W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 1 of 18

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 19.08.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 02.09.2026

Judgment uploaded on: 02.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010170562026

+ W.P.(C) 5411/2026

MOHD ARIF .....Petitioner

Through: Dr. Ashutosh, Ms. Fatima, Mr.

Rohit Swarup, Mr. Dalip Singh,

Mr. Avinash Kumar Singh, Mr.

Pravej Hasan, Mr. Abhijeet

Sagar, Mr. S.Vijaykanth, Advs.

versus

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Aakarsh Srivastava, Senior

Standing Counsel-Customs

with Mr. Ashish Bansal, Mr.

Anand Pandey, Mr. Ankit

Kumar and Mr. Dhananjay

Parth, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

J U D G M E N T

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:

1. The principal issue which arises for consideration in the present

Petition is whether this Court ought to examine the legality and

validity of an Order-in-Original passed by the competent Customs

authority, when the said order is appealable under Section 128 of the

Customs Act, 1962 [the „Act‟], particularly when the challenge raises

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 2 of 18

questions concerning the issuance/waiver of Show Cause Notice,

opportunity of personal hearing and the circumstances in which the

Petitioner made certain statements and representations before the

Customs authorities.

2. Through the present Petition, the Petitioner seeks quashing of

the Order-in-Original No. 1638/003806/17.02.2024/WH/2024-25

dated 14.06.2024 [the [„Impugned OIO‟], whereby two gold bars

weighing 233 grams and valued at Rs.13,07,412/- were ordered to be

absolutely confiscated under Sections 111(d), 111(j), 111(l) and

111(m) of the Act. The Petitioner also seeks release of the said gold

bars and a direction that no detention/warehouse charges be recovered

from him.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present

Petition, the relevant facts, in brief, are required to be noticed.

4. The Petitioner, an Indian national holding Passport No.

87431589, arrived at Terminal-3 of the Indira Gandhi International

Airport, New Delhi on 17.02.2024 by Flight No. XY-329. He arrived

from Riyadh and, according to the record, had opted for the Green

Channel.

5. Upon interception and examination by the Customs authorities,

two gold bars weighing 233 grams were recovered from the Petitioner.

The goods were detained vide Detention Receipt No.

DR/INDEL4/17.02.2024/003806 dated 17.02.2024. The Detention

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 3 of 18

Receipt describes the goods as two gold bars engraved “SUISSE”, of

purity 998 and weighing 233 grams.

6. On the same date, i.e. 17.02.2024, the Petitioner tendered a

statement under Section 108 of the Act. In the said statement, the

Petitioner stated, inter alia, that he had been intercepted after crossing

the Green Channel; that the two gold bars had been recovered from his

possession; that the goods belonged to him; and that he admitted his

omission and commission. He further stated that he was aware that

Customs duty was payable on the import of the goods, that he had

intentionally not declared the recovered items and that he was

agreeable to the description, quantity and value as assessed by the

Department. The statement further records that the Petitioner was

ready to pay Customs duty along with fine and penalty, as applicable,

and further that the contents thereof were read over and explained to

the Petitioner in vernacular, whereafter he signed the same without

protest. It further records that the Petitioner did not require a Show

Cause Notice or personal hearing and that he had tendered the

statement without any duress, pressure or threat.

7. Thereafter, the Petitioner appeared before the Customs

authorities on 22.04.2024 and submitted a written request in relation

to the detained goods. In the said request, the Petitioner sought release

of the detained goods, expressed regret for having opted for the Green

Channel, requested a lenient view and stated that his case may be

decided on merits. The said document also records that the Petitioner

did not want any written Show Cause Notice and personal hearing and

that an oral Show Cause Notice had been received.

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 4 of 18

8. On 22.04.2024, the detained gold was subjected to physical

examination by the Jewellery Appraiser in the presence of the

Petitioner. The goods were found to comprise two gold bars of purity

998 and weighing 233 grams. Their value was assessed at

Rs.13,07,412/-.

9. The Impugned OIO dated 14.06.2024 was thereafter passed by

the Joint Commissioner of Customs. The adjudicating authority, after

considering the material on record, recorded that the Petitioner had

crossed the Green Channel without declaring the gold and had thereby

violated Section 77 of the Act. The adjudicating authority further

recorded that the Petitioner was an “ineligible passenger” for import

of gold under the applicable notification since his stay abroad was less

than six months.

10. The adjudicating authority further considered the applicable

provisions of the Baggage Rules, 2016, the Foreign Trade Policy and

Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017, as amended. It

was concluded that the gold bars were liable to confiscation under

Sections 111(d), 111(j), 111(l) and 111(m) of the Act. The

adjudicating authority also considered the question of redemption

under Section 125 of the Act and declined to offer an option for

redemption of the confiscated gold on payment of redemption fine. A

penalty of Rs.1,30,000/- was also imposed upon the Petitioner under

Section 112 of the Act.

11. The Impugned OIO expressly records that the Petitioner had

requested waiver of Show Cause Notice and personal hearing vide his

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 5 of 18

letter dated 22.04.2024 and that, after accepting the said request, the

adjudicating authority proceeded to adjudicate the matter.

12. The Petitioner states that the Impugned OIO was never served

upon him. According to him, he made enquiries regarding the detained

gold and, through his counsel, addressed a letter dated 05.02.2026 to

the Customs authorities seeking a copy of the order. In response

thereto, the Customs authorities, vide communication dated

19.02.2026, supplied a certified copy of the Impugned OIO and

informed the Petitioner that the said order had been issued on

21.05.2024 and dispatched to him.

13. The Petitioner has thereafter approached this Court by way of

the present Petition.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

14. Contentions of the Petitioner

14.1. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Impugned

OIO is liable to be set aside as having been passed in violation of the

mandatory requirements of Sections 110 and 124 of the Act and the

principles of natural justice. It was contended that no valid Show

Cause Notice or effective opportunity of personal hearing was

afforded to the Petitioner before the gold was absolutely confiscated

and penalty was imposed.

14.2. It was submitted that the Respondent‟s reliance upon the

purported statement dated 17.02.2024 under Section 108 of the Act is

misplaced. According to the Petitioner, the document relied upon by

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 6 of 18

the Department cannot be treated as a valid statement under Section

108, having regard to the manner in which it was recorded and the

alleged non-compliance with the departmental instructions governing

recording of such statements. It was further submitted that the

Petitioner was made to sign documents without their contents being

properly explained to him and that the alleged statement was neither

voluntary nor sufficient to constitute a valid waiver of statutory

safeguards.

14.3. It was further submitted that there is no provision under the Act

permitting a blanket waiver of the statutory requirement of a Show

Cause Notice and personal hearing. Reliance was placed, inter alia, on

the decision of this Court in Shubhangi Gupta v. Commissioner of

Customs, which, according to the Petitioner, has also been affirmed

by the Supreme Court. It was argued that the mere recording in the

Impugned OIO that the Petitioner had “requested for waiver” of Show

Cause Notice and personal hearing could not dispense with the

mandatory requirements of law.

14.4. It was further submitted that, even where an oral Show Cause

Notice is contemplated under the proviso to Section 124 of the Act,

the statutory requirements must be strictly complied with. According

to the Petitioner, there is no material demonstrating any specific

request by him for an oral Show Cause Notice, the acceptance of such

request by the Department, or effective communication to him of the

grounds and material relied upon for confiscation and imposition of

penalty. It was thus contended that the purported oral Show Cause

Notice cannot cure the statutory violation.

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 7 of 18

14.5. On the question of maintainability, it was submitted that the

availability of a statutory appeal does not bar exercise of jurisdiction

under Article 226 where there is a violation of principles of natural

justice or where the challenge raises a pure question of law. Reliance

was placed on Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer

and the settled exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. It was

contended that the present case concerns an alleged violation of

mandatory statutory provisions and, therefore, the decision in

Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline

Consumer Healthcare Ltd. does not warrant dismissal of the Petition.

14.6. Learned counsel also disputed the Respondent‟s contention that

the Petition is barred by delay and laches. It was submitted that the

Impugned OIO was never served upon the Petitioner and that the

Department has produced only proof of dispatch and not proof of

actual receipt. Reliance was placed upon Sections 153(1)(b) and

153(3) of the Act to contend that the statutory requirements for service

have not been established. It was therefore submitted that the

Petitioner cannot be presumed to have received the Impugned OIO in

June 2024.

14.7. It was lastly submitted that the alleged waiver and the

purported statement under Section 108 cannot validate an order which,

according to the Petitioner, is void ab initio for failure to comply with

mandatory statutory requirements. Reliance was also placed upon the

principle that where the statute prescribes a particular manner of doing

an act, the same must be done in that manner alone.

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 8 of 18

15. Contentions of the Respondent

15.1. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that

the present Petition is not maintainable, having been filed nearly two

years after the Impugned OIO and well beyond the period prescribed

for availing the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 128 of the

Act, namely, 60 days, with a further period of 30 days being

condonable. It was submitted that the order was dispatched to the

Petitioner by Speed Post on 21.06.2024 and, in terms of Section

153(3) of the Act, is deemed to have been received by him in the

ordinary course of transit.

15.2. It was further submitted that the Petitioner‟s assertion that he

became aware of the Impugned OIO only in February 2026 is

incorrect. The Respondent relied upon the Petitioner‟s letter dated

05.02.2026 to contend that the Petitioner was already aware that an

adjudication order had been passed, and submitted that the said letter

was merely an attempt to overcome the statutory limitation and

explain the delay.

15.3. On merits, it was submitted that the Petitioner voluntarily

tendered his statement on 17.02.2024, wherein he admitted recovery

of the gold, acknowledged his omission in declaring the same and

expressly stated that he did not require a Show Cause Notice or

personal hearing. It was submitted that the said statement was made

without duress or pressure and was never retracted.

15.4. Further reliance was placed upon the Petitioner‟s subsequent

written request dated 22.04.2024, wherein he again admitted his

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 9 of 18

mistake in opting for the Green Channel, sought a lenient view and

expressly recorded that he did not want a written Show Cause Notice

or personal hearing and that an oral Show Cause Notice had been

received. It is, therefore, submitted that the requirements of Sections

110 and 124 of the Act stood duly complied with.

15.5. It was also submitted that the allegations of coercion, alteration

or forced signatures are bald and unsupported by any

contemporaneous material. Reliance was placed upon Surjeet Singh

Chhabra v. Union of India (1997) 89 ELT 646 (SC), to contend that a

voluntary statement made under Section 108 of the Act constitutes an

admission and can be relied upon, particularly when the same has not

been retracted.

15.6. It was accordingly submitted that the Impugned OIO was

passed after due consideration of the material on record and that the

Petitioner, having failed to avail the statutory appellate remedy within

the prescribed period, cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of

this Court. Reliance was placed upon Assistant Commissioner (CT),

LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Healthcare Ltd.

1

, to

contend that the availability of an alternative remedy and the expiry of

the statutory period of limitation constitute sufficient grounds for

declining interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

ANALYSIS & FINDINGS

16. This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced

on behalf of the parties and perused the material on record.

1

(2020) 36 G.S.T.L. 305

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 10 of 18

17. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the scope of the

controversy. The Petitioner does not dispute that two gold bars

weighing 233 grams were recovered from his possession upon his

arrival at the Indira Gandhi International Airport on 17.02.2024. He

also does not dispute that the gold was thereafter subjected to

examination and valued at Rs.13,07,412/-. The Impugned OIO has

been passed by the competent adjudicating authority under the Act,

ordering absolute confiscation of the gold under Sections 111(d),

111(j), 111(l) and 111(m) and imposing a penalty of Rs.1,30,000/-

under Section 112 of the Act.

18. The principal objection raised by the Petitioner is procedural.

His case is that the statutory requirement of notice under Section 124

was not complied with and that no personal hearing was afforded to

him. The Respondent, on the other hand, contended that the Petitioner

had expressly waived written Show Cause Notice and personal

hearing and had also recorded receipt of an oral Show Cause Notice.

19. Before examining this contention, however, a more

fundamental question arises, namely, whether this Court ought to

exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution at all, particularly when the Impugned OIO is appealable

under Section 128 of the Act and the Petition has been instituted

nearly two years after the order was passed.

20. It is well settled that the existence of an alternative statutory

remedy does not constitute an absolute bar to the exercise of

jurisdiction under Article 226. The rule is one of self-imposed

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 11 of 18

restraint. Ordinarily, where the legislature has created a hierarchy of

remedies and has entrusted a specialised appellate authority with the

examination of orders passed under the statute, the High Court would

not ordinarily bypass such mechanism.

21. The Supreme Court in Glaxo Smith Kline (supra) examined the

interplay between the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and

a statutory appellate remedy which had become barred by limitation.

The Court recognised that the jurisdiction under Article 226 is

undoubtedly wide, but held that such jurisdiction ought not to be

exercised in a manner which defeats the statutory scheme, particularly

the legislative prescription concerning limitation.

22. Significantly, the Supreme Court observed that a writ petition

may, in an appropriate case, be entertained where an order is

challenged before expiry of the statutory appellate period on grounds

such as want or excess of jurisdiction or flagrant disregard of law and

procedure or violation of principles of natural justice. However, the

Court cautioned that once the maximum statutory period for availing

the appellate remedy has expired, the High Court cannot, as a matter

of course, entertain a writ petition so as to circumvent the statutory

scheme.

23. In the present case, the Petitioner seeks to bring his case within

the exception of violation of principles of natural justice. The

question, therefore, is whether the record discloses such a patent

violation as would justify this Court in overlooking both the statutory

appellate remedy and the substantial delay in approaching this Court.

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 12 of 18

24. In our view, the answer must be in the negative.

25. The record placed before this Court does not present a case

where the Petitioner was wholly unaware of the proceedings

concerning the seized gold. On the contrary, the material placed on

record shows his participation at more than one stage.

26. The statement dated 17.02.2024 records, inter alia, the recovery

of the two gold bars, the Petitioner's ownership thereof, his admission

regarding non-declaration and his willingness to pay the applicable

Customs duty, fine and penalty. More importantly for the present

controversy, the document records that the Petitioner did not require a

Show Cause Notice or personal hearing and that the statement had

been tendered without duress, pressure or threat.

27. The significance of this document does not arise merely from

the description given to it by the Customs authorities as a statement

under Section 108 of the Act. Even leaving aside, for the present, the

legal debate regarding the precise evidentiary character of the

document, the fact remains that the document placed on record bears

the Petitioner‟s signatures and contains the aforesaid assertions and

did not, contemporaneously or thereafter for a substantial period,

communicate to the Customs authorities that the contents thereof were

incorrect or that his signatures had been obtained by coercion.

28. There is, thereafter, a further and independent document dated

22.04.2024 which assumes considerable significance. The Petitioner

himself approached the Customs authorities in relation to the detained

gold. In that communication, he expressed regret for having opted for

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 13 of 18

the Green Channel, sought release of the goods, requested a lenient

view and stated that he did not require a written Show Cause Notice or

personal hearing. The document further records that an oral Show

Cause Notice had been received.

29. Thus, this is not a case where the Department, for the first time

in its counter affidavit, has sought to introduce an entirely new case

that an oral Show Cause Notice had been issued. There is a

contemporaneous document dated 22.04.2024, emanating from the

Petitioner himself, which records receipt of an oral Show Cause

Notice.

30. This aspect materially distinguishes the present case from

Shubhangi Gupta (supra). In that case, this Court was dealing with a

situation where the Revenue had not pleaded that an oral Show Cause

Notice had actually been issued. The Court specifically noted that the

Revenue‟s case was that no Show Cause Notice was required because

the petitioner had waived it, and held that there was no provision

under the Act for such waiver.

31. In the present case, by contrast, the Respondent‟s case is not

founded merely upon a purported waiver. The record also contains the

Petitioner's own written acknowledgment that an oral Show Cause

Notice had been received. Consequently, the question whether the

statutory requirements were complied with cannot be answered merely

by mechanically applying the ratio of Shubhangi Gupta (supra).

32. This Court is, however, not required to finally pronounce upon

each of the disputed factual assertions concerning the manner in which

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 14 of 18

the statement dated 17.02.2024 was recorded, whether the Petitioner

fully understood each part thereof, or whether there was any coercion

or pressure in obtaining his signatures. Such disputed questions,

particularly in proceedings seeking examination of the legality of an

adjudication order, are ordinarily matters which can appropriately be

considered by the statutory appellate authority.

33. The Petitioner‟s allegation that he was compelled to sign pre-

typed documents or blank papers is also unsupported by any

contemporaneous complaint or retraction. More importantly, the

subsequent letter dated 22.04.2024, admittedly submitted by the

Petitioner himself, does not record any allegation of coercion, threat or

compulsion. Instead, it reiterates the Petitioner‟s request for release of

the goods and records his desire that the matter be dealt with on

merits.

34. This subsequent conduct assumes importance when the

Petitioner, nearly two years later, seeks to contend that the entire

process was vitiated at inception by coercion and denial of

opportunity. Such a disputed factual controversy is not one which, in

the circumstances of the present case, warrants exercise of

extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

35. This Court may also deal with the contention concerning the

service of the Impugned OIO. The Respondent has placed on record

the dispatch particulars showing that the Impugned OIO was

dispatched by Speed Post on 21.06.2024 at the Petitioner‟s address.

Section 153(3) of the Act expressly provides for a deeming fiction in

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 15 of 18

respect of an order or communication sent by registered post or speed

post, subject to the addressee proving the contrary.

36. The Petitioner‟s contention is that there was no

acknowledgement due evidencing actual receipt. This contention, in

our view, cannot by itself justify ignoring the statutory deeming

provision contained in Section 153(3). Whether the statutory

requirements of service stood satisfied is itself a matter capable of

examination in the statutory appellate proceedings. For the purposes

of determining whether this Court should entertain a writ petition

almost two years after the order, the dispatch particulars placed on

record are certainly relevant.

37. Even accepting the Petitioner‟s assertion that he came to know

of the Impugned OIO only in February 2026, the record does not

disclose any contemporaneous step taken by him between April 2024

and February 2026 either to ascertain the status of the adjudication

proceedings or to seek release of the detained goods.

38. The present case, therefore, cannot be equated with a case

where the petitioner was entirely unaware of the initiation of

proceedings or where an adjudication order came to be passed behind

his back without his participation at any stage.

39. There is yet another important consideration. The challenge

raised by the Petitioner is not directed against an order passed by an

authority wholly lacking jurisdiction. The Customs authorities

undoubtedly possessed jurisdiction to examine the import of gold,

determine whether the statutory requirements had been complied with,

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 16 of 18

adjudicate the question of confiscation and impose penalty in

accordance with law.

40. The Petitioner‟s grievance essentially concerns the manner in

which that jurisdiction was exercised. He disputes the legal

consequences flowing from the statement dated 17.02.2024, the

communication dated 22.04.2024, the alleged oral Show Cause Notice

and the absence of a separate personal hearing. These are matters

which can be examined by the appellate authority within the statutory

framework.

41. The distinction between absence of jurisdiction and an alleged

erroneous exercise of jurisdiction is material in the present context.

The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court cannot ordinarily be

invoked merely to bypass the appellate mechanism where the

grievance concerns the correctness or procedural regularity of an order

passed by an authority having jurisdiction over the subject matter.

42. The Petitioner‟s reliance upon the principle that when a statute

prescribes a particular manner of doing an act, it must be done in that

manner, cannot alter this position. There can be no quarrel with the

said principle. However, the question whether the statutory procedure

was in fact complied with in the present case requires examination of

the documents and surrounding circumstances. The existence of a

disputed question as to compliance does not, by itself, justify

bypassing the statutory appellate remedy, particularly after such

substantial delay.

43. The plea of violation of natural justice, therefore, cannot be

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 17 of 18

accepted as an automatic exception to the rule of alternative remedy.

The Court must examine the substance of the complaint and the

circumstances in which the challenge is brought. In the present case,

the contemporaneous record demonstrates participation by the

Petitioner and contains an express statement regarding the oral Show

Cause Notice and waiver of a written Show Cause Notice and

personal hearing.

44. This Court also finds considerable force in the Respondent‟s

contention concerning delay. The Impugned OIO was passed on

14.06.2024. The Department‟s record shows dispatch on 21.06.2024.

The present Petition has been instituted only in 2026. Even accepting,

for the purposes of argument, the Petitioner‟s assertion that he

obtained a copy of the order only on 19.02.2026, there remains the

question whether the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court should be

invoked when the statutory remedy was available and the Petitioner‟s

own conduct during the relevant period does not demonstrate any

contemporaneous challenge to the proceedings.

45. The decision in Glaxo Smith Kline (supra) reinforces the

principle that the High Court should not permit the writ jurisdiction to

become a means of circumventing the statutory period prescribed for

pursuing the appellate remedy. The Supreme Court has specifically

cautioned that the width of Article 226 cannot be employed in a

manner which renders the statutory scheme concerning remedies and

limitation otiose.

46. In the facts of the present case, therefore, this Court is of the

W.P.(C) 5411/2026 Page 18 of 18

view that the Petitioner ought to have availed of the statutory remedy

under Section 128 of the Act. This Court sees no exceptional

circumstance warranting interference under Article 226 at this stage.

CONCLUSION

47. The present Petition is, accordingly, dismissed on the ground

that the Petitioner has an efficacious statutory remedy under Section

128 of the Act and has approached this Court after substantial delay,

without making out any exceptional circumstance warranting exercise

of writ jurisdiction.

48. It is clarified that this Court has not examined the merits of the

Petitioner‟s challenge to the absolute confiscation of the gold bars or

the imposition of penalty. Likewise, this Court has not expressed any

final opinion on the evidentiary value of the statement dated

17.02.2024 or the precise legal effect of the Petitioner‟s

communication dated 22.04.2024. These issues, if raised before the

competent appellate forum, shall be considered in accordance with

law.

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

SHAIL JAIN, J.

SEPTEMBER 02, 2026

sp/pal