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A.M. Mathur Vs. Pramod Kumar Gupta

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /1537/1990
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Case Background

As per case facts, a High Court Judge, while allowing a writ petition and delivering a concurring opinion, made disparaging remarks attributing mala fides to the State Government. These strictures ...

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Document Text Version

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7

PETITIONER:

A.M. MATHUR

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

PRAMOD KUMAR GUPTA

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/03/1990

BENCH:

SHETTY, K.J. (J)

BENCH:

SHETTY, K.J. (J)

SAHAI, R.M. (J)

CITATION:

1990 AIR 1737 1990 SCR (2) 110

1990 SCC (2) 533 JT 1990 (1) 545

1990 SCALE (1)527

ACT:

Practice and Procedure: Judicial restraint--Need

for--High Court Judge making derogatory remarks criticising

counsel, parties or witnesses--Such remark not to be made

unless absolutely necessary for deciding the case.

HEADNOTE:

While allowing a writ petition, one of the Judges deliv-

ered the main Judgment invalidating the decision of the

Government on the ground that it violated Article 14 of the

Constitution. The other Judge delivered a separate, but

concurring opinion which contained highly disparaging re-

marks attributing mala fides and underhand dealing on the

part of the State Government. Several appeals were filed

against the said decision before this Court. This Court

allowed the appeals and observed that the strictures passed

in the concurring Judgment were totally unjustified and

unwarranted. State of M.P. v. Nandial Jaiswal & Ors., [1987]

1 SCR 1.

Thereafter an Advocate who had no connection whatsoever

with the litigation filed a review petition before the High

Court. It was alleged that the State Government committed

fraud and procured the judgment from this Court. The matter

was listed before a Division Bench on 29th October 1988, and

one of the Judges dismissed the review petition as not

maintainable. Meanwhile, another application for review was

filed stating that the Vidhan Sabha proceedings would lend

credence to the claim that the State Government had prac-

tised fraud on the Court. On 6th February, 1989 the other

Judge,(who had passed strictures against the Government in

the Writ Petition) dismissed the review position, for want

of jurisdiction, with an observation that had the appellant

acted bona fide in briefing the then Chief Minister, the

fraud on the Court, as also the misleading press statement

by the then Chief Minister, would have been avoided. It was

further observed that the appellant did not act befitting

the status of the high office of the Advocate General and

that he did not have the courage to face the situation in

the Court later.

Before this Court. the appellant contended that he had no

111

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opportunity to meet the allegations in the review petitions.

He had also contended that earlier he entered appearance as

Advocate General on behalf of the State, and that when the

review petitions were heard neither he was the Advocate

General nor did he wish to enter appearance since he thought

that the review petitions deserved to be dismissed as there

were no valid grounds.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: 1. Judicial restraint and discipline are as neces-

sary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to

the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this

humility of function should be a constant theme of our

judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary

for judges to command respect as to protect the independence

of the judiciary..Judicial restraint in this regard might

better be called judicial respect; that is, respect by the

judiciary. Respect to those who come before the Court as

well to other co-ordinate branches of the State, the Execu-

tive and the Legislature. There must be mutual respect. When

these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe

that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be

neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process.

[117C-E]

2. The Judges Bench is a seat of power. Not only do

judges have power to make binding decisions, their decisions

legitimate the use of power by other officials. The Judges

have the absolute and unchallengeable control of the Court

domain. But they cannot misuse their authority by intemper-

ate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of

counsel, parties or witnesses. The Court has the inherent

power to act freely upon its own conviction on any matter

coming before it for adjudication but it is a general prin-

ciple of the highest importance to the proper administration

of justice that derogatory remarks ought not to be made

against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into

consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the

decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct. [117F-

G]

R.K. Lakshmanan v.A.K. Srinivasan, [1976] 1 SCR 204 and

Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhushan Kar, [1986] 2 SCC 567,

relied on.

3. No doubt each Judge is independent to form an opinion

of his own in deciding cases or in any phase of the deci-

sional function. But the facts of the present case against

the background of the views expressed by this Court apropos

to the earlier strictures against the Government, should

have warned the Judge no matter how clear he was in his

mind,

112

not to criticise the appellant. The avoidance of even the

appearance of bitterness, so important in a Judge, required

him not to cast aspersions on the professional conduct of

the appellant, especially when he held that the High Court

had no jurisdiction to entertain the review petition. The

observations made are not only without jurisdiction, but are

also wholly and utterly unjustified and unwarranted, and

hence expunged. [116C-1); 118B]

The Nature of the Judicial Process by Benjamin N. Cardo-

zo, p. 168-169; Some Observations of Felix Frankfurter, J.,

on the Nature of Judicial Process of Supreme Court Litiga-

tion, 98 Proceedings AM Phil Society 233 (1954) and The

Judiciary and Constitutional Politics-Views from the Bench

by Mark W. Cannon and David M.O. 's Brien, p. 27, referred

to.

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JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1537 of

1990

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.2.1989 of the Madhya

Pradesh High Court in M.C.C. No. 213 of 1988.

K. Parasaran, P.P. Rao, Sushil Kumar Jain, Mrs. Pratibha

Jain and Sudhanshu Alreya for the Appellant.

M.L. Chansoria, R.K. Gupta, K.K. Gupta, Dr. A.M.

Singhvi, Ashok Mathur and N. Waziri for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. Special leave granted.

Mr. B.M. Lal, J. of the Madhya Pradesh High Court while

dismissing an apparently unsustainable review petition has,

however, made certain derogatory remarks against Mr. A.M.

Mathur, senior Advocate and also the Ex-Advocate General of

the State. Mr. Mathur has appealed to this Court for setting

aside that order.

This matter pertains to a case which has come to be

known as M.P. Liquor case. It was with regard to the grant

for construction of new distillaries by the policy decision

of the State Government of Madhya Pradesh. That policy

decision was challenged before the High Court by way of writ

petitions. The Writ Petitions were allowed by the Division

Bench consisting of the Acting Chief Justice Mr. J.S. Verma

(as he then was) and Justice B.M. Lal. In those writ peti-

tions,

113

Mr. Mathur as Advocate-General appeared and argued for the

State Government. Learned Acting Chief Justice delivered the

main judgment in the writ petitions invalidating the deci-

sion of the Government on the ground that it violated Arti-

cle 14 of the Constitution. Justice B.M. Lal delivered a

separate concurring opinion in which he made highly dispar-

aging remarks attributing mala fides and underhand dealing

to the State Government. Against the judgment of the High

Court, several appeals including one by the State of Madhya

Pradesh were filed before this Court. The appeal preferred

by the State was argued by the then Attorney General of

India assisted by the appellant. This Court. allowed the

appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court. The

decision of this Court has since been reported in 1987 1 SCR

1 (State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors.,).

Bhagwati, CJ., speaking for the Court in that case while

expressing strong disapproval of the strictures made by B.M.

Lal, J. observed (at p. 66):

"We may observe in conclusion that Judges should not use

strong and carping language while criticising the conduct of

parties of their witnesses. They must act with sobriety,

moderation and restraint. They must have the humility to

recognise that they are not infallible and any harsh and

disparaging strictures passed by them against any party may

be mistaken and unjustified and if so, they may do consider-

able harm and mischief and result in injustice. Here, in the

present case, the observations made and strictures passed by

B.M. Lal, J. were totally unjustified and unwarranted and

they ought not to have been made."

On or about 3rd June 1988 i.e. after a delay of 738 days Mr.

Promod Kumar Gupta, Advocate who had no connection whatsoev-

er with the earlier litigation in the writ petitions or

appeals, filed a review petition before the High Court. He

was represented by Mr. S. Dixit, Advocate. In the review

petition it was inter alia alleged that the State Government

by committing fraud has procured the judgment from the

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Supreme Court, thereby vitiating the most solemn proceedings

of the Apex Court of the Nation. He has also filed an appli-

cation No. 3858 of 1988 for interim findings on the question

of fraud.

On 29 October, 1988, the matter was listed for admission

before a Bench consisting of learned Judges Mr. C.P. Sen and

Mr. B.M. Lal. After arguments, C.P. Sen, J., seems to have

dictated his order in the

114

open Court dismissing the review petition. He expressed the

view that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the

petition and the economically well-to-do parties to the writ

petitions who lost their case before this Court did not

choose to file any review petition. He also held that the

petition for review was not maintainable before the High

Court since the decision of the High Court was reversed by

this Court. The petition was also held to be hopelessly

barred by limitation and there was no sufficient cause for

condoning the inordinate delay.

B.M. Lal, J. did not pass any order on 29 October, 1988.

He pronounced his order on 6th February 1989. In this inter-

regnum there was another application from Mr. Gupta. On 25

January 1989, he filed an application in the aforesaid

review petition requesting the Court to take judicial notice

of some extract of the Vidhan Sabha proceedings and to pass

appropriate strictures against the appellant. According to

him, that extract of the proceedings of the Vidhan Sabha

would lend credence to his contention that the State has

practised fraud on the Court. That application was not

served on the appellant nor the Court gave him any opportu-

nity to file his counter. It may be mentioned that Mr.

Mathur has tendered his resignation as Advocate General on

25 January 1989. On 6 February 1989, the said application

was taken on record along with the documents annexed there-

by. On the same day B.M. Lal, J. pronounced his order dis-

missing the review petition.

The relevant portion of that order is as under:

"While briefing about the application for amendment of the

return to the Chief Minister Shri Arjun Singh, had Shri A.M.

Matbut, Advocate-General acted in bona fide and honest

manner, the fraud on the Court would have been avoided. So

also the misleading press statement by the Chief Minister to

the Blitz would have been on true facts and this situation

would not have arisen; putting the Courts in an embarrassing

position."

Continued:

"It is the moral duty of a lawyer, much less the Advocate

General, to act faithfully for the cause of his client and

to furnish information about the Court's proceedings cor-

rectly. In the past the chair of Advocate General was

adorned by glorious and eminent lawyers who never showed any

sycophancy and never suffered from mosaifi. As such, the

115

action on the part of the Advocate General, was not befit-

ting to the status of the High Office."

Added:

"It appears that this was the reason that Shri A.M. Mathur

avoided filing reply to the petition and skilfully succeeded

in his attempt to abstain himself from the case on28.8.

1988, presumably, he had no courage to face the situation."

Finally, rounded off the conclusion:

"As far as exercise of jurisdiction of this Court is con-

cerned, observing the judicial discipline envisaged under

Article 141 of the Constitution and has been merged in the

decision of the Supreme Court particularly when the decision

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of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandial Jaiswal,

case, it is for the petitioner, if he is so advised, to

vindicate his grievances before the Apex Court.

Learned counsel further pointed out that one of

the distiller's application for modification of the order is

sub judice before the Apex Court. As such, in view of the

observations made in A.R. Antulay's, case [1988] SCC II 602

the petitioner, if so advised, may approach the Apex Court

for getting redress."

From the foregoing order it will be seen that the

learned Judge seems to have formed an opinion that the

appellant did not act honestly and bona fide in briefing the

then Chief Minister Mr. Arjun Singh and if he had acted bona

fide and in honest manner, the fraud on the Court would have

been avoided and the Chief Minister would not have given a

misleading press statement. He has also remarked that the

appellant did not act befitting with the status of the High

Office of the Advocate General and he did not have the

courage to face the situation in the Court. Such are his

conclusions, or surmises in the review petition which was

not disposed of on the merits but dismissed for want of

jurisdiction.

The appellant's complaint before us is that he had no

opportunity to meet the allegations in the review petition,

much less as against averments in the subsequent application

dated 25 January, 1989. He made it clear to the High Court

on 6 October 1988 and also

116

on 29 October 1988 that he entered appearance pursuance to

service of a copy of the review petition as per the High

Court rules, on the Advocate General's office. He has not

entered appearance as such on behalf of the State or other

respondents. He has, further, made it clear that there was

no ground for review and it deserved to be dismissed and so

he did not wish to enter appearance at that stage before the

admission of the review petition. The appellant appears to

be correct in these statements and they are found recorded

in the Court proceedings dated 6 October, 1988.

It may be noted that C.P. Sen, J. dismissed the review

petition on the ground of maintainability, limitation and

locus standi of the petitioner. Thereafter the application

was filed to pass strictures against the appellant in the

light of the Vidhan Sabha proceedings. B.M. Lal, J. seems to

have acceded to that request. No doubt each Judge is inde-

pendent to form an opinion of his own in deciding cases or

in any phase of the decisional function. But the facts of

the present case against the background of the views ex-

pressed by this Court apropos to the earlier strictures

against the Government, should have warned B.M. Lal, J., no

matter how clear he was in his mind, not to criticise the

appellant. The avoidance of even the appearances of bitter-

ness, so important in a Judge required him not to cast

aspersions on the professional conduct of the appellant.

Justice Cardozo of course said:

"The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men,

do not turn aside in their course, and pass judges by. We

like to figure to ourselves the processes of justice as

coldly objective and impersonal. The law, conceived of as a

real existence, dwelling apart and alone, speaks, through

the voices of priests and ministers, the words which they

have no choice except to utter. That is an ideal of objec-

tive truth toward which every system of jurisprudence

tends ..... It has a lofty sound; it is well and finely

said; but it can never be more than partly true. "(1)

Justice Felix Frankfurter, put it with a different emphasis:

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7

"Judges are men, not disembodied spirits. Of course a Judge

is not free from preferences or, if you will, biases. "(2)

(1) The Nature of the Judicial Process by Benjamin N. Cardo-

zo p. 168-169.

(2) Some observations of Felix Frankfurter, J., on the

Nature of Judicial Process of Supreme Court Litigation 98

Proceedings AM Phil Society 233 (1954).

117

It is true that the judges are flesh and blood mortals

with individual personalities and with normal human traits.

Still what remains essential in judging, Justice Felix

Frankfurter said:

"First and foremost, humility and an understanding of the

range of the problems and (one's) own inadequacy in dealing

with them, disinterestedness ..... and allegiance to noth-

ing except the effort to find (that) pass through precedent,

through policy, through history, through (one's) own gifts

of insights to the best judgment that a poor fallible crea-

ture can arrive at in that most difficult of all tasks, the

adjudication between man and man, between man and state,

through reason called law.(3)

Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to

the orderly administration of justice as they are to the

effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this

humility of function should be a constant theme of our

judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary

for judges to command respect as to protect the independence

of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this regard might

better be called judicial respect; that is, respect by the

judiciary. Respect to those who come before the Court as

well to other co-ordinate branches of the State, the Execu-

tive and Legislature. There must be mutual respect. When

these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe

that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be

neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process.

The Judges Bench is a seat of power. Not only do judges

have power to make binding decisions, their decisions legit-

imate the use of power by other officials. The Judges have

the absolute and unchallenged control of the Court domain.

But they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate com-

ments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of counsel,

parties or witnesses. We concede that the Court has the

inherent power to act freely upon its own conviction on any

matter coming before it for adjudication, but it is a gener-

al principle of the highest importance to the proper admin-

istration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not to be

made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into

consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the

decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct. (See

(i) R.K. Lakshmanan v.A.K. Srinivasan, [1976] I SCR 204 and

(ii) Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhushan Kar, [1986] 2 SCC 567

at 576.

(3) The Judiciary and Constitutional Politics--Views

from the Bench by Mark W. Cannon and David M.O.'s Brien p.

27.

118

Learned Judge having held that the High Court has no

jurisdiction to entertain the review petition ought not to

have commented on the professional conduct of the appellant

and that too without an opportunity for him. We regret to

note that the observations made and aspersions cast on the

professional conduct of the appellant are not only without

jurisdiction, but also they are wholly and utterly unjusti-

fied and unwarranted.

We therefore, allow the appeal and expunge all the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7

remarks made by B.M. Lal, J. against the appellant in the

impugned order.

Normally, we would have awarded heavy costs against the

respondent but since the respondent is also an Advocate, we

refrain from making any order as to costs.

G.N. Appeal allowed.

119

Reference cases

Description

Upholding Judicial Decorum: An Analysis of Judicial Restraint Principles and Ethical Judicial Conduct

The Supreme Court of India's ruling in *A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta*, dated March 22, 1990, stands as a pivotal judgment reinforcing **Judicial Restraint Principles** and emphasizing the imperative of **Ethical Judicial Conduct** from the bench. This significant case, meticulously documented on CaseOn, provides crucial guidance on the boundaries of judicial authority and the decorum expected in court proceedings. It underscores the judiciary's role not just in delivering justice, but in maintaining the highest standards of impartiality and respect for all parties involved.

Case Background: A Saga of Strictures and Review

This case originates from a complex legal journey, highlighting repeated instances where judicial conduct came under scrutiny.

The Initial Controversy: M.P. Liquor Case

The saga began with the 'M.P. Liquor case', where the High Court had invalidated a State Government decision, citing a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. During this proceeding, one of the High Court judges, Justice B.M. Lal, delivered a separate, concurring opinion that contained 'highly disparaging remarks', attributing mala fides and 'underhand dealing' to the State Government. These remarks were significant enough that when the matter reached the Supreme Court, which ultimately allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment, the strictures passed by Justice B.M. Lal were explicitly deemed 'totally unjustified and unwarranted'. This foundational judgment, *State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., [1987] 1 SCR 1*, served as a clear directive on judicial propriety.

The Review Petition and Renewed Allegations

Years later, an Advocate named Pramod Kumar Gupta, who had no prior connection to the original litigation, filed a review petition before the High Court. He alleged that the State Government had committed fraud to procure the Supreme Court's judgment. While one judge, C.P. Sen, J., dismissed the review petition on grounds of maintainability, lack of locus standi, and being time-barred, Justice B.M. Lal—the same judge who had previously issued the controversial strictures—issued another order. Despite dismissing the petition for 'want of jurisdiction', Justice B.M. Lal proceeded to make fresh, adverse observations against Mr. A.M. Mathur, who had served as the Advocate General for the State. These remarks suggested that Mr. Mathur had not acted 'bona fide' in briefing the Chief Minister, implied that his actions could have prevented the alleged fraud and misleading press statements, and stated that he did not act 'befitting the status of the High Office of the Advocate General' nor possessed the 'courage to face the situation'. Mr. Mathur contended before the Supreme Court that he was never given an opportunity to address these new allegations.

The Legal Issues at Hand (Issue)

The central legal questions before the Supreme Court were:

  1. Can a judge, while explicitly stating a lack of jurisdiction to hear a review petition, proceed to make derogatory and unsubstantiated remarks about counsel or parties involved, particularly without offering them an opportunity to be heard?
  2. What are the established principles governing judicial conduct, and specifically, the parameters of judicial restraint and respect that judges must adhere to in their pronouncements?

Guiding Legal Principles (Rule)

The Supreme Court reiterated fundamental principles governing judicial conduct, drawing from previous precedents and established judicial philosophy:

  • Judicial Restraint and Discipline: The Court underscored that judicial restraint and discipline are as crucial for the orderly administration of justice as they are for the effectiveness of the armed forces. Judges must exhibit humility, a core quality that ensures respect for litigants and other co-ordinate branches of the State (Executive and Legislature).
  • Boundaries of Judicial Authority: While judges hold absolute and unchallenged control over their court domain, this authority must not be misused through 'intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of counsel, parties or witnesses'.
  • Necessity of Remarks: Derogatory remarks against individuals or authorities whose conduct comes under consideration should *only* be made if 'absolutely necessary for the decision of the case'.
  • Precedent: The Court explicitly referred to its previous judgments in *R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan, [1976] 1 SCR 204* and *Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhushan Kar, [1986] 2 SCC 567*, which caution against unwarranted strictures.

These rules collectively emphasize that judicial power, while vast, must be exercised with extreme caution, integrity, and adherence to due process.

The Supreme Court's Analysis (Analysis)

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed Justice B.M. Lal’s actions in light of these principles. The Court observed that Justice B.M. Lal's renewed strictures against Mr. A.M. Mathur were particularly egregious given the Supreme Court's prior unequivocal disapproval of his earlier, similar remarks in the M.P. Liquor case. This prior admonition should have served as a clear warning.

A critical point of the analysis was the inherent contradiction in Justice B.M. Lal's order: he dismissed the review petition for 'want of jurisdiction' but simultaneously made observations about Mr. Mathur’s professional conduct. The Supreme Court emphasized that once jurisdiction was disclaimed, there was no legal basis for commenting on the merits or the conduct of parties. Such remarks, therefore, lacked any legal foundation.

The Court highlighted the fundamental importance of avoiding even the 'appearance of bitterness' in judicial pronouncements. It noted that casting aspersions on professional conduct without proper jurisdiction and without providing the affected party an opportunity to be heard constitutes a violation of natural justice and fair play. Mr. Mathur's contention that he had no opportunity to defend himself against these allegations was found to be correct and valid.

Moreover, the Court implicitly underscored that judicial independence does not equate to unfettered power to criticize. It comes with the responsibility of upholding dignity, fairness, and due process. For legal professionals looking to quickly grasp the essence of such nuanced rulings, CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs offer an invaluable tool, enabling efficient analysis of complex judgments and the underlying principles of judicial conduct.

Judgment and Impact (Conclusion)

The Supreme Court's Verdict

In its final decision, the Supreme Court allowed A.M. Mathur's appeal. It ruled that the observations and strictures made by Justice B.M. Lal against the appellant were 'without jurisdiction, but are also wholly and utterly unjustified and unwarranted', and consequently ordered their expunction from the record. Demonstrating judicial fairness, the Court refrained from awarding costs, acknowledging that the respondent was also an Advocate.

Why This Judgment Matters for Lawyers and Students

This judgment serves as a cornerstone for several reasons:

  • Reinforcement of Due Process: It strongly reaffirms the principle of natural justice, ensuring that no adverse remarks are made against an individual without giving them an opportunity to be heard, especially when the court lacks jurisdiction over the matter.
  • Defining Judicial Boundaries: The ruling clearly demarcates the limits of judicial authority, cautioning judges against misusing their power for 'intemperate comments' or 'scathing criticism' unless absolutely essential for the case's decision.
  • Guidance on Ethical Judicial Conduct: It provides an enduring lesson on the need for judicial restraint, humility, and respect towards all participants in the legal process, including counsel and litigants.
  • Role of Appellate Review: It exemplifies the crucial role of appellate courts in correcting unwarranted judicial remarks and upholding the sanctity of judicial proceedings.
  • Implications for Advocate Generals: For aspiring and practicing Advocate Generals, it highlights the high standards of conduct expected, while also ensuring protection against unjustified judicial censure.

Ultimately, *A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta* is a vital reminder that the judiciary, as a pillar of democracy, must operate not only with authority but also with exemplary decorum and unwavering commitment to fairness.

Disclaimer

All information provided in this analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.

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