2025 INSC 1214 C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 1 of 11

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 26593 OF 2025)

PREM AGGARWAL ...APPELLANT(S)

Versus

MOHAN SINGH & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAM NATH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Some litigants, it seems, cannot take yes for an answer. After

this Court on 1

st April, 2025 set aside the decree but moulded

equitable relief by directing payment of ₹2,00,00,000/-

(Rupees Two Crores), a sum 800 (eight hundred) times the

₹25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) paid as

earnest money in 1989, the appellant refused the tender,

obstructed execution, and has returned to this Court in an

effort to delay the inevitable. This appeal is a cautionary tale

about how the pursuit of a windfall can turn the process of law

against those who seek to exploit it, in order to retain

possession while spurning an extraordinary monetary award.

The appellant has shot himself in the foot and in the same

breath dug his own grave. Equity will not allow unjust

enrichment. The process of execution exists to give effect to

C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 2 of 11

judgments and not to underwrite windfalls. A party that has

received such compensation must yield possession.

3. This appeal assails the correctness of the judgment and order

dated 11.09.2025 passed by the High Court of Punjab &

Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No. 5810 of 2025,

titled ‘Prem Aggarwal through her GPA Holder vs. Mohan

Singh and others’, whereby the said revision assailing the

correctness of the order dated 07.08.2025 as well as order

dated 12.08.2025 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division),

Chandigarh (for short, “Executing Court”) directing for issue of

warrant of possession and rejecting the objections/application

of the appellant, was dismissed.

4. The facts giving rise to the present appeal in brief are as

follows. Appellant hereinafter is referred to as the plaintiff and

the respondents as defendants for the initial part of the order.

i) An agreement to sell dated 12.06.1989 was executed by

the defendants whereby they agreed to sell the suit

property for a total sale consideration of Rs. 14,50,000/-

in favour of the plaintiff. At the time of execution of the

agreement to sell, an advance amount of Rs. 25,000/- was

paid as earnest money. The suit property consisted of two

floors. On the first floor there were two tenants. The

ground floor was vacant. Its possession was given to the

plaintiff pursuant to the agreement. In February 1990, the

plaintiff instituted Civil Suit No. 44 of 1990 for a simple

relief of permanent injunction to restrain the defendants

from alienating or dispossessing them from the suit

C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 3 of 11

property. The plaintiff apprehended that the defendants

intended to resell the suit property as an advertisement

had been issued by them on 07.01.1990 in daily

newspaper ‘The Tribune’. The said suit for permanent

injunction was dismissed as withdrawn by the Trial Court

on 15.06.1990 and attained finality.

ii) The plaintiff thereafter instituted another suit bearing Civil

Suit No. 55 of 1990 in June 1990 seeking a decree of

specific performance of the agreement to sell dated

12.06.1989. The said suit was decreed by the Trial Court,

vide judgment and order dated 11.12.2009. Against the

said order, the first appeal preferred by the defendants was

dismissed on 19.09.2013. The second appeal before the

High Court was also dismissed, vide judgment and order

dated 13.05.2022. A review petition by the defendants also

received the same fate and was dismissed on 19.08.2022.

High Court although dealt with the issue of Order II rule 2

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

1 but fell in error as it ignored

the fact that the suit for injunction and the suit for specific

performance were based on the same cause of action, i.e.,

the advertisement for sale published on 07.01.1990 in

daily newspaper ‘The Tribune’. High Court proceeded on

the premise that at the time of filing suit for injunction only

dispossession was threatened and there was no intention

to not execute the sale deed pursuant to the agreement to

sell.

1

For short, “CPC”

C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 4 of 11

iii) The defendants assailed the aforesaid judgments before

this Court by way of Civil Appeal Nos. 4647-4648 of 2025,

titled ‘Mohan Singh & Ors. Vs. Prem Aggarwal’.

iv) This Court, vide judgment and order dated 01.04.2025,

allowed the appeals and after setting aside the impugned

orders therein dismissed the suit, primarily on the finding

that the suit was barred under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC.

However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this

Court awarded an amount of Rupees Two Crores to be paid

by the defendants to the plaintiff within three months in

lieu of the earnest money of Rs.25,000/- that was paid in

the year 1989.

5. It appears that the defendants tried to make the payment to

the plaintiff but they declined to accept the same and as such

execution proceedings were initiated in which the defendants

deposited the amount of Rupees Two Crores by way of Fixed

Deposits in the name of the plaintiff. The Executing Court

directed the plaintiffs to accept the amount and hand over the

possession but when it did not happen, the defendants applied

for issuance of warrants of possession.

6. The Executing Court in its order dated 07.08.2025 noted that

the amount of Rupees Two Crores had been furnished by way

of Fixed Deposit in the name of the plaintiff. But since the

plaintiff had not received them, the Executing Court directed

that the original Fixed Deposit be returned, and fresh Fixed

Deposit be furnished in the name of the Court. It further

directed for issuance of warrant of possession on 07.08.2025

and fixed 12.08.2025 as the next date. The warrants were

C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 5 of 11

issued on 08.08.2025. When the matter was next taken up on

12.08.2025, the Court was apprised by the Bailiff that the

police assistance was required as there was resistance at the

time of the execution of warrants of possession.

7. Further on 12.08.2025, the plaintiff filed

objections/application to recall the warrant of possession to

which the defendants sought time to file response on the same

day. The matter was directed to be taken up post lunch. Post

lunch after hearing the counsel for the parties, the Executing

Court rejected the application/objections of the plaintiff and

further directed for police assistance to be rendered by the

concerned SHO. The Executing Court further granted 4 days’

time to the plaintiff to receive the amount, and the warrant of

possession were to be executed only after 4 days in case the

plaintiff would not receive the amount and hand over

possession. Aggrieved by the aforesaid two orders i.e.,

07.08.2025 and 12.08.2025, the plaintiff preferred Civil

Revision before the High Court which has since been

dismissed by the impugned judgment and order dated

11.09.2025.

8. We have heard Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned senior

counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and Mr. Aditya Dassaur,

learned counsel appearing for the defendants-respondents

appearing on caveat. Hereinafter the plaintiff would be referred

to as the appellant and the defendants as the respondents.

9. We have no hesitation in recording at the outset that the

appellant has been unnecessarily delaying and causing

obstruction in the execution of the decree. We also record that

C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 6 of 11

there is no default on the part of the defendants in complying

with the direction of this Court to pay the amount of Rupees

Two Crores to the appellant. The amount was to be paid within

three months, which was duly tendered by way of Fixed

Deposits along with the application for execution filed on

26.06.2025 within period of 3 months granted by this Court,

vide judgment dated 01.04.2025.

10. Once this Court found that the suit for specific performance

was liable to be dismissed it was at the discretion of this Court

whether or not to direct for refund of the earnest money and if

yes then at what rate of interest it should be awarded.

Normally it would be a reasonable rate of interest. If it was

increased to 18%, 24% or 36% still the amount of interest

would be abysmally low as compared to what this Court

awarded. Table below will show the amount of interest

component at different rates of interest:-

1. 25000 x 9 x 36 = 81,000/-

100

2. 25000 x 18 x 36 = 1,62,000/-

100

3. 25000 x 24 x 36 = 2,16,000/-

100

4. 25000 x 36 x 36 = 3,24,000/-

100

C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 7 of 11

What has been awarded by the judgment and order

dated 01.04.2025 is a whopping amount of Rs. 2,00,00,000/-

(Rs. Two Crores only) as against the earnest money of Rs.

25,000/- (Rs. Twenty five thousand only). Merely because the

fact of possession was not pointed out at the time of hearing,

the appellant as an unscrupulous litigant has been resisting

the delivery of possession and has dragged the respondents up

to this Court.

This Court had awarded the amount of Rs. 2,00,00,000/-

(Rs. Two Crores only) to the appellant to ensure that the suit

property of the respondents continues with them and at the

same time balance the equities between the parties. The

appellant who had won from three Courts and a period of

36 years had passed since the time of execution of the

agreement is suitably compensated. The appellant was

neither a tenant nor a licencee or lessee on the ground floor

of the suit property. He had been inducted only because of

the agreement to sell. Once it has been held that no relief

can be granted for specific performance and an

extraordinary amount has been awarded to compensate the

meagre amount of advance is only to adjust the equities.

Appellant cannot have any right to resist possession and

should not have obstructed or resisted the delivery of

possession.

11. The appellant has no locus or justification to hold on to the

possession for the additional following reasons:

C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 8 of 11

i) His suit for permanent injunction based upon his

possession pursuant to the agreement to sell had been

dismissed on 15

th June, 1990 and had attained finality.

ii) Apparently, it was not pointed out at the time of the

hearing of the Civil Appeal Nos. 4647-4648 of 2025 that

the appellant was continuing in possession otherwise at

that very stage this aspect would have been clarified and

specific direction would have been issued that the

amount of Rupees Two Crores was being paid by the

respondents to the appellant not only in lieu of earnest

money but also that the appellant would be required to

hand over possession to the respondents.

12. Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned senior counsel has sought

to argue that the appellant would be entitled to benefit of

Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and being

in possession of the suit property, she was entitled to continue

till there was a decree of eviction. The respondents having

failed to claim possession before this Court, therefore, now the

only recourse open to them is to file a suit for possession. He

has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case

of Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another vs.

Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (dead) by LRS. And

others

2.

13. The submission advanced by Mr. Bhatnagar does not merit

consideration as the very claim of possession was based on the

agreement to sell and the suit for specific performance having

2

(2002) 3 SCC 676

C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 9 of 11

been dismissed by this Court with an exorbitant amount of

compensation being awarded to suitably compensate him, he

cannot enjoy the possession and at the same time receive the

amount of Rupees Two Crores as against an advance amount

of Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only. The appellant had lost

in the suit for permanent injunction and now having lost in

the suit for specific performance of contract cannot claim to

hold on to the possession or insist that the defendants should

file a separate suit for possession. The compensation of

Rupees Two Crores was awarded only to bring an end to the

litigation and put a quietus.

14. The facts in the case of Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi

(supra) were quite different and distinct and do not in any way

help the plaintiffs. The plaintiff wants to take undue advantage

of an omission in the judgment dated 01.04.2025, wherein this

Court did not clarify that possession would be handed over to

the respondent upon receipt of the amount awarded.

15. The maxim ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’, which means that

the act of the Court shall prejudice no one, is a principle firmly

embedded in our jurisprudence. It is founded on the equitable

notion that no party should suffer owing to an error, delay, or

inadvertence attributable to the Court itself. The Court, acting

as in appendage of justice, cannot permit its own procedure or

inadvertent lapse to occasion injustice. Accordingly, where a

party has been disadvantaged by reason of an act of the Court,

it is incumbent upon the Court to undo such prejudice and

restore the party to the position he would have occupied but

for such act. This Court long back in the decision of three-

C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 10 of 11

Judges in Jang Singh v. Brij Lal

3, quoted the maxim with

approval and held that: -

“6. . . . It is no doubt true that a litigant must be vigilant

and take care but where a litigant goes to Court and asks

for the assistance of the Court so that his obligations under

a decree might be fulfilled by him strictly, it is incumbent

on the Court, if it does not leave the litigant to his own

devices, to ensure that the correct information is

furnished. If the Court in supplying the information makes

a mistake the responsibility of the litigant, though it does

not altogether cease, is at least shared by the Court. If the

litigant acts on the faith of that information the Courts

cannot hold him responsible for a mistake which it itself

caused. There is no higher principle for the guidance of the

Court than the one that no act of Courts should harm a

litigant, and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if

a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be

restored to the position he would have occupied but for that

mistake. This is aptly summed up in the maxim:

“Actus curiae neminem gravabit”.”

(emphasis supplied)

The maxim thus operates as a constant reminder that

the Court’s authority must be exercised not to the

disadvantage of litigants, but in furtherance of justice. After

all, to err is human, and when an inadvertent omission is

brought to the Court’s attention, it becomes the Court’s

solemn duty to ensure that no party suffers on account of such

mistake. In such circumstances, the Court is obliged to restore

the party to the very position he would have occupied had the

error not occurred.

16. We are thus satisfied that the Executing Court and the High

Court have taken a correct view in directing for issuance of

warrants of possession with police assistance. The appeal,

therefore, deserves dismissal.

3

1963 SCC OnLine SC 219

C.A.No……@ SLP (C) No. 26593 of 2025 Page 11 of 11

17. For all the reasons recorded above, we dismiss the appeal with

cost which is quantified as Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs

only) to be paid by the appellant to the respondents within 4

weeks failing which it will carry an interest component of 12%

per annum. Proof of payment of costs be filed within six weeks.

If no such proof is filed, the Registry shall list this matter

before this Court for appropriate orders.

..………………………. J.

[VIKRAM NATH]

..………………………. J.

[SANDEEP MEHTA]

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 07, 2025.