a body
performing a public function or discharging a public duty is well
established. This principle has been reiterated vide judgment dated
23.07.2024 passed by this Court in Sanchit Gupta v. Union of India, 2024
SCC OnLine Del 5880, in the context of a writ petition filed against a social
media entity (X Corp, formerly known as Twitter). In the facts of the case,
and considering the nature of grievance of the petitioner therein, it was
observed that “ In the Court's opinion, Petitioner's legal recourse appears
more appropriate for a claim breach of contract rather than a constitutional
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 55 of 144
violation. The proper venue for addressing such a breach would be the civil
courts, where contractual disputes are adjudicated. If the Petitioner believes
that his rights under the policy of X Corp have been violated, pursuing this
claim through civil litigation is advised, as the remedy for breach of
contract lies therein. Thus, the writ petition challenging such actions on
constitutional grounds is not maintainable.” The Court held as under:
“11. In conclusion, despite its significant role in public
discourse and the potential impact on public opinion and
democratic engagement, ‘X’ does not perform a ‘public
function’ in the strict legal sense intended under Article 226 of
the Constitution. The platform operates as a private entity under
private law and does not carry out any governmental duties or
obligations. Therefore, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 as currently interpreted by jurisprudence on
this issue.”
122. However, the present proceedings are directed at enforcing the
fundamental rights of the petitioners, originating from Article 21 of the
Constitution, the rights that the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v.
Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, expressly recognized as operating against
both State and non- State actors:
“328. Informational privacy is a facet of the right to privacy. The
dangers to privacy in an age of information can originate not only
from the State but from non- State actors as well……
XXX XXX XXX
367. Claims for protection of privacy interests can arise against the
State and its instrumentalities and against non- State entities, such
as, individuals acting in their private capacity and bodies corporate
or unincorporated associations, etc., without any element of State
participation. Apart from academic literature, different claims based
on different asserted privacy interests have also found judicial
support. Cases arose in various jurisdictions in the context of
privacy interests based on (i) common law; (ii) statutory
recognition; and (iii) constitutionally protected claims of the right to
privacy.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 56 of 144
XXX XXX XXX
644. The right to privacy is a fundamental right. It is a right which
protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference from
both State and non- State actors and allows the individuals to make
autonomous life choices
123. In exercise of its powers under Article 226, this Court can issue
directions to the respondents, including private parties, since fundamental
rights are enforceable even against persons other than the State or its
instrumentalities. The Kerala High Court in Dejo Kappan v. Deccan Herald
& Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6494, referring to the judgment rendered by
the Supreme Court in Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P. , (2023) 4 SCC 1, has
held as under:
.”
“20. In Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P.
7
, a Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court considered, inter alia, three issues in the
context of the right to free speech guaranteed under the
Constitution. They are: (i) whether the grounds specified in Article
19(2) in relation to which reasonable restrictions on the right to
free speech can be imposed by law, were exhaustive in nature or
whether restrictions on the right to free speech could be imposed
on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other
fundamental rights
? (ii) whether the fundamental right under
Article 19 or Article 21 of the Constitution can be claimed against
persons other than the State or its instrumentalities?
21. …Issue
and (iii)
whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the rights of a person under Article 21 of the Constitution even against a
threat to the liberty of a person by the acts or omissions of another
person or private agency?
(ii) was answered by considering the development of
law in other countries and India and holding that a fundamental
right under Articles 19 and 21 can be enforced even against
persons other than the State or its instrumentalities
124. If the right to privacy, including informational privacy, operates
against non-State actors, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 to
. ….”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 57 of 144
enforce the said right cannot be ousted merely because the entity whose
conduct causes the violation is a private entity. The violation of
informational privacy by private commercial entities, operating at such
extensive scale, is as real and as constitutionally significant as any violation
by a State actor. To hold otherwise, would render the fundamental right to
informational privacy illusory in precisely the domain where it is most
acutely threatened, i.e. the digital domain.
125. Additionally, Google and Indian Kanoon as intermediaries, are
subject to specific statutory obligations under Rule 3(1) (d) of the
Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics
Code) Rules, 2021 (hereinafter “IT Rules, 2021”) which , upon receiving an
order from a Court of competent jurisdiction, obliges intermediaries to not
host, store or publish the information concerned. The scope of the present
proceedings subsumes the issue as to whether such orders are required to be
passed in the peculiar factual matrix. The same provides an independent and
additional basis for the exercise of this Court's writ jurisdiction.
126. On the specific objection raised by the Media Houses, it may be noted
that the primary relief being considered in these proceedings , is not a blanket
restraint on publication or journalistic activities. Wh at falls for consideration
is whether any specific and narrowly tailored relief can be granted, inter
alia, relating to the de-indexing of content that has become disproportionate
and constitutionally unjustifiable in light of the legal outcomes of the
underlying proceedings.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 58 of 144
127. Further, reference in this regard may be placed on ABC v.
Commissioner of Police, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 449, wherein it was
observed as under:
“48. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view, that
the press and the media perform a public function and discharge a
public duty of: disseminating news, views & information; initiating
and responding to debates; dealing with matters of current interest
in the society in all fields such as politics, morality, law, crime, arts,
sports, entertainment, science, philosophy, religion, etc. There is not
an aspect related to human rights and human existence which is not
dealt with by the press and the media. Considering the immense
impact that the press and media has over the polity, in my view, it
cannot be said that they do not perform a public function or
discharge a public duty, inter alia , when they perform the act of
reporting news. Their functions touch the lives of practically
everyone. Their reach is very deep and pervasive. Infact, the audio-
visual media creates an even greater impact in today's time with
deeper & wider penetration all across the State.
49. The controversy in the present case, as aforementioned, relates
to the alleged disclosure of the identity of the petitioner's daughter,
who had reported a case of alleged child sexual abuse against her
own father, by the respondents herein. The duty of the respondents
herein to maintain utmost secrecy and confidence in the matter of
identity of the petitioner's daughter has not been disputed. Such a
duty of the press & media stems from the need to prevent social
obliteration and humiliation of the victim. The potential of the press
and media to cause such harm is immense because the press and the
media enjoy a position of trust in the society and also because of
their reach.
They command
immense power of making, moulding, sustaining or even changing
public opinion. The functions performed by the press & media are
recognised by the State which, consequently, accords various rights
& privileges to them.
Any function/activity, alleged to be in violation of such
duty, would fall within the ambit of scrutiny of this court exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226, especially when the same is alleged to
have infringed the fundamental rights of the victim. Therefore, the
respondent nos. 2 and 3 are subject to the writ jurisdiction of this
court in respect of the public function and public duty performed by
them.
128. The preliminary objection is accordingly rejected.
”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 59 of 144
II.
129. In view of the rival submissions placed before this Court, the central
issue that is required to be addressed at the outset is whether , and to what
extent, the “right to be forgotten” finds recognition within the constitutional
and legal framework, and whether it stands embedded within the right to
privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is, therefore,
apposite to first revisit the jurisprudence on the contours of the right to
privacy.
ON MERITS
130. The jurisprudence on privacy finds its early articulation in R.
Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632, popularly called the
“Auto Shankar case.” This judgment of the Supreme Court laid down
foundational principles that continue to inform the discourse on privacy:
The Right to Privacy and Informational Privacy under Article 21
“9. The right to privacy as an independent and distinctive concept
originated in the field of Tort law, under which a new cause of action for
damages resulting from unlawful invasion of privacy was recognised.
This right has two aspects which are but two faces of the same coin — (1)
the general law of privacy which affords a tort action for damages
resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy and (2) the constitutional
recognition given to the right to privacy which protects personal privacy
against unlawful governmental invasion. The first aspect of this right
must be said to have been violated where, for example, a person's name
or likeness is used, without his consent, for advertising — or non-
advertising — purposes or for that matter, his life story is written —
whether laudatory or otherwise — and published without his consent as
explained hereinafter. In recent times, however, this right has acquired a
constitutional status.....
XXX XXX XXX
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 60 of 144
26. We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the above
discussion:
(1)
(2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication
concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such
publication is based upon public records including court records. This is
for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the
right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for
comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the
opinion that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must
be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual
assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be
subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised
in press/media. ….”
The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty
guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a “right to be
let alone”. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his
family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child- bearing and education
among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above
matters without his consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether
laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to
privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for
damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily
thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a
controversy.
131. The recognition of privacy, being implicit in Article 21, was further
elaborated by the judgment rendered in PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1
SCC 301. The Apex Court, examining the legality of telephone tapping and
surveillance, affirmed privacy as integral to the dignity and liberty of the
individual. The Court observed as under:
“16. In R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. [(1994) 6 SCC 632] Jeevan Reddy,
J. speaking for the Court observed that in recent times right to privacy
has acquired constitutional status. The learned Judge referred to Kharak
Singh case [(1964) 1 SCR 332 : AIR 1963 SC 1295] , Gobind case
[(1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] and considered a large
number of American and English cases and finally came to the
conclusion that “
the right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and
liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a
‘right to be let alone’.” A citizen has a right “to safeguard the privacy of
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 61 of 144
his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child- bearing
and education among other matters”.
17. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that right to privacy is a
part of the right to “life” and “personal liberty” enshrined under Article
21 of the Constitution. Once the facts in a given case constitute a right to
privacy, Article 21 is attracted. The said right cannot be curtailed
“except according to procedure established by law”.
18. The right to privacy — by itself — has not been identified under the
Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it
judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed
in a given case would depend on the facts of the said case....
XXX XXX XXX
20. India is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 1966. Article 17 of the said covenant is as under:
“Article 17
1. No one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, human or correspondence, nor to lawful attacks on his
honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 is almost
in similar terms.”
132. The contours of privacy were further delineated in Mr . ‘X’ v. Hospital
‘Z’, (1998) 8 SCC 296, where the Supreme Court considered the delicate
balance between individual privacy and public interest and held that the
right to privacy is not an absolute right and may be restricted. The relevant
portion reads as under:
“26.
As one of the basic Human Rights, the right of privacy is not treated
as absolute and is subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the
prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or
protection of rights and freedoms of others.
27. Right of privacy may, apart from contract, also arise out of a
particular specific relationship which may be commercial, matrimonial,
or even political. As already discussed above, doctor -patient
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 62 of 144
relationship, though basically commercial, is, professionally, a matter of
confidence and, therefore, doctors are morally and ethically bound to
maintain confidentiality
. In such a situation, public disclosure of even
true private facts may amount to an invasion of the right of privacy which
may sometimes lead to the clash of one person's “right to be let alone”
with another person's right to be informed.
28. Disclosure of even true private facts has the tendency to disturb a
person's tranquillity. It may generate many complexes in him and may
even lead to psychological problems. He may, thereafter, have a
disturbed life all through. In the face of these potentialities, and as
already held by this Court in its various decisions referred to above, the
right of privacy is an essential component of the right to life envisaged by
Article 21. The right, however, is not absolute and may be lawfully
restricted for the prevention of crime, disorder or protection of health or
morals or protection of rights and freedom of others.
44. .....
XXX XXX XXX
where there is a clash of two Fundamental Rights, as in the
instant case, namely, the appellant's right to privacy as part of right to
life and Ms ‘Y’s right to lead a healthy life which is her Fundamental
Right under Article 21,
the right which would advance the public
morality or public interest, would alone be enforced through the process
of court, for the reason that moral considerations cannot be kept at bay
133. In Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493, the Supreme Court,
referring to R. Rajagopal(supra), PUCL (supra) and Gobind v. State of M.P.
(1975) 2 SCC 148, observed as under:
and the Judges are not expected to sit as mute structures of clay in the hall known as the courtroom, but have to be sensitive, “in the sense that they must keep their fingers firmly upon the pulse of the accepted
morality of the day”. (See: Allen: Legal Duties).”
“56. With the expansive interpretation of the phrase “personal liberty”,
this right has been read into Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. (See R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. [(1994) 6 SCC 632 : AIR 1995 SC 264] and People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India [(1997) 1 SCC 301]
.) In some cases the right has been held to amalgam of various rights.
57.
But the right to privacy in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution is not
an absolute right.
58. In Gobind v. State of M.P. [(1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468 :
AIR 1975 SC 1378] it was held: (SCC p. 157, para 31)
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 63 of 144
“Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen
have penumbral zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental
right, that fundamental right must be subject to restriction on the basis of
compelling public interest.”
59. If there were a conflict between fundamental rights of two parties,
that right which advances public morality would prevail
134. In District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC
496, the Supreme Court reiterated that the right to privacy is subject to
reasonable restrictions and observed as under:
. (See ‘X’ v.
Hospital ‘Z’ [(1998) 8 SCC 296] and ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’ [(2003) 1 SCC
500] .) In R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. [(1994) 6 SCC 632 : AIR 1995 SC
264] this Court upon formulating six principles, however, hastened to add
that they are only broad principles and neither exhaustive nor all-
comprehending and indeed no such enunciation is possible or advisable.”
“34.
Intrusion into privacy may be by — (1) legislative provisions, (2)
administrative/executive orders, and (3) judicial orders. The legislative
intrusions must be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness as guaranteed by the Constitution and for that purpose
the court can go into
the proportionality of the intrusion vis-à-vis the purpose sought to be
achieved. (2) So far as administrative or executive action is concerned, it
has again to be reasonable having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. (3) As to judicial warrants, the court must have sufficient
reason to believe that the search or seizure is warranted and it must keep in mind the extent of search or seizure necessary for the protection of the particular State interest. In addition, as stated earlier, common-law-
recognised rare exceptions such as where warrantless searches could be conducted but these must be in good faith, intended to preserve evidence or intended to prevent sudden danger to person or property. XXX XXX XXX
39. We have referred in detail to the reasons given by Mathew, J. in
Gobind [(1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] to show that,
the right
to privacy has been implied in Articles 19(1)(a) and (d) and Article 21;
that, the right is not absolute and that any State intrusion can be a
reasonable restriction only if it has reasonable basis or reasonable
materials to support it.
40. A two-Judge Bench in R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. [(1994) 6 SCC
632] held the right of privacy to be implicit in the right to life and liberty
guaranteed to the citizens of India by Article 21. “It is the right to be let
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 64 of 144
alone.” Every citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own.
However, in the case of a matter being part of public records, including
court records, the right of privacy cannot be claimed. The right to
privacy has since been widely accepted as implied in our Constitution, in
other cases, namely, People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India
[(1997) 1 SCC 301] , ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’ [(1998) 8 SCC 296] , People's
Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India [(2003) 4 SCC 399] and
Sharda v. Dharmpal [(2003) 4 SCC 493] .”
135. In the landmark judgment rendered in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy -9J.)
v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J, delineating
the concept of privacy, observed as under:
“127. .....
The right to privacy is an element of human dignity. The
sanctity of privacy lies in its functional relationship with dignity. Privacy
ensures that a human being can lead a life of dignity by securing the
inner recesses of the human personality from unwanted intrusion.
Privacy recognises the autonomy of the individual and the right of every
person to make essential choices which affect the course of life. In doing
so privacy recognises that living a life of dignity is essential for a human
being to fulfil the liberties and freedoms which are the cornerstone of the
Constitution.
XXX XXX XXX
298.
To recognise the value of privacy as a constitutional
entitlement and interest is not to fashion a new fundamental right by a
process of amendment through judicial fiat. Neither are the Judges nor is the process of judicial review entrusted with the constitutional responsibility to amend the Constitution. But judicial review certainly has the task before it of determining the nature and extent of the
freedoms available to each person under the fabric of those constitutional guarantees which are protected. Courts have traditionally discharged that function and in the context of Article 21 itself, as we have already noted, a panoply of protections governing different facets of a dignified existence has been held to fall within the protection of Article 21.
Privacy of the individual is an essential aspect of dignity. Dignity
has both an intrinsic and instrumental value. As an intrinsic value,
human dignity is an entitlement or a constitutionally protected interest in
itself. In its instrumental facet, dignity and freedom are inseparably
intertwined, each being a facilitative tool to achieve the other. The ability
of the individual to protect a zone of privacy enables the realisation of
the full value of life and liberty. Liberty has a broader meaning of which
privacy is a subset. All liberties may not be exercised in privacy. Yet
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 65 of 144
others can be fulfilled only within a private space. Privacy enables the
individual to retain the autonomy of the body and mind. The autonomy of
the individual is the ability to make decisions on vital matters of concern
to life. Privacy has not been couched as an independent fundamental
right. But that does not detract from the constitutional protection
afforded to it, once the true nature of privacy and its relationship with
those fundamental rights which are expressly protected is understood.
Privacy lies across the spectrum of protected freedoms.......
The Constitution does not contain a separate article telling us that
privacy has been declared to be a fundamental right. Nor have we tagged
the provisions of Part III with an alpha- suffixed right to privacy : this is
not an act of judicial redrafting. Dignity cannot exist without privacy.
Both reside within the inalienable values of life, liberty and freedom
which the Constitution has recognised. Privacy is the ultimate expression
of the sanctity of the individual. It is a constitutional value which
straddles across the spectrum of fundamental rights and protects for the
individual a zone of choice and self-determination.
299. Privacy represents the core of the human personality and recognises
the ability of each individual to make choices and to take decisions
governing matters intimate and personal....... Privacy at a subjective
level is a reflection of those areas where an individual desires to be left
alone
. On an objective plane, privacy is defined by those constitutional
values which shape the content of the protected zone where the individual
ought to be left alone. The notion that there must exist a reasonable
expectation of privacy ensures that while on the one hand, the individual
has a protected zone of privacy, yet on the other, the exercise of
individual choices is subject to the rights of others to lead orderly lives.
For instance, an individual who possesses a plot of land may decide to build upon it subject to zoning regulations. If the building bye-laws
define the area upon which construction can be raised or the height of the boundary wall around the property, the right to privacy of the individual is conditioned by regulations designed to protect the interests of the community in planned spaces.
Hence while the individual is
entitled to a zone of privacy, its extent is based not only on the subjective
expectation of the individual but on an objective principle which defines
a reasonable expectation.
XXX XXX XXX
313. Privacy has been held to be an intrinsic element of the right to life
and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a constitutional value which
is embodied in the fundamental freedoms embedded in Part III of the Constitution. Like the right to life and liberty, privacy is not absolute. The limitations which operate on the right to life and personal liberty would operate on the right to privacy. Any curtailment or deprivation of
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 66 of 144
that right would have to take place under a regime of law. The procedure
established by law must be fair, just and reasonable. The law which
provides for the curtailment of the right must also be subject to
constitutional safeguards.
XXX XXX XXX
320. Privacy is a constitutionally protected right which emerges
primarily from the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article 21 of
the Constitution. Elements of privacy also arise in varying contexts from
the other facets of freedom and dignity recognised and guaranteed by the
fundamental rights contained in Part III.
321. Judicial recognition of the existence of a constitutional right to
privacy is not an exercise in the nature of amending the Constitution nor
is the Court embarking on a constitutional function of that nature which
is entrusted to Parliament.
322. Privacy is the constitutional core of human dignity. Privacy has
both a normative and descriptive function. At a normative level privacy
subserves those eternal values upon which the guarantees of life, liberty
and freedom are founded. At a descriptive level, privacy postulates a
bundle of entitlements and interests which lie at the foundation of
ordered liberty.
323.
Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies,
the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual
orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy
safeguards individual autonomy and recognises the ability of the
individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. Personal choices
governing a way of life are intrinsic to privacy. Privacy protects heterogeneity and recognises the plurality and diversity of our culture.
While the legitimate expectation of privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone and from the private to the public arenas, it is important to underscore that privacy is not lost or surrendered merely because the individual is in a public place. Privacy attaches to the person since it is an essential facet of the dignity of the human being. 324. This Court has not embarked upon an exhaustive enumeration or a catalogue of entitlements or interests comprised in the right to privacy. The Constitution must evolve with the felt necessities of time to meet the challenges thrown up in a democratic order governed by the Rule of Law.....
325. Like other rights which form part of the fundamental freedoms protected by Part III, including the right to life and personal liberty
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 67 of 144
under Article 21, privacy is not an absolute right. A law which
encroaches upon privacy will have to withstand the touchstone of
permissible restrictions on fundamental rights. In the context of Article
21 an invasion of privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which
stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable. The law must
also be valid with reference to the encroachment on life and personal
liberty under Article 21.
An invasion of life or personal liberty must meet
the threefold requirement of (i) legality, which postulates the existence of
law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate State aim; and (iii)
proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and
the means adopted to achieve them.
136. In K.S. Puttaswamy(supra), S.A Bobde, J elaborated upon the concept
of privacy in the following words:
”
“402. “Privacy” is “[t]he condition or state of being free from public
attention to intrusion into or interference with one's acts or decisions” [Black's Law Dictionary (Bryan Garner Edition) 3783 (2004)] . The right to be in this condition has been described as “the right to be let alone” [ Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right To Privacy”, 4 H
ARV L REV 193 (1890)] . What seems to be essential to privacy is the
power to seclude oneself and keep others from intruding it in any way. These intrusions may be physical or visual, and may take any of several
forms including peeping over one's shoulder to eavesdropping directly or through instruments, devices or technological aids. XXX XXX XXX
405. Privacy, that is to say, the condition arrived at after excluding other
persons, is a basic prerequisite for exercising the liberty and the freedom to perform that activity.
The inability to create a condition of selective
seclusion virtually denies an individual the freedom to exercise that
particular liberty or freedom necessary to do that activity.
406. It is not possible to truncate or isolate the basic freedom to do an
activity in seclusion from the freedom to do the activity itself. The right to
claim a basic condition like privacy in which guaranteed fundamental
rights can be exercised must itself be regarded as a fundamental right.
Privacy, thus, constitutes the basic, irreducible condition necessary for the exercise of “personal liberty” and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. It is the inarticulate major premise in Part III of the Constitution.
XXX XXX XXX
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 68 of 144
415. Therefore, privacy is the necessary condition precedent to the
enjoyment of any of the guarantees in Part III. As a result, when it is
claimed by rights bearers before constitutional courts, a right to privacy
may be situated not only in Article 21, but also simultaneously in any of
the other guarantees in Part III. In the current state of things, Articles
19(1), 20(3), 25, 28 and 29 are all rights helped up and made meaningful
by the exercise of privacy. This is not an exhaustive list. Future
developments in technology and social ordering may well reveal that
there are yet more constitutional sites in which a privacy right inheres
that are not at present evident to us.
XXX XXX XXX
428.2. The right to privacy is inextricably bound up with all exercises of
human liberty—both as it is specifically enumerated across Part III, and
as it is guaranteed in the residue under Article 21. It is distributed across
the various Articles in Part III and, mutatis mutandis, takes the form of
whichever of their enjoyment its violation curtails.
428.3. Any interference with privacy by an entity covered by Article 12's
description of the “State” must satisfy the tests applicable to whichever
one or more of the Part III freedoms the interference affects.”
137. The contours of the right to privacy as explained in K.S. Puttaswamy
(supra), by R.F Nariman, J, are reproduced as under:
“521. In the Indian context, a fundamental right to privacy would cover
at least the following three aspects:
• Privacy that involves the person i.e. when there is some invasion by the
State of a person's rights relatable to his physical body, such as the right
to move freely;
• Informational privacy which does not deal with a person's body but
deals with a person's mind, and therefore recognises that an individual
may have control over the dissemination of material that is personal to
him. Unauthorised use of such information may, therefore lead to
infringement of this right; and
• The privacy of choice, which protects an individual's autonomy over
fundamental personal choices.
For instance, we can ground physical privacy or privacy relating to the
body in Articles 19(1)(d) and (e) read with Article 21; ground personal
information privacy under Article 21; and the privacy of choice in
Articles 19(1)(a) to (c), 20(3), 21 and 25. The argument based on
“privacy” being a vague and nebulous concept need not, therefore,
detain us.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 69 of 144
XXX XXX XXX
525. ..... In the ultimate analysis, the fundamental right to privacy, which
has so many developing facets, can only be developed on a case-to-case
basis. Depending upon the particular facet that is relied upon, either
Article 21 by itself or in conjunction with other fundamental rights would
get attracted.
526.
But this is not to say that such a right is absolute. This right is
subject to reasonable regulations made by the State to protect legitimate
State interests or public interest. However, when it comes to restrictions
on this right, the drill of various articles to which the right relates must
be scrupulously followed.
138. The understanding of the right to privacy was further clarified by
A.M. Sapre, J in his concurring opinion in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra). The
same reads as under:
For example, if the restraint on privacy is over
fundamental personal choices that an individual is to make, State action
can be restrained under Article 21 read with Article 14 if it is arbitrary
and unreasonable; and under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) only if
it relates to the subjects mentioned in Article 19(2) and the tests laid
down by this Court for such legislation or subordinate legislation to pass
muster under the said article. Each of the tests evolved by this Court, qua
legislation or executive action, under Article 21 read with Article 14; or
Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) in the aforesaid examples must be
met in order that State action pass muster. In the ultimate analysis, the
balancing act that is to be carried out between individual, societal and
State interests must be left to the training and expertise of the judicial
mind.”
“557.
In my considered opinion, “right to privacy of any individual” is
essentially a natural right, which inheres in every human being by birth.
559. “Right to privacy” is not defined in law except in the dictionaries.
The courts, however, by process of judicial interpretation, have assigned meaning to this right in the context of specific issues involved on case-to-
case basis.
560. The most popular meaning of “right to privacy” is—“the right to be
Such right remains with the human being till he/she breathes their last. It
is indeed inseparable and inalienable from human being. In other words,
it is born with the human being and extinguishes with human being.
XXX XXX XXX
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 70 of 144
let alone”.In Gobind v. State of M.P. [Gobind v. State of M.P., (1975) 2
SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] , K.K. Mathew, J. noticed multiple facets
of this right (paras 21- 25) and then gave a rule of caution while
examining the contours of such right on case-to-case basis.
XXX XXX XXX
565. In all the aforementioned cases, the question of “right to privacy”
was examined in the context of specific grievances made by the citizens
wherein their Lordships, inter alia, ruled that firstly, “right to privacy”
has multiple facets and though such right can be classified as a part of
fundamental right emanating from Articles 19(1)(a) and (d) and Article
21, yet it is not absolute, and secondly, it is always subject to certain
reasonable restrictions on the basis of compelling social, moral and
public interest and lastly, any such right when asserted by the citizen in
the court of law then it has to go through a process of case-to-case
development.
566.
I, therefore, do not find any difficulty in tracing the “right to
privacy” emanating from the two expressions of the Preamble, namely,
“liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship” and
“Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual” and also emanating
from Article 19(1)(a) which gives to every citizen “a freedom of speech
and expression” and further emanating from Article 19(1)(d) which gives
to every citizen “a right to move freely throughout the territory of India”
and lastly, emanating from the expression “personal liberty” under
Article 21. Indeed, the right to privacy is inbuilt in these expressions and
flows from each of them and in juxtaposition.
567. In view of the foregoing discussion, my answer to Question 2 is that
“right to privacy” is a part of fundamental right of a citizen guaranteed
under Part III of the Constitution. However, it is not an absolute right but
is subject to certain reasonable restrictions
139. In his concurring opinion in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), Sanjay Kishan
Kaul, J added a distinct dimension to the discourse on privacy. The relevant
paragraphs are reproduced as under:
, which the State is entitled to
impose on the basis of social, moral and compelling public interest in
accordance with law.
568. Similarly, I also hold that the “right to privacy” has multiple facets,
and, therefore, the same has to go through a process of case-to-case
development as and when any citizen raises his grievance complaining of
infringement of his alleged right in accordance with law.”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 71 of 144
“576. “The right to be”, though not extinguished for an individual, as the
society evolved, became hedged in by the complexity of the norms. There
has been a growing concern of the impact of technology which breaches
this “right to be” or privacy — by whatever name we may call it.
577. The importance of privacy may vary from person to person
dependent on his/her approach to society and his concern for being left
alone or not. That some people do not attach importance to their privacy
cannot be the basis for denying recognition to the right to privacy as a
basic human right.
578.
It is not India alone, but the world that recognises the right to
privacy as a basic human right. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to which India is a signatory, recognises privacy as an
international human right.
The importance of this right to privacy cannot
be diluted and the significance of this is that the legal conundrum was
debated and is to be settled in the present reference by a nine -Judge
Constitution Bench.
XXX XXX XXX
582. Privacy is an inherent right. It is thus not given, but already exists.
It is about respecting an individual and it is undesirable to ignore a
person's wishes without a compelling reason to do so.
583. The right to privacy may have different aspects starting from “the
right to be let alone” in the famous article by Samuel Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis [The Right to Privacy, (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193.] . One such
aspect is an individual's right to control dissemination of his personal
information. There is nothing wrong in individuals limiting access and
their ability to shield from unwanted access. This aspect of the right to
privacy has assumed particular significance in this information age and
in view of technological improvements. A person- hood would be a
protection of one's personality, individuality and dignity. [ Daniel
Solove, “10 Reasons Why Privacy Matters” published on 20- 1-2014
<https://www.teachprivacy.com/10-reasons-privacy- matters/>.]
However, no right is unbridled and so is it with privacy. We live in a
society/community. Hence, restrictions arise from the interests of the
community, State and from those of others. Thus, it would be subject to
certain restrictions which I will revert to later.
XXX XXX XXX
619.
Privacy is also the key to freedom of thought. A person has a right
to think. The thoughts are sometimes translated into speech but confined
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 72 of 144
to the person to whom it is made. For example, one may want to criticise
someone but not share the criticism with the world.
XXX XXX XXX
621. Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, J., notes that recognising a zone of privacy is
but an acknowledgment that each individual must be entitled to chart and
pursue the course of development of their personality. Rohinton F.
Nariman, J., recognises informational privacy which recognises that an
individual may have control over the dissemination of material which is
personal to him. Recognised thus, from the right to privacy in this
modern age emanate certain other rights such as the right of individuals
to exclusively commercially exploit their identity and personal
information, to control the information that is available about them on
the “world wide web” and to disseminate certain personal information
for limited purposes alone.
XXX XXX XXX
639. The right to privacy as already observed is not absolute. The right
to privacy as falling in Part III of the Constitution may, depending on its
variable facts, vest in one part or the other, and would thus be subject to
the restrictions of exercise of that particular fundamental right. ...
XXX XXX XXX
644
140. The nine-Judge Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), thus settled the
position that privacy is a constitutionally guaranteed right, integral to life
and personal liberty under Article 21 and extends across the spectrum of
fundamental freedoms enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. At the same
time, the Court underscored that the right is not absolute and is subject to
reasonable restrictions. Any invasion of privacy must be sanctioned by law,
and such law must meet the standards of fairness, justice, and
reasonableness. Restrictions are permissible only when they serve legitimate
State or public interests, and every encroachment must withstand
. The right to privacy is a fundamental right. It is a right which
protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference from both
State and non- State actors and allows the individuals to make
autonomous life choices.”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 73 of 144
constitutional scrutiny by satisfying the tests of legality, necessity, and
proportionality.
141. The right to be forgotten, understood as subsuming the right of an
individual to seek removal or restriction of personal information from public
digital accessibility, where such information is no longer relevant or serves
no legitimate public purpose, flows naturally and necessarily from the
constitutional recognition of informational privacy under Article 21.
The Right to be Forgotten as a Facet of Informational Privacy
142. Kaul J. expressly acknowledged this right in K.S. Puttaswamy
(supra). While delineating upon the informational aspect of privacy, he
emphasised the individual’s right to control personal data and highlighted
the concept of the “right to be forgotten”, as follows:
“629.
The right of an individual to exercise control over his personal
data and to be able to control his/her own life would also encompass his
right to control his existence on the internet. Needless to say that this
would not be an absolute right. The existence of such a right does not
imply that a criminal can obliterate his past, but that there are variant
degrees of mistakes, small and big, and it cannot be said that a person
should be profiled to the nth extent for all and sundry to know.
631. The impact of the digital age results in information on the internet
being permanent.
XXX XXX XXX
Humans forget, but the internet does not forget and
does not let humans forget.
634
Any endeavour to remove information from
the internet does not result in its absolute obliteration. The footprints
remain. It is thus, said that in the digital world preservation is the norm
and forgetting a struggle.
XXX XXX XXX
. People change and an individual should be able to determine the
path of his life and not be stuck only on a path of which he/she treaded
initially. An individual should have the capacity to change his/her beliefs
and evolve as a person. Individuals should not live in fear that the views they expressed will forever be associated with them and thus refrain from
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 74 of 144
expressing themselves.
635. Whereas this right to control dissemination of personal information
in the physical and virtual space should not amount to a right of total
eraser of history, this right, as a part of the larger right to privacy, has to
be balanced against other fundamental rights like the freedom of
expression, or freedom of media, fundamental to a democratic society.
636. Thus, the European Union Regulation of 2016 [ Regulation No.
(EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27- 4-
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive No. 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).] has
recognised what has been termed as
“the right to be forgotten”. This
does not mean that all aspects of earlier existence are to be obliterated,
as some may have a social ramification. If we were to recognise a similar
right, it would only mean that an individual who is no longer desirous of
his personal data to be processed or stored, should be able to remove it
from the system where the personal data/information is no longer
necessary, relevant, or is incorrect and serves no legitimate interest.
143. In Vysakh K.G. v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 7337, the
Kerala High Court traced the “right to be forgotten” and defined its various
facets including the right to rehabilitation, the right to erasure/deletion, the
right to delisting/de-indexing, the right to obscurity, and the right to
oblivion. The Court at paragraph 61 of the said judgment noted that the right
to delisting is the right of individuals to request search engines to de-link
web pages containing personal information about them, where the
information is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive for the
purposes of the data processing. It was observed as under:
Such a right cannot be exercised where the information/data is
necessary, for exercising the right of freedom of expression and
information, for compliance with legal obligations, for the performance
of a task carried out in public interest, on the grounds of public interest
in the area of public health, for archiving purposes in the public interest,
scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, or for
the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. Such justifications
would be valid in all cases of breach of privacy, including breaches of
data privacy.”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 75 of 144
“58. The recognition of this right to be forgotten is further supported by
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which supersedes
Directive 95/46/EC and expressly recognises this right. Article 17 of the
GDPR lays down when a data subject can exercise the right of erasure,
the obligation of data controllers to erase links to third- party websites,
and the exceptions to the when the right can be exercised.
59. The right to be forgotten is derived from the broader category of the
right to privacy. Cécile de Terwangne in her paper “Internet Privacy and
the Right to be Forgotten/Right to Oblivion”,defines the right to be
forgotten as ‘the right for natural persons to have information about
them deleted after a certain period of time.’ The basis of this right to be
forgotten being ‘internet privacy’, this concept relates to individual
autonomy, rather than secrecy or intimacy. Terwangner writes:
In the context of the Internet this dimension of privacy
means informational autonomy or informational self
determination. The Internet handles huge quantities of
information relating to individuals. Such personal data are
frequently processed : it is disclosed, disseminated, shared,
selected, downloaded, registered and used in all kinds of
ways. In this sense, the individual autonomy is in direct
relation to personal information. Information self
determination means the control over one's personal
information, the individual's right to decide which
information about themselves will be disclosed, to whom
and for what purpose.
60. The right to be forgotten consists of various facets or forms of
rights which is important in defining the extent of this right.
Professors W. Gregory Voss And Celine Castets-Renard's in their
paper “Proposal For An International Taxonomy On The Various
Forms of The “Right To Be Forgotten” : A Study On The
Convergence of Norms” categorize the right to be forgotten into five
different rights. The ‘right to rehabilitation’ is a right that existed
prior to the digital age and refers to social reintegration subsequent
to a judicial conviction. Legislation in the United Kingdom, France,
the United States etc. provides for the erasure of conviction records
subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions. The ‘right to
erasure/deletion’ is a right provided by data protection legislation. It
allows for the erasure of personal data where it is inaccurate or
obsolete. Article 17 of the GDPR sets out this right to erasure when
the data collected is no longer relevant for the purposes it was
originally processed, where consent is withdrawn by data subject etc.
This right is subject to freedom of speech and expression, public
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 76 of 144
interest in the area of public health, archiving for public interest etc.
This right to erasure/deletion is not a general right and applies only
in the limited cases enumerated in the data protection law. The
authors Voss and Renard write that the right to erasure/deletion ‘is
not an overarching right to be forgotten, but merely the possibility to
have data deleted in certain circumstances’.
61.
The ‘right to delisting’ and ‘right to oblivion’ are facets of the
right to be forgotten in the digital context. The right to delisting or
de-indexing is the right of individuals to request search engines to
delink web pages containing personal information about them.
This applies where the information is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive for the purposes of the data processing. This right operates in the context of search engines' processing of personal data and, which are considered as “controllers” under Directive 95/46170. The CJEU's decision involves a mere right to delisting (and not to be completely forgotten) because
the court orders the erasure of web links, but not the related article. In other words, “the source is preserved”. Finally, in order to recognize a right to delisting, neither the economic interest of the operator of the search engine nor the interest of
the general public in having access to that information shall prevail over the data subject's reputation and privacy.
The
authors Voss and Renard write:
62. Whereas, the ‘right to obscurity’ according to the authors refers to making personal information relatively hard to find. According to Hartzog and Stutzman, information is obscure online if it lacks one or more key factors i.e. search visibility, unprotected access, identification, or clarity that are essential for its discovery or comprehension. However, there is no legal recognition of this right at
present. [See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF, L. REV. 1, 4 (Feb. 2013).]
63. The last categorisation of the right is the ‘right to oblivion’ which allows individuals to demand the deletion of personal information collected by information society services. An example of this right can be seen in the personal data protection law of Nicaragua. The authors Voss and Renard, with regard to the right to oblivion, write:
The right to oblivion of data collected by information society services is a real right to be forgotten which can be exercised without the condition of providing evidence. It is not necessary to prove that the data are irrelevant, out -of-
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 77 of 144
date, or illegal. Besides, it is not merely a right to obscurity,
because the data are deleted. Therefore, it is a broad right
to obtain the erasure, meeting a social demand for this right,
especially with respect to social network services.”
144. In view of the above, “right to be forgotten” can be understood as a
broader manifestation of the right to privacy, a s Cécile de Terwangne has
observed
1
145. The right to be forgotten thus reflects the evolution of privacy in
response to the permanence of online information. In a society where digital
records are virtually indelible, the ability to seek erasure ensures that
informational self-determination remains effective. It protects individuals
from perpetual exposure to past events that may no longer bear relevance,
while preserving their dignity and autonomy in the society.
, “In the context of the Internet this dimension of privacy means
informational autonomy or informational sel f determination.....Information
self determination means the control over one's personal information, the
individual's right to decide which information about themselves will be
disclosed, to whom and for what purpose.” This observation highlights that
privacy in the digital age is not merely about seclusion, but about active
control over the circulation of personal data.
146. India presently lacks a comprehensive statutory framework explicitly
governing the right to be forgotten. However, the absence of specific
legislation does not preclude Constitutional C ourts from recognizing and
enforcing this right.
2
1
As quoted in paragraph 59 of Vysakh K.G. (supra)
2
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241:
“ Right to life means life with dignity. The primary responsibility for ensuring such safety and dignity
through suitable legislation, and the creation of a mechanism for its enforcement, is of the legislature and
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 78 of 144
III.
147. The recognition of the “right to be forgotten” inevitably brings into
focus the questions revolving around the interplay between the individual’s
‘right to privacy’ and the public’s ‘ right to information’ or the ‘right to
know’. While privacy safeguards informational autonomy, the ‘ right to
know’ ensures transparency, accountability and the free flow of information.
THE PRINCIPLE OF ‘OPEN JUSTICE’
148. In Vysakh K.G. (supra), the High Court of Kerala, dealing with the
transparency in judicial functions, referred to the judgments rendered by the
Supreme Court in Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v.
Union of India(2016) 5 SCC 1 and Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of
India (2018) 10 SCC 639 and observed as under:
“48. The independence of the judiciary cannot be assessed in
isolation of its functioning.
The functioning of the judiciary, on both
administrative and judicial sides, must carry the edifice of the
democratic character to sustain public confidence. Accordingly,
Courts in India generally follow an open Court justice system. The
closed-door justice system is a challenge to public confidence.
49. In Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of
India [
(2016) 5 SCC 1
Indisputably, this concept of independence of judiciary
which is inextricably linked and connected with the constitutional
process related to the functioning of judiciary is a “fixed- star” in
our constitutional consultation and its voice centres around the
philosophy of the Constitution.
], the Court opined on judicial function and
public confidence as follows:
The basic postulate of this concept
is to have a more effective judicial system with its full vigour and
vitality so as to secure and strengthen the imperative confidence
of the people in the administration of justice.
the executive. When, however, instances of sexual harassment resulting in violation of fundamental rights
of women workers under Articles 14, 19 and 21 are brought before us for redress under Article 32, an
effective redressal requires that some guidelines should be laid down for the protection of these rights to
fill the legislative vacuum.”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 79 of 144
50. The functioning of the Court and public confidence are mutually
interlinked to ensure the independence of the judiciary and augur
confidence about the judges who are administering justice. The
judiciary cannot ignore measures to gain public confidence and is
compelled to adopt steps for enhancing transparency in its
functioning.... ... ... In Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India
[
(2018) 10 SCC 639
As no person can be heard to plead ignorance of law,
there is corresponding obligation on the State to spread awareness about the law and the developments thereof including the evolution of the law which may happen in the process of adjudication of cases before this Court.
], the Apex Court in the context of live-streaming
of Court proceedings, elaborated the concept of open justice, judicial
accountability and transparency and opined as follows:
The right to know and
receive information, it is by now well settled, is a facet of Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution and for which reason the public is
entitled to witness Court proceedings involving issues having an
impact on the public at large or a section of the public, as the
case may be. This right to receive information and be informed is
buttressed by the value of dignity of the people.
149. In Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI, (2012) 10 SCC 603,
the Supreme Court affirmed that “Open Justice is the cornerstone of our
judicial system. It instils faith in the judicial and legal system.” At the same
time, the Court held that “ the right to open justice is not absolute. There can
be exceptions in the interest of administration of justice.” The Court traced
this to the nine-Judge Bench decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State
of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1, which established that courts have
One of the
proponents has also highlighted the fact that litigants involved in large number of cases pending before the Courts throughout the country will be benefitted if access to Court proceedings is made possible by way of live streaming of Court proceedings. That would increase the productivity of the country, since scores of persons involved in litigation in the Courts in India will be able to
avoid hearings and instead can attend to their daily work without taking leave.”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 80 of 144
inherent power to restrict publication where the administration of justice so
demands.
150. The conflict between the individual’s right to privacy and the
principle of open justice is not unprecedented but it acquires a qualitatively
different character in the digital age.
‘Open Justice’ and its Limitations in the Digital Age
151. As held in Sahara India (supra), the principle of open justice is not
absolute, and there can be exceptions in the interest of administration of justice. It has been observed therein:
“31. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [AIR
1967 SC 1] this Court dealt with the power of a court to conduct
court proceedings in camera under its inherent powers and also
to incidentally prohibit publication of the court proceedings or
evidence of the cases outside the court by the media. It may be stated
that “Open Justice” is the cornerstone of our judicial system. It
instils faith in the judicial and legal system. However, the right to
open justice is not absolute. It can be restricted by the court in its
inherent jurisdiction as done in Mirajkar case [AIR 1967 SC 1] if the
necessities of administration of justice so demand [see Kehar
Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1988) 3 SCC 609 : 1988 SCC (Cri)
711 : AIR 1988 SC 1883] ]. Even in the US, the said principle of
open justice yields to the said necessities of administration of justice
(see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court [73 L Ed 2d 248 : 457
US 596 (1982)] ). The entire law has been reiterated once again in
the judgment of this Court in Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of
Bihar [(2010) 4 SCC 653 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 904] , affirming the
judgment of this Court in Mirajkar case [AIR 1967 SC 1] .
32. Thus, the principle of open justice is not absolute. There can be
exceptions in the interest of administration of justice
152. It is in the digital sphere that the tension between transparency and
privacy acquires its sharpest edge, for the structure of online platforms
. …”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 81 of 144
determines how information is disseminated, magnified and preserved in
public memory. As Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul observed in K.S.
Puttaswamy (supra), “There has been a growing concern of the impact of
technology which breaches this “right to be” or privacy — by whatever
name we may call it. ….This aspect of the right to privacy has assumed
particular significance in this information age and in view of technological
improvements. ….The impact of the digital age results in information on the
internet being permanent. Humans forget, but the internet does not forget
and does not let humans forget.”
153. Thus, the permanence of the internet has fundamentally altered the
equation. A judgment that previously reposed in the Court records,
accessible only to the diligent searcher, is now instantly retrievable by any
person who enters a ‘party name’ into a search engine.
154. Transparency is undoubtedly an essential pillar of a strong and
independent judicial system. As noticed hereinabove, in Vysakh K.G.
(supra), the Kerala High Court, relying upon Supreme Court Advocates on
Record Association (supra) and Swapnil Tripathi (supra), recognized that
the functioning of Courts and public confidence are mutually interlinked,
and that the right to know and receive information is a facet of Article
19(1)(a).
155. While the principle of transparency is integral to judicial
independence and accountability, it cannot be pursued in isolation from the
protection of individual dignity and privacy. Recognizing the same, K.S.
Puttaswamy (supra), referring to Bihar Public Service Commission v.
Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi, (2012) 13 SCC 61, observed as under:
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 82 of 144
“91. The judgment of a Bench of two Judges of this Court in Bihar
Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi [Bihar
Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi, (2012) 13
SCC 61 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 131] dealt with the provisions of
Section 8(1)(g) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. A person
claiming to be a public-spirited citizen sought information under the
statute from the Bihar Public Service Commission on a range of
matters relating to interviews conducted by it on two days. The
Commission disclosed the information save and except for the names
of the interview board. The High Court directed [Saiyed Hussain
Abbas Rizwi v. State Information Commission, 2011 SCC OnLine Pat
1247 : (2011) 2 PLJR 663] disclosure. Section 8(1)(g) provides an
exemption from disclosure of information of the following nature :
(Saiyed Hussain case [Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed
Hussain Abbas Rizwi, (2012) 13 SCC 61 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 131] ,
SCC p. 72, para 21)
“21. … ‘information, the disclosure of which would endanger
the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source
of information or assistance given in confidence for law
enforcement and security purposes.’ ”
Swatanter Kumar, J. speaking for the Court, held thus : (SCC
p. 74, para 23)
“23. … Certain matters, particularly in relation to
appointment, are required to be dealt with great
confidentiality. The information may come to knowledge of the
authority as a result of disclosure by others who give that
information in confidence and with complete faith, integrity
and fidelity. Secrecy of such information shall be maintained,
thus, bringing it within the ambit of fiduciary capacity.
Similarly, there may be cases where the disclosure has no
relationship to any public activity or interest or it may even
cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual. All
these protections have to be given their due implementation as
they spring from statutory exemptions. It is not a decision
simpliciter between private interest and public interest. It is a
matter where a constitutional protection is available to a
person with regard to the right to privacy. Thus, the public
interest has to be construed while keeping in mind the balance
factor between right to privacy and right to information with
the purpose sought to be achieved and the purpose that would
be served in the larger public interest, particularly when both
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 83 of 144
these rights emerge from the constitutional values under the
Constitution of India.”
(emphasis supplied)
Significantly, though the Court was construing the text of a statutory
exemption contained in Section 8, it dwelt on the privacy issues
involved in the disclosure of information furnished in confidence by
adverting to the constitutional right to privacy.”
156. The resolution of this conflict requires a distinction to be made
between the existence and accessibility of judicial records and their name-
based digital searchability. ‘Open justice’ requires that (i) judicial records
exist, (ii) they be maintained; and (iii) they be accessible to those with a
legitimate purpose. These requirements are fully satisfied by the
maintenance of court records, accessible by case number, citation, or other
purposeful search. What open justice does not require, and what it cannot be
extended to mandate, is that a private individual's name functions as a
permanent and unlimited retrieval key, through a commercial search engine,
enabling any casual internet user to instantly access the entirety of an
individual's engagement with legal / judicial processes.
157. The principle of open justice was conceived to ensure that the judicial
process is accessible and fully transparent. It would be incongruous if the
same serves as justification for the perpetual and indiscriminate
amplification of a person’s worst travails with legal processes. It would be a
perverse extension of the concept to hold that open justice facilitates Google
(or any other search engine) to thrust an individual’s arrest, accusation or
legal misfortune in the face of every person who searches that individual’s
name, and to do so with particular force (to ‘satisfy’ a query), without regard
to the context. An acquittal buried at the bottom of the ‘ search results’, while
the arrest dominates the search results, cannot be characterized as an
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 84 of 144
ingredient of ‘open justice’. It is, in essence, a qualitative transformation that
a commercial search engine effects upon the ‘information’. This is brought
about by ‘aggregating, ranking, and serving’ in direct response to, and to
‘satisfy’ a name-based query.
158. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to note that the intersection
between the concept of ‘open justice’ and the ‘right to informational
privacy’ came to be considered in the judgments rendered in Karthick
Theodore v. Registrar General, Madras High Court, W.A.(MD) No. 1901
of 2021, and Vysakh K.G .(supra). However, the present proceedings have
been examined in a materially different conspectus and in the context of
qualitatively different relief/s. Several questions that arise in the present
batch of petitions did not fall for consideration in the said cases.
Karthick Theodore v. Registrar General, Madras High Court
(W.A.(MD) No. 1901 of 2021)
159. In Karthick Theodore (supra), the Madras High Court was called
upon to consider a prayer for the takedown of a judgment in its entirety from
an online legal database/ search engine namely, ‘Indian Kanoon’, in a matter
involving an acquittal.
160. Although the petition came to be dismissed by a Single Judge, the
Division Bench directed the concerned Registry to redact and mask names
from the judgment while also directing ‘ Indian Kanoon’ to remove the
concerned judgment from its website. The said direction for complete
takedown of the judgment is the subject of the SLP being SLP(C) No. 15311
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 85 of 144
of 2024, filed by ‘Indian Kanoon’, which is presently pending adjudication
before the Supreme Court.
161. The present proceedings are distinguishable from Karthick Theodore
(supra) in various material respects. First, this Court is not considering the
complete removal or takedown of any judgment/s from the website of
‘Indian Kanoon’ or any other legal database. The relief being considered
herein is a narrower one, viz. ‘de-indexing’ from name-based search results
and, separately, the restriction of name-based search functionality within the
platform of ‘ Indian Kanoon’ . The judicial record itself is not being touched.
162. Second, the question of whether a court can direct a legal database to
take down a judgment in its entirety, which is the fundamental question
before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid SLP, does not arise in such
context.
163. Third, the present proceedings have examined the rights of the parties
across a far wider spectrum and factual categories than those which fell for
consideration in Karthick Theodore (supra), including the position of search
engines as active processors of personal data; the constitutional position of
search engines, including Google; the territorial scope of directions
pertaining to de-indexing; and the distinction between de-indexing and
masking as complementary reliefs.
164. In Vysakh K.G.(supra), the Kerala High Court was called upon to
consider the contours of the ‘right to be forgotten’ in the context of data
made available by parties before a Court, and specifically the right to
Vysakh K.G. v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 7337
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 86 of 144
anonymity in judicial proceedings. The Court, while acknowledging the
right to privacy as a fundamental right and tracing the evolution of the right
to be forgotten, was ultimately reluctant to grant the specific relief sought
and declined to overstep what it considered to be the boundaries of judicial
function in the absence of legislation, expressing the view that the
legislature was better placed to evolve a comprehensive framework.
165. The present proceedings are distinguishable from Vysakh
K.G.(supra), in several significant respects. First, Vysakh K.G. (supra), was
decided in the context of a specific prayer for ‘masking’. Second, the
specific context of the present proceedings, that is, (i) the active role of
search engines in processing data, as distinct from the passive hosting of
judicial records;(ii) the distinction between de -indexing and takedown; and
(iii) the scope of de-indexing directions, was not specifically considered in
Vysakh K.G.(supra).
166. Furthermore, this Court is unable to subscribe to the view that the
absence of specific legislation on the ‘right to be forgotten’ deprives
Constitutional Courts of jurisdiction to evolve appropriate principles. As
settled in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241, where a
legislative vacuum exists and fundamental rights are at stake, Constitutional
Courts are not merely empowered but duty-bound to step in . This Court is
thus, not legislating, but applying constitutional principles to fill in a gap
that the legislature has not yet addressed.
167. It must also be noted that Vysakh K.G. (supra) did not go to the extent
of holding that the right to be forgotten can never be recognized under
Indian law in the absence of legislation. The Court expressed caution about
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 87 of 144
the scope of judicial intervention and declined to grant relief on the specific
facts, however, relief was extended in certain categories, including where
the content in question pertained to matters of matrimony/family/child
custody. The expression of such caution is materially different from holding
that the right does not exist or that Courts are without jurisdiction.
168. To undertake the balancing exercise identified above, it is necessary
to examine the operational framework of search engines such as those
operated by Google LLC. The manner in which such platforms function is
central to understanding how information is made perpetually accessible to
the public.
The Role and Character of Search Engines
169. In Google Spain, S.L. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD) & Mario Costeja González (Case C-131/12), the Court of Justice of
the European Union traced the functioning of Google as a search engine and
held:
“28. Therefore, it must be found that, in exploring the internet
automatically, constantly and systematically in search of the information
which is published there, the operator of a search engine collects such
data which it subsequently retrieves, records and organises within the
framework of its indexing programmes, stores on its servers and, as the
case may be, discloses and makes available to its users in the form of lists
of search results. As those operations are referred to expressly and
unconditionally in Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46, they must be classified
as processing within the meaning of that provision...
XXX XXXXXX
33. It is the search engine operator which determines the purposes and
means of that activity and thus of the processing of personal data that it
itself carries out within the framework of that activity and which must,
consequently, be regarded as the 'controller' in respect of that
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 88 of 144
processing..."
XXX XXXXXX
80. It must be pointed out at the outset that... processing of personal data,
such as that at issue in the main proceedings, carried out by the operator
of a search engine is liable to affect significantly the fundamental rights to
privacy and to the protection of personal data when the search by means
of that engine is carried out on the basis of an individual's name, since
that processing enables any internet user to obtain through the list of
results a structured overview of the information relating to that individual
that can be found on the internet — information which potentially
concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life and which, without
the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been
only with great difficulty — and thereby to establish a more or less
detailed profile of him. Furthermore, the effect of the interference with
those rights of the data subject is heightened on account of the important
role played by the internet and search engines in modern society, which
render the information contained in such a list of results ubiquitous."
XXX XXX XXX
83. As has been established in paragraphs 35 to 38 of the present
judgment, inasmuch as the data processing carried out in the context of
the activity of a search engine can be distinguished from
and is additional
to that carried out by publishers of websites and affects the data subject’s
fundamental rights additionally,
84. Given the ease with which information published on a website can be
replicated on other sites and the fact that the persons responsible for its
publication are not always subject to European Union legislation,
effective and complete protection of data users could not be achieved if
the latter had to obtain first or in parallel the erasure of the information
relating to them from the publishers of websites.
XXX XXX XXX
87. Indeed, since the inclusion in the list of results, displayed following a
search made on the basis of a person’s name, of a web page and of the
the operator of the search engine as the
controller in respect of that processing must ensure, within the framework
of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that that processing meets
the requirements of Directive 95/46, in order that the guarantees laid
down by the directive may have full effect.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 89 of 144
information contained on it relating to that person makes access to that
information appreciably easier for any internet user making a search in
respect of the person concerned and may play a decisive role in the
dissemination of that information, it is liable to constitute a more
significant interference with the data subject’s fundamental right to
privacy than the publication on the web page.
170. Google's operation involves three stages of processing.
3
171. Beyond these three stages, other technical features can actively
surface associations between an individual's name and terms such as 'case',
'court', or 'arrested' perpetuating the stigma even before the search is
completed.
The first
stage is crawling, wherein Google deploys automated programs known as
Googlebots that systematically navigate the internet, discovering and
reading web pages, including judicial records hosted on court websites and
legal databases. The next stage is indexing, wherein, the content is thereafter
analysed through sophisticated natural language processing algorithms that
identify names of entities, the names of parties in judicial proceedings, and
create structured associations between such names and documents, stored in
Google's index as a searchable database. The third stage is serving search
results, wherein when a user enters a name, Google retrieves all associated
documents and ranks them algorithmically. Because judicial records hosted
on reliable sources, including court websites and Indian Kanoon, are treated
as authoritative, they frequently appear prominently among the top search
results accessible to ordinary user.
3
https://developers.google.com/search/docs/fundamentals/how-search-works
https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/7645831?hl=en
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 90 of 144
172. Google has submitted that it performs a passive and neutral function.
This is inaccurate. By actively collecting, indexing, organizing and serving
personal data through name-based search results, and by deriving
commercial revenue through advertising linked to those search results,
Google is an active processor of personal data, which materially contributes
to the invasion of informational privacy. The same has also been traced by
the European Court of Human Rights, in the judgment rendered in Hurbain
v. Belgium (Grand Chamber, Application No. 57292/16):
“195. Subsequently, a new aspect of this “right to be
forgotten” emerged in national judicial practice in the context
of the digitisation of news articles, resulting in their
widespread dissemination on the websites of the newspapers
concerned. The effect of this dissemination was simultaneously
magnified by the listing of websites by search engines. In
judicial practice this aspect, known as the “right to be
forgotten online”, has concerned requests for the removal or
alteration of data available on the Internet or for limitations
on access to those data, directed against news publishers or
search engine operators. In such cases, the issue is not the
resurfacing of the information but rather its continued
availability online. The contemporary debate on this aspect of
the “right to be forgotten” was undoubtedly reinforced by the
CJEU’s Google Spain
judgment (C-131/12) concerning a
request for the operator of a search engine to remove links to
the web pages of a Spanish daily newspaper from the list of
results.”
173. Google Spain, S.L. (supra) also observes as under:
“36 Moreover, it is undisputed that that activity of search
engines plays a decisive role in the overall dissemination of
those data in that it renders the latter accessible to any
internet user making a search on the basis of the data.
subject’s name, including to internet users who otherwise
would not have found the web page on which those data are
published.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 91 of 144
37. Also, the organisation and aggregation of information
published on the internet that are effected by search engines
with the aim of facilitating their users’ access to that
information may, when users carry out their search on the
basis of an individual’s name, result in them obtaining through
the list of results a structured overview of the information
relating to that individual that can be found on the internet
enabling them to establish a more or less detailed profile of the
data subject.
XXX XXX XXX
40 That fact does not alter the position that the purposes and
means of that processing are determined by the operator of the
search engine.
XXX XXX XXX
43 ….. Google Search does not merely give access to content
hosted on the indexed websites, but takes advantage of that
activity and includes, in return for payment, advertising
associated with the internet users’ search terms, for
undertakings which wish to use that tool in order to offer their
goods or services to the internet users.
XXX XXX XXX
57. As has been stated in paragraphs 26 to 28 of the present
judgment, the very display of personal data on a search results
page constitutes processing of such data. Since that display of
results is accompanied, on the same page, by the display of
advertising linked to the search terms, it is clear that the
processing of personal data in question is carried out in the
context of the commercial and advertising activity of the
controller’s establishment on the territory of a Member State,
in this instance Spanish territory.”
174. On the question of Google’s constitutional rights, it is well settled that
fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution are available only to
the citizens of India. The legal position in this regard has been reiterated in a
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 92 of 144
catena of judgments
4
175. As held in Google Spain S.L. (supra), the activities of Google cannot
be equated with those of the “publishers of websites”. The observations
made in this regard are as under:
. It is also relevant to note that the functioning of
Google (and similar search engines) is entirely automated and algorithmic.
Article 19(1)(a) protects the human faculty of conscious and purposeful
expression, rooted in the values of human dignity and autonomy that the
Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), identified as the foundation of
all fundamental rights. A purely mechanical process driven by algorithmic
logic cannot constitute an exercise of freedom of speech and expression.
“35 In this connection, it should be pointed out that the processing of
personal data carried out in the context of the activity of a search
engine can be distinguished from and is additional to that carried out
by publishers of websites, consisting in loading those data on an
internet page.”
176. It follows that Google’s indexing and serving of judicial and other
records in response to name-based searches is not an exercise of any
fundamental right that can be legitimately pitted against the petitioner’s
fundamental right to informational privacy under Article 21 of the
Constitution. Such search engines are not ‘passive channels of information’ ,
instead they are in the nature of a ‘commercial platform’, deriving revenue
by leveraging user searches and associating them with advertising
opportunities
5
4
State Trading Corpn. of India Ltd. v. CTO, (1963) 33 Comp Cas 1057; Railway Board v. Chandrima
Das, (2000) 2 SCC 465.
. While the operations of the search engines may incidentally
5
Google Spain, S.L. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) & Mario Costeja González
(Case C-131/12)
“43. …..Google Search does not merely give access to content hosted on the indexed websites, but takes
advantage of that activity and includes, in return for payment, advertising associated with the internet
users’ search terms, for undertakings which wish to use that tool in order to offer their goods or services to
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 93 of 144
facilitate access to information, unlike the publishers of information/
websites, the search engines do not themselves exercise the fundamental
right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 of the
Constitution.
177. The position of Indian Kanoon is somewhat different. It performs a
function that bears a closer resemblance to publication. It curates, organizes
and makes available judicial records in a manner that facilita tes wide spread
dissemination of legal information. Importantly however, the relief being
considered against Indian Kanoon in the present proceedings, is not the
removal or takedown of judicial orders/judgments which would directly
burden its publication function, but the specific and narrow restriction of
name-based search functionality within the platform of Indian Kanoon for
judicial orders/judgments in defined categories. This narrow relief does not
substantially interfere with Indian Kanoon’s public interest function. The
judgment remains accessible by case number, citation, court, date and
subject matter.
IV.
178. Having identified the competing interests at stake, the petitioners’
fundamental right to informational privacy under Article 21 on one side, and
the principles of open justice, transparency and Article 19(1)(a) rights (only
in some cases) on the other side, the framework within which these interests
are to be reconciled, needs to be articulated.
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
the internet users….”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 94 of 144
179. The threefold test as put forth in paragraph 325 of the judgment
rendered in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), requires that any encroachment on the
right to privacy must satisfy (i) Legality : there must be a valid law justifying
the encroachment; (ii) Legitimate Aim: there must be a justifiable and
reasonable need; and (iii) Proportionality: the means must be proportionate
to the objective sought to be achieved.
180. In the categories of cases with which this Court is concerned, inter
alia, acquittals, discharges, quashings, settlements, compounding and
disputes of purely private nature, no law authorises Google or any search
engine to perpetually index and surface judicial records in a manner that
overrides the individual’s fundamental right to informational privacy. Rule
3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021 in fact obliges intermediaries to comply with
Court orders directing removal or restriction of content. No legitimate aim
of sufficient specificity is served by the unlimited and unrestricted name-
based searchability of records whose underlying proceedings have been
resolved, in favour of the concerned individual. Moreover, permanent and
unlimited name-based digital searchability, is wholly disproportionate to any
legitimate aim that might be identified.
181. The balancing framework has been further illuminated by several
judgments. In this regard, reference may be made to the following
judgments.
i. In Mr. ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’ (1998) 8 SCC 296:
“44. ..... where there is a clash of two Fundamental Rights, as in the
instant case, namely, the appellant's right to privacy as part of right to
life and Ms ‘Y’s right to lead a healthy life which is her Fundamental
Right under Article 21, the right which would advance the public morality
or public interest, would alone be enforced through the process of court,
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 95 of 144
for the reason that moral considerations cannot be kept at bay and the
Judges are not expected to sit as mute structures of clay in the hall known
as the courtroom, but have to be sensitive, “in the sense that they must
keep their fingers firmly upon the pulse of the accepted morality of the
day”. (See: Allen: Legal Duties).”
ii. Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493
“59. If there were a conflict between fundamental rights of two parties,
that right which advances public morality would prevail….”
iii. Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397
“61. Be it stated, circumstances may emerge that may necessitate for
balancing between intra- fundamental rights. It has been distinctly
understood that the test that has to be applied while balancing the two
fundamental rights or inter fundamental rights, the principles applied
may be different than the principle to be applied in intra- conflict between
the same fundamental right. To elaborate, as in this case, the accused has
a fundamental right to have a fair trial under Article 21 of the
Constitution. Similarly, the victims who are directly affected and also
form a part of the constituent of the collective, have a fundamental right
for a fair trial. Thus, there can be two individuals both having legitimacy
to claim or assert the right. The factum of legitimacy is a primary
consideration. It has to be remembered that no fundamental right is
absolute and it can have limitations in certain circumstances. Thus,
permissible limitations are imposed by the State. The said limitations are
to be within the bounds of law.
However, when there is intra-conflict of
the right conferred under the same article, like fair trial in this case, the
test that is required to be applied, we are disposed to think, it would be
“paramount collective interest” or “sustenance of public confidence in
the justice dispensation system”....…. Therefore, if the collective interest
or the public interest that serves the public cause and further has the legitimacy to claim or assert a fundamental right, then only it can put forth that their right should be protected. There can be no denial of the fact that the rights of the victims for a fair trial is an inseparable aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution and when they assert that right by themselves as well as the part of the collective, the conception of public interest gets galvanised. The accentuated public interest in such circumstances has to be given primacy, for it furthers and promotes “Rule of Law”.
It may be clarified at once that the test of primacy which
is based on legitimacy and the public interest has to be adjudged on the
facts of each case and cannot be stated in abstract terms. It will require
studied scanning of facts, the competing interests and the ultimate
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 96 of 144
perception of the balancing that would subserve the larger public interest
and serve the majesty of rule of law.
“Yadapi siddham, loka viruddham
In this regard, we are reminded of an
ancient saying:
Na adaraniyam, na acharaniyam”
The aforesaid saying lays stress on public interest and its significance
and primacy over certain individual interest. It may not thus have general
application, but the purpose of referring to the same is that on certain
occasions it can be treated to be appropriate.
62.
There may be a perception that if principle of primacy is to be
followed, then the right of one gets totally extinguished. It has to be borne
in mind that total extinction is not balancing.
iv. Sunil Sachdeva v. Owner of Domain Name WWW.CJR7.COM ,
2019 SCC OnLineDel 11168
When balancing act is done,
the right to fair trial is not totally crippled, but it is curtailed to some extent by which the accused gets the right of fair trial and simultaneously,
the victims feel that the fair trial is conducted and the court feels assured that there is a fair trial in respect of such cases. That apart, the faith of the collective is reposed in the criminal justice dispensation system and
remains anchored.”
“18. In Central Public Information Officer v. Subhash Chanda Agarwal,
2019 SCC OnLine SC 1459 pronounced today, even in the context of
Right to Information Act, 2005, it has been held that if ones right to know
is absolute, then the same may invade another's right to privacy and
breach of confidentiality, and therefore the former right has to be
harmonized with the need for personal privacy, confidentiality of
information and effective governance. Distinction was made between
personal information and information relating to pubic activity and interest, and the provisions of the Right to Information Act were interpreted to exempt disclosure of information which if disclosed, would
cause unwarranted invasion in privacy of the individual, unless public interest warranted its disclosure. It was again held that the two rights have to be balanced, and distinction was made between “something which is of interest to the public” and something which is “in public
interest”. It was held that public may be interested in private matters with which the public may have no concern and need to know; however such interest of the public in private matters would repudiate and directly traverse the protection of privacy and there is a right to shield oneself from unwarranted access to one's personal information and to protect facets of reputation, honor etc. associated with the right to privacy.
Transparency was held to be not entitled to run to its absolute.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 97 of 144
Chandrachud, J. in his concurring opinion reiterated that an individual
has a constitutionally protected right to control the dissemination of
personal information, and that unauthorized use of personal information
abridges a citizen's right to privacy. Information relating to health,
personal relationships and finances was identified as private information.
The test, whether the information would be offensive to a reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities, was advocated to be applied to determine
what information qualifies as personal.
182. The thread running through all these decisions is that even where
fundamental rights come into conflict, the balance is not absolute but
contextual, requiring careful attention to purpose, relevance, and the
potential impact on individual reputation and dignity. The decisive
consideration is always whether disclosure serves any integral public
welfare function. Only if the answer is in the affirmative can such
information be allowed to continue in the digital space in the form in which
it presently exists.
”
183. The concepts of de-indexing and masking emerge as the appropriate
modalities through which this balance is to be given practical effect. As
explained in Hurbain v. Belgium (Grand Chamber, European Court of
Human Rights, Application No. 57292/16), the minimal, appropriate
measure is not erasure of the article which remained preserved in the
archives, but its de-indexing from search engines so as to moderate
accessibility. The record is preserved; the unlimited and indiscriminate
name-based searchability is what is moderated.
184. In XXXX v. High Court of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 18, the
Karnataka High Court recognised this principle observing that “ the direction
would be only to enable the internet forget, like the humans forget. If it is
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 98 of 144
allowed to stay on record, the internet will never permit the humans to
forget.” The observations made by the Court in this regard are as under:
“11. This Court, in plethora of cases, comes about issues where crimes
are registered without any rhyme or reason and lead to quashment of
those proceedings in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Cr. P.C., sometimes on the sole score that it was frivolous or an
act of wreaking vengeance, inter alia. It is therefore, after the accused
gets blame-free by a process of law, he cannot be seen to be carrying
the sword of him being accused on his head, for all his life. Right to
oblivion; right to be forgotten are the principles evolved by the
democratic nations, as one being a facet of right to informational
privacy. Countries like France and Italy, had by themselves evolved
the concept of right to oblivion, which dates back to 19
th
century.
Europe, in the European Union has, over privacy and personal data,
evolved the principle of right to be forgotten, as a right to be a part of
ones right to personality, which encompasses dignity, honour and
right to a private life. The aforesaid principles evolved from time to
time, can be paraphrased into what could become right to life under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It becomes apposite to refer to
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of JUSTICE K.S.
PUTTASWAMY(RETD) v. UNION OF INDIA
1
. The Apex Court
considers various facets of privacy; one such privacy is informational
privacy. On informational privacy, the Apex Court observes as
follows:
“Informational privacy
629. The right of an individual to exercise control over his
personal data and to be able to control his/her own life would also
encompass his right to control his existence on the internet.
Needless to say that this would not be an absolute right. The
existence of such a right does not imply that a criminal can
obliterate his past, but that there are variant degrees of mistakes,
small and big, and it cannot be said that a person should be
profiled to the nth extent for all and sundry to know.
630. A high school teacher was fired after posting on her
Facebook page that she was “so not looking forward to another
[school] year” since the school district's residents were “arrogant
and snobby”. A flight attendant was fired for posting suggestive
photos of herself in the company's uniform. [Patricia Sánchez
Abril, “Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the
Twenty-First-Century Employee”, 49 Am Bus LJ 63 at p.
69 (2012).] In the pre-digital era, such incidents would have never
occurred. People could then make mistakes and embarrass
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 99 of 144
themselves, with the comfort that the information will be typically
forgotten over time.
631. The impact of the digital age results in information on the
internet being permanent. Humans forget, but the internet does
not forget and does not let humans forget. Any endeavour to
remove information from the internet does not result in its
absolute obliteration. The footprints remain. It is thus, said that
in the digital world preservation is the norm and forgetting a
struggle [ Ravi Antani, “the resistance of memory : could the
European union's right to be forgotten exist in the united
states?”, 30 Berkeley Tech LJ 1173 (2015).].
632. The technology results almost in a sort of a permanent
storage in some way or the other making it difficult to begin life
again giving up past mistakes. People are not static, they change
and grow through their lives. They evolve. They make mistakes.
But they are entitled to re- invent themselves and reform and
correct their mistakes. It is privacy which nurtures this ability
and removes the shackles of unadvisable things which may have
been done in the past.
633. Children around the world create perpetual digital
footprints on social network websites on a 24/7 basis as they
learn their “ABCs” : Apple, Bluetooth and chat followed by
download, e-mail, Facebook, Google, Hotmail and Instagram.
[Michael L. Rustad, Sanna Kulevska, “Reconceptualizing the
right to be forgotten to enable transatlantic data flow”, (2015) 28
Harv JL & Tech 349.] They should not be subjected to the
consequences of their childish mistakes and naivety, their entire
life. Privacy of children will require special protection not just in
the context of the virtual world, but also the real world.
634. People change and an individual should be able to
determine the path of his life and not be stuck only on a path of
which he/she treaded initially. An individual should have the
capacity to change his/her beliefs and evolve as a person.
Individuals should not live in fear that the views they expressed
will forever be associated with them and thus refrain from
expressing themselves.
635. Whereas this right to control dissemination of personal
information in the physical and virtual space should not amount
to a right of total eraser of history, this right, as a part of the
larger right to privacy, has to be balanced against other
fundamental rights like the freedom of expression, or freedom of
media, fundamental to a democratic society.
636. Thus, the European Union Regulation of 2016 [Regulation
No. (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27- 4-2016 on the protection of natural persons with
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 100 of 144
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive No. 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation).] has recognised what has
been termed as “the right to be forgotten”. This does not mean
that all aspects of earlier existence are to be obliterated, as some
may have a social ramification. If we were to recognise a similar
right, it would only mean that an individual who is no longer
desirous of his personal data to be processed or stored, should be
able to remove it from the system where the personal
data/information is no longer necessary, relevant, or is incorrect
and serves no legitimate interest. Such a right cannot be
exercised where the information/data is necessary, for exercising
the right of freedom of expression and information, for
compliance with legal obligations, for the performance of a task
carried out in public interest, on the grounds of public interest in
the area of public health, for archiving purposes in the public
interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical
purposes, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal
claims. Such justifications would be valid in all cases of breach
of privacy, including breaches of data privacy.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. The Apex Court considers the entire spectrum the right to privacy
and the ‘right to be forgotten’ evolved in the European Union
Regulation of 2016, by the European Parliament. The Apex Court
recognizes the right to be forgotten to be a basic right under the right
to informational privacy. It has observed the right of an individual to
exercise control over his personal data and, to be able to control his
or her own life would encompass his right to control over its existence
on the internet. The Apex Court observes that the impact of digital age
results in information on the internet being permanent. Humans forget,
but the internet does not forget and does not let humans forget.
Therefore, the soul of the judgment of the Apex Court quoted supra is
that the footprints in certain circumstances should not be permitted to
remain, as it is an anti-thesis to right to be forgotten.
XXX XXX XXX
16. Evolving this concept of a right to be forgotten or right to erasure
have been the subject matter of the Personal Data Protection Bills
notified from time to time. The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018
recognizes the right to be forgotten. Likewise, the Personal Data
Protection Bill, 2018 also recognizes the right to correction and
erasure. The Government of India notifies the Digital Personal Data
Protection Act, 2023, on 11
th
August, 2023, to come into force from the
date of its publication in the official gazette. The Act also recognizes
the right of erasure of personal data. The aforesaid are referred only
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 101 of 144
to lay emphasis, on the fact that the law in this regard is also evolving
in the country.
17. It becomes germane at this juncture, to notice the judgment of the
Queen's Bench of the United Kingdom rendered on 13- 04-2018, which
also recognizes the said principle in NT 1 v. GOOGLE LLC
4
wherein
the Queen's Bench has held as follows:
“1. These two claims are about the “right to be forgotten” or, more
accurately, the right to have personal information “delisted” or “de -
indexed” by the operators of internet search engines (“ISEs”).
… … …
38. Point 2 highlights the fact that the CJEU regarded the sensitivity
of the data in question as an important element in striking the
balance. Point 4 explains why it may be misleading to label the right
asserted by these claimants as the “right to be forgotten”. They are
not asking to “be forgotten”. The first aspect of their claims asserts a
right not to be remembered inaccurately. Otherwise, they are asking
for accurate information about them to be “forgotten” in the narrow
sense of being removed from the search results returned by an ISE in
response to a search on the claimant's name. No doubt a successful
claim against Google would be applied to and by other ISEs. But it
does not follow that the information at issue would have to be
removed from the public record, or that a similar request would have
to be complied with by a media publisher on whose website the same
information appeared. In these proceedings the claimants are not
asking for any such remedy. It is also worth noting here a point that I
shall come back to: a successful delisting request or order in respect
of a specified URL will not prevent Google returning search results
containing that URL; it only means that the URL must not be returned
in response to a search on the claimant's name.
… … …
101. In my judgment, both versions of the argument would fail on the
alternative ground that the processing involved when Google Search
makes available third party content that happens to be of a
journalistic nature is not properly regarded as processing undertaken
“solely” or “only” for journalistic purposes, as required by Article 9
and s 32. In Google Spain, the Grand Chamber indicated at [85] that
it did not consider an ISE would process solely for journalistic
purposes, and although that was not an integral part of the Court's
reasoning I consider it is true. I also accept the argument of Ms
Proops, for the ICO that Google's approach to the journalism
exemption is to be resisted because it would have consequences that
cannot have been intended by the legislators. The argument, shortly
stated, is that the effect of ss 3, 45 and 46 of the DPA is to impose
severe constraints on the ICO's powers of enforcement where data are
processed for the special purposes. If Google's activities fall within
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 102 of 144
that description, it would be able to operate the “right to be forgotten
regime” without regulatory oversight and control. I consider my
conclusions to be consistent with the stricture contained in Article 9 of
the DP Directive, that Member States may provide for journalistic
exemptions “only if they are necessary to reconcile … privacy with …
freedom of expression”
(emphasis added).
… … …
165. Behind these competing submissions lie some obvious
difficulties. It is not a simple matter of applying s 4 of the 1974 Act,
without regard to other factor or considerations. Such a hard-edged
approach would be incompatible with human rights jurisprudence,
and the fact-sensitive approach that is required. The argument for the
ICO, and the argument with which Mr Tomlinson ended up,
acknowledge as much. The Court's task is to interpret and apply the
will of Parliament as expressed in a statute passed some 25 years
before the advent of the internet, to a set of facts of a kind that
Parliament cannot then have foreseen; to do so consistently with the
will of Parliament as expressed via the HRA in 1998; and to do so in
the light of the fact that it was not until 2004 that the Courts identified
the existence of the common law tort of misuse of private information.
The conclusions arrived at then have to be fitted into the scheme of the
“right to be forgotten”, first authoritatively recognised in a CJEU
judgment of 2014 by which this Court is bound, by reason of the 1972
Act.
… … …
230. My conclusions are:—
(1) The delisting claim is not an abuse of the court's process, as
alleged by Google.
(2) The inaccuracy complaint is upheld, and an appropriate
delisting order will be made, its terms to be the subject of argument.
(3) The remainder of the delisting claim also succeeds. An
appropriate order will be made, in terms to be the subject of
argument.
(4) The claim for misuse of private information succeeds.
(5) But Google took reasonable care, and the claimant is not entitled
to compensation or damages.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. The Queen's Bench declines to accept the contentions of Google
for delisting the name of the accused therein. The claim of the
appellant before the Queen's Bench, on an allegation of misuse of
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private information succeeded. The distilled essence of the judgments
rendered by the Apex Court and the judgment of the Delhi High
Court, as also that of the judgment of Queen's Bench all quoted supra
would mean that, even an accused who has been discharged or
acquitted honourably by a competent Court of law has a right to live
with dignity.
19. Article 21 of the Constitution of India mandates that no person
shall be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with law.
The expression ‘life’ cannot be seem to connote a mere animal
existence, it has a much wider meaning. It takes within its sweep right
to live with dignity. In the crime, once the accused gets acquitted -
honourably, discharged by a competent Court of law, or this Court
would quash those crimes in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. and those orders become final, the shadow
of crime, if permitted to continue in place of shadow of dignity, on any
citizen, it would be travesty of the concept of life under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Every citizen born in this nation, governed
by the Constitution, has a right to live with dignity. What is being
sought for, is masking of the name of the petitioner in the cause title of
the case found in the records of this Court.
20. In the peculiar facts of the case, no fault can be found with such a
demand. I deem it appropriate to observe that when identical demands
are made by those accused or victims, as the case would be, accused
who come within the circumstances narrated hereinbefore, the Fourth
Estate should also consider masking, delisting and deleting their
names from their respective digital records and not drive them to this
Court seeking such deletion. However, it is made clear that mere
erasure of the name of the petitioner in the cause title, does not mean
that he is entitled to seek such erasure from the police records. The
direction would be only to enable the internet forget, like the humans
forget. If it is allowed to stay on record, the internet will never permit
the humans to forget.”
185. In State of H.P. v. X2, 2024 SCC OnLine HP 3169, the Court, relying
upon directions of the Supreme Court, directed masking of names in digital
records, holding that “the shadow of crime, if permitted to continue and
substitute its place for the shadow of dignity on any citizen, it would be a
travesty of the concept of life under Article 21.”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 104 of 144
186. It must also be noted that this Court's own Registry has developed and
operationalised masking software, enabling masking of names at the stage of
e-filing when ordered by the Court.
V.
DE-LINKING / DE-INDEXING
187. The principle underlying de-indexing has been explained by the
Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights, in the judgment
rendered in Hurbain v. Belgium (supra), wherein, the Court considered
whether the continued prominence of a lawfully published article in search
results disproportionately intruded upon private life. The measure directed
was not erasure of the article, which remained preserved in the archives, but
its de-indexing from search engines so as to moderate accessibility.
188. De-indexing and de-linking are terms that are used interchangeably in
the context of the present proceedings, and this Court uses them to refer to
the same relief, that is, the removal of a specific URL or record from the
name-based search results generated by a search engine or legal database
platform in response to a search query entered in the name of an individual.
189. De-indexing does not erase the judicial record. The judgment or order
continues to exist on the court's website, on Indian Kanoon, or on whichever
platform hosts it. It remains accessible to anyone who knows the case
number, the citation, the court, or any other purposeful identifier. The record
is preserved in its entirety for institutional, precedential and accountability
purposes. What changes is only that the concerned name (whether an
individual or an entity) ceases to function as an unlimited retrieval key that
instantly and effortlessly surfaces the record for any casual internet user who
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 105 of 144
happens to search that name. In respect to ‘Indian Kanoon’, disabling of
name- based search functionality serves the purpose.
190. The relief of de-indexing, properly understood, is therefore not an
interference with open justice. As noticed, ‘open justice ’ requires that
judicial records exist, be maintained and be accessible to those with a
legitimate interest. De-indexing does not touch any of these requirements .
191. The relief of de-indexing is also distinct from the relief of masking
(which is addressed separately in this judgment). De-indexing operates at
the level of the search engine or legal database platform. Masking operates
at the level of the court record itself. It is a direction to a court or its registry
to replace a party's name with a neutral reference in the publicly accessible
digital version of a judgment, while preserving the un-redacted version in
the court’s internal records. The two reliefs are complementary and address
different dimensions of the same underlying harm. De-indexing reduces the
digital amplification of the harm whereas masking addresses the harm at its
source in the court record. Together, they provide the most complete
available protection of the right to informational privacy in the digital
domain, while preserving the principles of open justice and transparency.
192. De-indexing affords a relief, which while meaningful and necessary is
limited in nature, in relation to the violation of informational privacy , of the
kind suffered by the petitioners. The violation does not consist merely of the
searchability of a name, but the nature of the ‘ results driven’ algorithmic
logic of a commercial platform , designed to highlight what is ‘most clicked’ ,
‘most shared’ , and ‘ most sensational’ .
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 106 of 144
193. A search on a person’s name in conjunction with the terms such as
‘arrested’, ‘accused’, ‘case’, or ‘court’, returns results that are ranked by
engagement and not by accuracy or completeness. The algorithm that
determines this ranking is not a function of ‘open justice’, but is designed to
maximize commercial interest. De-indexing moderates the harm to some
extent in as much as it removes the specific URL from ‘name-based result.’
Such relief is liable be granted in a deserving case. The same principle
applies to video content hosted on platforms such as ‘YouTube’ which is
detrimental to certain of the petitioners. Such content, when it surfaces in
response to a name-based search, causes the identical harm that de-indexing
is designed to address viz. the disproportionate and indiscriminate
amplification of damaging material in response to a search.
194. The protection under right to informational privacy under Article 21 i s
not merely against the disclosure of personal information but against an
individual being involuntarily and perpetually defined in the digital domain,
by such projection, and that too, regardless of the outcome of the underlying
legal and judicial proceedings pertaining to such conduct (which is the
subject matter of a video or a news article).
195. As noticed above, ‘de-indexing’ is in the nature of a limited relief in a
deserving case involving invasion of informational privacy rights as a result
of operation of search engines, given that the relief operates at the level of
specified URLs and leaves untouched the underlying architecture of search
engines. Yet it is imperative to ensure that the modalities of de-indexing are
The legal parameters/ Tests for directing ‘de-indexing’
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 107 of 144
applied in a principled and consistent manner, avoiding both unconstrained
discretion and mechanical application. The determination of whether such
measures are warranted must be guided by a variety of considerations that
together provide the framework for balancing privacy and transparency.
196. The relevant factors are: (i) the nature of the information sought to be
moderated, that is, whether it pertains to intimate aspects of private life,
professional conduct, or matters of public record; (ii) the time that has
elapsed since publication and the continuing relevance of the disclosure; (iii)
the public role of the individual, i.e., those who occupy positions of
responsibility or influence are subject to heightened demands of
transparency; (iv) the accuracy and completeness of the material, that is,
outdated, misleading, or partial disclosures cannot sustain a continuing
intrusion into privacy; (v) the impact upon dignity and autonomy, including
reputational harm, stigma, or disproportionate interference with the
individual's ability to lead a dignified life, weighed against any legitimate
public welfare served by disclosure; (vi) the degree of accessibility in the
digital sphere, where search engines amplify the reach and effect of
information; and (vii) the effect upon freedom of expression and the
integrity of public records.
197. These factors are not to be applied as a checklist or a set of boxes to
be ticked. They are to be weighed contextually, with due regard to the facts
of each case. The decisive consideration always has to be the facts and
circumstances of the individual case.
198. Within this broader framework, the following specific tests can be
applied:
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 108 of 144
199. The most significant factor is the outcome of the underlying legal
proceedings. Where proceedings have resulted in acquittal or discharge and
it has been judicially determined that the accusation was not established, the
presumption of innocence requires that this determination be given full
practical effect, including in the digital domain. An acquittal that is
effective in law but negated by the permanent digital searchability of the
accusation, results in an incongruity.
Test One: The c haracter of the information and the outcome of
concluded proceedings
200. Similarly, where proceedings have been quashed, the same Court
tantamounts to a determination that those proceedings ough t never to have
been initiated. Where proceedings have been concluded by settlement or
compounding, the complainant has consensually extinguished the matter. In
each of these cases, the continued unlimited name-based searchability of the
records fails the proportionality test, that is, the harm to the individual is
disproportionate to any legitimate purpose served.
201. For purely private civil and matrimonial disputes, as mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs, K.S. Puttaswamy
6
6
“323. Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage,
procreation, the home and sexual orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards
individual autonomy and recognises the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. Personal
choices governing a way of life are intrinsic to privacy. Privacy protects heterogeneity and recognises the plurality and
diversity of our culture. While the legitimate expectation of privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone
and from the private to the public arenas, it is important to underscore that privacy is not lost or surrendered merely
because the individual is in a public place. Privacy attaches to the person since it is an essential facet of the dignity of
the human being.”
(supra) identified family life,
marriage, procreation, and personal relationships as lying at the very core of
the protected zone of privacy under Article 21. Once such proceedings have
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 109 of 144
concluded, their continued unlimited digital searchability serves no purpose
and has no bearing on ‘open justice’.
202. As recognised in R. Rajagopal
Test Two: The Public Role of the Individual
7
203. However, this principle does not extend to every aspect of a public
figure's existence. A public figure’s status in one domain does not transform
the intimate details of their private life, including matrimonial disputes,
personal relationships, or conduct entirely unrelated to their public role, into
matters of public interest. The public figure principle is limited to conduct in
the public capacity.
(supra), public officials have no right
to privacy with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of
their official duties. This principle extends to all those who voluntarily enter
public life, their conduct in their public role is a legitimate subject of public
scrutiny. Where judicial proceedings relate directly to the manner in which a
public figure has exercised their public role, the public interest in the
continued accessibility of that information is of constitutional weight.
7
“18. The principle of the said decision has been held applicable to “public figures” as well. This is for the
reason that public figures like public officials often play an influential role in ordering society. It has been
held that as a class the public figures have, as the public officials have, access to mass media
communication both to influence the policy and to counter-criticism of their views and activities. On this
basis, it has been held that the citizen has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such
persons and that the freedom of press extends to engaging in uninhibited debate about the involvement of
public figures in public issues and events.
26 (3) There is yet another exception to the rule in (1) above — indeed, this is not an exception but an
independent rule. In the case of public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that matter, the
remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the
discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements
which are not true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with
reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or
media) to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to
prove that what he has written is true….”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 110 of 144
204. Even initially lawful processing of accurate data may, with the
passage of time and change in circumstances, lose its justification for
continued processing. As recognised in Google Spain S.L.
Test Three: Accuracy and Continuing Relevance
8
205. Inaccurate information stands in an even stronger position . Where
information is demonstrably false, its continued name-based searchability
has no claim to protection on the ground of continuing relevance. The
principles of open justice and public interest, lend no support to the
perpetuation of a demonstrably false association between a person and those
proceedings.
(supra), the
lawfulness of processing personal data is not static but must be assessed in
light of its continued necessity and relevance. Where information has
become inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation
to any purpose that can be identified, its continued searchability fails the
proportionality test.
206. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are categories where relief in the
form of de-indexing or masking may not be apposite. The same are as under:
Cases where de-indexing may not be appropriate
i. Cases involving conviction for offences against women or children:
where a person stands convicted of such an offence, there subsists a
8
“93. It follows from those requirements, laid down in Article 6(1)(c) to (e) of Directive 95/46, that even
initially lawful processing of accurate data may, in the course of time, become incompatible with the
directive where those data are no longer necessary in the light of the purposes for which they were
collected or processed. That is so in particular where they appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer
relevant, or excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed.”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 111 of 144
continuing public interest, inter alia, for the protection of potential
victims and those responsible for their safety, in the accessibility of
that information. This interest does not attenuate with the passage of
time. Article 15(3) of the Constitution and enactments such as t he
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012,
reflect the legislative recognition of the protective concern towards
this category.
ii. Cases involving persons convicted of offences involving breach of
public trust, including offences by public servants, elected
representatives, and those in positions of fiduciary responsibility. The
principle of public accountability, which underlies the constitutional
framework of democratic governance, demands that the public retain
access to information about the abuse of public trust.
207. Where proceedings have abated by death without any merits based
determination, the right to be forgotten does not arise in its primary form,
which flows from the vindication of the concerned person/s in judicial
proceedings. However, de-indexing may be warranted on the grounds of
proportionality, where digital accessibility occasions disproportionate and
continuing harm to the surviving family, particularly the children who had
no involvement in the proceedings.
De-indexing where proceedings have abated
208. An important aspect is the territorial scope of a de-indexing direction.
For instance, Google operates multiple country -specific versions of its
The Territorial Scope of De-indexing
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 112 of 144
search engine, including google.co.in for India, as well as its global platform
at google.com. A de-indexing direction limited to google.co.in would be of
limited practical utility since google.com is freely and easily accessible to
any person in India.
209. The fundamental right to informational privacy under Article 21 of
the Constitution is not a right of limited territorial application. The harm
caused by unlimited digital accessibility is not confined to searches
conducted on any particular domain. A remedy that can be circumvented by
the simple expedient of changing a domain suffix is not a meaningful
remedy. De-indexing directions issued pursuant to this framework shall
accordingly operate globally, across all versions and domains of the relevant
search engine, to the extent necessary to give meaningful and effective
protection to the petitioner's fundamental right to informational privacy
under Article 21.
VI.
210. Having addressed the relief of de-indexing, it is now necessary to
examine in greater detail the relief of masking.
MASKING: JURISDICTION, ENTITLEMENT AND PARAMETERS
211. Masking, in the context of the present proceedings, refer s to the
replacement of a party’s name and such other personal identifiers (including
address and identity details) as are necessary, with a neutral reference such as ‘ABC’ or ‘XYZ’ in the publicly accessible digital version of a judicial
record. It is a direction to a court’s registry to modify the publicly accessible
version of the record in this limited respect, while preserving the complete un-redacted version in the court's internal records without any modification.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 113 of 144
212. Masking does not erase the judgment. The reasoning, findings, legal
conclusions, case number, the court details, date etc., remain entirely intact
and publicly accessible. The judgment continues to serve every institutional
and precedential purpose that it was intended to serve. What changes is only
the direct association between a specific individual's name and the judicial
record in the public digital domain. A person's name ceases to function as
the searchable key that unlocks the record for casual public access. The
record itself, in all its substance, remains accessible to courts, parties,
advocates, authorities, and any person who seeks it through purposeful
means.
213. Masking is therefore not censorship or suppression of judicial records,
but a precisely calibrated intervention that gives effect to the right to
informational privacy while preserving the full requirements of open justice.
As the Karnataka High Court observed in XXXX v. High Court of
Karnataka (supra), the direction is “only to enable the internet f orget, like
the humans forget. If it is allowed to stay on record, the internet will never
permit the humans to forget.”
214. In State of H.P. v. X2 (supra), the Court, relying upon directions
issued by the Supreme Court in XXXXX v. YYYY2 , 2022 SSC online SC
1123, emphasized that the right to privacy, of which the right to be forgotten
or the right to be left alone is an inherent aspect, necessitates masking of
names of both the accused and the prosecutrix in digital records. The Court
observed that continued visibility of such identifiers in search engines would
jeopardize dignity and cause irreparable hardship. The relevant observations
are as follows:
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 114 of 144
“19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a case concerning squabble between
husband and wife, wherein the High Court had rejected the plea of the
parties therein to mask their names, directed the High Court to evolve
methodology for masking the names of both the accused and the victim.
The order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case XXXXX v. YYYY2,
2022 SSC online SC, neutral citation 2024 : KHC : 14572, on dated
18.07.2022 reads as follows:—
“i) Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has entered appearance and
joins in the request made by the petitioner.
ii) The petitioner submits that the display of her name in the public
domain with respect to offences committed on the modesty of woman and
Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) has caused immense loss by way of
social stigma and infringement of her personal privacy. Even if the name
of the respondent No. 1 appears, it causes the same result.
iii) The petitioner pleads the
iv) The IA and the Miscellaneous Application accordingly stand disposed
of.
‘right to be forgotten’ and ‘right of eraser’
being rights of privacy, the name of the petitioner as well as the
respondent be removed/masked along with the address, identification
details and case numbers to the extent that the same are not visible for
search engines. We thus, call upon the Registry of the Supreme Court to
examine the issue and to work out how the name of both the petitioner
and respondent No. 1 along with address details can be masked so that
they do not appear visible for any search engine.
v) The needful be done within three weeks from today by the Registry.”
20. Thus, there can be no dispute that right of privacy of which the right
to be forgotten and the right to be left alone are inherent aspects. Once
that be so, obviously, the names of the prosecutrix as also the appellant
need to be masked/erased so that they do not appear/visible in any
search engine, least the same is likely to jeopardize and cause
irreparable hardship, prejudice etc., not only to the respondent and the
prosecutrix, but to their little daughter in their day-today life, career
prospects etc. etc.
21. Article 21 of the Constitution of India mandates that no person shall
be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with law. It is more
than settled that the expression ‘life’ cannot be seem to connote a mere
animal existence it has a much wider meaning. It takes within its sweep
right to live with dignity. In the crime, once the accused gets
acquitted/honorably discharged by a competent Court of law or this
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 115 of 144
Court, and the order becomes final, the shadow of crime, if permitted to
continue and substitute its place for the shadow of dignity on any citizen,
it would be a travesty of the concept of life under Article 21. Every
person has a right to live with dignity.
22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we not only do not find any merit
in the instant application and accordingly reject the application for grant
of leave to appeal, but also direct masking the names of the appellant
and the prosecutrix from the data base of the learned Special Judge,
Bilaspur and further direct the Registrar General of this Court to mask
the names of the appellant in the digital records, pertaining to the instant
appeal.”
215. The entitlement to masking flows from the same constitutional
foundation as the entitlement to de-indexing, that is, the right to
informational privacy as a facet of Article 21, as recognised in K.S.
Puttaswamy (supra). The proportionality analysis that underlies the right to
be forgotten is equally applicable. The continued association of an
individual's name with a judicial record in the public digital domain causes
disproportionate harm to informational privacy, dignity and reputation that
is not justified by any legitimate public interest in the eligible categories
identified in this judgment.
Legal Parameters for granting the relief of Masking
216. In cases of acquittal, discharge, or quashing, the presumption of
innocence, (a substantive guarantee under Article 21), requires that the
judicial determination of innocence be given full practical effect. Masking gives that determination its full effect at the level of the court record itself. In cases of settlement, the consensual extinguishment of the proceedings by the complainant removes any basis for the continued association of the individual's name with the record. In matrimonial and purely private civil
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 116 of 144
disputes, K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), at paragraph 323, identifies the sanctity
of family life, marriage and personal relationships as lying at the very core
of the protected zone of privacy. The intimate details of such proceedings
have no legitimate claim to continued name-based retrievability once they
have concluded.
217. The same absolute bars that deny de-indexing in cases of convictions
for offences against women or children, breach of public trust, and the
public conduct of public figures, apply equally to masking. There is no
separate or more permissive standard.
218. The question of jurisdiction in relation to masking requires careful
consideration. Unlike de-indexing, which is a direction to a private platform,
‘masking’ would involve a direction to a Court or more precisely to a
Court's registry, to modify the publicly accessible version of its own judicial
record.
219. The general principle, consistently applied by courts in India, is that a
request for masking or anonymisation of a judicial record ought to be made
before the court that rendered the original order or judgment. In Abhishek
Beri v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 15145/2024, this Court observed
9
9
“3. In this regard, it is noted that directions for masking can be issued by the concerned Court that has
rendered the original order/ judgment. Accordingly, Mr. Chaudhury counsel for Petitioner states that at
the first instance he will make a request to the concerned court for appropriate directions for masking the
details of the parties. Consequently, he requests permission to withdraw the present writ petition, with
liberty to reapply if the Petitioner’s request is not entertained by the concerned court.”
that
directions for masking can be issued by the concerned court that rendered
the original order or judgment. The underlying rationale for this position is
that the originating court has direct supervisory authority over its own
registry/ records, and is in the best position to carry out the modification
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 117 of 144
while ensuring the un- redacted version is properly preserved. For this
reason, in the opinion of this Court, masking of subordinate court records is
more appropriately left to the originating court.
220. The following parameters would govern the grant of relief of
masking:
i. Only names and personal identifiers are masked, not the substance of
the judgment. The reasoning, findings, legal conclusions, case
number, court details, relevant dates, etc., remain intact and publicly
accessible. The judicial record retains its full institutional,
precedential and accountability functions.
ii. The complete and un-redacted version of the judgment is preserved in
the court's internal records without exception. Masking applies only to
the publicly accessible digital versions. The un-redacted version
remains accessible to courts, parties, advocates, and authorities with a
legitimate legal purpose.
iii. Masking operates both retrospectively, in respect of the existing
publicly accessible digital version and prospectively, in respect of any
future digitisation or uploading.
iv. A masking order by the concerned Court constitutes an order of a
Court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of Rule 3(1)(d) of the
Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media
Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. Upon receipt of such an order, Google and
other search engine operators are obliged to de-index the masked
judgment from name-based search results and ‘Indian Kanoon’ and
other hosts are obliged to disable name-based search functionality on
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 118 of 144
their platform/s in respect of that judgment. The concerned Court may
expressly include this direction in its masking order.
v. The concerned Court retains jurisdiction to review and revoke a
masking direction if subsequent circumstances bring the matter within
the absolute bars or other categories where relief is not available.
vi. Masking applications must be disposed of expeditiously, having
regard to the continuing nature of the harm caused by the availability
of personal identifiers in the public digital domain.
221. Where this Court has directed de-indexing in respect of any of the
petitioners, such petitioners shall also be at liberty to seek masking of their
names and personal identifiers from the publicly accessible digital versions
of the relevant judicial record by moving an appropriate application before
the concerned Court that rendered the original order or judgment. Such an
application, where made, shall be decided expeditiously.
Liberty to Seek Masking from Concerned Courts
E.
222. In the above conspectus, what falls for consideration is whether the
limited relief of de -indexing (much short of complete takedown) of the
offending digital material can be granted in the present petitions. As noticed, directions regarding complete takedown have previously been issued by
APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES TO THE
PRESENT PETITIONS
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 119 of 144
certain High Courts
10
, but qua some of the said orders, the Supreme Court
has passed interim orders. The de-indexing direction being considered in
these proceedings are in a much narrower domain. De -indexing has also
been ordered in various other proceedings.
11
223. The largest group of petitions before this Court involves persons who
have been acquitted of criminal charges, discharged from criminal
proceedings, or whose cases have been quashed. These petitions share a
common foundation that the judicial process has formally determined that
the criminal allegations against these persons were not established.
Petitions Involving Acquittal, Discharge and Quashing
224. The right to reputation, recognised as an inseparable facet of Article
21 in Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P
12
10
Karthick Theodore v. Registrar General, Madras High Court (W.A.(MD) No. 1901 of 2021); Rakesh
Jagdish Kalra v. India Today Group, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5113.
., (2013) 10 SCC 591 and Om Prakash
11
Vysakh K.G. v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 7337.
12
“18. Allegations against any person if found to be false or made forging someone else's signature may
affect his reputation. Reputation is a sort of right to enjoy the good opinion of others and it is a personal
right and an enquiry to reputation is a personal injury. Thus, scandal and defamation are injurious to
reputation. Reputation has been defined in dictionary as “to have a good name; the credit, honour, or
character which is derived from a favourable public opinion or esteem and character by report”. Personal
rights of a human being include the right of reputation. A good reputation is an element of personal
security and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty and
property. Therefore, it has been held to be a necessary element in regard to right to life of a citizen under
Article 21 of the Constitution. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 recognises
the right to have opinions and the right to freedom of expression under Article 19 is subject to the right of
reputation of others. Reputation is “not only a salt of life but the purest treasure and the most precious
perfume of life”. (Vide Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry [(1989) 1 SCC 494 : AIR 1989 SC 714] , Port of
Bombay v. DilipkumarRaghavendranath Nadkarni [(1983) 1 SCC 124 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 61 : AIR 1983
SC 109] , Nilgiris Bar Assn. v. T.K. Mahalingam [(1998) 1 SCC 550 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 450] , Mehmood
Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2012) 8 SCC 1 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 34 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 733 :
(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 449 : AIR 2012 SC 2573] , Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath
Agrawal [(2012) 7 SCC 288 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 224 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 347 : AIR 2012 SC 2586]
and Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. [(2013) 2 SCC 398 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 655] )”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 120 of 144
Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan
13
(2014) 5 SCC 417, requires that legal
exoneration be given full effect, including in the digital domain. It is,
therefore, held that persons, who have been acquitted, discharged, or whose
proceedings have been quashed are entitled to have that legal determination
reflected in their digital identity/persona. The question in each case is
whether any specific competing interest qualifies or limits that entitlement.
225. The petitioner stands acquitted of criminal charges by concurrent
findings of two courts including this Court. The proceedings have attained
finality. The petitioner is a private individual. There is nothing in the record
to suggest that the subject matter retains any continuing relevance to any
matter of public concern, or that the petitioner continues in any role where
these proceedings would bear upon any legitimate public assessment of him.
The right to informational privacy under Article 21 entitles the petitioner to
relief. Accordingly, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/
legal database platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all
platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 3918/2021
13
“Reputation is fundamentally a glorious amalgam and unification of virtues which makes a man feel
proud of his ancestry and satisfies him to bequeath it as a part of inheritance on posterity. It is a nobility in
itself for which a conscientious man would never barter it with all the tea of China or for that matter all the
pearls of the sea. The said virtue has both horizontal and vertical qualities. When reputation is hurt, a man
is half- dead. It is an honour which deserves to be equally preserved by the downtrodden and the privileged.
The aroma of reputation is an excellence which cannot be allowed to be sullied with the passage of time.
The memory of nobility no one would like to lose; none would conceive of it being atrophied. It is dear to
life and on some occasions it is dearer than life. And that is why it has become an inseparable facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution. No one would like to have his reputation dented. One would like to perceive
it as an honour rather than popularity. When a court deals with a matter that has something likely to affect
a person's reputation, the normative principles of law are to be cautiously and carefully adhered to. The
advertence has to be sans emotion and sans populist perception, and absolutely in accord with the doctrine
of audi alteram partem before anything adverse is said.”
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 121 of 144
226. The petitioners have been acquitted yet continue to be associated in
the digital public domain with allegations of smuggling and illegal activities.
It appears evident that the impugned articles constitute an impermissible
encroachment on the petitioner’s reputational and informational privacy
rights. As such, grant of relief is merited. In the circumstances, the
concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base platforms
are directed to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and domains,
name-based search functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news
articles complained of in the petition. The petitioners are at liberty to pursue
such further remedies as may be available against the publishers on account
of inaccurate/ defamatory content.
W.P.(C) 8557/2021
227. The petitioner was acquitted of all charges in the proceedings initiated
by the CBI. The said acquittal is confirmed by the dismissal of CRL.L.P. 565/2018. In a separate matter, a closure report was accepted by the Special
Judge in CC No. 01/2021.
W.P.(C) 11553/2021
228. Also, the orders sought to be de-linked contain not merely the
petitioner's personal details but also particulars of his children, including
their identities and other personal information. Kaul J. in K.S. Puttaswamy
(supra) expressly recognised that the privacy of children requires special
protection not merely in the physical world but in the digital domain as well.
Children cannot be made to bear the digital consequences of proceedings in
which they had no involvement and over which they had no control.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 122 of 144
Accordingly, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data
base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and
domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition, with particular
emphasis on the removal of identifying details of the petitioner's children
from publicly accessible digital records.
229. The petitioner was acquitted as far back as in 2010, of serious charges
including abetment of suicide and cruelty under Sections 498A/306/34
Indian Penal code, 1860 (IPC). Whatever public interest may have attached
to these proceedings has long since dissipated. The right of an individual to
move beyond a chapter of life that the law has formally closed, as
recognised in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra) as an aspect of the right to privacy,
is directly involved in the present petition. In the circumstances, the
concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base platforms
are directed to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and domains,
name-based search functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news
articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 4094/2023
230. The petitioner was acquitted of charges of rape and criminal
intimidation under Sections 328/376/506 IPC. He urges a broader principle
to the effect that the identity of persons accused of sexual offences ought to
be protected upon acquittal.
W.P.(C) 5400/2023
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 123 of 144
231. This submission merits careful consideration. The law already
protects the identity of victims of sexual offences but the stigma associated
with an accusation of rape is of such severity and permanence that an
acquittal, without more, is frequently insufficient to undo the reputational
damage. A person acquitted of charges of committing rape carries
indefinitely, the association with such accusation in name-based search
results, not because they were found guilty but because the accusation was
made and is permanently retrievable. This Court is of the view that in cases
of acquittal from charges of sexual offences, where the petitioner is a private
individual and no specific articulable continuing public interest in their
identification can be established, the case for masking and de-indexing
follows almost as a matter of course from the acquittal itself. Accordingly,
the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base
platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and
domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
232. The petitioner seeks removal of content pertaining to Crime No.
420/20 and consequential proceedings. The petitioner was acquitted of the
charges vide judgment dated 17.09.2021 passed by the Additional Sessions
Judge-06, Gwalior. In light of acquittal, the concerned respondents/ search
engine operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and
disable, across all platforms and domains, name-based search functionality
in respect of the judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the
petition.
W.P.(C) 2353/2023
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 124 of 144
233. The petitioners were acquitted of the charges of sexual offence under
Sections 376 and 506 IPC. Multiple orders and judgments from different
stages of the proceedings remain publicly accessible through name based
search. The constitutional position of these petitioners is directly analogous
to that of the petitioner in W.P.(C) 5400/2023 and the same reasoning
applies with equal force. In the circumstances, the concerned respondents/
search engine operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index,
and disable, across all platforms and domains, name-based search
functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news articles complained of
in the petition.
W.P.(C) 3687/2024
234. The petitioner was discharged by this Court vide judgment dated
30.05.2024 in Crl. Rev.no. 745/2023. The SLP filed against the said
judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 15.10.2024.
The present petition warrants emphasis on a particular aspect, viz., that this
Court’s own order of discharge is not being given full practical effect in the
digital domain. A court order that discharges a person from criminal proceedings must carry its legal consequence into the digital domain as well.
In the circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/
legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all
platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 2887/2025
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 125 of 144
235. The matter was settled between the parties through a Memorandum of
Understanding dated 29.09.2021 and the proceedings emanating from FIR
no. 293/2021 were quashed by this Court vide order dated 02.06.2022
passed in CRL.M.C 1207/2022. In the circumstances, two independent
grounds, warranting relief emerge, namely, consensual settlement and
judicial quashing. Considering the convergence of the said reliefs, this Court
is of the view that continued searchability of content about the FIR a nd the
petitioner's arrest serves no purpose that can withstand constitutional
scrutiny. In the circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine
operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable,
across all platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect
of the judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 5608/2023
236. The FIR against the petitioners was quashed by this Court vide order
dated 14.09.2023 in CRL.M.C. No. 1274/2023. Howeve r, despite such
quashing, the content pertaining to the petitioners’ arrest in connection with
the said FIR continues to be available in the digital domain, sustaining an
association with criminal allegations that this Court has itself determined
should not be continued. In the circumstances, the concerned respondents/
search engine operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index,
and disable, across all platforms and domains, name-based search
functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news articles complained of
in the petition.
W.P.(C) 15523/2023
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 126 of 144
237. FIR No. 29/2022, lodged against the petitioner, alleged rape and
sexual assault. The investigation pursuant to the said FIR resulted in a
closure report. The protest petition was dismissed by the concerned
Metropolitan Magistrate. The revision petition in CRL.REV.P. 129/2023
was also dismissed vide order dated 09.02.2023. Evidently, the said closure
has been affirmed through successive judicial determinations. The particular
stigma that attaches to a person accused of committing sexual offences, as
discussed in the context of WP(C) 5400/2023, makes the case for relief quite
compelling. In the circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine
operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable,
across all platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect
of the judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 13461/2023
238. The petitioner was named in an FIR against which the CBI, upon
investigation, filed a closure report noting that no case was made against the
petitioner. The concerned Special Judge, CBI accepted the closure report
vide order dated 25.11.2019. It is noted that certain articles of derogatory
nature were published even before the investigation had concluded. The said
articles remain accessible in the public domain on a name -based search,
despite the closure of proceedings by the CBI . The disparity between the
outcome of due process and what the internet perpetuates is precisely the
harm that the right to informational privacy requires to address.
Accordingly, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data
base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and
W.P.(C) 14360/2021
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 127 of 144
domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
239. The petitioner additionally seeks a direction for publication of news
regarding the aforesaid order dated 25.11.2019. This prayer is declined,
while granting liberty to the petitioner to pursue such private remedies as
may be available through appropriate proceedings.
240. FIR No. 67/2006 was quashed by this Court vide order dated
04.05.2023 passed in CRL.M.C. 1460/2023. Despite the said quashing, the
judicial records associated with the said FIR continue to be publicly
displayed. In line with the reasoning set forth in W.P.(C) 15523/2023, the
concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base platforms
are directed to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and domains,
name-based search functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news
articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 14696/2025
241. The petitioner was arrayed in five CBI cases, viz, Special (CBI) Case
nos. 9/2011; 65/2011; 66/2011; 71/2011; 72/2011. Pursuant to the filing of
the charge sheet/s, the petitioner was discharged from all five cases by the
concerned Special Judge vide orders dated 17.06.2015 and 22.06.2015. A
discharge from CBI proceedings after the filing of a charge sheet/s is a
significant judicial determination. Considering that over a decade has
elapsed since the petitioner’s discharge, no continuing public interest lies in
the association of the petitioner's name with the said proceedings.
W.P.(C) 1567/2025
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 128 of 144
242. The prejudicial context referred to in the petition, despite its
irrelevance (i) has caused the petitioner and his family embarrassment and
social hardship; and (ii) has affected and prejudiced his engagement with
potential clients and investors.
243. In the circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine
operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable,
across all platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect
of the judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
244. FIR No. 167/2021 was registered against the petitioner alleging
offences under Sections 328/342/376/34 IPC. After trial, the petitioner was
acquitted vide judgment dated 13.11.2024 passed by the ASJ (FTSC)(RC)-
02/West/Tis Hazari Courts in SC No. 534/23. Despite the said acquittal, the
content published during the trial remains available in public domain on a
name-based search. Needless to say, the proximity of acquittal is not a
relevant factor; the right to informational privacy arises from the legal
determination of acquittal itself. In the circumstances, the concerned
respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base platforms are directed
to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and domains, name-based
search functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news articles
complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 11714/2025
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 129 of 144
Petitions Involving Settlement and Compounding
245. The petitioner was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, a provision that is in its essence a commercial
remedy between private parties. Subsequent to conviction, the parties
arrived at a settlement before the Mediation Centre, recorded vide order
dated 15.09.2022 by the ASJ- 02, East District, Karkardooma District Courts.
W.P.(C) 9824/2023
246. The compounding of the offence through settlement extinguished the
proceedings by the consensual act of the parties. The complainant's own
election to compound extinguishes whatever public interest may have
existed. In the circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine
operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable,
across all platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect
of the judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
247. The petitioner claims himself to be a public figure. FIR No.
0418/2022 alleging commission of sexual offences under Sections 376 and
506 of the IPC was lodged against the petitioner. The said FIR was quashed
by this Court vide order dated 06.02.2024 in CRL.MC. No. 5294/2022 on
the basis of a settlement between the petitioner and the complainant.
W.P.(C) 9940/2024
248. Settlement based quashing in matters involving sexual offences and
the public figure status of the petitioner impinges upon the petitioner’s entitlement to relief. There is a continuing public interest in the accessibility of proceedings that touch upon serious allegations against such public
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 130 of 144
figure. As such, it is untenable to grant relief as sought by the present
petitioner.
Petitions Involving Purely Private Civil and Matrimonial Disputes
249. These two petitions present materially identical circumstances and are
thus considered together. Both petitioners were parties to matrimonial
disputes that attained finality in 2015 through a consent orders passed by the
Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 6827/2015 and SLP (Civil) No.
19646/2014, respectively, granting a decree of div orce and quashing all
pending criminal proceedings between the parties therein.
W.P.(C) 16476/2023 and W.P.(C) 6695/2024
250. Matrimonial disputes lie at the very core of the zone of privacy as
identified in K.S Puttaswamy (supra), the sanctity of family life, marriage,
and personal relationships. Those proceedings concluded by consent nearly
a decade ago. Whatever public interest may have existed has long been
extinguished. Therefore, the petitioners in both the petitions are entitled to
relief.
251. Accordingly, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/
legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all
platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition. The petitioner
is relegated to avail appropriate remedies as regards the prayer in W.P.(C)
16476/2023 for removal of judgment/s from the Supreme Court's website.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 131 of 144
252. The petitioner was embroiled in multiple matrimonial proceedings
before this Court. The petitioner's right to informational privacy in respect of
the intimate details of her matrimonial life outweighs any residual public
interest in the name-based searchability of these records. In the
circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal
data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all
platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 11862/2025
253. The petitioner seeks removal of the judgment/order dated 30.05.2023
in MAT.APP.(F.C) 49/2023 containing intimate personal details including
the terms of settlement between the parties, details of the matrimonial
relationship and a list of assets of the parties. The combination of the purely
private nature of the matrimonial dispute and the consensual nature of the
settlement warrants that appropriate relief be granted. In the circumstances,
the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base
platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and
domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 7763/2024
254. The petitioner seeks masking and removal of the judgment dated
02.04.2024 in MAT APP (FC) 321/2018. Her former husband is stated to be
a public figure and renowned chef. His public status as a chef does not
W.P.(C) 6047/2024
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 132 of 144
transform the intimate details of his private marriage into matters of public
interest. The public figure principle relates to conduct in the public role. The
petitioner is a private individual whose right to informational privacy is not
diminished by her former husband's professional public status. In the
circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal
data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all
platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
255. The petitioner seeks restriction of name-based search in respect of the
judgment dated 06.04.2013 in Civil Suit No. 380/12 which gives an adverse
impression about his conduct towards his now deceased father and his
relationship with his wife. This is a purely private civil dispute between
private individuals concerning personal and family matters. No public
interest of any kind attaches to its continued name-based searchability.
W.P.(C) 12179/2024
256. Over a decade has elapsed since the judgment in question came to be
passed. In the circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine
operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable,
across all platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect
of the judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 133 of 144
Other Petitions
257. The petitioner was never a party to the proceedings before the Special
Judge, NDPS, in CR No.1/15. His name appears in the order dated
13.10.2015 solely as an identifier , as the husband of a respondent, and the
petitioner had no role in those proceedings whatsoever. The digital identity
of the petitioner has been affected not by any proceeding to which he was a
party and not by any proceeding in which the open justice principle can be
invoked in relation to the petitioner, but by an incidental reference in a
proceeding entirely concerning third parties.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016
258. No principle of open justice, freedom of expression, or public interest
can justify the continued prominent searchability of a person's name in
connection with criminal proceedings in which they had no involvement. In
the circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal
data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all
platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
259. The petitioner obtained the order dated 08.04.2019 in CS SCJ 1194/18
for a purely administrative purpose, that is, to resolve a discrepancy in his
name arising from a name change, on the advice of an examining authority
in the context of the petitioner’s medical licensing application. The
proceeding was not adversarial. No allegation was made or found. This is a
case where proceedings were entirely innocuous in nature and purpose, but
W.P.(C) 8209/2021
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 134 of 144
whose public availability has resulted in consequences disproportionate to
any legitimate public interest.
260. No interest in transparency or accountability is served by the
searchability of an administrative declaration obtained by a private
individual to resolve a documentary discrepancy. In the circumstances, the
concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base platforms
are directed to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and domains,
name-based search functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news
articles complained of in the petition.
261. The petitioner is described as a world-renowned figure in the fight
against HIV-AIDS. The petitioner was arrested in 1999 on allegations
relating to the treatment administered by him to HIV patients. Over 15 years
ago, the petitioner was discharged vide order dated 04.08.2009 by the Ad
Hoc Additional Sessions Judge, City Sessions Court, Sewree, Bombay,
however, articles pertaining to his arrest continue to appear in name -based
search results.
W.P.(C) 2134/2023
262. The content qua which relief is sought, relates to allegations
pertaining to the petitioner’s medical practice, which could be char acterized
as conduct in his professional capacity. However, the discharge by the
competent Court represents a definitive judicial determination that the
allegations were not established. The petitioner’s public contribution to the
fight against HIV-AIDS , is entirely unrelated to and unaffected by the
allegations. The continued digital prominence of those out-dated allegations,
long after discharge, serves no legitimate public interest. In the
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 135 of 144
circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal
data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all
platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
263. The petitioner, an Associate Professor seeks removal of the judgment
dated 19.04.2022 passed in CR No. 140/2020, whereby the Court directed
registration of an FIR against persons who had accused the petitioner of
being the biological father of a colleague's child and extorted money from
the petitioner. It is to be noted that the petitioner is the complainant and not
the accused.
W.P.(C) 12567/2022
264. No public interest is served by the searchability of this order, which
serves as a direction to register an FIR on a private complaint. In the
circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all
platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
265. The petitioner was not a party to FIR No. 486/2021 neither as an
accused, nor as a complainant, nor as a witness. The petitioner’s name
appears in news articles in the context of the above FIR and the said news
article/s alludes/ suggests the petitioner’s involvement therein, despite the
fact that the petitioner was never an accused therein nor any order has been passed against the petitioner. In the circumstances, the concerned
W.P.(C) 13192/2024
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 136 of 144
respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base platforms are directed
to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and domains, name-based
search functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news articles
complained of in the petition.
266. The petitioner's grievances under the Digital Personal Data Protection
Act, 2023 in respect of representations made to MEITY are appropriately
directed to MEITY for consideration under the applicable statutory
framework.
267. The NGT took suo moto cognizance based on a news report alleging
unauthorised tree felling by the petitioner. The NGT disposed of Suo Moto
Application No. 262/2015 on 13.07.2018, after the forest officer’s affidavit,
consistent with findings of the Supreme Court and the Central Empowered
Committee, confirmed that no unauthorised tree felling had occurred. The
NGT proceedings concluded with an effective exoneration on the very
allegations that prompted them. News reports that remain available present
the allegations without the context of their resolution in the petitioner's
favour. In the circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine
operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable,
across all platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect
of the judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 16447/2023
268. The FIR No. 303/2024 arose from a business dispute. The petitioner's
anticipatory bail application was initially dismissed by the Sessions Court
W.P.(C) 30/2025
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 137 of 144
before being granted by this Court vide order dated 22.08.2024.
Subsequently the parties settled and a closure report was filed and accepted
vide order dated 07.11.2024 in Cr. Case 13895/2024.
269. The particular harm identified is the continued availability of the
anticipatory bail order, which records the dismissal of bail by the Sessions
Court before its grant by this Court, creating a misleading picture of the
petitioner’s legal position. The order in isolation records a dismissal of bail,
a fact that without the context of the subsequent grant by this Court and the
final settlement and closure, creates a false impression. The settlement and
closure extinguishes any public interest. In the circumstances, the concerned
respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base platforms are directed
to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and domains, name-based
search functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news articles
complained of in the petition.
270. The petitioner is a company engaged in the power transmission sector.
News reports in 2022 portrayed it as involved in serious financial fraud
arising from FIRs registered in connection with internal shareholder
disputes. All disputes were resolved and the FIRs were quashed by the
Allahabad High Court vide order dated 29.07.2024. The NCLT also
disposed of the company petition vide order dated 27.02.2025 in view of the
settlement. Evidently, the concerned proceedings stand concluded and the
same renders the concerned news reports disproportionate. In the
circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal
data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all
W.P.(C) 18962/2025
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 138 of 144
platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition. .
271. The petitioner seeks removal of content relating to the demise of his
wife in 2015. The content concerns a private matter. No criminal
proceedings were involved. No public interest of any kind attaches to the
continued searchability of content about the demise of a private person. The
petitioner’s own right to informational privacy in respect of the most
intimate aspects of his personal life, including the circumstances of his
wife’s death, the same serves no public interest and its continued
searchability is disproportionate to any legitimate purpose. In the
circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine operators/ legal
data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable, across all
platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect of the
judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
W.P.(C) 8658/2022
272. The petitioner seeks removal of the order dated 09.08.2018 passed by
the Special Judge (PC Act), CBI-03, Dwarka Courts in CBI proceedings, on
the ground that it contains personal details of the petitioner. Taking note of the fact that the said order pertains to proceedings of matrimonial nature,
and on the basis of the personal details contained in the order, and the
absence of any identified continuing public interest, the concerned
respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base platforms are directed
to de-index, and disable, across all platforms and domains, name-based
W.P.(C) 1671/2022
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 139 of 144
search functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news articles
complained of in the petition.
273. The petitioner seeks removal of content linking him to the Bike Bot
Scam, Project Grand Venice, and Mist Avenue, characterizing the content as
sensational and premised on inaccurate facts. The current status of the
underlying proceedings is not placed on the record before this Court.
Content that presents allegations as established facts, without substantiation,
cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely. However, the petitioner has not
placed the status of the underlying proceedings before this Court. The prayer
for de- indexing cannot be adjudicated without this information and is
accordingly rejected on the material available.
W.P.(C) 11372/2022
274. This petition stands in a category entirely its own. The petitioner is a
victim of sexual offences, the complainant in proceedings arising out of FIR
No. 50/2022 registered at Women’s Police Station, Srinagar, wherein she
accused Nadeem Ahmad Ganai @ Nadeem Nadu of offences under Sections
376/384/506 IPC. Orders and judgments containing the name and personal
identifiers of the petitioner have been uploaded on Indian Kanoon without
masking or redaction of the same. Despite multiple representations, no
action has been taken.
W.P.(C) 9929/2025
275. This petition does not require the application of the framework
pertaining to the right to be forgotten as its primary basis. The identity of a
victim of sexual offences is expressly protected under Section 228A of the
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 140 of 144
IPC, now Section 72 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which prohibits
the disclosure of the identity of any person against whom a sexual offence
has been committed. This prohibition is a statutory mandate of absolute
application and not a discretionary relief. The uploading of orders/ judgments
containing the identity of a victim of sexual offences on a publicly
searchable legal database, without masking or redaction constitutes a
violation of this statutory prohibition. The failure of Indian Kanoon to act
upon the petitioner's multiple representations, despite being placed on
notice, enhances the violation. In the circumstances, the concerned
respondents/ search engine operators/ legal data base platforms are directed
to immediately de-index, and disable, across all platforms and domains,
name-based search functionality in respect of the judgments/orders/news
articles complained of in the petition.
276. This relief is directed as a matter of statutory right and legal
obligation under Section 228A IPC read with Article 21 of the Constitution
and not merely as a matter of judicial discretion under the right to be
forgotten framework. The respondents are directed to comply forthwith.
This Court also records its deep concern that a victim of sexual offences was
required to approach this Court to enforce a statutory right that ought to have
been given effect without the necessity of any litigation.
277. Indian Kanoon is directed to put in place appropriate systems at the
point of upload, to ensure that in future, the identity of victims of sexual
offences are not disclosed.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 141 of 144
278. The petitioner claims himself to be a renowned public figure, who,
working as a television artist, has appeared in various reality shows/daily
soaps. The petitioner seeks the removal of posts, videos and articles
depicting several incidents of drunken behaviour said to have occurred more
than a decade ago. The petitioner is, avowedly, a public figure and the
content relates to conduct in the public domain.
W.P.(C) 6790/2021
279. On careful consideration, this Court declines to grant relief in the
present case. The petitioner is a public figure. The right to be forgotten, as
articulated in this judgment, is primarily a protection for private individuals
against the disproportionate perpetuation of information whose legal or
social foundation has been extinguished. It is not a mechanism for the
selective erasure of past conduct by those who have voluntarily assumed a
public identity. The mere passage of time does not extinguish the public
interest in the conduct of a person who remains a public figure. If the
content complained of is demonstrably false or inaccurate, a separate cause
of action in defamation may be available through appropriate proceedings.
The petition is accordingly dismissed.
280. The petitioner seeks removal of content relating to his conviction for
the offence of ‘one count of blackmail and fifteen counts of fraud’ by the
Leicester Crown Court of the United Kingdom dated 19.02.2015. This Court
is not inclined to grant relief for multiple reasons. First, the petitioner stands
convicted of serious offences by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The right
to be forgotten cannot be invoked as a means to efface serious criminal
W.P.(C) 12620/2021
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 142 of 144
culpability. While a conviction may, as in the case of NT1 , NT2 and Google
LLC and The Information Commissioner, [2018] EWHC 799 (QB), lose its
continuing relevance with the passage a sufficient period of time, no such
case is made out here. The conviction is of relatively recent vintage and is
for offences whose relevance to th ose who may have occasion to deal with
him, does not diminish with passage of time. In the circumstances, this
Court is not inclined to grant the relief sought; the prayer is, accordingly
rejected.
281. The petitioner seeks the removal of bail orders concerning his
deceased son-in-law, who was, vide FIR No. 105/2019, accused of offences
under Sections 376 /323/506/509/174-A/34of IPC. While on bail, the son-in-
law passed away on 15.11.2021, rendering the criminal trial in Case No.
SC/515/2019 infructuous and abated on 23.11.2021.
W.P.(Crl.) 1861/2022
282. Considering the circumstances, in light of the framework articulated
above, including the fact that the proceedings have abated upon the demise
of the accused without any adverse determination, and that the continued
circulation of such orders serves no present public purpose while perpetuating stigma upon the surviving family, including the wife and
children of the deceased, this Court is of the view that de-indexing from
search results linked to the name of the deceased son- in-law of the petitioner
is warranted on the ground of proportionality. The family of the deceased
(including his children), is entitled to be protected from the perpetuation of
unresolved allegations.
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 143 of 144
283. In the circumstances, the concerned respondents/ search engine
operators/ legal data base platforms are directed to de-index, and disable,
across all platforms and domains, name-based search functionality in respect
of the judgments/orders/news articles complained of in the petition.
F.
284. Unless otherwise specified, all aforesaid directions shall be complied
with within two weeks from today. Where relief has been granted, Google
LLC/ Google Inc./Google India Private Ltd. and all other search engine
operators are directed to de-index the relevant content, orders, judgments
and associated reportage from name-based search results, and shall be
complied in the same manner, as a direction under Rule 3(1)(d) of the
Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics
Code) Rules, 2021.
FURTHER DIRECTIONS
285. Indian Kanoon (iKanoon Software Development Private Limited) is
directed to restrict name-based search functionality within its platform in
respect of the records of the petitioners identified above. The judgments and
orders shall remain accessible on Indian Kanoon by case number, citation,
Court details and date.
286. All petitioners in respect of whom de-indexing has been directed shall
be at liberty to seek masking from the concerned C ourt that rendered the
original order or judgment.
287. The Union of India, through the Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology (MEITY), is directed to ensure compliance with
these directions by the respondent intermediaries within the aforementioned
W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 144 of 144
time period. MEITY shall immediately communicate these directions to
Google LLC/ Google Inc., Indian Kanoon and all other search engine
operators and intermediary platforms operating within the jurisdiction of
India, and shall file a compliance affidavit within a period four weeks from
today.
288. The petitions are disposed of in the above terms. All pending
applications, also stand disposed of, accordingly.
SACHIN DATTA, J
MAY 29, 2026/ss,ka.
In a pivotal ruling, the Delhi High Court has delivered a comprehensive judgment on the application of the Right to be Forgotten and Informational Privacy in the digital age. This landmark decision, which addresses a batch of petitions concerning online judicial records, sets crucial precedents for individuals seeking to manage their digital reputations. Legal professionals and students can delve into the full depth of this ruling and many others by exploring CaseOn, a leading platform for legal research and analysis.
\n\nAt the heart of these petitions lies a fundamental conflict: the individual\'s right to privacy and dignity (Article 21 of the Constitution) versus the public\'s right to information and the principle of \'open justice\' (Article 19(1)(a)). Petitioners, ranging from those acquitted of criminal charges to parties in matrimonial disputes, sought the de-indexing and masking of personal identifiers from publicly accessible digital judicial records, arguing that their continued online presence causes disproportionate harm to their reputations and life prospects.
\n\nThe permanence of information on the internet has profoundly altered how past events impact individuals. What was once confined to court archives, accessible only through diligent manual searches, is now instantly retrievable via a simple name-based online query. This raises critical questions about how digital platforms, which actively collect, index, and disseminate personal data, contribute to the invasion of informational privacy.
\n\nThe Court reiterated that the right to privacy is an intrinsic facet of Article 21, as established in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017). This right protects the \'inner sphere\' of an individual from interference by both State and non-State actors, enabling autonomous life choices and preserving human dignity. Informational privacy, specifically, grants individuals control over the dissemination of their personal data.
\n\nDrawing on Justice Kaul\'s opinion in Puttaswamy and cases like Vysakh K.G. v. Union of India (2022), the Court affirmed the Right to be Forgotten as a natural extension of informational privacy. This right allows individuals to seek removal or restriction of personal information from public digital accessibility when it is no longer relevant or serves no legitimate public purpose. It recognizes that \'humans forget, but the internet does not forget\', emphasizing the need for individuals to control their digital existence and not be perpetually defined by past mistakes.
\n\nWhile \'open justice\' is a cornerstone of the judicial system, ensuring transparency and public confidence, it is not an absolute right. Exceptions exist in the interest of justice, as noted in Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI (2012). The Court clarified that \'open justice\' requires judicial records to exist and be accessible for legitimate purposes (case number, citation), but it does not mandate that a private individual\'s name serve as a permanent, unlimited retrieval key through commercial search engines.
\n\nThe Court rejected Google\'s claim of being a passive intermediary, recognizing it as an active processor of personal data, deriving commercial revenue from its indexing and serving activities. This active role significantly impacts informational privacy. Google\'s algorithmic processes, driven by commercial interest rather than public good, cannot be equated with freedom of speech. Indian Kanoon, as a legal database, performs a function closer to publication, curating and organizing judicial records for widespread dissemination. Both are subject to IT Rules, 2021, and court orders for content restriction.
\n\nDe-indexing refers to the removal of a specific URL or record from name-based search results generated by search engines or legal databases. Crucially, it does not erase the judicial record itself, which remains accessible via case number or other identifiers. It merely moderates the unlimited and indiscriminate name-based searchability that amplifies damaging material.
\n\nMasking involves replacing a party\'s name and personal identifiers (like address) with a neutral reference (e.g., \'ABC\' or \'XYZ\') in the publicly accessible digital version of a judicial record. The un-redacted version is preserved in the court\'s internal records. This calibrated intervention gives effect to informational privacy while preserving open justice principles, acting both retrospectively and prospectively.
\n\nThe Court applied a three-fold proportionality test from K.S. Puttaswamy to balance privacy and transparency:
\nFor cases resulting in acquittals, discharges, quashings, or settlements, the underlying accusation is deemed unestablished or extinguished. Continuing name-based searchability in such instances is disproportionate to any legitimate public purpose. The presumption of innocence, a substantive guarantee under Article 21, must be given full practical effect in the digital domain.
\nPublic figures have a diminished expectation of privacy concerning their public roles. However, this principle does not extend to intimate details of their private lives, such as matrimonial disputes or conduct unrelated to their public function. The public interest must be specific and not mere curiosity.
\nInformation that is outdated, misleading, inaccurate, irrelevant, or excessive loses its justification for continued processing. Demonstrably false information, in particular, has no claim to protection under \'continuing relevance\'.
\nThe Court identified categories where de-indexing or masking may not be appropriate:
\nFor legal professionals seeking to quickly grasp the nuances of such complex rulings, CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that distil the essence of the judgment, saving valuable time and enhancing comprehension.
\n\nRecognizing that digital harm is not confined to specific domains, the Court directed that de-indexing orders should operate globally, across all versions and domains of the relevant search engine (e.g., google.co.in and google.com), to ensure meaningful and effective protection of informational privacy under Article 21.
\n\nThe Court granted de-indexing and masking for petitioners acquitted, discharged, or whose cases were quashed, especially in cases of sexual offences where the stigma is severe. It emphasized that children involved in such proceedings should also have their identifying details removed. This includes cases like W.P.(C) 3918/2021 (acquittal), W.P.(C) 8557/2021 (acquittal, articles related to smuggling), W.P.(C) 11553/2021 (CBI acquittal, children\'s details), W.P.(C) 4094/2023 (IPC 498A/306 acquittal), W.P.(C) 5400/2023 (rape/criminal intimidation acquittal), W.P.(C) 2353/2023 (acquittal), W.P.(C) 3687/2024 (sexual offence acquittals), W.P.(C) 2887/2025 (discharge from FIR), W.P.(C) 14696/2025 (FIR quashed), W.P.(C) 1567/2025 (CBI discharge), and W.P.(C) 11714/2025 (sexual offence acquittal).
\n\nDe-indexing and masking were granted where proceedings were concluded by settlement or compounding, as the public interest in such matters is extinguished. This applied to W.P.(C) 9824/2023 (NI Act conviction settled) and W.P.(C) 5608/2023 (FIR quashed by settlement). However, for W.P.(C) 9940/2024, involving sexual offence allegations against a public figure, relief was denied due to continuing public interest.
\n\nFor purely private civil and matrimonial disputes, the Court affirmed the right to privacy, recognizing the sanctity of family life and personal relationships. De-indexing and masking were directed for such cases, including W.P.(C) 16476/2023 and W.P.(C) 6695/2024 (matrimonial disputes concluded by consent), W.P.(C) 11862/2025 (multiple matrimonial proceedings), W.P.(C) 7763/2024 (matrimonial settlement), and W.P.(C) 12179/2024 (private family dispute). For W.P.(C) 6047/2024, involving a public figure chef\'s matrimonial details, relief was granted as private marriage details do not transform into public interest matters.
\n\nThe Delhi High Court\'s judgment meticulously balances the fundamental rights to informational privacy and open justice. It establishes that while judicial records serve a public purpose, their indiscriminate, name-based online searchability can cause disproportionate harm to individuals, especially when proceedings have concluded favorably (acquittals, quashings, settlements) or involve private matters. The Court distinguished between de-indexing (moderating search visibility) and masking (redacting personal identifiers at the source) and provided a clear framework for their application, emphasizing proportionality and the need for global compliance from online platforms.
\n\nThis ruling is indispensable for legal professionals and students for several reasons:
\nAll information provided in this blog post is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy and clarity, readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues or cases. The interpretation and application of law can vary based on individual circumstances and jurisdiction.
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