1
Reserved on : 27.11.2025
Pronounced on : 08.01.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 08
TH
DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.7053 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
1 . ABUZAR AHMED
S/O SAUD AHMED,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS.
2 . SAUD AHMED
S/O MUKTAR AHMED,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS.
3 . MARZIA SAUD
W/O SAUD AHMED,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS.
4 . FAIZAN AHMED
S/O SAUD AHMED,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS.
ALL ARE RESIDING AT
NO. 27, ALFRED STREET,
MUSEUM ROAD,
RICHMOND TOWN,
BENGALURU – 560 025.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI SYED KHALEEL PASHA, ADVOCATE)
R
2
AND:
1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY
BASAVANGUDI WOMEN PS
BENGALURU CITY,
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2 . RUMAN ASAD
W/O ABUZAR AHMED,
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 5A, 4
TH
FLOOR,
27
TH
MAIN, 39
TH
CROSS,
AL AMEEN APARTMENT,
9
TH
BLOCK, JAYANAGAR
BENGALURU – 560 069.
3. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
BENGALURU.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
SRI NAVEED AHMED, ADVOCATE FOR R-2;
SRI H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN, DSGI FOR R-3)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.90/2024 OF
BASAVANGUDI WOMEN P.S., P/U/S 498-A, 504 OF IPC, R/ W 3 AND
4 OF DP ACT, WHICH IS PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HO N’BLE
37
th
ACMM COURT AT BANGALORE.
3
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 27.11.2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWIN G:-
CAV ORDER
The petitioners, 4 in number, stand before this Cou rt
seeking shelter from the sweeping arm of criminal l aw,
which according to them, has been set in motion, no t by the
weight of culpability, but by the frailty of matrim onial
discord. They call into question the registration of crime in Crime
No.90 of 2024, where they have been arrayed as accu sed, for
offences punishable under Sections 498A and 504 of the IPC and
Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (‘the Act’ for
short).
2. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -
Before embarking upon consideration of the issue o n its
merits, it becomes necessary to delineate the relat ionships that
bind and now divide, the protagonists in the lis. The 2
nd
respondent
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
4
is the complainant/wife of the 1
st
petitioner/accused No.1. Accused
No.2 is the father-in-law of the complainant; accused No.3 is the
mother-in-law and accused No.4 is the brother-in-la w. The 2
nd
respondent/complainant and accused No.1 get married on
25-08-2017. The couple then relocated to the United States of
America, where accused No.1 was gainfully employed. For nearly 6
years, the matrimonial life unfolded overseas, culminating in the
birth of a child. It is only in January 2023 that the complainant
returns to India and thereafter, seeks to set the criminal law into
motion, by registering a complaint for offences punishable under
Sections 498A, 504 r/w 34 of the IPC, not only against her husband
but also against the father-in-law, mother-in-law and brother-in-
law. On the complaint, the Police register a crime in Crime No.90 of
2024 for the afore-quoted offences, including offen ces under
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. On registration of cr ime, the
petitioners are before this Court in the subject petition.
3. Heard Sri Syed Khaleel Pasha, learned counsel a ppearing
for the petitioners; Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State
Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1, Sr i Naveed
5
Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 and
Sri H. Shanthi Bhushan, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India
appearing for respondent No.3.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitione rs would
vehemently contend that accused No.1 and the compla inant lived in
United States of America. They had some misundersta nding or
minor problems that would happen in a marriage. The complainant
comes back to India in January 2023 and then allege s that the
husband and other members of the family have harass ed her over
telephone. He would submit that if this is permitted to continue, it
would become a classic illustration of abuse of Section 498A of the
IPC. The learned counsel would further submit that on registration
of crime a look out circular was also issued against the 1
st
petitioner
which had stopped him from moving beyond the shores of the
nation. All this, the learned counsel would submit, is an abuse of
the process of law.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel Sri Naveed Ahme d
appearing for the 2
nd
respondent/complainant would refute the
6
submissions in contending that the harassment by th e husband or
the in-laws is clearly brought out in the complaint. Investigation, at
least, must be permitted to be continued. The momen t crime is
registered, the petitioners have approached this Co urt and this
Court has granted an interim order of stay. Against the in-laws, he
would submit that it may not meet the ingredients of offences. But,
against the husband it clearly meets and, therefore , the
proceedings must be permitted to continue against the husband in
the least. He would seek dismissal of the petition.
6. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor
Sri B.N. Jagadeesha would also seek dismissal of the petition on the
sole score that investigation in the least is a must.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the su bmissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have per used the
material on record.
8. The facts, in their broad outline, are not in d ispute. The
marriage between the 1
st
petitioner and the complainant takes
7
place on 25-08-2017. The 1
st
petitioner who was already working
in the United States of America takes his wife and continues to stay
in the United States of America. Several incidents have happened
in United States of America, due to which the wife comes back to
India in January 2023, 6 years after the marriage and two children
being born from the wedlock. She registered a comp laint in the
year 2024. The complaint ranges incidents from 2017 to 2024 most
of which have happened in the United States of Amer ica. Since the
entire issue has triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate
to notice the complaint in its entirety.
THE COMPLAINT:
“To,
The Station House Officer
Basvangudi Womens Police Station,
Basvangudi, Bengaluru
Respected Sir,
Subject: Complaint against my husband and in
laws regarding dowry harassment,
domestic violence and mental torture,
physical and economical abuse wrongful
confinement etc.,
1) MR Abuzar Ahmed - 9036713643
2) MR Soud Ahmed - 9880172674
3). Mrs. Marzia Soud – 9900763776
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4) MR Faizan Ahmed - 9810957535
All residing at # 103, 1
st
Floor SS Meridian
dreams # 27 Alfred street Richmond Town,
Bangalore, Karnataka India - 560025
1. With reference to the above subject I would like to lodge
this complaint against the persons named above with
regard to harassment, domestic violence and mental
torture.
2. I got a marriage proposal through a marriage Br oker. Mr.
Abuzar Ahmed along with his family came to my house
and accepted me as the bride. Mr.Abuzar Ahmed is a
qualified engineer working in San Antonio Texas USA.
3. The marriage date was fixed on 25 August 2017 W hile the
marriage preparations were going on my mother in la w
wanted all the Jewellery according to her taste hence she
has made my parents to give altogether 900 Grams of 24
carat gold Jewelleries as Dowry at the time of marriage.
4. The marriage took place on the 25
th
August 2017 at
SHAMS convention center. The marriage was registere d
on the 5
th
September 2017. I left with my husband Mr.
Abuzar Ahmed to San Antonio Texas on the 16
th
September 2017. That I started my marital life with my
husband Mr Abuzer Ahmed in San Antonio Texas. I was
forced and asked to complete all the house choses
everyday. I was told by my husband Mr. Abuzer Ahmed
that this marriage is going to work ONLY if I do all the
Cooking and cleaning and call my mother in law who was
in India everyday I was being judged and criticized for my
cooking and cleaning they use to taunt me and tortu re
me for same. I had no proper winter apparel for the way
chill winter and Mr. Abusar Ahmed taunted told me, my
parents should have given all clothes before the wedding.
5. In the month of March 2018 I had a very severe Fungal
Infection my husband did took me to doctor for
treatment, instead Mr Abuzar Ahmed call my father i n
9
India and told him; I am sending your daughter you
to India and you bear all the expenses of her
treatment."
6. I was sent to India in the month of October 2018 after 8
months of tolerating the Infection. I was subjected to
mental harassment and torture and abuse from my
husband and in laws.
7. I was constantly called out for not bearing children by Mrs
Marzia Soud my mother in law, she abused me and
tortured me mentally. My mother in law Marzia Saud
taunted me saying; "I have a lot of male hormones in
my body and I cannot bear children ".
8. My husband and I left for Texas USA after about 2
months in India. I was called out every other day f or
doing Cooking and clearing. I was told I was not do ing
enough. I was told I should not talk to my parents on
phone and Instead speared time cooking and cleaning .
Because my parents didn't wish Mr Abazar Ahmed on h is
birthday, I was told I should stop talking to my parents. I
was constantly told by my mother in law that my parents
should present my husband with gifts every few days .
The Internet and my phone was cut-off for a month s o I
couldn't talk to my family, because my husband was
angry that my parents didn't wish him on his birthday.
9. I was pregnant with my first child and my mothe r in law
wanted my parents to go to the USA for helping me w ith
delivery which was due on may 2020. My Parents got the
USA visa in February 2020 and planned to travel to the
USA in the month of May. But covid hit in the month of
March my parents couldn't come. I was mentally tortured
that my parents could not make it for the delivery. My
husband wanted my parent to travel to the USA inspite of
the lockdown and Quarantine. Just 2 days before of my
first delivery as I did not fold the laundry My husband
manhandled me aggressively and I was dragged from o ne
room to the other.
10. I had to deliver the next day because my blood
pressure was high and the doctor thought it was
10
not safe for me to go back home. After the delivery
my husband Mr Abazar Ahmed didn't want me to
eat French fries and rice and meat because I would
put on weight. After a few months my daughter and
I had gone out for our clothes and when I asked my
husband to get us new stuff he denied and my
mother in law told me on call that I should ask my
father who was in India to send me all of the new
clothes I needed. My husband and in laws have
denied our basic needs I had to beg for every thing
which a woman requires. I called My father; my
father managed to send me a courses of the clothes
all the way from India to the USA. Because I asked
Mr Abuzar to buy me clothes, he didn't want to talk
to me and gave me torture for 2 months which was
very mentally exhausting and draining.
11. In 2021 Mr Abuzer and I came to India and I wa s
pregnant with my 2
nd
child. My mother in law didn't
wanted me to have the second child because she
thought I was not capable of managing 2 kids. She
insisted should get an abortion or I stay in India
without my husband for the rest of my life. Then
she came to a conclusion that my mother and I go
back to the USA to deliver my second child. My
mother stayed with me for three months for the
delivery of my son. After she left Mr Abusar
constantly fought with me and mentally pressured
me to manage the Kids and cooking cleaning
everything, I was treated like a made (servant). I
was pressured to do everything (all the chores)
everyday It was mentally and physically torture for
me to manage the house and the kids. In July of
2022 My husband along with kids and I came to
India, I was told to stay at my parents house for 2
weeks so that my mother in law and Mr Abusar
would go on vacation to Turkey, they didn't want
me and the kids to join them. As soon as they came
back from Turkey trip, my mother was ill and was
admitted to the hospital. my husband along with his
mother father and brother came to my house to
jayanagar and verbally abused me and my parents.
My mother in law Father in law and Brother in law
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all saw Mг Abuzar verbally abuse me but did
nothing about it and my Brother in law MR Faizan
Ahmed wanted me to say that & I was at fault and
his mother was right. I was verbally abused by Mr
Abusar and he even tried to come and physically
charge at me but his mother stopped him. Abusar
wanted me to stay back in India after this Insident .
MR. Faizan Ahmed has also ill treated from the
beginning, Everytime Abuzar and I had
disagreement my brother in law has told his mother
to send me back to my parents house and dissolve
the marriage. He has even questioned mand
showed his disliking towards my daughter having
milk when she was just a few months old. He has
always questioned my dressing style.
12. My husband tortured me like anything and he wa nted me
to dress up according to his mother's liking and sister
liking. In the month of Sep 2022 Mr. Abuzar and I along
with the kids returned to the USA. In the month of
December 2022, MR Abusar wanted to go to India for visa
stamping so he left me and kids back in the USA alo ne
without food and care for 3 weeks. After he came to India
he tried to avoid my calls because he went out for
vacation with his mother and brothers family. My
daughter stuck a pice & candy in her nose I called Abusar,
he was on vacation with his family to Mumbai and didn't
want me to know. He didn't want to Inform me about his
vacation He came back to the USA after 3 weeks and
didn't want to talk to me and the kids. The next day he
started verbally abusing me because he didn't find the
plates in the kitchen. He wanted me to leave the ho use
that very minute. I have no family or friends there in the
USA and I was financially dependant on him. He booked a
flight for the kids and me in a few days and asked me to
go back to India. I flew down to India with the kids who
were not feeling well, they had cold and fevers, they were
not even taken to the see the doctor. MR Abuzar had
taken down all the locks from the luggage and told I
should travel without locks to my bags. So that i should
face customs interrogations.
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13. I am in India since January 2023 for the past year
and a half. He is not receiving my calls and every
time he received my call he verbally abuses me and
my father. He dosent even want to talk to the kids.
After I was sent back to India in Jan 2023, he call ed
his parents and Brother's family to the USA, I feel
like all this was planned by them so that they coul d
come and stay in the USA and MR Abuzar could
avoid expenses on me and the kids and instead
spend on his parents and brother family. In the No
may 2024, Abuzas has come down to India
Bangalore.
14. I tried to call him, he is not receiving my ca lls I
even went to my in laws house on 05-06-2024 at
about 7 Pm so I could talk to him but my brother in
law did not let me enter the house by using crimina l
force against me and pushed me out of the door
created fearful situation and asked me to leave and
told me that MR Abuzar is not at home I waited
outside the hours for A hours but nobody spoke to
me. I learnt that my in laws and husband are
planning for second marriage for want of handful of
dowry amount. My husband is not taking care of me
and my children in any manner and committed
physical and economical abuse on us.
Therefore I request you to take appropriate legal action against
my husband and inlaws and punish them according to law. And I
further request you to restore my belongings and Je wellery
which was forcefully taken away from me and kept in the locker
of my husband by mother in law and other in laws at their
house.”
(Emphasis added)
A careful reading of the complaint reveals grievanc es such
as dietary restrictions, expectations regarding att ire,
allocation of household responsibilities, disagreem ents over
television preferences laced with a statement that the
13
husband treated the complainant/wife as his servant . These
allegations even if accepted at face value, portray a portrait
of marital discord, but falls woefully short of dep icting the
statutory cruelty contemplated under Section 498A o f the
IPC. The complaint further narrates that the husband st ops
receiving calls and he is said to have called his brother and parents
to go and stay with him in the United States of Ame rica. If this is
the complaint against the husband and in-laws, it c annot but be
held that it is an abuse of the process of law, as minor skirmishes
that happens in the family between the husband and the wife are
projected to become a crime for offences punishable under Section
498A of the IPC or even under Section 504 IPC. It is shocking as to
how without any preliminary inquiry as directed by the Apex Court
in the case of LALITA KUMARI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
[(2014)2 SCC 1], the complaint is even registered, by the
jurisdictional police and above all, the husband is stopped from
moving away from the shores of the nation on frivolous allegations
on account of issuance of Look Out Circular. It is therefore
necessary to notice Section 498A of the IPC.
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9. Section 498A of the IPC reads as follows:
“498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or
the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman
to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty”
means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with
a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuab le
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”
The law does not criminalize incompatibility, nor d oes it
punish imperfect marriages. Section 498A of the IP C is not
a panacea for all matrimonial ills. It is a targeted provision
meant to address grave cruelty, conduct so wilful a nd
pernicious so as to imperil life, limb or mental he alth or even
harassment tethered to unlawful demands of dowry. This is
the purport of the provision - 498A. The complaint quoted
supra is conspicuously bereft of such particulars. There is neither
an allegation of demand of dowry nor any conduct of such
15
severity as would shock the conscience or satisfy t he
statutory threshold. In the light of the aforesaid narration in the
complaint, I deem it apposite to notice the judicial landscape on the
issue.
JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE:
10. The Apex Court in the case of SHOBHIT KUMAR
MITTAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
1
, has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
15. Similarly, an offence is punishable under
Section 498A of the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects
a woman to cruelty, which may result in imprisonmen t for a
term extending up to three years and a fine. The Ex planation
under Section 498A of the IPC defines “cruelty” for the purpose
of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of the acts mentioned in
clauses (a) or (b) therein. The first limb of clause (a) of the
Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC states that “cruelty”
means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of clause
(a) of the Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC states that
cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman. Further, clause ( b) of the
Explanation to Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would
also include harassment of the woman where such har assment
is to coerce her or any person related to her to me et any
unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on
account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet
such demand.
1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2059
16
16. Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with the
penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any person who
gives, takes, or abets the giving or taking of dowry shall face a
punishment of imprisonment for a minimum term of fi ve years
and a fine not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of
the dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the D owry Act
talks about the penalty for demanding dowry. It states that any
person demanding dowry directly or indirectly from the parents
or other relatives or guardians of a bride or bridegroom, as the
case may be, shall be punished with imprisonment fo r a term
which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend
to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand
rupees.
17. The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts
and circumstances of the present case and after examining the
FIR, the High Court was right in refusing to quash the criminal
proceedings arising out of FIR No. 347 of 2023 date d
09.11.2023 under Section 323 and 498A of the IPC and Sections
3 and 4 of the Dowry Act, as against the appellant herein.
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations
made by complainant/respondent No. 2 are vague and omnibus.
Other than claiming that the husband and his family along with
the accused/appellant herein mentally harassed her with a
demand for dowry, the complainant/respondent No. 2 has not
provided any specific details or described any particular instance
of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date,
place, or manner in which the alleged harassment oc curred or
the details of the nature of demand or its particulars. Therefore,
the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations. Furthermore, the
complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to impress the Court as
to how the alleged harassment has any proximate rel ationship
to the said injury and nerve damage that she sustained, so as to
punish her in-laws under Section 323 IPC. There is no remote or
proximate act or omission attributed to the accused /appellant
that implicates him or assigns him any specific role in the said
FIR for the offence of hurt as defined under Section 319 IPC.
Furthermore, merely stating that the accused/appell ant has
mentally harassed the complainant/respondent No. 2 with
respect to a demand for dowry does not fulfill the ingredients of
Section 498A of IPC specially in absence of any cogent material
17
or evidence on record to substantiate the said allegations. The
term “cruelty” cannot be established without specific instances.
The tendency of invoking the aforesaid provisions, without
mentioning any specific detail, weakens the case of the
prosecution and casts serious aspersions on the probability of
the version of the complainant. Therefore, this Cou rt cannot
ignore the missing specifics in the FIR which is th e basic
premise for invoking the criminal machinery of the State. In
such cases involving allegations of cruelty and har assment,
there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would
be required to be spelt out by the complainant agai nst
perpetrators in specific terms to initiate criminal proceedings
against them. Therefore, mere general allegations o f
harassment without pointing out the specific details would not
be sufficient to continue criminal proceedings agai nst any
person.
19. Courts have to be careful and cautious in dealing with
complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration
while dealing with matrimonial disputes where the a llegations
have to be scrutinized with great care and circumsp ection in
order to prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of
law.
20. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the
judgment of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (“ Bhajan Lal”) with particular
reference to paragraph 102 therein, wherein this Court observed
as hereunder:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the followin g
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
18
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein suc h
power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the Accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers Under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected
in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the Accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
19
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
Accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
21. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned
judicial tests, we find that none of the offences alleged against
the accused/appellant herein is made out. In fact, we find that
the allegations of cruelty, mental harassment and v oluntarily
causing hurt against the accused/appellant herein a re vague
and general in nature and therefore, the judgment of this Court
in the case of Bhajan Lal squarely applies to the facts of this
case. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to
permit the present prosecution emanating from the F IR to
continue.
22. Furthermore, at this juncture, we find it appropriate
to quote the observations of this Court in Dara Lakshmi
Narayana v. State of Bihar, (2025) 3 SCC 735 wherein it was
observed:
“27. A mere reference to the names of family
members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial
dispute, without specific allegations indicating the ir
active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a
well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience,
that there is often a tendency to implicate all the
members of the husband's family when domestic
disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such
generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by
concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot
form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must
exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal
provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary
harassment of innocent family members. We say so for
the reason that while the complainant/respondent No. 2
has made vague and omnibus allegations against the
accused/appellant herein, she has failed to justify the
same before this Court. Such actions would create
significant divisions and distrust among people, while
also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial
system, particularly criminal courts.
xxx
20
30. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by
way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty
inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family,
ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, i n
recent years, as there have been a notable rise Page 22
of 26 in matrimonial disputes across the country,
accompanied by growing discord and tension within th e
institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a
growing tendency to misuse provisions like
Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing
personal vendetta against the husband and his family by
a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during
matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the
misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use
of arm-twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family.
Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of
the IPC against the husband and his family in order to
seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a
wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again,
cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his
family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against
them.
31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any
woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has
been contemplated under Section 498A of theIPCshould
remain silent and forbear herself from making a
complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is
not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we
should not encourage a case like as in the present one,
where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of
marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the
second respondent herein, a complaint under
Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact,
the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for
the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in
the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security in the form
of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the
present case.”
The Apex Court holds that the provision of Section 498A of the IPC
has been misused by the complainant without there b eing any
21
rhyme or reason, and therefore, such cases must be nipped in the
bud. The aforesaid judgment is rendered by the Apex Court qua in-
laws being brought under the web of crime, without any rhyme or
reason.
11. Insofar as the husband is concerned, the Apex C ourt in
the case of ABHISHEK v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
2
, has
held as follows:
“…. …. ….
16. Instances of a husband's family members filing a
petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against them by
his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity
nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this score.
We may now take note of some decisions of particula r
relevance. Recently, in KahkashanKausar v. State of
Bihar [KahkashanKausar v. State of Bihar, (2022) 6 SCC 599:
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 684] , this Court had occasion to deal with a
similar situation where the High Court had refused [Mohd.
Ikram v. State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 1985] to quash
an FIR registered for various offences, including Section 498-
AIPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required
determination was whether allegations made against the in-laws
were general omnibus allegations which would be lia ble to be
quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein concern
was expressed over the misuse of Section 498-AIPC a nd the
increased tendency to implicate relatives of the hu sband in
matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that fals e
implications by way of general omnibus allegations made in the
course of matrimonial disputes, if left unchecked, would result in
misuse of the process of law. On the facts of that case, it was
2
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083
22
found that no specific allegations were made against the in-laws
by the wife and it was held that allowing their prosecution in the
absence of clear allegations against the in-laws would result in
an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal
trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe scars
upon the accused and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.
17. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [Preeti
Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667: (2010) 3 SCC
(Cri) 473] , this Court noted that the tendency to implicate the
husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon
in complaints filed under Section 498-A IPC. It was observed
that the courts have to be extremely careful and ca utious in
dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities
into consideration while dealing with matrimonial c ases, as
allegations of harassment by husband's close relati ons, who
were living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited
the place where the complainant resided, would add an entirely
different complexion and such allegations would hav e to be
scrutinised with great care and circumspection.
18. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [Neelu
Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286],
this Court observed that the mere mention of statut ory
provisions and the language thereof, for lodging a complaint, is
not the “be all and end all” of the matter, as what is required to
be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the
offence committed by each and every accused and the role
played by each and every accused in the commission of that
offence. These observations were made in the contex t of a
matrimonial dispute involving Section 498-A IPC.
19. Of more recent origin is the decision of this Court
in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. [Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P.,
(2023) 15 SCC 488] on the legal principles applicable apropos
Section 482CrPC. Therein, it was observed that when an
accused comes before the High Court, invoking eithe r the
inherent power under Section 482 CrPC or the extrao rdinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to get the FIR
or the criminal proceedings quashed, essentially on the ground
that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or
instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, then
in such circumstances, the High Court owes a duty to look into
23
the FIR with care and a little more closely. It was further
observed that it will not be enough for the court to look into the
averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the p urpose of
ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the
alleged offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or vexatious
proceedings, the court owes a duty to look into man y other
attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case
over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care
and circumspection, to try and read between the lines.
… … …
27. Given the totality of the facts and circumstances, we
are of the considered opinion that Bhawna's allegations against
the appellants, such as they are, are wholly insufficient and,
prima facie, do not make out a case against them. Further, they
are so farfetched and improbable that no prudent pe rson can
conclude that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against
them. In effect, the case on hand falls squarely in Categories (1)
and (5) set out in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] . Permi tting the
criminal process to go on against the appellants in such a
situation would, therefore, result in clear and patent injustice.
This was a fit case for the High Court to exercise its inherent
power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and t he
consequential proceedings.”
12. The Apex Court later, in the case of ACHIN GUPTA v.
STATE OF HARYANA
3
has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
32. Many times, the parents including the close relatives
of the wife make a mountain out of a molehill. Inst ead of
salvaging the situation and making all possible endeavours to
save the marriage, their action either due to ignorance or on
account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family
members, brings about complete destruction of marri age on
trivial issues. The first thing that comes in the mind of the wife,
3
2024 SCC OnLine SC 759
24
her parents and her relatives is the police, as if the police is the
panacea of all evil. No sooner the matter reaches u p to the
police, then even if there are fair chances of reco nciliation
between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation
of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one
another. Tolerance to each other's fault to a certain bearable
extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles,
trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be
exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said
to have been made in the heaven. The Court must app reciate
that all quarrels must be weighed from that point o f view in
determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case,
always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the
parties, their character and social status. A very technical and
hypersensitive approach would prove to be disastrou s for the
very institution of the marriage. In matrimonial disputes the
main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such
venom in their heart that they do not think even for a second
that if the marriage would come to an end, then what will be the
effect on their children. Divorce plays a very dubious role so far
as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason
why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue
delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring
about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of
genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the husband and his
family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-
treatment or harassment may vary. However, the poli ce
machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and
that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The
police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding
the husband at ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife
at the instigation of her parents or relatives or friends. In all
cases, where wife complains of harassment or ill-tr eatment,
Section 498-AIPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is
complete without Sections 506(2) and 323IPC. Every
matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to t he other,
may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels
between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may
also not amount to cruelty.
… … …
35. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court
in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. [Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P.,
25
(2023) 15 SCC 488], authored by one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.),
the legal principle applicable apropos Section 482C rPC was
examined. Therein, it was observed that when an acc used
comes before the High Court, invoking either the inherent power
under Section 482CrPC or the extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution, to get the FIR or the criminal
proceedings quashed, essentially on the ground that such
proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted
with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, the n in such
circumstances, the High Court owes a duty to look into the FIR
with care and a little more closely. It was further observed that
it will not be enough for the Court to look into the averments
made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged
offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or ve xatious
proceedings, the court owes a duty to look into man y other
attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case
over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care
and circumspection, to try and read between the lines.
… … …
38. In the aforesaid context, we looked into Sections 85
and 86, respectively, of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhit a, 2023,
which is to come into force with effect from 1-7-2024 so as to
ascertain whether the legislature has seriously looked into the
suggestions of this Court as made in Preeti Gupta [Preeti
Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667: (2010) 3 SCC
(Cri) 473].
39. Sections 85 and 86, respectively, are reproduced
hereinbelow:
“85. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty .—Whoever, being
the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years and shall also be liable to fine.
86. Cruelty defined.—For the purposes of
Section 85, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
26
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”
40. The aforesaid is nothing but verbatim reproduction of
Section 498-AIPC. The only difference is that the Explanation to
Section 498-AIPC, is now by way of a separate provi sion i.e.
Section 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
41. We request the legislature to look into the issue as
highlighted above taking into consideration the pra gmatic
realities and consider making necessary changes in Sections 85
and 86, respectively, of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhit a, 2023,
before both the new provisions come into force.
42. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned judgment and order [ Achin
Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 3054] passed
by the High Court is hereby set aside. The proceedi ngs of
CHI/1856/2021 arising from FIR No. 95 of 2021 dated 9-4-
2021, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Hisar are hereby quashed.”
The Apex Court in the case of ABHISHEK supra holds that minor
skirmishes between the husband and the wife cannot be projected
to become a crime under Section 498-A of the IPC. L ikewise, the
Apex Court in the case of ACHIN GUPTA supra laments about
repeated abuse of the provision i.e., Section 498-A of the IPC and
also suggests making some changes in the BNS owing to such
27
abuse. The present case forms, as observed hereinab ove, a classic
illustration of the said abuse. The Apex Court, in such cases, holds
that the offence should be nipped in the bud by interfering under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
13.
The Apex Court in the case of BELIDE SWAGATH
KUMAR v. STATE OF TELANGANA
4
, has held as follows:
“….. ….. …..
18. Section 498A ofthe IPC deals with offences
committed by the husband or relatives of the husban d
subjecting cruelty towards the wife. The said provision reads as
under:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the
husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished wi th
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three y ears
and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this section,
“cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or
4
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2890
28
is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”
19. Further, Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act talk about the
penalty for giving or taking or demanding a dowry.
“3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If
any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or
takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shal l be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less
than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of
such dowry, whichever is more.
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and
special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impo se a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in
relation to,—
(a) presents which are given at the time of a
marriage to the bride (without any demand
having been made in that behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in
a list maintained in accordance with the rules
made under this Act;
(b) presents which are given at the time of a
marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand
having been made in that behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in
a list maintained in accordance with the rules
made under this Act:
Provided further that where such presents
are made by or on behalf of the bride or any
person related to the bride, such presents are of
a customary nature and the value thereof is not
excessive having regard to the financial status of
the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such
presents are given.
29
4. Penalty for demanding dowry.— If any person
demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other
relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case
may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months, but which may extend to two years and with fi ne
which may extend to ten thousand rupees:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and
special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impos e a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six
months.”
20. An offence is punishable under Section 498A of
the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a w oman
to cruelty, which may result in imprisonment for a term
extending up to three years and a fine. The Explana tion
under Section 498A of the IPC defines “cruelty” for the
purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of t he
acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of
clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of
the IPC states that “cruelty” means any wilful cond uct
that is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide. The second limb of clause (a) of th e
Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that
cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature
as to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman. Further,
clause (b) of the Explanation of Section 498A of
the IPC states that cruelty would also include hara ssment
of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her or
any person related to her to meet any unlawful dema nd
for any property or valuable security or is on acco unt of
failure by her or any person related to her to meet such
demand.
21. Further, Section 3 of the DP Act deals with the
penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any
person who engages in giving, taking, or abetting t he
exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment of
imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine of
not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the
dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the DP Ac t talks
of penalty for demanding dowry. It states that any person
30
demanding dowry directly or indirectly, from the pa rents
or other relatives or guardians of a bride or bride groom
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term wh ich
shall not be less than six months, but which may ex tend
to two years and with fine which may extend to ten
thousand rupees.
22. The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts
and circumstances of the case and after examining the FIR and
the Complaint Case, the High Court was correct in r efusing to
quash the ongoing criminal proceedings against the appellants
arising out of FIR No. 29 of 2022 dated 27.01.2022 and the
Complaint Case No. 1067 of 2022 under Section 498A of
the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act.
23. Courts have to be extremely careful and
cautious in dealing with complaints and must take
pragmatic realities into consideration while dealin g with
matrimonial cases where the allegations have to be
scrutinized with greater care and circumspection in order
to prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of proc ess of
law. The allegations put forth by the complainant-
respondent No. 2 have been considered by us. In our
view, they reflect the daily wear and tear of marri age and
can, in no way, be categorised as cruelty. The act of the
accused-appellant of sending money back to his fami ly
members cannot be misconstrued in a way that leads to a
criminal prosecution. The allegation that the accus ed-
appellant forced the complainant-respondent No. 2 t o
maintain an excel sheet of all the expenses, even i f taken
on the face value, cannot come under the definition of
cruelty. The monetary and financial dominance of the
accused-appellant, as alleged by the complainant-
respondent No. 2, cannot qualify as an instance of
cruelty, especially in the absence of any tangible mental
or physical harm caused. The said situation is a mi rror
reflection of the Indian society where men of the
households often try to dominate and take charge of the
finances of the women but criminal litigation canno t
become a gateway or a tool to settle scores and pur sue
personal vendettas. Furthermore, the other allegati ons of
the complainant-respondent No. 2 such as lack of ca re on
the part of the husband-the accused-appellant durin g
31
pregnancy and postpartum and constant taunts about her
after-birth weight, if accepted prima facie, at best reflect
poorly upon the character of the accused-appellant but
the same cannot amount to cruelty so as to make him
suffer through the process of litigation.
24. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations
made by the complainant-respondent No. 2 are vague and
omnibus. Other than claiming that the husband and h is family
along with the accused-appellant herein mentally harassed her
with a demand of dowry, the complainant-respondent No. 2 has
not provided any specific details or described any particular
instance of harassment. Although she has alleged th at an
amount totalling to Rupees One Crore was demanded b y the
accused-appellant and his family members, the compl ainant-
respondent No. 2 has failed to put forth any eviden ce or
material on record to elaborate or substantiate the same.
Furthermore, the complainant-respondent No. 2 has
failed to impress the court as to how the said alle ged
harassment has caused her any injury, mental or
physical. There has been no remote or proximate act or
omission attributed to the accused-appellant that
implicates him or assigns him any specific role in the said
FIR for the offence of 498A of the IPC. Merely stati ng that
the accused-appellant has mentally harassed the
complainant-respondent No. 2 with respect to a dema nd
of dowry does not fulfil the ingredients of Section 498A of
the IPC especially in the face of absence of any co gent
material or evidence on record to substantiate the said
allegations. The term “cruelty” cannot be establish ed
without specific instances. The tendency of invokin g
these sections, without mentioning any specific det ails,
weakens the case of prosecution and casts serious
aspersions on the viability of the version of the
complainant. Therefore, this Court cannot ignore th e
missing specifics in an FIR which is the premise of
invoking criminal machinery of the State. In such c ases
involving allegations of cruelty and harassment, th ere
would normally be a series of offending acts, which would
be required to be spelt out by the complainant agai nst
perpetrators in specific terms to involve such
perpetrators into the criminal proceedings sought t o be
initiated against them and therefore mere general
32
allegations of harassment without pointing out the
specifics against such persons would not be suffici ent to
continue criminal proceedings.
25. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the
judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to
paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of
the various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated
by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 2 26
or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cod e
which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
have given the following categories of cases by way
of illustration wherein such power could be exercis ed
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaust ive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
33
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him
due to private and personal grudge .”
26. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned
judicial dictum, we find that none of the offences alleged against
the accused-appellant herein is made out. In fact, we find
that the allegations of cruelty, mental harassment and
voluntarily causing hurt against the accused-appell ant
herein have been made with a mala-fide intent with
vague and general allegations and therefore, the
judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and
particularly sub-paragraphs (1) and (7) of paragrap h
102, extracted above, squarely apply to the facts o f these
cases. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice
to permit the present prosecution emanating from th e
FIR and consequent Complaint Case No. 1067 of 2022 t o
continue.
34
27. Furthermore, at this juncture, we find it appropriate
to quote the judgment of this Court in Dara Lakshmi
Narayana v. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735 wherein it
was observed:
“27. A mere reference to the names of family
members in a criminal case arising out of a
matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations
indicating their active involvement should be nippe d
in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of
judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to
implicate all the members of the husband's family
when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial
discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations
unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised
allegations cannot form the basis for criminal
prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such
cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the
legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of
innocent family members. In the present case,
Appellants 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of
Appellant 1 have been living in different cities and have not
resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant 1 and
Respondent 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged i nto
criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the
process of the law in the absence of specific allegat ions
made against each of them.
xxx
30. The inclusion of Section 498-A IPC by way
of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty
inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family,
ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in
recent years, as there have been a notable rise in
matrimonial disputes across the country,
accompanied by growing discord and tension within
the institution of marriage, consequently, there ha s
been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like
Section 498-A IPC as a tool for unleashing personal
vendetta against the husband and his family by a
wife. Making vague and generalised allegations
during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinised, w ill
lead to the misuse of legal processes and an
encouragement for use of arm-twisting tactics by a
wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is take n
35
to invoke Section 498-A IPC against the husband and
his family in order to seek compliance with the
unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this
Court has, time and again, cautioned against
prosecuting the husband and his family in the
absence of a clear prima facie case against them.
31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any
woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been
contemplated under Section 498-A IPC should remain si lent
and forbear herself from making a complaint or initia ting
any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our
aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a ca se
like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the
petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the fir st
appellant, husband of the second respondent herein, a
complaint under Section 498-A IPC is lodged by the la tter.
In fact, the insertion of the said provision is mea nt
mainly for the protection of a woman who is
subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home
primarily due to an unlawful demand for any propert y
or valuable security in the form of dowry. However,
sometimes it is misused as in the present case.” .”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. The Apex Court in the case of MARAM NIRMALA v.
STATE OF TELANGANA
5
, has held as follows:
“….. ….. …..
12. The appellant(s) herein are the mother-in-law and
father- in-law of respondent No. 2. They had filed a petition
under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of t he
proceedings instituted against them in C.C. No. 338 /2023
pending on the file of the Judicial First Class Mag istrate
(Prohibition and Excise offence) at Nalgonda alleging offences
punishable under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 read with
Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act.
5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2913
36
13. By the impugned order, the said criminal petition has
been disposed of reserving liberty to the appellant(s) herein to
seek discharge in accordance with law. Hence, this appeal.
14. The case at hand pertains to allegations of
cruelty and dowry demand made by the respondent No. 2
against the appellant(s) herein. A bare perusal of the FIR
however, shows that the allegations made by respond ent
No. 2 are vague and omnibus inasmuch as there is an
absence of any specific instance or occasion detail ed with
particulars wherein the appellant(s) demanded dowry
from respondent No. 2 and on refusal of the same,
subjected her to mental and physical cruelty. The on ly
allegations levelled by respondent No. 2 against th e
appellants herein are that subsequent to the birth of her
daughter, the conduct of her husband underwent a
change, which is stated to have been on account of the
alleged inducement exercised by the in-laws includi ng
the appellant(s) herein for the purpose of demandin g
additional dowry and that pursuant to the counselli ng
conducted at the Women Police Station, Nalgonda,
although the husband of respondent No. 2 and his fa mily
assured that she would be treated properly, they
nevertheless continued to subject respondent No. 2 to
mental and physical cruelty.
15. We therefore find that the aforesaid allegations
levelled against the appellant(s), even if taken at their face
value, do not prima facie disclose the commission of the alleged
offences so as to warrant the initiation of criminal proceedings.
16. During the course of submissions, learned counsel for
the appellant(s) brought to our notice the judgment of this
Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of
Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735 (“Dara Lakshmi Narayana ”) as
well as other judgments which squarely apply to this case. We
have perused the same.
17. This Court speaking through one of us (B.V.
Nagarathna, J.) in Dara Lakshmi Narayana, while dealing with
the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings instituted by the
respondent wife therein against her husband and in- laws who
were charged with offences punishable under Section s 498A of
37
the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act, 1961, h eld as
follows:
“27. A mere reference to the names of family
members in a criminal case arising out of a
matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations
indicating their active involvement should be nippe d
in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of
judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to
implicate all the members of the husband's family
when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial
discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations
unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised
allegations cannot form the basis for criminal
prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such
cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the
legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of
innocent family members. In the present case,
Appellants 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of
Appellant 1 have been living in different cities and have not
resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant 1 and
Respondent 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged i nto
criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the
process of the law in the absence of specific allegat ions
made against each of them.
xxx
30. The inclusion of Section 498-A IPC by way
of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty
inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family,
ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in
recent years, as there have been a notable rise in
matrimonial disputes across the country,
accompanied by growing discord and tension within
the institution of marriage, consequently, there ha s
been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like
Section 498-AIPC as a tool for unleashing personal
vendetta against the husband and his family by a
wife. Making vague and generalised allegations
during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinised, w ill
lead to the misuse of legal processes and an
encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a
wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken
to invoke Section 498-A IPC against the husband and
his family in order to seek compliance with the
unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this
38
Court has, time and again, cautioned against
prosecuting the husband and his family in the
absence of a clear prima facie case against them.
xxx
31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any
woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been
contemplated under Section 498-A IPC should remain si lent
and forbear herself from making a complaint or initia ting
any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our
aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a ca se
like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the
petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the firs t
appellant, husband of the second respondent herein, a
complaint under Section 498-A IPC is lodged by the la tter.
In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly
for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in
the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry.
However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.
xxx
34. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the
impugned FIR No. 82 of 2022 filed by Respondent 2 wa s
initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and
grudges against Appellant 1 and his family members i.e.
Appellants 2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand
falls within Category (7) of illustrative parameters
highlighted in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426].
Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not
exercising the powers available to it under Section 482CrPC
and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court's process
by continuing the criminal prosecution against the
appellants.”
(underlining by us)
18. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this
case, we find that the judgment of this Court in Dara Lakshmi
Narayana would apply. Hence, the impugned order of the High
Court is set aside. The proceedings instituted agai nst the
appellant(s) in C.C. No. 338/2023 pending on the fi le of the
39
Judicial First Class Magistrate (Prohibition and Excise offence) at
Nalgonda stand quashed in relation to the appellants herein.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. The Apex Court in the case of GHANSHYAM SONI v.
STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)
6
, has held as follows:
“….. ….. …..
10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made
by the complainant are that in the year 1999, the A ppellant
inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing
insufficient dowry. The Complainant refers to few instances
of such atrocities, however the allegations are gen eric,
and rather ambiguous. The allegations against the fa mily
members, who have been unfortunately roped in, is t hat
they used to instigate the Appellant husband to har ass
the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant f or
not bringing enough dowry; however, there is no spe cific
incident of harassment or any evidence to that effe ct.
Similarly, the allegations against the five out of six sisters that
they used to insult the Complainant and demanded do wry
articles from her, and upon failure beat her up, but there is not
even a cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also
been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he be ing a
friend of the Appellant instigated him against the Complainant,
and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed . Such
allegations are merely accusatory and contentious i n
nature, and do not elaborate a concrete picture of what
may have transpired. For this reason alone, and tha t the
evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations, the version of the Complainant seems
implausible and unreliable. The following observation in K.
Subba Rao v. State of Telangana Represented by Its Secretary,
Department of Home, fits perfectly to the present scenario:
6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1301
40
“6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding
against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to
matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the
husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus
allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in
the crime are made out.”
11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly
specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure
in nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the
prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald
allegations without any specifics of time, date or place,
there is no incriminating material found by the
prosecution or rather produced by the complainant t o
substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under
section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case
of JaydedeepsinhPravinsinh Chavda v. State of
Gujarat and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh .
The Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any
medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, o r any
witnesses to substantiate her allegations. We cannot ignore
the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her sec ond
Complaint dt. 06.12.1999 six days later on 12.12.1999. There
is also no evidence to substantiate the purported d emand
for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or his fa mily
and the investigative agencies in their own prudenc e
have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibit ion
Act, 1961 to the chargesheet.
12. In this respect, the Sessions Court has applied its
judicial mind to the allegations in the FIR & the m aterial on
record, and has rightly discharged the Appellants of the offences
under section 498A & 34 IPC. Notwithstanding the sa id
observation by the Sessions Court that the possibility of false
implication cannot be ruled out, the discharge of the Appellant
merely because the Complainant is a police officer is erroneous
and reflects poorly on the judicial decision making, which must
be strictly based on application of judicial principles to the
merits of the case. On the other hand, the High Court vide the
Impugned Order has traversed one step further and o vertly
emphasised that simply because the Complainant is a police
officer, it cannot be assumed that she could not have been a
victim of cruelty at the hands of her husband and in-laws. We
41
agree with the sensitive approach adopted by the High Court in
adjudicating the present case, however a judicial d ecision
cannot be blurred to the actual facts and circumsta nces of a
case. In this debate, it is only reasonable to re-iterate that the
Sessions Court in exercise of its revisionary jurisdiction and the
High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under
section 482 CrPC, must delve into the material on r ecord to
assess what the Complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
In the present case, such scrutiny of the allegations in the FIR
and the material on record reveals that no prima facie is made
out against the Appellant or his family. It is also borne from the
record that the divorce decree of their marriage, has already
been passed, and the same has never been challenged by the
Complainant wife, and hence has attained finality. Upon
consideration of the relevant circumstances and that the alleged
incidents pertain to the year 1999 and since then the parties
have moved on with their respective lives, it would be unjust
and unfair if the Appellants are forced to go throu gh the
tribulations of a trial.
13. It is rather unfortunate that the Complainant being
an officer of the State has initiated criminal machinery in such a
manner, where the aged parents-in-law, five sisters and one
tailor have been arrayed as an accused. Notwithstanding the
possibility of truth behind the allegations of crue lty, this
growing tendency to misuse legal provisions has tim e and
again been condemned by this Court. The observations
in Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana , Preeti
Gupta v. State of Jharkhandaptly captures this concern.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. The Apex Court in the case of RAJESH CHADDHA v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
7
, has held as follows:
“….. ….. …..
7
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1094
42
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the respectiv e
parties and having perused the record, the question remains
whether the High Court vide Impugned Order dt. 14.1 1.2018
whilst exercising its revisionary jurisdiction, was correct in
upholding the conviction of the Appellant under
Section 498A IPC & Section 4 D.P. Act, 1961. In that respect, it
is prudent to examine the statutory provisions, whi ch are as
under:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the
husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished wi th
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three y ears
and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For t he
purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wi lful
conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger
to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any pers on
related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any
property or valuable security or is on account of failure by
her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”
3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If
any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or
takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shal l be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less
than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of
such dowry, whichever is more. Provided that the Cour t
may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the
judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of
less than five years. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) s hall
apply to, or in relation to,— (a) presents which are given at
the time of a marriage to the bride without any dema nd
having been made in that behalf : Page 12 of 26 Provi ded
that such presents are entered in a list maintained in
accordance with the rules made under this Act; (b) presents
which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom
without any demand having been made in that behalf :
Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained
in accordance with the rules made under this Act : Provided
further that where such presents are made by or on be half
of the bride or any person related to the bride, such
43
presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is
not excessive having regard to the financial status of the
person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are
given.
4. Penalty for demanding dowry.— If any person
demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other
relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case
may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months, but which may extend to two years and with fi ne
which may extend to ten thousand rupees : Provided tha t
the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be
mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of
imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”
8. At the outset, an act of ‘cruelty’ for the purpose
of Section 498A, corresponds to a willful conduct o f such
nature, that may cause danger to the life, limb and health
of the woman, which is inclusive of the mental and
physical health and the harassment caused to her, b y
coercing her to meet unlawful demands or impossible
standards. Further, the demand for dowry in terms o f
Section 3 and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 refer s to
both a direct or indirect manner of demand for dowr y
made by the husband or his family members. In order to
meet the threshold of the offences under
Section 498A IPC & Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961,
the allegations cannot be ambiguous or made in thin air.
9. In the present case, the allegations made by the
Complainant are vague, omnibus and bereft of any
material particulars to substantiate this threshold . Apart
from claiming that Appellant husband harassed her f or
want of dowry, the Complainant has not given any
specific details or described any particular instan ce of
harassment. The allegations in the FIR, and the
depositions of the prosecution witnesses suggest th at on
multiple occasions, the Complainant wife was ousted
from the matrimonial house, and kicked and punched in
the presence of her father, PW-2 herein and she was
repeatedly tormented with dowry demands, and when
she was unable to honor them, the Appellant and her
family physically beat her up; whereas she has not
44
mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the
alleged harassment occurred. It is alleged that the
Complainant suffered a miscarriage, as she fell dow n,
when the Appellant and her family who pushed her ou t of
the house; however, no medical document from any
medical institution or hospital or nursery was prod uced to
substantiate the allegations.
10. Upon carefully considering the record, we find that
apart from the statements of PW-1 and PW-2, there i s no
evidence to substantiate the allegations of harassment and acts
of cruelty within the scope of Section 498A of IPC, and
Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. For this reason, we find merit in
the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, and are
of the considered view that there is no material on record to
establish the allegations of hurt or miscarriage, and of hurt and
criminal intimidation in terms of Section 323 r/w 3 4 and
Section 506 IPC respectively. The Trial Court has rightly held
that evidence of the Complainant is the only strong evidence
that she sustained injuries on various parts of her body due to
the physical assault by the accused persons, and that there was
no medical examination conducted by the Complainant , so as to
prove that the miscarriage was a consequence of the physical
assault.
11. The Trial Court has indeed applied its judicial mind to
the material on record whilst acquitting the Appellant and the
co-accused parents-in-law for offences under
Section 323 r/w 34 & Section 506 IPC. However, it appears that
the Trial Court had passed the order of conviction of the
Appellant under Section 498A IPC & Section 4 of the D.P. Act,
1961, merely on the possibility that the allegations and the
depositions of the PW-1 corroborated by PW2, are tr ue and
correct. Although one cannot deny the emotional or
mental torture that the Complainant may have underg one
in the marriage, however a cursory or plausible vie w
cannot be conclusive proof to determine the guilt o f an
individual under Section 498A & Section 4 of the D. P. Act,
1961, especially to obviate malicious criminal pros ecution
of family members in matrimonial disputes. In this respect,
we also cannot ignore that the FIR dt. 20.12.1999 w as
registered after the Appellant had filed the Divorc e Petition
under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 06.02.1999. In
45
consideration thereof and that the Complainant had cohabited
with the Appellant only for a period of about a year, it appears
that the FIR registered by the Complainant was not genuine.
12. In respect thereof, the High Court while exercising its
revisionary jurisdiction ought to have examined the correctness
of decision of the Trial Court in light of the material on record,
which reveals nothing incriminatory against the App ellant to
sustain a conviction under Section 498A IPC or Sect ion 4 of
the D.P. Act, 1961. Although we do not agree with t he
submission on behalf of the Appellant that the Impugned Order
dt. 14.11.2018 was passed in absentia, however the High Court
was well within its revisionary powers to discern whether an FIR
and the proceedings emanating therefrom were sustai nable. In
all certainty, it could have saved 6 years' worth of time for the
Appellant, who has endured litigation for over 20 years as of
today.
13. Notwithstanding the merits of the case, we are
distressed with the manner, the offences under
Section 498A IPC, and Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Ac t,
1961 are being maliciously roped in by Complainant
wives, insofar as aged parents, distant relatives, married
sisters living separately, are arrayed as accused, in
matrimonial matters. This growing tendency to appen d
every relative of the husband, casts serious doubt on the
veracity of the allegations made by the Complainant wife
or her family members, and vitiates the very object ive of
a protective legislation. The observations made by this
Hon'ble Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi
Narayana v. State of Telangana appropriately
encapsulates this essence as under:
“25. A mere reference to the names of family
members in a criminal case arising out of a
matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations
indicating their active involvement should be nippe d
in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of
judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to
implicate all the members of the husband's family
when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial
discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations
unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised
allegations cannot form the basis for criminal
46
prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such
cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the
legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of
innocent family members. In the present case,
appellant Nos. 2 to 6, who are the members of the
family of appellant No. 1 have been living in diffe rent
cities and have not resided in the matrimonial hous e
of appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 herein.
Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal
prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the
process of the law in the absence of specific
allegations made against each of them.”
14. The term “cruelty” is subject to rather cruel
misuse by the parties, and cannot be established
simpliciter without specific instances, to say the least.
The tendency of roping these sections, without
mentioning any specific dates, time or incident, we akens
the case of the prosecutions, and casts serious sus picion
on the viability of the version of a Complainant. W e
cannot ignore the missing specifics in a criminal
complaint, which is the premise of invoking crimina l
machinery of the State . Be that as it may, we are informed
that the marriage of the Appellant has already been dissolved
and the divorce decree has attained finality, hence any further
prosecution of the Appellant will only tantamount to an abuse of
process of law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. The Apex Court in the case of KAMAL v. STATE OF
GUJARAT
8
, has held as follows:
“….. ….. …..
10. A perusal of the impugned FIR would disclose
that the complainant at the time of lodging the FIR had
been living with her own parents. The allegations a re that
initially, after marriage, there were no issues. La ter,
8
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1726
47
when parents in law started living with her husband , she
had to suffer taunts at their end on trivial issues . When
she complained about this to her husband, he sided with
his parents and even assaulted the complainant. It is
alleged that she informed her parents and uncle about this, who
counselled her to have patience in the interest of the family. FIR
also discloses that since 2008 she is having a job. Initially with
Ugam Solutions and, later, as a lecturer for nine y ears. She
admits of having stayed at different places in rent ed
accommodation post her marriage. However, she alleg es that
she used to hand over her salary to her father-in-law who used
to deprive her of her money. Besides that, she alleges of her
husband having an affair with his business partner for the last
two years and because of that he had been constantly torturing
her, both physically and mentally, to end the relationship and
with that motive divorce petition has been filed.
11. What is important, for the purposes of deciding
this case, is that in the FIR there is no specific allegation
of demand of dowry by the accused. Further, the
allegation of harassment of the complainant at the
instance of the parents in law is limited to extend ing
taunts and custody related issues of minor children .
However, there is no disclosure about the nature of those
taunts. Admittedly, the second respondent was marri ed
to the first appellant in the year 2005 and for las t several
years since before lodging the FIR, the complainant had
been working and staying in rented accommodations a t
different places.Besides that, the FIR was lodged on
20.07.2019, just three days after service of summon s of
the divorce proceedings initiated by the first appe llant. In
these circumstances, we will have to consider wheth er
the impugned proceedings are vexatious and mala fid e,
particularly in the context of a matrimonial disput e where
time and again Courts have been cautioned to be
circumspect to obviate malicious prosecution of fam ily
members of the main accused.
12. Even if we assume that there are some
allegations of assault and of physical and mental t orture
of the complainant, but they are against the husban d. As
against the parents in law, the allegations are onl y of
extending taunts and of not parting with the money for
48
managing household expenses. Specific details in re spect
of those taunts have not been disclosed. Moreover, a few
taunts here and there is a part of everyday life wh ich for
happiness of the family are usually ignored. Intere stingly,
as per own allegations in the FIR, the complainant admits
that when she reported those issues to her parents and
uncle, she was counselled to bear patience. In the
circumstances, in our considered view, no case to
proceed against the parents in law, namely, the sec ond
and third appellant is made out. In so far as the first
appellant is concerned, there are allegations of physical and
mental torture of the complainant at his behest. Consequently,
the case may proceed qua the first appellant.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Judicial precedent speaking in consistent and cauti onary
voice has underscored that criminal law must not be
permitted to degenerate into an instrument of oppre ssion or
personal vengeance. The inherent powers of this Co urt
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C./528 of the BNSS ex ist
precisely to prevent such abuse and to secure the e nds of
justice.
18. What is more disquieting is, the indiscriminating
roping in of the parents-in-law and brother-in-law, despite
their residence in India, while the marital life wa s largely
lived abroad. It is therefore the Apex Court in the aforesaid
49
judgments cautions against this very tendency of
transforming a matrimonial dispute into a criminal dragnet
ensnaring every member of the husband’s family. Su ch
prosecutions founded on vague and omnibus allegatio ns or
even the complaints so registered on omnibus alleg ations,
do not advance justice, they in fact corrode it. T he
allegations in the case at hand, even at their high est, do not
constitute the offence alleged, they are in fact in herently
improbable. The continuation of investigation woul d serve
no purpose other than to prolong harassment, stigma tize the
petitioners and squander the precious time of crimi nal
Courts. The issuance of a look out circular against the 1
st
petitioner, on allegations so tenuous, would only c ompound
injustice. Therefore, to permit the criminal proce ss to
lumber forward would be to allow law to become a we apon
rather than a remedy. I thus, deem it appropriate to
exercise my jurisdiction under Section 482 of the C r.P.C. and
obliterate the very registration of crime against t hese
petitioners, to prevent it becoming an abuse of the process
of the law and resulting in miscarriage of justice.
50
19. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
O R D E R
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) FIR in Crime No.90 of 2024 registered before
Basavanagudi Women Police Station and pending befor e
the 37
th
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court
at Bangalore stands quashed qua the petitioners.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Bkp
CT:MJ
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