Supreme Court, India, Criminal Appeal, Unlawful Assembly, IPC Section 149, Death Penalty, Sentencing, CrPC, Murder, Vicarious Liability
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Allauddin Mian & Ors. Sharif Mian & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar

  Supreme Court Of India Criminal Appeal /343 And 446/1988
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Case Background

As per case facts, an unlawful assembly of six accused intended to kill Baharan Mian. When he escaped, accused Nos. 1 and 2, in frustration, fatally attacked his two infant ...

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PETITIONER:

ALLAUDDIN MIAN & ORS. SHARIF MIAN & ANR.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF BIHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/04/1989

BENCH:

AHMADI, A.M. (J)

BENCH:

AHMADI, A.M. (J)

NATRAJAN, S. (J)

CITATION:

1989 AIR 1456 1989 SCR (2) 498

1989 SCC (3) 5 JT 1989 (2) 171

1989 SCALE (1)945

ACT:

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Section 235 and

section 354(3)--Sentence--Decision--Sentencing court to

approach question seriously--Endeavour to see that all

relevant facts and circumstances bearing on sentence brought

on record--Sentence of severity imposed-Imperative for Judge

to indicate basis 'Special reason clause' in death sentence

cases indicates obligation to explain choice of sentence.

Indian Penal Code, 1860: Sections 34, 141, 149--Unlawful

assembly--Fastening of vicarious responsibility on a

member--Prosecution to prove act was done in prosecution of

common object of assembly.

HEADNOTE:

Accused Nos. 1 to 6, constituting an unlawful assembly

the common intention of which Was to kill Baharan Mian, came

to his house armed with deadly weapons. Baharan Mian, appre-

hending trouble, ran inside Co arm himself but his wife

prevented him from coming out again. At that time, Baharan

Mian's two infant daughters, Sahana Khatoon aged about seven

years and Chand Tara aged about seven months, were playing

in the 'dalan' of his house. Failing in their object to kill

Baharan Mlan, accused No. 1 gave farsa blows on the head,

abdomen and left thumb of Sahana Khatoon causing serious

injuries, and accused No. 2 gave one farsa blow on the head

of infant Chand Tara. As a result of these injuries, Sahana

Khatoon died the same day while Chand Tara died after 28

days.

Accused Nos.1 and 2 were charged under sections 302, 452

and 148 I.P.C., whereas accused Nos. 3 to 6 were sought to

be held vicariously liable under section 302/149 I.P.C.

Accused Nos. 3 and 4 were further charged under sections 447

and 148, I.P.C. and accused Nos. 5 & 6 were charged under

sections 447 and 147, I.P.C. The Trial Court convicted

accused Nos. 1 and 2 on all the three counts and awarded the

sentence of death to both of them for the commission of the

offence punishable under section 302, I.P.C. Accused Nos. 3

and 4 were convicted under sections 302/149, 447 and 148,

I.P.C. and for the offence under section 302/149, each of

them was directed to suffer imprison-

499

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ment for life. Accused Nos. 5 and 6 were convicted under

sections 302/149, 447 and 147, I.P.C. For the offence under

sections 302/149, I.P.C., they were sentenced to undergo

imprisonment for life.

The High Court dismissed the appeal of accused Nos. 1

and 2 and, while accepting the reference, confirmed the

sentence of death awarded to them for the murder of the two

infant girls. The conviction of the remaining four accused

under section 302/149 was, however, altered to sections

326/149 and the sentence of imprisonment for life given to

each of them was substituted by a sentence of rigorous

imprisonment for seven years. Their convictions and sen-

tences on the other counts were, however, maintained:

Before this Court it was contended on behalf of the

appellants that (1) the evidence adduced by the prosecution

was not reliable; (2) Even on the facts found proved by the

courts below, accused Nos. 1 to 6 could not be held guilty

of murder with the aid of section 149, I.P.C. as the kill-

ings of the two girls was outside the common object of the

unlawful assembly; (3) the facts of the case did not warrant

a death penalty in the case of accused Nos. 1 and 2, more so

because the procedural requirement of section 235(2) of the

Cr. P.C. was not followed in letter and spirit; and (4)

section 302, I.P.C., and section 354(3), Cr.P.C., insofar as

they permit the imposition of the death penalty were viola-

tive of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

While partly allowing the appeals by converting the

sentence of death in the case of accused nos. 1 and 2 to

imprisonment for life under section 302, I.P.C., and setting

aside the conviction of accused nos. 3 to 6 under section

326/149 I.P.C., the Court,

HELD: (1) There is no substance in the contention that

the prosecution evidence is unreliable and should not be

acted upon for confirming the conviction of the accused

persons. [508B-C]

(2) If the prosecution did not examine some persons who

were admittedly present at the scene of occurrence, on

learning that they were won over, it cannot be said that the

prosecution was unfair to the accused persons. The non-

examination of these persons cannot affect the probative

value of the evidence of other prosecution witnesses. [508F]

(3) Section 149. I.P.C., creates a. specific offence.

Since this section imposes a constructive penal liability,

it must be strictly construed. [509G]

500

(4) It is not the intention of the legislature in enact-

ing section 149 to render every member of an unlawful assem-

bly liable to punishment for every offence committed by one

or more of its members. In order to invoke section 149 it

must be shown that the incriminating act was done to accom-

plish the common object of the unlawful assembly. Even if an

act incidental to the common object is committed to accom-

plish the common object of the unlawful assembly, it must be

within the knowledge of other members as one likely to be

committed in prosecution of the common object. If the mem-

bers of the assembly knew or were aware of the likelihood of

a particular offence being committed in. prosecution of the

common object they would be liable for the same under sec-

tion 149. I.P.C. [510F-H]

(5) What is important in each case is to find out if the

offence was committed to accomplish the common object of the

assembly or was one which the members knew to be likely to

be committed. There must be a nexus between the common

object and the offence committed, and if it is found that

the same was committed to accomplish the common object,

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every member of the assembly will become liable for the

same. [509H; 510A-B]

(6) In the instant case, the common object of the unlaw-

ful assembly, as alleged in the charge, was to kill Baharan

Mian. When accused Nos. 1 and 2 realised that Baharan Mian

was beyond their reach. they. frustrated at their failure to

accomplish their mission, wielded their weapons on the

innocent girls, which was no part of the common object of

the unlawful assembly. For accomplishing their common object

it was not necessary to kill the two girls who were not a

hinderance to accused Nos. 1 and 2 accomplishing their

common object. Accused Nos. 3 to 6 cannot, therefore, be

convicted for the injuries caused to the two minor girls by

accused Nos. 1 and 2, with the aid of section 149. [511A-B]

(7) Section 302, I.P.C, casts a heavy duty on the Court

to choose between death and imprisonment for life. When the

Court is called upon to choose between the convict's cry 'I

want to live' and the prosecutor's demand 'he deserves to

die', it goes without saying that the Court must show a high

degree of concern and sensitiveness in the choice of sen-

tence. [511D-E]

(8) In our justice delivery system several difficult

decisions are left to the presiding officer, sometimes

without providing the scales or the weights for the same. In

cases of murder, however, since the choice

501

is between capital punishment and life imprisonment, the

legislature has provided a guideline in the form of sub-

section (3) of section 354 of the Code of Criminal Proce-

dure, 1973. [511E-F]

(9) When the law casts a duty on the Judge to state

reasons it follows that he is under a legal obligation to

explain his choice of the sentence. It may seem trite to say

so but the existence of the 'special reason clause' in the

above provision implies that the Court can in fit cases

impose the extreme penalty of death which negatives the

contention that there never can be a valid reason to visit

an offender with the death penalty, no matter how cruel,

gruesome or shocking the crime may be. [512A-C]

(10) Where a sentence of severity is imposed, it is

imperative that the Judge should indicate the basis upon

which he considers a sentence of that magnitude justified.

Unless there are special reasons, special to the facts of

the particular case, which can be cataloged as justifying a

severe punishment, the Judge would not award the death

sentence. If a Judge finds that he is unable to explain with

reasonable accuracy the basis for selecting the higher of

the two sentences, his choice should fail on the lower

sentence. [512D-E]

(11) The choice of the sentence has to be made after

following the procedure set out in sub-section (2) of sec-

tion 235 of the Code. Since the provision is intended to

give the accused an opportunity to place before the Court

all the relevant material having a bearing on the question

of sentence, there can be no doubt that the provision is

salutary and must be strictly followed. [513D, H; 514A]

(12) The requirement of hearing the accused is intended

to satisfy the rule of natural justice. In the case of life

or death, the presiding officer must show a high degree of

concern for the statutory right of the accused and should

not treat it as a mere formality to be crossed before making

the choice of the sentence. If the choice is made without

giving the accused an effective and real opportunity to

place his antecedents, social and economic background,

mitigating and extenuating circumstances, etc. before the

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Court, the Court's decision on the sentence would be vulner-

able. [514C]

(13) A sentencing decision taken without following the

requirements of sub-section (2) of section 235 of the Code

in letter and spirit may have to be replaced by an appropri-

ate order. In the instant case, the Trial Court actually

treated it as a mere formality as is evident from

502

the fact that it recorded the finding of guilt on 31st

March, 1987, and on the same day before the accused could

absorb and overcome the shock of conviction they were asked

if they had anything to say on the question of sentence.

Immediately thereafter the decision imposing the death

penalty on the two accused was pronounced. [514B, E]

(14) As a general rule, the Trial Courts should after

recording the conviction adjourn the matter to a future date

and call upon both the prosecution as well as the defence to

place the relevant material bearing on the question of

sentence before it and thereafter pronounce the sentence to

be imposed on the offender. [514F-G]

(15) In the instant case, the Trial Court did not attach

sufficient importance to the mandatory requirement of sub-

section (2) of section 235 of the Code. The High Court also

had before it only the scanty material placed before the

Sessions Judge when it confirmed the death penalty. Absence

of particulars of ancedents of accused, their socio economic

conditions, the impact of their crime on the community, etc.

makes the choice of punishment difficult. [514G-H]

(16) It is necessary that the maximum sentence pre-

scribed by law should be reserved for 'the rarest of rare'

cases which are of an exceptional nature. Sentences of

severity are imposed t9 reflect the seriousness of the

crime, to promote respect for the law, to provide just

punishment for the offence, to afford adequate deterrent to

criminal conduct and to protect the community from further

similar conduct. [515G]

(17) In the instant case, unfortunately the material for

choice of sentence is scanty. The motive for the crime is

obscure, the one stated. namely, the quarrel between two

infants of both sides, does not seem to be correct. The

killings were not for gain. The change shows that the target

was Baharan Mian, the father, and not the two infants. The

killing of the two infants was not in the contemplation of

any of the accused. Both the girls were the victims of the

offenders' ire resulting from frustration at the escape of

their target. There is nothing so uncommon about the crime

as to make the case an exceptional one. The mere fact that

infants are killed, without more, is not sufficient to bring

the case within the category of 'the rarest of rare' cases.

[516C-E]

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1980] 2 SCC 684; and

Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983] 3 SCC 470, referred

to.

JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.

343 and 446 of 1988.

503

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.4.1988 of the Patna

High Court in Crl. A. No. 140 of 1987 and Death Ref. No. 3

of 1987 and Crl. A. No. 136 of 1987.

R.K. Garg, Salman Khurshid, Rakesh Luthra, Irshad Ahmad,

Vinayak D. Phadke, Mrs. Bimla Sinha and Gopal Singh for the

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Appellants.

A. Sharan, D. Goburdhan, D.N. Goburdhan and B .B. Singh

for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

AHMADI, J. The appellants in these two appeals by spe-

cial leave are the six accused persons who were arraigned

before the learned Third Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan,

for trial. Criminal Appeal No. 343 of 1988 is by original

accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 (Allauddin Mian, Keyamuddin Mian,

Saheb Hussain and Afzal Mian) and Criminal Appeal No. 466 of

1988_is by original accused Nos. 4 and 6 (Sarif Mian and

Mainuddin Mian). For the sake of convenience we will refer

to them by their original positions in the Trial Court.

AccuSed Nos. 1 and 2 were charged with the commission of

offences punishable under Sections 302, 452 and 148, I.P.C.

The prosecution case was that accused Nos. 1 and 2 along

with accused Nos. 3 to 6 constituted an unlawful assembly,

the common object of which was to kill PW 6 Baharan Mian and

in pursuance of the said object accused No. 1 caused the

death of Sahana Khatoon aged about seven years and accused

No. 2 caused the death of Chand Tara aged about seven

months. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 were substantively charged

under Section 302, I.P.C., whereas accused Nos. 3 to 6 were

sought to be held vicariously liable under Section 302/149,

I.P.C. Accused Nos. 3 and 4 were further charged under

Sections 447 and 148, I.P.C., and accused Nos. 5 and 6 were

charged under Sections 447 and 147, I.P.C. The Trial Court

convicted accused Nos. 1 and 2 on all the three counts and

awarded the sentence of death to both of them for the com-

mission of the offence punishable under Section 302, I.P.C.

Each of them was also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprison-

ment for one year on each count under Sections 148 and 452,

I.P.C. The substantive sentences were directed to run con-

currently. Accused Nos. 3 and 4 were convicted under Sec-

tions 302/149, 447 and 148, IPC and for the offence under

Section 302/149 each of them was directed to suffer impris-

onment for life. For the offences under Sections 148 and

447,/.P.C., they

504

were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonments for one year

and three months, respectively. The substantive sentences

were ordered to run concurrently. Accused Nos. 5 and 6 were

convicted under Sections 302/149, 447 and 147, I.P.C. For

the offence under Section 302/149, I.P.C., they were sen-

tenced to undergo imprisonment for life whereas for the

offences punishable under Sections 447 and 147, I.P.C., they

were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonments for three

months and six months, respectively. The substantive sen-

tences were ordered to run concurrently. Since accused Nos.

1 and 2 were awarded the death penalty a reference was made

to the High Court which came to be numbered as Reference No.

3 of 1987. Accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 preferred an appeal,

Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 1987, challenging their convic-

tions and sentences awarded to them by the Trial Court.

Accused Nos. 4 and 6 preferred a separate appeal, Criminal

Appeal No. 136 of 1987, against their convictions and sen-

tences by the Trial Court. The said reference and both the

appeals were disposed of by the High. Court by a common

judgment. The High Court dismissed the appeal insofar as

accused Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned and, while accepting the

reference, confirmed the sentence of death awarded to them

for the murder of two the infant girls. The conviction of

the remaining four accused under Section 302/149 was, howev-

er, altered to Section 326/149 and the sentence of imprison-

ment for life given to each of them was substituted by a

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sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Their

convictions and sentences on the other counts were, however,

maintained. Feeling aggrieved by the convictions and sen-

tences awarded to them on different counts all the six

accused persons have preferred the present two appeals by

special leave.

Briefly stated the prosecution case is that on the

afternoon of 25th July, 1985 around 4.30 p.m. when PW 6

Baharan Mian was sitting at the entrance of his house, the

aforesaid six accused persons came from the west armed with

deadly weapons; accused Nos. 1 and 2 were carrying 'farsas',

accused Nos. 3 and 4 were armed with spears (bhalas) and

accused Nos. 5 and 6 were armed with sticks (Lathis). On

seeing them PW 6 got up and went to the 'osra' (verandah) of

his house. Accused No. 3 began to untie the buffalo tethered

in front of the house while the other accused persons show-

ered abuses on PW 6, to which the latter objected. There-

upon, accused Nos. 4 and 6 shouted 'Sale ko jan se mar do'.

Immediately thereafter, accused Nos. 1 and 2 moved menacing-

ly towards PW 6. The two infants Sahana Khatoon and Chand

Tara were then playing in the 'dalan' outside the western

room. On seeing accused Nos. 1 and 2 approaching him duly

armed with farsas PW 6 apprehended trouble and ran into the

adjoining room to

505

arm himself with a spear. His wife, PW 5 Laila Khatun, who

was in the room, however, prevented him from going out for

fear that he may be done to death by the accused persons.

Realising that PW 6 has entered the inner room and was

prevented by his wife from coming out, accused No. 1 gave

farsa blows on the head, abdomen and left thumb of Sahana

Khatoon causing serious injuries. Accused No. 2 gave one

farsa blow on the head of infant Chand Tara. The neighbors

PW 2 Ful Mohammad Mian, PW 3 Ali Asgar, PW 4 Vidya Giri and

others, namely, Jalaluddin Ahmad, Sadik Mian, Ram Chandra

Prasad, Bhikhari Mian, etc. intervened, pacified the assail-

ants and sent them away. After the assailants had left the

scene of occurrence the two injured girls were removed to

the city dispensary where the First Information Report of PW

6 was recorded at about 6.45 p.m. Unfortunately, Sahana

Khatoon died shortly after she was admitted to the dispen-

sary. Her younger sister Chand Tara succumbed to her in-

juries on 23rd August, 1985. Immediately after the two

injured were removed to the dispensary for treatment, PW 7

Dr. Haliwant Singh who examined Sahana Khatoon noted that

she had a sharp cutting injury on the anterior half of the

head causing a fracture of cranial bone with the brain

substance protruding out, a sharp cutting injury on the left

illiao fossa and a sharp cutting injury on the left thumb

and left index finger. PW 1 Dr. Anil Kumar Verma, the Senior

Assistant Surgeon in Siwan Sadar Hospital, performed the

autopsy on the dead body of Sahana Khatoon on the afternoon

of 26th July, 1985. Since the fact that Sahana Khatoon died

a homicidal death is not in dispute, we need not set out the

findings recorded by PW 1 in his postmortem report. Suffice

it to say that in the opinion of PW 1 death was due to shock

and haemorrhage resulting from the injuries caused to the

victim with the farsa.

The injured Chand Tara was examined on the same day by

PW 7. He had noticed a sharp cutting injury on the anterior

half of the head slightly to the right of the mid-line with

the brain matter coming out from the posterior half. She was

admitted as an indoor patient but was discharged on 13th

August, 1985. A few days later she died on 23rd August,

1985. PW 10 Dr. Ahmad performed the autopsy on the dead body

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of Chand Tara and he found that she had an infected ulcer 3"

x 1-1/4" by cranial cavity deep communicated with brain on

the anteriofrontal portion of the head, On dissection the

meningities and the brain matter were found to be congested.

In his view, the meningitis and encephalitis which had

resulted due to infection resulting from the injury caused

by a sharp cutting weapon like a farsa were the cause of

death. It is evident from the above evidence that Chand Tara

also died a homicidal death.

506

The finding that both the girls died a

homicidal death is unassailable in view of the

clear evidence of the aforesaid three medical-

men, namely, PW 1, PW 7, and PW 10. The ques-

tion then is whether the appellants are re-

sponsible for their deaths and if so, to what

extent? To bring home the guilt against the

six accused persons, the prosecution examined

five eye witnesses to the occurrence, namely,

PWs 2 to 6. These five eye witnesses have

unfolded the prosecution case that the six

accused persons had formed an unlawful assem-

bly the common object whereof was to kill PW 6

Baharan Mian. In pursuance of that common

object they, duly armed with weapons such as

farsas, bhalas and lathis, entered the resi-

dential premises of PW 6 on the evening of

25th July, 1985 and committed the acts set out

earlier. The courts below found that the

presence of PWs 5 and 6 in the house at that

point of time could not be doubted. In fact

these accused persons had come to the house to

kill PW 6. PWs 2, 3 and 4 who can be said to

be dependable witnesses have also supported

the prosecution case as narrated by PWs 5 and

6. The evidence of these prosecution witnesses

stands further corroborated by the evidence of

PW 7 who had seen the wounds on the two in-

jured soon after the incident. PWs 1 and 10

who performed the post-mortem examination on

the dead bodies also lend corroboration to the

testimony of the eye witnesses. The courts

below, therefore, recorded the convictions

relying on the evidence of the aforesaid

witnesses as set out earlier. In the backdrop

of these facts, the learned counsel for the

accused made the following submissions:

1. The evidence adduced by the prosecution to

bring home the guilt against the accused,

particularly the evidence of PWs 2 to 6, is

not reliable and should not be acted upon.

2. Even on the facts found proved by the

courts below, the four accused persons, name-

ly, accused Nos. 3 to 6 cannot be held guilty

of murder with the aid of Section 149, I.P.C.

as the killings of the two girls was outside

the common object of the unlawful assembly

3. Even if the conviction of accused Nos. 1

and 2 for the murder of the two girls is

confirmed, the facts of the case do not war-

rant a death penalty, more so because the

procedural requirement of Section 235(2) of

the Cr. P.C. was not followed in letter and

spirit, and

4. Section 302, I.P.C., and Section 354(3),

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Cr. P.C., insofar as they permit the imposi-

tion of the death penalty are violative of

507

Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of

India.

We will immediately proceed to deal with these

contentions.

The learned counsel Shri Garg took us through the evi-

dence of the five eye witnesses with a view to satisfying us

that their version regarding the incident was not free from

blemish and it would be highly unsafe to place implicit

reliance on their evidence. We have carefully scrutinised

the evidence of the aforesaid five eye witnesses and we are

inclined to think that their evidence was correctly appreci-

ated by both the Courts below. The presence of PWs 5 and 6,

the parents of the two victim girls, in the house at that

point of time cannot be disputed. In fact, the accused

persons had constituted an unlawful assembly with a view to

killing PW 6, the father of the two girls. With that avowed

object they went, duly armed with lethal weapons, to launch

an attack on PW 6. After accused No. 3 had untied the buf-

fallo notwithstanding the protest from PW 6, accused Nos. 4

and 6 gave the call to kill PW 6. Encouraged by this call

accused Nos. 1 and 2 moved menacingly towards PW 6 who was

then standing in 'osra'. Realising that accused nos. 1 and 2

were out to kill him, PW 6 went inside the room to fetch a

bhala to defend himself. His wife PW 5 who was in the room

sensing danger to his life stood in his way and did not

permit him to go out and face accused Nos. 1 and 2. PWs 2, 3

and 4 who were neighbours saw the incident from close quar-

ters when accused Nos. 1 and 2 dealt fatal blows with their

farsas to the two girls who were playing in the 'dalan'. PW

2 who is the brother of PW 6 was in the field to the east of

the house and was, therefore, in a position to see the

incident. PW 3 was returning from the bazar when he saw the

accused persons at the door of PW 6. He heard the accused

persons uttering abuses and the call given by accused Nos. 4

and 6 to kill PW 6. He also saw the accused persons entering

the house and going towards the room which PW 6 had entered

to fetch a bhala. In the end he saw accused Nos. 1 and 2

inflicting farsa blows on the two girls. He was cross-exam-

ined at length but except for minor contradictions here and

there which are only to be/expected when a witness gives

evidence after a lapse of time, nothing substantial shaking

the substratum of the prosecution case has surfaced to

discredit him. PW 4 was at the saw mill of Ram Chandra

Prasad when he saw the accused persons coming from the west

and proceeding towards the east.-He saw these persons going

to the house of PW 6 and heard them showering abuses. In his

cross-examination an attempt was made to show that he could

not be present at Ram Chandra Prasad's saw mill at that

hours since he was a Government Servant and admittedly his

normal duty hours were from

508

10 a.m. to 5 p.m. Further effort was to show that he was

connected with a case between Bhikhari Dass and Sita Ram

Prasad pending under Section 145, Cr. P.C. in respect of

possession of some land. He has also disowned knowledge of

any dispute between Bhikhari Dass and Mainuddin Mian in

respect of another parcel of land. He was cross-examined at

length to prove that he was an interested and a biased

witness. Even if the evidence of this witness is ignored,

there is sufficient evidence on record to support the find-

ings recorded by both the courts below. We are, therefore,

of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention

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of the learned counsel for the accused that the prosecution

evidence is not reliable and should not be acted upon for

confirming the conviction of the accused persons.

It was next submitted by learned counsel for the accused

that some of the prosecution witnesses, namely, Jallaluddin,

Bhikhari Mian and Ram Chandra Prasad who were admittedly

present at the scene of occurrence according to the prosecu-

tion and had witnessed the entire incident were deliberately

dropped with a view to suppressing the truth. We cannot

accept this contention for the simple reason that apart from

both PW 5 and PW 6 having deposed that they were pressurised

by the defence the High Court has found in paragraph 36 of

its judgment that efforts were made by the defence to scare

away the witnessess from giving evidence. There is ample

material on record to conclude that considerable pressure

was exerted on the prosecution witnesses to stay away from

the witness box. Some succumbed to the threats and pressure

while some others did not and displayed courage to give

evidence and state the truth. In this backdrop, if the

prosecution did not examine Jallaluddin, Ram Chandra Prasad

and Bhikhari Mian on learning that they were won over it

cannot be said that the prosecution was unfair to the ac-

cused persons. Mr. Garg submitted that there was nothing to

show that the accused persons were in any way guilty of

pressurising or threatening the witnesses. That is besides

the point. What is relevant is the fact it so happened.

Therefore, the non-examination of the aforesaid witnesses

cannot affect the probative value of the evidence of other

prosecution witnesses.

We now proceed to consider whether accused Nos. 3 to 6

have been rightly convicted with the aid of Section 149 for

the acts of accused Nos. 1 and 2. Section 141, I.P.C.,

defines an unlawful assembly as an assembly of five or more

persons whose common object is to commit any one of the five

acts enumerated therein. The explanation to that section

makes it clear that an assembly which was not unlawful when

it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly.

509

Section 142 states: whoever, being aware of facts which

render any assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally

joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a

member of an unlawful assembly. Section 143 sets out the

punishment for being a member of an unlawful assembly.

Section 144 prescribes the punishment for joining an unlaw-

ful assembly armed with deadly weapons. Section 145 pre-

scribes the punishment for joining or continuing in an

unlawful assembly which has been commanded to disperse.

Section 146 defines rioting. It says that whenever force or

violence is used by an unlawful assembly, or by any member

thereof, in prosecution of the common object of such assem-

bly, every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence

of rioting. Section 147 then prescribes the punishment for

rioting. Section 148 prescribes the punishment for rioting

by members of an unlawfully assembly armed with deadly

weapons. Then comes Section 149 which reads as under:

"If an offence is committed by any member of

an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the

common object of that assembly, or such as the

members of that assembly knew to be likely to

be committed in prosecution of that object,

every person who, at the time of the commit-

ting of that offence, is a member of the same

assembly, is guilty of that offence."

Therefore, in order to fasten vicarious responsibility on

any member of an unlawful assembly the prosecution must

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prove that the act constituting an offence was done in

prosecution of the common object of that assembly or the act

done is such as the members of that assembly knew to be

likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object

of that assembly. Under this section, therefore, every

member of an unlawful assembly renders himself liable for

the criminal act or acts of any other member or members of

that assembly provided the same is/are done in prosecution

of the common object or is/are such as every member of that

assembly knew to be likely to be committed. This section

creates a specific offence and makes every member of the

unlawful assembly liable for the offence or offences commit-

ted in the course of the occurrence provided the same

was/were committed in prosecution of the common object or

was/were such as the members of that assembly knew to be

likely to be committed. Since this section imposes a con-

structive penal liability, it must be strictly construed as

it seeks to punish members of an unlawful assembly for the

offence or offences committed by their associate or associ-

ates in carrying out the common object of the assembly. What

is important in each case is to

510

find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the

common object of the assembly or was one which the members

knew to be likely to be committed. There must be a nexus

between the common object and the offence committed and if

it is found that the same was committed to accomplish the

common object every member of the assembly will become

liable for the same. Therefore, any offence committed by a

member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of anyone or

more of the five objects mentioned in Section 141 will

render his companies constituting the unlawful assembly

liable for that offence with the aid of Section 149, I.P.C.

In the present case, the common object of the unlawful

assembly as alleged in the charge was to kill PW 6 Baharan

Mian. To accomplish that objective accused Nos. 1 and 2 went

after PW 6. Sensing danger PW 6 ran into the adjoining room

to fetch a spear to defend himself. His wife PW 5, however,

blocked his way and did not permit him to go out. When

accused Nos. 1 and 2 realised that PW 6 was beyond their

reach, they, frustrated at their failure to accomplish their

mission, wielded their weapons on the innocent girls who

were playing in the Dalan. The common object having thus

been frustrated, accused Nos. 1 and 2 took out their wrath

on the innocent girls which was no part of the common object

of the unlawful assembly. It was not necessary to kill these

girls to accomplish their object of killing PW 6 as these

two girls had not prevented them from reaching PW 6. The

learned counsel for the accused, therefore, rightly submit-

ted that while accused Nos. 1 and 2 can be punished for

their individual acts committed after the common object

stood frustrated and abandoned on PW 6 placing himself

beyond their reach, the other members of the unlawful assem-

bly could not be punished for the acts of accused Nos. 1 and

2 as the killing of the girls was no part of the common

object of the assembly. Once PW 6was beyond the reach of his

two tormenters, the common object to kill him stood frus-

trated and whatever the individual members did thereafter

could not be said to have been done in prosecution of the

common object of the assembly. It is not the intention of

the legislature in enacting Section 149 to render every

member of an unlawful assembly liable to punishment for

every offence committed by one or more of its members. In

order to invoke Section 149 it must be shown that the in-

criminating act was done to accomplish the common object of

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the unlawful assembly. Even if an act incidental to the

common Object is committed to accomplish the common object

of the unlawful assembly it must be within the knowledge of

other members as one likely to be committed in prosecution

of .the common object. If the members of the assembly knew

or were aware of the likelihood of a particular offence

being committed in prosecution of the common object they

would be liable for the same

511

under Section 149, I.P.C. In the instant case, however, the

members constituting the unlawful assembly had gone to the

house of PW 6 to kill him. That was the common object of the

unlawful assembly. For accomplishing that common object it

was not necessary to kill the two girls who were not an

hinderance to accused Nos. 1 and 2 accomplishing their

common object. We are, therefore, of the opinion that ac-

cused Nos. 3 to 6 cannot be convicted for the injuries

caused to the two minor girls by accused Nos. 1 and 2 with

the aid of Section 149, I.P.C. We, therefore, set aside the

conviction under Section 326/149, I.P.C., and also the

sentence imposed on accused Nos. 3 to 6 on that count. We,

however, hold accused Nos. 3 and 4 guilty under Sections 447

and 148, I.P.C., and confirm the sentences awarded to them

on those counts. So also we hold accused Nos. 5 and 6 guilty

under Sections 447 and 147, IPC and confirm their sentences

for the said offences.

Having come to the conclusion that Allauddin Mian and

Keyambuddin Mian are guilty of murder, the next question is

what punishment should be awarded to them, namely, whether

extinction of life or incarceration for life. Section 302,

IPC casts a heavy duty on the Court to choose between death

and imprisonment for life. When the Court is called upon to

choose between the convicts cry 'I want to live' and the

prosecutor's demand 'he deserves to die' it goes without

saying that the Court must show a high degree of concern and

sensitiveness in the choice of sentence. In our justice

delivery system several difficult decisions are left to the

presiding officers, sometimes without providing the scales

or the weights for the same. In cases of murder, however,

since the choice is between capital punishment and life

imprisonment the legislature has provided a guideline in the

form of Subsection (3) of Section 354 of the Code of Crimi-

nal Procedure, 1973 ("the Code") which reads as under:

"When the conviction for an offence is punish-

able with death or, in the alternative, with

imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a

term of years, the judgment shall state the

reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the

case of sentence of death, the special reasons

for such sentence."

This provision makes it obligatory in cases of conviction

for an offence punishable with death or with imprisonment

for life or for a term of years to assign reasons .in sup-

port of the sentence awarded to the convict and further

ordains that in case the Judge awards the death penalty,

"special reasons" for such sentence shall be stated in the

512

judgment. When the law casts a duty on the Judge to state

reasons it follows that he is under a legal obligation to

explain his choice of the sentence. It may seem trite to say

so, but the existence of the 'special reasons clause' in the

above provision implies that the Court can in fit cases

impose the extreme penalty of death which negatives the

contention that there never can be a valid reason to visit

an offender with the death penalty, no matter how cruel,

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gruesome or shocking the crime may be. Basing his submission

on what is described as the humanitarian ideology or the

rehabilitarian philosophy, Mr. Garg submitted that any law

which permits the supreme right to life being sacrificed for

the failure of the State to establish a social order in

which such crimes are not committed must be struck down as

offending Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. While

rejecting the demand of the protagonist of the reformatory

theory for the abolition of the death penalty the legisla-

ture in its wisdom thought that the 'special reasons clause'

should be a sufficient safeguard against arbitrary imposi-

tion of the extreme penalty. Where a sentence of severity is

imposed, it is imperative that the Judge should indicate the

basis upon which he considers a sentence of that magnitude

justified. Unless there are special reasons, special to the

facts of the particular case, which can be catalogued as

justifying a severe punishment the Judge would not award the

death sentence. It may be stated that if a Judge finds that

he is unable to explain with reasonable accuracy the basis

for selecting the higher of the two sentences his choice

should fall on the lower sentence. In all such cases the law

casts an obligation on the Judge to make his choice after

carefully examining the pros and cons of each case. It must

at once be conceded that offenders of some particularly

grossly brutal crimes which send tremors in the community

have to be firmly dealt with to protect the community from

the perpetrators of such crimes. Where the incidence of a

certain crime is rapidly growing and is assuming menacing

proportions, for example, acid pouring or bridge burning, it

may be necessary for the Courts to award exemplary punish-

ments to protect the community and to deter others from

committing such crimes. Since the legislature in its wisdom

thought that in some rare cases it may still be necessary to

impose the extreme punishment of death to deter others and

to protect the society and in a given case the country, it

left the choice of sentence to the judiciary with the rider

that the Judge may visit the convict with the extreme pun-

ishment provided there exist special reasons for so doing.

In the face of this statutory provision which is consistent

with Article 21 of the Constitution which enjoins that the

personal liberty or life of an individual shall not be taken

except according to the procedure established by law, we are

unable to countenance counsel's extreme submission of death

in no

513

case. The submission that the death penalty violates Arti-

cles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution was negatived by this

Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1980] 2 SCC 684.

Mr. Garg, however, submitted that the said decision needs

re-consideration as the learned Judges constituting the

majority did not have the benefit of the views of Bhagwati,

J. who ruled to the contrary. We are not impressed by this

submission for the simple reason that the reasons which

prevailed with Bhagwati, J., could not have been unknown to

the learned Judges constituting the majority.

Even a casual glance at the provisions of the Penal Code

will show that the punishments have been carefully graded

corresponding with the gravity of offences; in grave wrongs

the punishments prescribed are strict whereas for minor

offences leniency is shown. Here again there is considerable

room for manoeuvre because the choice of the punishment is

left to the discretion of the Judge with only the outer

limits stated. There are only a few cases where a minimum

punishment is prescribed. The question then is what proce-

dure does the Judge follow for determining the punishment to

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be imposed in each case to fit the crime? The choice has to

be made after following the procedure set out in sub-section

(2) of Section 235 of the Code. That sub-section reads as

under:

"If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall,

unless he proceeds in accordance with the

provisions of Section 360, hear the accused on

the question of sentence, and then pass sen-

tence on him according to law."

The requirement of hearing the accused is intended to satis-

fy the rule of natural' justice. It is a fundamental re-

quirement of fairplay that the accused who was hitherto

concentrating on the prosecution evidence on the question of

guilt should, on being found guilty, be asked if he has

anything to say or any evidence to tender on the question of

sentence. This is all the more necessary since the Courts

are generally required to make the choice from a wide range

of discretion in the matter of sentencing. To assist the

Court in determining the correct sentence to be imposed the

legislature introduced sub-section (2) to Section 235. The

said provision therefore satisfies a dual purpose; it satis-

fies the rule of natural justice by according to the accused

an opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence

and at the same time helps the Court to choose the sentence

to be awarded. Since the provision is intended to give the

accused an opportunity to place before the Court all the

relevant material having a bearing on the

514

question of sentence there can be no doubt that the provi-

sion is salutary and must be strictly followed. It is clear-

ly mandatory and should not be treated as a mere formality.

Mr. Garg was, therefore, justified in making a grievance

that the Trial Court actually treated it as a mere formality

as is evident from the fact that it recorded the finding of

guilt on 31st March, 1987, on the same day before the ac-

cused could absorb and overcome the shock of conviction they

were asked if they had anything to say on the question of

sentence and immediately thereafter the decision imposing

the death penalty on the two accused was pronounced. In a

case of life or death as stated earlier, the presiding

officer must show a high degree of concern for the statutory

tight of the accused and should not treat it as a mere

formality to be crossed before making the choice of sen-

tence. If the choice is made, as in this case, without

giving the accused an effective and real opportunity to

place his antecedents, social and economic background,

mitigating and extenuating circumstances, etc., before the

Court, the Court's decision on the sentence would be vulner-

able. We need hardly mention that in many cases a sentenc-

ing.decision has far more serious consequences on the of-

fender and his family members than in the case of a purely

administrative decision; a fortiori, therefore, the princi-

ple of fairplay must apply with greater vigour in the case

of the former than the latter. An administrative decision

having civil consequences, if taken without giving a hearing

is generally struck down as violative of the rule of natural

justice. Likewise a sentencing decision taken without fol-

lowing the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 235 of

the Code in letter and spirit would also meet a similar fate

and may have to be replaced by an appropriate order. The

sentencing court must approach the question seriously and

must endeavour to see that all the relevant facts and cir-

cumstances bearing on the question of sentence are brought

on record. Only after giving due weight to the mitigating as

well as the aggravating circumstances placed before it, it

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 16

must pronounce the sentence. We think as a general rule the

Trial Courts should after recording the conviction adjourn

the matter to a future date and call upon both the prosecu-

tion as well as the defence to place the relevant material

bearing on the question of sentence before it and thereafter

pronounce the sentence to be imposed on the offender. In the

present case, as pointed out earlier, we are afraid that

tile learned Trial Judge did not attach sufficient impor-

tance to the mandatory requirement of sub-section (2) of

Section 235 of the Code. The High Court also had before it

only the scanty material placed before the learned Sessions

Judge when it confirmed the death penalty.

Apart from what we have said earlier, we may now proceed to

515

consider whether the imposition of death penalty on the two

accused persons found guilty of murder is justified. The

Trial Court has dealt with the question of sentence in

paragraphs 42 to 44 of its judgment. The reason which

weighed with the Trial Court is: it is one of the gravest

cases of extreme culpability in which two innocent and

helpless babies were butchered in a barbarous manner. After

taking note of the mitigating circumstances that both the

offenders were married young men with children, the Trial

Court found that since the murders were committed without

provocation and in cold blood there, was no room for lenien-

cy as the crime was so abhorrent that it shocked the con-

science of the court. The High Court while maintaining the

conviction of the said two accused persons proceeded to deal

with the question of sentence thus:

"The conviction of Allauddin Mian and Keyamud-

din Mian having been upheld the question is

whether the reference should be accepted and

the sentence of death against them be upheld.

In my view Allauddin Mian and Keyamuddin Mian

have shown extreme mental depravity in causing

serious fatal injuries to helpless girls of

the age of 7/8 years and 7 months. In my view,

therefore, this murder can be characterised as

rarest of the rare cases. the extreme mental

depravity exhibited by Allauddin Mian and

Keyamuddin Mian impels me to uphold the sen-

tence imposed on Allauddin Mian and Keyamuddin

Mian by the learned Additional Sessions

Judge."

It will be seen from the above, that the courts below

were considerably moved by the fact that the victims were

innocent and helpless infants who had not provided any

provocation for the ruthless manner in which they were

killed. No one can deny the fact that the murders were

ghastly. However, in order that the sentences may be proper-

ly graded to fit the degree of gravity of each case, it is

necessary that the maximum sentence prescribed by law

should, as observed in Bachan Singh's case (supra), be

reserved for 'the rarest of rare' cases which are of an

exceptional nature. Sentences of severity are imposed to

reflect the seriousness of the crime, to promote respect for

the law, to provide just punishment for the offence, to

afford adequate deterrent to criminal conduct and to protect

the community from further similar conduct. It serves a

three-fold purpose (i) punitive (ii) deterrent and (iii)

protective. That is why this Court in Bachan Singh's case

observed that when the question of choice of sentence is

under consideration the Court must not only look to the

crime and the victim but also the

516

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circumstances of the criminal and the impact of the crime.

on the community. Unless the nature of the crime and the

circumstances of the offender reveal that the criminal is a

menace to the society and the sentence of life imprisonment

would be altogether inadequate, the Court should ordinarily

impose the lessor punishment and not the extreme punishment

of death which should be reserved for exceptional cases

only. In the subsequent decision of Machhi Singh v. State of

Punjab, [1983] 3 SCC 470 this Court, after culling out the

guidelines laid down in Bachan Singh's case, observed that

only in those exceptional cases in which the crime is so

brutal, diabolical and revolting as to shock the collective

conscience of the community, would it be permissible to

award the death sentence. In the present case, unfortunately

the material for choice of sentence is scanty. The motive

for the crime is obscure, the one stated, namely, the quar-

rel between two infants of both sides, does not seem to be

correct. The killings were not for gain. The charge shows

that the target was PW 6, the father, and not the two in-

fants. The killing of the two infants was not in the contem-

plation of any of the accused. Both the girls were the

victims of the offenders' ire resulting from frustration at

the escape of their target. There is nothing so uncommon

about the crime as to make the case an exceptional one. The

mere fact that infants are killed, without more, is not

sufficient to bring the case within the category of 'the

rarest of rare' cases.

In Bachan Singh's case the question of laying down

standards for categorising cases in which the death penalty

could be imposed was considered and it was felt that it

would be desirable to indicate the broad guidelines consist-

ent with section 354(3) of the Code without attempting to

formulate rigid standards. That was because it was felt that

standardisation of the sentencing process would leave little

room for judicial discretion to take account of variations

in culpability even within the same category of cases. After

referring to the aggravating circumstances (Para 202) and

the mitigating circumstances (Para 206) pointed out by

counsel, the Court observed that while 'these ,were relevant

factors it would not be desirable to fetter judicial discre-

tion. It pointed out that these factors were not exhaustive

and cautioned: 'courts, aided by broad illustrative guide-

lines indicated by us, will discharge the onerous function

with evermore scrupulous care and human concern' consistent

with Section 354(3) of the Code. In the subsequent decision

in Machhi Singh's case, the Court tried to indicate the type

of cases which may fall within the exceptional class without

attempting to introduce rigidity. It would not be fair to

read the decision as an attempt to fetter judicial discre-

tion. Even in cases of the

517

type indicated in that case, circumstances may vary, which

would necessitate a different approach. For example, the

circumstances of this case show that the offenders had

killed the two girls not because of any hatred for them or

to accomplish their objective but out of frustration and

anger at having lost their target. Unfortunately as the

trial Judge did not give time to the convicts to reflect on

the question of sentence, the chance, however remote, of the

true motive for the crime surfacing was lost. The anteced-

ents of the accused, their socioeconomic conditions, the

impact of their crime on the community etc., have not come

on record. The absence of these particulars makes the choice

of punishment difficult. In view of what we have observed

earlier and having regard to the circumstances in which the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 16

murders took place, we think the extreme punishment of death

is not warranted.

In the result both the appeals are partly allowed. The

conviction of accused Nos. 1 and 2 under all the heads is

confirmed but their sentence of death for killing Shahna

Khatoon and Chand Tara, respectively, is converted to im-

prisonment for life. So far as accused Nos. 3 to 6 are

concerned, their conviction and sentence under Section 326/

149, 1.P.C. is set aside; however, their conviction and

sentence under the other heads is maintained. Their bail

bonds will stand cancelled if they have already served out

their sentences; otherwise they will surrender to their bail

and serve out the remaining sentence. The appeals will stand

disposed of accordingly.

R.S.S. Appeals allowed

partly.

518

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