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1

Reserved on : 27.11.2025

Pronounced on : 08.01.2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 08

TH

DAY OF JANUARY, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION No.7053 OF 2024

BETWEEN:

1 . ABUZAR AHMED

S/O SAUD AHMED,

AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS.

2 . SAUD AHMED

S/O MUKTAR AHMED,

AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS.

3 . MARZIA SAUD

W/O SAUD AHMED,

AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS.

4 . FAIZAN AHMED

S/O SAUD AHMED,

AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS.

ALL ARE RESIDING AT

NO. 27, ALFRED STREET,

MUSEUM ROAD,

RICHMOND TOWN,

BENGALURU – 560 025.

... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI SYED KHALEEL PASHA, ADVOCATE)

R

2

AND:

1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

REPRESENTED BY

BASAVANGUDI WOMEN PS

BENGALURU CITY,

STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,

HIGH COURT BUILDING,

BENGALURU – 560 001.

2 . RUMAN ASAD

W/O ABUZAR AHMED,

AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,

R/AT NO. 5A, 4

TH

FLOOR,

27

TH

MAIN, 39

TH

CROSS,

AL AMEEN APARTMENT,

9

TH

BLOCK, JAYANAGAR

BENGALURU – 560 069.

3. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION

BENGALURU.

... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;

SRI NAVEED AHMED, ADVOCATE FOR R-2;

SRI H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN, DSGI FOR R-3)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF

CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.90/2024 OF

BASAVANGUDI WOMEN P.S., P/U/S 498-A, 504 OF IPC, R/ W 3 AND

4 OF DP ACT, WHICH IS PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HO N’BLE

37

th

ACMM COURT AT BANGALORE.

3

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND

RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 27.11.2025, COMING ON FOR

PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWIN G:-

CAV ORDER

The petitioners, 4 in number, stand before this Cou rt

seeking shelter from the sweeping arm of criminal l aw,

which according to them, has been set in motion, no t by the

weight of culpability, but by the frailty of matrim onial

discord. They call into question the registration of crime in Crime

No.90 of 2024, where they have been arrayed as accu sed, for

offences punishable under Sections 498A and 504 of the IPC and

Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (‘the Act’ for

short).

2. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

Before embarking upon consideration of the issue o n its

merits, it becomes necessary to delineate the relat ionships that

bind and now divide, the protagonists in the lis. The 2

nd

respondent

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

4

is the complainant/wife of the 1

st

petitioner/accused No.1. Accused

No.2 is the father-in-law of the complainant; accused No.3 is the

mother-in-law and accused No.4 is the brother-in-la w. The 2

nd

respondent/complainant and accused No.1 get married on

25-08-2017. The couple then relocated to the United States of

America, where accused No.1 was gainfully employed. For nearly 6

years, the matrimonial life unfolded overseas, culminating in the

birth of a child. It is only in January 2023 that the complainant

returns to India and thereafter, seeks to set the criminal law into

motion, by registering a complaint for offences punishable under

Sections 498A, 504 r/w 34 of the IPC, not only against her husband

but also against the father-in-law, mother-in-law and brother-in-

law. On the complaint, the Police register a crime in Crime No.90 of

2024 for the afore-quoted offences, including offen ces under

Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. On registration of cr ime, the

petitioners are before this Court in the subject petition.

3. Heard Sri Syed Khaleel Pasha, learned counsel a ppearing

for the petitioners; Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State

Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1, Sr i Naveed

5

Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 and

Sri H. Shanthi Bhushan, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India

appearing for respondent No.3.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitione rs would

vehemently contend that accused No.1 and the compla inant lived in

United States of America. They had some misundersta nding or

minor problems that would happen in a marriage. The complainant

comes back to India in January 2023 and then allege s that the

husband and other members of the family have harass ed her over

telephone. He would submit that if this is permitted to continue, it

would become a classic illustration of abuse of Section 498A of the

IPC. The learned counsel would further submit that on registration

of crime a look out circular was also issued against the 1

st

petitioner

which had stopped him from moving beyond the shores of the

nation. All this, the learned counsel would submit, is an abuse of

the process of law.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel Sri Naveed Ahme d

appearing for the 2

nd

respondent/complainant would refute the

6

submissions in contending that the harassment by th e husband or

the in-laws is clearly brought out in the complaint. Investigation, at

least, must be permitted to be continued. The momen t crime is

registered, the petitioners have approached this Co urt and this

Court has granted an interim order of stay. Against the in-laws, he

would submit that it may not meet the ingredients of offences. But,

against the husband it clearly meets and, therefore , the

proceedings must be permitted to continue against the husband in

the least. He would seek dismissal of the petition.

6. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor

Sri B.N. Jagadeesha would also seek dismissal of the petition on the

sole score that investigation in the least is a must.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the su bmissions

made by the respective learned counsel and have per used the

material on record.

8. The facts, in their broad outline, are not in d ispute. The

marriage between the 1

st

petitioner and the complainant takes

7

place on 25-08-2017. The 1

st

petitioner who was already working

in the United States of America takes his wife and continues to stay

in the United States of America. Several incidents have happened

in United States of America, due to which the wife comes back to

India in January 2023, 6 years after the marriage and two children

being born from the wedlock. She registered a comp laint in the

year 2024. The complaint ranges incidents from 2017 to 2024 most

of which have happened in the United States of Amer ica. Since the

entire issue has triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate

to notice the complaint in its entirety.

THE COMPLAINT:

“To,

The Station House Officer

Basvangudi Womens Police Station,

Basvangudi, Bengaluru

Respected Sir,

Subject: Complaint against my husband and in

laws regarding dowry harassment,

domestic violence and mental torture,

physical and economical abuse wrongful

confinement etc.,

1) MR Abuzar Ahmed - 9036713643

2) MR Soud Ahmed - 9880172674

3). Mrs. Marzia Soud – 9900763776

8

4) MR Faizan Ahmed - 9810957535

All residing at # 103, 1

st

Floor SS Meridian

dreams # 27 Alfred street Richmond Town,

Bangalore, Karnataka India - 560025

1. With reference to the above subject I would like to lodge

this complaint against the persons named above with

regard to harassment, domestic violence and mental

torture.

2. I got a marriage proposal through a marriage Br oker. Mr.

Abuzar Ahmed along with his family came to my house

and accepted me as the bride. Mr.Abuzar Ahmed is a

qualified engineer working in San Antonio Texas USA.

3. The marriage date was fixed on 25 August 2017 W hile the

marriage preparations were going on my mother in la w

wanted all the Jewellery according to her taste hence she

has made my parents to give altogether 900 Grams of 24

carat gold Jewelleries as Dowry at the time of marriage.

4. The marriage took place on the 25

th

August 2017 at

SHAMS convention center. The marriage was registere d

on the 5

th

September 2017. I left with my husband Mr.

Abuzar Ahmed to San Antonio Texas on the 16

th

September 2017. That I started my marital life with my

husband Mr Abuzer Ahmed in San Antonio Texas. I was

forced and asked to complete all the house choses

everyday. I was told by my husband Mr. Abuzer Ahmed

that this marriage is going to work ONLY if I do all the

Cooking and cleaning and call my mother in law who was

in India everyday I was being judged and criticized for my

cooking and cleaning they use to taunt me and tortu re

me for same. I had no proper winter apparel for the way

chill winter and Mr. Abusar Ahmed taunted told me, my

parents should have given all clothes before the wedding.

5. In the month of March 2018 I had a very severe Fungal

Infection my husband did took me to doctor for

treatment, instead Mr Abuzar Ahmed call my father i n

9

India and told him; I am sending your daughter you

to India and you bear all the expenses of her

treatment."

6. I was sent to India in the month of October 2018 after 8

months of tolerating the Infection. I was subjected to

mental harassment and torture and abuse from my

husband and in laws.

7. I was constantly called out for not bearing children by Mrs

Marzia Soud my mother in law, she abused me and

tortured me mentally. My mother in law Marzia Saud

taunted me saying; "I have a lot of male hormones in

my body and I cannot bear children ".

8. My husband and I left for Texas USA after about 2

months in India. I was called out every other day f or

doing Cooking and clearing. I was told I was not do ing

enough. I was told I should not talk to my parents on

phone and Instead speared time cooking and cleaning .

Because my parents didn't wish Mr Abazar Ahmed on h is

birthday, I was told I should stop talking to my parents. I

was constantly told by my mother in law that my parents

should present my husband with gifts every few days .

The Internet and my phone was cut-off for a month s o I

couldn't talk to my family, because my husband was

angry that my parents didn't wish him on his birthday.

9. I was pregnant with my first child and my mothe r in law

wanted my parents to go to the USA for helping me w ith

delivery which was due on may 2020. My Parents got the

USA visa in February 2020 and planned to travel to the

USA in the month of May. But covid hit in the month of

March my parents couldn't come. I was mentally tortured

that my parents could not make it for the delivery. My

husband wanted my parent to travel to the USA inspite of

the lockdown and Quarantine. Just 2 days before of my

first delivery as I did not fold the laundry My husband

manhandled me aggressively and I was dragged from o ne

room to the other.

10. I had to deliver the next day because my blood

pressure was high and the doctor thought it was

10

not safe for me to go back home. After the delivery

my husband Mr Abazar Ahmed didn't want me to

eat French fries and rice and meat because I would

put on weight. After a few months my daughter and

I had gone out for our clothes and when I asked my

husband to get us new stuff he denied and my

mother in law told me on call that I should ask my

father who was in India to send me all of the new

clothes I needed. My husband and in laws have

denied our basic needs I had to beg for every thing

which a woman requires. I called My father; my

father managed to send me a courses of the clothes

all the way from India to the USA. Because I asked

Mr Abuzar to buy me clothes, he didn't want to talk

to me and gave me torture for 2 months which was

very mentally exhausting and draining.

11. In 2021 Mr Abuzer and I came to India and I wa s

pregnant with my 2

nd

child. My mother in law didn't

wanted me to have the second child because she

thought I was not capable of managing 2 kids. She

insisted should get an abortion or I stay in India

without my husband for the rest of my life. Then

she came to a conclusion that my mother and I go

back to the USA to deliver my second child. My

mother stayed with me for three months for the

delivery of my son. After she left Mr Abusar

constantly fought with me and mentally pressured

me to manage the Kids and cooking cleaning

everything, I was treated like a made (servant). I

was pressured to do everything (all the chores)

everyday It was mentally and physically torture for

me to manage the house and the kids. In July of

2022 My husband along with kids and I came to

India, I was told to stay at my parents house for 2

weeks so that my mother in law and Mr Abusar

would go on vacation to Turkey, they didn't want

me and the kids to join them. As soon as they came

back from Turkey trip, my mother was ill and was

admitted to the hospital. my husband along with his

mother father and brother came to my house to

jayanagar and verbally abused me and my parents.

My mother in law Father in law and Brother in law

11

all saw Mг Abuzar verbally abuse me but did

nothing about it and my Brother in law MR Faizan

Ahmed wanted me to say that & I was at fault and

his mother was right. I was verbally abused by Mr

Abusar and he even tried to come and physically

charge at me but his mother stopped him. Abusar

wanted me to stay back in India after this Insident .

MR. Faizan Ahmed has also ill treated from the

beginning, Everytime Abuzar and I had

disagreement my brother in law has told his mother

to send me back to my parents house and dissolve

the marriage. He has even questioned mand

showed his disliking towards my daughter having

milk when she was just a few months old. He has

always questioned my dressing style.

12. My husband tortured me like anything and he wa nted me

to dress up according to his mother's liking and sister

liking. In the month of Sep 2022 Mr. Abuzar and I along

with the kids returned to the USA. In the month of

December 2022, MR Abusar wanted to go to India for visa

stamping so he left me and kids back in the USA alo ne

without food and care for 3 weeks. After he came to India

he tried to avoid my calls because he went out for

vacation with his mother and brothers family. My

daughter stuck a pice & candy in her nose I called Abusar,

he was on vacation with his family to Mumbai and didn't

want me to know. He didn't want to Inform me about his

vacation He came back to the USA after 3 weeks and

didn't want to talk to me and the kids. The next day he

started verbally abusing me because he didn't find the

plates in the kitchen. He wanted me to leave the ho use

that very minute. I have no family or friends there in the

USA and I was financially dependant on him. He booked a

flight for the kids and me in a few days and asked me to

go back to India. I flew down to India with the kids who

were not feeling well, they had cold and fevers, they were

not even taken to the see the doctor. MR Abuzar had

taken down all the locks from the luggage and told I

should travel without locks to my bags. So that i should

face customs interrogations.

12

13. I am in India since January 2023 for the past year

and a half. He is not receiving my calls and every

time he received my call he verbally abuses me and

my father. He dosent even want to talk to the kids.

After I was sent back to India in Jan 2023, he call ed

his parents and Brother's family to the USA, I feel

like all this was planned by them so that they coul d

come and stay in the USA and MR Abuzar could

avoid expenses on me and the kids and instead

spend on his parents and brother family. In the No

may 2024, Abuzas has come down to India

Bangalore.

14. I tried to call him, he is not receiving my ca lls I

even went to my in laws house on 05-06-2024 at

about 7 Pm so I could talk to him but my brother in

law did not let me enter the house by using crimina l

force against me and pushed me out of the door

created fearful situation and asked me to leave and

told me that MR Abuzar is not at home I waited

outside the hours for A hours but nobody spoke to

me. I learnt that my in laws and husband are

planning for second marriage for want of handful of

dowry amount. My husband is not taking care of me

and my children in any manner and committed

physical and economical abuse on us.

Therefore I request you to take appropriate legal action against

my husband and inlaws and punish them according to law. And I

further request you to restore my belongings and Je wellery

which was forcefully taken away from me and kept in the locker

of my husband by mother in law and other in laws at their

house.”

(Emphasis added)

A careful reading of the complaint reveals grievanc es such

as dietary restrictions, expectations regarding att ire,

allocation of household responsibilities, disagreem ents over

television preferences laced with a statement that the

13

husband treated the complainant/wife as his servant . These

allegations even if accepted at face value, portray a portrait

of marital discord, but falls woefully short of dep icting the

statutory cruelty contemplated under Section 498A o f the

IPC. The complaint further narrates that the husband st ops

receiving calls and he is said to have called his brother and parents

to go and stay with him in the United States of Ame rica. If this is

the complaint against the husband and in-laws, it c annot but be

held that it is an abuse of the process of law, as minor skirmishes

that happens in the family between the husband and the wife are

projected to become a crime for offences punishable under Section

498A of the IPC or even under Section 504 IPC. It is shocking as to

how without any preliminary inquiry as directed by the Apex Court

in the case of LALITA KUMARI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

[(2014)2 SCC 1], the complaint is even registered, by the

jurisdictional police and above all, the husband is stopped from

moving away from the shores of the nation on frivolous allegations

on account of issuance of Look Out Circular. It is therefore

necessary to notice Section 498A of the IPC.

14

9. Section 498A of the IPC reads as follows:

“498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman

subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or

the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman

to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which

may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty”

means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to

drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave

injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or

physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with

a view to coercing her or any person related to her to

meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuab le

security or is on account of failure by her or any person

related to her to meet such demand.”

The law does not criminalize incompatibility, nor d oes it

punish imperfect marriages. Section 498A of the IP C is not

a panacea for all matrimonial ills. It is a targeted provision

meant to address grave cruelty, conduct so wilful a nd

pernicious so as to imperil life, limb or mental he alth or even

harassment tethered to unlawful demands of dowry. This is

the purport of the provision - 498A. The complaint quoted

supra is conspicuously bereft of such particulars. There is neither

an allegation of demand of dowry nor any conduct of such

15

severity as would shock the conscience or satisfy t he

statutory threshold. In the light of the aforesaid narration in the

complaint, I deem it apposite to notice the judicial landscape on the

issue.

JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE:

10. The Apex Court in the case of SHOBHIT KUMAR

MITTAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

1

, has held as follows:

“…. …. ….

15. Similarly, an offence is punishable under

Section 498A of the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects

a woman to cruelty, which may result in imprisonmen t for a

term extending up to three years and a fine. The Ex planation

under Section 498A of the IPC defines “cruelty” for the purpose

of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of the acts mentioned in

clauses (a) or (b) therein. The first limb of clause (a) of the

Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC states that “cruelty”

means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as is likely to

drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of clause

(a) of the Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC states that

cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to

cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether

mental or physical) of the woman. Further, clause ( b) of the

Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would

also include harassment of the woman where such har assment

is to coerce her or any person related to her to me et any

unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on

account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet

such demand.

1

2025 SCC OnLine SC 2059

16

16. Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with the

penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any person who

gives, takes, or abets the giving or taking of dowry shall face a

punishment of imprisonment for a minimum term of fi ve years

and a fine not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of

the dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the D owry Act

talks about the penalty for demanding dowry. It states that any

person demanding dowry directly or indirectly from the parents

or other relatives or guardians of a bride or bridegroom, as the

case may be, shall be punished with imprisonment fo r a term

which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend

to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand

rupees.

17. The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts

and circumstances of the present case and after examining the

FIR, the High Court was right in refusing to quash the criminal

proceedings arising out of FIR No. 347 of 2023 date d

09.11.2023 under Section 323 and 498A of the IPC and Sections

3 and 4 of the Dowry Act, as against the appellant herein.

18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations

made by complainant/respondent No. 2 are vague and omnibus.

Other than claiming that the husband and his family along with

the accused/appellant herein mentally harassed her with a

demand for dowry, the complainant/respondent No. 2 has not

provided any specific details or described any particular instance

of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date,

place, or manner in which the alleged harassment oc curred or

the details of the nature of demand or its particulars. Therefore,

the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations. Furthermore, the

complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to impress the Court as

to how the alleged harassment has any proximate rel ationship

to the said injury and nerve damage that she sustained, so as to

punish her in-laws under Section 323 IPC. There is no remote or

proximate act or omission attributed to the accused /appellant

that implicates him or assigns him any specific role in the said

FIR for the offence of hurt as defined under Section 319 IPC.

Furthermore, merely stating that the accused/appell ant has

mentally harassed the complainant/respondent No. 2 with

respect to a demand for dowry does not fulfill the ingredients of

Section 498A of IPC specially in absence of any cogent material

17

or evidence on record to substantiate the said allegations. The

term “cruelty” cannot be established without specific instances.

The tendency of invoking the aforesaid provisions, without

mentioning any specific detail, weakens the case of the

prosecution and casts serious aspersions on the probability of

the version of the complainant. Therefore, this Cou rt cannot

ignore the missing specifics in the FIR which is th e basic

premise for invoking the criminal machinery of the State. In

such cases involving allegations of cruelty and har assment,

there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would

be required to be spelt out by the complainant agai nst

perpetrators in specific terms to initiate criminal proceedings

against them. Therefore, mere general allegations o f

harassment without pointing out the specific details would not

be sufficient to continue criminal proceedings agai nst any

person.

19. Courts have to be careful and cautious in dealing with

complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration

while dealing with matrimonial disputes where the a llegations

have to be scrutinized with great care and circumsp ection in

order to prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of

law.

20. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the

judgment of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan

Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (“ Bhajan Lal”) with particular

reference to paragraph 102 therein, wherein this Court observed

as hereunder:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the

various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter

XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court

in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the

extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent

powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have

extracted and reproduced above, we give the followin g

categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such

power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the

process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any

precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and

inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an

18

exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein suc h

power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if they

are taken at their face value and accepted in

their entirety do not prima facie constitute any

offence or make out a case against the Accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information

report and other materials, if any, accompanying

the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,

justifying an investigation by police officers Under

Section 156(1) of the Code except under an

order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in

the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected

in support of the same do not disclose the

commission of any offence and make out a case

against the Accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute

only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is

permitted by a police officer without an order of a

Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2)

of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or

complaint are so absurd and inherently

improbable on the basis of which no prudent

person can ever reach a just conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding against

the Accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in

any of the provisions of the Code or the

concerned Act (under which a criminal

proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where

there is a specific provision in the Code or the

concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for

the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the

19

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

Accused and with a view to spite him due to

private and personal grudge.”

21. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned

judicial tests, we find that none of the offences alleged against

the accused/appellant herein is made out. In fact, we find that

the allegations of cruelty, mental harassment and v oluntarily

causing hurt against the accused/appellant herein a re vague

and general in nature and therefore, the judgment of this Court

in the case of Bhajan Lal squarely applies to the facts of this

case. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to

permit the present prosecution emanating from the F IR to

continue.

22. Furthermore, at this juncture, we find it appropriate

to quote the observations of this Court in Dara Lakshmi

Narayana v. State of Bihar, (2025) 3 SCC 735 wherein it was

observed:

“27. A mere reference to the names of family

members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial

dispute, without specific allegations indicating the ir

active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a

well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience,

that there is often a tendency to implicate all the

members of the husband's family when domestic

disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such

generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by

concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot

form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must

exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal

provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary

harassment of innocent family members. We say so for

the reason that while the complainant/respondent No. 2

has made vague and omnibus allegations against the

accused/appellant herein, she has failed to justify the

same before this Court. Such actions would create

significant divisions and distrust among people, while

also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial

system, particularly criminal courts.

xxx

20

30. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by

way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty

inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family,

ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, i n

recent years, as there have been a notable rise Page 22

of 26 in matrimonial disputes across the country,

accompanied by growing discord and tension within th e

institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a

growing tendency to misuse provisions like

Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing

personal vendetta against the husband and his family by

a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during

matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the

misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use

of arm-twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family.

Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of

the IPC against the husband and his family in order to

seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a

wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again,

cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his

family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against

them.

31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any

woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has

been contemplated under Section 498A of theIPCshould

remain silent and forbear herself from making a

complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is

not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we

should not encourage a case like as in the present one,

where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of

marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the

second respondent herein, a complaint under

Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact,

the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for

the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in

the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful

demand for any property or valuable security in the form

of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the

present case.”

The Apex Court holds that the provision of Section 498A of the IPC

has been misused by the complainant without there b eing any

21

rhyme or reason, and therefore, such cases must be nipped in the

bud. The aforesaid judgment is rendered by the Apex Court qua in-

laws being brought under the web of crime, without any rhyme or

reason.

11. Insofar as the husband is concerned, the Apex C ourt in

the case of ABHISHEK v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

2

, has

held as follows:

“…. …. ….

16. Instances of a husband's family members filing a

petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against them by

his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity

nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this score.

We may now take note of some decisions of particula r

relevance. Recently, in KahkashanKausar v. State of

Bihar [KahkashanKausar v. State of Bihar, (2022) 6 SCC 599:

(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 684] , this Court had occasion to deal with a

similar situation where the High Court had refused [Mohd.

Ikram v. State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 1985] to quash

an FIR registered for various offences, including Section 498-

AIPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required

determination was whether allegations made against the in-laws

were general omnibus allegations which would be lia ble to be

quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein concern

was expressed over the misuse of Section 498-AIPC a nd the

increased tendency to implicate relatives of the hu sband in

matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that fals e

implications by way of general omnibus allegations made in the

course of matrimonial disputes, if left unchecked, would result in

misuse of the process of law. On the facts of that case, it was

2

2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083

22

found that no specific allegations were made against the in-laws

by the wife and it was held that allowing their prosecution in the

absence of clear allegations against the in-laws would result in

an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal

trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe scars

upon the accused and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.

17. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [Preeti

Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667: (2010) 3 SCC

(Cri) 473] , this Court noted that the tendency to implicate the

husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon

in complaints filed under Section 498-A IPC. It was observed

that the courts have to be extremely careful and ca utious in

dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities

into consideration while dealing with matrimonial c ases, as

allegations of harassment by husband's close relati ons, who

were living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited

the place where the complainant resided, would add an entirely

different complexion and such allegations would hav e to be

scrutinised with great care and circumspection.

18. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [Neelu

Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286],

this Court observed that the mere mention of statut ory

provisions and the language thereof, for lodging a complaint, is

not the “be all and end all” of the matter, as what is required to

be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the

offence committed by each and every accused and the role

played by each and every accused in the commission of that

offence. These observations were made in the contex t of a

matrimonial dispute involving Section 498-A IPC.

19. Of more recent origin is the decision of this Court

in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. [Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P.,

(2023) 15 SCC 488] on the legal principles applicable apropos

Section 482CrPC. Therein, it was observed that when an

accused comes before the High Court, invoking eithe r the

inherent power under Section 482 CrPC or the extrao rdinary

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to get the FIR

or the criminal proceedings quashed, essentially on the ground

that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or

instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, then

in such circumstances, the High Court owes a duty to look into

23

the FIR with care and a little more closely. It was further

observed that it will not be enough for the court to look into the

averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the p urpose of

ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the

alleged offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or vexatious

proceedings, the court owes a duty to look into man y other

attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case

over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care

and circumspection, to try and read between the lines.

… … …

27. Given the totality of the facts and circumstances, we

are of the considered opinion that Bhawna's allegations against

the appellants, such as they are, are wholly insufficient and,

prima facie, do not make out a case against them. Further, they

are so farfetched and improbable that no prudent pe rson can

conclude that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against

them. In effect, the case on hand falls squarely in Categories (1)

and (5) set out in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] . Permi tting the

criminal process to go on against the appellants in such a

situation would, therefore, result in clear and patent injustice.

This was a fit case for the High Court to exercise its inherent

power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and t he

consequential proceedings.”

12. The Apex Court later, in the case of ACHIN GUPTA v.

STATE OF HARYANA

3

has held as follows:

“…. …. ….

32. Many times, the parents including the close relatives

of the wife make a mountain out of a molehill. Inst ead of

salvaging the situation and making all possible endeavours to

save the marriage, their action either due to ignorance or on

account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family

members, brings about complete destruction of marri age on

trivial issues. The first thing that comes in the mind of the wife,

3

2024 SCC OnLine SC 759

24

her parents and her relatives is the police, as if the police is the

panacea of all evil. No sooner the matter reaches u p to the

police, then even if there are fair chances of reco nciliation

between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation

of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one

another. Tolerance to each other's fault to a certain bearable

extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles,

trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be

exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said

to have been made in the heaven. The Court must app reciate

that all quarrels must be weighed from that point o f view in

determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case,

always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the

parties, their character and social status. A very technical and

hypersensitive approach would prove to be disastrou s for the

very institution of the marriage. In matrimonial disputes the

main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such

venom in their heart that they do not think even for a second

that if the marriage would come to an end, then what will be the

effect on their children. Divorce plays a very dubious role so far

as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason

why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue

delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring

about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of

genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the husband and his

family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-

treatment or harassment may vary. However, the poli ce

machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and

that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The

police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding

the husband at ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife

at the instigation of her parents or relatives or friends. In all

cases, where wife complains of harassment or ill-tr eatment,

Section 498-AIPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is

complete without Sections 506(2) and 323IPC. Every

matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to t he other,

may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels

between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may

also not amount to cruelty.

… … …

35. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court

in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. [Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P.,

25

(2023) 15 SCC 488], authored by one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.),

the legal principle applicable apropos Section 482C rPC was

examined. Therein, it was observed that when an acc used

comes before the High Court, invoking either the inherent power

under Section 482CrPC or the extraordinary jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution, to get the FIR or the criminal

proceedings quashed, essentially on the ground that such

proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted

with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, the n in such

circumstances, the High Court owes a duty to look into the FIR

with care and a little more closely. It was further observed that

it will not be enough for the Court to look into the averments

made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining

whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged

offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or ve xatious

proceedings, the court owes a duty to look into man y other

attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case

over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care

and circumspection, to try and read between the lines.

… … …

38. In the aforesaid context, we looked into Sections 85

and 86, respectively, of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhit a, 2023,

which is to come into force with effect from 1-7-2024 so as to

ascertain whether the legislature has seriously looked into the

suggestions of this Court as made in Preeti Gupta [Preeti

Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667: (2010) 3 SCC

(Cri) 473].

39. Sections 85 and 86, respectively, are reproduced

hereinbelow:

“85. Husband or relative of husband of a

woman subjecting her to cruelty .—Whoever, being

the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,

subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to three

years and shall also be liable to fine.

86. Cruelty defined.—For the purposes of

Section 85, “cruelty” means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is

likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to

26

cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or

health (whether mental or physical) of the

woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such

harassment is with a view to coercing her or any

person related to her to meet any unlawful

demand for any property or valuable security or

is on account of failure by her or any person

related to her to meet such demand.”

40. The aforesaid is nothing but verbatim reproduction of

Section 498-AIPC. The only difference is that the Explanation to

Section 498-AIPC, is now by way of a separate provi sion i.e.

Section 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

41. We request the legislature to look into the issue as

highlighted above taking into consideration the pra gmatic

realities and consider making necessary changes in Sections 85

and 86, respectively, of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhit a, 2023,

before both the new provisions come into force.

42. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby

allowed. The impugned judgment and order [ Achin

Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 3054] passed

by the High Court is hereby set aside. The proceedi ngs of

CHI/1856/2021 arising from FIR No. 95 of 2021 dated 9-4-

2021, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,

Hisar are hereby quashed.”

The Apex Court in the case of ABHISHEK supra holds that minor

skirmishes between the husband and the wife cannot be projected

to become a crime under Section 498-A of the IPC. L ikewise, the

Apex Court in the case of ACHIN GUPTA supra laments about

repeated abuse of the provision i.e., Section 498-A of the IPC and

also suggests making some changes in the BNS owing to such

27

abuse. The present case forms, as observed hereinab ove, a classic

illustration of the said abuse. The Apex Court, in such cases, holds

that the offence should be nipped in the bud by interfering under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

13.

The Apex Court in the case of BELIDE SWAGATH

KUMAR v. STATE OF TELANGANA

4

, has held as follows:

“….. ….. …..

18. Section 498A ofthe IPC deals with offences

committed by the husband or relatives of the husban d

subjecting cruelty towards the wife. The said provision reads as

under:

“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a

woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the

husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,

subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished wi th

imprisonment for a term which may extend to three y ears

and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.— For the purpose of this section,

“cruelty” means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is

likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to

cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or

health (whether mental or physical) of the

woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such

harassment is with a view to coercing her or any

person related to her to meet any unlawful

demand for any property or valuable security or

4

2025 SCC OnLine SC 2890

28

is on account of failure by her or any person

related to her to meet such demand.”

19. Further, Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act talk about the

penalty for giving or taking or demanding a dowry.

“3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If

any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or

takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shal l be

punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be

less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less

than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of

such dowry, whichever is more.

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and

special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impo se a

sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in

relation to,—

(a) presents which are given at the time of a

marriage to the bride (without any demand

having been made in that behalf):

Provided that such presents are entered in

a list maintained in accordance with the rules

made under this Act;

(b) presents which are given at the time of a

marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand

having been made in that behalf):

Provided that such presents are entered in

a list maintained in accordance with the rules

made under this Act:

Provided further that where such presents

are made by or on behalf of the bride or any

person related to the bride, such presents are of

a customary nature and the value thereof is not

excessive having regard to the financial status of

the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such

presents are given.

29

4. Penalty for demanding dowry.— If any person

demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other

relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case

may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six

months, but which may extend to two years and with fi ne

which may extend to ten thousand rupees:

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and

special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impos e a

sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six

months.”

20. An offence is punishable under Section 498A of

the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a w oman

to cruelty, which may result in imprisonment for a term

extending up to three years and a fine. The Explana tion

under Section 498A of the IPC defines “cruelty” for the

purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of t he

acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of

clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of

the IPC states that “cruelty” means any wilful cond uct

that is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to

commit suicide. The second limb of clause (a) of th e

Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that

cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature

as to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health

(whether mental or physical) of the woman. Further,

clause (b) of the Explanation of Section 498A of

the IPC states that cruelty would also include hara ssment

of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her or

any person related to her to meet any unlawful dema nd

for any property or valuable security or is on acco unt of

failure by her or any person related to her to meet such

demand.

21. Further, Section 3 of the DP Act deals with the

penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any

person who engages in giving, taking, or abetting t he

exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment of

imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine of

not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the

dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the DP Ac t talks

of penalty for demanding dowry. It states that any person

30

demanding dowry directly or indirectly, from the pa rents

or other relatives or guardians of a bride or bride groom

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term wh ich

shall not be less than six months, but which may ex tend

to two years and with fine which may extend to ten

thousand rupees.

22. The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts

and circumstances of the case and after examining the FIR and

the Complaint Case, the High Court was correct in r efusing to

quash the ongoing criminal proceedings against the appellants

arising out of FIR No. 29 of 2022 dated 27.01.2022 and the

Complaint Case No. 1067 of 2022 under Section 498A of

the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act.

23. Courts have to be extremely careful and

cautious in dealing with complaints and must take

pragmatic realities into consideration while dealin g with

matrimonial cases where the allegations have to be

scrutinized with greater care and circumspection in order

to prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of proc ess of

law. The allegations put forth by the complainant-

respondent No. 2 have been considered by us. In our

view, they reflect the daily wear and tear of marri age and

can, in no way, be categorised as cruelty. The act of the

accused-appellant of sending money back to his fami ly

members cannot be misconstrued in a way that leads to a

criminal prosecution. The allegation that the accus ed-

appellant forced the complainant-respondent No. 2 t o

maintain an excel sheet of all the expenses, even i f taken

on the face value, cannot come under the definition of

cruelty. The monetary and financial dominance of the

accused-appellant, as alleged by the complainant-

respondent No. 2, cannot qualify as an instance of

cruelty, especially in the absence of any tangible mental

or physical harm caused. The said situation is a mi rror

reflection of the Indian society where men of the

households often try to dominate and take charge of the

finances of the women but criminal litigation canno t

become a gateway or a tool to settle scores and pur sue

personal vendettas. Furthermore, the other allegati ons of

the complainant-respondent No. 2 such as lack of ca re on

the part of the husband-the accused-appellant durin g

31

pregnancy and postpartum and constant taunts about her

after-birth weight, if accepted prima facie, at best reflect

poorly upon the character of the accused-appellant but

the same cannot amount to cruelty so as to make him

suffer through the process of litigation.

24. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations

made by the complainant-respondent No. 2 are vague and

omnibus. Other than claiming that the husband and h is family

along with the accused-appellant herein mentally harassed her

with a demand of dowry, the complainant-respondent No. 2 has

not provided any specific details or described any particular

instance of harassment. Although she has alleged th at an

amount totalling to Rupees One Crore was demanded b y the

accused-appellant and his family members, the compl ainant-

respondent No. 2 has failed to put forth any eviden ce or

material on record to elaborate or substantiate the same.

Furthermore, the complainant-respondent No. 2 has

failed to impress the court as to how the said alle ged

harassment has caused her any injury, mental or

physical. There has been no remote or proximate act or

omission attributed to the accused-appellant that

implicates him or assigns him any specific role in the said

FIR for the offence of 498A of the IPC. Merely stati ng that

the accused-appellant has mentally harassed the

complainant-respondent No. 2 with respect to a dema nd

of dowry does not fulfil the ingredients of Section 498A of

the IPC especially in the face of absence of any co gent

material or evidence on record to substantiate the said

allegations. The term “cruelty” cannot be establish ed

without specific instances. The tendency of invokin g

these sections, without mentioning any specific det ails,

weakens the case of prosecution and casts serious

aspersions on the viability of the version of the

complainant. Therefore, this Court cannot ignore th e

missing specifics in an FIR which is the premise of

invoking criminal machinery of the State. In such c ases

involving allegations of cruelty and harassment, th ere

would normally be a series of offending acts, which would

be required to be spelt out by the complainant agai nst

perpetrators in specific terms to involve such

perpetrators into the criminal proceedings sought t o be

initiated against them and therefore mere general

32

allegations of harassment without pointing out the

specifics against such persons would not be suffici ent to

continue criminal proceedings.

25. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the

judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992

Supp (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to

paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of

the various relevant provisions of the Code under

Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated

by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the

exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 2 26

or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cod e

which we have extracted and reproduced above, we

have given the following categories of cases by way

of illustration wherein such power could be exercis ed

either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may

not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly

defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaust ive

list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power

should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if

they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case

against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information

report and other materials, if any, accompanying

the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,

justifying an investigation by police officers under

Section 156(1) of the Code except under an

order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made

in the FIR or complaint and the evidence

collected in support of the same do not

disclose the commission of any offence and

make out a case against the accused.

33

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute

only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is

permitted by a police officer without an order of a

Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)

of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or

complaint are so absurd and inherently

improbable on the basis of which no prudent

person can ever reach a just conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in

any of the provisions of the Code or the

concerned Act (under which a criminal

proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where

there is a specific provision in the Code or the

concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for

the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on

the accused and with a view to spite him

due to private and personal grudge .”

26. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned

judicial dictum, we find that none of the offences alleged against

the accused-appellant herein is made out. In fact, we find

that the allegations of cruelty, mental harassment and

voluntarily causing hurt against the accused-appell ant

herein have been made with a mala-fide intent with

vague and general allegations and therefore, the

judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and

particularly sub-paragraphs (1) and (7) of paragrap h

102, extracted above, squarely apply to the facts o f these

cases. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice

to permit the present prosecution emanating from th e

FIR and consequent Complaint Case No. 1067 of 2022 t o

continue.

34

27. Furthermore, at this juncture, we find it appropriate

to quote the judgment of this Court in Dara Lakshmi

Narayana v. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735 wherein it

was observed:

“27. A mere reference to the names of family

members in a criminal case arising out of a

matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations

indicating their active involvement should be nippe d

in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of

judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to

implicate all the members of the husband's family

when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial

discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations

unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised

allegations cannot form the basis for criminal

prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such

cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the

legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of

innocent family members. In the present case,

Appellants 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of

Appellant 1 have been living in different cities and have not

resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant 1 and

Respondent 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged i nto

criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the

process of the law in the absence of specific allegat ions

made against each of them.

xxx

30. The inclusion of Section 498-A IPC by way

of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty

inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family,

ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in

recent years, as there have been a notable rise in

matrimonial disputes across the country,

accompanied by growing discord and tension within

the institution of marriage, consequently, there ha s

been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like

Section 498-A IPC as a tool for unleashing personal

vendetta against the husband and his family by a

wife. Making vague and generalised allegations

during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinised, w ill

lead to the misuse of legal processes and an

encouragement for use of arm-twisting tactics by a

wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is take n

35

to invoke Section 498-A IPC against the husband and

his family in order to seek compliance with the

unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this

Court has, time and again, cautioned against

prosecuting the husband and his family in the

absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any

woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been

contemplated under Section 498-A IPC should remain si lent

and forbear herself from making a complaint or initia ting

any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our

aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a ca se

like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the

petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the fir st

appellant, husband of the second respondent herein, a

complaint under Section 498-A IPC is lodged by the la tter.

In fact, the insertion of the said provision is mea nt

mainly for the protection of a woman who is

subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home

primarily due to an unlawful demand for any propert y

or valuable security in the form of dowry. However,

sometimes it is misused as in the present case.” .”

(Emphasis supplied)

14. The Apex Court in the case of MARAM NIRMALA v.

STATE OF TELANGANA

5

, has held as follows:

“….. ….. …..

12. The appellant(s) herein are the mother-in-law and

father- in-law of respondent No. 2. They had filed a petition

under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of t he

proceedings instituted against them in C.C. No. 338 /2023

pending on the file of the Judicial First Class Mag istrate

(Prohibition and Excise offence) at Nalgonda alleging offences

punishable under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 read with

Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act.

5

2025 SCC OnLine SC 2913

36

13. By the impugned order, the said criminal petition has

been disposed of reserving liberty to the appellant(s) herein to

seek discharge in accordance with law. Hence, this appeal.

14. The case at hand pertains to allegations of

cruelty and dowry demand made by the respondent No. 2

against the appellant(s) herein. A bare perusal of the FIR

however, shows that the allegations made by respond ent

No. 2 are vague and omnibus inasmuch as there is an

absence of any specific instance or occasion detail ed with

particulars wherein the appellant(s) demanded dowry

from respondent No. 2 and on refusal of the same,

subjected her to mental and physical cruelty. The on ly

allegations levelled by respondent No. 2 against th e

appellants herein are that subsequent to the birth of her

daughter, the conduct of her husband underwent a

change, which is stated to have been on account of the

alleged inducement exercised by the in-laws includi ng

the appellant(s) herein for the purpose of demandin g

additional dowry and that pursuant to the counselli ng

conducted at the Women Police Station, Nalgonda,

although the husband of respondent No. 2 and his fa mily

assured that she would be treated properly, they

nevertheless continued to subject respondent No. 2 to

mental and physical cruelty.

15. We therefore find that the aforesaid allegations

levelled against the appellant(s), even if taken at their face

value, do not prima facie disclose the commission of the alleged

offences so as to warrant the initiation of criminal proceedings.

16. During the course of submissions, learned counsel for

the appellant(s) brought to our notice the judgment of this

Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of

Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735 (“Dara Lakshmi Narayana ”) as

well as other judgments which squarely apply to this case. We

have perused the same.

17. This Court speaking through one of us (B.V.

Nagarathna, J.) in Dara Lakshmi Narayana, while dealing with

the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings instituted by the

respondent wife therein against her husband and in- laws who

were charged with offences punishable under Section s 498A of

37

the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act, 1961, h eld as

follows:

“27. A mere reference to the names of family

members in a criminal case arising out of a

matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations

indicating their active involvement should be nippe d

in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of

judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to

implicate all the members of the husband's family

when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial

discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations

unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised

allegations cannot form the basis for criminal

prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such

cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the

legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of

innocent family members. In the present case,

Appellants 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of

Appellant 1 have been living in different cities and have not

resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant 1 and

Respondent 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged i nto

criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the

process of the law in the absence of specific allegat ions

made against each of them.

xxx

30. The inclusion of Section 498-A IPC by way

of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty

inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family,

ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in

recent years, as there have been a notable rise in

matrimonial disputes across the country,

accompanied by growing discord and tension within

the institution of marriage, consequently, there ha s

been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like

Section 498-AIPC as a tool for unleashing personal

vendetta against the husband and his family by a

wife. Making vague and generalised allegations

during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinised, w ill

lead to the misuse of legal processes and an

encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a

wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken

to invoke Section 498-A IPC against the husband and

his family in order to seek compliance with the

unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this

38

Court has, time and again, cautioned against

prosecuting the husband and his family in the

absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

xxx

31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any

woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been

contemplated under Section 498-A IPC should remain si lent

and forbear herself from making a complaint or initia ting

any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our

aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a ca se

like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the

petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the firs t

appellant, husband of the second respondent herein, a

complaint under Section 498-A IPC is lodged by the la tter.

In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly

for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in

the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand

for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry.

However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

xxx

34. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the

impugned FIR No. 82 of 2022 filed by Respondent 2 wa s

initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and

grudges against Appellant 1 and his family members i.e.

Appellants 2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand

falls within Category (7) of illustrative parameters

highlighted in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan

Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426].

Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not

exercising the powers available to it under Section 482CrPC

and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court's process

by continuing the criminal prosecution against the

appellants.”

(underlining by us)

18. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this

case, we find that the judgment of this Court in Dara Lakshmi

Narayana would apply. Hence, the impugned order of the High

Court is set aside. The proceedings instituted agai nst the

appellant(s) in C.C. No. 338/2023 pending on the fi le of the

39

Judicial First Class Magistrate (Prohibition and Excise offence) at

Nalgonda stand quashed in relation to the appellants herein.”

(Emphasis supplied)

15. The Apex Court in the case of GHANSHYAM SONI v.

STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)

6

, has held as follows:

“….. ….. …..

10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made

by the complainant are that in the year 1999, the A ppellant

inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing

insufficient dowry. The Complainant refers to few instances

of such atrocities, however the allegations are gen eric,

and rather ambiguous. The allegations against the fa mily

members, who have been unfortunately roped in, is t hat

they used to instigate the Appellant husband to har ass

the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant f or

not bringing enough dowry; however, there is no spe cific

incident of harassment or any evidence to that effe ct.

Similarly, the allegations against the five out of six sisters that

they used to insult the Complainant and demanded do wry

articles from her, and upon failure beat her up, but there is not

even a cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also

been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he be ing a

friend of the Appellant instigated him against the Complainant,

and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed . Such

allegations are merely accusatory and contentious i n

nature, and do not elaborate a concrete picture of what

may have transpired. For this reason alone, and tha t the

evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with the

accusations, the version of the Complainant seems

implausible and unreliable. The following observation in K.

Subba Rao v. State of Telangana Represented by Its Secretary,

Department of Home, fits perfectly to the present scenario:

6

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1301

40

“6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding

against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to

matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the

husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus

allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in

the crime are made out.”

11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly

specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure

in nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the

prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald

allegations without any specifics of time, date or place,

there is no incriminating material found by the

prosecution or rather produced by the complainant t o

substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under

section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case

of JaydedeepsinhPravinsinh Chavda v. State of

Gujarat and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh .

The Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any

medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, o r any

witnesses to substantiate her allegations. We cannot ignore

the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her sec ond

Complaint dt. 06.12.1999 six days later on 12.12.1999. There

is also no evidence to substantiate the purported d emand

for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or his fa mily

and the investigative agencies in their own prudenc e

have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibit ion

Act, 1961 to the chargesheet.

12. In this respect, the Sessions Court has applied its

judicial mind to the allegations in the FIR & the m aterial on

record, and has rightly discharged the Appellants of the offences

under section 498A & 34 IPC. Notwithstanding the sa id

observation by the Sessions Court that the possibility of false

implication cannot be ruled out, the discharge of the Appellant

merely because the Complainant is a police officer is erroneous

and reflects poorly on the judicial decision making, which must

be strictly based on application of judicial principles to the

merits of the case. On the other hand, the High Court vide the

Impugned Order has traversed one step further and o vertly

emphasised that simply because the Complainant is a police

officer, it cannot be assumed that she could not have been a

victim of cruelty at the hands of her husband and in-laws. We

41

agree with the sensitive approach adopted by the High Court in

adjudicating the present case, however a judicial d ecision

cannot be blurred to the actual facts and circumsta nces of a

case. In this debate, it is only reasonable to re-iterate that the

Sessions Court in exercise of its revisionary jurisdiction and the

High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under

section 482 CrPC, must delve into the material on r ecord to

assess what the Complainant has alleged and whether any

offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

In the present case, such scrutiny of the allegations in the FIR

and the material on record reveals that no prima facie is made

out against the Appellant or his family. It is also borne from the

record that the divorce decree of their marriage, has already

been passed, and the same has never been challenged by the

Complainant wife, and hence has attained finality. Upon

consideration of the relevant circumstances and that the alleged

incidents pertain to the year 1999 and since then the parties

have moved on with their respective lives, it would be unjust

and unfair if the Appellants are forced to go throu gh the

tribulations of a trial.

13. It is rather unfortunate that the Complainant being

an officer of the State has initiated criminal machinery in such a

manner, where the aged parents-in-law, five sisters and one

tailor have been arrayed as an accused. Notwithstanding the

possibility of truth behind the allegations of crue lty, this

growing tendency to misuse legal provisions has tim e and

again been condemned by this Court. The observations

in Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana , Preeti

Gupta v. State of Jharkhandaptly captures this concern.”

(Emphasis supplied)

16. The Apex Court in the case of RAJESH CHADDHA v.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

7

, has held as follows:

“….. ….. …..

7

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1094

42

7. Having heard the learned counsel for the respectiv e

parties and having perused the record, the question remains

whether the High Court vide Impugned Order dt. 14.1 1.2018

whilst exercising its revisionary jurisdiction, was correct in

upholding the conviction of the Appellant under

Section 498A IPC & Section 4 D.P. Act, 1961. In that respect, it

is prudent to examine the statutory provisions, whi ch are as

under:

“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a

woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the

husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,

subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished wi th

imprisonment for a term which may extend to three y ears

and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For t he

purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wi lful

conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the

woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger

to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the

woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such

harassment is with a view to coercing her or any pers on

related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any

property or valuable security or is on account of failure by

her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If

any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or

takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shal l be

punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be

less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less

than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of

such dowry, whichever is more. Provided that the Cour t

may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the

judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of

less than five years. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) s hall

apply to, or in relation to,— (a) presents which are given at

the time of a marriage to the bride without any dema nd

having been made in that behalf : Page 12 of 26 Provi ded

that such presents are entered in a list maintained in

accordance with the rules made under this Act; (b) presents

which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom

without any demand having been made in that behalf :

Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained

in accordance with the rules made under this Act : Provided

further that where such presents are made by or on be half

of the bride or any person related to the bride, such

43

presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is

not excessive having regard to the financial status of the

person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are

given.

4. Penalty for demanding dowry.— If any person

demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other

relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case

may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six

months, but which may extend to two years and with fi ne

which may extend to ten thousand rupees : Provided tha t

the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be

mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of

imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”

8. At the outset, an act of ‘cruelty’ for the purpose

of Section 498A, corresponds to a willful conduct o f such

nature, that may cause danger to the life, limb and health

of the woman, which is inclusive of the mental and

physical health and the harassment caused to her, b y

coercing her to meet unlawful demands or impossible

standards. Further, the demand for dowry in terms o f

Section 3 and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 refer s to

both a direct or indirect manner of demand for dowr y

made by the husband or his family members. In order to

meet the threshold of the offences under

Section 498A IPC & Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961,

the allegations cannot be ambiguous or made in thin air.

9. In the present case, the allegations made by the

Complainant are vague, omnibus and bereft of any

material particulars to substantiate this threshold . Apart

from claiming that Appellant husband harassed her f or

want of dowry, the Complainant has not given any

specific details or described any particular instan ce of

harassment. The allegations in the FIR, and the

depositions of the prosecution witnesses suggest th at on

multiple occasions, the Complainant wife was ousted

from the matrimonial house, and kicked and punched in

the presence of her father, PW-2 herein and she was

repeatedly tormented with dowry demands, and when

she was unable to honor them, the Appellant and her

family physically beat her up; whereas she has not

44

mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the

alleged harassment occurred. It is alleged that the

Complainant suffered a miscarriage, as she fell dow n,

when the Appellant and her family who pushed her ou t of

the house; however, no medical document from any

medical institution or hospital or nursery was prod uced to

substantiate the allegations.

10. Upon carefully considering the record, we find that

apart from the statements of PW-1 and PW-2, there i s no

evidence to substantiate the allegations of harassment and acts

of cruelty within the scope of Section 498A of IPC, and

Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. For this reason, we find merit in

the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, and are

of the considered view that there is no material on record to

establish the allegations of hurt or miscarriage, and of hurt and

criminal intimidation in terms of Section 323 r/w 3 4 and

Section 506 IPC respectively. The Trial Court has rightly held

that evidence of the Complainant is the only strong evidence

that she sustained injuries on various parts of her body due to

the physical assault by the accused persons, and that there was

no medical examination conducted by the Complainant , so as to

prove that the miscarriage was a consequence of the physical

assault.

11. The Trial Court has indeed applied its judicial mind to

the material on record whilst acquitting the Appellant and the

co-accused parents-in-law for offences under

Section 323 r/w 34 & Section 506 IPC. However, it appears that

the Trial Court had passed the order of conviction of the

Appellant under Section 498A IPC & Section 4 of the D.P. Act,

1961, merely on the possibility that the allegations and the

depositions of the PW-1 corroborated by PW2, are tr ue and

correct. Although one cannot deny the emotional or

mental torture that the Complainant may have underg one

in the marriage, however a cursory or plausible vie w

cannot be conclusive proof to determine the guilt o f an

individual under Section 498A & Section 4 of the D. P. Act,

1961, especially to obviate malicious criminal pros ecution

of family members in matrimonial disputes. In this respect,

we also cannot ignore that the FIR dt. 20.12.1999 w as

registered after the Appellant had filed the Divorc e Petition

under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 06.02.1999. In

45

consideration thereof and that the Complainant had cohabited

with the Appellant only for a period of about a year, it appears

that the FIR registered by the Complainant was not genuine.

12. In respect thereof, the High Court while exercising its

revisionary jurisdiction ought to have examined the correctness

of decision of the Trial Court in light of the material on record,

which reveals nothing incriminatory against the App ellant to

sustain a conviction under Section 498A IPC or Sect ion 4 of

the D.P. Act, 1961. Although we do not agree with t he

submission on behalf of the Appellant that the Impugned Order

dt. 14.11.2018 was passed in absentia, however the High Court

was well within its revisionary powers to discern whether an FIR

and the proceedings emanating therefrom were sustai nable. In

all certainty, it could have saved 6 years' worth of time for the

Appellant, who has endured litigation for over 20 years as of

today.

13. Notwithstanding the merits of the case, we are

distressed with the manner, the offences under

Section 498A IPC, and Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Ac t,

1961 are being maliciously roped in by Complainant

wives, insofar as aged parents, distant relatives, married

sisters living separately, are arrayed as accused, in

matrimonial matters. This growing tendency to appen d

every relative of the husband, casts serious doubt on the

veracity of the allegations made by the Complainant wife

or her family members, and vitiates the very object ive of

a protective legislation. The observations made by this

Hon'ble Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi

Narayana v. State of Telangana appropriately

encapsulates this essence as under:

“25. A mere reference to the names of family

members in a criminal case arising out of a

matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations

indicating their active involvement should be nippe d

in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of

judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to

implicate all the members of the husband's family

when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial

discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations

unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised

allegations cannot form the basis for criminal

46

prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such

cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the

legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of

innocent family members. In the present case,

appellant Nos. 2 to 6, who are the members of the

family of appellant No. 1 have been living in diffe rent

cities and have not resided in the matrimonial hous e

of appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 herein.

Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal

prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the

process of the law in the absence of specific

allegations made against each of them.”

14. The term “cruelty” is subject to rather cruel

misuse by the parties, and cannot be established

simpliciter without specific instances, to say the least.

The tendency of roping these sections, without

mentioning any specific dates, time or incident, we akens

the case of the prosecutions, and casts serious sus picion

on the viability of the version of a Complainant. W e

cannot ignore the missing specifics in a criminal

complaint, which is the premise of invoking crimina l

machinery of the State . Be that as it may, we are informed

that the marriage of the Appellant has already been dissolved

and the divorce decree has attained finality, hence any further

prosecution of the Appellant will only tantamount to an abuse of

process of law.”

(Emphasis supplied)

17. The Apex Court in the case of KAMAL v. STATE OF

GUJARAT

8

, has held as follows:

“….. ….. …..

10. A perusal of the impugned FIR would disclose

that the complainant at the time of lodging the FIR had

been living with her own parents. The allegations a re that

initially, after marriage, there were no issues. La ter,

8

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1726

47

when parents in law started living with her husband , she

had to suffer taunts at their end on trivial issues . When

she complained about this to her husband, he sided with

his parents and even assaulted the complainant. It is

alleged that she informed her parents and uncle about this, who

counselled her to have patience in the interest of the family. FIR

also discloses that since 2008 she is having a job. Initially with

Ugam Solutions and, later, as a lecturer for nine y ears. She

admits of having stayed at different places in rent ed

accommodation post her marriage. However, she alleg es that

she used to hand over her salary to her father-in-law who used

to deprive her of her money. Besides that, she alleges of her

husband having an affair with his business partner for the last

two years and because of that he had been constantly torturing

her, both physically and mentally, to end the relationship and

with that motive divorce petition has been filed.

11. What is important, for the purposes of deciding

this case, is that in the FIR there is no specific allegation

of demand of dowry by the accused. Further, the

allegation of harassment of the complainant at the

instance of the parents in law is limited to extend ing

taunts and custody related issues of minor children .

However, there is no disclosure about the nature of those

taunts. Admittedly, the second respondent was marri ed

to the first appellant in the year 2005 and for las t several

years since before lodging the FIR, the complainant had

been working and staying in rented accommodations a t

different places.Besides that, the FIR was lodged on

20.07.2019, just three days after service of summon s of

the divorce proceedings initiated by the first appe llant. In

these circumstances, we will have to consider wheth er

the impugned proceedings are vexatious and mala fid e,

particularly in the context of a matrimonial disput e where

time and again Courts have been cautioned to be

circumspect to obviate malicious prosecution of fam ily

members of the main accused.

12. Even if we assume that there are some

allegations of assault and of physical and mental t orture

of the complainant, but they are against the husban d. As

against the parents in law, the allegations are onl y of

extending taunts and of not parting with the money for

48

managing household expenses. Specific details in re spect

of those taunts have not been disclosed. Moreover, a few

taunts here and there is a part of everyday life wh ich for

happiness of the family are usually ignored. Intere stingly,

as per own allegations in the FIR, the complainant admits

that when she reported those issues to her parents and

uncle, she was counselled to bear patience. In the

circumstances, in our considered view, no case to

proceed against the parents in law, namely, the sec ond

and third appellant is made out. In so far as the first

appellant is concerned, there are allegations of physical and

mental torture of the complainant at his behest. Consequently,

the case may proceed qua the first appellant.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Judicial precedent speaking in consistent and cauti onary

voice has underscored that criminal law must not be

permitted to degenerate into an instrument of oppre ssion or

personal vengeance. The inherent powers of this Co urt

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C./528 of the BNSS ex ist

precisely to prevent such abuse and to secure the e nds of

justice.

18. What is more disquieting is, the indiscriminating

roping in of the parents-in-law and brother-in-law, despite

their residence in India, while the marital life wa s largely

lived abroad. It is therefore the Apex Court in the aforesaid

49

judgments cautions against this very tendency of

transforming a matrimonial dispute into a criminal dragnet

ensnaring every member of the husband’s family. Su ch

prosecutions founded on vague and omnibus allegatio ns or

even the complaints so registered on omnibus alleg ations,

do not advance justice, they in fact corrode it. T he

allegations in the case at hand, even at their high est, do not

constitute the offence alleged, they are in fact in herently

improbable. The continuation of investigation woul d serve

no purpose other than to prolong harassment, stigma tize the

petitioners and squander the precious time of crimi nal

Courts. The issuance of a look out circular against the 1

st

petitioner, on allegations so tenuous, would only c ompound

injustice. Therefore, to permit the criminal proce ss to

lumber forward would be to allow law to become a we apon

rather than a remedy. I thus, deem it appropriate to

exercise my jurisdiction under Section 482 of the C r.P.C. and

obliterate the very registration of crime against t hese

petitioners, to prevent it becoming an abuse of the process

of the law and resulting in miscarriage of justice.

50

19. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

O R D E R

(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

(ii) FIR in Crime No.90 of 2024 registered before

Basavanagudi Women Police Station and pending befor e

the 37

th

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court

at Bangalore stands quashed qua the petitioners.

Sd/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA)

JUDGE

Bkp

CT:MJ

Description

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