High Court of H.P.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH , SHIMLA

Criminal Appeal No. 430 of 2010

Judgment reserved on : 11.07.2016

Date of Decision : August 24 , 2016

State of Himachal Pradesh …Appellant

Versus

Sanjeev Kumar …Respondent

Coram:

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol, Judge

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice, Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes.

For the appellant : Mr. V. S. Chauhan, Addl. Advocate General with

Mr. Vikram Thakur and Mr. Puneet Rajta,

Dy.A.Gs. for the appellant/State.

For the respondent : Mr. Rajesh Mandhotra and Ms. Kanta Thakur,

Advocates, for the respondent.

Sanjay Karol, J.

Assailing the judgment dated 29.04.2010,

passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge (II), Kangra at

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 2

Dharamshala, Distt. Kangra, H.P., in Sessions Case No. 1-

J/VII/2009, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sanjeev

Kumar, whereby respondent -accused stands acquitted,

State has filed the present appeal under the provisions of

Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

2. It is the case of prosecution that on 17.7.2008,

Smt. Jeevna Devi consumed poison in her matrimonial

house. She was taken to the Community Health Centre,

Fatehpur by her husband i.e. accused Sanjeev Kumar where

she was examined by Dr. Satnam Singh (PW -4). The matter

came to be reported to the police and ASI Mohinder Paul

(PW-10) rushed to the hospital , who after obtaining

certificate of fitness (Ext. PW-4/B) recorded statement (Ext.

PW-7/A) of Jeevna Devi, which was sent through Const.

Mohinder Singh and accordingly F.I.R. No. 144/2008, dated

18.7.2008 (Ext. PW-11/A) came to be registered at police

station Jawali, Distt. Kangra, H.P. against the accused under

the provisions of Sections 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.

Though the victim was further referred to the Civil Hospital

Nurpur, but instead taken to a private hospital, at Pathankot

where she expired. Post mortem of the dead body was

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 3

conducted by Dr. Anju Lath (PW-1) and Dr. Ashutosh Joshi

(PW-3) who issued reports (Ext. PW-1/B and Ext. PW-1/C).

Investigation revealed that since inception of their

marriage, in the year 2003, accused had been subjecting

the deceased to mental and physical cruelty, which

eventually prompted her to take aw ay her life. As such,

challan was presented in the Court for trial.

3. Accused was charged for having committed

offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 498-A

and 306 of the Indian Penal Code, to which he did not plead

guilty and claimed trial.

4. In order to prove its case, in all, prosecution

examined eleven witnesses and statement of the accused,

under Section 313 Cr. P.C. recorded, wherein he took a plea

of innocence and false implication. No evidence in defence

was led by the accused.

5. Based on the testimonies of the witnesses and

the material on record, trial Court acquitted the accused of

all the charged offences, for the reason that: (a) Prosecution

failed to establish the cause, prompting the deceased to

take away her life; (b) There was no evidence of

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 4

cruelty/harassment caused “soon before” the commission of

suicide; (c) Dying declaration (Ext. PW-7/A) was a weak

piece of evidence as there was (i) discrepancy about the

time when it came to be recorded, (ii) doubt with regard to

the mental condition of the victim, (iii) places of signatures

are different in the original and carbon copy (Mark-D1),

(iv) In view of the fact that the MLC (Ext.PW-4/A) bore her

thumb impression, her having signed the statement is

rendered doubtful; (d) Baldev Singh (PW-8) father of the

deceased, materially contradicted the prosecution case.

Absence of any prior complaint made to the

panchayat/police only fortified his version.

6. Hence, the present appeal by the State.

7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties as

also perused the record, we are of the considered view that

the trial Court seriously erred in not correctly and

completely appreciating the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses. It further erred in ignoring the relevant statutory

provisions and the law laid down by the apex Court.

Findings are, thus, perverse and illegal. It has resulted into

travesty of justice.

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 5

8. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court of India in M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR

1963 SC 200, has held that in d ealing with an appeal

against judgment of acquittal, the appellate Court should

normally be slow in disturbing the findings of fact recorded

by the trial Court. However, there is a caveat. Such findings

have to be based on proper and complete appreciation of

evidence. Jurisdiction and the power of the appellate Court

is also to reappreciate the evidence but with caution. The

Court is not to substitute its own opinion with that of the

trial Court.

9. In Madan Gopal Makkad v. Naval Dubey and

another, (1992) 3 SCC 204, the Apex Court held the scope

of the Court in an appeal against acquittal in the following

manner:

“26. In Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 SC

122; this court while examining the scope of S.

417 and 423 of the old Code pointed out that

even in appeals against acquittal, the powers of

the High court are as wide as in appeals from

convictions. See also (1) Surajpal Singh v. State,

AIR 1952 SC 52, (2) Tulsiram Kanu v. State, AIR

1954 SC 1, (3) Aher Raja Khima v. State of

Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217, (4) Radha Kishan

v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 822, holding that an

appeal from acquittal need not be treated

different from an appeal from conviction; (5)

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 6

Jadunath Singh v. State of U.P ., (1971) 3 SCC

577, (6) Dharam Das v. State of U.P., (1973) 2

SCC 216, (7) Barati v. State of U.P. , (1974) 4 SCC

258, and (8) Sethu Madhavan Nair v. State of

Kerala, (1975) 3 SCC 150.”

10. It is not a case of murder and the accused stands

charged for having committed offences, punishable under

the provisions of Sections 498-A & 306 of the Indian Penal

Code. To establish the same, prosecution has to prove that

the accused, being the husband, subjected the deceased to

cruelty or harassment and further as a result thereof

abetted her to commit suicide.

11. Certain facts are not in dispute: (i) the deceased

was married to the accused four – five years prior to the

incident; (ii) on 17.7.2008 she consumed poison when

accused took her to the hospital at Fatehpur. Such fact in

any case stands proved by Dr. Satnam Singh (PW-4) and ASI

Mohinder Paul (PW-10); and (iii) deceased consumed poison

in the matrimonial house. It also stands established by ASI

Mohinder Paul (PW-10).

12. On the record there is a dying declaration

(Ext.PW-7/A) which reads that the accused would physically

assault the deceased and even on the date of the incident

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 7

he had physically assaulted her for the reason that she was

elder in age and not to his liking. All this prompted her to

consume poison.

13. Authenticity of such statement is a fact in issue.

To establish the same, prosecution seeks reliance upon the

testimonies of Dr.Satnam Singh (PW.4), Kuldeep (PW.7),

Baldev Singh (PW-8) and ASI Mohinder Paul (PW-10). Before

we deal with the same, it would be prudent to discuss the

law on the issue.

14. In Jaishree Anant Khan dekar vs. State of

Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 647, a comparative study of

laws of various countries on the point of dying declaration

was done by the Apex Court. It was held that:

“17. The law relating to dying declaration is an

exception to the hearsay rule. The

rationale behind admissibility of a dying

declaration was best expressed,

not in any judgment, but in

one of the soliloquies in

Shakespeare's King John, when fatally

wounded Melun wails:

‘Have I met hideous

death within my view,

Retaining but a quantity of life,

Which bleeds away

even as a form of wax,

Resolveth from his figure

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 8

'gainst the fire?

What in the world should

make me now deceive,

Since I must lose the use of all

deceit?

Why should I then be false

since it is true

That I must die here

and live hence by truth?'

(See King John, Act V, Scene IV.)

18. Both Taylor and Wigmore in their treatise

on Evidence took refuge to the magic of

Shakespeare to illustrate the principles behind

admissibility of dying declaration by quoting the

above passage.

19. Among the judicial fraternity this has

been best expressed, possibly by Lord Chi ef

Justice Baron Eyre (See. R. Vs. Woodcock, (1789)

1 Lea.502, and which I quote (ER p.353): -

"...That such declarations are made in

extremity, when the party is at the point of

death, and when every hope of

this world is gone; when

every motive to falsehood is silenced,

and the mind is induced by the most

powerful considerations to speak

the truth; a situation so solemn

and so awful is considered by

the law as creating an obligation,

equal to that which is imposed by a

positive oath in a court of

justice."

20. The test of admissibility of dying

declaration is stricter in English Law than in

Indian Law. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 1876

brought out a ‘Digest of the Law of

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 9

Evidence' and its introduction is of

considerable interest even today. The

author wrote that English Code of

Evidence is modelled on the Indian Evidence Act

of 1872. In the words of the author:

"In the autumn of 1872 Lord Coleridge

(then Attorney General) employed me to

draw a similar code for England. I

did so in the course of the winter, and we

settled it in frequent consultations. It

was ready to be introduced early in the

Session of 1873. Lord Coleridge made

various attempts to bring it forward, but he

could not succeed till the very last day of

the Session. He said a few words on

the subject on the 5th August, 1873, just

before Parliament was prorogued. The

Bill was thus never made public, though I

believe it was ordered to be printed.

It was drawn on the model of the

Indian Evidence Act and contained a

complete system of law upon the

subject of evidence."

21. In that book, Article 26 sums up the

English law relating to dying declaration as

under:-

"Article 26. Dying Declaration as to

Cause of Death . - A declaration made by

the declarant as to the cause of his death,

or as to any of the circumstances of the

transaction which resulted in his death, is

deemed to be relevant only in trials for the

murder or manslaughter of the

declarant; and only when the declarant is

shown, to the satisfaction of the judge,

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 10

to have been in actual danger of death,

and to have given up all hope of recovery

at the time when his declaration was made.

Such a declaration is not irrelevant

merely because it was intended to be made

as a deposition before a magistrate, but is

irregular."

(emphasis supplied)

22. In Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act

the underlined portion is not there. Instead

Section 32 (1) is worded differently and which is

set out:

"32. Cases in which statement of

relevant fact by person who is dead or

cannot be found, etc., is relevant -

Statements, written or verbal, of relevant

facts made by a person who is dead, or

who cannot be found, or who has become

incapable of giving evidence, or whose

attendance cannot be procured, without an

amount of delay or expense which under

the circumstances of the case appears to

the Court unreasonable, are themselves

relevant facts in the following cases:-

(1) When it relates to cause of

death - When the statement is made by a

person as to the cause of his death, or to

any of the circumstances of the

transaction which resulted in his death, in

cases in which the cause of that person's

death comes into question.

Such statements are relevant

whether the person who made them was or

was not, at the time when they were made,

under expectation of death, and whatever

may be he nature of the proceeding in

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 11

which the cause of his death comes into

question." (emphasis supplied)

23. The Privy Council in the case of Nembhard

Vs. The Queen, 1982 (1) The All England Law

Reports 183 (Privy Council), while hearing an

appeal from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica,

made a comparison of the English Law and

Indian Law by referring to the underlined

portions of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence

Act at page 187 of the report. Sir Owen

Woodhouse, speaking for the Privy Council,

pointed out the different statutory dispensation

in Indian Law prescribing a test of admissibility of

dying declaration which is distinct from a

common law test in English Law.

24. Apart from an implicit faith in the intrinsic

truthfulness of human character at the

dying moments of one's life,

admissibility of dying declaration is also

based on the doctrine of necessity. In

many cases victim is the only eye witness to a

crime on him/her and in such situations

exclusion of the dying declaration, on hearsay

principle, would tend to defeat the ends of

justice. American Law on dying declaration

also proceeds on the twin postulates of certainty

of death leading to an intrinsic faith in

truthfulness of human character and the

necessity principle.

25. On certainty of death, the same strict test

of English Law has been applied

in American Jurisprudence. The

test has been variously expressed as

‘no hope of recovery', ‘a settled

expectation of death'. The core concept is that

the expectation of death must be absolute and

not susceptible to doubts and there should be no

chance of operation of worldly motives. (See

Wigmore on Evidence page 233 -234).

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 12

26. This Court in Kishan Lal Vs.

State of Rajasthan, AIR 1999 SC 3062,

held that under English Law the credence

and the relevance of the dying declaration is

admissible only when the person making

such statement is in hopeless condition and

expecting imminent death. Justice Willes coined

it as a "settled hopeless expectation of death" (R

Vs. Peel, (1860) 2 F. & F. 21, which was approved

by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R Vs. Perry,

(1909) 2 KB 697). Under our Law, the declaration

is relevant even if it is made by a person, who

may or may not be under expectation of death,

at the time of declaration. (See para 18,page

3066). However, the declaration must relate to

any of the circumstances of the transaction

which resulted in his death.”

15. The apex Court in Tapinder Singh vs. State of

Punjab & another, AIR 1970 S.C. 1566 has held that if the

dying declaration is acceptable as truthful, in the absence of

other corroborative evidence, the Court can act upon it and

convict the accused.

16. In Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1958

SC 22, the Apex Court has further held that:-

“Sometimes, attempts have been made to

equate a dying declaration with the evidence of

an accomplice or the evidence furnished by a

confession as against the maker, if it is retracted,

and as against others, even though not

retracted. But in our opinion, it is not right in

principle to do so. Though under S. 133 of the

Evidence Act, it is not illegal to convict a person

on the uncorroborated testimony of an

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 13

accomplice, illustration (b) to S. 114 of the Act,

lays down as a rule of produce based on

experience, that an accomplice is unworthy of

credit unless his evidence is corroborated in

material particulars and this has now been

accepted as a rule of law. The same cannot be

said of a dying declaration because a dying

declaration may not, unlike a confession, or the

testimony of an approver, come from a tainted

source. If a dying declaration has been made by

a person whose antecedents are as doubtful as

in the other cases that may be a ground for

looking upon it with suspicion, but generally

speaking, the maker of a dying declaration

cannot be tarnished with the same brush as the

maker of a confession or an approver .”

“It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule

of law that a dying declaration cannot form the

sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated;

each case must be determined on its own facts

keeping in view the circumstances in which the

dying declaration was made ; it cannot be laid

down as a general proposition that a dying

declaration is a weaker kind of evidence that

other pieces of evidence; a dying declaration

stands on the same footing as another piece of

evidence and has to be judged in the light of

surrounding circumstances and with reference to

the principles governing the weighing of

evidence; a dying declaration which has been

recorded by a competent magistrate in the

proper manner, that is to say, in the form of

questions and answers, and, as for as

practicable, in the words of the maker of the

declaration, stands on a much higher footing

than a dying declaration which depends upon

oral testimony which may suffer from all the

infirmities of human memory and human

character, and in order to test the reliability of a

dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view,

the circumstances like the opportunity of the

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 14

lying man for observation, for example, whether

there was sufficient light if the crime was

committed at night; whether the capacity of the

man to remember the facts stated, had not been

impaired at the time he was making the

statement, by circumstances beyond his control;

that the statement has been consistent

throughout if he had several opportunities of

making a dying declaration apart from the official

record of it; and that the statement had been

made at the earliest opportunity and was not the

result of tutoring by interested parties .”

“In order to pass the test of reliability, a

dying declaration has to be subjected to a very

close scrutiny , keeping in view the fact that the

statement has been made in the absence of the

accused who had no opportunity of testing the

veracity of the statement by cross-examination.

But once, the Court has come to the conclusion

that the dying declaration was the truthful

version as to the circumstances of the death and

the assailants of the victim, there is no question

of further corroboration. If, on the other hand,

the Court, after examining the dying declaration

in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has

come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by

itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then

without corroboration it cannot form the basis of

a conviction . Thus, the necessity for

corroboration arises not from any inherent

weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of

evidence, as held in some of the reported cases,

but from the fact that the Court, in a given case,

has come to the conclusion that particular dying

declaration was not free from the infirmities.”

(Emphasis supplied)

17. The aforesaid decision came up for consideration

before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Harbans

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 15

Singh and another vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC

439 and after taking into account its earlier decision in Ram

Nath vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 420,

affirmed the aforesaid view.

18. In Paniben (Smt.) vs. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2

SCC 474, the Court has further reiterated and laid down the

following principles:-

“A dying declaration is entitled to great weight.

Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration

was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base

its conviction without any further corroboration.

It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law

that the dying declaration cannot form the sole

basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The

rule requiring-corroboration is merely a rule of

prudence.”

“However, since the accused has no power

of cross-examination, which is essential for

eliciting the truth, the dying declaration

should be of such a nature as to inspire full

confidence of the Court in its correctness.

The Court has to be on guard that the

statement of deceased was not as a result

of either tutoring, prompting or a product of

imagination. The Court must be further

satisfied that the deceased was in a fit

state of mind after a clear opportunity to

observe and identify the assailants.

Normally the court in order to satisfy

whether deceased was in a fit mental

condition to make the dying declaration

look up to the medical opinion. But where

the eye witness has said that the deceased

was in a fit and conscious state to make

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 16

this dying declaration, the medical opinion

cannot prevail”.

“Merely because a dying declaration does

not contain the details as to occurrence, it

is not to be rejected. Equally, merely

because it is a brief statement, it is not be

discarded. On the contrary, the shortness

of the statement itself guarantees truth.

But a dying declaration which suffers from

infirmity cannot form the basis of

conviction. Where the prosecution version

differs from the version as given in the

dying declaration, the said declaration

cannot be acted upon.”

“(i) There is neither rule of law nor of

prudence that dying declaration cannot be

acted upon without corroboration. (Mannu

Raja v. State of U.P. (1976) 2 SCR 764) (AIR

1976 SC 2199).

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying

declaration is true and voluntary it can

base conviction on it, without corroboration

(State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR

1985 SC 416; Ramavati Devi v. State of

Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164).

(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying

declaration carefully and must ensure that

the declaration is not the result of tutoring,

prompting or imagination. The deceased

had opportunity to observe and identify the

assailants and was in a fit state to make

the declaration. (Rama Chandra Reddy v.

Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994).

(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it

should not be acted upon without

corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v.

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 17

State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264

: (AIR 1974 SC 332).

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious

and could never make any dying

declaration the evidence with regard to it is

to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P.,

AIR 1982 SC 1021).

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from

infirmity cannot form the basis of

conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P.,

1981 SCC (Crl) 581).

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration

does not contain the details as to the

occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State

of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati

Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617).

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief

statement it is not be discarded. On the

contrary, the shortness of the statement

itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Oza v.

State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1505).

(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy

whether deceased was i n a fit mental

condition to make the dying declaration

look up to the medical opinion. But where

the eyewitness has said that the deceased

was in a fit and conscious state to make

this dying declaration, the medical opinion

cannot prevail. (Nanahau Ram v. State, AIR

1988 SC 912).

(x) Where the prosecution version differs

from the version as given in the dying

declaration, the said declaration cannot be

acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan,

AIR 1989 SC 1519).

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 18

19. In the light of the above principles, we

will consider the three dying declarations in

the instant case and we will ascertain the

truth with reference to all dying

declarations made by the deceased Bai

Kanta. This Court in Mohan Lal v. State of

Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 839 held:

"where there are more than one

statement in the nature of dying

declaration, one first in point of time must

be preferred."

Of course, if the plurality of dying

declarations could be held to be trust -

worthy and reliable, they have to be

accepted.”

19. In Jayabalan vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry,

(2010) 1 SCC 199, the Apex Court was dealing with the

case of an accused who after pouring kerosene oil had set

his wife on fire. The husband was held guilty of having

committed an offence punishable under Section 302, IP C.

The accused assailed the findings of conviction on the

ground that prosecution had examined only interested

witnesses and also dying declaration was tutored, promoted

and product of the imagination of deceased. In the proven

facts of that case repelling the contention, it was held as

under:-

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 19

“We are of the considered view that in case

where the court is called upon to deal with the

evidence of the interested witnesses, the

approach of the court, while appreciating the

evidence of such witnesses must not be

pedantic. The court must be cautious in

appreciating and accepting the evidence given

by the interested witnesses but the court must

not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary

endeavour of the court must be to look for

consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot

be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes

from the mouth of a person who is closely

related to the victim.” (Emphasis supplied)

20. In Krishan vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 3 SCC

280, even where the witnesses had turned hostile, solely on

the basis of dying declaration, the Court convicted the

accused.

21. In Sukanti Moharana vs. State of Orissa, (2009)

9 SCC 163, the Court was dealing with a case where the

dying declaration was challenged on the ground that it did

not contain thumb impression or signatures of the

deceased. The challenge was repelled on the ground that

medical evidence proved that the deceased was having

90% burn injuries on the thumb and therefore was in no

position to sign the dying declaration. The Apex Court

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 20

further reiterated its decision in Nallapati Sivaiah vs. SDO,

(2007) 15 SCC 465, in the following terms:-

"18. …This Court in more than one decision

cautioned that the courts have always to be on

guard to see that the dying declaration was not

the result of either tutoring or prompting or a

product of imagination. It is the duty of the

courts to find that the deceased was in a fit state

of mind to make the dying declaration. In order

to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit

mental condition to make the dying declaration,

the courts have to look for the medical opinion."

22. This view stands reiterated in Ongole Ravikanth

vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 13 SCC 647.

23. Dying declaration can be made any time, in the

presence of anyone. It need not to be a Doctor, a

Government Officer or an Executive Magistrate. So long as

the victim is aware and fully conscious of what is being

done and said, any statement made by her can be treated

as an evidence, it being a different matter, as to whether it

requires corroboration or not. (See: Munnu Raja and another

v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 3 SCC 104;

Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 211).

24. Dying declaration need not be in the form of

question and answer. Principles required to be adopted for

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 21

recording the statement of deceased stand reiterated in

Ram Bihari Yadav Vs. State of Bihar and others, (1998) 4

SCC 517, State of Karnataka vs. Shariff (2003) 2 SCC 473

and K.Ramachandra Reddy and another vs. The Public

prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618.

25. Facts of each case have to be considered in the

attending circumstances.

26. Now what happened in the hospital is narrated

by Dr. Satnam Singh (PW -4). He is categorical that on

18.7.2008 at about 3 a.m., Jeevna Devi (deceased) with an

alleged history of consumption of some poisonous

substance, after quarrel with her husband was brought to

the hospital whom he examined. At that time, victim was

complaining of vomiting, sweating and giddiness. He is

categorical that the patient was cooperative and well

oriented to time and place. Her pulse was 80 per minute; BP

80/60; and pupils constricted and reactive to light. She was

administered emergency treatment . After some time, when

police moved an application, victim was checked and

thereafter he certified her fit to make a statement which

she did by stating that “before taking poison her husband

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 22

quarreled with her and as a result of which she was

compelled to take poison”. Thus Doctor does not state

anything about the physical assaults or the reason of

quarrel, but is certain about the quarrel which compelled for

taking poison. Most significantly he has testified that the

victim appended her signatures at Circle-A of the statement

contents whereof he does not deny to be false or incorrect.

We see no reason as to why this witness would depose

falsely. Our attention is invited to that part of his testimony

(in cross examination) wherein he admits that the victim

had put her thumb impression on the MLC (Ext. PW -4/A) for

the reason that she was unable to sign. But then this would

not in any manner, render the prosecution case or the dying

declaration to be doubtful. This we say so for the reason

that the victim remained under his examination for about

an hour i.e. between 3.00 a.m. to 4.00 a.m. It has not come

in the testimony of this witness that from the time of his

first examination, health of the victim had deteriorated. At

the time of her first examination victim may not have been

in a position to sign the papers but then the Doctor is

categorical that the victim herself had thumb marked the

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 23

document (Ext. PW-4/A), which only mean, that even at that

time, she was conscious. It is not that on this document

impression of her thumb was taken by the Doctor by lifting

her hand. Also Doctor is categorical that when police moved

the application, victim was fully conscious, aware and

oriented to time and place. Doctor had given her treatment

and possibly by that time, her condition had improved. He is

categorical that at the time of recording of such statement,

both the accused and relatives of the deceased were

present. Significantly none objected to or protested against

the recording of such statement. Also none tutored or

influenced anyone.

27. We find that statement (Ext. PW-7/A) came to be

recorded by ASI Mohinder Paul (PW-10). Our attention is

invited to that part of his testimony, which according to the

accused, renders the prosecution case to be doubtful. This

witness does admit that the said statement came to be

recorded in the presence of the brother of the victim; not in

the question & answer form; the place of signature on the

duplicate copy (Mark-D1) is different than the original (Ext.

PW-7/A). But then how would it make any difference,

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 24

rendering his testimony to be doubtful. After all it bears the

signature of the victim so appended in the presence of Dr.

Satnam Singh (PW-4). If in the duplicate copy signatures are

at a different place it would not make any difference, for it

is nobody’s case that such signatures are not that of the

victim or came to be appended later on.

28. Also Kuldeep (PW-7) who is the brother of the

deceased is categorical that the said statement came to be

recorded at the time when the victim was conscious and

alert. According to him, deceased had made a statement to

the police that the accused used to beat her under the

influence of liquor and that on account of mental torture she

consumed poison. The first part of such statement is an

improvement, but certainly would not render him to be an

unreliable witness. No doubt this witness in his cross

examination admits that the police had put questions to the

victim for about 10 to 15 minutes, but then, it remains

explained that answers were not being dictated by the

police officer who was only asking the questions. Questions

were being asked and answers given by the deceased.

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 25

29. We notice that there is variation with regard to

the time when the matter came to be reported to the police;

statement (Ext. PW-7/A) came to be recorded; and the

witnesses reached the hospital.

30. As per MLC (Ext. PW-4/A) patient was brought to

the hospital on 18.7.2008 at 3.00 a.m. when she was

examined and report sent to the police at 4.00 a.m. But ASI

Mohinder Paul (PW-10) states that the Doctor informed him

of the incident at 3.05 a.m. where after he rushed to the

hospital and after obtaining the certificate of fitness (Ext.

PW-4/B) recorded the statement (Ext. PW-7/A). This

document reveals the statement to have been recorded at

4.15 a.m. and the police informed about the incident at 3.05

a.m. Further Doctor (PW-4) states that he examined the

victim, at 3.00 a.m., but according to Kuldeep (PW -7) he

reached the hospital simultaneously with the police

between midnight and 1.00 a.m.

31. These contradictions with regard to the timings

have heavily weighed with the trial Court in disbelieving the

evidence of dying declaration (Ext. PW-7/A).

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 26

32. We do not find the difference in timing and the

variation in the testimonies of the witnesses and the

documentary evidence to be so significant or material so as

to render the prosecution case to be doubtful or the

testimonies of the witnesses to be unbelievable or unworthy

of credence. After all, one cannot lose sight of the fact that

we are dealing with the witnesses who hail from a rural

background and their statements came to be recorded in

the Court after a gap of more than one year. Kuldeep was

not residing in the same village. On telephone, parents of

the victim received information of the incident . They

travelled all the way to Fatehpur. It has not come in the

testimony of the police officials that by 1.00 a.m. itself, they

had received the information. In fact ASI Mohinder Paul

(PW-10) is categorical that he received the information at

3.05 a.m. Whether the police was informed at 3.00 a.m. or

4. 00 a.m. becomes absolutely immaterial for what is

required to be examined is as to whether , genesis of the

prosecution story of the victim having consumed poison and

made a dying declaration, in the presence of prosecution

witnesses, is inspiring in confidence or not. Significantly

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 27

both Dr. Satnam Singh (PW-4) and ASI Mohinder Paul (PW-

10) had no reason to falsely depose either which way, in

favour of the parties. Some leeway is required to be given

to the witnesses who have deposed after certain period of

time.

33. The witnesses are categorical that when

application came to be moved, certificate of soundness and

mental state came to be issued . In the presence of the

Doctor, when questioned, victim stated that only on account

of physical harassment and torture, she consumed poison.

She was subjected to physical assaults by her husband who

did not have any liking towards her, for she was elder in

age. What is relevant is the fact that at the time of making

statement, she was in a sound disposing state of mind.

None influenced, tutored or coerced her to make such a

statement. It was voluntary in nature. No doubt, brother of

the victim (PW-7) was present at that time, but then so was

the accused. The Doctor (PW -4), an independent person,

has categorically deposed the victim to have consume d

poison after her husband quarreled with her. What is that

quarrel, and who was responsible for the same, no doubt is

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 28

not so stated by him but then it is so clearly recorded in the

statement (Ext. PW-7/A) which is not only signed but also

testified to be the true and correct version of the victim.

34. Significantly there is nothing on record to

establish the time when the victim came to be discharged

from this hospital. It is not the case of the parties that

parents of the accused hail from the same village o r that

Police Post Fatehpur was close by. After all, it would have

taken time for the relatives of the victim and the police to

have reached the hospital. Variation in the timings, is also

explainable, for in these moments, none bothers to record

the exact time.

35. Further it is nobody’s case that relatives of the

victim brought the police. They may have reached the

hospital at the same time. It is not that police was acting on

their dictates. Independently they came to discharge their

duties in accordance with law.

36. Yes, Kuldeep (PW-7) does state that the victim

answered the questions put by the police, but then it is

nobody’s case that the statement came to be recorded in a

question & answer form. It stands specifically denied by the

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 29

witness that police officer had dictated the answers. What

was so stated by the victim came to be recorded in the

statement. Witnesses admit to have signed the same. Also

victim signed the same. Whether in the carbon copy such

signatures are at a different place would not make any

difference for even these signatures are in original and not

traces of the original.

37. We find that though father Baldev Singh (PW -8)

has not supported the prosecution but then even he admits

the statement of deceased Jeevna to have been recorded by

the police. In fact, he goes to admit that at that time,

deceased was fully conscious and had signed the same. He

further states “it is correct that my daughter gave

statement to the police that in the night the accused had

beaten her and said that she was elder to him and was also

not to his liking and as a result thereof she had taken some

poisonous substance. At that time Medical Officer was also

there”. No doubt in his statement he does state that in the

hospital at Fatehpur condition of his daughter was “not

good” and that she had spoken only three – four words with

him. But then he only narrates about his conversation with

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 30

the deceased and qualifies that the police had informed him

that “they have taken the statement of Jeevna Devi”.

38. Hence record does establish, beyond reasonable

doubt, the fact that the victim had made a dying declaration

(Ext. PW-7/A), authenticity whereof, to our mind, is beyond

the reach of ambiguity or doubt. To our mind , statement

(Ext. PW-7/A) is a perfect piece of evidence falling within the

ambit and scope of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act

establishing the guilt of the accused in relation to the

charged offences. Presumption, statutory in nature, under

the Evidence Act is clearly invokable in the instant case.

39. Trial Court in para – 17 of the impugned

judgment did notice the principles governing ‘dying

declaration’, as laid down by the apex Court. However, we

are of the view that the same have not been correctly

applied in the given facts and circumstances.

40. “Cruelty” for the purpose of the crime in

question would mean, willful conduct of the accused, which

is of such a nature as is likely to drive the deceased to

commit suicide or harassment with a view to coerce her to

meet any unlawful demand of property or valuable security.

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 31

Also, harassment on account of failure to meet such

demand would also amount to cruelty. If the prosecution is

able to show that suicide was committed within a period of

seven years from the date of marriage, as a result of

cruelty, the law by virtue of Section 113A of the Evidence

Act, mandates the Court to presume that such act of suicide

came to be abetted by her husband or his relatives. Also,

for proving the charge of abetment to suicide, it has to be

proved that the accused treated the deceased with cruelty

and drove her to commit suicide.

41. In Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh,

(2001) 9 SCC 618, the Apex Court has also held that

“Sections 498-A and 306 IPC are independent and

constitute different offences. Though, depending on the

facts and circumstances of an individual case, subjecting a

woman to cruelty may amount to an offence under section

498-A and may also, if a course of conduct, amounting to

cruelty is established leaving no other option for the woman

except to commit suicide, amount to abetment to commit

suicide. However, merely because an accused has been

held liable to be punished under section 498-A IPC it does

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 32

not follow that on the same evidence he must also and

necessarily be held guilty of having abetted the commission

of suicide by the woman concerned.”

42. In State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal (1994)

1 SCC 73 , the Apex Court has held as under:

“In a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter

than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a

criminal trial however intriguing may be facts and

circumstances of the case, the charges made

against the accused must be proved beyond all

reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof

cannot lie in the realm of surmises and

conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond

reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after

the introduction of S. 498A, I.P.C and S. 113A of

Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court's

conscience must be satisfied that the accused is

not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts

about the complicity of the accused in respect of

the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind

that there is no absolute standard for proof in a

criminal trial and the question whether the charges

made against the accused have been proved

beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon

the facts and circumstances of the case and the

quality of the evidences adduced in the case and

the materials placed on record. The doubt must be

of a reasonable man and the standard adopted

must be a standard adopted by a reasonable a nd

just man for coming to a conclusion considering

the particular subject matter.

The conscience of the court can never be bound

by any rule but that is coming itself dictates the

consciousness and prudent exercise of the

judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree

of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just

man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of

the doubt must be commensurate with the nature

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 33

of the offence to be investigated. Exaggerated

devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not

nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and

thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be

made sterile on the plea that it is better to let

hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent.

Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according

to law.”

(Emphasis supplied)

43. The Apex Court further cautioned that the court

should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and

circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in

the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty

meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the

life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a

victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary

petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite

common to the society to which the victim belonged and

such petulance, discord and differences were not expected

to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given

society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court

should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused

charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found

guilty.

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 34

44. In Arun Vyas & anr. Vs. Anita Vyas (1999) 4 SCC

690 , the Apex Court has held that the essence of offence in

Section 498-A is cruelty. It is a continuing offence and on

each occasion on which the wife is subjected to cruelty, she

would have a new starting point of limitation.

45. In Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr. Vs.

State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 2 SCC 684 , the Apex Court

has held as under:-

“The role of courts, under the

circumstances assumes greater importance and it

is expected that the courts would deal with such

cases in a more realistic manner and not allow

the criminals to escape on account of

procedural technicalities or insignificant lacune in

the evidence as otherwise the criminals would

receive encouragement and the victims of crime

would be totally discouraged by the crime going

unpunished. The courts are expected to be

sensitive in cases involving crime against women.”

46. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to

the other is essentially a question of fact. The impact of

complaints, accusations or taunts on a person amounting to

cruelty depends on various factors like the sensitivity of the

individual victim concerned, the social background, the

environment, education etc. Further, mental cruelty varies

from person to person depending on the intensity of

sensitivity and the degree of courage or endurance to

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 35

withstand such mental cruelty. In other words, each case

has to be decided on its own facts to decide whether the

mental cruelty was established or not. [Mohd. Hoshan A.P. &

Anrs. Vs. State of A.P. (2002) 7 SCC 414 ].

47. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke,

incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the

requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that

actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes

instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive

of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the

consequence must be capable of being spel t out. The

accused must by his acts or omission or by a continued

course of conduct create such circumstances that the

deceased is left with no other option except to commit

suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred.

A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without

intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be

said to be instigation. [Ramesh Kumar vs. State of

Chhatisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 ]

48. The Apex Court in Naresh Kumar v. State of

Haryana and others, (2015) 1 SCC 797, has observed that

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 36

“as regards the claim for parity of the case of the Appellant

with his mother and brother who have been acquitted, the

High Court has rightly found his case to be distinguishable

from the case of his mother and brother. The husband is not

only primarily responsible for safety of his wife, he is

expected to be conversant with her state of mind more than

any other relative. If the wife commits suicide by setting

herself on fire, proceeded by dissatisfaction of the husband

and his family from the dowry, the interference of

harassment against the husband may be patent.

Responsibility of the husband towards his wife is

qualitatively different and higher as against his other

relatives”.

49. With regard to dowry death, the Apex Court in

Baljinder Kaur v. State of Punjab , (2015) 2 SCC 629, held

that:

“21. In our view, there is force in the submission of

the learned counsel for the appellant. In cases

related to dowry death, the circumstances showing

the cruelty or harassment are not restricted to a

particular instance, but normally refer to a course

of conduct. Such conduct of cruelty or dowry

harassment must be "soon before death". There

should be a perceptible nexus between her death

and the dowry related harassment or cruelty

inflicted on her.”

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 37

50. The Apex Court in Rajinder Singh v. State of

Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477, in the following words, explained

the meaning of “dowry”, as under:

“8. A perusal of this Section shows that this

definition can be broken into six distinct parts:

(1) Dowry must first consist of any property or

valuable security - the word "any" is a word of

width and would, therefore, include within it

property and valuable security of any kind

whatsoever.

(2) Such property or security can be given or

even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such

property or security is, therefore, not necessary.

(3) Such property or security can be given or

agreed to be given either directly or indirectly.

(4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be

not only by one party to a marriage to the other

but also by the parents of either party or by any

other person to either party to the marriage or to

any other person. It will be noticed that this clause

again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those

guilty of committing the offence of giving or

receiving dowry is concerned.

(5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any

time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the

marriage. Thus, it can be many years after a

marriage is solemnised.

(6) Such giving or receiving must be in

connection with the marriage of the pa rties.

Obviously, the expression "in connection with"

would in the context of the social evil sought to be

tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean "in

relation with" or "relating to".”

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 38

51. In the very same decision, after examining the

intent of the Legislators for enacting the special enactment,

by applying the principle of “force and life”, the Court held

that any money or property or valuable security demanded

by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, at or before or at an y time after the

marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a

married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or

in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case

clearly and unequivocally point otherwise. Also, that the

word “soon” would not mean immediate and each case had

to be judged on the given facts. There has to be proximity

and link between the impact of dowry demand and the

consequential death and there cannot be any straitjacket

formula for determining such factor. “Soon before” was

held not to be synonymous with “immediately before”.

52. The guilt or innocence of the accused has to be

deduced from the material on record. And, what is required

to be kept in mind by the court, while appreciating the

evidence, stands reiterated by the Apex Court in Bhim Singh

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 39

and another v. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 4 SCC 281, as

under:

“22. In the present case, the guilt or innocence of

the accused has to be adduced from the

circumstantial evidence. The law regarding

circumstantial evidence is more or less well

settled. This Court in a plethora of judgments has

held that when the conviction is based on

circumstantial evidence solely, then there should

not be any snap in the chain of circumstances. If

there is a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled

to benefit of doubt. Gurpreet Singh v. State of

Haryana , (2002) 8 SCC 18 is one of such cases. On

the question of any reasonable hypothesis, this

Court has held that if some of the circumstances in

the chain can be explained by any oth er

reasonable hypothesis, then the accused is entitled

to benefit of doubt. But in assessing the evidence,

imaginary possibilities have no place. The Court

considers ordinary human probabilities.”

53. In the backdrop of narration of facts and the

principle of law, one now proceeds to discuss the testimony

of the prosecution witnesses on the issue of cruelty and

harassment.

54. We find Kuldeep (PW-7) to have disclosed that

the deceased used to complain against the accused for she

was not to his liking and that she was elder in age. Also the

accused used to physically assault her. Despite efforts of

reconciliation and counselling, accused refused to improve

his conduct and continued with such physical assaults.

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 40

Though the accused was counseled but only for protecting

the reputation of the family, matter never came to be

reported to the panchayat. We do not find credit of this

witness to have been impeached by the accused. His

testimony is clear, cogent and convincing.

55. On the issue of previous cruelty, we find even

Baldev Singh (PW-8), father of the deceased, who was

declared hostile but cross examined by the Public

Prosecutor, to have deposed and corroborated the version

of his son. He admits to have informed the police that the

accused used to harass the deceased on account of

insufficient dowry and that she was elder in age. He admits

to have disclosed to the police about the harassment and

maltreatment which prompted the deceased to take away

her life. Illiteracy and old age being factors for initially not

supporting the prosecution stand explained. The witness

admits to have deposed truthfully on recollection of facts

after having read his statement. Well the fact that the

accused did not demand any dowry from this witness or

that the deceased gave birth to her children in the

matrimonial house or that the parties were on visiting terms

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 41

would not in any manner either make any difference or

render the prosecution case to be doubtful. Thus in our

considered view these witnesses unequivocally have

deposed about the factum of cruelty.

56. Both the brother and the father of the deceased

do state that in order to save the honour of the family,

matter never came to be reported to anyone . Perhaps they

were waiting for the time to pass by and better sense

prevailing upon the accused. Also they wanted the

relationship to continue. We do find Raghav Singh (PW -9),

pradhan of the panchayat, to have stated that once Baldev

Singh had orally informed him about some dispute

pertaining to the deceased. Even he had advised not to

bring the matter to the notice of the panchayat.

57. Hence, Court below, seriously erred in correctly

and completely appreciating the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses as also the law as aforesaid.

58. In our considered view, prosecution has been

able to establish the guilt of the accused, beyond

reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and

reliable piece of evidence.

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 42

59. From the material placed on record, it stands

established by the prosecution witnesses that the accused

is guilty of having committed the offences charged for.

There is sufficient, convincing, cogent and reliable evidence

on record to this effect. The guilt of the accused stands

proved beyond reasonable doubt to the hilt. It cannot be

said that accused is innocent or not guilty or that he has

been falsely implicated or that his defence is probable or

that the evidence led by the prosecution is inconsistent,

unreliable, untrustworthy and unbelievable. It cannot be

said that the version narrated by the witnesses in Court is in

a parrot-like manner and hence is to be disbelieved.

60. Thus, in our considered view, findings returned

by the trial Court cannot be said to be based on correct and

complete appreciation of material on record, which are

reversed. The appeal is allowed and we hold the accused

guilty of having committed offences, punishable under the

provisions of Section 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal

Code, for treating deceased Jeevna Devi with cruelty and

thereby abetting her to commit suicide.

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS

High Court of H.P. 43

61. Bail bonds furnished by the accused-convict stand

cancelled. For the purpose of hearing him on the quantum of

sentence, the appeal be listed on 13/9/2016. He be produced

in the Court on the said date. Copy of the judgment be

supplied to the accused, free of cost.

Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending

application(s), if any.

(Sanjay Karol),

Judge.

(Ajay Mohan Goel),

Judge.

August 24 , 2016 (PK)

::: Downloaded on - 12/10/2022 18:43:32 :::CIS