S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

BABULAL PARATE

v.

THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER

(S. R. DAS, C.J., s. K. DAS, A. K.. SARKAR,

605

K. N. W ANCHOO, and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)

States, Reorganisation of-Modification of Bill by Parliament­

Such modification, if must be ref erred to State Legislature-ConsU­

tution of India, Art. 3, proviso-States Reorganisation Act, z956,

tXXXVII of z956), s. 8(z).

A Bill introduced in the House of the People on the report

of the States Reorganisation Commission and as recommended by

the President under the proviso to Art. 3

of the

Constitution,

contained a proposal for the formation of three separate units,

viz.,

(1)

Union territory of Bombay, (2) Maharashtra, including

Marathawada and Vidarbha and

(3) Gujrat, including Saurashtra ·and Cutch. This Bill was referred by the President to the State

Legislatures concerned and their views obtained. The Joint

Select Committee of the House of the People (Lok Sabha) and the

Council

of States (Rajya Sabha) considered the Bill and made its.

report. Subsequently, Parliament amended

some of the clauses

and passed the Bill which came to be known as the States

RE~organisation Act, 1956. That Act by s. 8(1) constituted a

composite State

of Bombay instead of the three separate units as

originally proposed in the Bill. The petition, out

of which the

present appeal has arisen, was

filed by the appellant under

Art.

226 of the

Constitution in the High Court of Bombay. His

contention was

that the said Act was passed in contravention

of the provisions of Art. 3 of the Constitution, since the Legisla­

ture

of Bombay

had not been given an opportunity of expressing

its views

on the formation of the composite State. The High

Court dismissed the petition.

Held, that the proviso to Art. 3 lays down two conditions

and under the second condition therein stated, what the President

has

to·reier to the State Legislature for its opinion is the proposal

contained in the Bill. On a true construction, the proviso does

not contemplate

that if Parliament subsequently modifies that

proposal, there must be a fresh bill or a fresh reference to the

State Legislature.

The word 'State' in Art. 3

of the Constitution has obvious

reference to Art. ,I and the States mentioned in the First Schedule

to the Constitution, and the expression 'Legislature of the State'

means

the. Legislature of such a State.

TJ:iere are, therefore, no

reasons for the application

of any special doctrine of democratic

theory or practice prevalent in other countries in interpreting

those words ; nor any justification for giving an extended meaning

to the word 'State' in determining the true scope and

eftect of the

proviso.

'11

z959

Aucust 118.

r959

Babulal Parate

v.

Tiu State of

Bombay

and Another

606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

The requirements of Art. IV, s. 3 of the American Constitu­

tion are materially different from those of the second proviso to

Art.

3 of the

Indi&n Constitution and, consequently, decisions

based

on the former are not in point.

State of Louisiana v. State of Mississipi,

(1905) 202 U.S. l

and State of Washington v. State of Oregon, (1908) 2II U.S. 127,

held inapplicable.

State of ;Texas v. George W. White, (1869) 74 U.S. 700

referred to.

It is not correct to contend that the word 'Bill' in the proviso

must be interpreted

to include an amendment of any of the clauses

of the Bill or at least a

substantial amendment thereof, and that

any proposal contained in such amendment must be referred

back to the State Legislature. Such an interpretation of Art. 3

will nullify the effect

of Art.

122(1) and is untenable in view of

the provisions in Arts.

II7 and II8 of the

Constitution.

Although the formation of a composite State in terms of s. 8

of the Act was without doubt a substantial modification of the.

proposal as originally contained in the Bill,

it could not be said

that the said modification was not germane to the subject

mafter

of the original proposal or was a direct negative thereof, so as to

be beyond the scope of an amendment.

T. H. Vakil v. Bombay Presidency Radio Club Ltd., (1944) 47

Born. L.R. 428, applied.

Therefore, the Act could not be held to have been enacted in

violation

of Art. 3 of the Constitution.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.

342

of 1956.

Appeal from

the judgment and order dated

Septem­

ber 14, 1956, of the Bombay High Court, in Special

Civil Application No. 2496of1956.

R. V. S. Mani, for the appellant.

O. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. Sen,

and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents.

1959.

August 28. The Judgment of the

Court was

delivered

by

s. K. Das J,

S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal on a certificate

granted by the High Court of Bombay under Art.

132 (1) of the Constitution, and the question involved

in the appeal is the true scope and effect of Art. 3 of

the Constitution, particularly of the proviso thereto

as it stands after the Oollstitution (Fifth Amendment)

Act, 11155, .

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 601

On December 22, 1953, the Prime Minister of India

made a statement in Parliament to the effect that a

Commission would be appointed to examine "objecti­

vely and dispassionately " the question of the re­

organisation of the States of the Indian Union "so

that the welfare of the people of each constituent unit

as well as

the nation as a whole is

promoted". This

was followed

by the appointment of a Commission

under a resolution

of the

Union Government in the

Ministry of Home Affairs, dated December 29; 1953.

The Commission submitted its report in due course

and on April 18, 1956; a

Bill was introduced in the

House of the People (Lok Sabha) entitled The States

Reorganisation Bill (No. 30of1956). Clauses 8, 9 and

10 of the said Bill contained a proposal for the for­

mation of three separate units, namely, (1) Union

territory of Bombay; (2) State of Maharashtra inclu­

ding Marathawada and Vidharbha; and (3) State of

Gujarat including Saurashtra and Cutch. The Bill

was introduced in the House

of the People on the

recom­

mendation of the President, as required by the proviso

to

art. 3 of the Constitution. It was then referred

to

a Joint Select Committee of the House of the

People (Lok Sabha) and the Council of State (Rajya

Sabha). The Joint Select Committee made its report

on

July 16, 1956.

Some of the clauses of the Bill

were amended in Parliament

and on being passed by

both Houses,

it received the President's assent on

August 31, 1956,

and became known a.s the

States

Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956) hereinafter

called

the Act.

It is necessary to read heres. 8(1) of 'the Act which

instead

of constituting three separate units as

origin­

ally proposed in the Bill constituted a. composite

State of Bombay as stated therein.

"S.8 (1): As from the appointed day, there shall

be formed a new Part A State to be known as the

State ofBombay comprising the following territories,

namely:-

(a) the territories of the existing State of Bombay,

excluding-

r959

Babulal Parat•

v.

Th• State of

Bombay

and another

s. K. Das].

I959

Babulal Parate

v.

The Stale of

Bombay

and A notlur

S. K. Das].

608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

(i) Bijapur, DharWar and Kanara districts and

Belgaum district except Chandgad taluka ; and

(ii) Abu Road taluka of Banaskantha district;

(b) Aurangabad, Parbhani, Bhir and Osmanabad

districts, Ahmadpur, Nilanga and Udgir taluks of

Bidar district, Nanded district (except Bichkonda

and Jukkal circles of Deglur taluk and Modhol,

Bhiansa

and Kuber circles of Modhol taluk) and

Islapur circle of Boath taluk, Kinwat taluk and

Rajura taluk of Adilabad district, in the existing State of Hyderabad;

(c) Buldana, Akola, Amaravati, Yeotmal, War­

dha, Nagpur, Bhandara and Chanda districts in

the existing State of Madhya Pradesh ;

(d) tl:1"e territories of the existing State of Sau­

rashtra; and

(e) the territories of the existing State of Kutch;

and thereupon the said territories shall cease to form

part of the existing States of Bombay, Hyderabad,

Madhya Pradesh, Saurashtra and Kutch, respecti­

vely."

The appointed day from which the new State of

Bombay came into existence was defined in the Act

as meaning November 1, 1956. But before that date,

to wit, on September 12, 1956, the appellant herein

filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in

the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in which he

alleged,

in substance, that the formation of the

com­

posite State of Bombay as one· unit instead of the three

separate units as originally proposed in the Bill

contravened Art. 3

of the Constitution, inasmuch as

the Legislature of the

State of Bombay had no oppor­

tunity of expressing its views on the formation of such

a composite State. The appellant asked for a declara­

tion that s. 8 and other consequential proYisions of

the Act were null and void and prayed for an

appropriate writ directing the State Government of

Bombay and the Union Government not to enforce

and implement the same. This writ petition was

heard by the Bombay High Court on September 14,

1956,

and by

its judgment of even date, the High

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 609

Court dismissed the petitfon, holding that there was

no violation or contravention of Art. 3 of the Consti­

tution. The appellant then obtained the necessary

certificate under Art.

132(1) of the Constitution, and

filed his appeal in this

Court on October 18, 1956 on

the strength of that certificate.

Now,

it is both convenient and advisable to read

at

this stage Art. 3 of the Constitution, as amended by

the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955, the

alleged violation of which is the main ground of attack

by learned counsel for the appellant.

"Art. 3 : Parliament·niay by law-

(a) form a new State by separation of territory

from

any State or by uniting two or more States or

parts of States or by uniting

any territory to a part

of any State ;

(b) increase the area of any State;

(c) diminish the area of any State;

(d) alter the boundaries of any State; and

· (e) alter the rftl.me of any State ;

Provided

that no Bill for the purpose shall be

introduced in either House of Parliament except on

the recommendation of the President and unless,

where

the proposal contained in the Bill affects the

a.rel!., boundaries or na.:me of any of the States the

Bill has been referred by the President to the

Legislature

of that State for expressing its views

thereon within such period as

may be specified

i:o.

the reference or within such further period as the

President miloy allow and the period so specified or

allowed

has expired.

"

It is clear that by its substantive pa.rt the 1ticle

gives a certain power to Parliament, viz., the power to

make a law in respect of any of the five matters men­

tioned in els. (a) to

(e) thereof. This

power includes

the making of a. law to increase the area. of any State;

diminish the area. of any State ; and alter the name of

any State. The substantive pa.rt is followed by a

proviso, which lays down certain conditions for

the

exercise of the power. It states that no Bill for the

purpose (the word

" purpose" obviously has reference

I959

Babula! Parale

v.

The State cf

Bombay

and 4nothiw

S. K. Das].

I959

Babulal Parate

...

The State of

Bombay

and Another

S. K. Das].

610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(1)]

to the power of making law in respect of the matters

mentioned in the substantive part) shall be introduced

in either House

of Parliament except on the

recom­

mendation of the President and unless, where the

proposal contained in the Bill affects the area,

boundaries

or name of any of the

States, the Bill has

been referred by the President to the Legislature of

that State for expressing its views thereon. Thus, the

proviso Jays down two conditions : one is that no Bill

shall be introduced except

on the recommendation of

the President, and the second condition is that where

the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area,

boundaries

or name of any of the

States, the Bill has

to be referred by the President to the Legislature of

the State for expressing its views thereon. The period

within which

the

State Legislature must express its

views

has to be specified by the President; but the

President may extend the period so specified. If,

however, the period specified or extended expires and

no views of the

State Legislature ,are received, the

second condition laid down in the proviso is fulfilled

in spite

of the fact that the views of the

State Legis­

lature have not been expressed. The intention seems

to be to give an opportunity to the State Legislature

to express its views within the time allowed; if the

State Legislature fails to avarJ itself of that opportu­

nity, such failure does not invalidate the introduction

of the Bill. Nor is there anything in the proviso to

indicate that Parliament must accept or act upon the

views of the State Legislature. Indeed, two State

Legislatures may express totally divergent views. All

that is contemplated is that Parliament should have

before it the views of the State Legislatures as to the

proposals contained in the Bill and then be free to

deal with the Bill in any manner it thinks fit, following

the usual practice and procedure prescribed by and

under the rules of business. Thus the essential content

of the second condition is a reference by the President

of the proposal contained in the bill to the State

Legislature to express its v.iews thereon within the

time allowed. It is worthy of note, and this has been

properly emphasised

in the judgment of the High

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 611

C~urt, that what has to be referred to the State Legis­

lature by the President is the proposal contained in

the Bill. The proviso does not say that if and when

a proposal contained in

the Bill is modified subsequently

by an amendment properly moved and accepted

in Parliament, there must be a fresh reference to

the State Legislature and a fresh bill

must be

introduced.

It was pointed out in the course of

arguments that if the second condition required a fresh

reference

and a fresh bill for every amendment, it

might result in an interminable process ; because any

and every amendment of the original proposal

contained in

the Bill would then necessitate a

fresh Bill

and a fresh reference to the State

Legis­

lature. Other difficulties might also arise if such a

construction were

put on the proviso;

fpr example,

in a. case where two or three States were involv­

ed, different views might be expressed by the Legis­

latures of different States. If Parliament were to

accept the views of one of the Legislatures and not of

the other; a fresh reference would still be necessary by

reason of any amendment in the original proposal

contained in the Bill.

We are referring to these difficulties not because we

think that a forced meaning-should be given to the

words of the proviso to avoid certain difficulties which

may arise. We are of the view that the words of the

proviso are clear enough and bear' their ordinary plain

meaning. According

to the accepted connotation of

the words used in the proviso, the second condition

means

what it states

and what has to be referred to

the State Legislature is the proposal contained in tLo

Bill ;

it

has no such drastic effect as to require a fresh

reference every time an amendment of the proposal

contained in

the Bill is moved and accepted in

accord­

ance with the rules of procedure of Parliament.

That in the present case the States Reorganisation

Bill was introduced on

the recommendation of the

President has not been disputed ; nor has it been

dis­

puted that the proposal contained in the Bill was

referred

to the

State Legislatures concerned and their

views were received, According

to learned counsel for

x959

Babulal Parale

v.

The Stale of

Bombay

and .A nolher

S. K.Das j.

I959

Babulal Parate

v.

The State of

Bombay

and Another

S. K. Das].

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

the appellant, however, this was not enough compli­

ance with

the second condition of the proviso. He has

put his argument in several ways. Firstly, he has con­

tended

that the word

" State " in Art. 3 should be

given a larger connotation so

as to mean and include

not merely the geographical entity called the

State, but

its people as well : this, according to learned counsel

for

the appellant, is the

"democratic process" incor­

porated in Art. 3

and according to this democratic

pro­

cess,. so learned counsel has argued, the" representatives

of the people of the State of Bombay assembled in the

State Legislature should have been given an opportu­

nity of expressing their views not merely on the pro­

posal originally contained in

the Bill, but on any

substantial modification thereof. Secondly and follow­

ing

the same line of argument, he has contended that

the word

" Bill" should be given an extended mean­

ing so as to include any amendment, at least any

substantial amendment, of the proposal contained in

the Bill; and thirdly, he .has contended that in the

present case the formation of a new Bombay State as

one unit was so different from the three units originally

proposed

in the Bill that it was not really an amend­

ment

of the original proposal but a new proposal

altogether for which

a fresh Bill and a fresh reference

were necessary.

We proceed now

to consider these contentions. It

is necessary to state at the outset that our task is to

determine on a proper construction the true scope

and effect of Art. 3 of the Constitution, with particular

reference to the second condition laid down by the

proviso thereto. We bring to our task such considera­

tions as are germane to

the interpretation of an

orga­

nic instrument like the Constitution ; but it will be

improper

to import into the question of construction

doctrines

of democratic theory and practice obtaining

in other countries, unrelated to the tenor, scheme and

words of the provisions which we have to construe. In

plain and unambiguous language, the proviso to Art. 3

of the Constitution states that where the proposal

con­

tained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name

of any of the States, the Bill must be referred by the

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 613

President to the Legislature of the State for expressing

its views.

It does not appear to us that any special or

recondite doctrine

of" democratic process" is involved

therein. Learned counsel for

the appellant has invited

our attention

to Art.

IV, s~ 3, of the American Consti­

tution which says inter alia that " no new State shall

be formed or erected within

the jurisdiction of any

other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of

two or more States or parts of /States without the

consent of the Legislatures of the State concerned as

well as of the

Congress." That provision is quite

different from

the proviso we are considering : the

former requires the consent of the State Legislature

whereas

the essential requirement of our proviso is a

reference

by the President of the proposal contained

in

the Bill for the expression of its views by the

State

Legislature. For this reason we do not think that the

decisions relied on by learned counsel for the appellant

(State of Louisiana v. State of Mississipi (

1

), and State of

Washington v. Staie of Oregon (

2

) ) are in point. The

expression ' State ' occurs in Art. 3, and as has been

observed.in

the State of Texas v. George W. White (

8

),

that expression may have different meanings: it may mean a territorial region, or people united in political

relation living in

that region or it may refer to the

government under which the people live or it may even

convey

the combined idea of territory, people and

government. Article 1 of our Constitution says

that

India is a Union of States and the States and the

territories thereof are specified in a Schedule. There

is, therefore, no Q.ifficulty in understanding what is

meant by the expression 'State' in Art. 3. It obviously

refers

to the States in the First Schedule and the

' Legislature of the

State ' refers to the Legislature

which

ea.ch State has under the Constitution. That

being the 'position we see no reasons for importing into

the construction of Art. 3 any doctrinaire consideration

of the sanctity of the rights of States or even for

giving

an extended meaning to the expression '

State '

occurring therein. None

of the constituent units of the

(1)

(1905) 202 U.S. I. (2) (1908) UJ U.S. 11.7.

(3)(1869)74 U.S. 700,

I9$9

Babulal Paral1

v.

The State of

Bombay

and A no I her

S.K. Das ].

I959

Babulal Parate

v.

The Slate of

Bombay

and Another

S. K. Das j.

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

Indian Union was sovereign and independent in the

sense the American colonies or the Swiss Cantons were

before

they formed their federal unions. The

Consti­

tuent Assembly of India, deriving its power from the

sovereign people, was unfettered by any previous

commitment in evolving a constitutional

pattern

suit­

able to the genius and requirements of the Indian

people as a whole. U;nlike some other federal legisla­

tures, Parliament, representing the people of India as

a whole,. has been vested with the exclusive power of

admitting or establishing new States, increasing or

diminishing the area of an existing State or altering

its boundaries, the Legislature or Legislatures of the

States concerned having only the right to an expression

of views on the proposals. It is significant that for

making such territorial adjustments

it is not necessary

even

to invoke the provisions governing constitutional

amendments.

The second line

of argument presented on behalf of

the appellant is that the word 'Bill' in the proviso

must be interpreted

to include an amendment of any

of the clauses of the Bill, at least any substantial

amendment thereof,

and any proposal contained in

such amendment must be referred to the

State Legis­

lature for expressioµ of its views. We do not think

that this interpretation is correct. Wherever the

introduction of an amendment is subject to a condition

precedent,

as in the case of financial bills, the

Consti­

tution has used the expression ' A bill or amendments ',

e.g. in Art. 117.

No such expression occurs in art 3.

Secondly, under Art. 118

Parliament has power to

make rules of its own procedure and conduct of

busi­

ness, including the moving of amendments etc. Rule

80 of the rules of procedure of the House of the People

(Lok Sabha) lays down the conditions which govern

the admissibility of amendments to clauses or schedules

of a Bill, and one of the conditions is that an amend­

ment shall be within the scope of the Bill and relevant

to the subject matter of the clause to which it

relates. Article 122 (1) of the Constitution says that

the validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall

not be called in question on the ground of any alleged

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 615

irregularity of procedure. In view of these provisions,

we cannot accept

an interpretation of Art. 3 which

may nullify the effect of Art. 122, an interpretation

moreover which is based

not on the words used therein

but on certain abstract and somewhat illusory ideas of

what learned counsel for the appellant has

character­

ised as the democratic process.

We recognise

that the formation of a new composite State of Bombay as ins. 8 of the Act was a substantial

modification of

the original proposal of three units

contained in

the Bill. That, however, does not mean

that it was not a proper amendment of the original

proposal or

that the

State Legislature had no opportu­

nity of expressing its views on all aspects of the subject

matter of the proposal. The High Court rightly pointed

out that in the debates in the State Legislature several

members spoke in favour

of a composite

State of

Bombay. The point to note is that many different

views were expressed in respect

of the subject matter

of the original proposal of three units, and as a matter

of fact it cannot be said that the

State Legislature had

no opportunity

of expressing its views in favour of

one composite unit instead of three units if it so

desired.

It cannot be said that the proposal of one

unit instead of three was not relevant or pertinent to

the subject matter of the original proposal. In

T. H.

Vakil v. Bombay Presidency Radio Club Ltd. (

1

),

a decision on which learned counsel for the appellant

has relied,

the question arose of the power of the

chairman of a club

to rule an amendment out of order.

It was said therein that (1) an a.niendment must be

germane

to the subject-matter of the original

proposi­

tion and (2) it must not be a direct negative thereof.

Judged by these two conditions, it cannot be said that

the proposal of one unit instead of three was not ger­

mane to the subject-matter of the original proposal or

was a direct negative thereof. We are unable, thereJ

fore,

to accept the third contention of learned counsel

for

the appellant to the effect that the formation of a

new Bombay

St.ate as envisaged in s. 8 of the Act was

so completely divorced from the proposal contained

in

(I)

(1944) 47 Born. L.R. 428.

I959

Babu/al Parale

v.

The State of

Bombay

and Another

S.K.Das].

'959

Babulal Parate

v.

The State of

Bombay

and Another

S. K. Das ].

I959

August 28.

616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]

the Bill that it was in reality a new bill and therefore

a fresh reference was necessary.

It is advisable, perhaps, to add a few more words

about Art.

122( 1) of the

Constitution. Learned counsel

for the appellant has posed before us the question

as

to what would be the effect of that Article if in

any Bill completely unrelated to any of the matters

referred to in

Cls. (a) to (e) of Art. 3 an amendment

was t!l be proposed and accepted changing (for example)

the name of a State. We do not think that we need

answer such a hypothetical question except merely

to

say that if an amendment is of such a character that

it is not really an amendment and is clearly violative

of Art. 3, the question then will be not the validity of

proceedings in Parliament but the violation of a

con­

situtional provision. That, however, is not the position

in

the present case.

For these reasons, we hold that there was no

viola­

tion of Art. 3 and the Act or any of its provisions are

not invalid on that ground.

The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with

costs.

Appeal dismissed.

RM. NL. RAMASW AMI CHE1'TIAR AND OTHERS.

v.

THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER,

RAMANATHAPURAM AT MADURAI & OTHERS

(S. K. DAs, A. K. SARKAR and K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.)

Insolvency--Decree-holder assigning decree-Adjudication as

insolvent on ground of assignment being fraudulent preference-Whe­

ther upon adjudication decree vests in Official Receiver-Order

annulling

assignment-If relates back to date of

assignment-Execu­

tion applications made by assignee before annulment order, whether

incompetent-Official Receiver making application for execution

after annulment

order-Limitation--Whether limitation saved by

applications made by

assignee-Indian Limitation Act,

r908 (V of

r908)--Provinciat Insolvency Act r920 (V of r920), ss. 28 and 54.

On May 9, 1935, one V obtained a decree against R and

later assigned the same in favour of his mother M. M made an

application for an order recognising her as the assignee and for