1

2026:CGHC:10578

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

Order Reserved on : 28.01.2026

Order Delivered on : 28.02.2026

WPS No. 4091 of 2023

Sahodra W/o Dhanaji Aged About 46 Years R/o Village Bharbhatha,

Tahsil And District- Bemetara Chhattisgarh

... Petitioner

versus

1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, Bemetara, District-

Bemetara Chhattisgarh

2 - The Upper Commissioner Durg, Division,district- Durg Chhattisgarh

3 - The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bemetara District- Bemetara

Chhattisgarh

4 - The Tahsildar, Bemetara, District- Bemetara Chhattisgarh

5 - Parmanand S/o Narottam R/o Village- Charbhatha, Tahsil And

District- Bemetara Chhattisgarh

6 - Milap S/o Narottam R/o Village- Charbhatha, Tahsil And District-

Bemetara Chhattisgarh

7 - Chhattisgarh Board Of Revenue Circuit Court, Raipur, District-

Raipur Chhattisgarh

... Respondents

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner :Mr. Bharat Rajput, Advocate

For Respondents-State :Mr. Anand Dadariya, Deputy Advocate

General with Ms. Vartika Shrivastava,

Panel Lawyer

For Respondent No.5 :Ms. Sareena Khan, Advocate

2

Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

C A V Order

1.The present writ petition arises out of proceedings relating to

appointment on the post of Village Kotwar under Section 230 of

the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred

to as “the Code, 1959”). The appointment to the post of Kotwar is

made by the Tahsildar after following the procedure prescribed

under the Code, 1959 and the applicable revenue practice. The

petitioner was appointed as Kotwar of Village Charbhatha, Tahsil

and District-Bemetara by the Tahsildar vide order dated

31.08.2012, after due inquiry and compliance of statutory

requirements, which appointment stood affirmed in first appeal

and second appeal by the competent revenue authorities.

2.The petitioner has called in question the impugned order dated

22.05.2023 passed by the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue,

Bilaspur, whereby the revision being No.RN/23/R/A-56/388/2015

preferred by respondent No. 5 was allowed, the concurrent orders

passed by the Tahsildar, Bemetara, the Sub-Divisional Officer,

Bemetara and the Additional Commissioner, Durg, Division Durg,

were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Tahsildar,

Bemetara for initiating a fresh process of appointment under

Section 230 of the Code, 1959, despite the fact that the petitioner

had been lawfully appointed after a full-fledged inquiry and had

continuously discharged her duties as Kotwar for more than ten

3

years.

3.The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition with the following

relief(s) :-

“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be

pleased to issue an appropriate writ/ order,

thereby setting-aside/quashing the impugned

order dated 22.05.2023 Annexure P/1 and

further be pleased to direct the respondent

authorities to allow the petitioner to continue

on the post of Kotwar of Village Charbhatha.

10.2 That, any other relief/order which may

deem fit and just in the facts and

circumstances of the case including award of

the costs of the petition may be given.”

4.Brief facts for disposal of the instant writ petition are that, the

petitioner’s father namely Late Premdas was serving as Kotwar of

Village Charbhatha, Tahsil & District-Bemetara, and had

discharged his duties faithfully during his lifetime. Upon his

demise, a vacancy arose on the post of Village Kotwar. In

accordance with the prevailing revenue practice and provisions of

law, the petitioner, being the daughter and legal heir of the

deceased Kotwar and possessing the requisite eligibility and

capability to perform Kotwar duties including proclamation work,

submitted an application before the Tahsildar, Bemetara seeking

appointment on the said post. On the basis of the petitioner’s

application, the villagers and Panchas of Gram Panchayat,

Charbhatha considered her candidature and recommended her

4

appointment on the post of Kotwar, recognizing her suitability and

entitlement. The petitioner’s application along with the

recommendation of the Gram Panchayat was duly placed before

the competent authority.

5.Thereafter, respondent No. 5 filed an objection before the

Tahsildar opposing the appointment of the petitioner and

simultaneously claimed appointment for himself on the post of

Village Kotwar. The petitioner filed a detailed reply to the said

objection, specifically asserting that since her father was working

as Kotwar, she was entitled to preferential consideration and was

fully competent to discharge the duties attached to the post. The

Tahsildar (respondent No. 4), following due process of law,

initiated proceedings by calling for opinion/proposal from the

Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Charbhatha, and also requisitioned

the character certificate of the petitioner from the concerned

Police Station, Bemetara. Pursuant thereto, the Station House

Officer submitted the character certificate certifying that no

criminal case was registered against the petitioner, thereby

confirming her suitability.

6.During the course of inquiry, the statement of the Sarpanch, Gram

Panchayat, Charbhatha was recorded, wherein he categorically

stated that although a proposal was shown to have been passed

in favour of respondent No. 5, the same was drafted by the

Panchayat Secretary and signatures of Panchas were obtained

5

mechanically. He further stated that had the petitioner informed

him about her application, he would have had no objection to her

appointment as Kotwar, thereby demolishing the claim of

respondent No. 5. After due consideration of the entire material on

record, including pleadings of the parties, documentary evidence,

character certificate, statements of witnesses, and after affording

proper opportunity of hearing to all concerned, the Tahsildar

appointed the petitioner as Village Kotwar vide order dated

31.08.2012.

7.Respondent No. 5 carried the matter in appeal before respondent

No. 3, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 23.02.2013.

Being unsuccessful, respondent No. 5 preferred a second appeal

before respondent No. 2, which was also dismissed vide order

dated 06.01.2015, thereby affirming the order of appointment

passed in favour of the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner

continued to discharge her duties as Village Kotwar

uninterruptedly. After an inordinate delay, respondent No. 5

preferred a revision before the Board of Revenue (respondent No.

7). Vide the impugned order dated 22.05.2023, the learned Board

of Revenue allowed the revision, set aside the concurrent orders

passed by respondents No. 2, 3 and 4, and remanded the matter

to the Tahsildar for initiating a fresh process of appointment under

Section 230 of the Code, 1959, despite the fact that the petitioner

had already been appointed after full compliance of statutory

requirements and had been continuing on the post for more than

6

a decade. Hence, the present writ petition.

8.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned

order dated 22.05.2023 (Annexure P/1) passed by the learned

Board of Revenue is patently illegal, perverse and beyond the

scope of revisional jurisdiction, inasmuch as it sets aside three

concurrent, well-reasoned and speaking orders passed by the

competent authorities, without recording any finding of perversity,

jurisdictional error or violation of statutory provisions. It is further

submitted that the Tahsildar, after conducting a detailed inquiry,

recording statements of relevant witnesses including the

Sarpanch, obtaining the character certificate of the petitioner and

after affording due opportunity of hearing to all parties, lawfully

appointed the petitioner as Kotwar vide order dated 31.08.2012,

which appointment has been affirmed in first appeal as well as in

second appeal.

9.Learned counsel contends that the Board of Revenue, while

exercising revisional powers, could not have re-appreciated the

evidence or interfered with concurrent findings of fact, especially

when no illegality or perversity was found in the orders passed by

the subordinate authorities. The revisional authority is confined to

examining legality and jurisdictional errors, and not to substituting

its own view on facts. It is also submitted that the petitioner, being

the daughter of the deceased Kotwar, was rightly granted

preferential consideration, which is in consonance with long-

7

standing revenue practice and settled principles governing Kotwar

appointments. The learned Board of Revenue has completely

ignored the categorical statement of the Sarpanch, which clearly

discredits the alleged proposal in favour of respondent No. 5.

10.Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order, passed

after more than a decade of the petitioner’s continuous service,

unsettles a long-standing and settled position and is violative of

the principles of finality, certainty and fairness, thereby causing

serious prejudice to the petitioner. Accordingly, learned counsel

prays that the impugned order dated 22.05.2023 be set aside, and

the orders passed by the Tahsildar and the appellate authorities

be restored.

11.On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the

submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and

submits that the impugned order dated 22.05.2023 passed by the

learned Board of Revenue is legal, proper and within the bounds

of its revisional jurisdiction. It is contended that the Board of

Revenue has rightly exercised its powers to ensure compliance

with the provisions of Section 230 of the Code, 1959, while

directing the Tahsildar to undertake the appointment process

afresh. He further submits that the post of Kotwar is not

hereditary, and appointment to the said post must strictly be in

accordance with the statutory provisions and prescribed

procedure, which includes obtaining a valid proposal from the

8

Gram Panchayat and verification of the candidate’s antecedents.

It is argued that the learned Board of Revenue has not appointed

respondent No. 5, but has only set aside the earlier orders and

remanded the matter to the Tahsildar for reconsideration after

completing procedural requirements, and therefore no prejudice

has been caused to the petitioner. It is lastly contended that the

interference made by the Board of Revenue is justified to rectify

procedural irregularities, and no case for exercise of extraordinary

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is made

out by the petitioner. Accordingly, it is prayed that the present writ

petition be dismissed.

12.Learned counsel for respondent No. 5 submits that the impugned

order dated 22.05.2023 passed by the learned Board of Revenue

is legal, justified and well within the scope of revisional

jurisdiction, and does not suffer from any infirmity warranting

interference by this Court. She further contends that the learned

Board of Revenue has rightly exercised its revisional powers to

ensure strict compliance with the provisions of Section 230 of the

Code, 1959, while directing the Tahsildar to undertake the process

of appointment to the post of Kotwar afresh, in accordance with

law. It is further submitted that the post of Kotwar is not hereditary

in nature, and no vested or automatic right accrues in favour of

the petitioner merely on account of her being the daughter of the

deceased Kotwar. Appointment to the said post must be made

strictly in accordance with statutory provisions, which mandatorily

9

require a valid proposal of the Gram Panchayat and proper

verification of antecedents.

13.Learned counsel for respondent No.5 further submits that the

learned Board of Revenue has not appointed respondent No. 5,

but has only set aside the previous orders and remanded the

matter to the Tahsildar for reconsideration after curing procedural

defects, and therefore no prejudice has been caused to the

petitioner. It is argued that the interference by the learned Board

of Revenue is justified to rectify material irregularities committed

during the earlier proceedings, and as such, no case is made out

for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. Accordingly, learned counsel for respondent

No. 5 prays that the present writ petition be dismissed.

14.I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at

length and considered their rival submission made herein and

gone through the record thoroughly and extensively.

15.For proper adjudication of the case, it would be apposite to extract

Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959,

which reads as under:-

“230. Appointment of kotwars and their

duties.-(1) For each village or group of

villages, there shall be appointed, in

accordance with Rules made under Section

258, one or more kotwars for the

performance of such duties as may be

10

prescribed :

Provided that in the Madhya Bharat region

the duties of kotwars under this section shall

be performed by the Police Chowkidars who

shall, on the coming into force of this Code,

be deemed to be kotwars under this section,

and be subject in all respects to the control of

Revenue Officers.

(2) Every person who at the coming into

force of this Code holds the post of a village

watchman in the Bhopal and Sironj regions

or of a chowkidar in the Vindhya Pradesh

region shall be deemed to be a kotwar under

this section”

16.Rules regarding appointment, punishment and removal of Kotwars

and their duties are noticed under Section 230 of the CGLRC,

relevant provisions of which reads as under :-

“1. The number of Kotwars who shall hold

office in any villages shall be as fixed at the

preceding settlement:

Provided that the Collector may reduce or

increase the number of Kotwars as fixed at

the preceding settlement and may appoint

additional Kotwars for villages in charge of a

single Kotwars or put a Kotwar in charge of

more villages than one in cases,-

(a) wherever it is necessary in order to

raise the number of houses in charge of a

Kotwar to a minimum of 50; or

(b) wherever it necessary in order to

11

reduce the number of houses in charge of

a Kotwar to 200; or

(c) with the sanction of the State

Government for any other reason.

2. No person shall be eligible for the post of

Kotwar, who-

(i) is, in the opinion of the appointing

authority, not of good character and

antecedents;

(ii) is, in the opinion of the appointing

authority, unfit through infirmity of body or

mind, to perform the duties of the post;

(iii) is below the age of 21 years;

3. The appointment of Kotwar shall rest with

the Collector, Sub-Divisional Officer, Assistant

Collector of the first grade, Assistant Col-

lector of the second grade if specially

empowered by the Collector in this behalf.

Tahsildar or Naib-Tahsildar who is

empowered to exercise the powers of a

Tahsildar under Sub-section (2) of Section 24

of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code,

1959 (No. 20 of 1959):

Provided that the Collector may specially

empower a Naib Tahsildar who has not been

invested with the powers of a Tahsildar under

the said Code to make appointments under

this rule.

4. [(1) On the occurrence of a vacancy in the

post of a Kotwar, the Revenue Officer, who is

12

empowered to make appointment, after

receiving a resolution duly passed by the

Gram Sabha in whose area the post of

Kotwar is vacant, shall appoint on eligible

person on the post of Kotwar, if the person

proposed in the resolution does not fulfil the

qualification prescribed in rule 2, the

authorised Revenue Officer shall reject the

resolution after recording the reasons in

writing and intimate the Gram Sabha and call

for a fresh proposal:

Provided that immediately on occurrence of a

vacancy, the appointing authority may

temporarily appoint a suitable person to

perform the duties of the office of Kotwar till

the regular appointment under sub-rule (1) is

made.]

(2) In making appointment of a Kotwar under

Sub-rule (1) preference may be given to the

near relative of the ex-Kotwar, other things

being equal.

Note.-If the vacancy is caused by the

suspension or dismissal of the previous

incumbent for bad character, misconduct or

disobedience and the effect of the dismissal

would be lost if a member of his family is

appointed to succeed him, relatives of the

previous incumbent may not be appointed.

5. (1) The appointing authority may fine,

suspend or dismiss a Kotwar for,-

(i) being of bad character, actually

13

participating in any kind of undesirable

activities or acting in any manner which, in

the opinion of the appointing authority, is

not in public interest;

(ii) willful breach of Rules:

Provided that the amount of fine imposed

at any one time shall not exceed Rs. 5.

(2) Action should be taken on reports made

by the Police against Kotwars and result

thereof be intimated to the police forthwith.

6. The appointing authority may terminate the

services of a Kotwar whenever, owing to age

or to mental or physical infirmity, he is no

longer fit to perform the duties of the post.”

17.From perusal of the aforementioned statutory provisions, it clearly

transpires that the post of Kotwar is not a contractual, casual, or

hereditary engagement, but a statutory post created, regulated,

and controlled exclusively by the provisions of the Code, 1959

and the Rules framed thereunder. The Code, 1959 and the Rules

comprehensively occupy the field with regard to the eligibility

criteria, mode of appointment, duties, disciplinary control,

suspension, dismissal, and termination of a Kotwar.

18.The power to appoint a Kotwar vests solely in the competent

Revenue Authorities, namely the Collector and other Revenue

Officers duly empowered under the Rules, and such appointment

is required to be made strictly in accordance with the procedure

prescribed, including consideration of the resolution of the

14

concerned Gram Sabha. Likewise, continuance in service,

imposition of penalties, and removal from service are matters

falling entirely within the statutory control of the appointing

authority, subject to the satisfaction of the conditions enumerated

under the Rules and observance of principles of fairness.

19.The scheme of Section 230 and the Rules framed thereunder

further makes it evident that no person can claim appointment or

continuation on the post of Kotwar as a matter of right, much less

on the basis of lineage, past occupation of a family member, or

any equitable consideration dehors the statute. Any preference

accorded to a near relative of an ex-Kotwar is merely

discretionary and conditional, and does not confer any vested or

enforceable right.

20.Thus, the statutory framework leaves no manner of doubt that

rights and obligations relating to the post of Kotwar emanate

solely from the statute, and any appointment, disciplinary action,

or termination made in conformity with the Code, 1959 and the

Rules would fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the competent

Revenue Authority and would not be open to interference unless

shown to be vitiated by patent illegality, procedural irregularity, or

arbitrariness.

21.In the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner’s father,

late Premdas, was serving as Kotwar of Village Charbhatha,

Tahsil and District Bemetara, and upon his demise, a vacancy

15

arose on the said post. The petitioner, being the daughter and

legal heir of the deceased Kotwar, submitted an application before

the Tahsildar seeking appointment. The Tahsildar initiated

proceedings in accordance with law, called for opinion from the

Gram Panchayat, requisitioned the petitioner’s character

certificate from the concerned Police Station, and afforded

opportunity of hearing to all stakeholders, including respondent

No. 5, who had raised objection and staked a rival claim.

22.During the inquiry, the Station House Officer certified that no

criminal case was registered against the petitioner. The Sarpanch

of Gram Panchayat, Charbhatha, in his statement, categorically

clarified that the alleged proposal in favour of respondent No. 5

was prepared by the Panchayat Secretary and signatures of

Panchas were obtained mechanically, and that he had no

objection to the petitioner’s appointment. Upon consideration of

the entire material, the Tahsildar found the petitioner suitable and

appointed her as Kotwar vide order dated 31.08.2012.

23.The said order of appointment was assailed by respondent No. 5

before the Sub-Divisional Officer, which appeal came to be

dismissed. The second appeal preferred before the Additional

Commissioner was also dismissed, thereby affirming the order

passed by the Tahsildar. As a consequence thereof, the petitioner

continued to discharge her duties as Village Kotwar

uninterruptedly for more than ten years.

16

24.After an inordinate and unexplained delay, respondent No. 5

invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue. The

Board of Revenue, by the impugned order dated 22.05.2023, set

aside the concurrent orders passed by the Tahsildar and the

appellate authorities and remanded the matter for fresh

consideration under Section 230 of the Code, 1959, without

recording any finding of perversity, jurisdictional error or violation

of statutory provisions in the earlier proceedings.

25.A careful perusal of the impugned order reveals that the Board of

Revenue has virtually re-appreciated the evidence and substituted

its own view in place of the concurrent findings recorded by three

competent authorities. Such an exercise clearly travels beyond

the permissible limits of revisional jurisdiction, which is confined to

examining legality, propriety and jurisdictional errors, and does not

extend to reopening concluded findings of fact.

26.It is also significant that the petitioner had been appointed after full

compliance of statutory requirements, including verification of

character and antecedents, and had continued on the post for

over a decade without any complaint or adverse material on

record. The impugned order, by unsettling a long-standing and

settled position, defeats the principles of finality, certainty and

administrative fairness.

27.In Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate,

(2019) 10 SCC 738, the Supreme Court emphasized that

17

decisions taken in undue haste or by bypassing mandatory

statutory requirements are liable to be struck down even if taken

in good faith. The Hon’ble Surpeme Court while dealing with the

issue, has held as under :-

“14. It could thus be seen that the scope of

judicial review of an administrative action is

very limited. Unless the Court comes to a

conclusion, that the decision maker has not

understood the law correctly that regulates his

decision-making power or when it is found that

the decision of the decision maker is vitiated by

irrationality and that too on the principle of

“Wednesbury Unreasonableness” or unless it is

found that there has been a procedural

impropriety in the decision-making process, it

would not be permissible for the High Court to

interfere in the decision making process. It is

also equally well settled, that it is not

permissible for the Court to examine the validity

of the decision but this Court can examine only

the correctness of the decision-making

process.

15. This Court recently in the case of West

Bengal Central School Service Commission vs.

Abdul Halim reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC

902 had again an occasion to consider the

scope of interference under Article 226 in an

administrative action.

“31. In exercise of its power of judicial review,

the Court is to see whether the decision

impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of

18

law. The test to determine whether a decision

is vitiated by error apparent on the face of

the record is whether the error is selfevident

on the face of the record or whether the error

requires examination or argument to

establish it. If an error has to be established

by a process of reasoning, on points where

there may reasonably be two opinions, it

cannot be said to be an error on the face of

the record, as held by this Court in

Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR

1960 SC 137. If the provision of a statutory

rule is reasonably capable of two or more

constructions and one construction has been

adopted, the decision would not be open to

interference by the writ Court. It is only an

obvious misinterpretation of a relevant

statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard

thereof, or a decision founded on reasons

which are clearly wrong in law, which can be

corrected by the writ Court by issuance of

writ of Certiorari.

32. The sweep of power under Article 226

may be wide enough to quash unreasonable

orders. If a decision is so arbitrary and

capricious that no reasonable person could

have ever arrived at it, the same is liable to

be struck down by a writ Court. If the

decision cannot rationally be supported by

the materials on record, the same may be

regarded as perverse.

33. However, the power of the Court to

19

examine the reasonableness of an order of

the authorities does not enable the Court to

look into the sufficiency of the grounds in

support of a decision to examine the merits

of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the

decision. The test is not what the Court

considers reasonable or unreasonable but a

decision which the Court thinks that no

reasonable person could have taken, which

has led to manifest injustice. The writ Court

does not interfere, because a decision is not

perfect.

16. It could thus be seen that an interference

by the High Court would be warranted only

when the decision impugned is vitiated by an

apparent error of law, i.e., when the error is

apparent on the face of the record and is self

evident. The High Court would be empowered

to exercise the powers when it finds that the

decision impugned is so arbitrary and

capricious that no reasonable person would

have ever arrived at. It has been reiterated that

the test is not what the court considers

reasonable or unreasonable but a decision

which the court thinks that no reasonable

person could have taken. Not only this but such

a decision must have led to manifest injustice.”

28.Further, the Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. M.V.

Mohanan Nair, (2020) 5 SCC 421, has authoritatively reiterated

the well-settled parameters governing the exercise of writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters

20

involving departmental proceedings and findings of fact recorded

by competent authorities. In the said decision, the Court held that

where findings of fact have been concurrently recorded by the

Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority, and/or the

Revisional Authority, such findings ordinarily attain finality and are

not to be lightly interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its

writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that judicial review is not

an appeal on facts. The High Court does not sit as a court of re-

appreciation of evidence, nor can it substitute its own conclusions

for those arrived at by the statutory authorities. It was further

clarified that interference would be justified only in exceptional

circumstances, namely where the findings are: (i) Perverse — i.e.,

findings which are based on no evidence at all, or are such that

no reasonable person acting judicially could have arrived at; (ii)

Arbitrary or capricious — where relevant material has been

ignored or extraneous considerations have influenced the

decision; (iii) Vitiated by patent illegality — such as violation of

principles of natural justice, non-observance of mandatory

statutory provisions, or procedural irregularities causing manifest

prejudice. The Court underscored that adequacy or sufficiency of

evidence is not a ground for interference in writ proceedings. So

long as there is some evidence to support the findings and the

decision-making process is fair, reasonable, and in accordance

with law, the High Court must exercise restraint. The principle

flowing from the said judgment is that writ jurisdiction is

21

supervisory in nature and not appellate. Therefore, once statutory

authorities have concurrently examined the record and arrived at

reasoned conclusions, the High Court would transgress the limits

of judicial review if it were to reassess the factual matrix merely

because another view is possible. Thus, the dictum in M.V.

Mohanan Nair (supra) reinforces the doctrine of judicial restraint

and finality of concurrent factual findings, unless the petitioner is

able to demonstrate perversity, arbitrariness, mala fides, or a

manifest error apparent on the face of the record.

29.Reverting back to the facts of the present case, and particularly to

the impugned order dated 22.05.2023 passed by the Board of

Revenue, it is evident that the revisional authority, while

entertaining Revision No. RN/23/R/A-56/388/2015 preferred by

respondent No. 5, has set aside the concurrent orders dated

31.08.2012 passed by the Tahsildar, 23.02.2013 passed by the

Sub-Divisional Officer, and 06.01.2015 passed by the Additional

Commissioner, and has remanded the matter to the Tahsildar for

initiating a fresh process of appointment under Section 230 of the

Code, 1959. The said order does not confer any positive direction

in favour of respondent No. 5, but merely directs reconsideration

of the appointment in accordance with the statutory scheme.

30.Upon careful scrutiny of the impugned order, this Court does not

find that the Board of Revenue has acted wholly without

jurisdiction or in disregard of the statutory framework. The

22

revisional jurisdiction under the Code, 1959 empowers the

authority to examine the legality and propriety of the orders

passed by subordinate revenue authorities. Merely because three

authorities had recorded concurrent findings in favour of the

petitioner, the revisional power does not stand obliterated,

particularly when the authority has formed an opinion that the

matter requires reconsideration in light of procedural requirements

prescribed under Section 230 and the Rules framed thereunder.

31.It is by now trite that the post of Kotwar is a statutory post and its

appointment is governed entirely by Section 230 of the Code,

1959 and the relevant Rules. The scheme makes it abundantly

clear that no appointment can be claimed as a matter of right, and

certainly not on the ground of hereditary succession. The

preference contemplated in Rule 4(2) in favour of a near relative

of an ex-Kotwar is conditional and operates only when other

statutory requirements are duly satisfied. It does not override the

requirement of a duly passed resolution of the Gram Sabha or

consideration thereof by the competent Revenue Officer.

32.The scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India is confined to examining the decision-making process and

not the merits of the decision itself. The Supreme Court of India in

Municipal Council, Neemuch (supra) and M.V. Mohanan Nair

(supra) has categorically held that judicial review does not extend

to re-appreciation of evidence or substitution of the Court’s view

23

for that of the statutory authority. Interference is warranted only

when the order is vitiated by manifest illegality, perversity,

jurisdictional error, or violation of principles of natural justice. The

test is not whether another view is possible, but whether the

decision is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no reasonable

authority could have arrived at it.

33.In the present case, the petitioner has not been able to

demonstrate that the impugned order dated 22.05.2023 suffers

from any such vice. The Board of Revenue has not finally

adjudicated the comparative merits nor has it conferred any right

upon respondent No. 5; rather, it has directed reconsideration in

accordance with law. The challenge raised by the petitioner is

essentially premised on the ground of long continuance and

concurrent findings, which, though relevant considerations, do not

by themselves render the revisional order per se illegal in

absence of a demonstrated jurisdictional flaw.

34.The fact that the petitioner has continued on the post for more

than a decade cannot, in the peculiar statutory scheme governing

appointment of Kotwars, crystallize into an indefeasible right,

especially when the revisional authority has found it appropriate to

remand the matter for fresh consideration. Continuation in service,

if subject to statutory scrutiny, remains open to examination within

the framework of law.

35.In the considered opinion of this Court, the writ petition does not

24

disclose any ground warranting interference in exercise of

extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. The impugned order represents an exercise

of statutory revisional power, and this Court would be

transgressing the limits of judicial review if it were to substitute its

own satisfaction for that of the competent authority.

36.Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby

dismissed. The Tahsildar, Bemetara shall proceed in terms of the

directions contained in the impugned order dated 22.05.2023 and

conclude the process of appointment under Section 230 of the

Code, 1959, expeditiously and strictly in accordance with law. It is

made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the

merits of the rival claimants, and the competent authority shall

decide the matter independently.

37.No order as to costs.

Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge

Yogesh

The date when the

judgment is

reserved

The date when the

judgment is

pronounced

The date when the judgment is

uploaded on the website

Operative Full

28.01.2026 28.02.2026 ------ 28.02.2026