IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

W.P.(C) No.2886 of 2018

CNR No. ODHC010015022018

In the matter of an application under Article 226 & 227 of

the Constitution of India, 1950.

………………

Ananda Chandra Behera …. Petitioner

-versus-

Odisha State Ware

Housing Corp., MD,

Cuttack & Ors.

…. Opp. Parties

For Petitioner : Mr. A. Behera, Advocate

For Opp. Parties : Mr. S. Das,

Addl. Standing Counsel

Mr. B.K. Sahoo, Adv. for O.P.3

PRESENT:

THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY

Date of Hearing: 21.09.2026 and Date of Judgment: 21.09.2026

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Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.

1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid

Arrangement (Virtual/Physical) Mode.

2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties.

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3. Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition inter

alia with the following prayer:-

“The petitioner, therefore, prays that your Lordships

would be graciously pleased to admit this writ petition,

call for the records and after hearing the parties allow

the issue writ/writs in the nature of certiorari/same,

mandamus and/or any other further writ/direction, and

quash the order dated 06.01.2018 passed by Managing

Director, Odisha State Warehousing Corporation

directing recovery of Rs. 23,88,921/- from the petitioner

under Annexure-1.

And for this act of kindness, the petitioner shall as in

duty bound ever pray.”

4. It is contended that Petitioner while continuing as

an employee under the Opposite Party-Corporation, he

retired from service on attaining the age of

superannuation on 30.09.2016.

4.1. It is contended that much after his retirement,

Petitioner was issued with the impugned order

dtd.06.01.2018 under Annexure-1, wherein Petitioner

was directed to pay a sum of Rs.23,88,921/-

recoverable from his retiral dues.

4.2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner while assailing

the impugned order contended that prior to issuance of

the impugned order under Annexure-1, Petitioner was

never show caused nor principle of natural justice was

followed.

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4.3. It is also contended that such recovery from the

retiral dues of the Petitioner, is not permissible as per

the service regulation / rule governing the field.

4.4. It is accordingly contended that since prior to

directing the Petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.23,88,921/-

toward recovery vide order under Annexure-1, principle

of natural justice was never followed, the same is not

sustainable in the eye of law.

4.5. In support of his submission, reliance was

placed to a decisions in the case of Menaka Gandhi

vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC-597, State of

Orissa vs. Binapani Das, AIR 1967 SC-1269,

State Bank of India And Others Vs. Rajesh

Agarwal & Ors., (2023) 6 SCC 1, Dushyant

Mainali Vs.Diwan Singh Bora & Another, SLP (C )

No.15191 of 2022 and Krishnadatt Awasthy Vs.

State of M.P & Others, Civil Appeal NO(s) 4806 of

2011 (2025 INSC 126).

4.6. In Menaka Gandhi (supra) , Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Paragraphs-57, 58 and 61 has held as

under:-

“57. The question immediately arises : does the

procedure prescribed by the Passports Act, 1967 for

impounding a passport meet the, test of this requirement

? Is it 'right or fair or just' ? The argument of the petitioner

was that it is not, because it provides for impounding of a

passport without affording reasonable opportunity to the

holder of the passport to be heard in defence. To impound

the passport of a person, said the petitioner, is a serious

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matter, since it prevents him from exercising his

constitutional right to go abroad and such a drastic

consequence cannot in fairness be visited without

observing the principle of audi alteram partem. Any

procedure which permits impairment of the constitutional

right to go abroad without giving reasonable opportunity

to show cause cannot but be condemned as unfair and

unjust and hence, there is in the present case clear

infringement of the requirement of Article 21. Now, it is

true that there is no express provision in the Passports

Act, 1967 which requires that the audi alteram partem

rule should be followed before impounding a passport,

but that is not conclusive of the question. If the statute

makes itself clear on this point, then no more question

arises. But even when the statute is silent, the law may

in a given case make an implication and apply the

principle stated by Byles, J., in Cooper v. Wandsworth

Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India on 25 January, 1978

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1766147/

57 Board of Works(2). "A long course of decision---,

beginning with Dr. Bentley's case and ending with some

very recent cases, establish that, although there are no

positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall

be heard, yet-the justice of the common law will supply

the omission of (1) [1974]2S.C.R.348. (2)

[1863]14C.B.N.S.180. the legislature". The principle of

audi alteram partem, which mandates that no one shall

be condemned unheard, part of the rules of natural

justice. In fact, there are two main principles in which the

rules of natural justice are manifested, namely, Nemo

Judex in Sua Causa and audi alteram partem. We are not

concerned here with the former, since there is no case of

bias urged here. The question is only in regard to the right

of hearing which involves the audi alteram partem rule.

Can it be imported in the procedure for impounding a

passport ?

58. We may commence the discussion of this question

with a few general observations to emphasise the

increasing importance of natural justice in the field of

administrative law. Natural justice is a great humanising

principle intended to invest law with' fairness and to

secure justice and over the years it has grown into a

widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of

administrative action. Lord Morris of Borth- y-Gest spoke

of this rule in eloquent terms in his address before the

Bentham Club : "We can, I think, take pride in what has

been done in recent periods and particularly in the field of

administrative law by invoking and by applying these

principles which we broadly classify under the

designation of natural justice. Many testing problems as

to their application yet remain to be solved. But I affirm

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that the area of administrative action is but one area in

which the principles are to be deployed. Nor are they to

be invoked only when procedural failures are shown.

Does natural justice qualify to be described as a

"majestic" conception ? I believe it does. Is it just a

rhetorical but vague phrase which can be employed,

when needed, to give a gloss of assurance ? I believe that

it is very much more. If it can be summarised as being fair

play in action-who could wish that it would ever be out of

action ? It denotes that the law is not only to be guided by

reason and by logic but that its purpose %, will not be

fulfilled; it lacks more exalted inspiration." (Current Legal

Problems, 1973, Vol. 26, p. 16) And then again, in his

speech in the House of Lords in Wiseman v. Borneman(1),

the learned Law Lord said in words of inspired felicity:

"that the conception of natural justice should at all stages

guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely

an acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of

the law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But

there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What

they comprehend has been analysed and described in

many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief

rather their spirit and their inspiration than any precision

of definition or precision as to application. We do not

search for prescriptions which will lay down exactly what

must, in various divergent situations, be done. The

principles and procedures are to be applied which, in any

particular situation or set of circumstances, are right and

just and fair. Natural justice, it has been said, is only "fair

play in action." Nor do we wait for directions from

Parliament. The common law has abundant riches : there

we may find what Byles, J., called "the justice of the

common law". Thus, the soul of natural justice is fair play

in action' and that is why it has received the widest

recognition throughout the democratic world. In the United

States, the right to an administrative hearing is regarded

as essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And in

England too it has been held that 'fair play in action'

demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is

taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity

to be heard. The rule was stated by Lord Henning, M.R. in

these terms in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home

Affairs(1) :-where a public officer has power to deprive a

person of his liberty or his property, the general principle

is that it has not to be done without his being given an

opportunity of being heard and of making representations

on his own behalf". The same rule also prevails in other

Commonwealth countries like Canada, Australia and New

Zealand. It has even gained access to the United Nations.

Vide American Journal of International Law, Vol. 67, page

479. Magarry, J., describes natural justice "as a distillate

of due process of law". Vide Fontaine v. Chesterton(2). It

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is the quintessence of the process of justice inspired and

guided by fair play in action'. If we look at the speeches of

the various law Lords in Wiseman's case, it will be seen

that each one of them asked the question "whether in the

particular circumstances of the case, the Tribunal acted

unfairly so that it could be said that their procedure did

not match with what justice demanded", ,or, was the

procedure adopted by the Tribunal 'in all the

circumstances unfair'? The test adopted by every law

Lord was whether the procedure followed was "fair in all

the circumstances" and 'fair play in action' required that

an opportunity should be given to the tax payer "to see

and reply to the counter-statement of the Commissioners"

before reaching the conclusion that "there is a prima facie

case against him." The inquiry must, therefore, always be

: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be

heard should be given to the person affected?.

XXX XXX XXX

61. This Court, speaking through Hegde, J., in ,I. K.

Kraipak's case quoted with approval the above passage

from the judgment of Lord Parker, C.J., and proceeded to

add : "The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure

justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of

justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered

by any law validly made. In other words they do not

supplant the law of the land but supplement it-Till very

recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the

authority concerned was required by the law under which

it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the,

application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of

that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the

rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice

One fails to see why those rules should be made

inapplicable, to administrative enquiries. Often times it is

not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative

enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which

were considered administrative at one time are now being

considered as quasi-.judicial in character. Arriving at a

just decision is the aim of both quasi- judicial enquiries as

well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an

administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect

than a decision in a quasi- judicial enquiry. As observed

by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. The University of

Kerala and Ors. (1969)1 S.C.R. 317 the rules of natural

justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of

natural justice should apply to a given case must depend

to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that

case the framework of the law under which the enquiry is

held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of

persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a

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complaint is made before a court that some principles of

natural justice had been contravened the court has to

decide whether the observance of that rule was

necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case."

This view was reiterated and re-affirmed in a subsequent

decision of this Court in D.F.O. South Khari v. Ram Sanehi

Singh(1). The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well

settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which

involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice

must be held to be applicable.

4.7. In State of Orissa vs. Binapani Das, Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Paragraph-12 has held as under:-

“12. It is true that some preliminary enquiry was made

by Dr. S, Mitra. But the report of that Enquiry Officer

was never disclosed to the first respondent. 'The rafter

the first respondent was required to show cause why

April 16, 1907, should not be accept das the date of

birth and without recording any evidence the order was

passed. We think that such an enquiry and decision

were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot

have any value. It is true that the order is administrative

in character, but even an administrative order which

involves civil consequences as already stated must be

made consistently with the rules of natural justice after

informing the first respondent of the case of the State,

the evidence in support thereof and after giving an

opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and

meeting or explaining the evidence. No such steps were

admittedly taken; the High Court was, in our judgment,

right in setting aside the order of the State.”

4.8. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh

Agarwal in Para 41 & 42 has held as follows:-

“41. In State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei [State of

Orissa v. Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269], a two -

Judge Bench of this Court held that every authority

which has the power to take punitive or damaging

action has a duty to give a reasonable opportunity to

be heard. This Court further held that an

administrative action which involves civil consequences

must be made consistent with the rules of natural

justice : (AIR p. 1271, para 9)

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“9. … The rule that a party to

whose prejudice an order is

intended to be passed is entitled to

a hearing applies alike to judicial

tribunals and bodies of persons

invested with authority to

adjudicate upon matters involving

civil consequences. It is one of the

fundamental rules of our

constitutional set-up that every

citizen is protected against exercise

of arbitrary authority by the State or

its officers. Duty to act judicially

would therefore arise from the very

nature of the function intended to be

performed : it need not be shown to

be super-added. If there is power to

decide and determine to the

prejudice of a person, duty to act

judicially is implicit in the exercise of

such power. If the essentials of

justice be ignored and an order to

the prejudice of a person is made,

the order is a nullity. That is a basic

concept of the rule of law and

importance thereof transcends the

significance of a decision in any

particular case.”

42. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka

Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] , a seven-

Judge Bench of this Court held that any person

prejudicially affected by a decision of the authority

entailing civil consequences must be given an

opportunity of being heard. This has been reiterated in a

catena of decisions of this Court.”

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4.9. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dushyant

Mainali, in para-5 of the said judgment held as

follows:

5. There is no necessity to reiterate that even the

Courts, including a highest court of the Country, are

bound by principle of natural justice. Nobody can be

condemned unheard.

4.10. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnadatt

Awasthy in para-68 of the said judgment held as

follows:

68. The principle of audi alteram partem is the

cornerstone of justice, ensuring that no person is

condemned unheard. This principle transforms

justice from a mere technical formality into a

humane pursuit. It safeguards against arbitrary

decision-making, and is needed more so in cases

of unequal power dynamics.

5. Mr. B.K. Sahoo, learned counsel appearing for

Opposite Party No.3 on the other hand made his

submission basing on the stand taken in the counter

affidavit so filed. It is contended that after his

retirement, basing on the letter issued by the Orissa

State Civil Supply Corporation, wherein suggestion was

made to recover the amount, the impugned order

dtd.06.01.2018 under Annexure-1 was issued.

5.1. It is accordingly contended that since after the

retirement of the Petitioner, Orissa State Civil Supply

Corporation suggested to recover the amount because

of mis-appropriation caused by the Petitioner, the

impugned order under Annexure-1 has been issued.

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5.2. It is accordingly contended that no illegality or

irregularity can be found with the same.

6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the

Parties and considering the submissions, it is found

that Petitioner while continuing under the Opposite

Party-Corporation, he retired on attaining the age of

superannuation on 30.09.2016. However, vide the

impugned order dtd.06.01.2018 under Annexure-1,

Petitioner was directed to deposit a sum of

Rs.23,88.921/- toward recovery.

6.1. Considering the submission made by the learned

counsel appearing for the Petitioner that principle of

natural justice was never followed prior to issuance of

Annexure-1 and this Court since could not find any

document enclosed to the counter affidavit, showing

issuance of any show cause prior to issuance of the

order at Annexure-1, basing on the suggestion given by

the Orissa State Supply Corporation, the impugned

order under Annexure-1 could not have been issued.

6.2. This Court on the ground of non-compliance of

the principle of natural justice and placing reliance on

the decisions as cited (supra), is inclined to quash

order dtd.06.01.2018 so passed under Annexure-1 by

Opposite Party No.3. While quashing the said order,

this Court permits Opposite Party-Corporation to re-

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determine the liability in accordance with law and by

following the principle of natural justice.

7. Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands disposed of.

(Biraja Prasanna Satapathy)

Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack

Dated the 21st September, 2026/Subrat