As per case facts, the appellants were convicted under IPC Sections 313, 323, and 498-A for allegedly causing a miscarriage, voluntarily causing hurt, and dowry cruelty. The complainant stated she ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
CRA-S-767-SB-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Whether only operative part of the judgment is Pronounced:
Whether full judgment is pronounced: YES
SUKHWINDER SINGH & ORS.
STATE OF PUNJAB
CORAM: HON'BLE MS
Present: Mr. Varun Tuteja, Advocate for the appellants.
Mr. J.S. Rattu, DAG Punjab.
Mr. H.S. Dhandi, Advocate for the complainant.
RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL, J.
1. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 27.03.2004 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Ludhiana, in Sessions
Case No.152 dated 08.10.2003, whereby the appel
Rajwinder Kaur, Amarjit Kaur and Surjit Singh have been convicted under
Sections 313, 323 and 498
1860 (for short, 'IPC'), and each of them has been sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/
with a default stipulation of rigorous imprisonment for three months, for the
offence punishable under Section 313 IPC; to undergo rigorous imprisonment
1
-2004
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRA
Reserved on:
Pronounced on:
Uploaded on:
operative part of the judgment is Pronounced:
Whether full judgment is pronounced: YES
SUKHWINDER SINGH & ORS.
Versus
PUNJAB
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL
Mr. Varun Tuteja, Advocate for the appellants.
Mr. J.S. Rattu, DAG Punjab.
Mr. H.S. Dhandi, Advocate for the complainant.
*****
RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL, J.
The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 27.03.2004 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Ludhiana, in Sessions
Case No.152 dated 08.10.2003, whereby the appel
Rajwinder Kaur, Amarjit Kaur and Surjit Singh have been convicted under
Sections 313, 323 and 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short, 'IPC'), and each of them has been sentenced to undergo
isonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/
with a default stipulation of rigorous imprisonment for three months, for the
offence punishable under Section 313 IPC; to undergo rigorous imprisonment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRA-S-767-SB-2004
Reserved on: 25.05.2026
Pronounced on: 28.07.2026
Uploaded on: 28.07.2026
operative part of the judgment is Pronounced: NO
….Appellants
....Respondent
. JUSTICE RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL
Mr. Varun Tuteja, Advocate for the appellants.
Mr. H.S. Dhandi, Advocate for the complainant.
The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 27.03.2004 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Ludhiana, in Sessions
Case No.152 dated 08.10.2003, whereby the appellants Sukhwinder Singh,
Rajwinder Kaur, Amarjit Kaur and Surjit Singh have been convicted under
A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short, 'IPC'), and each of them has been sentenced to undergo
isonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-,
with a default stipulation of rigorous imprisonment for three months, for the
offence punishable under Section 313 IPC; to undergo rigorous imprisonment
The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 27.03.2004 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Ludhiana, in Sessions
lants Sukhwinder Singh,
Rajwinder Kaur, Amarjit Kaur and Surjit Singh have been convicted under
A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short, 'IPC'), and each of them has been sentenced to undergo
,
with a default stipulation of rigorous imprisonment for three months, for the
offence punishable under Section 313 IPC; to undergo rigorous imprisonment
CRA-S-767-SB-
for a period of three years and to
stipulation of rigorous imprisonment for three months, for the offence
punishable under Section 498
a period of six months for the offence punishable under Section 323 I
the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently, with the benefit of
set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Appellant Sukhwinder Singh was married to the complainant
Kiranjit Kaur on 02.02.2000 at Machhiwa
Rajwinder Kaur is the sister
appellant Amarjit Kaur is her mother
father-in-law.
3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that
a written application before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Khanna,
alleging that sufficient dowry and
clothes and other household articles were given at the time of her marriage, but
the appellants-accused were not satisfied therewith and raised a demand for
more dowry and cash. It was further alleged that on 13.10.2000 at about 1.00
P.M., appellants Sukhwinder Singh and Surjit Singh gave beatings to the
complainant and threw her on the
appellant Sukhwinder Singh caught hold of her from her arms, while appellant
Rajwinder Kaur sat on the abdomen of the complainant and pressed the same,
and at that time appellant Surjit Singh was standing at th
complainant started bleeding per vagina. She informed her parents, whereupon
her father and brother came and took her with them and got her admitted in
R.K. Memorial Hospital, Machhiwara. The complainant further alleged that she
2
-2004
for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/
stipulation of rigorous imprisonment for three months, for the offence
punishable under Section 498-A IPC; and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
a period of six months for the offence punishable under Section 323 I
the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently, with the benefit of
set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Appellant Sukhwinder Singh was married to the complainant
Kiranjit Kaur on 02.02.2000 at Machhiwara according to Sikh rites. Appellant
Rajwinder Kaur is the sister-in-law (husband's sister) of the complainant,
appellant Amarjit Kaur is her mother-in-law and appellant Surjit Singh is her
The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that
a written application before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Khanna,
alleging that sufficient dowry and istridhan in the shape of gold ornaments,
clothes and other household articles were given at the time of her marriage, but
accused were not satisfied therewith and raised a demand for
more dowry and cash. It was further alleged that on 13.10.2000 at about 1.00
P.M., appellants Sukhwinder Singh and Surjit Singh gave beatings to the
complainant and threw her on the bed; appellant Amarjit Kaur pulled her legs,
appellant Sukhwinder Singh caught hold of her from her arms, while appellant
Rajwinder Kaur sat on the abdomen of the complainant and pressed the same,
and at that time appellant Surjit Singh was standing at th
complainant started bleeding per vagina. She informed her parents, whereupon
her father and brother came and took her with them and got her admitted in
R.K. Memorial Hospital, Machhiwara. The complainant further alleged that she
pay a fine of Rs.500/-, with a default
stipulation of rigorous imprisonment for three months, for the offence
A IPC; and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
a period of six months for the offence punishable under Section 323 IPC. All
the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently, with the benefit of
set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Appellant Sukhwinder Singh was married to the complainant
ra according to Sikh rites. Appellant
law (husband's sister) of the complainant,
law and appellant Surjit Singh is her
The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant moved
a written application before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Khanna,
in the shape of gold ornaments,
clothes and other household articles were given at the time of her marriage, but
accused were not satisfied therewith and raised a demand for
more dowry and cash. It was further alleged that on 13.10.2000 at about 1.00
P.M., appellants Sukhwinder Singh and Surjit Singh gave beatings to the
bed; appellant Amarjit Kaur pulled her legs,
appellant Sukhwinder Singh caught hold of her from her arms, while appellant
Rajwinder Kaur sat on the abdomen of the complainant and pressed the same,
and at that time appellant Surjit Singh was standing at the door. The
complainant started bleeding per vagina. She informed her parents, whereupon
her father and brother came and took her with them and got her admitted in
R.K. Memorial Hospital, Machhiwara. The complainant further alleged that she
, with a default
stipulation of rigorous imprisonment for three months, for the offence
A IPC; and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
PC. All
the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently, with the benefit of
Appellant Sukhwinder Singh was married to the complainant
ra according to Sikh rites. Appellant
law (husband's sister) of the complainant,
law and appellant Surjit Singh is her
the complainant moved
a written application before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Khanna,
in the shape of gold ornaments,
clothes and other household articles were given at the time of her marriage, but
accused were not satisfied therewith and raised a demand for
more dowry and cash. It was further alleged that on 13.10.2000 at about 1.00
P.M., appellants Sukhwinder Singh and Surjit Singh gave beatings to the
bed; appellant Amarjit Kaur pulled her legs,
appellant Sukhwinder Singh caught hold of her from her arms, while appellant
Rajwinder Kaur sat on the abdomen of the complainant and pressed the same,
e door. The
complainant started bleeding per vagina. She informed her parents, whereupon
her father and brother came and took her with them and got her admitted in
R.K. Memorial Hospital, Machhiwara. The complainant further alleged that she
CRA-S-767-SB-
was pregnant at
on account of the injuries caused by the appellants.
4. On the basis of the said complaint, FIR No.6 dated 03.02.2001,
under Sections 313/315/323/506/498
Station Machhiwara, District Ludhiana, against the appellants
5. On completion of the investigation, challan against the accused
was presented in Court. The case was committed to the Court of Session by the
learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class,
after completing the necessary formalities and finding a prima facie case, the
accused were charge
Section 34 IPC. The charge was read over and explained to the a
which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
6. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined PW
Kaur, complainant, PW
Sandeep Kumar, photographer, PW
Singh, PW-6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar, PW
Kumar, PW-9 Dr. T.S. Cheema and PW
documentary evidence on the record. Thereafter, the prosecution evidence was
closed.
7. Upon conclu
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied the prosecution
allegations and pleaded false implication. In defence, the accused examined 06
witnesses, namely, DW
3
-2004
was pregnant at the time of the occurrence and that she suffered a miscarriage
on account of the injuries caused by the appellants.
On the basis of the said complaint, FIR No.6 dated 03.02.2001,
under Sections 313/315/323/506/498-A/120-B IPC, was registered at Police
Station Machhiwara, District Ludhiana, against the appellants
On completion of the investigation, challan against the accused
was presented in Court. The case was committed to the Court of Session by the
learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Samrala vide order dated 16.02.2002 and,
after completing the necessary formalities and finding a prima facie case, the
accused were charge-sheeted under Sections 313, 498
Section 34 IPC. The charge was read over and explained to the a
which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined PW
Kaur, complainant, PW-2 Jaskaran Singh, father of the complainant, PW
Sandeep Kumar, photographer, PW-4 Kulwinder Singh, PW
6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar, PW-7 ASI Harbans Singh, PW
9 Dr. T.S. Cheema and PW-10 Tarlok Singh, besides tendering the
documentary evidence on the record. Thereafter, the prosecution evidence was
Upon conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the accused were
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied the prosecution
allegations and pleaded false implication. In defence, the accused examined 06
witnesses, namely, DW-1 Mela Singh, DW-2 C. Parminder
the time of the occurrence and that she suffered a miscarriage
on account of the injuries caused by the appellants.
On the basis of the said complaint, FIR No.6 dated 03.02.2001,
B IPC, was registered at Police
Station Machhiwara, District Ludhiana, against the appellants-accused.
On completion of the investigation, challan against the accused
was presented in Court. The case was committed to the Court of Session by the
Samrala vide order dated 16.02.2002 and,
after completing the necessary formalities and finding a prima facie case, the
sheeted under Sections 313, 498-A and 323 read with
Section 34 IPC. The charge was read over and explained to the accused, to
In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined PW-1 Kiranjit
2 Jaskaran Singh, father of the complainant, PW-3
4 Kulwinder Singh, PW-5 ASI Hakam
7 ASI Harbans Singh, PW-8 ASI Ashok
10 Tarlok Singh, besides tendering the
documentary evidence on the record. Thereafter, the prosecution evidence was
sion of the prosecution evidence, the accused were
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied the prosecution
allegations and pleaded false implication. In defence, the accused examined 06
2 C. Parminder Singh, DW-3
the time of the occurrence and that she suffered a miscarriage
On the basis of the said complaint, FIR No.6 dated 03.02.2001,
B IPC, was registered at Police
On completion of the investigation, challan against the accused
was presented in Court. The case was committed to the Court of Session by the
Samrala vide order dated 16.02.2002 and,
after completing the necessary formalities and finding a prima facie case, the
A and 323 read with
ccused, to
1 Kiranjit
3
5 ASI Hakam
8 ASI Ashok
10 Tarlok Singh, besides tendering the
documentary evidence on the record. Thereafter, the prosecution evidence was
sion of the prosecution evidence, the accused were
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied the prosecution
allegations and pleaded false implication. In defence, the accused examined 06
3
CRA-S-767-SB-
Surinder Singh, DW
Singh, and thereafter closed their defence evidence.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the
learned trial Court committed a grave error in
inasmuch as there is absolutely no legally admissible evidence on the record to
prove that the complainant was pregnant at the relevant time or that she suffered
any miscarriage or abortion. It has been contended that the laborat
Mark 'A', upon which the entire prosecution case rests, is a mere photocopy
which has never been proved in accordance with law, and that the said report
was procured for the purposes of the case. It has further been contended that, as
per the medical evidence on the file, no injury whatsoever was found on the
person of the complainant apart from bleeding per vagina, and that the offence
under Section 323 IPC is, therefore, not made out.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants has further contended
allegations regarding the demand of dowry are wholly vague and general,
inasmuch as neither any specific date nor any specific instance has been
mentioned as to when the appellants allegedly raised such a demand. He has
further argued that soon a
Sukhwinder Singh could not adjust with each other on account of a difference
in their temperaments, and that the complainant got the FIR registered by
concocting a false story merely in order to pressurise th
agreeing to a divorce. He has further pointed out that the matrimonial dispute
between the parties has since been settled and that the marriage of the
complainant with appellant Sukhwinder Singh has already been dissolved by a
decree of divorce by mutual consent, whereafter the complainant has moved
4
-2004
Surinder Singh, DW-4 Sultan Singh, DW-5 Prabh Kiran Singh and DW
Singh, and thereafter closed their defence evidence.
Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the
learned trial Court committed a grave error in
inasmuch as there is absolutely no legally admissible evidence on the record to
prove that the complainant was pregnant at the relevant time or that she suffered
any miscarriage or abortion. It has been contended that the laborat
Mark 'A', upon which the entire prosecution case rests, is a mere photocopy
which has never been proved in accordance with law, and that the said report
was procured for the purposes of the case. It has further been contended that, as
dical evidence on the file, no injury whatsoever was found on the
person of the complainant apart from bleeding per vagina, and that the offence
under Section 323 IPC is, therefore, not made out.
Learned counsel for the appellants has further contended
allegations regarding the demand of dowry are wholly vague and general,
inasmuch as neither any specific date nor any specific instance has been
mentioned as to when the appellants allegedly raised such a demand. He has
further argued that soon after the marriage the complainant and appellant
Sukhwinder Singh could not adjust with each other on account of a difference
in their temperaments, and that the complainant got the FIR registered by
concocting a false story merely in order to pressurise th
agreeing to a divorce. He has further pointed out that the matrimonial dispute
between the parties has since been settled and that the marriage of the
complainant with appellant Sukhwinder Singh has already been dissolved by a
ivorce by mutual consent, whereafter the complainant has moved
5 Prabh Kiran Singh and DW-6 Jasbir
Singh, and thereafter closed their defence evidence.
Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the
learned trial Court committed a grave error in convicting the appellants,
inasmuch as there is absolutely no legally admissible evidence on the record to
prove that the complainant was pregnant at the relevant time or that she suffered
any miscarriage or abortion. It has been contended that the laboratory report
Mark 'A', upon which the entire prosecution case rests, is a mere photocopy
which has never been proved in accordance with law, and that the said report
was procured for the purposes of the case. It has further been contended that, as
dical evidence on the file, no injury whatsoever was found on the
person of the complainant apart from bleeding per vagina, and that the offence
under Section 323 IPC is, therefore, not made out.
Learned counsel for the appellants has further contended that the
allegations regarding the demand of dowry are wholly vague and general,
inasmuch as neither any specific date nor any specific instance has been
mentioned as to when the appellants allegedly raised such a demand. He has
fter the marriage the complainant and appellant
Sukhwinder Singh could not adjust with each other on account of a difference
in their temperaments, and that the complainant got the FIR registered by
concocting a false story merely in order to pressurise the appellants into
agreeing to a divorce. He has further pointed out that the matrimonial dispute
between the parties has since been settled and that the marriage of the
complainant with appellant Sukhwinder Singh has already been dissolved by a
ivorce by mutual consent, whereafter the complainant has moved
6 Jasbir
Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the
convicting the appellants,
inasmuch as there is absolutely no legally admissible evidence on the record to
prove that the complainant was pregnant at the relevant time or that she suffered
ory report
Mark 'A', upon which the entire prosecution case rests, is a mere photocopy
which has never been proved in accordance with law, and that the said report
was procured for the purposes of the case. It has further been contended that, as
dical evidence on the file, no injury whatsoever was found on the
person of the complainant apart from bleeding per vagina, and that the offence
that the
allegations regarding the demand of dowry are wholly vague and general,
inasmuch as neither any specific date nor any specific instance has been
mentioned as to when the appellants allegedly raised such a demand. He has
fter the marriage the complainant and appellant
Sukhwinder Singh could not adjust with each other on account of a difference
in their temperaments, and that the complainant got the FIR registered by
e appellants into
agreeing to a divorce. He has further pointed out that the matrimonial dispute
between the parties has since been settled and that the marriage of the
complainant with appellant Sukhwinder Singh has already been dissolved by a
ivorce by mutual consent, whereafter the complainant has moved
CRA-S-767-SB-
forward in her life, whereas the appellants continue to face the agony of a
criminal prosecution founded upon false facts. He has accordingly prayed for
acquittal of the appellants.
10. Per
report Mark 'A' it stood revealed that the complainant was pregnant on
04.10.2000, and that on account of the beatings and other acts committed by the
appellants, the complainant suffered a misc
weeks was aborted against her wish and without her consent. He has further
argued that since the very inception of the marriage the appellants were not
satisfied with the dowry given in the marriage and were continuously ra
demands of dowry. He has further argued that the learned trial Court has
correctly appreciated the evidence on the record and that there is no scope for
interference with the findings so recorded. He has accordingly prayed for
dismissal of the appeal
submissions advanced on behalf of the State.
11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through
the record with their able assistance.
12. The appellants have been convicted under
498-A IPC. Section 313 IPC is a penal provision which draws its definitional
content from Section 312 IPC. The said provisions read as under:
faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
5
-2004
forward in her life, whereas the appellants continue to face the agony of a
criminal prosecution founded upon false facts. He has accordingly prayed for
acquittal of the appellants.
Per contra, learned State counsel has argued that vide laboratory
report Mark 'A' it stood revealed that the complainant was pregnant on
04.10.2000, and that on account of the beatings and other acts committed by the
appellants, the complainant suffered a miscarriage and her pregnancy of ten
weeks was aborted against her wish and without her consent. He has further
argued that since the very inception of the marriage the appellants were not
satisfied with the dowry given in the marriage and were continuously ra
demands of dowry. He has further argued that the learned trial Court has
correctly appreciated the evidence on the record and that there is no scope for
interference with the findings so recorded. He has accordingly prayed for
dismissal of the appeal. Learned counsel for the complainant has adopted the
submissions advanced on behalf of the State.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through
the record with their able assistance.
The appellants have been convicted under
A IPC. Section 313 IPC is a penal provision which draws its definitional
content from Section 312 IPC. The said provisions read as under:
“312. Causing miscarriage.-
Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to
miscarry, shall, if such miscarriage be not caused in good
faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
forward in her life, whereas the appellants continue to face the agony of a
criminal prosecution founded upon false facts. He has accordingly prayed for
has argued that vide laboratory
report Mark 'A' it stood revealed that the complainant was pregnant on
04.10.2000, and that on account of the beatings and other acts committed by the
arriage and her pregnancy of ten
weeks was aborted against her wish and without her consent. He has further
argued that since the very inception of the marriage the appellants were not
satisfied with the dowry given in the marriage and were continuously raising
demands of dowry. He has further argued that the learned trial Court has
correctly appreciated the evidence on the record and that there is no scope for
interference with the findings so recorded. He has accordingly prayed for
. Learned counsel for the complainant has adopted the
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through
The appellants have been convicted under Sections 313, 323 and
A IPC. Section 313 IPC is a penal provision which draws its definitional
content from Section 312 IPC. The said provisions read as under:-
Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to
l, if such miscarriage be not caused in good
faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
forward in her life, whereas the appellants continue to face the agony of a
criminal prosecution founded upon false facts. He has accordingly prayed for
has argued that vide laboratory
report Mark 'A' it stood revealed that the complainant was pregnant on
04.10.2000, and that on account of the beatings and other acts committed by the
arriage and her pregnancy of ten
weeks was aborted against her wish and without her consent. He has further
argued that since the very inception of the marriage the appellants were not
ising
demands of dowry. He has further argued that the learned trial Court has
correctly appreciated the evidence on the record and that there is no scope for
interference with the findings so recorded. He has accordingly prayed for
. Learned counsel for the complainant has adopted the
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through
Sections 313, 323 and
A IPC. Section 313 IPC is a penal provision which draws its definitional
CRA-S-767-SB-
Explanation.
13. In order to secure a conviction under Section 313 IPC, the
prosecution is required to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the following
essential ingredients:
6
-2004
which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both;
and, if the woman be quick with child, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—A woman who causes herself to miscarry, is
within the meaning of this section.
313. Causing miscarriage without woman's consent
Whoever commits the offence defined in the last preceding
section without the consent of the woman, whether the
woman is quick with child or not, shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of eit
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine.”
In order to secure a conviction under Section 313 IPC, the
prosecution is required to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the following
essential ingredients:-
(a) the woman was with child, that is to say, pregnancy is
the foundational fact upon which the charge rests and it
must be established by reliable medical or other cogent
evidence;
(b) the accused voluntarily caused the woman to miscarry,
there being a direct act or omission attributable to the
accused which resulted in the miscarriage;
(c) the miscarriage was caused without the consent of the
woman, the absence of free and voluntary consent being the
very feature which distinguishes Section 313 from
312 IPC;
(d) the act was intentional, that is to say, the miscarriage
was voluntarily caused; and
(e) the act was not done in good faith for the purpose of
saving the life of the woman.
which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both;
h child, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
A woman who causes herself to miscarry, is
within the meaning of this section.
miscarriage without woman's consent.-
Whoever commits the offence defined in the last preceding
section without the consent of the woman, whether the
woman is quick with child or not, shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
In order to secure a conviction under Section 313 IPC, the
prosecution is required to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the following
(a) the woman was with child, that is to say, pregnancy is
the foundational fact upon which the charge rests and it
must be established by reliable medical or other cogent
(b) the accused voluntarily caused the woman to miscarry,
a direct act or omission attributable to the
accused which resulted in the miscarriage;
(c) the miscarriage was caused without the consent of the
woman, the absence of free and voluntary consent being the
very feature which distinguishes Section 313 from Section
(d) the act was intentional, that is to say, the miscarriage
(e) the act was not done in good faith for the purpose of
In order to secure a conviction under Section 313 IPC, the
prosecution is required to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the following
CRA-S-767-SB-
14. To prove the aforesaid essential ingredients, the prose
rests upon the statements of PW
Rakesh Kumar, PW
15. PW
came to know that she was pregnant. She
herself medically checked and it was revealed that she was pregnant. However,
she has not disclosed the name of the doctor, hospital or any laboratory from
where she got herself medically checked. A critical analysis of he
reveals that she has nowhere stated that she got herself medically checked from
Abhisekh Laboratory, or that any report was issued to her revealing the factum
of pregnancy. The single most material fact in the prosecution case is thus left
wholly unanchored in the deposition of the complainant herself.
16. PW
deposed that vide report Mark 'A', the pregnancy of the complainant was tested
positive. However, no reliance can be placed upon the s
has not been proved as per law. Under Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by
secondary evidence, and Section 64 mandates that documents must be proved
by primary evidence except in the cases thereinafter mentioned. Section 63
exhaustively defines secondary evidence and Section 65 sets out the limited
circumstances in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be
given.
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
(2007) 5 SCC 730 : AIR 2007 SC 1721
7
-2004
To prove the aforesaid essential ingredients, the prose
rests upon the statements of PW-1 Kiranjit Kaur, complainant, PW
Rakesh Kumar, PW-9 Dr. T.S. Cheema and PW
PW-1 complainant has categorically stated that on 04.10.2000 she
came to know that she was pregnant. She stated that on 04.10.2000 she got
herself medically checked and it was revealed that she was pregnant. However,
she has not disclosed the name of the doctor, hospital or any laboratory from
where she got herself medically checked. A critical analysis of he
reveals that she has nowhere stated that she got herself medically checked from
Abhisekh Laboratory, or that any report was issued to her revealing the factum
of pregnancy. The single most material fact in the prosecution case is thus left
ly unanchored in the deposition of the complainant herself.
PW-10 Tarlok Singh, Technician, Abhisekh Laboratory, has
deposed that vide report Mark 'A', the pregnancy of the complainant was tested
positive. However, no reliance can be placed upon the s
has not been proved as per law. Under Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by
secondary evidence, and Section 64 mandates that documents must be proved
vidence except in the cases thereinafter mentioned. Section 63
exhaustively defines secondary evidence and Section 65 sets out the limited
circumstances in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in J. Ya
(2007) 5 SCC 730 : AIR 2007 SC 1721, has observed as under:
To prove the aforesaid essential ingredients, the prosecution case
1 Kiranjit Kaur, complainant, PW-6 Dr.
9 Dr. T.S. Cheema and PW-10 Tarlok Singh.
1 complainant has categorically stated that on 04.10.2000 she
stated that on 04.10.2000 she got
herself medically checked and it was revealed that she was pregnant. However,
she has not disclosed the name of the doctor, hospital or any laboratory from
where she got herself medically checked. A critical analysis of her testimony
reveals that she has nowhere stated that she got herself medically checked from
Abhisekh Laboratory, or that any report was issued to her revealing the factum
of pregnancy. The single most material fact in the prosecution case is thus left
ly unanchored in the deposition of the complainant herself.
10 Tarlok Singh, Technician, Abhisekh Laboratory, has
deposed that vide report Mark 'A', the pregnancy of the complainant was tested
positive. However, no reliance can be placed upon the said report as the same
has not been proved as per law. Under Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by
secondary evidence, and Section 64 mandates that documents must be proved
vidence except in the cases thereinafter mentioned. Section 63
exhaustively defines secondary evidence and Section 65 sets out the limited
circumstances in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be
J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani,
, has observed as under:-
cution case
6 Dr.
1 complainant has categorically stated that on 04.10.2000 she
stated that on 04.10.2000 she got
herself medically checked and it was revealed that she was pregnant. However,
she has not disclosed the name of the doctor, hospital or any laboratory from
r testimony
reveals that she has nowhere stated that she got herself medically checked from
Abhisekh Laboratory, or that any report was issued to her revealing the factum
of pregnancy. The single most material fact in the prosecution case is thus left
10 Tarlok Singh, Technician, Abhisekh Laboratory, has
deposed that vide report Mark 'A', the pregnancy of the complainant was tested
aid report as the same
has not been proved as per law. Under Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by
secondary evidence, and Section 64 mandates that documents must be proved
vidence except in the cases thereinafter mentioned. Section 63
exhaustively defines secondary evidence and Section 65 sets out the limited
circumstances in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be
shoda v. K. Shobha Rani,
CRA-S-767-SB-
produced, decides this objection that rule only means that,
possession or may be reached by you, you shall give no
proof of the contents of the documents tendered in
18. The said exposition of law proceeds upon the earlier
pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Dube and another
case in hand, report Mark 'A' being admittedly a photocopy, of which the
original was never produced and the non
accounted for, was not receivable in evidence at all, much less capable
8
-2004
“8. Essentially, secondary evidence is an evidence which
may be given in the absence of that better evidence which
law requires to be given first, when a proper
its absence is given. The definition in Section 63 is
exhaustive as the Section declares that secondary evidence
‘means and includes’ and then follow the five kinds of
secondary evidence.
9. The rule which is the most universal, namely that
best evidence the nature of the case will admit shall be
produced, decides this objection that rule only means that,
so long as the higher or superior evidence is within your
possession or may be reached by you, you shall give no
inferior proof in relation to it. Section 65 deals with the
proof of the contents of the documents tendered in
evidence. In order to enable a party to produce secondary
evidence it is necessary for the party to prove existence and
execution of the original document.
documents are to be proved by primary evidence. Section
65, however, permits secondary evidence to be given of the
existence, condition or contents of documents under the
circumstances mentioned. The conditions laid down in the
said section must be fulfilled before secondary evidence
can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a
document cannot be admitted without non
the original being first accounted for in such a manner as
to bring it within one or other of the cases provi
the section.”
The said exposition of law proceeds upon the earlier
pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
other., (1975) 4 SCC 664. Applying the aforesaid principles to the
case in hand, report Mark 'A' being admittedly a photocopy, of which the
original was never produced and the non-production whereof was never
accounted for, was not receivable in evidence at all, much less capable
“8. Essentially, secondary evidence is an evidence which
may be given in the absence of that better evidence which
law requires to be given first, when a proper explanation of
its absence is given. The definition in Section 63 is
exhaustive as the Section declares that secondary evidence
‘means and includes’ and then follow the five kinds of
9. The rule which is the most universal, namely that the
best evidence the nature of the case will admit shall be
produced, decides this objection that rule only means that,
so long as the higher or superior evidence is within your
possession or may be reached by you, you shall give no
tion to it. Section 65 deals with the
proof of the contents of the documents tendered in
evidence. In order to enable a party to produce secondary
evidence it is necessary for the party to prove existence and
riginal document. Under Section 64,
documents are to be proved by primary evidence. Section
65, however, permits secondary evidence to be given of the
existence, condition or contents of documents under the
circumstances mentioned. The conditions laid down in the
fulfilled before secondary evidence
can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a
document cannot be admitted without non-production of
the original being first accounted for in such a manner as
to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in
The said exposition of law proceeds upon the earlier
pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Dulichand v. Madavlal
. Applying the aforesaid principles to the
case in hand, report Mark 'A' being admittedly a photocopy, of which the
production whereof was never
accounted for, was not receivable in evidence at all, much less capable of
The said exposition of law proceeds upon the earlier
lal
. Applying the aforesaid principles to the
case in hand, report Mark 'A' being admittedly a photocopy, of which the
production whereof was never
of
CRA-S-767-SB-
forming the foundation of a conviction carrying a sentence extending to
imprisonment for life.
19. Quite apart from the legal inadmissibility of the document, a
careful perusal of the statement of PW
photocopy of repor
10 Tarlok Singh has stated in his cross
mentioned in the register maintained in the laboratory. However, he admitted
that report Mark 'A' does not bear the serial
admitted that in a photocopy of a report, the result of the patient, the date, the
name of the patient and other particulars can be changed. He further stated that
he cannot identify the complainant. He further stated tha
original of Mark 'A'. He further admitted that in the absence of the original
report, it cannot be said if the pregnancy test of the complainant was found
positive or negative. In the teeth of such admissions made by the prosecution's
own witness, the document is not merely unproved, but is affirmatively
unreliable.
20. So far as the testimony of PW
is observed that the same is not relevant for the adjudication of the controversy
in dispute. PW-
him on 31.05.2000, i.e. much prior to the alleged occurrence. Moreover, this
witness has nowhere stated that the complainant was pregnant at that time.
Rather, he has categorically stated that in the sc
abnormality was found at that time. His evidence, far from advancing the
prosecution case, is at its highest neutral.
9
-2004
forming the foundation of a conviction carrying a sentence extending to
imprisonment for life.
Quite apart from the legal inadmissibility of the document, a
careful perusal of the statement of PW-10 Tarlok Singh reveals that the
photocopy of report Mark 'A' is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. PW
10 Tarlok Singh has stated in his cross-examination that a serial number is
mentioned in the register maintained in the laboratory. However, he admitted
that report Mark 'A' does not bear the serial number of the register. He further
admitted that in a photocopy of a report, the result of the patient, the date, the
name of the patient and other particulars can be changed. He further stated that
he cannot identify the complainant. He further stated tha
original of Mark 'A'. He further admitted that in the absence of the original
report, it cannot be said if the pregnancy test of the complainant was found
positive or negative. In the teeth of such admissions made by the prosecution's
own witness, the document is not merely unproved, but is affirmatively
So far as the testimony of PW-9 Dr. T.S. Cheema is concerned, it
is observed that the same is not relevant for the adjudication of the controversy
-9 Dr. T.S. Cheema has deposed that the complainant came to
him on 31.05.2000, i.e. much prior to the alleged occurrence. Moreover, this
witness has nowhere stated that the complainant was pregnant at that time.
Rather, he has categorically stated that in the sc
abnormality was found at that time. His evidence, far from advancing the
prosecution case, is at its highest neutral.
forming the foundation of a conviction carrying a sentence extending to
Quite apart from the legal inadmissibility of the document, a
10 Tarlok Singh reveals that the
t Mark 'A' is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. PW-
examination that a serial number is
mentioned in the register maintained in the laboratory. However, he admitted
number of the register. He further
admitted that in a photocopy of a report, the result of the patient, the date, the
name of the patient and other particulars can be changed. He further stated that
he cannot identify the complainant. He further stated that he has not seen the
original of Mark 'A'. He further admitted that in the absence of the original
report, it cannot be said if the pregnancy test of the complainant was found
positive or negative. In the teeth of such admissions made by the prosecution's
own witness, the document is not merely unproved, but is affirmatively
9 Dr. T.S. Cheema is concerned, it
is observed that the same is not relevant for the adjudication of the controversy
T.S. Cheema has deposed that the complainant came to
him on 31.05.2000, i.e. much prior to the alleged occurrence. Moreover, this
witness has nowhere stated that the complainant was pregnant at that time.
Rather, he has categorically stated that in the scan of the uterus, no significant
abnormality was found at that time. His evidence, far from advancing the
forming the foundation of a conviction carrying a sentence extending to
Quite apart from the legal inadmissibility of the document, a
10 Tarlok Singh reveals that the
-
examination that a serial number is
mentioned in the register maintained in the laboratory. However, he admitted
number of the register. He further
admitted that in a photocopy of a report, the result of the patient, the date, the
name of the patient and other particulars can be changed. He further stated that
t he has not seen the
original of Mark 'A'. He further admitted that in the absence of the original
report, it cannot be said if the pregnancy test of the complainant was found
positive or negative. In the teeth of such admissions made by the prosecution's
own witness, the document is not merely unproved, but is affirmatively
9 Dr. T.S. Cheema is concerned, it
is observed that the same is not relevant for the adjudication of the controversy
T.S. Cheema has deposed that the complainant came to
him on 31.05.2000, i.e. much prior to the alleged occurrence. Moreover, this
witness has nowhere stated that the complainant was pregnant at that time.
an of the uterus, no significant
abnormality was found at that time. His evidence, far from advancing the
CRA-S-767-SB-
21. So far as the testimony of PW
is observed that the same also fal
pregnant at the time of the alleged occurrence or that she suffered a miscarriage.
This witness has deposed that on 14.10.2000, the complainant came to his
hospital; at that
disclosed the history of 10 weeks pregnancy; and he had only given her
treatment for stopping the bleeding. It is thus manifest that the factum of
pregnancy did not rest upon any clinical finding recorded by this witness, but
upon the history volunteered by the complainant herself. A history so disclosed
by a patient is not substantive proof of the fact stated therein; it is, at best, a
record of what the patient said.
22. During his cross
he is not a Gynaecologist but his wife, who is BAMS, MD, is a Gynaecologist.
He further stated that the complainant was checked by and remained under the
treatment of his wife. He further stated that there was no other injury on the
person of the complainant ex
the prosecution itself, the wife of Dr. Rakesh Kumar, who alone examined and
treated the complainant, was the best and indeed the only competent witness to
depose regarding the pregnancy and the termination
examined. No explanation whatsoever has been furnished for withholding this
crucial witness.
23. Illustration (g) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
permits the Court to presume that evidence which could be, and is not,
produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it.
Where the prosecution, having it in its pow
10
-2004
So far as the testimony of PW-6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar is concerned, it
is observed that the same also falls short to prove that the complainant was
pregnant at the time of the alleged occurrence or that she suffered a miscarriage.
This witness has deposed that on 14.10.2000, the complainant came to his
that time she had bleeding per vagina; the c
disclosed the history of 10 weeks pregnancy; and he had only given her
treatment for stopping the bleeding. It is thus manifest that the factum of
pregnancy did not rest upon any clinical finding recorded by this witness, but
y volunteered by the complainant herself. A history so disclosed
by a patient is not substantive proof of the fact stated therein; it is, at best, a
record of what the patient said.
During his cross-examination, PW-
not a Gynaecologist but his wife, who is BAMS, MD, is a Gynaecologist.
He further stated that the complainant was checked by and remained under the
treatment of his wife. He further stated that there was no other injury on the
person of the complainant except per vagina bleeding. Thus, on the showing of
the prosecution itself, the wife of Dr. Rakesh Kumar, who alone examined and
treated the complainant, was the best and indeed the only competent witness to
depose regarding the pregnancy and the termination
examined. No explanation whatsoever has been furnished for withholding this
Illustration (g) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
permits the Court to presume that evidence which could be, and is not,
produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it.
Where the prosecution, having it in its power to examine the one witness who
6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar is concerned, it
ls short to prove that the complainant was
pregnant at the time of the alleged occurrence or that she suffered a miscarriage.
This witness has deposed that on 14.10.2000, the complainant came to his
time she had bleeding per vagina; the complainant had
disclosed the history of 10 weeks pregnancy; and he had only given her
treatment for stopping the bleeding. It is thus manifest that the factum of
pregnancy did not rest upon any clinical finding recorded by this witness, but
y volunteered by the complainant herself. A history so disclosed
by a patient is not substantive proof of the fact stated therein; it is, at best, a
-6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar stated that
not a Gynaecologist but his wife, who is BAMS, MD, is a Gynaecologist.
He further stated that the complainant was checked by and remained under the
treatment of his wife. He further stated that there was no other injury on the
cept per vagina bleeding. Thus, on the showing of
the prosecution itself, the wife of Dr. Rakesh Kumar, who alone examined and
treated the complainant, was the best and indeed the only competent witness to
depose regarding the pregnancy and the termination thereof. She has not been
examined. No explanation whatsoever has been furnished for withholding this
Illustration (g) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
permits the Court to presume that evidence which could be, and is not,
produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it.
er to examine the one witness who
6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar is concerned, it
ls short to prove that the complainant was
pregnant at the time of the alleged occurrence or that she suffered a miscarriage.
This witness has deposed that on 14.10.2000, the complainant came to his
omplainant had
disclosed the history of 10 weeks pregnancy; and he had only given her
treatment for stopping the bleeding. It is thus manifest that the factum of
pregnancy did not rest upon any clinical finding recorded by this witness, but
y volunteered by the complainant herself. A history so disclosed
by a patient is not substantive proof of the fact stated therein; it is, at best, a
6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar stated that
not a Gynaecologist but his wife, who is BAMS, MD, is a Gynaecologist.
He further stated that the complainant was checked by and remained under the
treatment of his wife. He further stated that there was no other injury on the
cept per vagina bleeding. Thus, on the showing of
the prosecution itself, the wife of Dr. Rakesh Kumar, who alone examined and
treated the complainant, was the best and indeed the only competent witness to
thereof. She has not been
examined. No explanation whatsoever has been furnished for withholding this
Illustration (g) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
permits the Court to presume that evidence which could be, and is not,
produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it.
er to examine the one witness who
CRA-S-767-SB-
could speak to the foundational fact from her own professional knowledge, has
chosen instead to rest upon the hearsay recital of a history and upon an
unproved photocopy, the Court would be abdicating its function were it
supply by presumption what the prosecution has failed to establish by proof.
24. As a result of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that
the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to attract
Section 313 IPC. Th
complainant was pregnant at the relevant time or that any miscarriage was
caused by the act of the accused. Even otherwise, the prosecution has failed to
adduce reliable evidence to prove that the alleged
without the consent of the woman, which is the sine qua non for constituting an
offence under Section 313 IPC. The distinction between Sections 312 and 313
IPC lies precisely in the element of consent, and the learned trial Court has
returned no finding at all upon this indispensable ingredient. The conviction
under Section 313 IPC is, therefore, unsustainable.
25. So far as the offence under Section 498
said provision reads as under:
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
Explanation.
11
-2004
could speak to the foundational fact from her own professional knowledge, has
chosen instead to rest upon the hearsay recital of a history and upon an
unproved photocopy, the Court would be abdicating its function were it
supply by presumption what the prosecution has failed to establish by proof.
As a result of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that
the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to attract
Section 313 IPC. There is no cogent medical evidence proving that the
complainant was pregnant at the relevant time or that any miscarriage was
caused by the act of the accused. Even otherwise, the prosecution has failed to
adduce reliable evidence to prove that the alleged
without the consent of the woman, which is the sine qua non for constituting an
offence under Section 313 IPC. The distinction between Sections 312 and 313
IPC lies precisely in the element of consent, and the learned trial Court has
returned no finding at all upon this indispensable ingredient. The conviction
under Section 313 IPC is, therefore, unsustainable.
So far as the offence under Section 498
said provision reads as under:-
“498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.-
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband
of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to three years and shall also be liab
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘cruelty’
means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
could speak to the foundational fact from her own professional knowledge, has
chosen instead to rest upon the hearsay recital of a history and upon an
unproved photocopy, the Court would be abdicating its function were it to
supply by presumption what the prosecution has failed to establish by proof.
As a result of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that
the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to attract
ere is no cogent medical evidence proving that the
complainant was pregnant at the relevant time or that any miscarriage was
caused by the act of the accused. Even otherwise, the prosecution has failed to
adduce reliable evidence to prove that the alleged miscarriage was caused
without the consent of the woman, which is the sine qua non for constituting an
offence under Section 313 IPC. The distinction between Sections 312 and 313
IPC lies precisely in the element of consent, and the learned trial Court has
returned no finding at all upon this indispensable ingredient. The conviction
under Section 313 IPC is, therefore, unsustainable.
So far as the offence under Section 498-A IPC is concerned, the
ive of husband of a woman
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband
of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
For the purposes of this section, ‘cruelty’
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
could speak to the foundational fact from her own professional knowledge, has
chosen instead to rest upon the hearsay recital of a history and upon an
to
As a result of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that
the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to attract
ere is no cogent medical evidence proving that the
complainant was pregnant at the relevant time or that any miscarriage was
caused by the act of the accused. Even otherwise, the prosecution has failed to
miscarriage was caused
without the consent of the woman, which is the sine qua non for constituting an
offence under Section 313 IPC. The distinction between Sections 312 and 313
IPC lies precisely in the element of consent, and the learned trial Court has
returned no finding at all upon this indispensable ingredient. The conviction
A IPC is concerned, the
CRA-S-767-SB-
phy
26. Suffice it to say that vague and general allegations have been
levelled in the present case. It is settled law that general and omnibus
allegations are not sufficient to conclude that a woman was being harassed in
connection with the demand of dowry. The allegations levelled by the
complainant are lacking in material particulars, inasmuch as no date, no
occasion, no specific article demanded and no specific role attributed to any
individual appellant has been brought on t
supported by any independent or reliable evidence. It is also an admitted fact
that the marriage between the complainant and appellant Sukhwinder Singh has
been dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent.
27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
(2000) 5 SCC 207 : AIR 2000 SC 2324
held as under:-
12
-2004
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”
Suffice it to say that vague and general allegations have been
levelled in the present case. It is settled law that general and omnibus
allegations are not sufficient to conclude that a woman was being harassed in
tion with the demand of dowry. The allegations levelled by the
complainant are lacking in material particulars, inasmuch as no date, no
occasion, no specific article demanded and no specific role attributed to any
individual appellant has been brought on the record, and the same are not
supported by any independent or reliable evidence. It is also an admitted fact
that the marriage between the complainant and appellant Sukhwinder Singh has
been dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab,
(2000) 5 SCC 207 : AIR 2000 SC 2324, wherein the Hon'ble three
“5. ... For the fault of the husband, the in
relations cannot, in all cases, be held to b
demand of dowry. In cases where such accusations are
made, the overt acts attributed to persons other than
husband are required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. By mere conjectures and implications such relations
cannot be held guilty for the offence relating to dowry
deaths. A tendency has, however, developed for roping in
all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
to her to meet such demand.”
Suffice it to say that vague and general allegations have been
levelled in the present case. It is settled law that general and omnibus
allegations are not sufficient to conclude that a woman was being harassed in
tion with the demand of dowry. The allegations levelled by the
complainant are lacking in material particulars, inasmuch as no date, no
occasion, no specific article demanded and no specific role attributed to any
he record, and the same are not
supported by any independent or reliable evidence. It is also an admitted fact
that the marriage between the complainant and appellant Sukhwinder Singh has
been dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent.
Kans Raj v. State of Punjab,
, wherein the Hon'ble three-Judge Bench
“5. ... For the fault of the husband, the in-laws or the other
relations cannot, in all cases, be held to be involved in the
demand of dowry. In cases where such accusations are
made, the overt acts attributed to persons other than
husband are required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. By mere conjectures and implications such relations
y for the offence relating to dowry
deaths. A tendency has, however, developed for roping in
laws of the deceased wives in the
Suffice it to say that vague and general allegations have been
levelled in the present case. It is settled law that general and omnibus
allegations are not sufficient to conclude that a woman was being harassed in
tion with the demand of dowry. The allegations levelled by the
complainant are lacking in material particulars, inasmuch as no date, no
occasion, no specific article demanded and no specific role attributed to any
he record, and the same are not
supported by any independent or reliable evidence. It is also an admitted fact
that the marriage between the complainant and appellant Sukhwinder Singh has
Kans Raj v. State of Punjab,
Judge Bench
CRA-S-767-SB-
28. The aforesaid position was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Preeti Gupta and another v. State of Jharkhand and another, (2010)
7 SCC 667, wherein it has been observed:
29. That vague, general and omnibus allegations against the relatives
of the husband are not sufficient to sustain a prosecution stands authoritatively
settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
others v. State of Bihar and others,
held:-
false implication by way of general omnibus allegations
13
-2004
matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely
to affect the case of the prosecution even a
culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek
conviction for maximum people, the parents of the
deceased have been found to be making efforts for
involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case
of the prosecution even against the real accused.”
The aforesaid position was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Preeti Gupta and another v. State of Jharkhand and another, (2010)
, wherein it has been observed:-
“30. It is a matter of common experience that
complaints under Section 498-A IPC are filed in the heat of
the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations.
We come across a large number of such complaints which
are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive.”
at vague, general and omnibus allegations against the relatives
of the husband are not sufficient to sustain a prosecution stands authoritatively
settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and
others v. State of Bihar and others, (2022) 6 SCC 599
“18. The above-mentioned decisions clearly demonstrate
that this Court has at numerous instances expressed
concern over the misuse of Section 498
increased tendency of implicating relatives of the
in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long
ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the
accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that
false implication by way of general omnibus allegations
made in the course of matrimonial dispute, if left unchecked
would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this
matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely
to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real
culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek
conviction for maximum people, the parents of the
deceased have been found to be making efforts for
involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case
ainst the real accused.”
The aforesaid position was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Preeti Gupta and another v. State of Jharkhand and another, (2010)
. It is a matter of common experience that most of these
A IPC are filed in the heat of
the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations.
We come across a large number of such complaints which
are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive.”
at vague, general and omnibus allegations against the relatives
of the husband are not sufficient to sustain a prosecution stands authoritatively
Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and
(2022) 6 SCC 599, wherein it has been
mentioned decisions clearly demonstrate
that this Court has at numerous instances expressed
concern over the misuse of Section 498-A IPC and the
increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband
in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long-term
ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the
accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that
false implication by way of general omnibus allegations
rse of matrimonial dispute, if left unchecked
would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this
The aforesaid position was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Preeti Gupta and another v. State of Jharkhand and another, (2010)
at vague, general and omnibus allegations against the relatives
of the husband are not sufficient to sustain a prosecution stands authoritatively
Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and
, wherein it has been
CRA-S-767-SB-
proceeding against the relatives and in
30. To similar effect are the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of U.P. and another, (2012) 10
SCC 741, wherein, approving the earlier view taken in
Prasad and others,
members are roped into matrimonial litigation upon omnibus allegations, such
proceedings ought not to be permitted to continue. Tested on the anvil of the
aforesaid authorities, the material on the
Kaur, Amarjit Kaur and Surjit Singh, being respectively the husband's sister, the
mother-in-law and the father
beyond a bald and undifferentiated assertion of cruelty and de
Not a single independent witness has been produced by the prosecution to
establish either the demand or the harassment, notwithstanding that the
occurrence is alleged to have taken place in a residential locality and that the
complainant her
The persons allegedly informed contemporaneously by the complainant were
likewise never produced in the witness box. The conviction under Section 498
A IPC, resting upon such a foundation, ca
31. So far as the offence under Section 323 IPC is concerned, 'hurt' is
defined in Section 319 IPC to mean the causing of bodily pain, disease or
infirmity to any person, and Section 321 IPC defines the expression 'voluntarily
causing hurt'. PW
bleeding, no other injury was found on the person of the complainant. There is
no medico-legal report on the record evidencing any injury referable to the
14
-2004
Court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from
proceeding against the relatives and in
when no prima facie case is made out against them.”
To similar effect are the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme
Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of U.P. and another, (2012) 10
, wherein, approving the earlier view taken in
Prasad and others, (2000) 3 SCC 693, it was held that where all the family
members are roped into matrimonial litigation upon omnibus allegations, such
proceedings ought not to be permitted to continue. Tested on the anvil of the
aforesaid authorities, the material on the record against appellants Rajwinder
Kaur, Amarjit Kaur and Surjit Singh, being respectively the husband's sister, the
law and the father-in-law of the complainant, consists of nothing
beyond a bald and undifferentiated assertion of cruelty and de
Not a single independent witness has been produced by the prosecution to
establish either the demand or the harassment, notwithstanding that the
occurrence is alleged to have taken place in a residential locality and that the
complainant herself deposed that the neighbours were standing outside the door.
The persons allegedly informed contemporaneously by the complainant were
likewise never produced in the witness box. The conviction under Section 498
A IPC, resting upon such a foundation, cannot be sustained.
So far as the offence under Section 323 IPC is concerned, 'hurt' is
defined in Section 319 IPC to mean the causing of bodily pain, disease or
infirmity to any person, and Section 321 IPC defines the expression 'voluntarily
urt'. PW-6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar has clearly stated that except per vagina
bleeding, no other injury was found on the person of the complainant. There is
legal report on the record evidencing any injury referable to the
Court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from
proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband
e out against them.”
To similar effect are the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme
Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of U.P. and another, (2012) 10
, wherein, approving the earlier view taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V.
, it was held that where all the family
members are roped into matrimonial litigation upon omnibus allegations, such
proceedings ought not to be permitted to continue. Tested on the anvil of the
record against appellants Rajwinder
Kaur, Amarjit Kaur and Surjit Singh, being respectively the husband's sister, the
law of the complainant, consists of nothing
beyond a bald and undifferentiated assertion of cruelty and demand of dowry.
Not a single independent witness has been produced by the prosecution to
establish either the demand or the harassment, notwithstanding that the
occurrence is alleged to have taken place in a residential locality and that the
self deposed that the neighbours were standing outside the door.
The persons allegedly informed contemporaneously by the complainant were
likewise never produced in the witness box. The conviction under Section 498-
nnot be sustained.
So far as the offence under Section 323 IPC is concerned, 'hurt' is
defined in Section 319 IPC to mean the causing of bodily pain, disease or
infirmity to any person, and Section 321 IPC defines the expression 'voluntarily
6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar has clearly stated that except per vagina
bleeding, no other injury was found on the person of the complainant. There is
legal report on the record evidencing any injury referable to the
To similar effect are the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme
Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of U.P. and another, (2012) 10
G.V. Rao v. L.H.V.
, it was held that where all the family
members are roped into matrimonial litigation upon omnibus allegations, such
proceedings ought not to be permitted to continue. Tested on the anvil of the
record against appellants Rajwinder
Kaur, Amarjit Kaur and Surjit Singh, being respectively the husband's sister, the
law of the complainant, consists of nothing
mand of dowry.
Not a single independent witness has been produced by the prosecution to
establish either the demand or the harassment, notwithstanding that the
occurrence is alleged to have taken place in a residential locality and that the
self deposed that the neighbours were standing outside the door.
The persons allegedly informed contemporaneously by the complainant were
-
So far as the offence under Section 323 IPC is concerned, 'hurt' is
defined in Section 319 IPC to mean the causing of bodily pain, disease or
infirmity to any person, and Section 321 IPC defines the expression 'voluntarily
6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar has clearly stated that except per vagina
bleeding, no other injury was found on the person of the complainant. There is
legal report on the record evidencing any injury referable to the
CRA-S-767-SB-
beatings alleged. Once the pros
the offence under Section 313 IPC for the reasons discussed hereinabove, and
the per vagina bleeding is not shown by any acceptable evidence to be
attributable to any act of the appellants, the conviction o
Kaur under Section 323 IPC and that of the remaining appellants under Section
323/34 IPC is also liable to be set aside. Where the substratum of the
prosecution case fails, Section 34 IPC can fasten no vicarious liability, there
being no proved criminal act in furtherance whereof a common intention could
operate.
32. It may be noticed that the learned trial Court, while repelling the
contention that PW
Rizan and another v. Sta
therein enunciated, namely, that relationship is not by itself a factor which
affects the credibility of a witness, is unexceptionable and is respectfully
adopted. That principle, however, presupposes t
is otherwise cogent and credible, and it cannot be pressed into service to cure a
failure of proof upon the foundational facts themselves. The infirmity in the
present case is not that PW
objective, documentary and expert evidence upon which their version depended
has either collapsed in cross
a legally admissible form.
33. The cumulative effect of the foregoing discussion
prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against the appellants under
Sections 313, 323 and 498
doubt. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based upon a
15
-2004
beatings alleged. Once the prosecution has failed to establish the commission of
the offence under Section 313 IPC for the reasons discussed hereinabove, and
the per vagina bleeding is not shown by any acceptable evidence to be
attributable to any act of the appellants, the conviction o
Kaur under Section 323 IPC and that of the remaining appellants under Section
323/34 IPC is also liable to be set aside. Where the substratum of the
prosecution case fails, Section 34 IPC can fasten no vicarious liability, there
no proved criminal act in furtherance whereof a common intention could
It may be noticed that the learned trial Court, while repelling the
contention that PW-1 and PW-2 were interested witnesses, placed reliance upon
Rizan and another v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2003) 2 SCC 661. The proposition
therein enunciated, namely, that relationship is not by itself a factor which
affects the credibility of a witness, is unexceptionable and is respectfully
adopted. That principle, however, presupposes that the testimony under scrutiny
is otherwise cogent and credible, and it cannot be pressed into service to cure a
failure of proof upon the foundational facts themselves. The infirmity in the
present case is not that PW-1 and PW-2 are related to each othe
objective, documentary and expert evidence upon which their version depended
has either collapsed in cross-examination or was never brought on the record in
a legally admissible form.
The cumulative effect of the foregoing discussion
prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against the appellants under
Sections 313, 323 and 498-A read with Section 34 IPC beyond reasonable
doubt. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based upon a
ecution has failed to establish the commission of
the offence under Section 313 IPC for the reasons discussed hereinabove, and
the per vagina bleeding is not shown by any acceptable evidence to be
attributable to any act of the appellants, the conviction of appellant Rajwinder
Kaur under Section 323 IPC and that of the remaining appellants under Section
323/34 IPC is also liable to be set aside. Where the substratum of the
prosecution case fails, Section 34 IPC can fasten no vicarious liability, there
no proved criminal act in furtherance whereof a common intention could
It may be noticed that the learned trial Court, while repelling the
2 were interested witnesses, placed reliance upon
te of Chhattisgarh, (2003) 2 SCC 661. The proposition
therein enunciated, namely, that relationship is not by itself a factor which
affects the credibility of a witness, is unexceptionable and is respectfully
hat the testimony under scrutiny
is otherwise cogent and credible, and it cannot be pressed into service to cure a
failure of proof upon the foundational facts themselves. The infirmity in the
2 are related to each other; it is that the
objective, documentary and expert evidence upon which their version depended
examination or was never brought on the record in
The cumulative effect of the foregoing discussion is that the
prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against the appellants under
A read with Section 34 IPC beyond reasonable
doubt. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based upon a
ecution has failed to establish the commission of
the offence under Section 313 IPC for the reasons discussed hereinabove, and
the per vagina bleeding is not shown by any acceptable evidence to be
f appellant Rajwinder
Kaur under Section 323 IPC and that of the remaining appellants under Section
323/34 IPC is also liable to be set aside. Where the substratum of the
prosecution case fails, Section 34 IPC can fasten no vicarious liability, there
no proved criminal act in furtherance whereof a common intention could
It may be noticed that the learned trial Court, while repelling the
2 were interested witnesses, placed reliance upon
te of Chhattisgarh, (2003) 2 SCC 661. The proposition
therein enunciated, namely, that relationship is not by itself a factor which
affects the credibility of a witness, is unexceptionable and is respectfully
hat the testimony under scrutiny
is otherwise cogent and credible, and it cannot be pressed into service to cure a
failure of proof upon the foundational facts themselves. The infirmity in the
r; it is that the
objective, documentary and expert evidence upon which their version depended
examination or was never brought on the record in
is that the
prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against the appellants under
A read with Section 34 IPC beyond reasonable
doubt. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based upon a
CRA-S-767-SB-
misappreciation of the
proved, and the same cannot be sustained. The appellants are entitled to the
benefit of doubt.
34. As a result of above discussion, appeal is allowed. Impugned
judgment of conviction and the order of sen
aside. Appellants
extending benefit of doubt
35. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Trial
Court record be sent back forthwith.
28.07.2026
puneet
Whether speaking/reasoned
Whether reportable
16
-2004
misappreciation of the evidence and upon material which was never legally
proved, and the same cannot be sustained. The appellants are entitled to the
benefit of doubt.
As a result of above discussion, appeal is allowed. Impugned
judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 27.03.2004 are set
aside. Appellants-accused are acquitted of the offences charged with
extending benefit of doubt. Their bail bonds and surety bonds stand discharged.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Trial
Court record be sent back forthwith.
(RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL)
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
evidence and upon material which was never legally
proved, and the same cannot be sustained. The appellants are entitled to the
As a result of above discussion, appeal is allowed. Impugned
tence dated 27.03.2004 are set
accused are acquitted of the offences charged with by
heir bail bonds and surety bonds stand discharged.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Trial
(RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL)
JUDGE
evidence and upon material which was never legally
proved, and the same cannot be sustained. The appellants are entitled to the
As a result of above discussion, appeal is allowed. Impugned
tence dated 27.03.2004 are set
by
heir bail bonds and surety bonds stand discharged.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Trial
The recent judgment in Sukhwinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, a critical ruling on **Dowry Harassment Cases** and **Miscarriage Cases in India**, highlights the rigorous standards of proof required in criminal proceedings. This significant decision, pronounced on July 28, 2026, by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, is now accessible for detailed analysis on CaseOn, offering invaluable insights into the intricacies of Sections 313, 323, and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.
The appeal (CRA-S-767-SB-2004) was filed by Sukhwinder Singh and others against their conviction and sentence dated March 27, 2004, by the Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Ludhiana. The appellants were initially convicted under Sections 313 (causing miscarriage without consent), 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), and 498-A (cruelty by husband or relatives) read with Section 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The prosecution's case stemmed from a complaint by Kiranjit Kaur, wife of appellant Sukhwinder Singh. She alleged that her in-laws and husband were dissatisfied with the dowry and continuously demanded more. Specifically, on October 13, 2000, she claimed to have been beaten, thrown on the bed, and had her abdomen pressed, leading to vaginal bleeding and a miscarriage. She asserted she was pregnant at the time of the incident.
Section 313 IPC is a grave charge, drawing its definition from Section 312 IPC. To secure a conviction, the prosecution must establish:
The court emphasized the need for reliable medical or cogent evidence to prove pregnancy, the foundational fact.
This section addresses cruelty by a husband or his relatives. 'Cruelty' is defined as any willful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide, cause grave injury, or harassment to coerce her or her relatives to meet unlawful dowry demands. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against vague, general, and omnibus allegations in dowry cases, especially against relatives, stressing the need for specific overt acts to be proved beyond reasonable doubt (as seen in *Kans Raj v. State of Punjab*, *Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand*, and *Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar*).
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, particularly Sections 61, 63, 64, and 65, governs the proof of documents, requiring primary evidence unless specific conditions for secondary evidence are met (*J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani*). Furthermore, Illustration (g) to Section 114 allows for an adverse presumption if a crucial witness is withheld without explanation.
The High Court meticulously examined the evidence related to the alleged miscarriage:
The court concluded that the prosecution utterly failed to establish the foundational fact of pregnancy or that any miscarriage was caused by the accused's actions without consent.
Regarding Section 498-A, the court found the allegations to be "vague and general," lacking specific dates, occasions, demanded articles, or individual roles attributed to each appellant. The prosecution failed to present independent or reliable corroborating evidence. The court referenced various Supreme Court pronouncements, which caution against the misuse of Section 498-A by implicating all relatives on omnibus allegations, emphasizing that such proceedings weaken genuine cases and should not be permitted to continue.
It's worth noting here how CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs can significantly help legal professionals quickly grasp the nuances of such judgments, offering concise summaries that highlight key evidentiary issues and legal precedents without poring over lengthy documents.
Furthermore, the fact that the marriage between the complainant and Sukhwinder Singh had been dissolved by mutual consent through a divorce decree also weakened the prosecution's case regarding ongoing cruelty.
PW-6 Dr. Rakesh Kumar testified that no other injury apart from "per vagina bleeding" was found on the complainant. There was no medico-legal report to support claims of beatings. Since the miscarriage and its causation by the appellants were not proved, the vaginal bleeding could not be definitively attributed to the appellants' acts of voluntarily causing hurt. Consequently, Section 34 IPC (common intention) also failed, as no underlying criminal act in furtherance of a common intention was established.
In light of the comprehensive analysis, the High Court determined that the prosecution failed to prove the charges under Sections 313, 323, and 498-A read with Section 34 IPC beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's judgment was deemed a "misappreciation of the evidence and upon material which was never legally proved."
As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated March 27, 2004, were set aside. The appellants were acquitted, receiving the benefit of doubt, and their bail bonds were discharged.
This judgment serves as a vital precedent and learning resource for several reasons:
All information provided in this blog post is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.
Login with google
Legal Notes
Add a Note....