W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 1 of 113

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 14.05.2026

Date of decision: 29.05.2026

Uploaded on: 29.05.2026

+ W.P.(C) 11283/2024, CM APPL. 46717/2024, CM APPL.

59819/2024, CM APPL. 59822/2024, CM APPL. 10311/2025, CM

APPL. 47356/2025, CM APPL. 11954/2026, CM APPL. 18430/2026,

CM APPL. 26420/2026, CM APPL. 26536/2026, CM APPL.

32355/2026 & CM APPL. 29021/2026

VASANT KUNJ RESIDENTS WELFARE ASSOCIATION

SECTOR B POCKET 1 & ORS. ....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Ajay Verma, Senior Advocate

with Mr. Shreyuss Shankar Joshi, Mr.

Shresth Arya, Mr. Madhav Bhatia,

Anisha Awasthi, Ms. Amisha

Awasthi and Ms. Muskan Aggarwal,

Advocates.

versus

GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF

DELHI & ORS. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, SC with

Mr. Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. M.S.

Akhtar, Ms. Kushagra Dixit, Advs.

for R-1/L & B

Mr. Anurag Ahluwalia, Sr. Adv. with

Ms. Devika Mohan, Mr. Aakash

Sehrawat, Mr. Cyril, Mr. Dipanshu

Gaba, and Mr. Dhruv Negi, Advs. for

R-4 to 14.

Ms. Prabhsahay Kaur, SC with Mr.

Aditya Verma, Advs. for DDA

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 2 of 113

Mr. Ajjay Aroraa, Sr. Adv. with Mr.

Vikas Chopra, SC with Mr. Neeraj

Kumar, Mr. Vansh Luthra, Advs. for

R-3/MCD

+ W.P.(C) 17433/2025, CM APPL. 72015/2025 & CM APPL.

18403/2026

MASONIC PUBLIC SCHOOL THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED

REPRESENTATIVE .....Petitioner

Through: Ms. Vibha Mahajan, Sr. Adv. with

Ms. Eshna Kumar, Ms. Mahima, Mr.

M. Poudiuwibou and Mr. Piyush

Tandon, Advs.

versus

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY THROUGH ITS V ICE

CHAIRMAN & ORS. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Anurag Ahluwalia, Sr. Adv. with

Ms. Devika Mohan, Mr. Aakash

Sehrawat, Mr. Cyril and Mr. Dhruv

Negi, Mr. Dipanshu Gaba, Advs. for

R-3.

Mr. Tushar Sannu, Standing Counsel

wtih Mr. Fajallu Rehman and Mr.

Vaibhav Tripathi, Advs. for MCD.

Ms. Prabhsahay Kaur, SC with Mr.

Aditya Verma, Advs. for DDA

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

J U D G M E N T

SHAIL JAIN, J.

1. W.P.(C) No. 11283/2024, titled ‘Vasant Kunj Residents Welfare

Association, Sector-B, Pocket-1 & Ors. v. Government of National Capital

Territory of Delhi & Ors.’, has been instituted under Article 226 of the

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 3 of 113

Constitution of India by the Vasant Kunj Residents Welfare Association,

Sector-B, Pocket-1, New Delhi ("the Petitioner RWA"), along with certain

individual residents of the said colony, assailing the building sanction plan

dated 13

th

May, 2024, ("the impugned sanction") granted by the

Municipal Corporation of Delhi ("MCD") in favour of M/s R.R. Texknit

LLP ("the Developer"), for the construction of a Group Housing Society

comprising nine upper floors with a stilt floor and three basement levels

upon land bearing Khasra No. 1230/2 (New) [Old Khasra No.

2797/2026/1675], admeasuring 6 Bighas and 7 Biswas, situated at Sector-B,

Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj Housing Scheme, New Delhi ("the Subject

Property").

2. In the present dispute, the Petitioners have asserted that the area as a

whole was originally developed as a low-rise residential colony under the

Vasant Kunj scheme and that the subject land, located within the residential

pocket and connected through internal roads, could not lawfully be

developed as a high-rise group housing project under the applicable

planning norms and development regulations. The dispute further involves

issues relating to road width and access norms, conformity with surrounding

development, environmental clearances, civic infrastructure, ownership and

acquisition status of the land, and the legality of the sanctions and approvals

granted by the authorities.

3. The Respondents, including the planning and municipal authorities as

well as the private developers, on the other hand, state that the subject land

forms part of an integrated layout plan and that all requisite approvals,

clearances, and sanctions were granted after consideration by the competent

authorities in accordance with the Master Plan for Delhi-2021, the Unified

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 4 of 113

Building Bye-Laws-2016, and the Regulations for Enabling the Planned

Development of Privately Owned Lands.

4. It is further relevant to note that a connected writ petition bearing

W.P.(C) No. 17433/2025, titled Masonic Public School v. Delhi

Development Authority & Ors., has also been instituted before this Court in

relation to the very same proposed group housing project and the sanctions

and approvals granted in respect thereof. The said petition has been

preferred by Masonic Public School, (hereinafter referred as “the School”)

a Senior Secondary School situated within Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj,

New Delhi, directly adjoining the Subject Property, which has similarly

assailed the legality and validity of the impugned approvals and sanctions

and raised grievances regarding the consequent impact of the proposed

development upon the surrounding area and existing infrastructure. The

School, inter alia, questions the permissibility of the proposed construction

under the applicable planning framework and raises concerns pertaining to

vehicular access, traffic circulation and congestion, adequacy of civic

infrastructure, and compliance with the governing provisions of the Master

Plan for Delhi-2021 and the allied regulations and bye-laws.

5. Accordingly, the present Petitions have been instituted inter-alia

seeking adjudication on the validity of the impugned sanctions and

approvals, the interpretation and applicability of the governing planning

framework, and the rival claims of the residents, private developers, and

statutory authorities in respect of the subject property.

6. Since it is an admitted position that both the present Petitions emanate

from the same set of sanctions, approvals, layout-related decisions, and

proposed construction activities concerning the subject property situated at

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 5 of 113

Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi; in view of the substantial

overlap in facts, issues involved, parties, and reliefs sought, both the

petitions are interconnected in nature and are accordingly being considered

and adjudicated together by this Court.

BRIEF FACTS:

7. The brief background of facts leading to the filing of W.P. (CIVIL)

NO. 11283/2024 are as follows -

A. On 23

rd

January, 1965, land admeasuring approximately 4,820 bighas

situated in Village Mehrauli, including the Subject Property, was notified

for acquisition under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Subsequently, on 07

th

December, 1966, a declaration under Section 6 of

the said Act was issued, which also included the Subject Property.

Pursuant thereto, various awards came to be passed in relation to the

acquired lands situated in the Village Mehrauli.

B. It is the case of the Petitioners that the Subject Property was

specifically covered under the said acquisition proceedings and awards,

and that the land was recorded as Gram Sabha land. According to the

Petitioners, upon urbanisation of Village Mehrauli, the land vested in the

Central Government and, thereafter, vide Notification dated 20th August,

1974 issued under Section 22(1) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, the

Gram Sabha land was placed at the disposal of the Delhi Development

Authority (“DDA”).

C. The Petitioners further assert that the DDA thereafter formulated the

“Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme” on 21

st

December, 1987, for the

planned development of the area, including the Subject Property. While

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 6 of 113

the remaining portions of the scheme were developed and flats were

allotted under DDA’s Self-Financing Scheme, the Subject Property

continued to remain vacant.

D. According to the Petitioners, the original layout plan contemplated

development over the Subject Property in the form of:

a. flats bearing Nos. 1297–1312 and 1393–1424, comprising 48

SFS flats; and

b. green areas, lawns, and parking spaces.

E. The Petitioners state that the Subject Property was always treated as

part of the integrated layout plan of Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj, and

was expected either to be developed in accordance with the original DDA

layout plan and scheme or to remain available as common green/open

space and associated civic infrastructure.

F. It is also pertinent to note that a Resident Welfare Association under

the name and style of “Vasant Kunj Residents Welfare Association,

Sector-B, Pocket-1” had been constituted on 09

th

May, 1994.

G. The Respondents, however, assert that the Subject Property is a

private and unacquired parcel of land situated within Sector-B, Pocket-1,

Vasant Kunj, residential in land use, and owned and possessed by

Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 and their predecessors-in-interest. According to

the Respondents, the land was never acquired by the DDA, hence was

denotified vide Notification dated 20

th

August, 1996, and subsequently

remained excluded from the acquisition proceedings and awards

pertaining to the Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme and has continuously

remained under private ownership and possession.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 7 of 113

H. It is further the case of the Respondents that the land originally

belonged to one Shri Ram Dhan, who was declared bhumidar by virtue of

a Judgment and Decree dated 30th July, 1974. Upon his demise, the land

devolved upon his sons, whose names were subsequently mutated in the

revenue records. The Respondents further state that during the years

1978–79, one Kartar Singh instituted a suit for injunction against the

DDA, wherein the DDA undertook not to dispossess him except in

accordance with due process of law.

I. In this regard, the Petitioners allege that Kartar Singh claimed

ownership over the Subject Property on the premise that the land had not

been acquired. Thereafter, in the year 1995, Respondent Nos. 4 to 14

allegedly purchased the Subject Property through a Sale Deed dated 05th

April, 1995, pursuant to which mutation was also recorded in their favour.

J. Insofar as the challenges forming the subject matter of the present

Petitions are concerned, it is an admitted position between the parties that

Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 had, in the year 2008, applied to the Municipal

Corporation of Delhi seeking sanction for the construction of a Group

Housing Society over the Subject Property. The said proposal was

initially rejected by the Standing Committee vide decision dated 23rd

December, 2008. Aggrieved thereby, Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 preferred

an Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, MCD, which came to be

allowed vide Order dated 07

th

December, 2012. The said Order was

subsequently upheld by the learned District and Sessions Judge vide

Judgment dated 16

th

July, 2016. Thereafter, Respondent Nos. 4 to 14

sought approval under the “Regulations for Enabling the Planned

Development of Privately Owned Lands” notified on 04

th

July, 2018.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 8 of 113

Pursuant thereto, the DDA and MCD processed and approved the layout

plan and construction proposal pertaining to the Subject Property.

K. Aggrieved by the approvals and sanctions granted in favour of

Respondent Nos. 4 to 14, the Petitioners have approached this Court

seeking various reliefs in relation thereto.

“In view of the above, it is most respectfully prayed that this

Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a Writ, Order or

Direction in the nature of:-

a) CERTIORARI, thereby quashing sanction dated

13.05.2024 [Annexure P- 1] granted by the Respondent No.

3 with respect to the development over the Subject Property

being land situated at Khasra No. 1230/2 (New)

admeasuring 6 Bighas and 7 Biswa situated in Sector-B,

Pocket-1 in Vasant Kunj Housing Scheme, New Delhi;

b) PROHIBITION, thereby restraining Respondent Nos. 1-3

from granting any further Sanction or approval with respect

to any development over the Subject Property, being land

situated at Khasra No. 1230/2 (New) admeasuring 6 Bighas

and 7 Biswa situated in Sector-B, Pocket-1 in Vasant Kunj

Housing Scheme, New Delhi;

c) CERTIORARI, thereby quashing the Minutes of the 368th

Screening Committee Meeting as approved by the 368th

Screening Committee Meeting dated 22.04.2019, and 370th

Screen Committee Meeting dated 17.06.2019 in respect of

the subject property [Annexure P-2 (Colly)], being land

situated at Khasra No. 1230/2 (New) admeasuring 6 Bighas

and 7 Biswa situated in Sector-B, Pocket-1 in Vasant Kunj

Housing Scheme, New Delhi;

d) PROHIBITION, thereby restraining the Respondents

from permitting or actually raising of any construction on

the subject property contrary to the brochure (Annexure P-

1) and the original layout plan (Annexure P-2)

demonstrated to the public by the Respondents;

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 9 of 113

e) MANDAMUS, commanding the Respondent No. 1 – 3 to

restore the Subject Property, in terms of the promise as

made through the brochure (Annexure P-7) and the layout

plan (Annexure P-8) as demonstrated to the public by the

Respondents;

f) CERTIORARI, thereby quashing the order dated

07.12.2012, passed by the Ld. PO, Appellate Tribunal,

MCD allowed the appeal No. 24/AT/MCD/2009 (Annexure

P-3) as well as the final order and judgment dated

16.07.2016 passed by the Ld. District and Sessions Judge in

MCD Appeal No. 04/13 (Annexure P-4);

g) Issue any other writ/order/direction as this Hon'ble Court

may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the present

case.”

L. Additionally, various interlocutory Applications have been filed in

connection with the present proceedings, including CM APPL.

46717/2024 (seeking interim relief), CM APPL. 59819/2024 (for

impleadment), CM APPL. 59822/2024 (seeking directions), CM APPL.

47356/2025 (for placing additional documents on record), and CM APPL.

11954/2026 (seeking modification of Order) in W.P.(C) 11283/2024, as

well as CM APPL. 72015/2025 (seeking interim stay) in W.P.(C)

17433/2025. Amongst the aforesaid applications, this Court considers

CM APPL. 10311/2025, filed in W.P.(C.) 11283/2024 seeking

amendment of the Petition, to be of particular relevance, and the same is

accordingly being considered along with the present Writ Petitions.

8. Furthermore, the connected writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No.

17433/2025, titled ‘Masonic Public School v. Delhi Development Authority

& Ors.’, has been preferred by Masonic Public School, situated within

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 10 of 113

Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi, catering to approximately

2,500 students and employing around 200 teaching and non-teaching staff.

The School directly adjoins the Subject Property, shares a common

boundary wall therewith, and the proposed construction is stated to be

intended to be raised at a distance of merely 8 to 10 feet from the School's

boundary wall.

9. It is relevant to note that the School's grievances with respect to

access and congestion on the sole internal approach road are not of recent

origin. The School had earlier instituted W.P.(C) No. 1797/2016 before this

Court seeking provision of an alternative vehicular access road. The said

petition came to be disposed of on 21st January, 2025, with the Vice-

Chairman, DDA, vide Order dated 30th August, 2024, directing only the

provision of a pedestrian access from Aruna Asaf Ali Marg while retaining

the existing internal road as the sole vehicular approach to the School.

10. The School further places on record certain incidents that have

occurred on account of the congested state of the sole approach road,

including an incident on 19th July, 2023, wherein a girl student using the

internal approach road as a walking route was struck by a vehicle and

sustained multiple grievous injuries, and an incident on 01st May, 2024,

wherein a bomb threat necessitated immediate evacuation of the School

premises, during which ambulances, fire tenders, and emergency response

teams were unable to reach the School promptly on account of restricted

access and congestion on the approach road. Additionally, on 10th October,

2025, the School was constrained to formally communicate to the Central

Board of Secondary Education, ROD (East), its inability to serve as a Board

Examination Centre for the 2026 Board Examinations, citing the noise, dust,

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 11 of 113

air pollution, and restricted access arising from the ongoing construction

activity on the adjoining Subject Property. The School thereafter preferred

the present Petition upon becoming aware of the impugned sanctions and

approvals in September 2025, when construction activity was first noticed

on the Subject Property.

11. In addition to the aforesaid set of facts, given below are the specific

grounds taken up by the Petitioners to strengthen their claim-

I. Violation of MPD-2021 and Planned Development Norms

The Petitioners contend that the Subject Property does not satisfy the

minimum 18-metre ROW requirement prescribed under MPD-2021 for

Group Housing projects and that the authorities have wrongly relied

upon wider peripheral roads serving the larger pocket rather than the

roads directly abutting the Subject Property. It is further alleged that the

proposed development is contrary to the original Vasant Kunj layout

scheme and violates the Regulations dated 04th July, 2018 requiring

conformity with the surrounding development pattern. According to the

Petitioners, while the surrounding locality predominantly comprises

low-rise DDA SFS flats of approximately 3–4 storeys, the impugned

project contemplates substantially higher and denser construction,

thereby fundamentally altering the planned character of the colony.

II. Fraudulent Layout Plans and Illegality in the Approval

Process

The Petitioners further contend that misleading and manipulated layout

plans were submitted in order to falsely depict independent access to

the Subject Property and to incorporate existing DDA infrastructure

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 12 of 113

within the proposed project. It is alleged that the impugned approvals

and sanctions were granted arbitrarily, without due application of mind

and in collusion with private developers, rendering the entire approval

process legally unsustainable.

III. Legitimate Expectation, Civic Infrastructure and

Constitutional Concerns

The Petitioners state that residents purchased flats in the locality

relying upon the DDA brochures and sanctioned layout plans

representing the area as a low-density planned residential colony. It is

contended that the subsequent alteration of the colony’s character

violates the doctrines of legitimate expectation, promissory estoppel

and the guarantee of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution. The

Petitioners further submit that the proposed project would adversely

impact the existing civic infrastructure, affect the easementary rights of

residents and materially impair the environmental quality, habitability

and overall residential equilibrium of the locality.

IV. Environmental Violations and Challenge to Earlier Judicial

Orders

The Petitioners further contend that the project has proceeded without

obtaining mandatory environmental clearances and without adequate

environmental assessment in accordance with law. It is additionally

contended that the earlier judicial orders concerning the Subject

Property failed to properly consider the true character of the land and

are therefore to be set aside, on being without jurisdiction.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 13 of 113

12. In addition to the aforesaid set of facts, given below are the specific

grounds taken up by the Respondents to strengthen their claim -

I. Maintainability, Delay and Scope of Writ Jurisdiction

Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 contend that the present writ petitions are not

maintainable in view of the alternate statutory remedy available under

Section 347B of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. It is

further contended that the petitions suffer from gross delay and laches,

as the ownership status of the Subject Property, the layout approvals

and the judicial orders dated 07.12.2012 and 16.07.2016 had attained

finality long ago. The respondents also submit that the Petitioners were

not parties to the earlier proceedings and therefore lack locus standi to

assail the same. It is further contended that the Subject Property is a

privately owned and unacquired parcel of land and that disputes

relating to title, acquisition or Gaon Sabha status involve disputed

questions of fact not amenable to adjudication under Article 226 of the

Constitution.

II. Compliance with Planning Norms, Civic Infrastructure and

Statutory Approvals

The respondents maintain that the sanctioned project fully complies

with MPD-2021, the Unified Building Bye-Laws, 2016 and the

Regulations dated 04

th

July, 2018 governing privately owned lands.

According to them, the prescribed 18-metre ROW requirement stands

duly satisfied and was consciously examined by the competent

planning authorities while granting approvals. It is further asserted that

the Subject Property has consistently been designated for

residential/group housing use and that the proposed development is

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 14 of 113

compatible with the broader planning framework of the Vasant Kunj

Residential Scheme. The respondents also deny any adverse impact

upon civic infrastructure and submit that all requisite permissions,

sanctions and NOCs from the concerned statutory authorities have

already been duly obtained, rendering the allegations regarding absence

of environmental or statutory clearances wholly misconceived.

III. Denial of Legitimate Expectation and Allegations of Mala

Fides

The respondents deny the Petitioners’ claims founded upon legitimate

expectation, promissory estoppel and alleged alteration of the character

of the colony, contending that the original brochure and layout plan

themselves contemplated residential/group housing use of the Subject

Property. It is further alleged that the Petitioners have approached this

Court with unclean hands despite the existence of widespread

unauthorised constructions and encroachments within the colony and

are merely seeking to obstruct a lawful and duly sanctioned

development project.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:

Submissions on behalf of Vasant Kunj Sector-B, Pocket-1 Residents’

Welfare Association (RWA) (Petitioner)

13. At the threshold, the Respondents have raised a preliminary objection

to the maintainability of the present Writ Petition on the ground that an

efficacious alternate remedy is available to the Petitioner under Section 347-

B of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 ("DMC Act").

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 15 of 113

14. Learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner opposes the said objection

vehemently and submits that the same is devoid of merit and is liable to be

rejected for the reasons that alternate remedy is not an absolute bar. He

relies upon the judgment rendered in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of

Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil

Corporation Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107, contending that the existence of an

alternate remedy does not constitute an absolute or inviolable bar to the

exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

15. While relying upon the judgment rendered in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v.

E&TOCAA, reported as (2023) 109 GSTR 402, the learned Senior Counsel

has submitted that a distinction exists between the “maintainability” and the

“entertainability” of a writ petition. It is contended that the present Writ

Petition is maintainable, as it falls squarely within the recognised exceptions

to the rule of alternate remedy. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the

proposed construction directly imperils the fundamental rights guaranteed

under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India of more than 5,000

residents of the colony and that there has been a gross violation of the

principles of natural justice, inasmuch as specific queries raised by the

Building Planning Committee (“BPC”) were allegedly never addressed and

yet the sanction was mechanically granted. Lastly, it has also been

contended in the aforesaid regard that the impugned orders are wholly

without jurisdiction, having been passed in flagrant violation of the Master

Plan for Delhi, 2021 (“MPD-2021”), the Unified Building Bye-Laws, 2016

(“UBBL-2016”), and the Private Land Policy.

16. Learned Senior counsel further contends that Section 347-B of the

DMC Act provides a remedy only against limited classes of orders passed

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 16 of 113

under the DMC Act. The Appellate Tribunal for MCD ("ATMCD") is a

court of limited and circumscribed jurisdiction. The present Petition

specifically and inextricably challenges both the impugned Sanction dated

13.05.2024 passed by the MCD, and the 368th Screening Committee

Minutes dated 22.04.2019 passed by the DDA under the Private Land

Policy, which form the very basis and foundation of the impugned Sanction.

He goes on to submit that the first prayer is entirely dependent upon and a

direct consequence of later prayer. The ATMCD has no jurisdiction

whatsoever to set aside, nullify, or adjudicate upon the correctness of

Minutes passed by the DDA under the Private Land Policy, a regulation

under which the DDA, and not the MCD, acts. The challenge to the DDA's

Minutes can only be raised before this Court.

17. Furthermore, learned Senior counsel contends that the impugned

Sanction is a composite decision resulting from the integrated and

interlocked actions of the MCD, DDA, and other authorities. MCD has itself

admitted in its Counter Affidavit that it acted merely as an implementing

agency of the decisions taken by the DDA. The MCD's Building Plan

Committee Minutes dated 21.03.2024 expressly refer to and rely upon the

clarifications obtained from the DDA's Technical Committee, and it is only

on that basis that the Sanction was approved. In support of his contentions,

the learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the judgment rendered by

Hon'ble the Supreme Court in TN Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite

Industries (India) Ltd., (2019) 19 SCC 479, contending that composite

orders can only be challenged by way of a Writ Petition under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India. Hence, Section 347-B of the DMC Act, which

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 17 of 113

addresses only MCD orders, cannot remedy the illegality and arbitrariness

embedded in this integrated decision-making process.

18. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that in addition to the challenge

to the sanction plan, the Petitioner also seeks reliefs including restoration of

the Disputed Property in conformity with the original DDA Brochure and

Vasant Kunj Scheme, reliefs that are entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the

ATMCD under Section 347-B of the DMC Act. Such reliefs, grounded in

the doctrine of legitimate expectation and the fundamental rights of the

residents, can only be granted by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. While continuing his

arguments, the learned Senior Counsel further submits that the area in

question stood denotified on 20.08.1996, thereby divesting the DDA of

jurisdiction. Upon denotification, all building-control powers vested in the

MCD. Accordingly, any appeal under Section 31-C of the DDA Act would

be incompetent.

19. As to the issue raised by the Respondent that another Writ seeking

identical reliefs was filed before this court in which no relief was granted to

the Petitioner and the same was dismissed; the learned counsel for the

Petitioner submits that the very Writ being W.P.(C) No. 352/2025 was filed

by an individual resident who was not a member of the RWA Executive

Committee, who filed that petition after the filing of the present Writ

Petition, without disclosing the pendency of the present proceedings. The

Single Judge dismissed that petition primarily on the grounds of forum

hunting and concealment of material facts, specifically the non-disclosure of

the present pending Writ Petition; and prematurity, inasmuch as the CEC

had not yet given its finding on the Morphological Ridge character of the

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 18 of 113

land. He goes on to submit that both grounds are entirely inapplicable to the

present Writ Petition. Furthermore, he added that the order dated 07.02.2025

in LPA No. 92/2025 which was preferred against the dismissal of W.P.(C)

No. 352/2025, expressly preserved the present proceedings and directed that

the decision of the Expert Appraisal Committee would be subsumed in the

other prayers of the writ petition filed by the RWA and that appropriate

directions be passed by the Learned Single Judge in seisin of the said writ

petition.

20. Learned Senior counsel also submits that there has been no inordinate

or unexplained delay on the part of the Petitioner. The Petitioner became

aware of the illegal and fraudulent obtaining of the sanction plan by

Respondents No. 4 to 14 only recently, when ground-levelling activities

commenced with the evident intent to begin construction. The necessary

documents were obtained only through the RTI reply dated 24.07.2024

(Application No. PIO/EE(B)/HO/RTI/D.270).

21. As to the locus of the Petitioner, the learned counsel submits that the

Petitioner RWA is responsible for the welfare and well-being of the

residents of the colony. The proposed construction of a high-rise Group

Housing Society in the midst of the colony will directly and adversely affect

many rights of the residents including but not limited to the ingress and

egress of residents, the easementary rights of residents residing in the

immediate vicinity of the Disputed Property, the structural and

environmental safety of the surrounding buildings and the fundamental

rights of over 5,000 residents under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of

India.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 19 of 113

22. After contesting and arguing the matter on maintainability and locus

of the Petitioner, the learned Senior counsel shifted to argue on the merits

and substance of the Writ. The primary and most assertive contention being

that the land owners were never nor could have ever been the rightful

owners of the subject property upon which the Respondents were carrying

on construction.

23. Learned Senior counsel contends that the claim of Respondents No. 4

to 14 to title over the disputed property is legally untenable as their Sale

Deed dated 05.04.1995 traces title through an order of the Revenue

Assistant dated 30.07.1974, purportedly declaring one Sh. Ram Dhan as

Bhumidhar. This order is a nullity for the following reasons that Section 4

and Section 6 notifications under the Land Acquisition Act had been issued

in 1965 and 1966 respectively, vesting the land in the State for acquisition

purposes, upon urbanisation of Village Mehrauli in 1966, revenue

authorities had ceased to exercise any jurisdiction under the DLR Act he

added. Learned Senior counsel further contends that the Gram Sabha had

been dissolved and its assets vested in the Central Government under

Section 150 of the DLR Act and all the Gaon Sabha lands of 48 villages

including Mehrauli had been placed at the DDA's disposal by Notification

No. SO 2190 dated 20.08.1974.

24. In addition, the learned Senior counsel submits that once Section 4

and Section 6 notifications under the Land Acquisition Act have been issued

in respect of a property, any decree or order passed by a Revenue Court in

respect of that property is without jurisdiction and a nullity in law. He also

submits that this was admitted by the Vice-Chairman, DDA himself in his

affidavit dated 20.10.2014, wherein he acknowledged that Section 4 and

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 20 of 113

Section 6 notifications had been issued and that the property was Gram

Sabha land, and that title was being claimed solely on the basis of the

Revenue Court order, which order has not even been produced before this

Court.

25. The further contention was that during the pendency of the present

Writ Petition, it has emerged conclusively that the Disputed Property falls

within the Morphological Ridge Area of Delhi. The Central Empowered

Committee (CEC), vide its Report No. 25/2025 dated 14.05.2025, has

definitively held at Para 15 that:

"the majority of the 'subject land' falls within the

'Morphological Area'. Hence, the submission of Shri Rajiv

Ranjan...that the 'subject land' falls within the

Morphological Ridge Area is correct."

26. The aforesaid finding of CEC was arrived at by reference to the E-

Vanlekh portal of the Forest Department, GNCTD, the only objective basis

for determination of Morphological Ridge status. In support of his

contention, the learned Senior counsel has relied upon the judgment of this

Court in Ashok Kumar Tanwar v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No.

3339/2011, and on DDA v. Kenneth Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. &

Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5370/2016, of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,

contending that land falling outside the demarcated notified ridge but

bearing similar morphological features must be afforded the same protection

as notified ridge land. No construction can be undertaken on such land

without first obtaining clearance from the Ridge Management Board and the

permission of the Hon'ble Supreme Court through the CEC.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 21 of 113

27. In continuation to the above said contention, learned Senior counsel

submits that the Private Land Policy, 2018 under which the DDA's

Screening Committee purported to act itself excludes Ridge Areas from its

application by virtue of Clause 3.2.4 thereof. The Minutes of the 368

th

Screening Committee dated 22.04.2019 are therefore wholly without

jurisdiction on this fundamental ground alone, as the Disputed Property,

being Morphological Ridge, falls beyond the scope of the Private Land

Policy. He further adds that the order dated 12.08.2025 of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in I.A. Nos. 159062/2025 & 159063/2025 in W.P.(C) No.

202/1995 cannot be construed as a judicial endorsement of the impugned

Sanction Plan, for the reasons that the clearance granted by the CEC in its

Report No. 25/2025 is expressly conditional upon compliance with all

statutory permissions. Further, it is stated that the Environmental Clearance

dated 13.01.2025 granted by Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate

Change (MoEFCC) specifically stipulates at Condition 1.1 that it is "subject

to the outcome of court cases in Hon'ble High Court, Hon'ble NGT and

Central Empowered Committee" and further requires the Project Proponent

to seek clarification from the Ridge Management Board and, if applicable,

obtain an NOC therefrom, and that the present Writ Petition is pending

before this Court and the Environmental Clearance is itself made subject to

its outcome. The Hon’ble Supreme Court's conditional order is therefore not

a blanket endorsement but is itself qualified by the very statutory clearances

that remain sub-judice he emphasized.

28. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that sanctions granted by the

authorities could not have been granted as clause 4.4.3(B)(ii) of the Master

Plan of Delhi, 2021 mandates that a plot proposed for Group Housing must

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 22 of 113

be facing a road with a minimum Right of Way ("ROW") of 18 metres. The

368

th

Screening Committee Minutes themselves expressly record that the

Disputed Property is surrounded by 13-metre ROW roads on all three sides.

The Respondents have sought to circumvent this mandatory requirement by

taking the position that since the broader Sector-B, Pocket-1 is approached

through a 24-metre ROW road, the entire pocket qualifies for Group

Housing. This reasoning is manifestly fallacious and contrary to the express

text of the MPD 2021, which requires the specific plot for which Group

Housing is sought to be facing an 18-metre ROW and not merely the wider

pocket or sector of which it forms a part. The application for Group Housing

was being processed solely in respect of the Disputed Property, and the

surrounding pocket was not the subject of the application he added. In the

circumstances, the Respondents' attempt to project compliance by reference

to approach roads of a larger pocket is illegal and mala fide.

29. It was further argued by the Senior counsel that the Standard

Operating Procedure prescribed by the DDA for grant of permission for

planned development of privately owned land under the Private Land Policy

mandates, at Clause (xiv), that the applicant must produce "Documentary

proof for activities/uses existing on privately owned land existing prior to

MPD-1962." No such documents have been produced by Respondents No. 4

to 14, either before the DDA or before this Court. The impugned Minutes

are therefore, defective and without jurisdiction on this ground as well. He

also submits that Clause 8.2(a) of the UBBL 2016 independently mandates

that any building shall abut a street or a space connected from the street by a

hard-surface approach road having a width of at least 18 metres. The

Disputed Property, accessible only through 13-metre internal colony roads,

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 23 of 113

fails to satisfy this requirement as well. The DDA's Technical Committee

letter dated 10.01.2020, which provided a blanket clearance stating that the

subject property is an integrated part of Sector-B, Pocket-1 and that there

shall be no restriction on height, is directly contrary to both MPD 2021 and

UBBL 2016. It is well-settled that in the event of a conflict between the

UBBL 2016 and the MPD 2021, the Master Plan shall prevail.

30. Furthermore, learned Senior counsel argued that Clause 5.5 of the

Private Land Policy mandates that land parcels with already approved

schemes must be developed in conformity with the surrounding

development. Clauses 4.1 and 4.4 similarly mandate that all development

activity must conform to the existing development on the majority of

adjacent and surrounding plots. The Disputed Property is situated in the

midst of DDA SFS residential buildings uniformly not exceeding 3–4

storeys (approximately 12 metres) in height. The impugned Sanction,

however, permits the construction of three towers of approximately 30–33

metres in height nearly three times the height of the surrounding structures.

This is in blatant violation of Clause 5.5 and Clauses 4.1 and 4.4 of the

Private Land Policy. Learned Counsel additionally submits that the DDA

has itself admitted in its Counter Affidavit that the development control

norms shall be as per clause 5.5 and that the statutory provisions of Para 5.5

shall be complied with. The impugned Sanction, in permitting 33-metre

towers amidst 12-metre buildings, is even contrary to the DDA's own

admissions.

31. As to the sanctions granted by MCD, learned Senior counsel for the

Petitioner submits that MCD has granted the impugned Sanction under

Section 336 of the DMC Act without first obtaining the approval of a layout

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 24 of 113

plan as mandatorily required under Sections 312/313 of the DMC Act. The

approval of a layout plan under Section 312 is a sine qua non for the grant of

any sanction under Section 336, therefore the impugned Sanction is void for

non-compliance with this fundamental statutory prerequisite he adds.

32. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that Clause 11-A of the MPD

2021 prescribes a mandatory procedure for any modification to an existing

approved layout plan. The Disputed Property sought to be incorporated into

the existing layout plan of Sector-B, Pocket-1 amounts to a modification of

that plan. No procedure as required under Clause 11-A was followed. The

DDA had no authority to unilaterally declare the Disputed Property as an

integrated part of the Sector-B, Pocket-1 layout plan without following this

prescribed procedure.

33. It is also the contention of the Petitioner that the Building Planning

Committee of MCD, vide its minutes/letter dated 01.10.2018, raised specific

queries regarding the permissible height of the proposed building, the

boundary wall requirement, and the minimum road width mandated under

MPD 2021. These queries were never satisfactorily addressed. Despite the

pendency of these unresolved queries, the MCD postponed grant of sanction

vide its minutes dated 23.10.2019, seeking clarifications from the DDA. The

DDA's Technical Committee, vide letter dated 10.01.2020, provided a

generic and legally erroneous response, holding that there is no restriction

on height directly contrary to Clause 5.5 of the Private Land Policy and

MPD 2021. Notwithstanding these unresolved issues, the impugned

Sanction was granted vide the Building Plan Committee Minutes dated

21.03.2024 in a mechanical manner, without application of mind. The

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 25 of 113

provisions of MPD 2021 were selectively applied to suit the Respondents'

requirements, while other binding provisions were ignored and violated.

34. The learned Senior counsel also alleged that fraud and

misrepresentation of material facts was committed on the part of

Respondents No. 4 to 14 while obtaining NOCs and approvals from the Fire

Department, GNCTD, and other statutory authorities.

35. Learned Senior counsel while concluding his arguments submits that

the impugned Sanction Plan itself expressly conditions commencement of

construction upon the prior obtaining of Environmental Clearance from the

State Environment Impact Assessment Authority/State Expert Appraisal

Committee ("SEIA/SEAC"). Despite this express condition, and without

obtaining the requisite Environmental Clearance, Respondents No. 4 to 14

have already commenced construction activities including the felling of trees

and digging of foundations. The permits and approvals annexed to the

Respondents' own Counter Affidavit conspicuously do not include any

Environmental Clearance from SEIA/SEAC, confirming this admitted

violation.

36. Lastly, the ld. Senior counsel submitted that Respondent No. 2 (DDA)

had, through its Vasant Kunj Self-Financing Scheme Brochure of 1987,

made specific public representations to the allottees that the disputed

Property would be used either for the construction of 48 SFS flats for the

benefit of residents of the colony, or as a green park with lawns and parking

spaces. He further contends that the Petitioner and all allottees opted to

purchase and take possession of their flats in the colony in reliance upon and

on the basis of these representations and the promised layout plan.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 26 of 113

37. Learned Senior Counsel further presses that the DDA is bound by the

doctrine of legitimate expectation and is estopped from permitting the

disputed property to be used in a manner entirely contrary to the public

representations made in its Scheme. The impugned action of the DDA in

allowing a private developer to construct a high-rise Group Housing Society

at the heart of the colony, directly contradicting the Scheme's promises,

constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power in violation of

Article 14 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the proposed construction

consisting of three towers of approximately 33 metres in height, surrounded

by residential buildings of only 12 metres, serviced by 13-metre roads will

irreversibly impair the quality of life, safety, access, light, ventilation, and

environment of the 5,000-odd residents of the colony. This constitutes a

direct violation of the right to life and the right to a safe and healthy living

environment guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Submissions on Behalf of Masonic Public School

38. It is submitted on behalf of the Petitioner School that the impugned

approvals granted by Respondent No. 2/DDA and the sanction dated

13.05.2024 granted by Respondent No. 3/MCD are contrary to the

provisions of MPD-2021 and the “Regulations for Enabling the Planned

Development of Privately Owned Lands, 2018”, and are therefore liable to

be set aside. It is submitted that the subject land has been integrated into the

approved layout plan without proper consideration of the surrounding

development, existing infrastructure, carrying capacity of the area and

statutory planning requirements. It is further submitted that the approvals are

contrary to Regulations 4.2, 4.4 and 5.5 of the 2018 Regulations, which

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 27 of 113

mandate that development on privately owned land integrated within an

existing DDA scheme must conform to the surrounding development and

available infrastructure.

39. It is submitted that while the surrounding DDA SFS flats comprise

only 3–4 floors, sanction has been granted for construction of multi-storeyed

towers having 9–10 floors, thereby violating the requirement of conformity

with surrounding development. It is further submitted that the subject plot

abuts a road having a width of approximately 10.66 metres, whereas Clause

4.4.3(B)(ii) of MPD-2021 prescribes a minimum 18 metre ROW for Group

Housing projects. According to the Petitioner, while the Respondents treated

the subject land as part of an “integrated layout” for the purposes of

satisfying road width requirements, MPD-2021 norms relating to FAR,

height and density were simultaneously applied so as to confer undue benefit

upon the private Respondents.

40. It is further submitted that no proper Traffic Impact Assessment,

infrastructure assessment or study regarding the carrying capacity of the area

was undertaken prior to grant of approvals, despite the requirements under

MPD-2021 and 2018 Regulations. It is submitted that neither the Petitioner

School nor the surrounding occupants were considered while approving the

project and no effective measures were planned to address the already

saturated infrastructure of the locality.

41. According to the Petitioner School, it is already facing severe

congestion issues on its sole vehicular access road, which is also proposed to

be used for ingress and egress to the project site. The said road, stated to be

approximately 10–11 metres wide, is already burdened by movement of

around 2,500 students, 200 staff members, school buses and private vehicles

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 28 of 113

during school hours. It is submitted that the proposed construction activity

and additional vehicular movement would further aggravate congestion,

create serious safety concerns for students and staff, and adversely impact

emergency access to the school premises. Reliance is also placed on the

bomb threat incident dated 01.05.2024, during which emergency services

allegedly faced difficulty in accessing the School owing to congestion and

restricted access.

42. It is additionally submitted that the Traffic Assessment Report relied

upon by the Respondents is fundamentally flawed, as the traffic survey was

conducted during summer vacations when nearby schools were closed and,

consequently, the actual traffic conditions around the Petitioner School were

never properly assessed.

43. It is also submitted that the Petitioner School falls within a notified

“Silence Zone” and that the large-scale construction activity immediately

adjoining the school boundary wall would expose students to dust, vibration,

excessive noise, heavy machinery, labour movement and construction

traffic, thereby adversely affecting the functioning of the School and

infringing the students’ right to study in a safe, healthy and noise-free

environment under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

44. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the

Environmental Clearance and supporting reports were obtained on the basis

of misrepresentation and concealment of material facts. In particular, it is

submitted that the Petitioner School was shown in the environmental

documents as being located 400–500 metres away from the project site,

whereas in reality the School directly adjoins the project land and shares a

common boundary wall therewith. It is further submitted that the impact of

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 29 of 113

construction activity, labour deployment, vehicular movement and noise

levels on the functioning and safety of the School was not properly disclosed

before the authorities.

45. It is further submitted that the present petition has been instituted

independently by the Petitioner School for protection of its own rights and

concerns relating to safety, congestion, infrastructure and functioning of the

School, and not in collusion with the RWA or its members. It is submitted

that the Petitioner School has been agitating issues relating to access roads

and congestion since 1999 and had earlier approached this Hon’ble Court in

W.P.(C.) No. 1797/2016 seeking an alternative access road on account of

the already congested internal roads of the colony.

46. It is also submitted that the pendency of proceedings before the NGT

or the availability of remedies under Section 347B of the DMC Act does not

bar maintainability of the present writ petition, particularly when the present

challenge also pertains to approvals and decisions taken by Respondent No.

2/DDA, which are not amenable to challenge before the MCD Appellate

Tribunal.

47. Lastly, reliance is placed by the Petitioner upon the judgments of

Anirudh Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors., reported as

(2015) 7 SCC 779, and I.H. Sekar v. Principal Secretary to Government of

Tamil Nadu, reported as 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 18160.

Submissions on Behalf of Respondent Nos. 4-14

48. The Respondents have raised a preliminary objection to the

maintainability of the present writ petition, contending that the reliefs sought

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 30 of 113

are either barred by statutory remedies, consequential in nature, or otherwise

not maintainable in writ jurisdiction.

49. In the aforesaid regard, the Respondents further contend that the writ

court cannot sit in appeal over decisions of expert bodies and executive

authorities, including MCD, DDA, DPCC, CEC, AAI, Delhi Fire Services,

Delhi Jal Board and the Land Acquisition Collector, all of whom examined

the project in accordance with applicable regulations. It is submitted that the

ADM (LA), GNCTD confirmed that the subject land is free from

acquisition, and that the sanction was granted after due consideration by the

DDA Screening Committee, Technical Committee and the Building Plan

Committee of MCD.

50. It is further contended that the Petitioners had an efficacious

alternative remedy under Section 347B of the DMC Act before the ATMCD

and therefore invocation of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is

impermissible. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Division Bench

of this Court in RWA v. Paardarshita Public Welfare Foundation (NGO)

& Ors., W.P.(C) No. 14193/2024, as well as the decision of the Division

Bench of this Court in Diwan Chand Aggarwal & Ors. v. DDA & Ors.,

LPA No. 7/2021.

51. It is then submitted that prayer clause (a) of the present Petition,

seeking quashing of the sanction dated 13th May, 2024 granted by MCD, is

appealable under Section 347B of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The

Respondents further contend that an identical challenge was dismissed on

maintainability in W.P.(C) No. 352/2025 vide Order dated 20th January,

2025, which was affirmed in LPA No. 92/2025 vide Judgment dated 07th

February, 2025. Prayer clauses (b), (c), (d), and (e), according to the

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 31 of 113

Respondents, are merely consequential to prayer clause (a) and therefore

cannot survive independently. In relation to prayer clause (c), it is

additionally contended that the Minutes of the 368th Screening Committee

Meeting dated 22nd April, 2019 and the 370th Screening Committee

Meeting dated 17th June, 2019 are independently appealable under Section

347B of the DMC Act and Section 31C of the Delhi Development Act.

52. In respect of prayer clause (e), Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 contend that

the subject land is privately owned land belonging to Respondent No. 4 and

that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have no proprietary concern therein. It is

submitted that the DDA brochure applies only to DDA land and cannot be

enforced against privately owned land.

53. As regards prayer clause (f), seeking quashing of the order dated

07.12.2012 passed by the ATMCD in Appeal No. 24/AT/MCD/2009 and

the judgment dated 16.07.2016 passed by the learned District & Sessions

Judge, the Respondents submit that the said judicial orders have attained

finality and are therefore not open to challenge. It is further submitted that

the Petitioners were never parties to the said proceedings, whereas the

affected parties, namely MCD and DDA, accepted the same. According to

the Respondents, the said orders merely directed consideration of the

application for sanction of the layout plan and did not prejudice any third-

party rights.

54. The Respondents further contend that the prayers in the present

petition are substantially identical to those raised in W.P.(C) No. 352/2025.

Prayer (d), seeking restraint against construction, corresponds to prayer No.

1 therein; prayer (b), seeking restraint against further sanctions or approvals,

corresponds to prayer No. 2; prayer (a), seeking quashing of the sanction

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 32 of 113

dated 13.05.2024, corresponds to prayer No. 3; and prayer (c), seeking

quashing of the 368th and 370th Screening Committee Minutes, corresponds

to prayer No. 4 in the said writ petition.

55. The Respondents have also placed on record a chronology of

proceedings initiated by the Petitioner RWA and its members against

Respondent Nos. 4 to 14. In August 2024, the present writ petition was filed

challenging the sanction plan granted by MCD. On 10.09.2024, CM Appl.

Nos. 52907/2024 and 52908/2024 in Contempt Case No. 1149/2022 titled

Bhuvneen Kandhari v. C.S. Singh & Ors. were filed alleging illegal cutting

of trees, which applications were disposed of vide Order dated 06th

December, 2024 as no violation of any Court order was alleged. On 13th

September, 2024, O.A. No. 1171/2024 was filed before the NGT alleging

absence of Environmental Clearance and felling of trees, which was

dismissed vide Order dated 17.02.2025.

56. In November 2024, Rajeev Ranjan, then President of the RWA, filed

Case No. 1587 before the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) constituted

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court alleging that the subject land formed part of a

morphological ridge. The CEC thereafter submitted its Report dated 14th

May, 2025 permitting construction, which was forwarded to the Hon’ble

Supreme Court. In January 2025, residents of the RWA filed W.P.(C) No.

352/2025 titled Colonel Ajay Yadav & Anr. v. GNCTD & Ors., contending

that construction could not proceed as the subject land formed part of a

morphological ridge. The said petition was dismissed vide Order dated 20th

January, 2025, on the ground that none of the prayers were maintainable,

and the challenge thereto in LPA No. 92/2025 was dismissed vide Judgment

dated 07th February, 2025. Finally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, vide Order

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 33 of 113

dated 12th August, 2025 in W.P.(C) No. 202/1995, dismissed the

applications filed by Rajeev Ranjan and accepted the applications filed by

Texknit in terms of the CEC Report dated 14th May, 2025, thereby

permitting construction in accordance with law.

57. On the Petitioners’ objection that the subject land falls within a

morphological ridge, the Respondents submit that the present Petition

contains no such pleading. It is further contended that the CEC, being the

competent authority in such matters, vide Report dated 14th May, 2025

permitted Respondent No. 4 to undertake construction subject to conditions,

which Report was accepted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated

12th August, 2025 in W.P.(C) No. 202/1995. The Respondents further

contend that the same plea already stands rejected in W.P.(C) No. 352/2025

and LPA No. 92/2025.

58. On the allegation of a change in the DDA layout plan, the

Respondents deny any such change and state that both the land allotted to

the Petitioner Society and the private land of the Respondents form part of

the integrated layout plan of Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj. It is reiterated

that the subject plot forms an integral part of the pocket, having access

through 24-meter R/W on the northern and western sides, 45-meter R/W on

the eastern side, and 75-meter R/W on the southern side, and therefore the

entire pocket qualifies for Group Housing under MPD-2021 and the Zonal

Development Plan, and is therefore “Residential Group Housing Complex.”

It is submitted that the proposal underwent due scrutiny by the BPC, DDA

Screening Committee and Technical Committee before sanction was

granted. It is further contended that even assuming there was any change in

the layout plan, the remedy would lie before the ATMCD under Section 31-

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 34 of 113

C of the Delhi Development Act. Reliance is placed upon Paardarshita

Public Welfare Foundation (NGO) v. MCD & Ors., W.P.(C) No.

14193/2024 decided on 05.11.2024, and Diwan Chand Aggarwal & Ors. v.

DDA & Ors., LPA No. 7/2021 decided on 08.01.2021.

59. In relation to the challenge to the DDA Screening Committee

Minutes, the Respondents reiterate that the erstwhile owners’ application for

sanction was initially placed before the BPC, MCD on 01.10.2018 and

deferred for clarifications from DDA. The proposal was thereafter approved

in the 368th Screening Committee Meeting dated 22.04.2019. The matter

was again considered by the BPC in meetings dated 22.10.2019 and

23.10.2019, following which DDA clarified all issues through the Minutes

of the 11th Technical Committee Meeting dated 23.12.2019. Thereafter,

MCD sanctioned the building plan on 13.05.2024 after receipt of all

requisite approvals and clarifications.

60. On the objection regarding the height and number of floors in the

proposed Group Housing Project, the Respondents submit that all requisite

statutory permissions, including approvals from the Airports Authority of

India (“AAI”) and Delhi Fire Services, have been obtained. It is further

submitted that under Rules 1.2, 1.5 and 1.6 of the 2018 Regulations, the

Building Bye-Laws prevail, and neither MPD-2021 nor the Unified Building

Bye-Laws impose any restriction on the proposed height. Reliance is placed

upon paragraph 10 of MCD’s Counter Affidavit, wherein it is stated that

clarifications regarding permissible height and floors were specifically

sought from DDA before sanction. DDA’s Technical Committee clarified

that under MPD 2021 there is no restriction on height for Group Housing

projects, subject to requisite clearances from AAI, Fire Department and

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 35 of 113

other statutory authorities. DDA has affirmed the same position in its

Counter Affidavit and placed the relevant agenda and minutes on record.

61. It is further submitted by Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 that the Petitioners

have repeatedly made baseless and malicious attempts to tarnish the image

of the project despite Respondent No. 4 being the lawful owner of the

subject land and having obtained all requisite permissions and NOCs in

accordance with law. According to the Respondents, the sanctions and

approvals accorded to Respondent No. 4 have consistently withstood

judicial scrutiny across multiple forums. Reliance is placed upon the

dismissal of W.P.(C) No. 352/2025 and LPA No. 92/2025, dismissal of

proceedings before the NGT, the CEC Report dated 14.05.2025 permitting

construction, and the order dated 12.08.2025 passed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in W.P.(C) No. 202/1995 permitting construction in

accordance with due process of law.

62. In regard to the genesis of right, title and interest of Respondent No.

4, it is submitted that the subject land remained private land even after

urbanisation in 1966 as it was never acquired. The land was declared private

bhumidari land vide Judgment and Decree dated 30th July, 1974 in

favour of Ram Dhan. Upon his death, Mr. Kartar Singh became the

bhumidhar. Thereafter, Respondent Nos. 5 to 14 purchased the land from

Kartar Singh vide registered Sale Deed dated 05th April, 1995, and mutation

was effected in their favour. Respondent No. 4 subsequently purchased the

land from Respondent Nos. 5 to 14 vide registered Sale Deed dated 18th

April, 2024, thereby deriving title over the subject land.

63. The Respondents also contend that the disputed questions of title and

fact by seeking to challenge Orders dated 30th July, 1974, 07th December,

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 36 of 113

2012 and 16th July, 2016, can only be adjudicated by a competent civil court

upon evidence and not in writ jurisdiction. Reliance is placed upon Shalini

Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329, State of

Rajasthan v. Bhawani Singh 1993 Supp (1) SCC 306, and R.S. Juneja v.

MCD W.P. (C.) 6863/2009, Delhi High Court. It is further submitted that

judicial orders passed by competent courts are not amenable to certiorari

under Article 226.

64. According to the Respondents, the Petitioners are rank strangers to the

proceedings culminating in the orders dated 30th July, 1974, 07th

December, 2012 and 16th July, 2016, and therefore lack locus standi to

challenge the same. It is also contended that the foundational Sale Deed

dated 18.04.2024 in favour of Respondent No. 4 has not been challenged,

and therefore no effective relief can be granted.

65. It is additionally contended that the necessary parties, including Ram

Dhan or his legal heirs, have not been impleaded despite challenges being

raised to the order dated 30th July, 1974. Reliance is placed upon Prem

Porwal v. Jagdish Chandra. SLP(C.) No. 16483/2015, Supreme Court. The

Respondents also allege suppression of material facts, multiplicity of

proceedings, impermissible enlargement of the scope of the writ petition

through amendment applications and attempts to seek discovery of

documents from a private party in writ jurisdiction. It is further submitted

that relief cannot be sought in respect of documents not properly placed on

record.

66. The Respondents further raise objections of delay and laches,

contending that the Petitioner RWA has existed since the 1980s and never

objected to the mutation entries or the possession of Respondent Nos. 5 to

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 37 of 113

14 for decades. It is submitted that the Petitioners are therefore barred from

raising claims of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel. Reliance is

placed upon DLF Universal v. Greater Kailash II Welfare Association

LPA 2633/2005, Delhi High Court.

67. The Respondents further contend that Clause 5.5 of the Regulations

for Enabling the Planned Development of Privately Owned Land, 2018 has

been misconstrued by the Petitioners. According to the Respondents, the

provision must be read with Clauses 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5, which require

conformity with surrounding development, and since the surrounding

development is residential group housing, the proposed project is fully

compliant.

68. Lastly, on the issue of jurisdiction of revenue courts, the Respondents

contend that the order dated 30th July, 1974, declaring bhumidari rights was

validly passed by a competent revenue court in accordance with the then

prevailing law as recognised in Hatti v. Sunder Singh ( 1970 )2 SCC 841,

Umed Singh v. GNCTD,(1997) SCC OnLine Del 842 and Narain Singh v.

Mohinder Singh (2008) It is submitted that even though the legal position

was later revisited in Mohinder Singh v. Narayan Singh ,(2023) 9 SCC

757, orders validly passed under the then prevailing law cannot subsequently

be treated as void, reliance being placed upon GNCTD v. K.L. Rathi Steels

.,(2023) 9 SCC 757.

69. Accordingly, the Respondents submit that the writ petition is liable to

be dismissed both on maintainability and on merits.

Submissions on Behalf of Respondent No.3/MCD

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 38 of 113

70. Learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Municipal

Corporation of Delhi, submitted that the present writ petition proceeds on a

complete misconception of the statutory scheme governing planned

development under the Delhi Development Act, 1957 and the Delhi

Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.

71. Learned counsel submitted that under the statutory framework, there

exists a clear distinction between amendment of the Master Plan and

amendment/modification of a layout plan. It was argued that where the land

use itself is sought to be altered, such as from residential to commercial, the

procedure contemplated under the Delhi Development Act including public

notice and objections becomes mandatory. However, where the issue

concerns planning, development controls and layout regulation within an

existing permissible land use, the competent planning authority is

empowered to take decisions independently in accordance with law.

72. Learned counsel submitted that the subject land forms part of a

residential pocket and the proposal in question pertains to group

housing/residential development. Therefore, according to learned counsel,

there was no alteration of land use requiring any modification of the Master

Plan under Section 11A of the Delhi Development Act. The decision

impugned in the present petition was stated to be one concerning layout

planning and development regulation within the existing planning

framework.

73. Learned counsel further submitted that the decision regarding sanction

and planning approval was not taken arbitrarily or mechanically but after

due consideration by expert statutory bodies including the Technical

Committee, Screening Committee and the competent authorities under the

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 39 of 113

DDA and MCD. It was contended that the Building Plan Committee of

MCD comprises senior engineers and technical experts and the planning

decision in question was arrived at after consideration at multiple levels.

74. Learned counsel submitted that courts exercising jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India ordinarily ought not to interfere with

technical and planning decisions taken by specialized statutory authorities

possessing domain expertise, unless the decision is shown to be patently

arbitrary, mala fide or contrary to statute.

75. It was further submitted that the “Regulations for Enabling the

Planned Development of Privately Owned Lands, 2018” framed under

Section 57 of the Delhi Development Act specifically contemplate

development of privately owned pockets of land which had remained

undeveloped or left out within larger planned areas. According to learned

counsel, the objective of the policy was to ensure planned utilization of such

parcels rather than permitting them to remain unused indefinitely.

76. Learned counsel submitted that once the petitioners themselves

contend that the subject land is Government/DDA land, the rigours

applicable to privately owned lands under the 2018 Regulations regarding

development controls, road width, height restrictions and related conditions

would not even arise in the manner sought to be projected by the petitioners.

77. It was further argued that the allegations of fraud advanced by the

petitioners are wholly misconceived and unsupported by any cogent

material. Learned counsel submitted that the sanctioning authority processed

the applications on the basis of registered sale deeds and title documents

placed on record and there existed no material before the Corporation

suggesting fabrication or sham transactions.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 40 of 113

78. Learned counsel emphasized that registered documents carry a

statutory presumption of genuineness and sanctity and cannot casually be

treated as sham or fraudulent merely on the basis of bald allegations in writ

proceedings. It was argued that serious allegations regarding fraud in sale

transactions require clear pleadings and substantive evidence and cannot be

adjudicated merely on the basis of averments in an interlocutory application.

79. Learned counsel further submitted that even assuming the petitioners

allege that sanction was obtained by misrepresentation or fraudulent

disclosure, the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act itself provides a specific

statutory mechanism under Section 338 of the Act. Reference was made to

Section 338 of the DMC Act to contend that where sanction has been

obtained on the basis of material misrepresentation or fraudulent statement,

the Commissioner is empowered to cancel such sanction by a reasoned

written order. It was therefore submitted that the petitioners have an

efficacious statutory remedy even qua their allegations of fraud and

consequently invocation of extraordinary writ jurisdiction is wholly

unwarranted.

80. Learned counsel further submitted that Clause 1.6 of the applicable

Regulations specifically provides that any issue relating to interpretation of

the Regulations is required to be referred to the competent authority/DDA

for necessary clarification and directions. It was therefore argued that

disputes concerning applicability of the 2018 Policy, development controls,

road width, permissible height and related technical planning norms ought to

be left to the specialized statutory authorities and not adjudicated by the

Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 41 of 113

81. Learned counsel also dealt with the objection raised by the petitioners

regarding environmental clearance and submitted that the sanction granted

was conditional in nature and subject to procurement of all other statutory

approvals including environmental clearance. It was argued that such

conditional sanctions are common in planning matters and the mere

pendency of environmental clearance at a particular stage does not ipso facto

invalidate the sanction process.

Submissions on Behalf of Respondent No.2/DDA

82. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Delhi Development

Authority adopted the submissions advanced on behalf of MCD and further

invited attention to the counter affidavit filed by DDA, particularly

paragraph C(b) and C(c), to contend that the subject plot forms an integral

part of Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj and therefore the entire pocket

along with the subject plot qualifies as a group housing pocket under the

applicable planning framework.

83. Learned counsel submitted that the stand of DDA consistently has

been that the development norms applicable to the subject land are governed

by the surrounding integrated development of the area. It was submitted that

the entire pocket is bounded by 24 metres, 45 metre and 75 metre right-of-

way roads and the development control norms applicable to the subject land

are therefore regulated by Clause 5.5 of the “Regulations for Enabling the

Planned Development of Privately Owned Lands”. According to learned

counsel, the planning approvals granted in the present case are entirely

consistent with the aforesaid regulatory framework.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 42 of 113

84. Learned counsel also addressed the issue raised by the petitioners

regarding pedestrian access to the Masonic Public School and invited

attention to paragraph 11 of the relevant pleadings. It was submitted that the

issue had already been considered in earlier proceedings before this Court in

W.P.(C) No. 1797/2016 titled M/s Northern India Masonic Charitable

Society v. Delhi Development Authority & Anr.

85. Learned counsel submitted that in the aforesaid proceedings, this

Court by judgment dated 21.01.2025 had already directed creation of a

pedestrian passage for school children and that during pendency of the said

proceedings, the Vice Chairman, DDA had passed a detailed speaking order

dated 30.08.2024 directing construction of pedestrian access from Aruna

Asaf Ali Road to the Masonic Public School through the waterbody area.

86. It was therefore submitted that the grievance sought to be raised in the

present writ petition regarding pedestrian accessibility already stands

addressed by the competent authorities pursuant to judicial directions and

cannot constitute a surviving ground for interference with the sanction

granted in favour of the private respondents.

87. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the challenge raised by the

petitioners essentially seeks judicial review of technical planning decisions

taken by expert statutory authorities in accordance with the applicable

Regulations and Master Plan norms. According to learned counsel, no case

of arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of any statutory provision has been

made out warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 43 of 113

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

I. Whether the Petitioner RWA, the individual resident Petitioners in

W.P.(C.) No. 11283/2024, and the Petitioner School in W.P.(C.) No.

17433/2025 possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the present

writ petitions?

II. Whether CM APPL. 10311/2025 seeking amendment of the writ

petition is liable to be allowed, and if so, to what effect?

III. Whether the approvals and sanctions granted in favour of

Respondent Nos. 4 to 14, are contrary to standing laws including

sanction dated 13.05.2024, the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act,

1957, the Delhi Development Act, 1957, MPD-2021, Unified Building

Bye-Laws, 2016, and the applicable planning regulations, thereby

warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India?

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS:

88. This court has heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf

of the Petitioners, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MCD,

learned counsel appearing on behalf of DDA, as well as the learned Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 4 to 14, and has carefully

perused the pleadings, documents placed on record and the judgments relied

upon by the respective parties.

89. First and foremost, the issue which arises for consideration before this

Court is whether the Petitioners have the requisite locus standi to contest the

present writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 44 of 113

90. This Court has considered the preliminary objection as to locus standi

raised by the Respondents on various grounds. It is well settled that

maintainability under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not

depend upon a proprietary interest in the subject matter, a person directly

and prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority may

maintain proceedings even in absence of such a specific interest, particularly

where the impugned activity is alleged to violate the governing planning

framework and raises issues bearing upon public interest and the rule of law.

The Petitioner School satisfies this threshold on the face of the record. It

directly adjoins the Subject Property along a shared boundary wall, shares

the sole motorable vehicular access road a fact not disputed by the

Respondents and expressly acknowledged in DDA's own order dated

30.08.2024 passed in W.P.(C.) No. 1797/2016, and further operates as an

educational institution entitled to silence zone protection under Rule 3(5) of

the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000. As admitted, this

institution caters to approximately 2,500 students whose safety, health and

educational environment are prima facie directly implicated by the proposed

high-density construction immediately adjoining the School boundary. The

prejudice asserted is therefore neither remote nor generalised but connected

and institution-specific.

91. As regards to the allegation of proxy litigation as alleged by the

Respondents herein, it is established as per the records, to the satisfaction of

the Court that the School was admittedly not a party to W.P.(C.) No.

11283/2024, and the uncontroverted position is that it became aware of the

impugned approvals only in September 2025 upon noticing construction

activity at site a circumstance inconsistent with any inference of prior

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 45 of 113

collusion. Further, the grievances urged by the School including the silence

zone protection claim, the concern regarding the sole access road, and the

allegation that the School's location was misrepresented before the SEAC

are institution-specific grievances unavailable to, and not urged by, the

RWA Petitioners, thereby disclosing an independent and distinct cause of

action. Mere overlap in certain legal grounds arising from the same

impugned approvals does not render an independently aggrieved party's

petition a proxy proceeding. For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary

objection as to locus standi does not merit acceptance and is accordingly

rejected.

92. Now, turning to the locus standi of the Petitioner RWA and the

individual resident Petitioners in W.P.(C.) No. 11283/2024, the

Respondents contend that the Petitioners, being strangers to the title of the

Subject Property, lack any legally cognisable interest to question the

impugned sanctions and approvals. The Petitioner RWA is stated to

represent residents of Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj, within which the

Subject Property is situated, while the individual Petitioners are residents of

the colony who assert that they purchased their flats under DDA’s Self-

Financing Scheme in the backdrop of the sanctioned layout plan and

planning framework then prevailing. It is their case that the Subject Property

is accessible through the internal road network of the colony and that the

proposed development is likely to have a bearing on the existing civic

infrastructure, internal circulation and residential environment of the area.

93. The Petitioners further contend that the impugned approvals constitute

a departure from the originally contemplated development pattern of the

colony and that such change directly affects the residents of the surrounding

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 46 of 113

area. At this stage, the concerns raised with regard to access, ingress and

egress, traffic movement and the impact upon the surrounding residential

environment cannot be said to be wholly remote or unconnected with the

subject matter of challenge.

94. Equally, the mere fact that the Petitioners were not parties to the

proceedings culminating in the orders dated 07.12.2012 and 16.07.2016

would not, by itself, preclude them from independently raising their

grievances in appropriate proceedings, particularly when they assert that

they were neither impleaded nor heard therein. The allegations regarding

construction being done de-hors the standing regulations also do not, prima

facie, bear any direct nexus to the legality of the approvals presently under

challenge. In these circumstances, this Court is not inclined to reject the

claim of locus standi of the Petitioner RWA and the individual resident

Petitioners at the threshold.

95. Having answered Issue No. 1 in favour of the Petitioners herein, this

Court shall now proceed to examine Issue No. 2, namely, whether CM

APPL. 10311/2025 seeking amendment of the Writ petition 11283/2024

is liable to be allowed, and if so, to what effect.

96. The said application has been preferred on behalf of the Petitioners

under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 seeking amendment of the writ petition by incorporation of

additional pleadings and prayers pertaining to the alleged vesting of the

subject land in the Gaon Sabha/Central Government/DDA and the legality

of the order dated 30.07.1974 passed by the Revenue Assistant declaring

one Sh. Ram Dhan as Bhumidhar of the subject property. The Petitioners

further seek incorporation of averments alleging that the said order was

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 47 of 113

without jurisdiction, void ab initio and collusive in nature, and consequently

seek addition of a prayer for declaration that the said order is non-est and

unenforceable in law.

97. The amendment is opposed by Respondent Nos. 4 to 14, inter alia, on

the ground that the proposed amendment fundamentally alters the scope and

character of the writ proceedings, seeks to reopen questions pertaining to

title, vesting and ownership after several decades, introduces issues which

were admittedly within the Petitioners’ knowledge even at the time of filing

of the writ petition and would seriously prejudice vested rights accrued in

favour of subsequent purchasers who were not parties to the alleged revenue

proceedings of 1974.

98. It is further contended that the proposed controversy necessarily

involves disputed questions of title and proprietary rights which are

incapable of adjudication in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India.

99. Before adverting to the merits of the amendment application, it

becomes necessary to examine the nature and scope of the original writ

proceedings. A perusal of the writ petition demonstrates that the principal

challenge therein was directed against the sanction dated 13.05.2024

granted by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in respect of the proposed

group housing project over the subject property, the screening committee

approvals, and the consequential planning and development permissions

granted by the statutory authorities. The original controversy, therefore,

substantially arose in the context of planning norms, legality of sanctions,

road width requirements, environmental concerns, conformity with the

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 48 of 113

Master Plan and the legality of the approvals granted by the planning

authorities.

100. By way of the present amendment, however, the Petitioners now seek

to introduce extensive pleadings challenging the very root of title claimed by

Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 and their predecessors-in-interest. The Petitioners

further seek to contend that the land stood vested in the Gaon Sabha/Central

Government/DDA, that the order dated 30.07.1974 passed by the Revenue

Assistant was wholly without jurisdiction and that all subsequent

transactions flowing therefrom are consequently unsustainable. The

Petitioners further seek a substantive declaratory prayer assailing the said

revenue order itself.

101. The law governing amendment of pleadings is well settled. Though

courts ordinarily adopt a liberal approach while considering applications for

amendment, such discretion is neither automatic nor unrestricted. The

amendment must be necessary for determining the real controversy between

the parties and must not result in fundamentally altering the nature of the

proceedings or causing serious prejudice to accrued rights of the opposite

party.

102. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Pvt.

Ltd., (2022) 11 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprehensively

summarised the principles governing amendment of pleadings and held that

while amendments necessary for effective adjudication should ordinarily be

allowed, the Court must refuse amendments which fundamentally change

the nature of proceedings, reopen settled issues, or cause serious prejudice

incapable of compensation.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 49 of 113

103. Tested on the aforesaid principles, this Court is unable to persuade

itself to allow the present amendment.

104. It is significant that the Petitioners themselves admit that the facts

sought to be introduced by way of amendment were always within their

knowledge. The foundation of the proposed amendment rests upon the

notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in

the years 1965 and 1966, the alleged vesting of Gaon Sabha land upon

urbanisation of Village Mehrauli in 1966, the notification dated 20.08.1974

placing Gaon Sabha land at the disposal of DDA, and the order dated

30.07.1974 passed by the Revenue Assistant. All these events are historical

facts dating back several decades and are not based upon any subsequent

discovery or newly emerged material.

105. The Petitioners have failed to demonstrate as to what prevented them

from raising these pleas at the time of institution of the writ petition itself.

The amendment application does not disclose the emergence of any fresh

circumstance or subsequent event necessitating incorporation of the

proposed pleadings. Rather, the Petitioners seek to introduce an altogether

expanded challenge on the basis of material admittedly available to them

from the very inception.

106. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Vidyabai & Ors. v. Padmalatha &

Anr., (2009) 2 SCC 409, held that one of the primary considerations while

deciding amendment applications is whether the applicant acted with due

diligence and whether the amendment is sought at a belated stage despite

prior knowledge of the relevant facts. The relevant paragraph of the

judgement reads as under:

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 50 of 113

"10. By reason of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment)

Act, 2002 (Act 22 of 2002), Parliament inter alia inserted a

proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code, which reads as

under:

'Provided that no application for amendment shall be

allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court

comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the

party could not have raised the matter before the

commencement of trial.'

It is couched in a mandatory form. The court’s jurisdiction

to allow such an application is taken away unless the

conditions precedent therefor are satisfied viz. it must come

to a conclusion that in spite of due diligence the parties

could not have raised the matter before the commencement

of the trial.

[........]

19. It is the primal duty of the court to decide as to whether

such an amendment is necessary to decide the real dispute

between the parties. Only if such a condition is fulfilled, the

amendment is to be allowed. However, proviso appended to

Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code restricts the power of the court.

It puts an embargo on exercise of its jurisdiction. The

court's jurisdiction, in a case of this nature is limited. Thus,

unless the jurisdictional fact, as envisaged therein, is found

to be existing, the court will have no jurisdiction at all to

allow the amendment of the plaint.”

107. In the considered opinion of this Court, the present amendment

suffers from precisely such infirmity. The Petitioners, despite full

knowledge of the factual basis now sought to be introduced, chose not to

frame the original writ petition on the basis of title or vesting. Having

consciously instituted the writ petition challenging sanctions and approvals

granted by the planning authorities, the Petitioners cannot now be permitted

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 51 of 113

to substantially enlarge the scope of proceedings by converting the dispute

into one concerning the legality of a revenue order passed more than five

decades ago and the consequential validity of proprietary claims arising

therefrom.

108. Equally significant herein is the nature of the controversy sought to be

introduced. The proposed amendment directly impinges upon questions

relating to title, ownership, vesting and proprietary rights over immovable

property. Once the Petitioners seek a declaration that the order dated

30.07.1974 was void ab initio and that the land vested in the

Government/DDA, the controversy necessarily travels beyond the realm of

planning permissions and enters into adjudication of competing proprietary

claims.

109. Such questions cannot ordinarily be adjudicated in exercise of writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly where

determination of rights would require examination of historical revenue

records, acquisition proceedings, vesting notifications, title documents,

succession, mutations and competing factual assertions spanning several

decades.

110. In State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani Singh, (1993) Supp (1) SCC 306,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that disputed questions relating to title

and ownership of immovable property are ordinarily unsuited for

adjudication in writ jurisdiction.

111. The proposed amendment would therefore inevitably transform the

present proceedings from a challenge to planning sanctions into a

substantive adjudication concerning title and vesting of land. Such

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 52 of 113

enlargement of the controversy cannot be said to be merely ancillary or

explanatory in nature.

112. This Court also finds considerable merit in the submission advanced

on behalf of Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 that permitting the amendment at this

stage would seriously prejudice vested and accrued rights of third parties.

113. The record demonstrates that the land was allegedly purchased by

Respondent Nos. 5 to 14 through registered sale deeds executed in the year

1995 from persons claiming title through the revenue order dated

30.07.1974, then it was purchased by Respondent No. 4 from Respondents

5-14 in the year 2024. It is also not disputed that the original parties to the

said revenue proceedings, including the persons directly affected by the

order dated 30.07.1974, are no longer alive and are not parties to the present

writ proceedings.

114. The consequences of permitting the proposed amendment would

therefore be far-reaching. The Petitioners seek, in effect, to reopen the very

foundation of title upon which subsequent transactions and proprietary

claims have rested for several decades. Such adjudication would directly

affect the rights of subsequent purchasers claiming through bone-fide

registered conveyances and long-standing revenue entries.

115. In Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, (1978) 2 SCC 91, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court observed that though procedural laws should ordinarily be

construed liberally, amendments cannot be permitted where they result in

serious prejudice to the opposite side or seek to unsettle rights which have

accrued over time.

116. The prejudice in the present case is not merely procedural. The

amendment seeks to cast uncertainty upon long-standing proprietary claims

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 53 of 113

and transactions emanating from a revenue order passed in the year 1974.

More importantly, the original persons directly connected with those

proceedings are no longer before this Court. Permitting adjudication of such

issues in collateral writ proceedings at the instance of persons who were

admittedly not parties to the earlier proceedings would seriously prejudice

parties who have subsequently acquired rights on the basis of registered

instruments and settled revenue records.

117. Moreover, the Petitioners have sought to contend that an order

without jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage. There can be no quarrel

with the settled proposition that a void order can, in an appropriate case, be

questioned even in collateral proceedings. However, that principle does not

ipso facto compel this Court to permit amendment of pleadings in every case

irrespective of the nature of proceedings, the conduct of parties, the delay

involved, and the consequences flowing therefrom.

118. Even assuming the Petitioners are entitled to question the legality of

the order dated 30.07.1974, the question still remains whether such

adjudication can appropriately be undertaken in the present writ proceedings

instituted primarily against planning sanctions and approvals. In the

considered opinion of this Court, the answer must be in the negative.

119. The proposed amendment would necessarily require this Court to

undertake examination of intricate factual and legal issues concerning

acquisition proceedings, vesting of Gaon Sabha land, applicability of the

Delhi Land Reforms Act, legality and effect of the revenue order dated

30.07.1974, continuity of possession, succession, mutations and the validity

of subsequent conveyances. Such adjudication is wholly foreign to the

limited controversy originally raised in the writ petition and cannot

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 54 of 113

appropriately be converted into the principal subject matter of these

proceedings by way of amendment.

120. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that writ jurisdiction is

essentially discretionary and equitable in nature. A party seeking equitable

relief must approach the Court with due diligence and within a reasonable

framework of the controversy originally pleaded. Permitting the present

amendment would substantially alter the complexion of the proceedings and

reopen issues which have remained unquestioned for decades despite being

within the Petitioners’ knowledge throughout.

121. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that the proposed

amendment is neither necessary for adjudication of the original controversy

nor merely explanatory or clarificatory in nature. On the contrary, the

amendment seeks to substantially enlarge the scope of the writ petition by

introducing issues relating to title, vesting and legality of historical revenue

proceedings, which would require adjudication of complex disputed

questions beyond the permissible contours of the present writ proceedings.

122. The amendment also suffers from gross and unexplained delay

inasmuch as the factual basis thereof admittedly existed and remained within

the knowledge of the Petitioners even prior to institution of the writ petition.

No subsequent event or newly discovered material has been shown which

could justify incorporation of such pleas at this stage.

123. Furthermore, it is reiterated that permitting the amendment would

seriously prejudice vested rights claimed by subsequent purchasers who

were not parties to the alleged revenue proceedings and whose rights have

accrued through long-standing transactions and revenue records over several

decades.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 55 of 113

124. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the petitioners were

not aware of the proceedings before the Revenue Court at the time the Writ

was instituted, the petitioners’ own pleadings and submissions

fundamentally undermine this position. Throughout the course of arguments,

the petitioners have repeatedly contended that the land in question belongs

to the DDA and not to private owners, a submission which, in and of itself,

demonstrates a clear awareness of the underlying title dispute and of the

adjudication that had taken place before the Revenue Authority. It is against

this backdrop that the present application for amendment falls to be

considered.

125. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, this Court finds

itself unable to grant the relief sought at this stage, and for the following

reasons.

126. The first and most conspicuous infirmity afflicting the present

application is the inordinate and wholly unexplained delay with which the

petitioner has approached this Court. The petitioner invokes the

extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court after a lapse of approximately

five decades, without tendering any satisfactory explanation for this

extraordinary and unconscionable delay. It is well settled that the

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, though wide and

discretionary in its amplitude, is not designed to resuscitate stale claims or to

unsettle proceedings that have long since attained finality. The doctrine of

laches operates with full vigour in the present case. A party cannot remain

dormant over its rights for half a century and thereafter seek to invoke the

extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to reopen matters that the passage of

time has conclusively closed. This position finds further reinforcement in the

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 56 of 113

decision of this Court in Bhagwan Singh v. Financial Commissioner ILR

(2008) 2 Delhi 762, wherein a challenge to revenue entries made after a

lapse of twenty-six years was held not to be maintainable, and the writ

petition was accordingly dismissed. If a delay of twenty-six years was found

to be fatal to the maintainability of such a challenge, the delay of nearly five

decades in the present case admits of no indulgence whatsoever.

127. Proceeding further, even if the question of delay were to be set aside,

the nature and scope of writ jurisdiction itself presents an insuperable

obstacle to the grant of the relief sought. This Court, exercising jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not sit as a court of

appeal over the Revenue Authority, and it is not within the province of this

Court to re-examine the correctness of findings of fact or to substitute its

own assessment for that of a competent tribunal. It is only the powers of

judicial review that this Court exercises, and any interference, if at all, must

remain strictly within the parameters of such review and cannot partake of

the character of appellate scrutiny. The mere fact that a wrong view may

have been taken by the Revenue Authority would not, of itself, entitle this

Court to interfere. Interference would be warranted only where perversity is

demonstrated, or where it is shown that the order of the Revenue Authority

is contrary to settled law, or where the findings returned are shown to rest

upon no material whatsoever. The appropriate and efficacious remedy

available to the petitioner, had it been aggrieved by the award of the

Revenue Authority, was to challenge the same through the statutory

mechanism prescribed under the relevant revenue laws. By failing to avail of

such remedy and instead approaching this Court after decades through the

device of an amendment to a petition whose original prayers bore no nexus

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 57 of 113

whatsoever with the question of title, the petitioner cannot now be permitted

to circumvent the statutory scheme so as to achieve collaterally what it could

not have sought directly.

128. In this connection, the observations of a Full Bench of the Punjab and

Haryana High Court in Dr. Kidar Nath Sharma v. Rattiram Mangli AIR

1966 P&H 321 are instructive. The Full Bench made reference to an earlier

Division Bench judgment of that Court dated 13th March, 1963 in Ramjilal

v. Lekhi, which laid down that the task of determining which individuals

were entitled to the benefit of the general declaration of Bhumidhari rights

in accordance with the entries in the revenue records was of enormous

magnitude and would consume years if every such case were to be

contested. It was accordingly held that the record of Bhumidhari rights was

to be made on the basis of revenue records, and that persons wishing to

contest the certificates granted thereunder had ample opportunity to do so

under Rule 8(4) of the Reforms Rules. In the same vein, a Division Bench of

this Court in Gaon Sabha v. Jage Ram 1973 Rajdhani Law Reporter 597

held that a person seeking to challenge the correctness of entries in the land

revenue forms must first apply to the Revenue Assistant under Rule 8(4) of

the Reforms Rules, who may then require him to file a regular suit in a Civil

Court. These decisions collectively underscore the principle that the

statutory machinery must be invoked before recourse is given to this Court,

and that bypassing such machinery altogether is impermissible.

129. The settled legal position with respect to revenue entries further

buttresses this conclusion. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishwa Vijay

Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan (1976) 3 SCC 642 held that entries in the

revenue record ought generally to be accepted at their face value, and that

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 58 of 113

courts should not embark upon an appellate enquiry into their correctness

unless it is shown that such entries were made fraudulently and

surreptitiously. No such fraud has been established in the present case. To

the same effect is the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jagdeo v.

Deputy Director of Consolidation MANU/UP/1079/2006, wherein it was

held that revenue entries in respect of agricultural lands carry great

evidentiary value, given the meticulous procedure prescribed for their

recording, correction, and maintenance, and that they cannot be equated with

entries made for purposes such as house tax under the Municipalities Act. It

was further observed that purchasers of agricultural land and others dealing

therewith invariably verify the right of the vendor from the revenue records

alone a recognition of the primacy accorded to such entries in matters of

title.

130. What further fortifies this Court in arriving at the aforesaid conclusion

is the complete absence of locus on the part of the petitioner. The

proceedings before the Revenue Authority were contested solely between

the DDA and one Shri Ram Dhan, and admittedly, the petitioner was never

impleaded as a party therein. This Court fails to comprehend how a third

party, who was not even aware of the existence of such proceedings at the

relevant time, can seek to assail a decree after the lapse of more than five

decades.

131. It is also significant that neither the petitioners nor the respondents

have placed any material on record to show that the order passed by the

Revenue Authority was ever set aside, modified, or remained pending

challenge in appeal or revision. On the contrary, the material on record

reflects that the decree attained finality and was acted upon subsequently as

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 59 of 113

well. In fact, when the DDA later formulated the Self-Financing Housing

Scheme (SFS), Vasant Kunj, and sought to utilize the land by stacking

construction material and raising a boundary wall, certain persons including

one Shri Kartar Singh approached the Civil Court claiming rights over the

land on the strength of the order dated 30.07.1974 passed by the Revenue

Assistant declaring them bhoomidars. The suit for permanent injunction was

decreed in their favour and even the appeal preferred by the DDA came to

be dismissed.

132. These subsequent developments lend further credence to the

conclusion that the findings returned by the Revenue Authority had attained

conclusiveness inter se the parties. The decree itself had been passed after

due opportunity to the contesting parties, upon consideration of the relevant

revenue records and the report of the Village Patwari, who had specifically

recorded that the land belonged to private owners.

133. In these circumstances, this Court fails to see how a stranger to the

proceedings can be permitted to impeach its validity at this belated stage. It

may additionally be observed that the Revenue Act provides a clear

procedure for impugning a wrong entry, if any, made in the record of rights,

and that a party aggrieved by a mutation was required to have the same

corrected through the prescribed statutory mechanism. Without applying for

such correction, no party can be heard to contend to the contrary. The

Legislature has expressly bestowed a presumption of correctness upon such

entries, and the failure to seek their correction through the proper forum

which alone is competent to adjudicate such a dispute renders the present

application not only belated but fundamentally misconceived.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 60 of 113

134. The settled legal position on the scope of writ jurisdiction in such

matters admits of no ambiguity. As observed herein above that it has been

consistently held in a catena of decisions that a decree passed by the

Revenue Authority or the Board of Revenue cannot be set aside in writ

proceedings, since the High Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction

over such tribunals. The only recognised exception to this principle is where

the impugned decree is shown to be illegal on the face of the record, or

where the findings recorded are so perverse as to shock the conscience of the

Court and even this limited exception is available only to a party who has

first exhausted the statutory remedies available to it. Neither condition is

satisfied in the present case. The decree does not suffer from any apparent

illegality, nor has the petitioner exhausted or indeed invoked any statutory

remedy at any point in time. To permit a third party to mount a collateral

attack upon a decree that has stood unchallenged for five decades would be

repugnant to all principles of finality, repose, and the orderly administration

of justice.

135. For all the foregoing reasons, this Court is not inclined to allow the

application for amendment, which would have the effect of introducing an

entirely new relief namely, a challenge to the title of the property into a

petition whose original prayers bore no relation to any such claim.

Accordingly, the application bearing CM APPL. 10311/2025 stands

dismissed.

136. Having dealt with Issue No. 2, this Court shall now proceed to

adjudicate upon the principal controversy arising in the present proceedings,

namely, whether the approvals and sanctions granted in favour of

Respondent Nos. 4 to 14, are contrary to standing laws including sanction

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 61 of 113

dated 13.05.2024, the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, the Delhi

Development Act, 1957, MPD-2021, Unified Building Bye-Laws, 2016, and

the applicable planning regulations, thereby warranting interference under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

137. At the outset, it becomes necessary to appreciate the statutory and

regulatory architecture governing the present controversy in its entirety

rather than in the selective and fragmented manner. The Master Plan for

Delhi, 2021, the Unified Building Bye-Laws, 2016, and the Regulations for

Enabling the Planned Development of Privately Owned Lands, 2018 do not

operate in isolation. They constitute an integrated planning framework

intended to secure orderly urban development, planned utilisation of land,

and balanced infrastructural growth within the National Capital Territory of

Delhi. The provisions contained therein are therefore required to be

interpreted harmoniously and purposively so as to further the object of

planned development, rather than in a narrow or compartmentalised manner

leading to internal inconsistency within the statutory scheme.

138. It is equally necessary to bear in mind the institutional character of the

authorities whose decisions are under challenge in the present proceedings.

The Screening Committee, the Technical Committee, and the Building Plan

Committee are specialised statutory and technical bodies constituted

precisely to examine, weigh and decide questions of planning, development

control, road access, environmental impact, and regulatory compliance.

Such bodies undertake detailed technical scrutiny upon examination of

planning records, layouts, site conditions, circulation networks, Floor-Area

Ratio (FAR) calculations, and infrastructural feasibility, which are matters

requiring specialised expertise. The scope of judicial review under Article

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 62 of 113

226 of the Constitution of India in matters involving technical planning

decisions is therefore necessarily limited. Constitutional Courts do not sit as

appellate planning authorities to substitute their own views for those arrived

at by expert statutory bodies merely because another view may also be

possible. Interference is warranted only where the decision-making process

is shown to suffer from patent illegality, manifest arbitrariness, mala fides,

or clear violation of statutory provisions.

139. The principal challenge raised by the Petitioners proceeds on the

premise that the Subject Property itself could not have been processed under

the “Regulations for Enabling the Planned Development of Privately Owned

Lands, 2018” (hereinafter, “2018 Regulations”) and that its incorporation

within the integrated layout framework of Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj

is fundamentally contrary to the planning scheme envisaged under the Delhi

Development Act and MPD-2021.

140. According to the Petitioners, the Subject Property originally formed

part of acquisition proceedings undertaken for planned development and had

always been represented as part of the Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme

floated by DDA. It has further been contended that once notifications under

Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been issued and the

area stood urbanised, the Revenue Authorities lacked jurisdiction to declare

bhumidari rights vide judgment dated 30.07.1974, and consequently the

subsequent chain of title relied upon by Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 is void ab

initio.

141. Per contra, the Respondents have consistently maintained that the

Subject Property remained privately owned land throughout, that it was

never acquired under the acquisition proceedings in question, that the land

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 63 of 113

stood specifically de-notified on 20.08.1996 and that the rights of

Respondent Nos. 4 to 14 emanate from valid revenue entries, mutation

records, and registered conveyance documents. Reliance has also been

placed upon the communication dated 22.02.2024 issued by the Land

Acquisition Collector (South), expressly stating that the Subject Property is

free from acquisition.

142. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the

challenge raised by the Petitioners essentially seeks reopening of complex

questions relating to acquisition, title, bhumidari rights, de-notification, and

ownership extending back several decades. Such issues are not only heavily

disputed on facts but have also undergone substantive adjudication before

competent forums in earlier proceedings.

143. At this stage, this Court finds it apposite to refer to the Order dated

07.12.2012 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Appellate Tribunal,

MCD in Appeal No. 24/AT/MCD/2009, which had comprehensively

examined the status of the Subject Property, the nature of the rights claimed

by the private Respondents, and the extent of authority, if any, vested in the

DDA to object to development over the said land.

144. The Appellate Tribunal, MCD, while deciding the aforesaid appeal

upon remand by the learned District Judge (South), examined the legality of

the rejection of the Appellants’ layout plan by the Municipal Corporation of

Delhi (“MCD”) on the basis of objections raised by DDA. Upon

appreciation of the material placed before it, the Tribunal returned a

categorical finding that the Subject Property was privately owned land,

continued to stand mutated in the names of the Appellants in the revenue

records, had never been acquired, and was residential in land use where

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 64 of 113

Group Housing was permissible in terms of the applicable notification dated

05.06.1999.

145. The Tribunal further noticed that though DDA had sought acquisition

of the land since the year 1989 for the purposes of the “Vasant Kunj

Residential Scheme”, no acquisition proceedings had culminated for more

than two decades and, significantly, the area itself stood de-notified vide

notification dated 20.08.1996. The Tribunal also took note of the statement

made by the Assistant Town Planner, MCD, to the effect that there existed

no statutory provision requiring procurement of a No Objection Certificate

from DDA for sanction of the layout plan. Proceeding on the aforesaid basis,

the Tribunal held that the DMC Act constituted a complete code in itself

insofar as sanction of layout plans was concerned and that the MCD alone

was competent under Section 313 thereof to process and sanction the

proposal.

146. The Tribunal categorically held that DDA possessed no right, title,

control or jurisdiction over the subject land and that mere contemplation of

future acquisition did not empower it to obstruct development over private

unacquired land, particularly in the absence of any statutory provision

mandating such NOC. The ATMCD further held that MCD acted illegally in

rejecting the proposal solely on the basis of DDA’s objection, especially

when DDA had earlier itself proposed “no objection” to the development.

Rejecting DDA’s plea regarding planned development, the Tribunal held

that speculative future acquisition could not curtail the Appellants’ rights

over their property and reiterated that even issuance of a notification under

Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act would not deprive the owners of their

right to use the land until possession was taken. Accordingly, the impugned

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 65 of 113

order dated 23.12.2008 was set aside as suffering from “patent illegality”

and the matter was remanded to MCD for fresh consideration uninfluenced

by DDA’s objections.

147. The aforesaid findings thereafter came to be substantially affirmed by

the learned District and Sessions Judge in MCD Appeal No. 04/2013 vide

final judgment and order dated 16.07.2016. The learned Appellate Court,

while dismissing the Appeal preferred by DDA, again noted that the Subject

Property was admittedly a private, residential, and de-notified parcel of land

standing mutated in favour of the landowners and that despite repeated

requests made by DDA since 1989, no acquisition proceedings had

culminated for more than two decades.

148. The Appellate Court also took note of the affidavits filed on behalf of

the Vice Chairman, DDA, wherein categorical admissions were made that

the Subject Property had neither been acquired nor placed at the disposal of

DDA and that DDA exercised jurisdiction only in respect of acquired or

notified development land. The Court further noticed DDA’s subsequent

stand that acquisition of the Subject Property was not financially viable and

that the issue relating to sanction of the proposal was liable to be considered

by the competent municipal authority. Upon consideration of the aforesaid

material, the learned District & Sessions Judge held that a private landowner

could not be indefinitely deprived of development rights merely because

DDA contemplated possible acquisition at some future date, particularly

when the proposed development was otherwise consistent with the

residential land use prescribed under the applicable planning framework.

The learned Court accordingly affirmed that no NOC from DDA was legally

required for consideration of the proposal.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 66 of 113

149. The aforesaid judicial determinations assume considerable

significance in the present proceedings. The planning authorities, while

processing the proposal under the 2018 Regulations and the applicable

planning framework, were not acting in a factual or legal vacuum but upon

the basis of findings already rendered by competent appellate forums

regarding the status of the Subject Property and the absence of any legal

embargo upon consideration of development permissions in respect thereof.

150. Further, this Court finds support in the aforesaid regard from the CEC

Report, which itself records that the original DDA SFS Scheme of 1987 left

the Subject Property out because the land could not be acquired, and that the

parcel thereafter remained surrounded by multi-storeyed DDA residential

housing. The planning authorities, therefore, proceeded upon the premise

that the Subject Property constituted an undeveloped private pocket

embedded within an otherwise planned residential layout.

151. Accordingly, the consistent findings of the ATMCD, the learned

District and Sessions Judge, and the CEC Report conclusively settle the

position that the Subject Property is a private, unacquired and denotified

parcel of land over which DDA possesses neither proprietary rights nor

statutory authority to obstruct development.

152. The remaining contentions of the respective parties, are discussed in

detail hereinafter:

(I) Alleged Violation of MPD- 2021

(a) Integration of Layout Plan

153. The Petitioners have contended that the incorporation of the Subject

Property into the existing layout plan of Sector-B, Pocket-1 amounted to a

modification of an approved layout plan, which, according to them, could

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 67 of 113

only have been undertaken after following the mandatory procedure

prescribed under Clause 11A of the MPD-2021. However, upon examination

of the MPD-2021, it emerges that no such clause exists therein, and that the

statutory framework governing modification of plans, including the

requirement of public notice and invitation of objections, is in fact contained

in the Delhi Development Act, 1957.

154. For the sake of convenience, the concerned Section 11-A of the DDA

Act, 1957 is extracted hereunder-

“11A. Modifications to plan.—

(1) The Authority may make any modifications to the master

plan or the zonal development plan as it thinks fit, being

modifications which, in its opinion, do not effect important

alterations in the character of the plan and which do not

relate to the extent of land-uses or the standards of

population density.

(2) The Central Government may make any modifications to

the master plan or the zonal development plan whether such

modifications are of the nature specified in sub-section (1)

or otherwise.

(3) Before making any modifications to the plan, the

Authority or, as the case may be, the Central Government

shall publish a notice in such form and manner as may be

prescribed by rules made in this behalf inviting objections

and suggestions from any person with respect to the

proposed modifications before such date as may be

specified in the notice and shall consider all objections and

suggestions that may be received by the Authority or the

Central Government.

(4) Every modification made under the provisions of this

section shall be published in such manner as the Authority

or the Central Government, as the case may be, may specify

and the modifications shall come into operation either on

the date of the publication or on such other date as the

Authority or the Central Government may fix.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 68 of 113

(5) When the Authority makes any modifications to the plan

under sub-section (1), it shall report to the Central

Government the full particulars of such modifications within

thirty days of the date on which such modifications come

into operation.

(6) If any question arises whether the modifications

proposed to be made by the Authority are modifications

which effect important alterations in the character of the

plan or whether they relate to the extent of land-uses or the

standards of population density, it shall be referred to the

Central Government whose decision thereon shall be final.

(7) Any reference in any other Chapter, except Chapter III,

to the master plan or the zonal development plan shall be

construed as a reference to the master plan or the zonal

development plan as modified under the provisions of this

section.”

155. At the outset, it is necessary to appreciate the nature of the action

impugned under this ground. The Petitioners proceed on the premise that

any incorporation of a previously undeveloped parcel within an existing

approved layout constitutes a "modification" attracting the full procedural

rigour of Section 11-A of the DDA Act. This premise, in the considered

opinion of this Court, conflates two conceptually distinct categories of

planning action which the statutory framework treats differently and for

good reason.

156. A modification of land use, that is, an alteration of the designated use

of land from one category to another, such as from residential to commercial

or from green space to institutional, directly affects the planning

entitlements of the surrounding area and the expectations of those who have

organised their lives and investments around the existing use designation. It

is precisely such action that attracts the rigorous procedural safeguards

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 69 of 113

under the Delhi Development Act and MPD-2021, including public notice,

opportunity for objections and higher-level regulatory scrutiny. The

rationale underlying those requirements is the protection of third-party

interests which may be prejudicially affected by a fundamental alteration of

the planning character of an area.

157. The present case, however, involves no such alteration. The Subject

Property has consistently retained its residential character within the

planning framework. The proposal before the authorities pertained to

residential group housing development within a zone already designated and

developed for residential group housing purposes. No change of land use

from one category to another was involved, and no fundamental alteration of

the planning character of the surrounding area was occasioned. The action of

the planning authorities in integrating the Subject Property within the layout

framework of Sector-B, Pocket-1 was therefore a planning determination

within an already permissible land use category and not a modification of

land use in the sense contemplated under Section 11-A

158. It is equally significant that the integration of the Subject Property

was not an ad hoc or unilateral act of the planning authorities but was

undertaken specifically under the 2018 Regulations, which were specifically

framed under Section 57 of the Delhi Development Act to address

undeveloped privately owned land pockets embedded within larger planned

and urbanised areas. The 2018 Regulations themselves prescribe a defined

procedure for such integration, involving examination by the Screening

Committee and the Technical Committee of the DDA, each of which is a

competent expert body entrusted with the responsibility of examining the

planning, infrastructural and regulatory dimensions of the proposal. The

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 70 of 113

objective underlying the said Regulations is to avoid creation of

permanently undeveloped enclaves within otherwise planned urban layouts

and to integrate such land parcels into the planning framework in a regulated

and coordinated manner. To superimpose upon that procedure the additional

requirements of Section 11-A, which addresses a different category of

planning action altogether, would be to read the two provisions in a manner

that is neither harmonious nor consistent with the distinct objects they

respectively serve.

159. In this regard, the Minutes of the 368th and 370th Screening

Committee Meetings, read conjointly with the Minutes of the 11th Technical

Committee Meeting dated 23.12.2019, assume considerable significance.

The Technical Committee specifically noted that the Subject Property forms

part of the integrated layout plan of Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj and

examined the proposal within the framework of residential land use

applicable to the area. The material placed on record prima facie indicates

that the Subject Property retained residential character within the planning

framework and that the proposed development likewise pertains to

residential group housing. Consequently, the present case does not involve

any alteration of land use from residential to commercial, industrial, or

institutional use so as to attract the rigours applicable to change of land use

under the Delhi Development Act and MPD-2021.

160. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioners that the Subject Property

was impermissibly “inserted” into the approved layout at a subsequent stage

also does not merit acceptance in the facts of the present case.

161. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that the challenge

raised by the Petitioners to the very applicability of the 2018 Regulations

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 71 of 113

and to the incorporation of the Subject Property into the planning framework

cannot be accepted. The planning authorities were acting within the contours

of the applicable statutory and regulatory framework, and no patent illegality

has been demonstrated warranting interference by this Court in exercise of

writ jurisdiction.

162. For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the procedure under

Section 11-A of DDA Act, 1957 was not attracted in the facts of the present

case, and that the planning authorities committed no illegality in proceeding

under the 2018 Regulations without independently initiating the Section 11-

A process.

(b) Collusion in the Approval Process

163. The Petitioners have alleged, under this composite head of challenge,

that misleading and manipulated layout plans were submitted to falsely

depict independent access to the Subject Property and to incorporate existing

DDA infrastructure within the proposed project, that the approvals were

granted in collusion with private developers, and that the MCD granted

sanction under Section 336 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957

without first obtaining approval of a layout plan as mandatorily required

under Sections 312 and 313 of the said Act. This Court has carefully

considered each of the aforesaid allegations and finds, for the reasons set out

hereinbelow, that none of them merit acceptance.

164. Dealing first with the allegations of fraud and collusion, it is a well-

settled principle that allegations of manipulation and collusion, particularly

in the context of statutory planning approvals granted by expert public

bodies, cannot rest upon mere assertion. Such allegations strike at the

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 72 of 113

integrity of the decision-making process and, precisely for that reason,

require clear, specific and substantiated pleadings supported by

demonstrable evidence. The graver the charge, the more exacting is the

standard of proof required to sustain it. Bald assertions of manipulation,

however forcefully or repeatedly urged, cannot substitute for proof, and this

Court cannot proceed to invalidate approvals granted by competent statutory

authorities on the basis of unsubstantiated insinuation alone.

165. The material placed on record, far from supporting an inference of

manipulation or collusion, in fact points in the opposite direction. The

proposal was subjected to scrutiny at multiple levels before sanction was

granted, including before the Building Plan Committee of the MCD, the

Screening Committee of the DDA, and the Technical Committee of the

DDA. Each of these bodies is a specialised expert statutory authority

constituted for the precise purpose of examining the technical, planning and

regulatory dimensions of development proposals. The existence of such a

multi-layered approval process, involving independent expert examination at

each stage, is itself inconsistent with any credible inference of collusion or

mechanical grant of sanction. The Petitioners have not identified any

specific document alleged to have been fabricated, any particular

representation alleged to have been fraudulently made before any of these

bodies, or any material demonstrating that the scrutiny undertaken by them

was anything other than genuine.

166. It is further relevant in this regard that the legislature, in its wisdom,

has specifically provided under Section 338 of the Delhi Municipal

Corporation Act, 1957 a statutory mechanism for cancellation of sanctions

obtained on the basis of material misrepresentation or fraud. This remedy,

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 73 of 113

which is both appropriate and efficacious for addressing precisely the kind

of allegation urged by the Petitioners, was never invoked. The Petitioners

having neither availed of the said statutory remedy nor placed before this

Court any material capable of establishing that any specific document was

fabricated or any particular representation was fraudulently made, the

allegation of fraud, manipulation and collusion in the approval process

cannot be accepted and is accordingly rejected.

167. Turning to the contention regarding Sections 312 and 313 of the DMC

Act, the Petitioners have urged that the grant of sanction under Section 336

without prior approval of a layout plan under Sections 312 and 313 renders

the impugned sanction void for non-compliance with a mandatory statutory

prerequisite. This Court is unable to accept the said contention on the facts

of the present case. The layout of Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj, was an

already approved and developed scheme. The Subject Property, upon being

integrated within the existing approved layout framework through the

process under the 2018 Regulations, was treated by the competent

authorities as forming part of an already sanctioned layout plan rather than

as a standalone parcel requiring a fresh and independent layout sanction.

The ATMCD in its order dated 07.12.2012 had itself found that the MCD

was the competent authority to process the proposal under the DMC Act and

had directed fresh consideration of the same. The subsequent processing of

the proposal by the Building Plan Committee, which involved detailed

examination of planning parameters including FAR, setbacks, access, height

and statutory compliances, constituted in substance the requisite

consideration of the layout and development parameters applicable to the

Subject Property.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 74 of 113

168. The contention that an entirely fresh and independent layout sanction

under Sections 312 and 313 was mandatorily required, as though the Subject

Property existed in planning isolation, does not account for the fact that the

Subject Property was processed as part of an integrated residential pocket

with an already approved layout. Sections 312 and 313 are intended to

ensure that development proposals are examined with reference to the layout

framework governing the area before individual building sanctions are

granted. That object was, in substance, achieved through the layered process

of examination undertaken by the Screening Committee, Technical

Committee and the Building Plan Committee in the present case. No

prejudice having been demonstrated from the manner in which the proposal

was processed, and no substantive infirmity in the approval process having

been established, this ground is also rejected.

(c) Environmental Clearance

169. The Petitioners have contended that the Sanction Plan expressly

conditioned commencement of construction upon prior obtainment of

Environmental Clearance from the SEIA/SEAC, and that construction

activity including tree felling and foundation work was commenced without

such clearance. The Respondents have not effectively controverted this

assertion. This is a ground which this Court treats with greater seriousness

than the others urged in the present proceedings.

170. Conditions imposed upon a sanction are not mere directory

requirements but constitute enforceable obligations defining the basis upon

which authorization to commence construction rests. A sanction expressed

to be conditional upon subsequent compliance cannot be construed as

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 75 of 113

conferring an unconditional licence to proceed in advance of fulfilment of

stated preconditions. At the same time, this Court is not oblivious to the

practical realities of the statutory clearance process. Environmental

clearances involve multi-layered procedural scrutiny, public consultations

and technical appraisals, all of which necessarily consume considerable

time, and it is not uncommon for various statutory clearances to be

processed concurrently over an extended period. The mere fact that a

clearance was obtained subsequent to the grant of sanction does not, without

more, establish deliberate circumvention of the regulatory framework,

particularly where the clearance process was actively pursued and has since

been duly completed.

171. The Environmental Clearance from MoEFCC was granted on

13.01.2025 during the pendency of these proceedings, and the Hon'ble

Supreme Court vide order dated 12.08.2025 has since permitted the project

to proceed subject to conditions. The subsequent obtainment of clearance

does not, however, retroactively validate construction activity, if any,

undertaken in breach of the express precondition prior to its grant.

(d) The 18-Metre Right of Way (ROW) Requirement

172. Having thus held, this Court shall now proceed to examine the next

substantial objection raised by the Petitioners, namely, whether the Subject

Property satisfies the minimum Right of Way (“ROW”) requirement

prescribed for Group Housing under the applicable planning framework.

173. The Petitioners have vehemently contended that the Subject Property

does not directly abut an 18 metre ROW as allegedly mandated under

Clause 4.4.3(B)(ii) of MPD-2021 governing Group Housing development.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 76 of 113

According to the Petitioners, the actual frontage available to the Subject

Property comprises only internal roads measuring approximately 13 metres

in width and, therefore, the very grant of approval in favour of Respondent

Nos. 4 to 14 is contrary to the mandatory planning norms prescribed under

the Master Plan. It has further been argued that the DDA Screening

Committee and Technical Committee impermissibly relied upon wider

peripheral roads servicing the larger layout of Sector-B, Pocket-1 in order to

artificially satisfy the said requirement.

174. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, it becomes necessary

to extract the relevant planning provision. Clause 4.4.3(B)(ii) of MPD-

2021, reads as under:

“ ii. [Plots for group housing should be located on roads

facing a minimum width of 18 m ROW (7.5m ROW for

Redevelopment Areas / Rehabilitation area / Special Area /

Village (Lal Dora / Firni) / Extended Lal Dora)”

175. Clause 4.4.3(B)(ii) of MPD-2021, insofar as relevant, provides that

Group Housing plots are required to “face” a minimum 18 metre ROW. The

expression employed in the planning framework is significant. The

provision does not state that every individual parcel must independently and

exclusively abut an 18 metre road in isolation from the planning structure

governing the surrounding layout. The requirement must therefore

necessarily be understood in the context of the larger planning framework,

circulation network, and integrated access structure applicable to the area in

question.

176. At this stage, it is also important to note that the interpretation placed

upon the aforesaid provision by the DDA Technical Committee and

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 77 of 113

Screening Committee constitutes the considered view of the specialised

planning authorities entrusted under the Delhi Development Act, 1957 with

implementation of MPD-2021 and regulation of planned development in

Delhi. Such interpretation, unless shown to be ex facie arbitrary or contrary

to the statutory scheme, deserves due deference in exercise of writ

jurisdiction.

177. The record demonstrates that the issue relating to ROW and

accessibility was specifically deliberated upon by the competent authorities

during the processing of the proposal. The Minutes of the 368th Screening

Committee Meeting dated 22.04.2019 reveal that the Committee consciously

examined the accessibility and circulation pattern governing the Subject

Property and took note of the fact that the parcel forms part of the integrated

layout plan of Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj, which itself is serviced

through a planned circulation network connected to wider arterial roads

having 24 metre, 45 metre and 75 metre ROW. The Committee thereafter

proceeded upon the planning assessment that the Subject Property could not

be viewed in isolation from the integrated circulation framework of the

larger residential pocket.

178. The aforesaid approach adopted by the planning authorities cannot be

said to be alien to the statutory framework. On the contrary, the 2018

Regulations themselves specifically contemplate development of privately

owned land pockets situated within already planned and urbanised areas.

Clause 4.1 of the said Regulations envisages planned integration of such

undeveloped private parcels within the larger layout of which they form an

integral component.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 78 of 113

179. The regulatory framework therefore itself recognises that privately

owned enclaves situated within larger planned sectors are required to be

examined in the context of the integrated planning structure surrounding

them, rather than as standalone and disconnected parcels.

180. The position was thereafter independently affirmed by the DDA

Technical Committee vide communication dated 10.01.2020, wherein the

competent planning authority clarified that, the Subject Property being part

of the integrated layout of Sector-B, Pocket-1, the ROW requirement could

not be interpreted in the isolated and fragmented manner suggested by the

Petitioners. The MCD Building Plan Committee subsequently relied upon

the aforesaid clarification while processing the building plans and granting

sanction dated 13.05.2024.

181. In the considered opinion of this Court, the interpretation advanced by

the Petitioners would lead to impractical and unworkable consequences in

the context of planned urban development.

182. Acceptance of the Petitioners’ contention would effectively imply that

every internal plot situated within a larger planned residential pocket must

independently abut an 18 metre ROW irrespective of the integrated

circulation network servicing the area as a whole. Such an interpretation

would render development of numerous internal plots within planned

colonies impossible despite adequate connectivity through the planned road

network. Planning norms relating to accessibility and circulation cannot be

interpreted in a manner divorced from the realities of integrated urban

layouts.

183. The planning framework itself contemplates coexistence of plot-level

development controls and sector-level circulation planning. Merely because

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 79 of 113

certain development parameters are assessed at the plot level does not

necessarily imply that access and circulation must also be viewed in

complete isolation from the larger integrated planning framework governing

the surrounding sector.

184. This Court also finds merit in the submission advanced on behalf of

the Respondents that Clause 1.6 of the 2018 Regulations specifically

provides that interpretational issues are to be referred to the DDA for

clarification. The MCD followed precisely this procedure by seeking

clarification from the DDA regarding the issues of road width and

permissible height, and thereafter acting upon the clarification furnished by

the competent planning authority. Such procedure cannot be characterised as

abdication of statutory responsibility or mechanical approval; rather, it

reflects adherence to the regulatory mechanism specifically contemplated

under the governing framework for resolution of planning interpretation

issues. Therefore, it is safe to say that the concept of an “integrated layout”

is not an afterthought introduced by the Respondents to circumvent

regulatory requirements.

185. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the Subject Property, when

examined in the context of the integrated layout and circulation framework

of Sector-B, Pocket-1, satisfies the minimum ROW requirement under

Clause 4.4.3(B)(ii) of MPD-2021 and Clause 8.2(a) of the Unified Building

Bye-Laws, 2016. Consequently, the clarification issued by the DDA

Technical Committee vide communication dated 10th January, 2020, under

MPD-2021 and the 2018 Regulations, cannot be said to be arbitrary,

contrary to the planning framework, or liable to interference in exercise of

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 80 of 113

(e) Conformity With Surrounding Development: Clause 5.5 and

Height Restrictions

186. The aforesaid conclusion naturally leads this Court to the next limb of

challenge raised by the Petitioners, namely, whether the proposed

construction violates the requirement of conformity with the surrounding

development under Clause 5.5 of the 2018 Regulations and whether the

height of the sanctioned structure is contrary to the applicable planning

framework.

187. The Petitioners have placed heavy reliance upon Clause 5.5 of the

2018 Regulations and have contended that since existing buildings

surrounding the Subject Property within Sector-B, Pocket-1 predominantly

comprise DDA SFS flats of approximately 3 to 4 storeys, the proposed

development consisting of nine upper floors with stilt and basement levels is

ex facie contrary to the requirement of conformity with surrounding

development. According to the Petitioners, the proposed construction

fundamentally alters the built character of the locality and disrupts the low-

rise planning profile originally envisaged under the Vasant Kunj Residential

Scheme.

188. At first blush, the aforesaid submission may appear attractive,

however, upon closer scrutiny of the regulatory framework and the planning

context in which the impugned approvals were granted, this Court is unable

to accept the narrow construction sought to be placed by the Petitioners

upon Clause 5.5 of the 2018 Regulations.

189. The 2018 Regulations were framed with the specific object of

enabling planned and regulated development of privately owned

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 81 of 113

undeveloped land pockets situated within already urbanised and planned

areas. The Regulations neither contemplate blanket prohibition on

development of such parcels nor require that every future development

identically replicate the precise built form of pre-existing structures

surrounding it. At the same time, the Regulations undoubtedly seek to

ensure that development undertaken thereunder remains compatible with the

broader planning character of the surrounding zone. It is in this context that

Clause 5.5, as well as Clauses 4.1 and 4.4 of the Regulations, are required

to be understood. The relevant clauses reads as under:

“4.1. Development on the privately owned land shall be in

consonance with the land use as notified in prevailing MPD

/ ZDP or land use / use premise mentioned in already

approved layout plans / schemes of that area, if any or as

specified in these Regulations.”

“4.4. The category / type of development activity shall be in

conformity with the existing development on majority of the

plots adjacent / surrounding the said land parcel.”

“5.5. Land parcels falling within the already approved or

developed schemes of DDA/ ULBs/ other government bodies

shall be in conformity with the surrounding development,

irrespective of applicable development control norms. The

development of such lands will be governed by the use/

activity and the development control norms of the

surrounding development (subject to availability of required

infrastructure services), maintaining the planned

development around the land parcel.”

190. Clause 5.5 provides that land parcels with already approved schemes

must be developed “in conformity with the surrounding development”.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 82 of 113

Clauses 4.1 and 4.4 similarly mandate that all development activity must be

assessed in the context of the surrounding planned area. However, the

expression “conformity” employed therein cannot be interpreted to mean

exact replication of the height, design, or architectural profile of every

immediately adjoining structure. Such an interpretation would not only be

impractical but would also defeat the very object underlying evolving urban

planning norms and contemporary development policies embodied in MPD-

2021.

191. The expression “surrounding development” must necessarily be

understood in the broader planning sense and not merely with reference to

the immediately adjacent buildings viewed in isolation. The surrounding

area of Sector-B, Pocket-1 is not a standalone enclave consisting exclusively

of low-rise flats. It forms part of the larger Vasant Kunj Housing Scheme,

which itself comprises multiple pockets and sectors containing residential

developments of varying densities and heights, including group housing

complexes and multi-storeyed residential structures. The planning character

of the larger zone is therefore residential group housing and not merely low-

rise walk-up apartments.

192. In this regard, the Respondents have specifically placed on record the

existence of comparable group housing developments within the broader

Vasant Kunj area having heights and scales substantially similar to the

proposed development. Significantly, the Petitioners have not effectively

rebutted the said factual position. The absence of any substantive challenge

to the existence of such surrounding developments lends considerable

support to the stand of the Respondents that the conformity requirement

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 83 of 113

contained in Clause 5.5 is satisfied when viewed in the context of the larger

planned residential zone.

193. More importantly, Clause 5.5 cannot be read in isolation divorced

from Clauses 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5 of the 2018 Regulations. A conjoint reading of

the aforesaid provisions clearly indicates that the relevant unit of planning

analysis is the planned area or residential pocket as a whole and not merely

the immediately adjoining structures. The conformity requirement therefore

mandates compatibility with the planning character of the surrounding zone

rather than mechanical identity with existing neighbouring buildings. Since

the proposed development itself is residential group housing within a

residential group housing zone, the essential planning requirement stands

satisfied.

194. This Court also finds merit in the submission advanced on behalf of

the Respondents that the issue relating to permissible height was specifically

examined by the competent planning authorities. The DDA Technical

Committee, upon consideration of the applicable planning framework,

clarified that no independent height restriction operated in the manner

suggested by the Petitioners and that the permissible height would be

governed by the applicable building bye-laws and statutory clearances. The

record further demonstrates that requisite clearances from the Airports

Authority of India, Delhi Fire Services, and other concerned authorities were

duly obtained prior to grant of sanction.

195. The Unified Building Bye-Laws, 2016 and MPD-2021 do not

prescribe that permissible height of a proposed structure must necessarily

correspond to the height of surrounding buildings. Height restrictions under

the applicable planning framework are governed by FAR, setbacks, fire

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 84 of 113

safety norms, aviation clearances, structural safety requirements, and other

technical parameters. Once the competent authorities, upon examination of

the applicable norms, granted approval subject to statutory compliances, this

Court would be slow to substitute its own assessment in place of the

technical determination rendered by expert planning bodies.

196. Further, the DDA’s counter-affidavit unequivocally states that the

applicable development control norms are to be governed by Clause 5.5 of

the Private Land Policy. The impugned sanction permitting the proposed 33-

metre development is entirely consistent with the said position and cannot be

said to be contrary thereto. The record, in fact, demonstrates complete

consistency in the stand adopted by the Respondents throughout the

proceedings.

197. The clarification issued by the DDA Technical Committee vide

communication dated 10th January, 2020, whereby it was concluded that

no independent height restriction operated in the manner suggested by the

Petitioners, is fully sustainable in law and in conformity with the applicable

planning framework. The said determination was rendered by the competent

expert authority upon consideration of the governing regulations, the layout

structure and the surrounding planning context.

198. Accordingly, on perusal of the regulations and the sanctioned building

plans, including the height parameters approved by the competent

authorities, it is cannot be said that they are contrary to the provisions of

MPD-2021 or the applicable development control norms.

199. In DLF Universal Ltd. v. Greater Kailash II Welfare Association,

LPA 2633/2005, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider a

Letters Patent Appeal arising from an order of a coordinate Bench, wherein

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 85 of 113

a challenge had been raised by the residents and welfare association of

adjoining colonies against the sanction granted for the renovation and

modification of the existing Savitri Cinema into a mini cinema hall-cum-

commercial complex. The challenge was founded on the apprehension that

the proposed project would lead to traffic congestion, parking difficulties,

and public inconvenience in the surrounding areas. Upon examining the

approvals granted by the MCD, DUAC, DCP (Traffic), DCP (Licensing),

and other competent authorities, the Division Bench held that matters

concerning parking norms, traffic circulation, and allied planning

considerations fall squarely within the domain of the statutory and expert

authorities entrusted with such functions, and that a writ court ought not to

interfere with the exercise of such expert judgment in the absence of clear

illegality or shocking arbitrariness. The Division Bench observed as under:

“34. We have carefully perused the judgment of the learned

Single Judge and we are of the opinion that learned Single

Judge has practically sat as a court of appeal over the

decisions of the executive authorities. It may be mentioned

that granting permission, regulating traffic etc. are all

executive functions and it is ordinarily wholly

inappropriate for the judiciary to encroach into the

executive function vide VISA Steel Ltd & Ors. vs. Union of

India & Others in W.P (C ) No. 20185-87/2005 decided on

8.12.2005, Rama Muthuramalingam, vs. Dy. Superintendent

of Police, Mannargudi and Another AIR 2005 Madras |, etc.

These decisions have referred to the relevant case law on

the point, which may be seen.

35. Whether the relevant standards and requirements have

been met is ordinarily for the concerned authorities to look

into, and not for this Court.

[.........]

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 86 of 113

38. In our opinion, it was for the aforesaid authorities to

consider whether the appellant's proposal met the requisite

requirements under the law, and it is not for this Court to

ordinarily go into these considerations. The Court has to

maintain judicial restraint and has to ordinarily defer to

the opinion of the administrators, unless there is clear

violation of law or something shockingly arbitrary.

[......]

42. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the opinion of the

MCD and other authorities. With respect to the learned

Single Judge, we are of the opinion that he has wrongly

stayed the sanction granted by the MCD even though he

found no irregularity or mala fides in the sanction order,

and despite the fact that the sanction had already been

acted upon fully by the appeltant and the

renovation/modification project had been completed in

terms of the same even prior to the filing of the writ petition.

In our opinion, the learned Single Judge should have

dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches because

clearly the petitioner came after unreasonable delay”

[…Emphasis Supplied]

200. The aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench was carried in appeal

before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Greater Kailash Part II Welfare

Association & Ors. v. DLF Universal Ltd. & Ors., (2007) 6 SCC 448.,

wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by the Division

Bench and held that where the competent statutory, planning and traffic

authorities had examined the proposal and granted sanction in accordance

with the applicable Rules, Building Bye-Laws and regulatory framework,

the writ court ought not to interfere merely on the basis of apprehended

traffic congestion, inconvenience or possible traffic problems projected by

the residents. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 87 of 113

“58. The owner of a plot of land is entitled to use and utilise

the same for any lawful purpose and to erect any

construction thereupon in accordance with the existing

rules. So long as such owner does not contravene any of the

provisions which restrict his use of the plot in any manner,

he cannot be prevented from utilising the same in

accordance with law. In this case, Respondent 1 which is

the owner of the plot in question cannot be denied the use of

the plot on account of the apprehension of the appellants,

particularly when he has already raised the structure in

accordance with the sanctioned plan. It is not the case of the

appellants that Respondent 1 has in any manner deviated

from the building plan as sanctioned. The grievance of the

appellants is confined to the possible problem that may

arise from the use of the building as a cinema hall-cum-

commercial complex. Once the authorities who are

competent to do so have indicated that the apprehension

was unfounded, it is not for the writ court to interfere with

such decision.”

[……EmphasisSupplied]

201. The aforesaid principles apply with full force to the controversy in the

present case. As the Division Bench observed in DLF Universal Ltd(supra).

and as affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Greater Kailash Part II

Welfare Association (supra), where the competent statutory, planning, and

expert authorities have examined a proposal and granted sanction in

accordance with the applicable rules and regulatory framework, a writ court

ought not to interfere merely on the basis of apprehended congestion,

inconvenience, or allied infrastructural concerns projected by third parties.

The challenge in the present case is founded substantially upon such

apprehensions of traffic congestion, environmental impact, and

inconvenience notwithstanding that the project has undergone due scrutiny

by every competent authority under the applicable regulatory framework. As

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 88 of 113

the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed, once the authorities who are

competent to do so have indicated that such apprehensions are unfounded, it

is not for the writ court to interfere with that determination. Significantly, no

patent illegality, manifest arbitrariness, or violation of any governing

statutory provision, building norm, or planning regulation has been

demonstrated so as to warrant interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction

particularly in matters involving technical and administrative determinations

that fall squarely within the specialised domain of expert authorities, and

into which the judiciary ought not ordinarily to encroach.

202. It must also be borne in mind that MPD-2021 itself reflects a

conscious planning shift towards vertical urban development as a necessary

response to the acute scarcity of residential land in Delhi. The Master Plan

recognizes that Delhi, being a land-constrained metropolitan city with

continuously increasing population pressure, cannot sustainably rely upon

horizontal expansion alone. The planning framework therefore consciously

encourages optimal utilization of available urban land through higher

density and vertical development, particularly in areas already forming part

of planned urban infrastructure

203. The objective underlying such policy is evident from the broader

scheme of MPD-2021, which seeks to balance planned urban growth with

efficient land utilization, infrastructure optimization and housing

availability. The encouragement of Group Housing and vertical development

is intended to address precisely the problem of limited developable land

within Delhi and the increasing demand for residential accommodation.

204. Viewed in this context, the mere fact that the proposed project

contemplates greater height than some of the surrounding older DDA SFS

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 89 of 113

flats cannot, by itself, render the project contrary to the planning framework.

It is reiterated that the surrounding development largely pertains to an earlier

phase of urban planning and cannot operate as a perpetual restriction

freezing all future development to the same height parameters irrespective of

subsequent planning policy and statutory evolution.

205. Also, the planning framework under MPD-2021 does not proceed on

the principle that future development must identically mirror the built form

of older surrounding structures. Rather, it contemplates calibrated

intensification and vertical growth, subject to compliance with

infrastructural, safety and environmental safeguards.

206. Accordingly, the Petitioners cannot insist that the development

potential of the subject property be confined to the height profile of older

neighbouring structures, particularly when no such statutory embargo is

borne out from the applicable planning regulations. Acceptance of such a

contention would effectively render subsequent planning measures and

revised development policies otiose, and would unjustifiably curtail the

permissible utilisation of privately owned land despite full compliance with

the governing norms and regulatory approvals.

207. The proposed construction represents a development sanctioned under

the prevailing statutory regime and in furtherance of contemporary urban

planning requirements. Merely because the surrounding structures were

constructed under an earlier planning framework with comparatively lower

height norms cannot operate as a legal prohibition against subsequent

development undertaken in accordance with present-day regulations.

208. This Court is therefore of the considered view that no case is made

out for interdicting the sanctioned construction on the ground urged by the

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 90 of 113

Petitioners. The relief sought, insofar as it seeks to restrain the Respondents

from proceeding with the approved development solely on the basis of

comparative building height, cannot be granted. The sanctioned

construction, having been approved by the competent authorities upon

due consideration of the applicable planning framework and statutory

requirements, does not warrant interference in exercise of writ

jurisdiction.

(II) Environmental Jurisprudence And The Effect Of The CEC Report:

Morphological Ridge

209. The question as to whether the Subject Property forms part of the

Morphological Ridge constitutes another substantial aspect of the

controversy involved in the present proceedings.

210. The Petitioners have consistently contended that once the Subject

Property was found to substantially fall within the Morphological Ridge

Area, the proposed Group Housing Project became legally impermissible

under the environmental regime governing protection of the Delhi Ridge. In

support of the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed upon the orders

passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in W.P.(C) No. 202/1995 and connected

proceedings, as well as the decisions rendered in Ashok Kumar Tanwar v.

Union of India (supra) and DDA v. Kenneth Builders (supra). According

to the Petitioners, once the ridge character stood established, the project

could not be permitted to proceed merely by imposing conditions, as Clause

3.2.4 of the 2018 Regulations excludes ridge areas from permissible

development activities.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 91 of 113

211. In this backdrop, the CEC Report dated 14.05.2025 assumes central

significance. The CEC considered two separate applications, namely:

A. Application No. 1587/2024 filed by Shri Rajiv Ranjan

objecting to the proposed project on the ground that the Subject

Property forms part of the Morphological Ridge Area; and

B. Application No. 1608/2025 filed by M/s RR Texknit LLP

seeking permission for construction of the Group Housing

Project over the Subject Property.

212. Upon examination of the material placed before it, the CEC

categorically recorded that approximately 4553 sq. metres out of the total

5353 sq. metres of the Subject Property falls within the Morphological

Ridge Area. The CEC further observed that the E-Vanlekh Portal

constituted the only objective basis for determining such status and

expressly accepted the contention that the Subject Property possesses

Morphological Ridge character. Ordinarily, such a finding would carry

serious environmental implications, particularly having regard to the

judicially recognised ecological significance and protected status accorded

to ridge areas within the NCT of Delhi.

213. Now, ordinarily, a finding that the Subject Property falls within the

Morphological Ridge Area would carry significant environmental

implications, particularly having regard to the judicial protection

consistently accorded to ridge areas within Delhi. However, the matter does

not conclude merely with the aforesaid determination. Significantly, the

CEC, during its site inspection conducted on 03rd January, 2025, recorded

several important factual observations, namely that:

(a) the land was substantially flat in character;

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 92 of 113

(b) the site was surrounded by existing developed residential housing;

(c) the area did not exhibit rocky terrain, dense vegetation or biodiversity

attributes typically associated with ridge ecosystems;

(d) the land was neither notified as Forest nor Protected Forest nor

formally notified Ridge;

(e) the land was not classified as “Gair Mumkin Pahar” in the revenue

records; and

(f) the approved integrated layout plan classified the land for residential

use.

These observations assume considerable significance, as they demonstrate

that although the Subject Property may technically fall within the

Morphological Ridge delineation, the CEC did not regard it as ecologically

analogous to an untouched or environmentally pristine ridge forest

ecosystem warranting an absolute prohibition against development.

214. Most importantly, it is imperative to note at this juncture is that

notwithstanding its express finding regarding the Morphological Ridge

character of the Subject Property, the CEC ultimately did not recommend an

absolute prohibition upon development over the land. On the contrary, after

undertaking an extensive factual, environmental and planning assessment,

the CEC consciously recommended that the project be permitted to proceed,

albeit subject to stringent safeguards, environmental conditions, mitigation

measures and continuing regulatory oversight. The significance of this

conclusion cannot be understated. The CEC was fully conscious of the

environmental sensitivity attributed to the area and yet, rather than

recommending cancellation of the project or restoration of the land to an

undeveloped state, it adopted a calibrated and balanced approach seeking to

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 93 of 113

reconcile environmental concerns with the existing planning and proprietary

realities governing the Subject Property.

215. This Court is therefore required to harmoniously reconcile the two

facets emerging from the CEC Report itself: first, the categorical

observation that the Subject Property bears characteristics relatable to the

Morphological Ridge; and second, the equally categorical conclusion that

development over the land need not be altogether interdicted, provided

adequate environmental safeguards and regulatory controls are imposed and

continuously monitored. These two findings cannot be selectively read in

isolation from one another. The Report, when read as a whole, does not

proceed on the premise that every parcel identified as part of the

Morphological Ridge is, by that reason alone, rendered absolutely incapable

of development irrespective of its legal status, planning history, surrounding

urbanization, or the nature of the proposed project. Rather, the CEC appears

to have recognized the peculiar factual position of the Subject Property,

namely that it is a long-standing private parcel embedded within an already

urbanized and fully developed residential layout surrounded by multi-

storeyed housing and civic infrastructure.

216. The Petitioners, however, seek to isolate the first observation and

contend that the mere identification of Morphological Ridge characteristics

necessarily invalidates all subsequent permissions, sanctions and approvals

granted in favour of the project. Such an interpretation, in the considered

view of this Court, is neither borne out from the language of the CEC Report

nor consistent with the ultimate recommendations made therein. If the CEC

itself, despite recording its environmental concerns, stopped short of

recommending complete prohibition and instead proposed a framework of

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 94 of 113

conditional regulation and environmental compliance, it would be

impermissible to read the Report as mandating an automatic and irreversible

embargo upon all development activity. The Report, properly construed,

reflects not an absolutist prohibition, but a nuanced balancing exercise

between environmental preservation, planned development considerations,

and the vested rights arising from the long-standing private character of the

Subject Property.

217. The Respondents, on the other hand, have contended that all

competent environmental, planning and statutory authorities, including the

CEC itself, examined the peculiar and distinguishing factual circumstances

surrounding the Subject Property before ultimately recommending

conditional approval of the project. It has been submitted that the material

placed on record clearly reflects that the surrounding locality already stands

substantially urbanised and forms part of an extensively developed

residential zone comprising multi-storeyed group housing, civic

infrastructure, internal roads and other urban amenities developed over

several decades. According to the Respondents, the Subject Property

constitutes an isolated private parcel embedded within an otherwise fully

developed urban residential fabric and, therefore, cannot be mechanically

equated with untouched or ecologically pristine ridge forest land warranting

an absolute prohibition against all forms of construction activity. It is their

contention that the competent authorities consciously appreciated this

unique factual matrix and accordingly adopted a balanced regulatory

approach by permitting development subject to strict environmental

safeguards, mitigation measures and continuing supervision, instead of

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 95 of 113

directing total prohibition or restoration of the land to its alleged original

condition.

218. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid controversy can

no longer be treated as res integra in view of the proceedings before the

Hon’ble Supreme Court. Vide Order dated 12th August, 2025 passed in

W.P. (C.) 202/1995.

219. In W.P.(C.) 202/1995 before Hon’ble the Supreme Court, learned

Senior Counsel appearing for M/s RR Texknit LLP supported the

recommendations of the CEC and submitted that the proposed Group

Housing Project possessed all requisite statutory approvals and clearances

from the competent authorities, including the DDA, MCD, MoEFCC and

other concerned agencies. It was further contended that the CEC, after

examining the entire record including the reports of the Forest Department,

had recommended approval of the project subject to stringent environmental

safeguards. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Shri Rajeev

Ranjan opposed the recommendations of the CEC and reiterated that the

Subject Property forms part of the Morphological Ridge Area and therefore

ought not to be permitted for development. On the aforesaid basis, rejection

of the CEC recommendations was sought.

220. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, after considering the rival

submissions and the recommendations of the CEC, proceeded to accept the

applications filed by M/s RR Texknit LLP and permitted the project to

proceed subject to strict adherence to the conditions stipulated in the CEC

Report. The observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are of considerable

significance and merit reproduction:

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 96 of 113

“10. Be that as it may, since the applicant is having valid

permissions from all the competent authorities and since

the CEC has also found that the permission to go ahead

with the project can be granted on imposing certain

stringent conditions, we see no reason not to accept the

recommendations of the CEC. In the event, it is found that

the project proponent has committed a crime with regard to

felling of trees, the law would take its own course. Further,

a criminal also cannot be prohibited to use his property in

the manner he desires, subject to obtaining requisite

permissions from the competent authorities.

11. In that view of the matter, IA Nos. 159062/2025 &

159063/2025 stand allowed subject to the project proponent

scrupulously following all the conditions as stipulated in the

report of the CEC. Consequently, IA Nos. 135736/2025,

136040/2025, 135954/2025, 173765/2025, 173767/2025 are

dismissed. IA Nos. 126582/2025, 138810/2025 &

133813/2025 stand disposed of.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

221. The significance of the said order lies not merely in the fact that the

CEC Report was taken on record, but in the circumstance that the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, while fully cognizant of the findings concerning the

Morphological Ridge character of the Subject Property, nonetheless

permitted the matter to proceed in accordance with the conditional

framework recommended by the CEC. The acceptance of the CEC

recommendations by the Hon’ble Supreme Court necessarily indicates

judicial approval of the balanced and conditional approach adopted therein,

rather than an interpretation advocating a blanket embargo upon all

developmental activity over the Subject Property. The issue must therefore

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 97 of 113

be viewed in light of the final position emerging from the proceedings

before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein environmental concerns were

consciously weighed against the peculiar factual and planning realities

governing the Subject Property, and a calibrated regime of regulated

development was ultimately considered appropriate.

222. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that while the

Morphological Ridge character of the Subject Property remains an important

environmental consideration necessitating strict regulatory oversight,

continuing compliance and rigorous adherence to all safeguards imposed by

the competent authorities, the same cannot, in the peculiar factual and legal

circumstances of the present case, justify complete invalidation of the

impugned sanctions and approvals. The project shall, however, remain

strictly governed by the environmental safeguards, monitoring mechanisms

and compliance conditions imposed by the competent authorities, the CEC

and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and any deviation therefrom shall invite

consequences in accordance with law.

(III) Legitimate Expectation And Promissory Estoppel

223. The Petitioners have also invoked the doctrines of legitimate

expectation and promissory estoppel on the basis of the representations

allegedly made by the DDA in the Vasant Kunj Self-Financing Scheme

Brochure of 1987 and the corresponding layout representations pertaining to

Sector-B, Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj. According to the Petitioners, the DDA had

publicly represented that the Subject Property would either be developed as

48 SFS flats for the benefit of the residents of the colony or retained as

green/open space comprising lawns and parking areas. It is their case that

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 98 of 113

several residents purchased flats in the locality acting upon the aforesaid

representations and on the legitimate understanding that the character of the

colony would remain substantially low-rise, planned and environmentally

balanced. On that basis, it has been contended that the DDA is estopped

from now permitting a high-density private Group Housing Project upon the

Subject Property.

224. The doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel

undoubtedly constitute important principles of public law intended to secure

fairness, consistency and non-arbitrariness in administrative action. Public

authorities are ordinarily expected to honour representations legitimately

made by them, particularly where citizens have altered their position acting

in reliance thereupon. Equally, however, these doctrines cannot be applied in

a manner that permanently freezes urban planning or disables statutory

planning authorities from responding to evolving developmental

requirements, demographic pressures and changing urban realities.

225. The Respondents have sought to answer the aforesaid contention by

asserting that the brochure relied upon by the Petitioners pertained only to

DDA-owned land and could not operate to regulate or restrict development

upon privately owned land. At the same time, the Petitioners’ plea of

legitimate expectation operates at two distinct levels. Firstly, the Petitioners

assert that the Subject Property itself constitutes DDA/Government land,

though the adjudication of title disputes in that regard stands preserved

before the competent civil forum. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the

Petitioners contend that the overall planning character of the colony,

including the existence of open areas, green spaces and low-density

development, was publicly projected by the DDA and formed a material

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 99 of 113

basis upon which residents chose to acquire residential units within the

locality.

226. This Court is unable to accept the proposition that a planning

brochure or layout representation issued several decades ago creates an

immutable and perpetual prohibition against any future redevelopment or

alteration within an urban colony. Urban development plans are inherently

dynamic instruments. Metropolitan cities such as Delhi are continuously

shaped by population growth, infrastructural demands, land scarcity and

evolving planning priorities. Consequently, redevelopment, densification

and calibrated intensification of urban land use may legitimately become

necessary within the framework of statutory planning controls. The planning

process cannot therefore be judicially fossilised on the basis of

representations made at a particular historical stage of urban development.

227. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Howrah Municipal Corpn. v. Ganges

Rope Co. Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 663 clarified that the doctrine of legitimate

expectation does not create an indefeasible or vested right capable of

overriding statutory provisions. The Court observed that, at best, an

applicant may possess a settled expectation that its application would be

considered under the rules prevailing on the date of submission. However,

such expectation remains subject to changes in law effected in public

interest. The Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically held that where, during

the pendency of an application, the governing statutory rules are amended,

any expectation founded upon the unamended regime stands extinguished

and cannot be enforced against the State or statutory authorities. It was

further emphasized that no claim founded upon legitimate expectation or

alleged vested right can prevail against subsequently enacted statutory

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 100 of 113

provisions introduced to serve larger public interest and convenience. The

relevant paragraph reads as under:

“37. “The argument advanced on the basis of so-called

creation of vested right for obtaining sanction on the basis

of the Building Rules (unamended) as they were on the date

of submission of the application and the order of the High

Court fixing a period for decision of the same, is

misconceived. The word “vest” is normally used where an

immediate fixed right in present or future enjoyment in

respect of a property is created. With the long usage the

said word “vest” has also acquired a meaning as “an

absolute or indefeasible right” [see K.J. Aiyer's Judicial

Dictionary (A Complete Law Lexicon), 13th Edn.]. The

context in which the respondent Company claims a vested

right for sanction and which has been accepted by the

Division Bench of the High Court, is not a right in relation

to “ownership or possession of any property” for which the

expression “vest” is generally used. What we can

understand from the claim of a “vested right” set up by the

respondent Company is that on the basis of the Building

Rules, as applicable to their case on the date of making an

application for sanction and the fixed period allotted by the

Court for its consideration, it had a “legitimate” or “settled

expectation” to obtain the sanction. In our considered

opinion, such “settled expectation”, if any, did not create

any vested right to obtain sanction. True it is, that the

respondent Company which can have no control over the

manner of processing of application for sanction by the

Corporation cannot be blamed for delay but during

pendency of its application for sanction, if the State

Government, in exercise of its rule-making power, amended

the Building Rules and imposed restrictions on the heights

of buildings on G.T. Road and other wards, such “settled

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 101 of 113

expectation” has been rendered impossible of fulfilment due

to change in law. The claim based on the alleged “vested

right” or “settled expectation” cannot be set up against

statutory provisions which were brought into force by the

State Government by amending the Building Rules and not

by the Corporation against whom such “vested right” or

“settled expectation” is being sought to be enforced. The

“vested right” or “settled expectation” has been nullified

not only by the Corporation but also by the State by

amending the Building Rules. Besides this, such a “settled

expectation” or the so-called “vested right” cannot be

countenanced against public interest and convenience

which are sought to be served by amendment of the Building

Rules and the resolution of the Corporation issued

thereupon."

This principle assumes particular significance in the present case, where the

Petitioners seek to rely upon historical planning representations and the

earlier low-rise character of the locality so as to restrain a development

otherwise processed and sanctioned under the prevailing statutory and

regulatory framework.

228. At the same time, the grievance raised by the Petitioners cannot be

brushed aside as entirely insubstantial. Residents who purchased properties

within a planned colony were undoubtedly entitled to expect that any

significant alteration affecting the locality would occur transparently,

rationally and in conformity with applicable planning norms. The doctrines

of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel may not, by themselves,

invalidate the impugned project; however, they unequivocally require the

planning authorities to act fairly, transparently and consistently, and to duly

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 102 of 113

account for the impact of intensified development upon the existing

residential environment before permitting such development.

229. The Petitioners have further contended that the impugned project

infringes Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India by adversely

impacting the rights of the residents and the Petitioner School to a safe,

healthy and dignified living environment. According to the Petitioners, the

scale and nature of the proposed development would substantially alter the

existing character and equilibrium of the locality, adversely affecting the

environmental quality, civic sustainability and overall habitability of the

surrounding area. It is their case that the constitutional guarantee of life

under Article 21 necessarily encompasses the right to reside in an

environment consistent with principles of safety, environmental balance and

orderly urban living, and that any development undertaken without adequate

regard to such concerns would fail to satisfy the constitutional requirement

of fairness and reasonableness.

230. There can be no dispute with the proposition that the Right to life

under Article 21 encompasses the right to a healthy, safe and

environmentally sustainable living environment. Equally, however, Article

21 cannot be construed as prohibiting planned urban development

undertaken in accordance with law and subject to statutory safeguards. The

constitutional obligation of the Court is therefore to ensure that development

proceeds within the discipline of the rule of law, environmental protections

and planning norms. The Court cannot proceed on the assumption that every

urban development project necessarily results in violation of Article 21

merely because residents perceive inconvenience, increased density or

alteration of neighbourhood character. Conversely, statutory authorities

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 103 of 113

cannot disregard genuine infrastructural, environmental and safety concerns

merely because a project formally satisfies technical parameters on paper.

231. This Court also cannot lose sight of the larger statutory and planning

philosophy underlying MPD-2021 and the framework governing urban

development in Delhi. Delhi is a land-constrained metropolitan city facing

continuous demographic pressure, rapid urbanisation and an ever-increasing

demand for residential accommodation. The availability of developable

urban land is inherently limited. It is precisely for this reason that MPD-

2021 consciously promotes optimal utilisation of available urban land

through planned redevelopment, Group Housing and calibrated vertical

development, particularly in areas already supported by existing

infrastructure and civic amenities. The Master Plan does not contemplate

perpetual freezing of localities in the precise form in which they may

originally have been developed decades earlier. Urban planning is

necessarily evolutionary in character, and development norms, density

patterns and housing policies must adapt to changing population realities

and infrastructural demands. The surrounding DDA SFS flats in the present

case largely belong to an earlier phase of Delhi’s urban planning history.

The fact that such structures were originally developed at comparatively

lower height and density levels cannot operate as an absolute or perpetual

restriction prohibiting all future intensification of residential development

within planned urban areas. At the same time, MPD-2021 does not permit

unrestricted or unregulated construction. The governing planning framework

seeks to secure planned growth subject to compliance with environmental

safeguards, infrastructural sustainability, traffic management norms and

public safety requirements. The balance envisaged under MPD-2021 is

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 104 of 113

therefore not between “development” and “non-development”, but between

planned urban growth and unregulated urbanisation. So long as the proposed

development remains within the discipline of statutory planning controls and

is subjected to adequate environmental and infrastructural safeguards, the

objective of planned urban development under MPD-2021 cannot be

defeated merely because the proposed structures are taller or denser than

certain older surrounding developments.

232. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no legal basis to

invoke the principles of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation so as

to invalidate the impugned sanction. The material relied upon by the

Petitioners, including the brochure and layout representations, at best

reflected the planning position prevailing at the relevant point in time and

cannot be elevated to the status of a binding and immutable assurance

controlling all future planning decisions concerning the locality.

233. The jurisdiction exercised by statutory planning authorities

necessarily includes the power to revisit, revise and adapt development

patterns in accordance with contemporary urban requirements and

applicable regulatory frameworks. Unless a clear statutory infraction,

manifest unreasonableness or abuse of power is established, the Court would

not substitute its own perception of desirable urban development for that of

the competent planning authorities.

234. The Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the impugned project

has been sanctioned dehors the governing statutory regime or in violation of

any enforceable legal right arising from the doctrines invoked by them. The

plea founded upon promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation,

therefore, does not merit acceptance and cannot constitute a valid ground to

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 105 of 113

restrain the Respondents from proceeding with the sanctioned development

and is accordingly dismissed.

(IV) The Masonic Public School's Concerns

(a) Impact of Traffic

235. The Petitioner School contends that the impugned Group Housing

Project would aggravate congestion on the existing approach road, rendering

the same inadequate for school operations and emergency access, and that

the Traffic Impact Assessment (“TIA”) stands vitiated as the traffic survey

was conducted during summer vacations when the School was not

operational. The aforesaid submissions are required to be examined in the

backdrop of the material placed on record and the previous proceedings

concerning the issue of access to the School.

236. The issue concerning access to the School is not res integra and had

independently engaged the attention of this Court in W.P.(C.) No.

1797/2016 instituted by the parent organization of the Petitioner School.

Pursuant thereto, the Vice-Chairman, DDA constituted a multi-disciplinary

Committee which, after site inspection and consultation with stakeholders,

recorded that the School had always been accessed through the existing 13.5

metre internal road forming part of the approved layout plan of Sector-B,

Pocket-1, Vasant Kunj, and further found that creation of any separate

motorable access route through the adjoining green/waterbody area or

beneath the 66 KV high-tension line was not feasible owing to

environmental and safety constraints as well as the likelihood of tree cutting.

Consequently, by speaking order dated 30.08.2024, the Vice-Chairman,

DDA directed that the said 13.5 metre internal road shall continue to remain

the approach road for the School and further directed the RWA B1 Vasant

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 106 of 113

Kunj to ensure that the road is cleared of parked vehicles. Simultaneously, in

order to reduce pedestrian movement on the internal road, DDA directed

provision of a separate pedestrian pathway for students from Aruna Asaf Ali

Marg through the adjoining green area in Khasra No.1220 with appropriate

fencing and safeguards. The arrangement thus envisaged retention of the

existing vehicular access together with provision of an independent

pedestrian entry, the pedestrian pathway being intended not as a substitute

for the motorable access road but as an additional mitigating measure to

facilitate smoother circulation. The aforesaid arrangement subsequently

received judicial recognition in the order dated 21.01.2025 passed by this

Court in CONT.CAS(C) No. 118/2024 and W.P.(C.) No. 1797/2016,

whereupon the parent organization of the School stated that its grievances

stood adequately addressed and did not press for any further relief.

237. As regards the challenge to the TIA, this Court is unable to accept the

submission that the report stands vitiated merely because the survey was

conducted during the summer vacation period. The report itself expressly

discloses that schools in the vicinity were closed during the survey period

and that the likely impact thereof was considered while preparing the

assessment. There is thus no concealment in the methodology adopted.

Significantly, the TIA formed part of the Environmental Clearance process

and was examined by the SEAC and other competent expert authorities

before grant of approval. The Petitioners have placed no independent

technical study, expert opinion or counter-assessment demonstrating that the

conclusions of the report are so fundamentally flawed or perverse as to

warrant judicial interference. Mere disagreement with the conclusions of a

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 107 of 113

technical assessment cannot justify substitution of judicial opinion for that

of specialized expert bodies.

238. It is also material that the sanctioned project incorporates structured

basement parking and regulated internal circulation systems designed to

accommodate vehicular demand substantially within the project site itself,

thereby minimizing dependence upon on-street parking and reducing

spillover onto the existing internal road network. This assumes significance

in light of the specific direction issued by the Vice-Chairman, DDA for

removal of parked vehicles from the existing internal road. The proposed

development, therefore, is not shown to aggravate the existing situation;

rather, the sanctioned planning measures are intended to aid and improve

traffic management and circulation within the pocket.

239. It is also relevant that the School accepted allotment of its land in

1988 within a larger urban scheme which contemplated residential and

group housing development. The School has co-existed for decades with a

substantial resident population utilizing the same circulation network. The

incremental addition arising from the present project cannot therefore be

said to justify interdiction of the sanctioned development itself.

240. The existence of a functioning educational institution in the vicinity

cannot operate as an absolute embargo against all future development upon

adjoining privately owned land, particularly where such development has

proceeded through a layered statutory approval process involving planning

authorities, municipal authorities, environmental bodies and other expert

agencies. Planned urban development necessarily requires balancing

competing public and private interests and, so long as access to the

institution continues to remain available and mitigating measures have been

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 108 of 113

evolved by the competent authorities, this Court would be slow to interfere

in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

241. The scope of judicial review in matters involving technical planning

assessments and traffic evaluation is limited to examining whether the

decision-making process suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides, non-

application of mind or violation of statutory provisions. No such infirmity is

made out in the facts of the present case. The contentions of the Petitioner

School on the issue of traffic, circulation and access are accordingly

rejected.

(b) Other Contentions

242. The Petitioner School has further contended that the proposed

construction activity including the movement of labour, operation of

machinery, dust generation, vibration, and construction noise would

adversely affect the functioning of the School and the educational

environment of its students. This Court, while not entirely dismissing such

concerns as fanciful, is nonetheless of the view that apprehensions of this

nature, rooted as they are in conjecture rather than demonstrated fact, cannot

by themselves constitute sufficient ground to invalidate sanctions and

approvals that have been duly granted by the competent statutory and expert

authorities upon due application of mind. The question which therefore

arises for consideration is not whether some degree of inconvenience may

attend the construction activity in proximity to the Petitioner School, but

whether any legally cognisable infirmity in the impugned approvals has

been established so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its

writ jurisdiction a threshold which, for the reasons that follow, the Petitioner

School has failed to meet.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 109 of 113

243. The record indicates that the project proposal has undergone

consideration before the competent planning, municipal and environmental

authorities within the framework of the applicable statutory regime. The

Petitioners have not placed on record any independent technical assessment

or material demonstrating that the authorities completely failed to consider

the existence and functioning of the Petitioner School while processing the

project, or that the concerns relating to construction activity are of such

nature that the sanctioned development itself becomes incapable of

proceeding within the regulatory framework governing urban construction

activity. The apprehensions raised by the Petitioners substantially pertain to

the manner in which construction activity is to be undertaken and regulated

during the execution phase of the project.

244. It also cannot be overlooked that temporary inconvenience, traffic

movement, construction noise, dust generation and related operational issues

are matters which may arise to varying degrees in the course of urban

development activity and ordinarily fall within the sphere of supervision and

regulation by the concerned authorities during execution of the project. The

mere possibility of such inconvenience, by itself, cannot furnish a ground to

interdict a development project which has otherwise undergone scrutiny and

approval under the applicable planning and regulatory framework. In this

regard, this Court finds guidance from the principles laid down by the

Division Bench of this Court in DLF Universal Ltd.(supra), as affirmed by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Greater Kailash Part II Welfare

Association(supra), wherein it was observed that matters concerning traffic

circulation, planning requirements and allied infrastructural considerations

ordinarily fall within the domain of the competent expert authorities, and

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 110 of 113

that a writ court ought not to interfere merely on the basis of apprehended

inconvenience or possible traffic and infrastructural concerns once the

competent authorities have examined the proposal in accordance with the

governing framework

245. This Court, having considered the matter in its entirety, is of the view

that the material placed on record falls considerably short of establishing any

illegality, arbitrariness, or jurisdictional infirmity in the impugned sanctions

and approvals so as to warrant interference in exercise of the jurisdiction

vested in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of the India. The

writ petition, insofar as it seeks invalidation of approvals duly granted by the

competent statutory and expert authorities, is accordingly without merit. It

is, however, made clear that the concerned authorities shall remain obligated

to ensure that the execution of the project is carried out in strict conformity

with the applicable permissions, conditions, and regulatory requirements

governing the same, and that any deviation therefrom shall be dealt with in

accordance with law.

CONCLUSION

246. In view of the foregoing discussion and findings returned on the

issues framed hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that no

ground warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India is made out insofar as the challenge to the impugned planning

approvals, sanctions, and consequential permissions is concerned. The

challenge raised by the Petitioners essentially seeks re-appreciation of

technical and planning determinations rendered by expert statutory

authorities; nevertheless, no patent illegality, manifest arbitrariness, mala

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 111 of 113

fides, or jurisdictional infirmity having been established so as to justify

interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

247. At the same time, considering the nature of the concerns raised

regarding environmental safeguards, statutory compliances, and adherence

to the sanctioned plans, this Court deems it appropriate to ensure that the

development permitted pursuant to the impugned approvals remains strictly

regulated in accordance with law.

248. Accordingly, the present petitions are disposed of in the following

terms:

I. The prayers seeking quashing of the sanction dated 13.05.2024 issued

by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the Minutes of the 368th and

370th Screening Committee Meetings of the Delhi Development

Authority, and all consequential approvals and permissions granted in

favour of Respondent Nos. 4 to 14, are rejected.

II. The prayers seeking quashing of the order dated 07.12.2012 passed by

the learned Presiding Officer, Appellate Tribunal, MCD in Appeal No.

24/AT/MCD/2009 and the judgment dated 16.07.2016 passed by the

learned District & Sessions Judge in MCD Appeal No. 04/2013 are also

rejected.

III. The prayers seeking restraint against construction over the Subject

Property on the grounds of alleged violation of the Right of Way

requirements, height restrictions, conformity clauses, layout integration,

and planning norms under MPD-2021, Unified Building Bye-Laws,

2016, and the applicable Regulations, stand rejected.

IV. The prayers founded upon the doctrines of legitimate expectation and

promissory estoppel based upon the Vasant Kunj Self Financing Scheme

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 112 of 113

Brochure and the original layout depiction are also rejected, no

enforceable legal right having been established so as to invalidate the

impugned approvals on the said basis.

V. Nevertheless, the Respondent authorities shall ensure that the

proposed construction and development over the Subject Property strictly

conform to the sanctioned plans, applicable environmental norms, fire

safety requirements, aviation clearances, traffic circulation standards, and

all other statutory conditions imposed under the applicable laws, rules,

regulations, and bye-laws.

VI. The impugned sanction dated 13.05.2024 and all consequential

approvals shall remain subject to continued compliance by Respondent

Nos. 4 to 14 with all statutory requirements, permissions, environmental

conditions, and compliances contemplated under the applicable Standard

Operating Procedures, statutory framework, and regulatory approvals. In

the event of any deviation from the sanctioned plans or breach of

statutory conditions, it shall remain open to the competent authorities to

take action strictly in accordance with law.

VII. Nothing contained in the present judgment shall be construed as an

expression on the merits of any independent civil, title, acquisition,

environmental, or statutory proceedings, if any, pending or initiated

before any competent forum in accordance with law.

249. Accordingly, W.P.(C) No. 11283/2024 titled Vasant Kunj Residents

Welfare Association, Sector-B, Pocket-1 & Ors. v. Government of NCT of

Delhi & Ors. and W.P.(C) No. 17433/2025 titled Masonic Public School v.

W.P.(C) 11283/2024 & W.P.(C) 17433/2025 Page 113 of 113

Delhi Development Authority & Ors. stand dismissed in the aforesaid

terms.

250. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. No order as to costs.

SHAIL JAIN

JUDGE

MAY 29, 2026

HP/RM/MM/DG