Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster; Constitutional validity; Parens Patriae; Natural Justice; Settlement; Victims' rights; Industrial disaster fund; Supreme Court of India; 1985 Act; UCC liability
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Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc. Vs. Union of India and Ors.

  Supreme Court Of India Writ Petition Civil /268/1989
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Case Background

As per case facts, the 1984 Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster caused widespread devastation. To address the resulting claims, the Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) ...

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PETITIONER:

CHARAN LAL SAHU ETC. ETC.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/12/1989

BENCH:

MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)

BENCH:

MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)

SINGH, K.N. (J)

RANGNATHAN, S.

AHMADI, A.M. (J)

SAIKIA, K.N. (J)

CITATION:

1990 AIR 1480 1989 SCR Supl. (2) 597

1990 SCC (1) 613 JT 1989 (4) 582

CITATOR INFO :

E 1991 SC 101 (30,278)

E 1992 SC 248 (31,33,35,36,44,70,71,79,80,81

ACT:

Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 19 and

21--Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of claims) Act,

1985--Whether constitutionally valid.

Preamble and Articles 38, 39 and 39A--Doctrine of

'parens patriae'--Applicability of Exercise of sovereign

power--Limitations. Articles 21, 48A and 51(g)--Human

rights--State's obligation to protect--Need for enacting law

protecting the constitutional rights of citizens--Evolving

standards highlighted by clauses 9 and 13 of U.N. Code of

Conduct on transnational corporations.

Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of claims) Act,

1985: Sections 3, 4, 5, 9 and 11--Constitutional validity

of. Central Govt. representing victims in suit against

multinational company--Govt. holding share in company--Govt.

alleged to be joint tort feasor--Whether competent to repre-

sent victims--Whether principles of natural justice violat-

ed.

Settlement of claims before court--Pre-decisional and

post decisional notice--Need for----Effect of non-issue of

notice.

Power conferred on Central Govt. to represent victims in

suit-Divesting individual rights to legal remedy--Procedure

followed-Whether consistent with the Code of Civil Procedure

1908.

Interim Compensation--Payment of. Precautionary meas-

ures-Need for--Guidelines for the future--Immediate relief

to victims-Setting up of a Tribunal--Creation of Industrial

Disaster Fund-Mooted.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order I Rule 8 and Order

23 Rule 3B--Procedure followed under the Bhopal Gas Leak

Disaster (Processing of claims) Act, 1985--Central Govt.

representing victims in suit-Divesting individual rights to

legal remedy--Whether procedure

598

standard and fair--Whether violative of principles of natu-

ral justice.

Administrative Law--Principles of Natural Justice.' Act

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of Parliament within legislative competence--applicability

of the principles.

Pre-decisional notice not given--Effect of. Central

Government representing victims in a suit against a multina-

tional company--Govt. having shares in company--Alleged

tort-feasor--Whether competent to represent victims--Doc-

trine that no man shall be judge of his own cause--Doctrine

of necessity----Doctrine of 'defacto validity'--Doctrine of

bona fide representation--Applicability of.

Statutory construction: Constructive intuition ap-

proach--statute to be read purposefully and

meaningfully--Regard to be had to the spirit of the statute

and the mischief intended to be cured by it.

Law of Torts: Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of

claims) Act, 1985--Grant of interim relief to the

victims--Whether inherent in the Act and the Scheme framed

thereunder--Liability of tort-feasor-Whether limited to

civil liability to compensation-whether includes criminal

liability to punitive damages also.

HEADNOTE:

Union Carbide (India) Ltd. (UCIL) is a subsidiary of

Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), a New York Corporation.

UCIL was incorporated in India in 1954. 50.99% of its share

holding was with UCC and 22% of the shares were held by Life

Insurance Corporation of India and Unit Trust of India. UCIL

owned a chemical plant in Bhopal for the manufacture of

pesticides using Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) a highly toxic gas.

On the night between 2nd and 3rd December, 1984, there

was a massive escape of lethal gas from the MIC Storage tank

at the Bhopal plant resulting in the tragic death of about

3,000 people. Thousands of people suffered injuries. The

environment also got polluted, badly affecting the flora and

the fauna.

On behalf of the victims, many suits were filed in

various District Courts in the United States of America. All

such suits were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on

Multi-District Litigation and were assigned to the U.S.

District Court, Southern District of New York and Judge

Keenan was the Presiding Judge throughout. Later, the legal

battle shifted to Indian Courts, as it could not proceed in

the U.S. Courts, on the ground of forum non conveniens.

599

Meanwhile, the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of

claims) 1985 was passed by the Government of India with a

view to secure that the claims arising out of or connected

with the Bhopal gas leak disaster were dealt with speedily,

effectively and equitably.

Union of India filed a suit for damages in the District

Court of Bhopal on 5.9.86. However, there were negotiations

for a settlement; hut ultimately the settlement talks had

failed.

On 17.12.1987, the District Judge ordered interim relief

of Rs.350 crores. On appeal, the High Court, on 4.4.88

modified the order of the District Judge and ordered an

interim relief of Rs.250 crores.

Aggrieved, the UCC as also the Union of India filed

petitions for special leave before this Court. Leave was

granted. By its orders dated 14.2.89 and 15.2.89, this

Court, on the basis of a settlement arrived at between the

parties, directed UCC to pay a sum of 470 million U.S.

Dollars to the Union of India in full settlement of all

claims, rights and liabilities related to and arising out of

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the Bhopal gas disaster.

The said orders were passed keeping in view the Bhopal

Gas Disaster (Processing of claims) Act, 1985.

The present Writ Petitions challenge the constitutional

validity of the said Act inter alia on the grounds that the

Act is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under

Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution: that the Act is

violative of the Principles of Natural Justice mainly on the

ground that Union of India, being a joint tort-feasor, in

that it has permitted establishment of such factories with-

out necessary safeguards, has no locus standi to compromise

on behalf of the victims; that the victims and their legal

heirs were not given the opportunity of being heard, before

the Act was passed; that in the guise of giving aid, the

State could not destroy the rights inherent in its citizens;

nor could it demand the citizens to surrender their rights

to the State; that vesting of the rights in Central Govern-

ment was bad and unreasonable because there was conflict of

interest between the Central Government and the victims.

since the Central Government owned 22% share in UCIL, and

that would make the Central Government a Judge in its own

cause.

Disposing of the Writ Petitions, this Court,

600

HELD: Sabyasachi Mukharji, CJ and K.N. Saikia, J.--Per C J:

1.1 The Act is constitutionally valid. It proceeds on

the hypothesis that until the claims of the victims are

realised or obtained from the delinquents, namely, UCC and

UCIL by settlement or by adjudication and until the proceed-

ings in respect thereof continue, the Central Government

must pay interim compensation or maintenance for the vic-

tims. In entering upon the settlement in view of s. 4 of the

Act, regard must be had to the views of the victims and for

the purpose of giving regard to these, appropriate notices

before arriving at any settlement, was necessary. In some

cases, however, post-decisional notice might be sufficient

but in the facts and the circumstances of the present case,

no useful purpose would be served by giving a post-decision-

al hearing having regard to the circumstances mentioned in

the order of this Court dated 4th May, 1989 and having

regard to the fact that there are no further additional data

and facts available with the victims which can be profitably

and meaningfully presented to controvert the basis of the

settlement and further having regard to the fact that the

victims had their say, or on their behalf their views had

been agitated in these proceedings, and will have further

opportunity in the pending review proceedings. [703E-H;

704A]

1.2 Though settlement without notice is not quite prop-

er, on the materials so far available, it is seen that

Justice has been done to the victims but justice has not

appeared to have been done. In view of the magnitude of the

misery involved and the problems in this case, the setting

aside of the settlement on this ground in view of the facts

and the circumstances of this case keeping the settlement in

abeyance and giving notice to the victims for a post-deci-

sional hearing would not be in the ultimate interest of

justice. It is true that not giving notice was not proper

because principles of natural justice are fundamental in the

constitutional set up of this country. No man or no man's

right should be affected without an opportunity to ventilate

his views. Justice is a psychological yearning, in which men

seek acceptance of their view point by having an opportunity

of vindication before the forum or the authority enjoined or

obliged to take a decision affecting their right. Yet in the

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particular situations, one has to bear in mind how an in-

fraction of that should be sought to be removed in accord-

ance with justice. "To do a great right" after all. it is

permissible sometimes "to do a little wrong". In the facts

and circumstances of the case, this is one of those rare

occasions. [701G-H; 702A-C]

2.1 The constitutional validity of the statute would

have to be determined on the basis of its provisions and on

the ambit of its operation as reasonably construed. It has

to be borne in mind that if so

601

judged it passed the test of reasonableness, then the possi-

bility of the power conferred being improperly used is no

ground for pronouncing the law itself invalid. [659E-G]

2.2 Conceptually and from the jurisprudential point of

view, especially in the background of the Preamble to the

Constitution of India and the mandate of the Directive

Principles, it was possible to authorise the Central Govern-

ment to take over the claims of the Victims to fight against

the multinational corporation in respect of the claims.

Because of the situation the victims were under disability

in pursuing their claims in the circumstances of the situa-

tion fully and properly. But there is no prohibition or

inhibition, for Indian State taking over the claims of the

victims or for the State acting for the victims as the Act

has sought to provide. [640E-H]

2.3 The Act does provide a special procedure in respect

of rights of the victims and to that extent the Central

Govt. takes upon itself the rights of the victims. It is a

special Act providing a special procedure for a kind of

special class of victims. In view of the enormity of the

disaster the victims of the Bhopal gas leak disaster, as

they were placed against the multi-national and a big Indian

Corporation and in view of the presence of foreign contin-

gency lawyers to whom the victims were exposed, the claim-

ants and victims can legitimately be described as a class by

themselves different and distinct, sufficiently separate and

identifiable to be entitled to special treatment for effec-

tive, speedy, equitable and best advantageous settlement of

their claims. There indubitably is differentiation. But this

differentiation is based on a principle which has rational

nexus with the aim intended to be achieved by this differen-

tiation. The disaster being unique in its character and in

the recorded history of industrial disaster, situated as the

victims were against a mighty multinational with the

presence of foreign contingency lawyers looming on the

scene, there were sufficient grounds for such differentia-

tion and different treatment. In treating the victims of the

gas leak disaster differently and providing them a proce-

dure, which was just, fair, reasonable and which was not

unwarranted or unauthorised by the Constitution, Article 14

is not breached. [683E-H; 684A-B]

Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chet-

ty, [1962] 3 SCR 786; P.J. Irani v. State of Madras, [1962]

1 SCR 169; D.K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat, [1986] Suppl.

SCC 20, relied on.

Ballast Corporation v. O.D. Commission, [1960] AC 490,

referred to-

602

3.1 The present case is one where the Govt. of India

only represented the victims as a party' and did not adjudi-

cate between the victims and the UCC. It is the court which

would adjudicate the rights of the victims. The representa-

tion of the victims by the Government of India cannot be

held to be bad, and there is and there was no scope of

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violation of any principle of natural justice. [670B]

3.2 The connotation of the term "parens patria" differs

from country to country, for instance, in England it is the

King, in America it is the people, etc. According to Indian

concept parens patria doctrine recognised King as the pro-

tector of all citizens as parent. The Government is within

its duty to protect and to control persons under disability.

Conceptually, the parens patriae theory is the obligation of

the State to protect and take into custody the rights and

privileges of its citizens for discharging its obligations.

Our Constitution makes it imperative for the State to secure

to all its citizens the rights guaranteed by the Constitu-

tion and where the citizens are not in a position to assert

and secure their rights, the State must come into picture

and protect and fight for the right of the citizens. The

Preamble to the Constitution, read with the Directive Prin-

ciples contained in Articles 38, 39 and 39A enjoins the

State to take up these responsibilities. It is the protec-

tive measure to which the social welfare state is committed.

It is necessary for the State to ensure the fundamental

rights in conjunction with the Directive Principles of State

Policy to effectively discharge its obligation and for this

purpose, if necessary, to deprive some rights and privileges

of the individual victims or their heirs to protect their

rights better and secure these further. [638E-H; 639A]

3.3 The UCC had to be sued before the American courts.

The tragedy was treated as a national calamity and the Govt.

of India had the right, and indeed the duty, to take care of

its citizens, in the exercise of its parens patriae juris-

diction or on principles analogous thereto. After having

statutorily armed itself in recognition of such parens

patriae right or on principles analogous thereto, it went to

the American Courts. No other person was properly designed

for representing the victims, as a foreign court had to

recognise a right of representation. The Govt. of India was

permitted to represent was permitted to represent the vic-

tims before the American courts. Private plaintiffs were

also represented by their attorneys. The order of Judge

Keenan permitted the Govt. of India to represent the vic-

tims. If there was any remote conflict of interests between

the Union of India and the victims from the theoretical

point of view the doctrine of necessity would override the

possible violation of the principles of natural

justice--that no man should be Judge in his own case.

[669C-F]

603

3.4 The Act in question has been passed in recognition

of the right of the sovereign to act as parens patriae. The

Government of India in order to effectively safeguard the

rights of the victims in the matter of the conduct of the

case was entitled to act as parens patriae, which position

was reinforced by the statutory provisions, namely the Act.

It has to be borne in mind that conceptually and jurispru-

dentially, the doctrine of parens patriae is not limited to

representation of some of the victims outside the territo-

ries of the country. It is true that the doctrine has been

so utilised in America so far. Where citizens of a country

are victims of a tragedy because of the negligence of any

multinational in peculiar situation arises which calls for

suitable effective machinery to articulate and effectuate

the grievance and demands of the victims, for which the

conventional adversary system would be totally inadequate.

The State in discharge of its sovereign obligation must come

forward. The Indian State because of its constitutional

commitment is obliged to take upon itself the claim of the

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victims and to protect them in their hour of need. [658B-F]

3.5 There is no bar on the State to assume responsibili-

ties analogous to parens patriae to discharge the State's

obligations under the Constitution. What the Central Govern-

ment has done in the instant case seems to be an expression

of its sovereign power. This power is plenary and inherent

in every sovereign state to do all things which promote the

health, peace, moral, education and good order of the people

and tend to increase the wealth and prosperity of the State.

Sovereignty is difficult to define. By the nature of things,

the State Sovereignty in these matters cannot be limited. It

has to be adjusted to the conditions touching the common

welfare when covered by legislative enactments. This power

is to the public what the law of necessity is to the indi-

vidual. It is comprehended in the maxim salus populi suprema

lex--regard for public welfare is the highest law. It is not

a rule, it is an evolution. This power has always been as

broad as public welfare and as strong as the arm of the

state, this can only be measured by the legislative will of

the people, subject to the fundamental rights and constitu-

tional limitations. This is an emanation of sovereignty and

it is the obligation of the State to assume such responsi-

bilities and protect its citizens. [658G-H; 659A-C]

3.6 In the instant case, the victims cannot be consid-

ered to be any match to the multinational companies or the

Government with whom in the conditions that the victims or

their representatives were after the disaster physically,

mentally, financially, economically and also because of the

position of litigation would have to contend. In such a

situation of

604

predicament the victims can legitimately be considered to be

disabled. They were in no position by themselves to look

after their own interest effectively or purposefully. In

that background, they are people who needed the State's

protection and should come within the umbrella of State's

sovereignty to assert, establish and maintain their rights

against the wrong doers in this mass disaster. In that

perspective, it is jurisprudentially possible to apply the

principle of parens patriae doctrine to the victims. But

quite apart from that, it has to be borne in mind that in

this case the State is acting on the basis of the Statute

itself. For the authority of the Central Government to sue

for and on behalf of or instead in place of the victims, no

other theory, concept, or any jurisprudential principle is

required than the Act itself. The Act empowers and substi-

tutes the Central Government. The victims have been divested

of their rights to sue and such claims and such rights have

been vested in the Central Government. The victims have been

divested because the victims were disabled. The disablement

of the victims vis-a-vis their adversaries in this matter is

a self evident factor. Even if the strict application of the

'parens patriae' doctrine is not in order, as a concept it

is a guide. The jurisdiction of the State's power cannot be

circumscribed by the limitations of the traditional concept

of parens patriae. Jurisprudentially it could be utilised to

suit or alter or adapt itself to the changed circumstances.

In the situation in which the victims were, the State had to

assume the role of a parent protecting the rights of the

victims who must come within the protective umbrella of the

State and the common sovereignty of the Indian people. The

act is an exercise of the sovereign power of the State. It

is an appropriate evolution of the expression of sovereignty

in the situation that had arisen. It has to be accepted as

such. [685C-H]

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3.7 The concept of parens patriae can be varied to

enable the Government to represent the victims effectively

in domestic forum if the situation so warrants. There is no

reason to confine the 'parens patriae' doctrine to only

quasi-sovereign right of the State independent of and behind

the title of the citizen. [692B-C]

3.8 The power to compromise and to conduct the proceed-

ings are not uncanalised or arbitrary. These were clearly

exercisable only in the ultimate interests of the victims.

The possibility of abuse of a statute does not impart to it

any element of invalidity. [659C-D]

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1974] 2 SCR 348;

Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; R.D.

Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, [1979] 3

SCR 1014 followed.

605

Ram Saroop v. S.P. Sahi, [1969] 2 Suppl. SCR 583 relied on.

Budhkaran Chankhani v. Thakur Prasad Shah, AIR 1942 Col

311; Banku Behari Mondal v. Banku Behari Hazra, AIR 1943 Cal

203; Medai Dalavoi T. Kumaraswamy Mudaliar v. Medai Dalavoi

Rajammal, AIR 1957 Mad. 563 approved.

State of U.P. v. Poosu, [1978] 3 SCR 1005; K.M. Nanavati

v. State of Bombay, [1961] 1 SCR 497; Ram Gopal Sarubai v.

Smt. Sarubhai & Ors., [1981] 4 SCC 505; India Mica & Mican-

ite Industries Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. [1982] 3 SCC

182; Alfred L Snapp & SonInc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 US 592 73,

Ed. 2d 995, 102 s. ct. 3260; State of Georgia v. Tennessee

Copper Co., 206 US 230, 51 L.Ed. 1038 27 s. et. 618, re-

ferred to.

B.K. Mukherjea on Hindu Religious and Charitable Trusts,

Tagore Law Lectures, 5th Edn. p. 404; Words & Phrases,

permanent Edn.

vol. 33 p. 99; Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn. 1979, p.

1003; Weaver's Constitutional Law, p. 490; American Consti-

tutional Law by Lawrence H. Tribe 1978 Edn. para 3.24,

referred to.

4.1 Section 3 provides for the substitution of the

Central Government with the right to represent and act in

place of (whether within or outside India) every person who

has made or is entitled to make, a claim in respect of the

disaster. The State has taken over the rights and claims of

the victims in the exercise of sovereignty in order to

discharge the constitutional obligations as the parent and

guardian of the victims who in the situation as placed

needed the umbrella of protection. Thus, the State has the

power and jurisdiction and for this purpose unless the Act

is otherwise unreasonable or violative of the constitutional

provisions no question of giving a hearing to the parties

for taking over these rights by the State arises. For legis-

lation by the Parliament, no principle of natural justice is

attracted provided such legislation is within the competence

of the legislature. Indeed the present Act is within the

competence of the Parliament. Section 3 makes the Central

Government the dominoes litis and it has the carriage of the

proceedings, but that does not solve the problem of by what

procedure the proceedings should be carried. [692A-D]

4.2 Section 4 means and entails that before entering

into any settlement affecting the rights and claims of the

victims some kind of notice or information should be given

to the victims. [699D]

606

4.3 Sections 3 and 4 are categorical and clear. When the

expression is explicit, the expression is conclusive, alike

in what it says and in what it does not say. These give the

Central Government an exclusive right to act in place of the

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persons who are entitled to make claim or have already made

claim. The expression 'exclusive' is explicit and signifi-

cant. The exclusively cannot be wittled down or watered

down. The said expression must be given its full meaning and

extent. This is corroborated by the use of the expression

'claim' for all purposes. If such duality of rights are

given to. the Central Government alongwith the victims in

instituting or proceeding for the realisation or the en-

forcement of the claims arising out of Bhopal gas leak

disaster, then that would be so cumbersome that it would not

be speedy, effective or equitable and would not be the best

or more advantageous procedure for securing the claims

arising out of the leakage. [683A-C]

4.4 Sections 3 and 4 of the Act should be read together

alongwith other provisions of the Act and in particular

sections 9 and 11 of the Act. These should be appreciated in

the context of the object sought to be achieved by the Act

as indicated in the Statement of objects and Reasons and the

Preamble to the act. The Act was so designed that the vic-

tims of the disaster are fully protected and the claims of

compensation or damages for loss of life or personal in-

juries or in respect of other matters arising out of or

connected with the disaster are processed speedily, effec-

tively, equitably and to the best advantage of the claim-

ants. Section 3 of the Act is subject to other provisions of

the Act which includes Sections 4 and 11. Section 4 of the

Act opens with non-obstante clause, vis-a-vis, section 3

and, therefore overrides section 3. [659G-H; 660A-B]

4.5 In the instant case, the Government of India is only

capable to represent the victims as a party. The adjudica-

tion of the claims would be done by the Court. The doctrine

of 'Bona fide Representation' as also 'defacto validity' are

not applicable to the present case. [690F]

Basheshar v. Income Tax Commissioner, AIR 1959 SC 149; In re

Special Courts Bill, [1979] 2 SCR 476; A.R. Antulay v. R.S.

Nayak & Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 602; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Ten-

dulkar, [1955] SCR 279; Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of

U.P. & Ors. etc. [1980] 3 SCR 1159; Bodhan Chowdhary v.

State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045; Lakshmi Kant Pandey v.

Union of India, [1984] 2 SCR 795; M/s Mackinnon Mackenzie &

Co. Ltd. v. Audrey D' Costa and Anr., [1987] 2 SCC 469;

Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children Aid Society & Ors.,

[1987] 1 SCR 870; Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P.,

[1981] 3 SCR 474; Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhwan.

[1987] 3 SCC 367;

607

M/s Beopar Sahayak (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Vishwanath & Ors.,

[1987] 3 SCC 693; Dharampal Singh v. Director of Small

Industries Services & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1888; N.K. Mohammed

Sulaiman v. N.C. Mohammed lsmail & Ors., [1966] 1 SCR 937;

Malkariun Bin Shidrammappa Pasare v. Narhari Bin Shivappa &

Anr., 271 A 216, referred to.

Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edn. p. 437, referred to.

5. The restrictions or limitations on the substantive

and procedural rights in the Act will have to be judged from

the point of view of the particular Statute in question. No

abstract rule or standard of reasonableness can be applied.

That question has to be judged having regard to the nature

of the rights alleged to have been infringed in this case,

the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied,

disproportionate imposition, prevailing conditions at the

time, all these facts will have to be taken into considera-

tion. Having considered the background, the plight of the

impoverished, the urgency of the victims' need, the presence

of the foreign contingency lawyers, the procedure of settle-

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ment in USA in mass action, the strength of the foreign

multinationals, the nature of injuries and damages, and the

limited but significant right of participation of the vic-

tims as contemplated by s. 4 of the Act, the Act cannot be

condemned as unreasonable. [684C-E]

State of Madras v. V.G. Row, [1952] SCR 597, referred to.

6.1 In view of the principles settled by this Court and

accepted all over the world in a case of this magnitude and

nature, when the victims have been given some say by Section

4 of the Act, in order to make that opportunity contemplated

by section 4 of the Act, meaningful and effective, it should

be so read that the victims have to be given an opportunity

of making their representation before the court comes to any

conclusion in respect of any settlement. How that opportuni-

ty should be given, would depend upon the particular situa-

tion. Fair procedure should be followed in a representative

mass tort action. [696E-F]

6.2 One assumption under which the Act is justified is

that the victims were disabled to defend themselves in an

action of this type. If that is so, then the Court cannot

presume that the victims were a lot, capable and informed to

be able to have comprehended or contemplated the settlement.

In the aforesaid view of the matter notice was necessary.

The victims at large did not have the notice. The Central

Government as the representative of the victims must have

the views of the victims and place such view before the

court in such manner it considers neces-

608

sary before a settlement is entered into. If the victims

want to advert to certain aspect of the matter during the

proceedings under the Act and settlement indeed is an impor-

tant stage in the proceedings, opportunities must be given

to the victims. Individual notices may not be necessary. The

Court can, and should in such situation formulate modalities

of giving notice and public notice can also be given invit-

ing views of the victims by tile help of mass media. Howev-

er, it is not necessary that such views would require the

consent of all the victims. [698B-C; 698G-H; 699A]

6.3 One of the important requirements of justice is that

people affected by an action or inaction should have oppor-

tunity to have their say. That opportunity the victims have

got when these applications were heard and they were heard

after utmost publicity and they would have further opportu-

nity when review application against the settlement would be

heard. 1700G-H; 701A]

7.1 The Act does not expressly exclude the application

of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11 of the Act pro-

vides the overriding effect indicating that anything incon-

sistent with the provisions of the Act or in other laws

including the Civil Procedure Code should be ignored and the

Act should prevail. Strictly speaking, Order 1 Rule 8 will

not apply to a suit or a proceeding under the Act. It is not

a case of one having common interest with others. Here the

plaintiff, the Central Government has replaced and divested

the victims. 1696H; 697A-B]

7.2 In the instant case, there is no question of aban-

donment as such of the suit or part of the suit, the provi-

sions of order XXIII Rule 1 would also not strictly apply.

However, Order XXIH Rule 3B of the Code is an important and

significant pointer and the principles behind the said

provision would apply to this case. The said rule 3B pro-

vides that no agreement of compromise in a representative

suit shall be entered into without the leave of the Court

expressly recorded in the proceedings; and sub-rule (2) of

rule 3B enjoins that before granting such leave the court

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shall give notice in such manner as it may think fit in a

representative action. Representative suit has been defined

under Explanation to the said rule vide clause (d) as any

other suit in which the decree passed may, by virtue of the

provisions this Code or of any other law for the time being

in force, bind any person who is not named as party to the

suit. Indubitably the victims would be bound by the Settle-

ment though not named in the suit. 11his is a position

conceded by all. If that is so, it would be a representative

suit in terms of and for the purpose of Rule 315 of Order

XXIII of the Code. If the principles of this rule are the

principles of natural justice then we are of the opinion

that

609

the principles behind it would be applicable; and also that

section 4 of the Act should be so construed in spite of the

difficulties of the process of notice and other difficulties

of making "informed decision making process cumbersome".

[697C-G]

7.3 In as much as section 4 of the Act had given a

qualified right of participation to the victims, there

cannot be any question of violation of the principles of

natural justice. The scope of the application of the princi-

ples of natural justice cannot be judged by any strait

jacket formula. [662G-H]

R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, [1963] 3

SCR 22; M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, [1963]

Supp. (2) 724; Chintaharan Ghose & Ors. v. Gujaraddi Sheik &

Ors., AIR 1951 Cal. 456; Ram 'Sarup v. Nanak Ram, AIR 1952

All. 275; referred to.

8. The Act has to be understood that it is in respect of

the person responsible, being the person in-charge-of the

UCIL and the parent company UCC. This interpretation of the

Act is further strengthened by the fact that a 'claimant"

has been defined in clause (c) of Section 2 as a person who

is entitled to make a claim and the expression "person" in

Section 2(e) includes the Government. Therefore, the Act

proceeded on the assumption that the Government could be a

claimant being a person as such. [690A-B]

9.1 The fact that the provisions of the principles of

natural justice have to be complied with, is undisputed.

This is well-settled by the various decisions of the Court.

The Indian Constitution mandates that clearly, otherwise the

Act and the actions would be violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution and would also be destructive of Article

19(1)(g) and negate Article 21 of the Constitution by deny-

ing a procedure which is just, fair and reasonable. [693D-E]

9.2 Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules.

Hence, it was not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue

of such rules. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective

rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory au-

thority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to

act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. The

rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not

covered by any law validly made. The general principle as

distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application

is that where a statute does not in terms exclude the rule

of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing

610

amounting to a full review of the original order on merits

then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi

alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. If the

statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the

giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected

the administrative decision after post-decisional hearing

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was good. [694A-D]

9.3 In the instant case, no question of violation of the

principle of natural justice arises, and there is no scope

for the application of the principle that no man should be a

Judge in his own cause. The Central Government was not

judging any claim, but was fighting and advancing the claims

of the victims. The adjudication would be done by the

courts, and therefore, there is no scope of the violation of

any principle of natural justice. [688G-H; 689A-B]

Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; Olga

Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, [1985] Supp. 2 SCR

51; Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, [1985] Supp. 2 SCR

131; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, [1981] 2 SCR

533, relied on.

Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, [1974] 3 SCR 882; S.L. Kapoor

v. Jagmohan, [1981] 1 SCR 745; Sangram v. Election Commis-

sion, [1955] 2 SCR 1, referred to.

10. Though not expressly stated, the Act proceeds on

'the major inarticulate premise'. It is on this promise or

premise that the State would be justified in taking upon

itself the right and obligation to proceed and prosecute the

claim and deny access to the courts of law to the victims on

their own. If it is only so read, it can only be held to be

constitutionally valid. It has to be borne in mind that the

language of the Act does not militate against this construc-

tion but on the Contrary. Sections 9, 10 and the scheme of

the Act suggest that the Act contains such an obligation. If

it is so read, then only meat can be put into the skeleton

of the Act making it meaningful and purposeful. The Act

must, therefore, be so read. This approach to the interpre-

tation of the Act can legitimately be called the 'construc-

tive intuition' which is a permissible mode of viewing the

Acts of Parliament. The freedom to search for 'the spirit of

the Act' or the quantity of the mischief at which it is

aimed (both synonymous for the intention of the parliament)

opens up the possibility of liberal interpretation "that

delicate and important branch of judicial power, the conces-

sion of which is dangerous, the denial ruinous". Given this

freedom it is a rare opportunity though never to be misused

and challenge for the Judges to adopt and give meaning to

611

the act, articulate and inarticulate and thus translate the

intention of the Parliament and fulfil the object of the

Act. After all, the Act was passed to give relief to the

victims, who, it was thought, were unable to establish their

own rights and fight for themselves. [687E-H; 688A]

11.1 The circumstances that financial institutions held

shares in the UCIL would not disqualify the Government of

India from acting as parens patriae and in discharging its

statutory duties under the Act. The suit was filed only

against the UCC and not against UCIL. On the basis of the

claim made by the Government of India, UCIL was not a neces-

sary party. It was suing only the multinational based on

several legal grounds of liability of the UCC, inter alia,

on the basis of enterprise liability. If the Government of

India had instituted a suit against UCIL to a certain extent

it would have weakened its case against UCC in view of the

judgment of this Court in M.C. Mehta's case. [668H; 669A-B]

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, [1987] 1 SCR 819, referred to.

11.2 Even if there was any remote conflict of interests

between the Union of India and the victims on account of the

sharesholding, doctrine of necessity would override the

possible violation of the principles of natural justice.

[669F]

Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of UP, [1965] 1 SCR

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 104

375; State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati, [1962] 2 Supp. SCR

989; J. Mohapatra & Co. & Anr. v. State of Orissa & Anr.,

[1984] 4 SCC 103, referred to.

Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 1, 4th Edn. para 73

Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn.

pp. 276-277; Natural Justice by G.A. Flick, [1979] Edn. pp.

138-141, referred to.

12. The Act does not create new causes of action or

create special courts. The jurisdiction of the civil court

to entertain suit would still arise out of section 9 of the

CPC and the substantive cause of action and the nature of

the reliefs available would also continue to remain un-

changed. The only difference produced by the provisions of

the Act would be that instead of the suit being filed by the

victims themselves the suit would be filed by the Central

Government on their behalf. [655F]

13. Normally, in measuring civil liability, the law has

attached more importance to the principle of compensation

than that of punishment. Penal redress, however, involves

both compensation to the

612

person injured and punishment as deterrence. The Act, as

such does not abridge or curtail damage or liability whatev-

er that might be. So the challenge to the Act on the ground

that there has been curtailment or deprivation of the rights

of the victims which is unreasonable in the situation is

unwarranted and cannot be sustained. [680G-H; 681A-F]

Roshanlal Kuthiala & Ors. v. R.B. Mohan Singh, Oberoi

(1975) 2 SCR 491; Nandram Heeralal v. Union of India & Anr.,

AIR 1978 M.P. 209; Ryland v. Flatcher, (1868) Vol 3 LR E& I

Appeal Cases 330; Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] AC 1129, re-

ferred to.

Salmond's Law of Torts, 15th Edn. p. 30, referred to.

14. The Act in question does not purport to deal with

the criminal liability, if any, of the parties or persons

concerned nor it deals with any of the consequences flowing

from those. This position is clear from the provisions and

the preamble to the Act. [636F]

15. The major inarticulate premise apparent from the Act

and the scheme and the spirit of the Act is that so long as

the rights of the victims are prosecuted the state must

protect the victims. Otherwise the object of the Act would

be defeated its purpose frustrated. Therefore, continuance

of the payments of the interim maintenance for the continued

sustenance of the victims is an obligation arising out of

State's assumption of the power and temporary deprivation of

the rights of the victims and divestiture of the right of

the victims to fight for their own rights. This is the only

reasonable interpretation which is just, fair and proper.

[686B-C]

16. The promises made to the victims and hopes raised in

their hearts and minds can only be redeemed in some measure

if attempts are made vigorously to distribute the amount

realised to the victims in accordance with the scheme. That

would be redemption to a certain extent. The law relating to

damages and payment of interim damages or compensation to

the victims of this nature should be seriously and scientif-

ically examined by the appropriate agencies. [704F-H; 705A]

17. The Bhopal Gas Leak disaster and its aftermath

emphasise the need for laying down certain norms and stand-

ards that the Government may follow before granting permis-

sion or licences for the running of industries dealing with

materials which are of dangerous potentialities. The Govern-

ment, should, therefore, examine or have the problem exam-

ined by an expert committee as to what should be the condi-

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tions on

613

which future licences and/or permission for running indus-

tries on Indian soil would be granted and for ensuring

enforcement of those conditions, sufficient safety measures

should be formulated and scheme of enforcement indicated.

The Government should insist as a condition precedent to the

grant of such licences or permission, creation of a fund in

anticipation by the industries to be available for payment

of damages out of the said fund in case of leakages or

damages in case of accident or disaster flowing from negli-

gent working of such industrial operations or failure to

ensure measures preventing such occurrence. The Government

should also ensure that the parties must agree to abide to

pay such damages out of the said Fund by procedure separate-

ly evolved for computation and payment of damages without

exposing the victims or sufferers of the negligent act to

the long and delayed procedure. Special procedure must be

provided for and the industries must agree as a condition

for the grant of licence to abide by such procedure or to

abide by statutory arbitration. The basis for damages in

case of leakages and accident should also be statutorily

fixed taking into consideration the nature of damages in-

flicted, the consequences thereof and the ability and capac-

ity of the parties to pay. Such should also provide for

deterrant or punitive damages, the basis for which should be

formulated by a proper expert committee or by the Govern-

ment. For this purpose, the Government should have the

matter examined by such body as it considers necessary and

proper like the Law Commission or other competent bodies.

This is vital for the future. [705B-F]

18. That people are born free, the dignity of the per-

sons must be recognised, and competent tribunal is one of

the surest methods of effective remedy. If, therefore, as a

result of this tragedy new consciousness and awareness on

the part of the people of this country to be more vigilant

about measures and the necessity of ensuring more strict

vigilance for permitting the operations of such dangerous

and poisonous gases dawn, then perhaps the tragic experience

of Bhopal would not go in vain. [682D-E]

Per Singh, J. (concurring):

1.1 In India, the need for industrial development has

led to the establishment of a number of plants and factories

by the domestic companies and under-takings as well as by

Transnational Corporations. Many of these industries are

engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities

which pose potential threat to life, health and safety of

persons working in the factory, or residing in the surround-

ing areas. Though working of such factories and plants is

regulated by a

614

number of laws of our country, there is no special legisla-

tion providing for compensation and damages to outsiders who

may suffer on account of any industrial accident. As the law

stands today, affected persons have to approach civil courts

for obtaining compensation and damages. In civil courts, the

determination of amount of compensation or damages as well

the liability of the enterprise has been bound by the shack-

les of conservative principles. [707D-G]

1.2 The principles laid down in Ryland v. Fletcher made

it difficult to obtain adequate damages from the enterprise

and that too only after the negligence of enterprise was

proved. [707G-H]

1.3 The law laid down in Oleum Gas Leak case made a

land-mark departure from the conservative principles with

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regard to the liability of an enterprise carrying on hazard-

ous or inherently dangerous activities. [709C]

1.4 In the instant case, there is no scope for any doubt

regarding the liability of the UCC for the damage caused to

the human beings and nature in and around Bhopal. [709E]

Ryland v. Fletcher, [1868] LR 3 HL 330; M.C. Mehta v.

Union of India, [1987] 1 SCR 819, referred to.

2. In the context of our national dimensions of human

rights, right to life, liberty, pollution free air and water

is guaranteed by the Constitution under Articles 21, 48A and

51(g), it is the duty of the State to take effective steps

to protect the constitutional rights guaranteed. These

rights must be integrated and illumined by evolving interna-

tional dimensions and standards, having regard to our sover-

eignty as highlighted by Clauses 9 and 13 of U.N. Code of

Conduct on Transnational Corporations. Such a law may pro-

vide for conditions for granting licence to Transnational

Corporations, prescribing norms and standards for running

industries on Indian soil ensuring the above said constitu-

tional rights of our people. A Transnational Corporation

should be made liable and subservient to laws of our country

and the liability should not be restricted to affiliate

company only but the parent corporations should also be made

liable for any damage caused to the human beings or ecology.

The law must require transnational Corporations to agree to

pay such damages as may be determined by the statutory

agencies and forum constituted under it without exposing the

victims to long drawn litigation. In order to meet the

situation, to avoid delay and to ensure immediate relief to

the victims, the law should

615

provide for constitution of tribunals regulated by special

procedure for determining compensation to victims of indus-

trial disaster or accident, appeal against which may lie to

this Court on the limited ground of questions of law only

after depositing the amount determined by the Tribunal. The

law should also provide for interim relief to victims during

the pendency of proceedings. These steps would minimise the

misery and agony of victims of hazardous enterprises. [710H;

711A-F]

3. Industrial development in our country and the hazards

involved therein, pose a mandatory need to constitute a

statutory "Industrial Disaster Fund", contributions to which

may be made by the Government, the industries whether they

are transnational corporations or domestic undertakings,

public or private. The extent of contribution may be worked

out having regard to the extent of hazardous nature of the

enterprise and other allied matters. The fund should be

permanent in nature. so that money is readily available for

providing immediate effective relief to the victims. [711 G

-H; 712A]

Ranganathan and Ahmadi, J J----Per Ranganathan, J. (Concur-

ring).'

1. The provisions of the Act, read by themselves, guar-

antee a complete and full protection to the rights of the

claimants in every respect. Save only that they cannot file

a suit themselves, their right to acquire redress has not

really been abridged by the provisions of the Act. Sections

3 and 4 of the Act completely vindicate the objects and

reasons which compelled Parliament to enact this piece of

legislation. Far from abridging the rights of the claimants

in any manner, these provisions are so worded as to enable

the Government to prosecute the litigation with the maximum

amount of resources, efficiency and competence at its com-

mand. as well as with all the assistance and help that can

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be extended to it by such of those litigants and claimants

as are capable of playing more than a mere passive role in

the litigation. [720G-H; 721A-B]

2. Even if the provisions of s. 3 had been scrupulously

observed and the names of all parties, other than the Cen-

tral Government, had been got deleted from the array of

parties in the suits and proceedings pending in this coun-

try, the result would not have been fatal to the interests

of the litigants. On the contrary, it enabled the litigants

to obtain the benefit of all legal expertise at the command

of the Government of India in exercising their rights

against the Union Carbide Corporation. Such representation

can well be justified by resort to a principle analogous to,

if not precisely the same, as that of, "parens

616

patriae". A victim of the tragedy is compelled to part with

a valuable right of his in order that it might be more

efficiently and satisfactorily exploited for his benefit

than he himself is capable of. It is of course possible that

there may be an affluent claimant or lawyer engaged by him,

who may be capable of fighting the litigation better. It is

possible that the Government of India as a litigant may or

may not be able to pursue the litigation with as much deter-

mination or capability as such a litigant. But in a case of

the present type one should not be confounded by such a

possibility. There are more indigent litigants than affluent

ones. There are more illiterates than enlightened ones.

There are very few of the claimants, capable of finding the

financial wherewithal required for fighting the litigation.

Very few of them are capable or prosecuting such a litiga-

tion in this country not to speak of the necessity to run to

a foreign country. The financial position of UCIL was negli-

gible compared to the magnitude of the claim that could

arise and, though eventually the battle had to be pitched on

our own soil, an initial as well as final recourse to legal

proceedings in the United States was very much on the cards,

indeed inevitable. In this situation, the legislature was

perfectly justified in coming to the aid of the victims with

this piece of legislation and in asking the Central Govern-

ment to shoulder the responsibility by substituting itself

in place of the victims for all purposes connected with the

claims. [716C-H; 717A]

3. Section 4 adequately safeguards the interest of

individual victims. It enables each one of them to bring to

the notice of the Union any special features or circum-

stances which he would like to urge in respect of any matter

and if any such features are brought to its notice the Union

is obliged to take it into account. The individual claimants

are also at liberty to engage their own counsel to associate

with the State counsel in conducting the proceedings. If the

suits in this case had proceeded, in the normal course,

either to the stage of a decree or even to one of settlement

the claimants could have kept themselves abreast of the

developments and the statutory provisions would have been

more than adequate to ensure that the points of view of all

the victims are presented to the court. Even a settlement or

compromise could not have been arrived at without the court

being apprised of the views of any of them who chose to do

so. The statute has provided that though the Union of India

will be the dominus litis in the suit, the interest of all

the victims and their claims should be safeguarded by giving

them a voice in the proceedings to the extent indicated

above. This provision of the statute is an adaptation of the

principle of Order 1 Rule 8 and of order XXIII Rule 38 of

the Code of Civil Procedure in its application to the suits

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governed by it and, though the extent of participation al-

lowed to

617

the victims is somewhat differently enunciated in the legis-

lation, substantially speaking, it does incorporate the

principles of natural justice to the extent possible in the

circumstances. The statute cannot, therefore, be faulted on

the ground that it denies the victims an opportunity to

present their views or places them at any disadvantage in

the matter of having an effective voice in settling the suit

by way of compromise. [724G-H; 725A-D]

4. Sections 3 and 4 combine together the interest of the

weak, illiterate, helpless and poor victims as well as the

interest of those who could have managed for themselves,

even without the help of this enactment. The combination

thus envisaged enables the Government to fight the battle

with the foreign adversary with the full aid and assistance

of such of the victims or their legal advisers as are in a

position to offer any such assistance. Though section 3

denies the climants the benefit of being eo nominee parties

in such suits or proceedings, section 4 preserves to them

substantially all that they can achieve by proceeding on

their own. In other words, while seeming to deprive the

claimants of their right to take legal action on their own,

it has preserved those rights, to be exercised indirectly. A

conjoint reading of sections 3 and 4 would show that there

has been no real total deprivation of the right of the

claimants to enforce their claim for damage in appropriate

proceedings before any appropriate forum. There is only a

restriction of this right which, in the circumstances, is

totally reasonable and justified. [718D-G ]

5. It is not possible to bring the suits brought under

the Act within the categories of representative action

envisaged in the Code of Civil Procedure. The Act deals with

a class of action which is sui generis and for which a

special formula has been found and encapsuled in s. 4. The

Act divests the individual claimants of their right to sue

and vests it in the Union. In relation to the suit in India,

the Union is the sole Plaintiff. none of the others are

envisaged as plaintiffs or respondents. The victims of the

tragedy were so numerous that they were never defined at the

stage of filing the plaint nor do they need to be defined at

the stage of settlement. The litigation is carried on by the

State in its capacity not exactly the same as, but somewhat

analogous to that of "parens patriae". In the case of a

litigation by a Karta of a Hindu undivided family or by a

guardian on behalf of a ward, who is non-sui juris, the

junior members of the family or the wards, are not to be

consulted before entering into a settlement. In such cases,

court acts as guardian of such persons to scrutinise the

settlement and satisfy itself that it is in the best inter-

est of all concerned. If it is later discovered that there

has been any fraud or collusion, it may be open to the

junior members of the

618

family or the wards to call the Karta or guardian to account

but, barring such a contingency, the settlement would be

effective and binding. In the same way, the Union as "parens

patriae' would have been at liberty to enter into such

settlement as it considered best on its own and seek the

Court's approval therefore. [723G-H; 724A-D]

6. It is common knowledge that any authority given to

conduct a litigation cannot be effective unless it is accom-

panied by an authority to withdraw or settle the same if the

circumstances call for it. The vagaries of a litigation of

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this magnitude and intricacy could not be fully anticipated.

There were possibilities that the litigation may have to be

fought out to the bitter finish. There were possibilities

that the UCC might be willing to adequately compensate the

victims either on their own or at the insistence of the

Government concerned. There was also the possibility, which

had already been in evidence before Judge Keenan, that the

proceedings might ultimately have to end in negotiated

settlement. In most of the mass disaster cases reported,

proceedings finally end in a compromise, if only to avoid an

indefinite prolongation of the agonies caused by such liti-

gation. The legislation, therefore, cannot be considered to

be unreasonable merely because in addition to the right to

institute a suit or other proceedings it also empowers the

Government to withdraw the proceedings or enter into a

compromise. [719B-E]

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, [1987] 1 SCR 819, referred to.

7. The Act has provided an adequate opportunity to the

victims to speak out and if they or the counsel engaged by

some of them in the trial court had kept in touch with the

proceedings in this court, they could have most certainly

made themselves heard. If a feeling has gained ground that

their voice has not been fully heard, the fault was not with

the statute but was rather due to the development leading to

the finalisation of the settlement when the appeal against

the interim order was being heard in this Court. [726B-D]

8. In the field of torts, under the common law of Eng-

land, no action could be laid by the dependants or heirs of

a person whose death was brought about by the tortious act

of another on the maxim actio personalis maritur cum persona

although a person injured by a similar act could claim

damages for the wrong done to him. In England this situation

was remedied by the passing of Fatal Accidents Act, 1846,

popularly known as Lord Compbell's Act. Thereafter the

Indian Legislature enacted the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855.

This Act is fashioned on the

619

lines of the English Act of 1840. Even though the English

Act has undergone a substantial change, our law has remained

static and seems a trifle archaic. The magnitude of the gas

leak disaster in which hundreds lost their lives and thou-

sands were maimed, not to speak of the damage to livestock,

flora and fauna, business and property, is an eye opener.

The nation must learn a lesson from this traumatic experi-

ence and evolve safeguards atleast for the future. The time

is ripe to take a fresh look at the outdated century old

legislation which is out of tune with modern concepts.

[728F-H; 729A-B]

9. The Central Government will be well advised to insist

on certain safeguards before permitting a transnational

company to do business in the country. It is necessary to

insist on a right to be informed of the nature of the proc-

esses involved so as to take prompt action in the event of

an accident. The victims in this case have been considerably

handicapped on account of the fact that the immediate tort-

feasor was the subsidiary of a multi-national with its

Indian assets totally inadequate to satisfy the claims

arising out of the disaster. It is, therefore, necessary to

evolve, either by international consensus or by unilateral

legislation, steps to overcome these handicaps and to ensure

that foreign corporations seeking to establish an industry

here, agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts in

India in respect of actions for tortious acts in this coun-

try; that the liability of such a corporation is not limited

to such of its assets (or the assets of its affiliates) as

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may be found in this country, but that the victims are able

to reach out to the assets of such concerns anywhere in the

world; and that any decree obtained in Indian Courts in

compliance with due process of law is capable of being

executed against the foreign corporation, its affiliates and

their assets without further procedural hurdles. in those

other countries. [729G-H; 730A-E]

10. It is hoped that calamities like the one which this

country has suffered will serve as catalyst to expedite the

acceptance of an international code on such matters in the

near future. [730F-G]

JUDGMENT:

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 268 of 1989

etc. etc.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).

K. Parasaran, Attorney General, R.K. Garg, Ms. Indira

Jaising, L.N. Sinha, Dr. V. Gauri Shankar, Vepa P. Sarathi,

Shanti Bhushan, Rakesh Luthra, C.L. Sahu, Indeevar

Goodwill, N.S. Malik, N.S. Pundir, R.C, Kaushik, D.K. Garg,

Rajeev Dhawan, Miss Kamini

620

Jaiswal, Anip Sachthey, R.C. Pathak, H.D. Pathak, Harish

Uppal, S.K. Gambhir, Gopal Subramanium, D.S. Shastri, Arun

Sharma, Miss A. Subhashini, C.V.S. Rao, Satish K. Agnihotri,

Ashok Kumar Singh, R.K. Jain, Kailash Vasdev and Prashant

Bhushan for the appearing parties.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ. 1. Is the Bhopal Gas Leak

Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 (hereinafter

referred to as 'the Act') is constitutionally valid? That is

the question.

2. The Act was passed as a sequel to a grim tragedy. On

the night of 2nd December, 1984 occurred the most tragic

industrial disaster in recorded human history in the city of

Bhopal in the State of Madhya Pradesh in India. On that

night there was massive escape of lethal gas from the MIC

storage tank at Bhopal Plant of the Union Carbide (I) Ltd.

(hereinafter referred to as 'UCIL') resulting in large scale

death and untold disaster. A chemical plant owned and oper-

ated by UCIL was situated in the northern sector of the city

of Bhopal. There were numerous hutments adjacent to it on

its southern side, which were occupied by impoverished

squatters. UCIL manufactured the pesticides, Sevin and

Tamik, at the Bhopal plant, at the request of, it is stated

by Judge John F. Keenan of the United States District Court

in his judgment, and indubitably with the approval of the

Govt. of India. UCIL was incorporated in 1984 under the

appropriate Indian law: 50.99% of its shareholdings were

owned by the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), a New York

Corporation, L.I.C. and the Unit Trust of India own 22% of

the shares of U.C.I.L., a subsidiary of U.C.C.

3. Methyl Isocyanate (MIC), a highly toxic gas, is an

ingredient in the production of both Sevin and Temik. On the

night of the tragedy MIC leaked from the plant in substan-

tial quantities. the exact reasons for and circumstances of

such leakage have not yet been ascertained or clearly estab-

lished. The results of the disaster were horrendous. Though

no one is yet certain as to how many actually died as the

immediate and direct result of the leakage, estimates at-

tribute it to about 3,000. Some suffered injuries the ef-

fects of which are described as Carcinogenic and ontogenic

by Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned counsel; some suffered

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injuries serious and permanent and some mild and temporary.

Livestock was killed, damaged and infected. Businesses were

interrupted. Environment was polluted and the ecology af-

fected, flora and fauna disturbed.

621

4. On 7th December, 1984, Chairman of UCC Mr. Warren

Anderson came to Bhopal and was arrested. He was later

released on bail. Between December 1984 and January 1985

suits were filed by several American lawyers in the courts

in America on behalf of several victims. It has been stated

that within a week after the disaster, many American law-

yers, described by some as 'ambulance chasers', whose fees

were stated to be based on a percentage of the contingency

of obtaining damages or not, flew over to Bhopal and ob-

tained Powers of Attorney to bring actions against UCC and

UCIL. Some suits were also filed before the District Court

of Bhopal by individual claimants against UCC (the American

Company) and the UCIL.

5. On or about 6th February, 1985, all the suits in

various U.S. Distt. Courts were consolidated by the Judicial

Panel on Multi-District Litigation and assigned to U.S.

Distt. Court, Southern Distt. of New York. Judge Keenan was

at all material times the Presiding Judge there.

6. On 29th March, 1985, the Act in question was passed.

The Act was passed to secure that the claims arising out of

or connected with the Bhopal gas leak disaster were dealt

with speedily, effectively and equitably. On 8th April, 1985

by virtue of the Act the Union of India filed a complaint

before the U.S. Distt. Court, Southern Distt. of New York.

On 16th April, 1985 at the first pre-trial conference in the

consolidated action transferred and assigned to the U.S.

Distt. Court, Southern Distt., New York, Judge Keenan gave

the following directions:

(i) that a three member Executive Committee be

formed to frame and develop issues in the case

and prepare expeditiously for trial or settle-

ment negotiations. The Committee was to com-

prise of one lawyer selected by the firm

retained by the Union of India and two other

lawyers chosen by lawyers retained by the

individual plaintiffs.

(ii) that as a matter of fundamental human

decency, temporary relief was necessary for

the-victims and should be furnished in a

systematic and coordinated fashion without

unnecessary delay regardless of the posture of

the litigation then pending.

7. On 24th September, 1985 in exercise of powers con-

ferred by section 9 of the Act, the Govt. of India framed

the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of

Claims) Scheme, 1985 (hereinafter called the Scheme).

622

8. On 12th May, 1986 an order was passed by Judge Keenan

allowing the application of UCC on forum non convenience as

indicated hereinafter. On 21st May, 1986 there was a motion

for fairness hearing on behalf of the private plaintiffs. On

26th June, 1986 individual plaintiffs filed appeal before

the US Court of Appeal for the second circuit challenging

the order of Judge Keenan. By an order dated 28th May, 1986

Judge Keenan declined the motion for a fairness hearing. The

request for fairness hearing was rejected at the instance of

Union of India in view of the meagerness of the amount of

proposed settlement. On 10th July, 1986 UCC filed an appeal

before the US Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit. It

challenged Union of India being entitled to American mode of

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discovery, but did not challenge the other two conditions

imposed by Judge Keenan, it is stated. On 28th July, 1986

the Union of India filed cross-appeal before the US Court of

Appeal praying that none of the conditions imposed by Judge

Keenan should be disturbed. In this connection it would be

pertinent to set out the conditions incorporated in the

order of Judge Keenan, dated 12th May, 1986 whereby he had

dismissed the case before him on the ground of forum non

convenience, as mentioned before. The conditions were fol-

lowing:

1. That UCC shall consent to the jurisdiction

of the courts of India and shall continue to

waive defenses based on the statute of limita-

tion,

2. That UCC shall agree to satisfy any judg-

ment rendered by an Indian court against it

and if applicable, upheld on appeal, provided

the judgment and-affirmance "comport with

minimal requirements of due process"; and

3. That UCC shah be subject to discovery under

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the US

after appropriate demand by the plaintiffs.

9. On 5th September, 1986 the Union of India filed a

suit for damages in the Distt. Court of Bhopal, being regu-

lar suit No. H 13/86. It is this suit, inter alia, and the

orders passed therein which were settled by the orders of

this Court dated 14th & 15th February, 1989, which will be

referred to later. On 17th November, 1986 upon the applica-

tion of the Union of India, the Distt. Court, Bhopal, grant-

ed a temporary injunction restraining the UCC from selling

assets, paying dividends or buying back debts. On 27th

November, 1986 the UCC gave an undertaking to preserve and

maintain unencumbered assets to the extent of 3 billion US

dollars.

623

10. On 30th November, 1986 the Distt. Court, Bhopal

lifted the injunction against the Carbide selling assets on

the strength of the written undertaking by UCC to maintain

unencumbered assets of 3 billion US dollars. On 16th Decem-

ber, 1986 UCC filed a written statement contending that they

were not liable on the ground that they had nothing to do

with the Indian Company; and that they were a different

legal entity; and that they never exercised any control and

that they were not liable in the suit. Thereafter, on 14th

January, 1987 the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit

affirmed the decision of Judge Keenan but deleted the condi-

tion regarding the discovery under the American procedure

granted in favour of the Union of India. It also suo motu

set aside the condition that on the judgment of the Indian

court complying with due process and the decree issued

should be satisfied by UCC. 1t ruled that such a condition

cannot be imposed as the situation was covered by the provi-

sions of the Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments

Act.

11. On 2nd April, 1987, the court made a written propos-

al to all parties for considering reconciliatory interim

relief to the gas victims. In September, 1987, UCC and the

Govt. of India sought time from the Court of Distt. Judge,

Bhopal, to explore avenues for settlement. It has been

asserted by the learned Attorney General that the possibili-

ty of settlement was there long before the full and final

settlement was effected. He sought to draw our attention to

the assertion that the persons concerned were aware that

efforts were being made from time to time for settlement.

However, in November'87 both the Indian Govt. and the Union

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 104

Carbide announced that settlement talks had failed and Judge

Deo extended the time.

12. The Distt. Judge of Bhopal on 17th December, 1987

ordered interim relief amounting to Rs.350 crores. Being

aggrieved thereby the UCC filed a Civil Revision which was

registered as Civil Revision Petition No. 26/88 and the same

was heard. On or about 4th February, 1988, the Chief Judi-

cial Magistrate of Bhopal ordered notice for warrant on

Union Carbide, Hong Kong for the criminal case filed by CBI

against Union Carbide. The charge sheet there was under

sections 304, 324, 326, 429 of the Indian Penal Code read

with section 35 IPC and the charge was against S/Shri Warren

Anderson, Keshub Mahindra. Vijay Gokhale, J. Mukund, Dr.

R.B. Roy Chowdhay. S.P. Chowdhary, K.V. Shetty, S.1. Qureshi

and Union Carbide of U.S.A., Union Carbide of Hong Kong and

Union Carbide having Calcutta address. It charged the Union

Carbide by saying that MIC gas was stored and it was further

stated that MIC had to be stored and handled

624

in stainless steel which was not done. The charge sheet,

inter alia, stated that a Scientific Team headed by Dr.

Varadarajan had concluded that the factors which had led to

the toxic gas leakage causing its heavy toll existed in the

unique properties of very high reactivity, volatility and

inhalation toxicity of MIC. It was further stated in the

charge sheet that the needless storage of large quantities

of the material in very large size containers for inordi-

nately long periods as well as insufficient caution in

design, in choice of materials of construction and in provi-

sion of measuring and alarm instruments, together with the

inadequate controls on systems of storage and on quality of

stored materials as well as lack of necessary facilities for

quick effective disposal of material exhibiting instability,

led to the accident. It also charged that MIC was stored in

a negligent manner and the local administration was not

informed, inter alia, of the dangerous effect of the expo-

sure of MIC or the gases produced by its reaction and the

medical steps to be taken immediately. It was further stated

that apart from the design defects the UCC did not take any

adequate remedial action to prevent back flow of solution

from VGS into RVVH and PVH lines. There were various other

acts of criminal negligence alleged. The High Court passed

an order staying the operation of the order dated 17.12.87

directing the defendant-applicant to deposit Rs.3,500 mil-

lions within two months from the date of the said order. On

4th April, 1988 the judgment and order were passed by the

High Court modifying the order of the Distt. Judge, and

granting interim relief of Rs.250 crores. The High Court

held that under the substantive law of torts, the Court has

jurisdiction to grant interim relief under Section 9 of the

CPC. On 30th June, 1988 Judge Deo passed an order restrain-

ing the Union Carbide from settling with any individual gas

leak plaintiffs. On 6th September, 1988 special leave was

granted by this Court in the petition filed by UCC against

the grant of interim relief and Union of India was also

granted special leave in the petition challenging the reduc-

tion of quantum of compensation from Rs.350 crores to Rs.250

crores. Thereafter, these matters were heard in November-

December'88 by the bench presided over by the learned Chief

Justice Of India and hearing, continued also in January Feb-

ruary'89 and ultimately on 14-15th February, 1989 the order

culminating in the settlement was passed.

13. In judging the constitutional validity of the Act,

the subsequent events, namely, how the Act has worked itself

out, have to be looked into. It is, therefore, necessary to

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refer to the two orders of this Court. The proof of the cake

is in its eating, it is said, and it is perhaps not possible

to ignore the terms of the settlement reached on 14th and

625

15th February, 1989 in considering the effect of the lan-

guage used in the Act. Is that valid' or proper--or has the

Act been worked in any improper way? These questions do

arise.

14. On 14th February, 1989 an order was passed in C.A.

Nos. 3187-88/88 with S.L.P. (C) No. 13080/88. The parties

thereto were UCC and the Union of India as well as Jana

Swasthya Kendra, Bhopal, Zehraeli Gas Kand Sangharsh Morcha,

Bhopal. MP. That order recited that having considered all

the facts and the circumstances of the case placed before

the Court, the material relating to the proceedings in the

Courts in the United States of America, the offers and

counter-offers made between the parties at different stages

during the various proceedings, as well as the complex

issues of law and fact raised and the submissions made

thereon, and in particular the enormity of human suffering

occasioned by the Bhopal Gas disaster and the pressing

urgency to provide immediate and substantial relief to

victims of the disaster, the 'Court found that the case was

preeminently fit for an overall settlement between the

parties covering all litigations, claims, rights and liabil-

ities relating to and arising out of the disaster and it was

found just, equitable and reasonable to pass, inter alia,

the following orders:

.lm

"(1) The Union Carbide Corporation shall pay a sum of U.S.

Dollars 470 million (Four hundred and seventy millions) to

the Union of India in full settlement of all claims, fights

and liabilities related to and arising out of Bhopal Gas

disaster.

(2) The aforesaid sum shall be paid by the Union Carbide

Corporation to the Union of India on or before 31st March,

1989.

(3) To enable the effectuation of the settlement, all civil

proceedings related to and arising out of the Bhopal Gas

disaster shall hereby stand transferred to this Court and

shall stand concluded in terms of the settlement, and all

criminal proceedings related to and arising out of the

disaster shall stand quashed wherever these may be pending

15. A written memorandum was filed thereafter and the

Court on 15th February, 1989 passed an order after giving

due consideration thereto. The terms of settlement were as

follows:

626

"1. The parties acknowledge that the order

dated February 14, 1989 disposes of in its

entirety all proceedings in Suit No. 1113 of

1986. This settlement shall finally dispose of

all past, present and future claims, causes of

action and civil and criminal proceedings (of

any nature whatsoever wherever pending) by all

Indian citizens and all public and private

entities with respect to all past, present or

future deaths, personal injuries, health

effects, compensation, losses, damages and

civil and criminal complaints of any nature

whatsoever against UCC, Union Carbide India

Limited, Union Carbide Eastern, and all of

their subsidiaries and affiliates as well as

each of their present and former directors,

officers, employees, agents, representatives,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 23 of 104

attorneys, advocates and solicitors arising

out of, relating to or connected with the

Bhopal gas leak disaster, including past,

present and future claims, causes of action

and proceedings against each other. All such

claims and causes of action whether within or

outside India of Indian citizens, public or

private entities are hereby extinguished,

including without limitation each of the

claims filed or to be filed under the Bhopal

Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing

of Claims) Scheme 1985, and all such civil

proceedings in India are hereby transferred to

this Court and are dismissed without preju-

dice, and all such criminal proceedings in-

cluding contempt proceedings stand quashed and

accused deemed to be acquitted.

2. Upon full payment in accordance with the

Court's directions the undertaking given by

UCC pursuant to the order dated November 30,

1986 in the District Court, Bhopal stands

discharged, and all orders passed in Suit No.

1113 of 1986 and or in any Revision therefrom,

also stand discharged."

16. It appears from the statement of objects & reasons

of the Act that the Parliament recognized that the gas leak

disaster involving the release, on 2nd and 3rd December,

1984 of highly noxious and abnormally dangerous gas from a

plant of UCIL, a subsidiary of UCC, was of an unprecedented

nature, which resulted in loss of life and damage to proper-

ty on an extensive scale, as mentioned before. It was stated

that the victims who had managed to survive were still

suffering from the adverse effects and the further complica-

tions which might arise in their cases, of course, could not

be fully visualised. It was asserted by

627

Ms. Indira Jaising that in case of some of the victims the

injuries were carcinogenic and ontogenic and these might

lead to further genetic complications and damages. The

Central Govt. and the Govt. of Madhya Pradesh and various

agencies had to incur expenditure on a large scale for

containing the disaster and mitigating or otherwise coping

with the effects thereto. Accordingly, the Bhopal Gas Leak

Disaster (Processing of Claims) Ordinance, 1985 was promul-

gated, which provided for the appointment of a Commissioner

for the welfare of the victims of the disaster and for the

formulation of the Scheme to provide for various matters

necessary for processing of the claims and for the utilisa-

tion by way of disbursal or otherwise of amounts received in

satisfaction of the claims.

17. Thereafter, the Act was passed which received the

assent of the President on 29th March, 1985. Section 2(b) of

the Act defines 'claim'. It says that "claims" means--(i) a

claim, arising out of, or connected with, the disaster, for

compensation or damages for any loss of life or personal

injury which has been, or is likely to be suffered; (ii) a

claim, arising out of, or connected with, the disaster, for

any damage to property which has been, or is likely to be,

sustained; (iii) a claim for expenses incurred or required

to be incurred for containing the disaster or mitigating or

otherwise coping with the effects of the disaster; (iv) any

other claim (including any claim by way of loss of business

or employment) arising out of, or connected with, the disas-

ter. A "claimant" is defined as a person entitled to make a

claim. It has been provided in the Explanation to Section 2

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that for the purpose of clauses (b) and (c), where the death

of a person has taken place as a result of the disaster, the

claim for compensation or damages for the death of such

person shall be for the benefit of the spouse, children

(including a child in the womb) and other heirs of the

deceased and they shall be deemed to be the claimants in

respect thereof.

18. Section 3 is headed "Power of Central Govt. to

represent claimants". It provides as follows:

"3(1) Subject to the other provisions of this

Act, the Central Government shall, and shall

have the exclusive right to, represent, and

act in place of (whether within or outside

India) every person who has made, or is enti-

tled to make, a claim for all purposes con-

nected with such claim in the same manner and

to the same effect as such persons.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the

generality of

628

the provisions of sub-section (1), the pur-

poses referred to therein include--

(a) Institution of any suit or other proceed-

ing in or before any court or other authority

(whether within or outside India) or withdraw-

al of any such suit or other proceeding, and

(b) entering into a compromise.

(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall

apply also in relation to claims in respect of

which suits or other proceedings have been

instituted in or before any court or other

authority (whether within or outside India)

before the commencement of this Act:

Provided that in the case of any such suit or

other proceeding with respect to any claim

pending immediately before the commencement of

this Act in or before any court or other

authority outside India, the Central Govt.

shall represent, and act in place of, or along

with, such claimant, if such court or other

authority so permits."

19. Section 4 of the Act is headed as "Claimant's right

to be represented by a legal practitioner". It provides as

follows:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in section

3, in representing, and acting in place of,

any person in relation to any claim, the

Central Government shall have due regard to

any matters which such person may require to

be urged with respect to his claim and shall,

if such person so desires, permit at the

expense of such person, a legal practitioner

of his choice to be associated in the conduct

of any suit or other proceeding relating to

his claim."

20. Section 5 deals with the powers of the Central Govt.

and enjoins that for the purpose of discharging its func-

tions under this Act, the Central Govt. shall have the

powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 6 provides for the ap-

pointment of a Commissioner and other officers and employ-

ees. Section 7 deals with powers to delegate. Section 8

deals with limitation, while section 9 deals with the power

to frame Scheme. The Central Govt. was enjoined to frame a

scheme which was to take into account, inter alia, the

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processing of the claims for securing their enforcement,

creation of a fund for meeting expenses in connection

629

with the administration of the Scheme and of the provisions

of this Act and the amounts which the Central Govt. might,

after due appropriation made by the Parliament by law in

that behalf, credit to the fund referred to in clauses above

and any other amounts which might be credited to such fund.

Such Scheme was enjoined, as soon as after it had been

framed, to be laid before each House of Parliament. Section

10 deals with removal of doubts. Section 11 deals with the

overriding effect and provides that the provisions of the

Act and of any Scheme framed thereunder shall have effect

notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in

any enactment other than the Act or any instrument having

effect by virtue of any enactment other than the Act.

21. A Scheme has been framed and was published on 24th

September, 1985. Clause 3 of the said Scheme provides that

the Deputy Commissioners appointed under Section 6 of the

Act shall be the authorities for registration of Claims

(including the receipt, scrutiny and proper categorisation

of such claims under paragraph 5 of the Scheme) arising

within the areas of their respective jurisdiction and they

shall be assisted by such other officers as may be appointed

by the Central Govt. under Section 6 of the Act for scrutiny

and verification of the claims and other related matters.

The Scheme also provides for the manner of filing claims. It

enjoins that the Dy. Commissioner shall provide the required

forms for filing the applications. It also provides for

categorisation and registration of claims. Sub-clause (2) of

Clause 5 enjoins that the claims received for registration

shall be placed under different heads.

22. Sub-clause (3) of clause 5 enjoins that on the

consideration of claims made under paragraph 4 of the

Scheme, if the Dy. Commissioner is of the opinion that the

claims fall in any category different from the category

mentioned by the claimant, he may decide the appropriate

category after giving an opportunity to the claimant to be

heard and also after taking into consideration any facts

made available to him in this behalf. Sub-clause (6) of

Clause 5 enjoins that if the claimant is not satisfied with

the order of the Dy. Commissioner, he may prefer an appeal

against such order to the Commissioner, who shall decide the

same.

23. Clause 9 of the Scheme provides for processing of

Claims Account Fund, which the Central Govt. may, after due

appropriation made by Parliament, credit to the said Fund.

It provides that there shall also be a Claims and Relief

Fund, which will include the amounts

630

received in satisfaction of the claims and any other amounts

made available to the Commissioner as donation or for relief

purposes. Subclause (3) of clause 10 provides that the

amount in the said Fund shall be applied by the Commissioner

for, disbursal of amounts in settlement of claims, or as

relief, or apportionment of part of the Fund for disbursal

of amounts in settlement of claims arising in future or for

disbursal of amounts to the Govt. of Madhya Pradesh for the

social and economic rehabilitation of the persons affected

by the Bhopal gas leak disaster.

24. Clause 11 of the Scheme deals with the disbursal,

apportionment of certain amounts, and sub-clause (2) thereof

enjoins that the Central Govt. may determine the total

amount of compensation to be apportioned for each category

of claims and the quantum of compensation payable, in gener-

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al, in relation to each type of injury or loss. Sub-clause

(5) thereto provides that in case of a dispute as to disbur-

sal of the amounts received in satisfaction of claims, an

appeal shall lie against the order of the Dy. Commissioner

to the Additional Commissioner, who may decide the matter

and make such disbursal as he may, for reasons to be record-

ed in writing, think fit. The other clauses are not relevant

for our present purposes.

25. Counsel for different parties in all these matters

have canvassed their submissions before us for the gas

victims. Mr. R.K. Garg, Ms. Indira Jaising, and Mr. Kailash

Vasudev have made various submissions challenging the valid-

ity of the Act on various grounds. They all have submitted

that the Act should be read in the way they suggested and as

a whole. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, appearing for interveners on

behalf of Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangathan and

following him Mr. Prashant Bhushan have urged that the Act

should be read in the manner canvassed by them and if the

same is not so read then the same would be violative of the

fundamental rights of the victims, and as such unconstitu-

tional. The learned Attorney General assisted by Mr. Gopal

Subramanium has on the other hand urged that the Act is

valid and constitutional and that the settlement arrived at

on 14th/15th February is proper and valid.

26. In order to appreciate the background Ms. Indira

Jaising placed before us the proceedings of the Lok Sabha

wherein Mr. Veerendra Patil, the Hon'ble Minister, stated on

March 27, 1985 that the tragedy that had occurred in Bhopal

on 2nd and 3rd December, 1984 was unique and unprecedented

in character and magnitude not only for our country but for

the entire world. It was stated that one of

631

the options available was to settle the case in Indian

courts. The second one was to file the cases in American

courts. Mr. Patil reiterated that the Govt. wanted to pro-

ceed against the parent company and also to appoint a Com-

mission of Inquiry.

27. Mr. Garg in support of the proposition that the Act

was unconstitutional, submitted that the Act must be exam-

ined on the touchstone of the fundamental rights on the

basis of the test laid down by this court in state of Madras

v. V.G, Row, [1952] SCR 597, There at page 607 of the report

this Court has reiterated that in considering the reasona-

bleness of the law imposing restrictions on the fundamental

rights, both the substantive and the procedural aspects of

the impugned restrictive law should be examined from the

point of view of reasonableness. And the test of reasonable-

ness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each indi-

vidual Statute impugned, and no abstract standard or general

pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to

all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been

infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions im-

posed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be

remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the

prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the

judicial verdict. (The emphasis supplied). Chief Justice

Patanjali Sastri reiterated that in evaluating such elusive

factors and forming their own conception of what is reasona-

ble, in the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable

that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the

judges participating in the decision would play an important

role.

28. Hence, whether by sections, 3, 4 & 11 the rights of

the victims and the citizens to fight for their own causes

and to assert their own grievances have been taken away

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validly and properly, must be judged in the light of the

prevailing conditions at the time, the nature of the right

of the citizen, the purpose of the restrictions on their

rights to sue for enforcement in the courts of law or for

punishment for offences against his person or property, the

urgency and extent of the evils sought to be remedied by the

Act, and the proportion of the impairment of the rights of

the citizen with reference to the intended remedy pre-

scribed. According to Mr. Garg, the present position called

for a comprehensive appreciation of the national and inter-

national background in which precious rights to life and

liberty were enshrined as fundamental rights and remedy for

them was also guaranteed under Article 32 of the Constitu-

tion. He sought to urge that multinational corporations have

assumed powers or potencies to override the political and

economic independence of the sovereign nations which have

632

been used to take away in the last four decades, much wealth

out of the Third World. Now these are plundered much more

than what was done to the erstwhile colonies by imperialist

nations in the last three centuries of foreign rule. The

role of courts in cases of conflict between rights of citi-

zens and the vast economic powers claimed by multinational

corporations to deny moral and legal liabilities for their

corporate criminal activities should not be lost sight of.

He, in this background, urged that these considerations

assume immense importance to shape human fights jurispru-

dence under the Constitution, and for the Third World to

regulate and control the power and economic interests of

multinational corporations and the power of exploitation and

domination by developed nations without submitting to due

observance of the laws of the developing countries. It

therefore appears that the production of, or carrying on

trade in dangerous chemicals by multinational industries on

the soil of Third World countries call for strictest en-

forcement of constitutional guarantees for enjoying human

fights in free India, urged Mr. Garg. In this connection,

our attention was drawn to the Charter of Universal Declara-

tion of Human Rights. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights, 1948 reiterates that all human-beings are

born free and equal in dignity and rights. Article 3 states

that everyone has right to life, liberty and security of

person. Article 6 of the Declaration states that everyone

has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before

the law. Article 7 states that all are equal before the law

and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protec-

tion of the law. All are entitled to equal protection

against any discrimination in violation of the Declaration

of Human Rights and against any incitement to such discrimi-

nation. Article 8 states that everyone has the right to an

effective remedy by competent National Tribunal for acts

violating fundamental rights guaranteed to him by the Con-

stitution or by the law. It is, therefore, necessary to bear

in mind that Indian citizens have a fight to live which

cannot be taken away by the Union of India or the Govt. of a

State, except by a procedure which is just, fair and reason-

able. The right to life includes the fight to protection of

limb against mutilation and physical injuries, and does not

mean merely the fight to breathe but also includes the fight

to livelihood. It was urged that this right is available in

all its dimension till the last breath against all injuries

to head, heart and mind or the lungs affecting the citizen

or his next generation or of genetic disorders. The enforce-

ment of the right to life or limb calls for adequate and

appropriate reliefs enforceable in courts of law and of

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equity with sufficient power to offer adequate deterrence in

all cases of corporate criminal liability under strict

liability, absolute liability, punitive liability and crimi-

nal prosecution and

633

punishment to the delinquents. The damages awarded in civil

jurisdiction must be commensurate to meet well-defined

demands of evolved human rights jurisprudence in modern

world. It was, therefore, submitted that punishment in

criminal jurisdiction for serious offences is independent of

the claims enforced in civil jurisdiction and no immunity

against it can be granted as part of settlement in any civil

suit. If any Act authorises or permits doing of the same,

the same will be unwarranted by law and as such bad. The

Constitution of India does not permit the same.

29. Our attention was drawn to Article 21 of the Consti-

tution and the principles of international law. Right to

equality is guaranteed to every person under Art. 14 in all

matters like the laws of procedure for enforcement of any

legal or constitutional right in every jurisdiction, sub-

stantive law defining the rights expressly or by necessary

implications, denial of any of these rights to any class of

citizens in either field must have nexus with constitution-

ally permissible object and can never be arbitrary. Arbi-

trariness is, therefore, anti-thetical to the right of

equality. In this connection, reliance was placed on the

observations of this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil

Nadu & Anr., [1974] 2 SCR 348 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of

India, [1978] 2 SCR 621 where it was held that the view that

Articles 19 & 21 constitute watertight compartments has been

rightly overruled. Articles dealing with different fundamen-

tal rights contained in Part III of the Constitution do not

represent entirely separate streams of rights which do not

mingle at any point of time. They. are all parts of an

integrated scheme in the Constitution and must be preserved

and cannot be destroyed arbitrarily. Reliance was placed on

the observations in R.D. Shetty v. The I.A.A. of India &

Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 1014. Hence, the rights of the citizens

to fight for remedies and enforce their rights flowing from

the breach of obligation in respect of crime cannot be

obliterated. The Act and Sections 3, 4 & 11 of the Act in so

far as these purport to do so and have so operated, are

violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitu-

tion. The procedure envisaged by the said Sections deprives

the just and legitimate rights of the victims to assert and

obtain their just dues. The rights cannot be so destroyed.

It was contended that under the law the victims had right to

ventilate their rights.

30. It was further contended that Union of India was a

joint tort-feasor along with UCC and UCIL. It had negligent-

ly permitted the establishment of such a factory without

proper safeguards exposing the victims and citizens to great

danger. Such a person or authority

634

cannot be entrusted to represent the victims by denying the

victims their rights to plead their own cases. It was sub-

mitted that the object of the Act was to fully protect

people against the disaster of highly obnoxious gas and

disaster of unprecedented nature. Such an object cannot be

achieved without enforcement of the criminal liability by

criminal prosecution. Entering into settlement without

reference to the victims was, therefore, bad and unconstitu-

tional, it was urged. If an Act, it was submitted, permits

such a settlement or deprivation of the rights of the vic-

tims, then the same is bad.

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31. Before we deal with the various other contentions

raised in this case, it is necessary to deal with the appli-

cation for intervention and submission made on behalf of the

Coal India in Writ Petition No. 268/89 wherein Mr. L.N.

Sinha in his written submission had urged for the intervener

that Article 21 of the Constitution neither confers nor

creates nor determines the dimensions nor the permissible

limits of restrictions which appropriate legislation might

impose on the right to life or liberty. He submitted that

provisions for procedure are relevant in judicial or quasi

judicial proceedings for enforcement of rights or obliga-

tions. With regard to alteration of rights, procedure is

governed by the Constitution directly. He sought to inter-

vene on behalf of Coal India and wanted these submissions to

be taken into consideration. However, when this contention

was sought to be urged before this Court on 25th April,

1989, after hearing all the parties, it appeared that there

was no dispute between the parties in the instant writ

petitions between the victims and the Government of India

that the rights claimed in these cases are referrable to

Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, no dispute really

arises with regard to the contention of Coal India and we

need not consider the submissions urged by Shri Sinha on

behalf of the intervener in this case. It has been so re-

corded.

32. By the order dated 3rd March, 1989, Writ Petitions

Nos. 268/89 and 164/86 have been directed to be disposed of

by this Bench.' We have heard these two writ petitions along

with the other writ petitions and other matters as indicated

hereinbefore. The contentions are common. These writ peti-

tions question the validity of the Act and the settlement

entered into pursuant to the Act. Writ Petition No. 164/86

is by one Shri Rakesh Shrouti who is an Indian citizen and

claims to be a practising advocate having his residence at

Bhopal. He says that he and his family members were at

Bhopal on 2nd/3rd December, 1984 and suffered immensely as a

result of the gas leak. He challenges the validity of the

Act on various grounds. He contends that the Union of India

should not have the exclusive right to represent the

635

victims in suits against the Union Carbide and thereby

deprive the victims of their right to sue and deny access to

justice. He further challenges the right of the Union of

India to represent the victims against Union Carbide because

of conflict of interests. The conduct of the Union of India

was also deprecated and it was further stated that such

conduct did not inspire confidence. In the premises, the

said petitioner sought a declaration under Article 32 of the

Constitution that the Act is void, inoperative and unen-

forceable as violative of Articles 14, 19 & 21 of the Con-

stitution- Similarly, the second writ petition, namely, writ

petition No. 268/89 which is filed by Sh. Charan Lal Sahu,

who is also a practising Advocate on behalf of the victims

and claims to have suffered damages as a result of the gas

leak. challenges the Act. He further challenges the settle-

ment entered into under the Act. He says that the said

settlement was violative of principles of natural justice

and the fundamental right of the said petitioner and other

victims. It is his case that in so far as the Act permits

such a course to be adopted, such a course was not permissi-

ble under the Constitution. He further asserts that the

Union of India was negligent and a joint tort-feasor. In the

premises, according to him, the Act is bad, the settlement

is bad and these should be set aside.

33. In order to determine the question whether the Act

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in question is constitutionally valid or not in the light of

Articles 14, 19(l)(g) and 21 of the Constitution, it is

necessary to find out what does the Act actually mean and

provide for. The Act in question, as the Preamble to the Act

states, was passed in order to confer powers on the Central

Government to secure that the claims arising out of, or

connected with, the Bhopal gas leak disaster are dealt with

speedily, effectively, equitably and to the best advantage

of the claimants and for matters incidental thereto. There-

fore, securing the claims arising out of or connected with

the Bhopal gas leak disaster is the object and purpose of

the Act. We have noticed the proceedings of the Lok Sabha in

connection with the enactment of the Act. Our attention was

also drawn by the learned Attorney General to the proceed-

ings of the Rajya Sabha wherein the Hon'ble Minister, Shri

Virendra Patil explained that the bill enabled the Govern-

ment to assume exclusive right to represent and act, whether

within or outside India in place of every person who had

made or was entitled to make claim in relation to the disas-

ter and to institute any suit or other proceedings or enter

into any compromise as mentioned in the Act. The whole

object of the Bill was to make procedural changes to the

existing Indian law which would enable the Central Govern-

ment to take up the responsibility of fighting litigation on

behalf of these victims. The first point was that it

636

sought to create a locus standi in the Central Government to

file suits on behalf of the victims. The object of the

Statute. it was highlighted, was that because of the dimen-

sion of the tragedy covering thousands of people, large

number of whom being poor, would not be able to go to the

courts, it was necessary to create the locus standi in the

Central Government to start the litigation for payment of

compensation in the courts on their behalf. The second

aspect of the Bill was that by creating this locus standi in

the Central Government, the Central Government became compe-

tent to institute judicial proceedings for payment of com-

pensation on behalf of the victims. The next aspect of the

Bill was to make a distinction between those on whose behalf

suits had already been filed and those on whose behalf

proceedings had not yet then been instituted. One of the

Members emphasised that under Article 21 of the Constitu-

tion, the personal liberty of every citizen was guaranteed

and it has been widely interpreted as to what was the mean-

ing of the expression 'personal liberty'. It was cmphasised

that one could not take away the right of a person, the

liberty of a person, to institute proceedings for his own

benefit and for his protection. It is from this point of

view that it was necessary, the member debated, to preserve

the right of a claimant to have his own lawyers to represent

him along with the Central Government in the proceedings

under Section 4 of the Act, this made the Bill constitution-

ally valid.

34. Before we deal with the question of constitutionali-

ty, it has to be emphasised that the Act in question deals

with the Bhopal gas leak disaster and it deals with the

claims meaning thereby claims arising out of or connected

with the disaster for compensation of damages for loss of

life or any personal injury which has been or is likely to

be caused and also claims arising out of or connected with

the disaster for any damages to property or claims for

expenses incurred or required to be incurred for containing

the disaster or making or otherwise coping with the impact

of the disaster and other incidental claims. The Act in

question does not purport to deal with the criminal liabili-

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ty, if any, of the parties or persons concerned nor it deals

with any of the consequences flowing from those. This posi-

tion is clear from the provisions and the Preamble to the

Act. Learned Attorney General also says that the Act does

not cover criminal liability. The power that has been given

to the Central Government is to represent the 'claims',

meaning thereby the monetary claims. The monetary claims, as

was argued on behalf of the victims, are damages flowing

from the gas disaster. Such damages, Mr. Garg and Ms. Jais-

ing submitted, are based on strict liability, absolute

liability and punitive liability. The Act does not, either

expressly or impliedly, deal with the extent of the damages

or

637

liability. Neither section 3 nor any other section deals

with any consequences of criminal liability. The expression

"the Central Government shall, and shall have the exclusive

right to, represent, and act in place of (whether within or

outside India) every person who has made, or is entitled to

make, a claim for all purposes connected with such claim in

the same manner and to the same effect as such person", read

as it is, means that Central Government is substituted and

vested with the exclusive right to act in place of the

victims, i.e., eliminating the victims, their heirs and

their legal representatives, in respect of all such claims

arising out of or connected with the Bhopal gas leak disas-

ter. The right, therefore, embraces right to institute

proceedings within or outside India along with right to

institute any suit or other proceedings or to enter into

compromise. Sub-section 1 of section 3 of the Act, there-

fore, substitutes the Central Government in place of the

victims. The victims, or their heirs and legal representa-

tives, get their rights substituted in the Central Govern-

ment along with the concomitant right to institute such

proceedings, withdraw such proceedings or suit and also to

enter into compromise.The victims or the heirs or the legal

representatives of the victims, are substituted and their

rights are vested in the Central Government. This happens by

operation of section 3 which is the legislation in question.

Sub-section (3) of section 3 makes it clear that the provi-

sions of sub-section (1) of section 3 shall also apply in

relation to claims in respect of which suits or other pro-

ceedings have been instituted in or before any court or

other authority (whether within or outside India) before the

commencement of this Act, but makes a distinction in the

case of any such suit or other proceeding with respect to

any claim pending immediately before the commencement of

this Act in or before any court or other authority outside

India, and provides that the Central Government shall repre-

sent, and act in place of, or along with, such claimant, if

such court or other authority so permits. Therefore, in

cases where such suits or proceedings have been instituted

before the commencement of the Act in any court or before

any authority outside India, the section by its own force

will not come into force in substituting the Central Govern-

ment in place of the victims or the heirs or their legal

representatives, but the Central Government has been given

the right to act in place of, or along with, such claimant,

provided such court or other authority so permits. It is to

have adherence and conformity with the procedure of the

countries or places outside India, where suits or proceed-

ings are to be instituted or have been instituted. There-

fore, the Central Government is authorised to act along with

the claimants in respect of proceedings instituted outside

India subject to the orders of such courts or the authori-

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ties. Is such a right valid and proper?

638

35. There is the concept known both in this country and

abroad, called "parens patriae. Dr. D.K. Mukherjea in his

"Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts", Tagore Law

Lectures, Fifth Edition, at page 404, referring to the

concept of parens patriae, has noted that in English Law,

the Crown as parens patriae is the constitutional protector

of all property subject to charitable trusts, such trusts

being essentially matters of public concern. Thus the posi-

tion is that according to Indian concept parens patriae

doctrine recognized King as the protector of all citizens

and as parent. In Budhakaran Chankhani v. Thakur Prasad

Shah, AIR 1942 Cal. 311 the position was explained by the

Calcutta High Court at page 3 18 of the report. The same

position was reiterated by the said Court in Banku Behary

Mondal v. Banku Behary Hazra & Anr., AIR 1943 Cal. 203 at

page 205 of the report. The position was further elaborated

and explained by the Madras High Court in Medai Dalavoi T.

Kumaraswami Mudaliar v. Medai Dalavoi Rajammal, AIR 1957

Mad. 563 at page 567 of the report. This Court also recog-

nized the concept of parens patriae relying on the observa-

tions of Dr. Mukherjea aforesaid in Ram Saroop v. S.P. Sahi,

[1959] 2 Supp. SCR 583, at pages 598 and 599. In the "Words

and Phrases" Permanent edition, Vol. 35 at p. 99, it is

stated that parens patriae is the inherent power and author-

ity of a Legislature to provide protection to the person and

property of persons non suijuris, such as minor, insane, and

incompetent persons, but the words "parens patriae" meaning

thereby 'the father of the country', were applied originally

to the King and are used to designate the State referring to

its sovereign power of guardianship over persons under

disability, (Emphasis supplied). Parens patriae jurisdic-

tion, it has been explained, is the right of the sovereign

and imposes a duty on sovereign, in public interest, to

protect persons under disability who have no rightful pro-

tector. The connotation of the term "parens patriae" differs

from country to country, for instance, in England it is the

King, in America it is the people, etc. The Government is

within its duty to protect and to control persons under

disability. Conceptually, the parens patriae theory is the

obligation of the State to protect and take into custody the

rights and the privileges of its citizens for discharging

its obligations. Our Constitution makes it imperative for

the State to secure to all its citizens the rights guaran-

teed by the Constitution and where the citizens are not in a

position to assert and secure their rights, the State must

come into picture and protect and fight for the rights of

the citizens. The Preamble to the Constitution, read with

the Directive Principles, Articles 38, 39 and 39A enjoins

the State to take up these responsibilities. It is the

protective measure to which the social welfare state is

committed. It is necessary for the State to ensure the

funda-

639

mental rights in conjunction with the Directive Princi-

ples of State Policy to effectively discharge its obliga-

tion and for this purpose, if necessary, to deprive some

rights and privileges of the individual victims or their

heirs to protect their rights better and secure these

further. Reference may be made to Alfred L. Snapp & Son,

Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 US 592, 73 L. Ed. 2d 995, 1028. Ct,

3260 in this connection. There it was held by the Supreme

Court of the United States of America that Commonwealth of

Puerto have standing to sue as parens patriae to enjoin

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apple growers' discrimination against Puerto Rico migrant

farm workers. This case illustrates in some aspect the scope

of 'parens patriae'. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sued

in the United States District Court for the Western District

of Virginia, as parens patriae for Puerto Rican migrant farm

workers, and against Virginia apple growers, to enjoin

discrimination against Puerto Ricans in favour of Jamaican

workers in violation of the Wagner-Peyser Act, and the

Immigration and Nationality Act. The District Court dis-

missed the action on the ground that the Commonwealth

lacked standing to sue, but the Court of Appeal for the

Fourth Circuit reversed it. On certiorari, the United States

Supreme Court affirmed. In the opinion by White, J. joined

by Burger, Chief Justice and Brennan, Marshall, Blackman,

Rennquist, Stevens, and O'Connor, JJ., it was held that

Puerto Rico had a claim to represent its quasi sovereign

interests in federal court at least which was as strong as

that of any State, and that it had parens patriae standing

to sue to secure its residents from the harmful effects of

discrimination and to obtain full and equal participation

in the federal employment service scheme established pursu-

ant to the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration and Nation-

ality Act of 1952. Justice White referred to the meaning of

the expression "parens patriae". According to Black's Law

Dictionary, 5th Edition 1979, page 1003, it means literally

'parent of the country' and refers traditionally to the role

of the State as a sovereign and guardian of persons under

legal disability. Justice White at page 1003 of the report

emphasised that the parens patriae action had its roots in

the common-law concept of the "royal prerogative". The royal

prerogative included the right or responsibility to take

care of persons who were legally unable, on account of

mental incapacity, whether it proceeds from nonage, idiocy,

or lunacy to take proper care of themselves and their

property. This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in

the supreme power of every state, whether that power is

lodged in a royal person or m the legislature and is a most

beneficent function. After discussing several cases Justice

White observed at page 1007 of the report that in order to

maintain an action, in parens patriae, the state must artic-

ulate an interest apart from the interests of

640

particular parties, i.e. the State must be more than a

nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign

interest. Again an instructive insight can be obtained from

the observations of Justice Holmes of the American Supreme

Court in the case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 US

230, 51 L.Ed. 1038, 27 S Ct 618, which was a case involving

air pollution in Georgia caused by the discharge of noxious

gases from the defendant's plant in Tennessee. Justice

Holmes at page 1044 of the report described the State's

interest as follows:

"This is a suit by a State for an injury to it

in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that

capacity the State has an interest independent

of and behind the titles of its citizens, in

all the earth and air within its domain. It

has the last word as to whether its mountains

shall be stripped of their forests and its

inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might

have to pay individuals before it could utter

that word, but with it remains the final

power ......

..... When the States by their

union made the forcible abatement of outside

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nuisances impossible to each, they did not

thereby agree to submit to whatever might be

done. They did not renounce the possibility of

making reasonable demands on the ground of

their still remaining quasi-sovereign inter-

ests"

36. Therefore, conceptually and from the jurisprudential

point of view, especially in the background of the Preamble

to the Constitution of India and the mandate of the Direc-

tive Principles, it was possible to authorise the Central

Government to take over the claims of the victims to tight

against the multinational Corporation in respect of the

claims. Because of the situation the victims were under

disability in pursuing their claims in the circumstances of

the situation fully and properly. On its plain terms the

State has taken over the exclusive right to represent and

act in place of every person who has made or is entitled to

make a claim for all purposes connected with such claim in

the same manner and to the same effect as such person.

Whether such provision is valid or not in the background of

the requirement of the Constitution and the Code of Civil

Procedure, is another debate. But there is no prohibition or

inhibition, in our opinion, conceptually or jurisprudential-

ly for Indian State taking over the claims of the victims or

for the State acting for the victims as the Act has sought

to provide. The actual meaning of what the Act has provided

and the validity thereof, however, will have to be examined

in the light of the specific submissions advanced in this

case.

641

37. Ms. Indira Jaising as mentioned hereinbefore on

behalf of some other victims drew out attention to the

background of the passing of the Act in question. She drew

our attention to the fact that the Act was to meet a specif-

ic situation that had arisen after the tragic disaster and

the advent of American lawyers seeking to represent the

victims in American courts. The Government's view, according

to her, as was manifest from the Statement of Objects and

Reasons, debates of the Parliament, etc. was that the inter-

ests of the victims would be best served if the Central

Government was given the right to represent the victims in

the courts of United States as they would otherwise be

exploited by 'ambulance-chasers' working on contingency

fees. The Government also proceeded initially on the hypoth-

esis that US was the most convenient forum in which to sue

UCC. The Government however feared that it might not have

locus standi to represent the victims in the courts of the

United States of America unless a law was passed to enable

it to sue on behalf of the victims. The dominant object of

the Act, therefore, according to her, was to give to the

Government of India locus Standi to sue on behalf of the

victims in foreign jurisdiction, a standing which it other-

wise would not have had. According to her, the Act was never

intended to give exclusive rights to the Central Government

to sue on behalf of the victims in India or abroad. She drew

our attention to the parliamentary debates as mentioned

hereinbefore. She drew our attention to the expression

'parens patriae' as appearing in the Words and Phrases,

Volume 31 p. 99. She contends that the Act was passed to

provide locus standi only to represent in America. She drew

our attention to the "American Constitutional Law by Lau-

rence B. Trioe, 1978 Edition at paragraph 3.24, where it was

stated that in its capacity as proprietor, a state may

satisfy the requirement of injury to its own interests by an

assertion of harm to the state as such. It was further

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stated by the learned author there that the State may sue

under the federal anti-trust laws to redress wrongs suffered

by it as the owner of a railroad and as the owner and opera-

tor of various public institutions. It was emphasised that

in its quasi-sovereign capacity, the state has an interest,

independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all

the earth and air within its domain. It was sought to be

suggested that in the instant Act no such right was either

asserted or mentioned. The State also in its quasi-sovereign

capacity is entitled to bring suit against a private indi-

vidual to enjoin a corporation not to discharge noxious

gases from its out of state plant into the suing state's

territory. Finally, it was emphasised that as 'parens patr-

iae' on behalf of the citizens, where a state's capacity as

parens patriae is not negated by the federal structure, the

protection of the general health, comfort, and welfare of

the state's inhabitants has been held to give the state

itself a sufficient

642

interest. Ms. Jaising sought to contend that to the extent

that the Act was not confined to empowering the Government

to sue on behalf of those who were not sui generis but

extended also to representing those who are, this exercise

of the power cannot be referrable to the doctrine of 'parens

patriae'. To the extent, it is not confined in enabling the

Government to represent its citizens in foreign jurisdiction

but empowered it to sue in local courts to the exclusion of

the victims it cannot be said to be in exercise of doctrine

of 'parens patriae', according to her. We are unable to

agree. As we have indicated before conceptually and juris-

prudentially there is no warrant in the background of the

present Act, in the light of circumstances of the Act in

question to confine the concept into such narrow field. The

concept can be varied to enable the Government to represent

the victims effectively in domestic forum if.the situation

so warrants. We also do not find any reason to confine the

'parens patriae' doctrine to only quasisovereign right of

the State independent of and behind the title of the citi-

zens, as we shall indicate later.

38. It was further contended that deprivation of the

rights of the victims and denial of the rights of the vic-

tims or the fights of the heirs of the victims to access to

justice was unwarranted and unconstitutional. She submitted

that it has been asserted by the Government that the Act was

passed pursuant to Entry 13 of the List I of the Seventh

Schedule to the Constitution. It was therefore submitted

that to the extent it was a law relating to civil procedure,

it sets up a different procedure for the Bhopal gas victims

and denies to them equality before law, violating Article 14

of the Constitution. Even assuming that due to the magnitude

of the disaster, the number of claimants and their disabili-

ty they constituted a separate class and that it was permis-

sible to enact a special legislation setting up a special

procedure for them, the reasonableness of the procedure has

still to be tested. Its reasonableness, according to her,

will have to be judged on the touchstone of the existing

Civil Procedure Code of 1908 and when so tested, it is found

wanting in several respects. It was also contended by the

Government that it was a legislation relating to "actionable

wrongs" under Entry 8 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh

Schedule. But so read, she said, it could only deal with the

procedural aspects and not the substantive aspect of "ac-

tionable wrongs". If it does, then the reasonableness of a

law must be judged with reference to the existing substan-

tive law of actionable wrongs and so judged it is in viola-

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tion of many constitutional rights as it takes away from the

victims the right to sue for actionable wrongs according to

counsel for the victims. According to her, it fails to take

into account the law of strict liability for ultra

643

hazardous activity as clarified by this Court in M.C. Meh-

ta's, case (supra). She further submitted that it is a bad

Act as it fails to provide for the right to punitive damages

and destruction of environment.

39. It was contended on behalf of the Central Government

that the Act was passed to give effect to the Directive

Principle as enshrined under Article 39-A of the Constitu-

tion of India. It was, on the other side, submitted that it

is not permissible for the State to grant legal aid on pain

of destroying rights that inhere in citizens or on pain of

demanding that the citizens surrender their rights to the

State. The Act in fact demands a surrender of rights of the

citizens to the State. On the interpretation of the Act, Ms.

Indira Jaising submitted that sections 3 and 4 as noted

above, give exclusive power to the Government to represent

the victims and there is deprivation of the victims' right

to sue for the wrongs done to them which is uncanalised and

unguided and the expression "due regard" in section 4 of the

Act does not imply consent and as such violative of the

rights of the victims. The right to be associated with the

conduct of the suit is hedged in with so many conditions

that it is illusory. According to her, a combined reading of

sections 3 and 4 of the act lead to the conclusion that the

victims are displaced by the Central Government which has

constituted itself as the "surrogate" of the claimants, that

they have no control over the proceedings, that they have no

right to decide whether or not to compromise and if so on

what terms and they have no right to be heard by the court

before any such compromise is effected. Therefore, section 3

read with section 4, according to her, hands over to the

Government all effective rights of the victims to sue and is

a naked usurption of power. It was submitted that in any

event on a plain reading of the Act, section 3 read with

section 4 did not grant the Government immunity from being

sued as a joint tort-feasor.

40. It was further urged that section 9 makes the Gov-

ernment the total arbitor in the matter of the registration,

processing and recording of claims. Reference was made to

section 9(2)(a), (b) and (c) and disbursal of claims under

sections 9(2)(f) and 10. It was urged that the Deputy Com-

missioner and Commissioner appointed under the Act and the

Scheme are subordinates and agents of the Central Govern-

ment. They replace impartial and independent civil court by

officers and subordinates of the Central Government. Clause

11 of the Scheme makes the Central Government, according to

counsel, judge in its own cause inasmuch as the Central

Government could be and was in fact a joint tort-feasor. It

was submitted that sections 5 to 9 of the Act read with the

Scheme do not set up a machinery which is

644

constitutionally valid. The Act, it was urged, deprives the

victims of their rights out of all proportion to the object

sought to be achieved, namely, to sue in foreign jurisdic-

tion or to represent those incapable of representing them-

selves. The said object could be achieved, according to

counsel, by limiting the right to sue in foreign jurisdic-

tion alone and in any event representing only those victims

incapable of representing themselves. The victims who wish

to sue for and on their own behalf must have power to sue,

all proper and necessary parties including Government of

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India, Government of Madhya Pradesh, UCIL and Shri Arjun

Singh to vindicate their right to life and liberty and their

rights cannot and should not be curtailed, it was submitted.

Hence, the Act goes well beyond its objects and imposes

excessive restriction amounting to destruction of the rights

of the victims, according to. counsel. In deciding whether

any rights are affected, it is not the object of the Act

that is relevant but its direct and inevitable effect on the

rights of the victims that is material. Hence no matter how

laudable the object of the Act is alleged to be by the

Government of India, namely, that it is an Act to give

effect to Directive Principles enshrined in Article 39-A of

the Constitution, the direct and inevitable effect of sec-

tion 3 according to counsel for the victims is to deprive

the victims of the right to sue for and on their own behalf

through counsel of their choice and instead empower the

Central Government to sue for them.

41. The Act is, it was contended, unconstitutional

because it deprives the victims of their right to life and

personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21. The right to life

and liberty includes the right to sue for violations of the

right, it was urged. The right to life guaranteed by Article

21 must be interpreted to mean all that makes life livable,

life in all its fullness. According to counsel, it includes

the right to livelihood. Reference was made to the decision

of Olga Tellis v. B.M.C., [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 51 at p. 78-83.

This right, it was contended, is inseparable from the reme-

dy. It was urged that personal liberty includes a wide range

of freedoms to decide how to order one's affairs. Reference

was made to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (supra), The

right to life and liberty also includes the right to healthy

environment free from hazardous pollutants. The right to

life and liberty, it was submitted, is inseparable from the

remedy to judicial vindication of the violation of that

right--the right of access to justice must be deemed to be

part of that right. Therefore, the importance is given to

the right to file a suit for an actionable wrong. See Ganga

Bai v. Vijay Kumar, [1974] 3 SCR 882 at 886. According to

counsel appearing for the victims, the Act read strictly

infringes the right to life and personal liberty because the

right to sue by the affected person

645

for damages flowing from infringement of their rights is

taken away. Thus, it was submitted that not just some inci-

dents of the right to life, but the right itself in all its

fullness is taken away. Such depravation, according to

counsel, of the right is not in accordance with procedure

established by law inasmuch as the law which takes away the

right, i.e., impugned Act is neither substantively nor

procedurally just, fair or reasonable. A law which divests

the victims of the right to sue to vindicate for life and

personal liberty and vests the said right in the Central

Government is not just, fair or reasonable. The victims are

sui generis and able to decide for themselves how to vindi-

cate their claims in accordance with law. There is, there-

fore, no reason shown to exist for divesting them of that

right and vesting that on the Central Government.

42. All the counsel for the victims have emphasised that

vesting of the right in Central Government is bad and unrea-

sonable because there is conflict of interests between the

Central Government and the victims. It was emphasised that

the conflict of interest has already prejudiced the victims

in the conduct of the case inasmuch as a compromise unac-

ceptable to the victims has been entered into in accordance

with the order of this Court of 14th/15th February, 1989

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without heating the victims. This conflict of interest will

continue, it was emphasised, to adversely affect the victims

inasmuch as section 9 of the Act read with clauses 5, 10 and

11 of the Scheme empower the Central Government to process

claims, determine the category into which these fall, deter-

mine the basis on which damages will be payable to each

category and determine the amount of compensation payable to

each claimant. Learned counsel urged that the right to a

just, fair and reasonable procedure was itself a guaranteed

fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution. This

included right to natural justice. Reference was made to

Olga Tellis's. case (supra) and S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan,

[1981] 1 SCR 746 at 753, 766. The right to natural justice

is included in Article 14 Tulsi Ram v. Union of India,

[1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131. Reference was also made to Maneka

Gandhi's, case (supra). It was contended by counsel that the

right to natural justice is the right to be heard by Court

at the pre-decisional stage, i.e., before any compromise is

effected and accepted. Reference was made to the decision of

this Court in Swadeshi Cotton v. Union of India, [1981] 2

SCR 533. It was submitted that natural justice is a highly

effective tool devised by the Courts to ensure that a statu-

tory authority arrives at a just decision. It is calculated

to act as a healthy check on the abuse of power. Natural

justice is not dispensable nor is it an empty formality.

Denial of that right can and has led to the miscar-

646

riage of justice in this case. According to counsel, if the

victims had been given an opportunity to be heard, they

would, inter alia, have pointed out that the amount agreed

to be paid by UCC was hopelessly inadequate and that UCC,

its officer and agents ought not to be absolved of criminal

liability, that the Central Government itself was liable to

have been sued as a joint tort-feasor and, according to

counsel, had agreed to submit to a decree if found liable

under the order dated 31st December, 1985, that suits had

been filed against the State of Madhya Pradesh, Shri Arjun

Singh and UCIL which said suits cannot be deemed to have

been settled by the compromise/order of 14th/15th February,

1989. It was also pointed out that Union of India was under

a duty to sue UCIL, which it had failed and neglected to do.

It was submitted that to the extent that the statute does

not provide for a pre-decisional hearing on the fairness of

the proposed settlement or compromise by Court, it is void

as offending natural justice hence violative of Articles 14

and 21 of the Constitution. Alternatively, it was contended

by the counsel that since the statute neither expressly nor

by necessary implication bars the right to be heard by Court

before any compromise is effected such a right to a pre-

decisional hearing by Court must be read into section

3(2)(b) of the Act. Admittedly, it does not expressly ex-

clude the right to a hearing by Court prior to any settle-

ment being entered into. Far from excluding such a right by

necessary implication, having regard to the nature of the

rights affected, i.e., the right to life and personal liber-

ty, such a right to hearing must be read into the Act in

order to ensure that justice is done to the victims, accord-

ing to all the counsel. The Act sets up a procedure differ-

ent from the ordinary procedure established by law, namely,

Civil Procedure Code. But it was submitted that the Act

should be harmoniously read with the provisions of Civil

Procedure Code and if it is not so read, then the Act in

question would be unreasonable and unfair. In this connec-

tion, reliance was placed on the provisions of Order I, Rule

4, Order 23, Rule 1 proviso, Order 23, Rule 3-9 and Order

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32, Rule 7 of CPC and it was submitted that these are not

inconsistent with the Act. On the contrary these are neces-

sary and complementary, intended to ensure that there is no

miscarriage of justice. Hence these must be held to apply to

the facts and circumstances of the case and the impugned Act

must be read along with these provisions. Assuming that the

said provisions do not directly apply then, provisions

analogous to the said provisions must be read with section

3(2)(b) to make the Act reasonable, it was submitted. It was

urged that if these are not so read then the absence of such

provisions would vest arbitrary and unguided powers in the

Central Government making section 3(2)(b) unconstitutional.

The said provisions are intended to ensure the machinery of

647

accountability to the victims and to provide to them, an

opportunity to be heard by court before any compromise is

arrived at. In this connection, reference was made to Rule

23(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in America

which provides for a hearing to the victims before a compro-

mise is effected. The victims as plaintiffs in an Indian

court cannot be subjected to a procedure which is less fair

than that provided by a US forum initially chosen by the

Government of India, it was urged.

43. Counsel submitted that Section 6 of the Act is

unreasonable because it replaces an independent and impar-

tial Civil Court of competent jurisdiction by an Officer

known as the Commissioner to be appointed by the Central

Government. No qualification, according to counsel, had been

prescribed for the appointment of a Commissioner and clause

5 of the Scheme framed under the Act vests in the Commis-

sioner the judicial function of deciding appeals against the

order of the Deputy Commissioner registering or refusing to

register a claim. It was further submitted that clause 11(2)

of the Scheme is unreasonable because it replaces an inde-

pendent and impartial civil court of competent jurisdiction

with the Central Government, which is a joint tort-feasor

for the purpose of determining the total amount of compensa-

tion to be apportioned for each category of claims and the

quantum of compensation payable for each type of injury or

loss. It was submitted that the said function is a judicial

function and if there is any conflict of interest between

the victims and Central Government, vesting such a power in

the Central Government amounts to making it a judge in its

own cause. It was urged that having regard to the fact that

amount received in satisfaction of the claims is ostensibly

pre-determined, namely, 470 million dollars unless the order

of 14th/15th February is set aside which ought to be done,

according to counsel, the Central Government would have a

vested interest in ensuring that the amount of damages to be

disbursed does not exceed the said amount. Even otherwise,

according to counsel, the Government of India has been sued

as a joint tort-feasor, and as they would have a vested

interest in depressing the quantum of damages, payable to

the victims. This would, according to counsel, result in a

deliberate under-estimation of the extent of injuries and

compensation payable.

44. Clause 11(4) of the Scheme, according to counsel, is

unreasonable inasmuch as it does not take into account the

claims of the victims to punitive and exemplary damages and

damages for loss and destruction of environment. Counsel

submitted that in any event the expression "claims" in

section 2(b) cannot be interpreted to mean

648

claims against the Central Government, the State of Madhya

Pradesh, UCIL, which was not sued in suit No. 1113/86 and

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Shri Arjun Singh, all of whom have been sued as joint tort

feasors in relation to the liability arising out of the

disaster. Counsel submitted that if section 3 is to be held

to be intra vires, the word "exclusive" should be severed

from section 3 and on the other hand, if section 3 is held

ultra vires, then victims who have already filed suits or

those who had lodged claims should be entitled to continue

their own suits as well as Suit No. 1113/86 as plaintiffs

with leave under Order 1 Rule 8. Counsel submitted that

interim relief as decided by this Court can be paid to the

victims even otherwise also, according to counsel, under

clause 10(2)(b) of the Scheme.

45. Counsel submitted that the balance of $ 470 million

after deducting interim relief as determined by this Court

should be attached. In any event, it was submitted that, it

be declared that the word "claim" in section 2 does not

include claims against Central Govt. or State of Madhya

Pradesh or UCIL. Hence, it was urged that the rights of the

victims to sue the Government of India, the State of Madhya

Pradesh or UCIL would remain unaffected by the Act or by the

compromise effected under the Act. Machinery to decide suit

expeditiously has to be devised, it was submitted. Other

suits filed against UCC, UCIL, State of Madhya Pradesh and

Arjun Singh should to be transferred to the Supreme Court

for trial and disposal, according to counsel. It was submit-

ted that the Court should fix the basis of damages payable

to different categories, namely, death and disablement

mentioned under clause 5(2) of the scheme. Counsel submitted

that this Court should set up a procedure which would ensure

that an impartial judge assisted by medical experts and

assessors would adjudicate the basis on which an individual

claimant would fall into a particular category. It was also

urged that this Court should quantify the amount of compen-

sation payable to each category of claimant in clause 5(2)

of the Scheme. This decision cannot, it was submitted, be

left to the Central Government as is purported to be done by

clause 11(2) of the Scheme.

This Court must set up, it was urged, a trust with

independent trustees to administer the trust and trustees to

be accountable to this Court. An independent census should

be carried out of number of claimants, nature and extent of

injury caused to them, the category into which they fall.

Apportionment of amounts should be set aside or invested for

future claimants, that is the category in clause 5(2)(a) of

the Scheme, which is, according to counsel, of utmost impor-

tance

649

since the injuries are said to be. carcinogenic and ontogen-

ic and wide affecting persons yet unborn.

47. Shri Garg, further and on behalf of some of the

victims counsel, urged before us that deprivation of the

rights of the victims and vesting of those fights in the

State is violative of the rights of the victims and cannot.

be justified or warranted by the Constitution. Neither

section 3 nor section 4 of the Act gives any right to the

victims; on the other hand, it is a complete denial of

access to justice for the victims, according to him. This,

according to counsel, is arbitrary. He also submitted that

section 4 of the Act, as it stands, gives no right to the

victims and as such even assuming that in order to fight for

the rights of the victims, it was necessary to substitute

the victims even then in so far as the victims have been

denied the right of say, in the conduct of the proceedings,

this is disproportionate to the benefit conferred upon the

victims. Denial of rights to the victims is so great and

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deprivation of the right to natural justice and access to

justice is so tremendous that judged by the well settled

principles by which yardsticks provisions like these should

be judged in the constitutional framework of this country,

the Act is violative of the fundamental rights of the vic-

tims. It was further submitted by him that all the rights of

the victims by the process of this Act, the right of the

victims to enforce full liability against the multinationals

as well as against the Indian Companies, absolute liability

and criminal liability have all been curtailed.

48. All the counsel submitted that in any event, the

criminal liability cannot be subject matter of this Act.

Therefore, the Government was not entitled to agree to any

settlement on the ground that criminal prosecution would be

withdrawn and this being a part of the consideration or

inducement for settling the civil liability, he submitted

that the settlement arrived at on the 14th/l5th February,

1989 as recorded in the order of this Court is wholly unwar-

ranted, unconstitutional and illegal.

49. Mr. Garg additionally further urged that by the

procedure of the Act, each individual claim had to be first

determined and the Government could only take over the

aggregate of all individual claims and that could only be

done by aggregating the individual claims of the victims.

That was not done, according to him. Read in that fashion,

according to Shri Garg, the conduct of the Government in

implementing the Act is wholly improper and unwarranted. It

was submitted by him that the enforcement of the fight of

the victims

650

without a just, fair and reasonable procedure which is

vitally necessary for representing the citizens or victims

was bad. It was further urged by him that the Bhopal gas

victims have been singled out for hostile discrimination

resulting in total denial of all procedures of approach to

competent courts and tribunals. It was submitted that the

Central Government was incompetent to represent the victims

in the litigations or for enforcement of the claims. It was

then submitted by him that the claims of the victims must be

enforced fully against the Union Carbide Corporation carry-

ing on commercial activities for profit resulting in unprec-

edented gas leak disaster responsible for a large number of

deaths and severe injuries to others. It was submitted that

the liability of each party responsible, including the

Government of India, which is a joint tort-feasor along with

the Union Carbide, has to be ascertained in appropriate

proceedings. It was submitted on behalf of the victims that

Union of India owned 22% of the shares in Union Carbide and

therefore, it was incompetent to represent the victims.

There was conflict of interest between the Union of India

and the Union Carbide and so Central Government was incompe-

tent. It is submitted that pecuniary interest howsoever

small disqualifies a person to be a judge in his own cause.

The settlement accepted by the Union of India, according to

various counsel is vitiated by the pecuniary bias as holders

of its shares to the extent of 22%.

50. It was submitted that the pleadings in the court of

the United States and in the Bhopal court considered in the

context of the settlement order of this Court accepted by

the Union of India establish that the victims' individuality

were sacrificed wontedly and callously and, therefore, there

was violation, according to some of the victims, both in the

Act and in its implementation of Articles 14, 19(l)(g) and

21 of the Constitution.

51. The principles of the decision of this Court in M.C.

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Mehta & Anr. v. Union of India, [1987] 1 SCR 819 must be so

interpreted that complete justice is done and it in no way

excludes the grant of punitive damages for wrongs justifying

deterrents to ensure the safety of citizens in free India.

No multinational corporation, according to Shri Garg, can

claim the privilege of the protection of Indian law to earn

profits without meeting fully the demands of civil and

criminal justice administered in India with this Court

functioning as the custodian. Shri Garg urged that the

liability for damages, in India and the Third World Coun-

tries, of the multinational companies cannot be less but

must be more because the persons affected are often without

remedy for

651

reasons of inadequate facilities for protection of health or

property. Therefore, the damages sustainable by Indian

victims against the multinationals dealing with dangerous

gases without proper security and other measures are far

greater than damages suffered by the citizens of other

advanced and developed countries. It is, therefore, neces-

sary to ensure by damages and deterrent remedies that these

multinationals are not tempted to shift dangerous manufac-

turing operations intended to advance their strategic objec-

tives of profit and war to the Third World Countries with

little respect for the right to life and dignity of the

people of sovereign third world countries. The strictest

enforcement of punitive liability also serves the interest

of the American people. The Act, therefore, according to

Shri Garg is clearly unconstitutional and therefore, void.

52. It was urged that the settlement is without juris-

diction. This Court was incompetent to grant immunity

against criminal liabilities in the manner it has purported

to do by its order dated 14th/l5th February, 1989, it was

strenuously suggested by counsel. It was further submitted

that to hold the Act to be valid, the victims must be heard

before the settlement and the Act can only be valid if it is

so interpreted. This is necessary further, according to Shri

Garg, to lay down the scope of heating. Shri Garg also drew

our attention to the scheme of disbursement of relief to the

victims. He submitted that the scheme of disbursement is

unreasonable and discriminatory because there is no proce-

dure which is just, fair and reasonable in accordance with

the provisions of Civil Procedure Code. He further submitted

that the Act does not lay down any guidelines for the con-

duct of the Union of India in advancing the claims of the

victims. There were no essential legislative guidelines for

determining the rights of the victims, the conduct of the

proceedings on behalf of the victims and for the relief-

claimed. Denial of access to justice to the victims through

an impartial judiciary is so great a denial that it can only

be consistent with the situation which calls for such a

drastic provision. The present circumstances were not such.

He drew our attention to the decision of this Court in

Basheshar v. Income Tax Commissioner, AIR 1959 SC 149; in Re

Special Courts Bill, [1979] 2 SCR 476; A.R. Antulay v. R.S.

Nayak & Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 602; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Ten-

dulkar, [1955] SCR 279; Ambika Prasad Mishra etc. v. State

of U.P. & Ors. etc., [1960] 3 SCR 1159 and Bodhan Chowdhary

v. State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045. Shri Garg further

submitted that Article 21 must be read with Article 51 of

the Constitution and other directive principles. He drew our

attention to Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, [1984] 2

SCR 795; M/s Mackinnon Machkenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Audrey

D'Costa

652

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and Anr., [1987] 2 SCC 469; Sheela Barse v. Secretary,

Children Aid Society & Ors., [1987] 1 SCR 870. Shri Garg

submitted that in india, the national dimensions of human

rights and the international dimensions are both congruent

and their enforcement is guaranteed under Articles 32 and

226 to the extent these are enforceable against the State,

these are also enforceable against transnational corpora-

tions inducted by the State on conditions of due observance

of the Constitution and all laws of the land. Shri Garg

submitted that in the background of an unprecedented disas-

ter resulting in extensive damage to life and property and

the destruction of the environment affecting large number of

people and for the full protection of the interest of the

victims and for complete satisfaction of all claims for

compensation, the Act was passed empowering the Government

of India to take necessary steps for processing of the

claims and for utilisation of disbursal of the amount re-

ceived in satisfaction of the claims. The Central Government

was given the exclusive right to represent the victims and

to act in place of, in United States or in india, every

citizen entitled to make a claim. Shri Garg urged that on a

proper reading of section 3(1) of the Act read with section

4 exclusion of all victims for all purpose is incomplete and

the Act is bad. He submitted that the decree for adjudica-

tion of the Court must ascertain the magnitude of the dam-

ages and should be able to grant reliefs required by law

under heads of strict liability, absolute liability and

punitive liability.

53. Shri Garg submitted that it is necessary to consider

that the Union of India is liable for the torts. In several

decisions to which Shri Garg grew our attention, it has been

clarified that Government is not liable only if the tortious

act complained has been committed by its servants in exer-

cise of its sovereign powers bY which it is meant powers

that can be lawfully exercised under sovereign rights only

vide Nandram Heeralal v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1978

M.P. 209 at p. 212. There is a real and marked distinction

between the sovereign functions of the government and those

which are non-sovereign and some of the functions that fall

in the latter category are those connected with trade,

commerce, business and industrial undertakings. Sovereign

functions are such acts which are of such a nature as cannot

be performed by a private individual or association unless

powers are delegated by sovereign authority of state.

54. According to Shri Garg, the Union and the State

Governments under the Constitution and as per laws of the

Factories, Environment Control, etc. are bound to exercise

control on the factories in public interest and public

purpose. These functions are not sovereign func-

653

tions, according to Shri Garg, and the Government in this

case was guilty of negligence. In support of this, Shri Garg

submitted that the offence of negligence on the part of the

Govt. would be evident from the fact that--

(a) the Government allowed the Union Carbide

factory to be installed in the heart of the

city;

(b) the Government allowed habitation in the

front of the factory knowing that the most

dangerous and lethal gases were being used in

the manufacturing processes;

(c) the gas leakage from this factory was a

common affair and it was agitated continuously

by the people journalists and it was agitated

in the Vidhan Sabha right from 1980 to 1984.

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These features firmly proved, according to

Shri Garg, the grossest negligence of the

governments. Shri Garg submitted that the gas

victims had legal and moral right to sue the

governments and so it had full right to im-

plead all the necessary and proper parties

like Union Carbide, UCIL, and also the then

Chief Minister Shri Arjun Singh of the State.

He drew our attention to Order 2, rule 3, of

the Civil Procedure Code. In suits on joint

torts, according to Shri Garg, each of the

joint tort feasors is responsible for the

injury sustained for the common acts and they

can all be sued together. Shri Garg's main

criticism has been that the most crucial

question of corporate responsibility of the

people's right to life and their right to

guard it as enshrined in Article 21 of the

Constitution were sought to be gagged by the

Act. Shri Garg tried to submit that this was

an enabling Act only but not an Act which

deprived the victims of their right to sue. He

submitted that in this Act, there is denial of

natural justice both in the institution under

section 3 and in the conduct of the suit under

section 4. It must be seen that justice is

done to all (R. Viswanathan v. Rukh-ul-Mulk

Syed Abdul Wajid, [1963] 3 SCR 22). It was

urged that it was necessary to give a reasona-

ble notice to the parties. He referred to M.

Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, [1963]

Supp. 2 SCR 724.

55. Shri Shanti Bhushan appearing for Bhopal Gas Peedit

Mahila Udyog Sangathan submitted that if the Act is to be

upheld, it has to be read down and construed in the manner

urged by him. It was submitted that when the Bhopal Gas

disaster took place, which was the worst industrial disaster

in the world which resulted in the deaths

654

of several thousands of people and caused serious injuries

to lakhs others, there arose a right to the victims to get

not merely damages under the law of the torts but also arose

clearly, by virtue of right to life guaranteed as fundamen-

tal right by Article 21 of the Constitution a right to get

full protection of life and limb. This fundamental right

also, according to Shri Shanti Bhushan, embodied within

itself a right to have the claim adjudicated by the estab-

lished courts of law. It is well settled that right of

access to courts in respect of violation of their fundamen-

tal rights itself is a fundamental right which cannot be

denied to the people. Shri Shanti Bhushan submitted that

there may be some justification for the Act being passed. He

said that the claim against the Union Carbide are covered by

the Act. The claims of the victims against the Central

Government or any other party who is also liable under tort

to the victims is not covered by the Act. The second point

that Shri Shanti Bhushan made was that the Act so far as it

empowered the Central Government to represent and act in

place of the victims is in respect of the civil liability

arising out of disaster and not in respect of any right in

respect of criminal liability. The Central Govt., according

to Shri Shanti Bhushan, cannot have any right or authority

in relation to any offences which arose out of the disaster

and which resulted in criminal liability. It was submitted

that there cannot be any settlement or compromise in rela-

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tion to non-compoundable criminal cases and in respect of

compoundable criminal cases the legal right to compound

these could only be possessed by the victims alone and the

Central Government could not compound those offences on

their behalf. It was submitted by Shri Shanti Bhushan that

even this Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to transfer

any criminal proceedings to itself either under any provi-

sion of the Constitution or under any provision of the

Criminal Procedure Code or under any other provision of law

and, therefore, if the settlement in question was to be

treated not as a compromise but as an order of the Court, it

would be without jurisdiction and liable to be declared so

on the principles laid down, according to Shri Bhushan, by

this Court in Antulay's case (supra). Shri Shanti Bhushan

submitted that even if under the Act, the Central Government

is considered to be able to represent the victims and to

pursue the litigation on their behalf and even to enter into

compromise on their behalf, it would be a gross violation of

the constitutional rights of the victims to enter into a

settlement with the Union Carbide without giving the victims

opportunities to express their views about the fairness or

adequacy of the settlement before any court could permit

such a settlement to be made.

56. Mr. Shanti Bhushan submitted that the suit which may be

655

brought by the Central Government against Union Carbide

under section 3 of the Act would be a suit of the kind

contemplated by the Explanation to Order 23, rule 3 of the

Code of Civil Procedure since the victims are not parties

and yet the decree obtained in the suit would bind them. It

was, therefore, urged by Shri Shanti Bhushan that the provi-

sions of Section 3(1) of the Act merely empowers the Central

Government to enter into a compromise but did not lay down

the procedure which was to be followed for entering into any

compromise. Therefore, there is nothing which is inconsist-

ent with the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-B of the CPC to

which the provisions Section 11 of the Act be applied. If,

however, by any stretch of argument the provisions of the

Act could be construed so as to override the provisions of

Order 23 Rule 3-B CPC, it was urged, the same would render

the provisions of the Act violative of the victims' funda-

mental rights and the actions would be rendered unconstitu-

tional. If it empowered the Central Government to compromise

the victims' rights, without even having to apply the prin-

ciples of natural justice, then it would be unconstitutional

and as such bad. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, Ms. Jaising and Mr.

Garg submitted that these procedures must be construed in

accordance with the provisions contained in Order 23 Rule

3-B CPC and an opportunity must be given to those whose

claims are being compromised to show to the court that the

compromise is not fair and should not accordingly be permit-

ted by the court. Such a hearing in terms, according to

counsel, of Order 23 Rule 3-B CPC has to be before the

compromise is entered into. It was then submitted that

section 3 of the Act only empowers the Central Government to

represent and act in place of the victims and to institute

suits on behalf of the victims or even to enter into compro-

mise on behalf of the victims.

57. The Act does not create new causes of action create

special courts. The jurisdiction of the civil court to

entertain suit would still arise out of section 9 of the CPC

and the substantive cause of action and the nature of the

reliefs available would also continue to remain unchanged.

The only difference produced by the provisions of the Act

would be that instead of the suit being filed by the victims

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themselves the suit would be filed by the Central Government

on their behalf.

58. Shri Shanti Bhushan then argued that the cause of

action of each victim is separate and entitled him to bring

a suit for separate amount according to the damages suffered

by him. He submitted that even where the Central Government

was empowered to file suits on behalf of all the victims it

could only ask for a decree of the same kind as could have

been asked for by the victims themselves, namely, a

656

decree awarding various specified amounts to different

victims whose names had to be disclosed. According to Shri

Shanti Bhushan, even if all the details were not available

at the time when the suit was filed, the details of the

victims' damages had to be procured and specified in the

plaint before a proper decree could be passed in the suit.

even if the subject matter of the suit had to be compromised

between the Central Government and the Union Carbide the

compromise had to indicate as to what amount would be pay-

able to each victim, in addition to the total amount which

was payable by Union Carbide, submitted Shri Shanti Bhushan.

It was submitted that there was nothing in the Act which

permitted the Central Government to enter into any general

compromise with Union Carbide providing for the lumpsum

amount without disclosure as to how much amount is payable

to each victim.

59. If the Act in question had not been enacted, the

victims would have been entitled to not only sue Union

Carbide themselves but also to enter into any compromise or

settlement of their claims with the Union Carbide immediate-

ly. The provisions of the Act, according to Mr. Shanti

Bhushan, deprive the victims of their legal right and such

deprivation of their rights and creation of a corresponding

right in the Central Government can be treated as reasonable

only if the deprivation of their rights imposed a corre-

sponding liability on the Central Government to continue to

pay such interim relief to the victims as they might be

entitled to till the time that the Central Government is

able to obtain the whole amount of compensation from the

Union Carbide. He submitted that the deprivation of the

right of the victims to sue for their claims and denial of

access to justice and to assert their claims and the substi-

tution of the Central Government to carry on the litigation

for or on their behalf can only be justified, if and only if

the Central Government is enjoined to provide for such

interim relief or continue to provide in the words of Judge

Keenan, as a matter of fundamental human decency, such

interim relief, necessary to enable the victims to fight the

battle. Counsel submitted that the Act must be so read. Shri

Shanti Bhushan urged that if the Act is construed in such a

manner that it did not create such an obligation on the

Central Government, the Act cannot be upheld as a reasonable

provision when it deprived the victims of their normal legal

rights of immediately obtaining compensation from Union

Carbide. He referred to section 10(b) of the Act and clause

10 and 11(1) of the Scheme to show that the legislative

policy underlying the Bhopal Act clearly contemplated pay-

ment of interim relief to the victims from time to time till

such time as the Central Government was able to recover from

Union Carbide

657

full amount of compensation from which the interim reliefs

paid by the Central Government were to be deducted from the

amount payable to them by way of final disbursal of the

amounts recovered.

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60. The settlement is bad, according to Shri Shanti

Bhushan if part of the bargain was giving up of the criminal

liability against UCIL and UCC. Shri Shanti Bhushan submit-

ted that this Court should not hesitate to declare that the

settlement is bad because the fight will go on and the

victims should be provided reliefs and interim compensation

by the Central Government to be reimbursed ultimately from

the amount to be realised by the Central Government. This

obligation was over and above the liability of the Central

Government as a joint tort-feasor, according to Shri Shanti

Bhushan.

61. Shri Kailash Vasdev, appearing for the petitioners

in Writ Petition No. 155 1/86 submitted that the Act dis-

placed the claimants in the matter of their right to seek

redressal and remedies of the actual injury and harm caused

individually to the claimants. The Act in question by re-

placing the Central Government in place of the victims. by

conferment of exclusive right to sue in place of victims,

according to him, contravened the procedure established by

law. The right to sue for the wrong done to an individual

was exclusive to the individual. It was submitted that under

the civil law of the country, individuals have rights to

enforce their claims and any deprivation would place them

into a different category from the other litigants. The

right to enter into compromise, it was further submitted,

without consultation of the victims, if that is the con-

struction of section 3 read with section 4 of the Act, then

it is violative of procedure established by law. The proce-

dure substituted, if that be the construction of the Act,

would be in violation of the principles of natural justice

and as such bad. It was submitted that the concept of

'parens patriae' would not be applicable in these cases. It

was submitted that traditionally, sovereigns can sue under

the doctrine of 'parens patriae' only for violations of

their "quasi-sovereign" interests. Such interests do not

include the claims of individual citizens. It was submitted

that the Act in question is different from the concept of

parens patriae because there was no special need to be

satisfied and a class action, according to Shri Vasdev,

would have served the same purpose as a suit brought under

the statute and ought to have been preferred because it

safeguarded claimants' right to procedural due process. In

addition, a suit brought under the statute would threaten

the victims' substantive due process rights. It was further

submitted that in order to sustain an action, it was neces-

sary for the Government of India to have standing

658

62. Counsel submitted that 'parens patriae' has received

no judicial recognition in this country as a basis for

recovery of money damages for injuries suffered by individu-

als. He may be right to that extent but the doctrine of

parens patriae has been used in India in varying contexts

and contingencies.

63. We are of the opinion that the Act in question was

passed in recognition of the right of the sovereign to act

as parens patriae as contended by the learned Attorney

General. The Government of India in order to effectively

safeguard the rights of the victims in the matter of the

conduct of the case was entitled to act as parens patriae,

which position was reinforced by the statutory provisions,

namely, the Act. We have noted the several decisions re-

ferred to hereinbefore, namely, Bhudhkaran Chankhani v.

Thakur Prasad Shad, (supra); Banku Behary Mondal v. Banku

Behari Hazra, (supra); Medai Dalavoi T. Kumaraswami Mudaliar

v. Medai Dalavai Rajammal, (supra) and to the decision of

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this Court in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P. Sahi, (supra)

and the decision of the American Supreme Court in Alfred

Schnapp v. Puerto Rico, (supra). It has to be borne in mind

that conceptually and jurisprudentially, the doctrine of

parens patriae is not limited to representation of some of

the victims outside the territories of the country. It is

true that the doctrine has been so utilised in America so

far. In our opinion, learned Attorney General was right in

contending that where citizens of a country are victims of a

tragedy because of the negligence of any multinational, a

peculiar situation arises which calls for suitable effective

machinery to articulate and effectuate the grievances and

demands of the victims, for which the conventional adversary

system would be totally inadequate. The State in discharge

of its sovereign obligation must come forward. The Indian

state because of its constitutional commitment is obliged to

take upon itself the claims of the victims and to protect

them in their hour of need. Learned Attorney General was

also right in submitting that the decisions of the Calcutta,

Madras and U.S. Supreme Court clearly indicate that parens

patriae doctrine can be invoked by sovereign state within

India, even if it be contended that it has not so far been

invoked inside India in respect of claims for damages of

victims suffered at the hands of the multinational. In our

opinion, conceptually and jurisprudentially, there is no bar

on the State to assume responsibilities analogous to parens

patriae to discharge the State's obligations under the

Constitution. What the Central Government has done in the

instant case seems to us to be an expression of its sover-

eign power. This power is plenary and inherent in every

sovereign state to do all things which promote the health,

peace,

659

morals, education and good order of the people and tend to

increase the wealth and prosperity of the state. Sovereignty

is difficult to define. See in this connection, Weaver on

Constitional Law, p. 490. By the nature of things, the state

sovereignty in these matters cannot be limited. It has to be

adjusted to the conditions touching the common welfare when

covered by legislative enactments. This power is to the

public what the law of necessity is to the individual. It is

comprehended in the maxim salus populi suprema lex--regard

for public welfare is the highest law. It is not a rule, it

is an evolution. This power has always been as broad as

public welfare and as strong as the arm of the state, this

can only be measured by the legislative will of the people,

subject to the fundamental rights and constitutional limita-

tions. This is an emanation of sovereignty subject to as

aforesaid. Indeed, it is the obligation of the State to

assume such responsibility and protect its citizens. It has

to be borne in mind, as was stressed by the learned Attorney

General, that conferment of power and the manner of its

exercise are two different matters. It was submitted that

the power to conduct the suit and to compromise, if neces-

sary, was vested in the Central Government for the purpose

of the Act. The power to compromise and to conduct the

proceedings are not uncanalised or arbitrary. These were

clearly exercisable only in the ultimate interests of the

victims. The possibility of abuse of a statute does not

impart to it any element of invalidity. In this connection,

the observations of Viscount Simonds in Belfast Corporation

v. O.D. Commission, [1950] AC 490 at 520-21 are relevant

where it was emphasised that validity of a measure is not be

determined by its application to particular cases. This

Court in Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu

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Chetty, [1962] 3 SCR 786 at 825 emphasised that the consti-

tutional validity of the statute would have to be determined

on the basis of its provisions and on the ambit of its

operation as reasonably construed. It has to be borne in

mind that if upon so judged it passes the test of reasona-

bleness, then the possibility of the powers conferred being

improperly used is no ground for pronouncing the law itself

invalid. See in this connection also the observations in

P.J. Irani v. State of Madras, [1962] 2 SCR 169 at 178 to

181 and D.K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat, [1986] Supp. SCC

20 at 60-61

64. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act should be read together

as contended by the learned Attorney General, along with

other provisions of the Act and in particular sections 9 and

11 of the Act. These should be appreciated in the context of

the object sought to be achieved by the Act as indicated in

the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preamble to the

Act. The Act was so designed that the victims of the

660

disaster are fully protected and the claims of compensation

or damages for loss of life or personal injuries or in'

respect of other matters arising out of or connected with

the disaster are processed speedily, effectively, equitably

and to the best advantage of the claimants. Section 3 of the

Act is subject to other provisions of the Act which includes

sections 4 and 11. Section 4 of the Act opens with non-

obstante clause, vis-a-vis, section 3 and therefore, over-

rides section 3. Learned Attorney General submitted that the

right of the Central Government under section 3 of the Act

was to represent the victims exclusively and act in the

place of the victims. The Central Government, it was urged,

in other words, is substituted in the place of 'the victims

and is the dominus litis. Learned Attorney General submitted

that the dominus litis carries with it the right to conduct

the suit in the best manner as it deems fit, including, the

right to withdraw and right to enter into compromise. The

right to withdraw and the right to compromise conferred by

section 3(2) of the Act cannot be exercised to defeat the

rights of the victims. As to how the rights should be exer-

cised is guided by the objects and the reasons contained in

the Preamble, namely, to speedily and effectively process

the claims of the victims and to protect their claims. The

Act was passed replacing the Ordinance at a time when many

private plaintiffs had instituted complaints/suits in the

American Courts. In such a situation, the Government of

India acting in place of the victims necessarily should have

right under the statute to act in all situations including

the position of withdrawing the suit or to enter into com-

promise. Learned Attorney General submitted that if the UCC

were to agree to pay a lump sum amount which would be just,

fair and equitable, but insists on a condition that the

proceedings should be completely withdrawn, then necessarily

there should be power under the Act to so withdraw. Accord-

ing to him, therefore, the Act engrafted a provision empow-

ring the Government to compromise. The provisions under

section 3(2)(b) of the Act to enter into compromise was

consistent with the powers of dominus litis. In this connec-

tion, our attention was drawn to the definition of 'Dominus

Litis' in Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, P. 437,

which states as follows:

"'Dominus litis'. The master of the suit; i.e.

the person who was really and directly inter-

ested in the suit as a party, as distinguished

from his attorney or advocate. But the term is

also applied to one who, though not originally

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a party, has made himself such, by interven-

tion or otherwise, and has assumed entire

control and responsibility for one side and is

treated by the Court as liable for costs. Vir-

ginia Electric & Power Co, v. Bowers, ISI Va.,

542, 25 S.E. 2d 361,263".

661

65. Learned Attorney General sought to contend that the

victims had not been excluded entirely either in the conduct

of proceedings or in entering into compromise, and he re-

ferred to the proceedings in detail emphasising the partici-

pation of some of the victims at some stage. He drew our

attention to the fact that the victims had filed separate

consolidated complaints in addition to the complaint filed

by the Government of India. Judge Keenan of the Distt. Court

of America had passed orders permitting the victims to be

represented not only 'by the private Attorneys but also by

the Govt. of India. Hence, it was submitted that it could

not be contended that the victims had been excluded. Learned

Attorney General further contended that pursuant to the

orders passed by Judge Keenan imposing certain conditions

against the Union Carbide and allowing the motion for forum

non convenience of the UCC that the suit came back to India

and was instituted before the Distt. Court of Bhopal. In

those circumstances, it was urged by the learned Attorney

General that the private plaintiffs who went to America and

who were represented by the contingency lawyers fully knew

that they could also have joined in the said suit as they

were before the American Court along with the Govt. of

India. It was contended that in the proceedings at any point

of time or stage including when the compromise was entered

into, these private plaintiffs could have participated in

the court proceedings and could have made their representa-

tion, if they so desired. Even in the Indian suits, these

private parties have been permitted to continue as parties

represented by separate counsel even though the Act empowers

the Union to be the sole plaintiff. Learned Attorney General

submitted that Section 4 of the Act clearly enabled the

victims to exercise their right of participation in the

proceedings. The Central Govt. was enjoined to have due

regard to any matter which such person might require to be

urged. Indeed, the learned Attorney General urged very

strenuously that in the instant case, Zehreeli Gas Kand

Sangharsh Morcha and Jana Swasthya Kendra (Bhopal) had filed

before the Distt. Judge, Bhopal, an application under Order

I Rule 8 read with Order I Rule 10 and Section 15 1 of the

CPC for their-intervention on behalf of the victims. They

had participated in the hearing before the learned Distt.

Judge, who referred to their intervention in the order. It

was further emphasised that when the UCC went up in revision

to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur against the

interim compensation ordered to be paid by the Distt. Court,

the intervener through its Advocate, Mr. Vibhuti Jha had

participated in the proceedings. The aforesaid Association

had also intervened in the civil appeals preferred pursuant

to the special leave granted by this Court to the Union of

India and Union Carbide against the judgment of the

662

High Court for interim compensation. In those circumstances,

it was submitted that there did not exist any other gas

victim intervening in the proceedings, claiming participa-

tion under Section 4. Hence, the right to compromise provid-

ed for by the Act, could not be held to be violative of the

principles of natural justice. According to the learned

Attorney General, this Court first proposed the order to

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counsel in court and after they agreed thereto, dictated the

order on 14th February, 1989. On 15th February, 1989 after

the Memorandum of Settlement was filed pursuant to the

orders of the court, further orders were passed. The said

Association, namely, Zehreeli Gas Kand Sangharsh Morcha was

present, according to the records, in the Court on both the

dates and did not apparently object to the compromise. Mr.

Charanlal Sahu, one of the petitioners in the writ petition,

had watched the proceedings and after the Court had passed

the order on 15th February, 1989 mentioned that he had filed

a suit for Rs. 100 crores. Learned Attorney General submit-

ted that Mr. Sahu neither protested against the settlement

nor did he make any prayer to be heard. Shri Charan Lal

Sahu, in the petition of opposition in one of these matters

have prayed that a sum of Rs. 100 million should be paid

over to him for himself as well as on behalf of those vic-

tims whom he claimed to represent. In the aforesaid back-

ground on the construction of the Section, it was urged by

the learned Attorney General that Section 3 of the Act

cannot be held to be unconstitutional. The same provided a

just, fair and reasonable procedure and enabled the victims

to participate in the proceedings at all stages--those who

were capable and willing to do so. Our attention was drawn

to the fact that Section 11 of the Act provides that the

provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding

anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other

enactment other than the Act. It was, therefore, urged that

the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code stood overridden

in respect of the areas covered by the Act, namely, (a)

representation, (b) powers of representation; and (c) com-

promise.

66. According to the learned Attorney General, the Act

did not violate the principles of natural justice. The

provisions of the CPC could not be read into the Act for

Section 11 of the Act provides that the application of the

provision of the Civil Procedure Code in so far as those

were inconsistent with the Act should be construed as over-

ridden in respect of areas covered by it. Furthermore,

inasmuch as Section 4 had given a qualified right of partic-

ipation to the victims, there cannot be any question of

violation of the principles of natural justice. The scope of

the application of the principles of natural justice cannot

be judged by any strait jacket formula. According to him,

the

663

extension of the principles of natural justice beyond what

is provided by the Act in Sections 3 & 4, was unwarranted

and would deprive the provisions of the Statute of their

efficacy in relation to the achievement of 'speedy relief',

which is the object intended to be achieved. He emphasised

that the process of notice, consultation and exchange of

information, informed decision-making process, the modali-

ties of assessing a consensus of opinion would involve such

time that the Govt. would be totally unable to act in the

matter efficiently, effectively and purposefully on behalf

of the victims for realisation of the just dues of the

victims. He further urged that the Civil Procedure Code

before its amendment in 1976 did not have the provisions of

Order l Rules 8(4), (5) & (6) and Explanations etc. nor

Order XXIII Rules 3A and 3B. Before the amendment the High

Court had taken a view against the requirement of hearing

the parties represented in the suit under Order 1, Rule 8

before it before settling or disposing of the suit. Our

attention was drawn to the decision of the Calcutta High

Court in Chintaharan Ghose & Ors. v. Gujaraddi Sheik & Ors.,

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AIR 1951 Cal. 456 at 457-459, wherein it was held by the

learned Single Judge that the plaintiff in a representative

suit had right to compromise subject to the conditions that

the suit was properly filed in terms of the provisions of

that Rule and the settlement was agreed bona fide. Learned

Attorney General in that context contended that when the

suit was validly instituted, the plaintiff had a right to

compromise the suit and there need not be any provision for

notice to the parties represented before entering into any

compromise. Reliance was placed on the decision of the

Allahabad High Court in Ram Sarup v. Nanak Ram, AIR 1952

Allahabad 275, where it was held that a compromise entered

into in a suit filed under Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC was

binding on all persons as the plaintiffs who had instituted

the suit in representative capacity had the authority to

compromise. He further submitted that most, if not all, of

the victims had given their powers of attorney which were

duly filed in favour of the Union of India. These powers or

attorney have neither been impeached nor revoked or with-

drawn. By virtue of the powers of attorney the Union of

India, it was stated, had the authority to file the suits

and to compromise the interests of the victims if so re-

quired. The Act in question itself contemplates settlement

as we have noted, and a settlement would need a common

spokesman.

67. It was submitted that the Govt. of India as the

statutory representative discharged its duty and is in a

centralised position of assessing the merits and demerits of

any proposed course of action. So far as the act of compro-

mise, abridging or curtailing the ambit of the

664

rights of the victims, it was submitted that in respect of

liabilities of UCC & UCIL, be it corporate, criminal or

tortious, it was open to an individual to take a decision of

enforcing the liability to its logical extent or stopping

short of it and acceding to a compromise. Just as an indi-

vidual can make an election in the matter of adjudication of

liability so can a statutory representative make an elec-

tion. Therefore, it is wholly wrong to contend, it was

urged, that Section 3(ii)(b) is inconsistent with individu-

al's right of election and at the same time it provides the

centralised decision-making processes to effectively adjudge

and secure the common good. It was only a central agency

like the Govt. of India, who could have a perspective of the

totality of the claims and a vision of the problems of

individual plaintiffs in enforcing these, it was urged. It

was emphasised that it has to be borne in mind that a com-

promise is a legal act. In the present case, it is a part of

the conduct of the suit. It is, therefore, imperative that

the choice of compromise is made carefully, cautiously and

with a measure of discretion, it was submitted. But if any

claimant wished to be associated with the conduct of the

suit, he would necessarily have been afforded an opportunity

for that purpose, according to the learned Attorney General.

In this connection, reference was made to Section 4 of the

Act. On the other hand, an individual who did not partici-

pate in the conduct of the suit and who is unaware of the

various intricacies of the case, could hardly be expected to

meaningfully partake in the legal act of settlement either

in conducting the proceedings or entering into compromise,

it was urged. In those circumstances, the learned Attorney

General submitted that the orders of 14-15th February, 1989

and the Memorandum of Settlement were justified both under

the Act and the Constitution. According to him, the terms of

Settlement might be envisaged as pursuant to Section

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3(ii)(b) of the Act, which was filed according to him pursu-

ant to judical direction. He sought more than once to empha-

sise, that the order was passed by the highest Court of the

land in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction vested in it

under the Constitution.

68. Our attention was drawn to several decisions for the

power of this Court under Articles 136 and 142 of the Con-

stitution. Looked closely at the provisions of the Act, it

was contended that taking into consideration all the

factors, namely, possibilities of champerty, exploita-

tion, unconscionable agreements and the need to represent

the dead and the disabled, the course of events would reveal

a methodical and systematic protection and vindication of

rights to the largest possible extent. It was observed that

the rights are indispensably valuable possessions, but the

rights is something which a

665

man can stand on, something which must be demanded or in-

sisted upon without embarrassment or shame. When rights are

curtailed, permissibility of such a measure can be examined

only upon the strength, urgency and the preeminence of

rights and the largest good of the largest number sought to

b,e served by curtailment. Under the circumstances which

were faced by the victims of Bhopal gas tragedy, the justi-

fying basis, according to the learned Attorney General, or

ground of human rights is that every person morally ought to

have something to which he or she is entitled. It was empha-

sised that the Statute aimed at it. The Act provides for

assumption of rights to sue with the aim of securing speedy,

effective and equitable results to the best advantage of the

claimants. The Act and the scheme, according to the learned

Attorney General, sought to translate that profession into a

system of faith and possible association when in doubt.

Unless such a profession is shown to be unconscionable under

the circumstances or strikes judicial conscience as a sub-

version of the objects of the Act, a declaredly fair, just

and equitable exercise of a valid power would not be open to

challenge. He disputed the submission that the right to

represent victims postulated as contended mainly by the

counsel on behalf of the petitioners, a pre-determination of

each individual claim as a sine qua non for proceeding with

the action. Such a construction would deplete the case of

its vigour, urgency and sense of purpose, he urged. In this

case, with the first of the cases having been filed in U.S.

Federal Court on December 7, 1984 a settlement would have

been reached for a much smaller sum to the detriment of the

victims. Learned Attorney General emphasised that this

background has to be kept in mind while adjudging the valid-

ity of the Act and the appropriateness of the conduct of the

suit in the settlement entered into.

69. He submitted that it has to be borne in mind that if

the contentions of the petitioners are entertained, the

rights theoretically might be upheld but the ends of justice

would stand sacrificed. It is in those circumstances that it

was emphasised that the claimant is an individual and is the

best person to speak about his injury. The knowledge in

relation to his injury is relevant for the purpose of com-

pensation, whose distribution and disbursement is the sec-

ondary stage. It is fallacious to suggest that the plaint

was not based upon necessary data. He insisted that the

figures mentioned in the plaint although tentative were not

mentioned without examination or analysis.

70. It was further submitted by the learned Attorney General

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that while the Govt. of India had proceeded against the UCC,

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it had to represent the victims as a class and it was not

possible to define each individual's right after careful

scrutiny, nor was it necessary or possible to do so in a

mass disaster case. The settlement was a substitute for

adjudication since it involved a process of reparation and

relief. The relief and reparation cannot be said to be

irrelevant for the purpose of the Act. It was stated that

the alleged liability of the Govt. of India or any claim

asserted against the alleged joint tort-feasor should not be

allowed to be a constraint on the Govt. of India to protect

the interests of its own citizens. Any counter-claim by UCC

or any claim by a citizen against the Govt. cannot vitiate

the action of the State in the collective interest of the

victims, who are the citizens. Learned Attorney General

submitted that any industrial activity, normally, has to be

licensed. The mere regulation of any activity does not carry

with it legally a presumption of liability for injury caused

by the activity in the event of a mishap occurring in the

course of such an activity. In any event, the learned Attor-

ney General submitted the Govt. of India enjoys sovereign

immunity in accordance with settled law. If this were not

the case, the Sovereign will have to abandon all regulatory

functions including the licensing of drivers of automobiles.

Hence, we have to examine the question whether even on the

assumption that there was negligence on the part of the

Govt. of India in permitting/licensing of the industry set

up by the Union Carbide in Bhopal or permitting the factory

to grow up, such permission or conduct of the Union of India

was responsible for the damage which has been suffered as a

result of Bhopal gas leakage. It is further to be examined

whether such conduct was in discharge of the sovereign

functions of the Govt., and as such damages, if any, result-

ing therefrom are liable to be proceeded against the Govt.

as a joint tort-feasor or not. In those circumstances, it

was further asserted on behalf of the Union of India that

though calculation of damages in a precise manner is a

logical consequence of a suit in progress it cannot be said

to be a condition precedent for the purpose of settling the

matter. Learned Attorney General urged that the accountabil-

ity to the victims should be through the court. He urged

that the allegation that a large number of victims did not

give consent to the settlement entered into, is really of no

relevance in the matter of a compromise in a mass tort

action. It was highlighted that it is possible that those

who do not need urgent relief or are uninformed of the

issues in the case, may choose to deny consent and may place

the flow of relief in jeopardy. Thus, consent based upon

individual subjective opinion can never be correlated to the

proposal of an overall settlement in an urgent matter.

Learned Attorney General urged further that if indeed con-

sent were to be insisted upon as a mandatory

667

requirement of a Statute, it would not necessarily lead to

an accurate reflection of the victims' opinion as opinions

may be diverse. No individual would be in a position to

relate himself to a lump sum figure and would not be able to

define his expectations on a global criteria. In such cir-

cumstances the value of consent is very much diminished. It

was urged that if at all consent was to be insisted it

should not be an expression of the mind without supporting

information and response. To make consent meaningful it is

necessary that it must be assertion of a fight to be exer-

cised in a meaningful manner based on information and com-

prehension of collective welfare and individual good. In a

matter of such dimensions the insistence upon consent will

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lead to a process of enquiry which might make effective

consideration of any proposal impossible. For the purpose of

affording consent, it would also be necessary that each

individual not only assesses the damages to himself objec-

tively and places his opinion in the realm of fair expecta-

tion, but would also have to do so in respect of others. The

learned Attorney General advanced various reasons why it is

difficult now or impossible to have the concurrence of all.

71. In answer to the criticism by the petitioners, it

was explained on behalf of the Union of India that UCIL was

not impleaded as a party in the suit because it would have

militated against the plea of multinational enterprise

liability and the entire theory of the case in the plaint.

It was highlighted that the power to represent under the Act

was exclusive, the power to compromise for the Govt. of

India is without reference to the victims, yet it is a power

guided by the sole object of the welfare of the victims. The

presence and ultimately the careful imprimatur of the judi-

cial process is the best safeguard to the victims. Learned

Attorney General insisted that hearing the parties after the

settlement would also not serve any purpose. He urged that

it can never be ascertained with certainty whether the

victims or groups have authorised what was being allegedly

spoken on their behalf; and that the victims would be unable

to judge a proposal of this nature. A method of consensus

need not be evolved like in America where every settlement

made by contingency fee lawyers who are anxious to obtain

their share automatically become adversaries of the victims

and the court should therefore be satisfied. Here the Court

arrived at the figure and directed the parties to file a

settlement on the basis of its order of February 14, 1985

and the interveners were heard, it was urged. It was also

urged that notice to the victims individually would have

been a difficult exercise and analysis of their response

time consuming.

668

72. The learned Attorney General urged that neither the

Central Govt. nor the State Govt. of Madhya Pradesh is

liable for the claim of the victims. He asserted that, on

the facts of the present case, there is and can be no li-

ability on their part as joint tort-feasors. For the welfare

of the community several socio-economic activities will have

to be permitted by the Govt. Many of these activities may

have to be regulated by licensing provisions contained in

Statutes made either by Parliament or by State Legislatures.

Any injury caused to a person, to his life or liberty in the

conduct of a licensed authority so as to make the said

licensing authority or the Govt. liable to damages would not

be in conformity with jurisprudential principle. If in such

circumstances it was urged on behalf of the Govt., the

public exchequer is made liable, it will cause great public

injury and may result in drainage of the treasury. It would

terrorise the welfare state from acting for development of

the people, and will affect the sovereign governmental

activities which are beneficial to the community not being

adequately licensed and would thereby lead to public injury.

In any event, it was urged on behalf of the Govt., that such

licensing authorities even assuming without admitting could

be held to be liable as joint tort feasors, it could be so

held only on adequate allegations of negligence with full

particulars and details of the alleged act or omission of

the licensing authority alleged and its direct nexus to the

injury caused to the victims. It had to be proved by cogent

and adequate evidence. On some conjecture or surmise without

any foundation on facts, Govt's right to represent the

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victims cannot be challenged. It was asserted that even if

the Govt. is considered to be liable as a joint tort feasor,

it will be entitled to claim sovereign immunity on the law

as it now stands.

73. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in

Kasturilal Kalia Ram Jain v. The State of U.P., [1965] 1 SCR

375 where the conduct of some police officers in seizing

gold in exercise of their statutory powers was held to be in

discharge of the sovereign functions of the State and such

activities enjoyed sovereign immunities. The liability of

the Govt. of India under the Constitution has to be referred

to Article 300, which takes us to Sections 15 & 18 of the

Indian Independence Act, 1947, and Section 176(1) of the

Govt. of India Act, 1935. Reference was also made to the

observations of this Court in The State of Rajasthan v. Mst.

Vidhyawati, & Anr., [1962] 2 Supp. SCR 989.

74. We have noted the shareholding of UCC. The circum-

stances that financial institutions held shares in the UCIL

would not disqualify

669

the Govt. of India from acting as patens patriae and in

discharging of its statutory duties under the Act. The suit

was filed only against the UCC and not against UCIL. On the

basis of the claim made by the Govt. of India, UCIL was not

a necessary party. It was suing only the multinational based

on several legal grounds of liability of the UCC, inter

alia. on the basis of enterprise liability. If the Govt. of

India had instituted a suit against UCIL to a certain extent

it would have weakened its case against UCC in view of the

judgment of this Court in M.C. Mehta's case (supra). Accord-

ing to learned Attorney General, the Union of India in the

present case was not proceeding on the basis of lesser

liability of UCC predicated in Mehta's case but on a differ-

ent jurisprudential principle to make UCC strictly and

absolutely liable for the entire damages.

75. The learned Attorney General submitted that even

assuming for the purpose of argument without conceding that

any objection can be raised for the Govt. of India repre-

senting the victims, to the present situation the doctrine

of necessity applied. The UCC had to be sued before the

American courts. The tragedy was treated as a national

calamity, and the Govt. of India had the right, and indeed

the duty, to take care of its citizens, in the exercise of

its parens patriae jurisdiction or on principle analogous

thereto. After having statutorily armed itself in recogni-

tion of such parens patraie right or on principles analogous

thereto, it went to the American courts. No other person was

properly designed for representing the victims as a foreign

court had to recognise a right of representation. The Govt.

of India was permitted to represent the victims before the

American courts. Private plaintiffs were also represented by

their attorneys. A Committee of three attorneys was formed

before the case proceeded before Judge Keenan. It was high-

lighted that the order of Judge Keenan permitted the Govt.

of India to represent the victims. If there was any remote

conflict of interests between the Union of India and the

victims from the theoretical point of view the doctrine of

necessity would override the possible violation of the

principles of natural justice--that no man should be Judge

in his own case. Reference may be made to Halsbury's Laws of

England, Vol. 1, 4th Edn., page 89, para 73, where it was

pointed that that if all the members of the only tribunal

competent to determine a matter are subject to disqualifica-

tion, they may be authorised and obliged to hear that matter

by virtue of the operation of the common law doctrine of

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necessity. Reference was also made to De Smith's Judicial

Review of Administrative Action (4th Edn. pages 276-277. See

also G.A. Flick--Natural Justice, [1879] pages 138-141.

Reference was also made to the observations of this Court in

J. Mohapatra & Co.

670

& Anr. v. State of Orissa & Anr., [1984] 4 SCC 103, where at

page 112 of the report, the Court recognised 'the principle

of necessity. It was submitted that these were situations

where on the principle of doctrine of necessity a person

interested was held not disqualified to adjudicate on his

rights. The present is a case where the Govt. of India only

represented the victims as a party and did not adjudicate

between the victims and the UCC. It is the Court which would

adjudicate the rights of the victims. The representation of

the victims by the Govt. of India cannot be held to be bad,

and there is and there was no scope of violation of any

principle of natural justice. We are of the opinion in the

facts and the circumstances of the case that this contention

urged by Union of India is right. There was no scope of

violation of the principle of natural justice on this score.

76. It was also urged that the doctrine of de facto

representation will also apply to the facts and the circum-

stances of the present case. Reliance was placed on the

decision of this Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju etc. v. State

of A.P., [1981] 3 SCR 474, where it was held that the doc-

trine of de facto representation envisages that acts per-

formed within the scope of assumed official authority in the

interest of public or third persons and not for one's own

benefit, are generally to be treated as binding as if they

were the acts of officers de jure. This doctrine is rounded

on good sense, sound policy and practical expediency. It is

aimed at the prevention of public and private mischief and

protection of public and private interest. It avoides end-

less confusion and needless chaos. Reference was made to the

observations of this Court in Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M.L.

Wadhawan, [1987] 3 SCC 367 at 389-390 and M/s. Beopar Shayak

(P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Vishwa Nath & Ors., [1987] 3 SCC 693 at

702 & 703. Apart from the aforesaid doctrine, doctrine of

bona fide representation was sought to be resorted to in the

circumstances. In this connection, reference was made to

Dharampal Sing, v. Director of Small Industries Services &

Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1888; N.K. Mohammad Sulaiman v. N.C.

Mohammad Ismail & Ors., [1966] 1 SCR 937 and Malkarjun Bin

Shigramappa Pasara v. Narhari Bin Shivappa & Anr., 27 IA 2

16.

77. It was further submitted that the initiation of

criminal proceedings and then quashing thereof, would not

make the Act ultra vires so far as it concerned. Learned

Attorney General submitted that the Act only authorised the

Govt. of India to represent the victims to enforce their

claims for damages under the Act. The Govt. as such had

nothing to do with the quashing of the criminal proceedings

and it was not representing the victims in respect of the

criminal liability of

671

the UCC or UCIL to the victims. He further submitted that

quashing of criminal proceedings was done by the Court in

exercise of plenary powers under Articles 136 and 142 of the

Constitution. In this connection, reference was made to

State of U.P. v. Poosu & Anr., [1976] 3 SCR 1005; K.M.

Nanavati v. The State of Bombay, [1961] 1 SCR 497. According

to the learned Attorney General, there is also power in the

Supreme Court to suggest a settlement and give relief as in

Ram Gopal v. Smt. Sarubai & Ors., [1981] 4 SCC 505; India

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Mica & Micanite Industries Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors.,

[1982] 3 SCC 182.

78. Learned Attorney General urged that the Supreme

Court is empowered to act even outside a Statute and give

relief in addition to what is contemplated by the latter in

exercise of its plenary power. This Court acts not only as a

Court of Appeal but is also a Court of Equity. See Roshanlal

Kuthiala & Ors. v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi, [1975] 2 SCR 49

1. During the course of heating of the petitions, he in-

formed this Court that the Govt. of India and the State

Govt. of Madhya Pradesh refuted and denied any liability,

partial or total, of any sort in the Bhopal gas Leak disas-

ter, and this position is supported by the present state of

law. It was, however, submitted that any claim against the

Govt. of India for its alleged tortious liability was out-

side the purview of the Act and such claims, if any, are not

extinguished by reason of the orders dated 14th & 15th

February, 1989 of this Court.

79. Learned Attorney General further stated that the

amount of $ 470 million which was secured as a result of the

memorandum of settlement and the said orders of this Court

would be meant exclusively for the benefit of the victims

who have suffered on account of the Bhopal gas leak disas-

ter. The Govt. of India would not seek any reimbursement on

account of the expenditure incurred suo motu for relief and

rehabilitation of the Bhopal victims nor will the Govt. or

its instrumentality make any claim on its own arising from

this disaster. He further assured this Court that in the

event of disbursement of compensation being initiated either

under the Act or under the orders of this Court, a notifica-

tion would be instantaneously issued under Section 5(3) of

the Act authorising the Commissioner or any other officers

to discharge functions and exercise all or any powers which

the Central Govt. may exercise under Section 5 to enable the

victims to place before the Commissioner or the Dy. Commis-

sioner any additional evidence that they would like to be

considered.

80. The Constitution Bench of this Court presided over

by the learned Chief Justice has pronounced an order on 4th

May, 1989 giving

672

reasons for the orders passed on 14th-- 15th February, 1989.

Inasmuch as good deal of criticism was advanced before this

Court during the hearing of the arguments on behalf of the

petitioners about the propriety and validity of the settle-

ment dated 14th-15th February, 1989 even though the same was

not directly in issue before us, it is necessary to refer

briefly to what the Constitution Bench has stated in the

said order dated 4th May, 1989. After referring to the facts

leading to the settlement, the Court has set out the brief

reason on the following points:

(a) How did the Court arrive at the sum of 470

million US dollars for an overall settlement?

(b) Why did the Court consider the sum-of 470

millions US dollars as 'just, equitable and

reasonable'? (c) Why did the Court not pro-

nounce on certain important legal questions of

far-reaching importance said to arise in the

appeals as to the principles of liability of

monolithic, economically entrenched multina-

tional companies operating with inherently

dangerous technologies in the developing

countries of the third world? These questions

were said to be of great contemporary rele-

vance to the democracies of the third world.

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This Court recognised that there was another

aspect of the review pertaining to the part of

the settlement which terminated the criminal

proceedings. The questions raised on the point

in the review-petitions, the Court was of the

view, prima facie merit consideration and

therefore, abstained from saying anything

which might tend to prejudge this issue one

way or the other.

81. The basic consideration, the Court recorded, moti-

vating the conclusion of the settlement was the compelling

need for urgent relief, and the Court set out the law's

delays duly considering that there was a compelling duty

both judicial and humane, to secure immediate relief to the

victims. In doing so, the Court did not enter upon any

forbidden ground, the court stated. The Court noted that

indeed efforts had already been made in this direction by

Judge Keenan and the learned District Judge of Bhopal. Even

at the opening of the arguments in the appeals, the Court

had suggested to learned counsel to reach a just and fair

settlement. And when counsel met for re-scheduling of the

hearings the suggestion was reiterated. The Court recorded

that the response of learned counsel was positive in at-

tempting a settlement but they expressed a certain degree of

uneasiness and skepticism at the prospects of success in

view of their past experience of such negotiations when, as

they stated, there had been uninformed and even irresponsi-

ble criticism of the attempts at settlement.

673

82. Learned Attorney General had made available to the

Court the particulars of offers and counter-offers made on

previous occasions and the history of settlement. In those

circumstances, the Court examined the prima facie material

as the basis of quantification of a sum which, having regard

to all the circumstances including the prospect of delays

inherent in the judicial process in India and thereafter in

the matter of domestication of the decree in the U.S. for

the purpose of execution and directed that 470 million US

dollars, which upon immediate payment with interest over a

reasonable period, pending actual distribution amongst the

claimants, would aggregate to nearly 500 million US dollars

or its rupee equivalent of approximately Rs.750 crores which

the learned Attorney General had suggested, be made the

basis of settlement, and both the parties accepted this

direction.

83. The Court reiterated that the settlement proposals

were considered on the premise that the Govt. had the exclu-

sive statutory authority to represent and act on behalf of

the victims and neither counsel had any reservation on this.

The order was also made on the premise that the Act was a

valid law. The Court declared that in the event the Act is

declared void in the pending proceedings challenging its

validity, the order dated 14th February, 1989 would require

to be examined in the light of that decision. The Court also

reiterated that if any material was placed before it from

which a reasonable inference was possible that the UCC had,

at any time earlier, offered to pay any sum higher than an

outright down payment of US 470 million dollars, this Court

would straightaway initiate suo motu action requiring the

concerned parties to show cause why the order dated 14th

February'89 should not be set aside and the parties relegat-

ed to their original positions. The Court reiterated that

the reasonableness of the sum was based not only on inde-

pendent quantification but the idea of reasonableness for

the present purpose was necessarily a broad and general

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estimate in the context of a settlement of the dispute and

not on the basis of an accurate assessment by adjudication.

The Court stated that the question was, how good or reasona-

ble it was as a settlement, which would avoid delay, uncer-

tainties and assure immediate payment. An estimate in the

very nature of things, would not have the accuracy of an

adjudication. The Court recorded the offers, counter-offers,

reasons and the numbers of the persons treated and the

claims already made. The Court found that from the order of

the High Court and the admitted position on the plaintiff's

side, a reasonable prima facie estimate of the number of

fatal cases and serious personal injury cases, was possible

to be made. The Court referred to the High Court's

674

assessment and procedure to examine the task of assessing

the quantum of interim compensation. The Court referred to

M. C Mehta's case reiterated by the High Court, bearing in

mind the factors that if the suit proceeded to trial the

plaintiff-Union of India would obtain judgment in respect of

the claims relating to deaths and personal injuries in the

following manner:-

(a) Rs.2 lakhs in each case of death; (b) Rs.2 lakh in each

case of total permanent disability; (c) Rs. 1 lakh in each

case of permanent partial disablement; and (d) Rs.50,000 in

each case of temporary partial disablement.

84. Half of these amounts were awarded as interim com-

pensation by the High Court.

85. The figures adopted by the High Court in regard to

the number of fatal cases and cases of serious personal

injuries did not appear to have been disputed by anybody

before the High Court, this Court observed. From those

figures, it came to the conclusion that the total number of

fatal cases was about 3,000 and of grievous and serious

personal injuries, as verifiable from the records was

30,000. This Court also took into consideration that about 8

months after the occurrence a survey had been conducted for

the purpose of identification of cases. These figures indi-

cated less than 10,000. In those circumstances, as a rough

and ready estimate, this Court took into consideration the

prima facie findings of the High Court and estimated the

number of fatal cases of 3,000 where compensation could

range from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs.3 lakhs. This would account for

Rs.70 crores, nearly 3 times higher than what would have

otherwise been awarded in comparable cases in motor vehicles

accident claims.

86. The Court recognised the effect of death and reiter-

ated that loss of precious human lives is irreparable. The

law can only hope to compensate the estate of a person whose

life was lost by the wrongful act of another only in the way

the law was equipped to compensate i.e. by monetary compen-

sation calculated on certain well-recognised principles.

"Loss to the estate" which is the entitlement of the estate

and the 'loss of dependency' estimated on the basis of

capitalised present value awardable to the heirs and depend-

ants, this Court considered, were the main components in the

computation of compensation in fatal accident actions, but

the High Court adopted a higher basis. The Court also took

into account the personal injury cases, and stated that

these apportionments were merely broad considerations gener-

ally guiding the idea of reasonableness of the overall basis

of

675

settlement, and reiterated that this exercise was not a

pre-determination of the quantum of compensation amongst the

claimants either individually or catagory-wise, and that the

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determination of the actual quantum of compensation payable

to the claimants has to be done by the authorities under the

Act. These were the broad assessments and on that basis the

Court made the assessment. The Court believed that this was

a just and reasonable assessment based on the materials

available at that time. So far as the other question, name-

ly, the vital juristic principles of great contemporary

relevance to the Third World generally, and to India in

particular, touching problems emerging from the pursuit of

such dangerous technologies for economic gains by multi-

nationals in this case, the Court recognised that these were

great problems and reiterated that there was need to evolve

a national policy to protect national interests from such

ultra-hazardous pursuits of economic gain; and that Jurists,

technologists and other experts in economics. environmen-

tology, futurology, sociology and public health should

identify the areas of common concern and help in evolving

proper criteria which might receive judicial recognition and

legal sanction. The Court reiterated that some of these

problems were referred to in M.C. Mehta's case (supra). But

in the present case, the compulsions of the need for immedi-

ate relief to tens of thousands of suffering victims could

not wait till these questions vital though these be, were

resolved in due course of judicial proceedings; and the

tremendous suffering of thousands of persons compelled this

Court to move into the direction of immediate relief which,

this Court thought, should not be subordinated to the uncer-

tain promises of the law, and when the assessment of fair-

ness of the amount was based on certain factors and assump-

tions not disputed even by the plaintiffs.

87. Before considering the question of constitutional

validity of the Act, in the light of the background of the

facts and circumstances of this case and submissions made,

it is necessary to refer to the order dated 3rd March, 1989

passed by the Constitution Bench in respect of writ peti-

tions Nos. 164/86 and 268/89, consisting of 5 learned Judges

presided over by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India. The

order stated that these matters would be listed on 8th

March, 1989 before a Constitution Bench for decision "on the

sole question whether the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Process-

ing of Claims) Act, 1985 is ultra vires". This is a judicial

order passed by the said Constitution Bench. This is not an

administrative order. Thus, these matters are before this

Court. The question, therefore, arises; what are these

matters? The aforesaid order specifically states that these

matters were placed before this Bench on the "sole question"

whether the Act is ulta vires.

676

Hence, these matters are not before this Bench for disposal

of these writ petitions. If as a result of the determina-

tion, one way or the other, it is held, good and bad, and

that some relief becomes necessary, the same cannot be given

or an order cannot be passed in respect thereof, except

declaring the Act or any portion of the Act, valid or in-

valid constitutionally as the decision might be.

88. In writ petition No. 268/89 there is consequential

prayer to set aside the order dated 14/15th February, 1989.

But since the order dated 3rd March, 1989 above only sug-

gests that these matters have been placed before this Bench

'on the sole question' whether the Bhopal Act is ultra vires

or not, it is not possible by virtue of that order to go

into the question whether the settlement is valid or liable

to be set aside as prayed for in the prayers in these appli-

cations.

89. The provisions of the Act have been noted and the

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rival contentions of the parties have been set out before.

It is, however, necessary to reiterate that the Act does not

in any way circumscribe the liability of the UCC, UCIL or

even the Govt. of India or Govt. of Madhya Pradesh if they

are jointly or severally liable. This follows from the

construction of the Act, from the language that is apparent.

The context and background do not indicate to the contrary.

Counsel for the victims plead that that is so. The learned

Attorney General accepts that position. The liability of the

Government is, however, disputed. This Act also does not

deal with any question of criminal liability of any of the

parties concerned. On an appropriate reading of the relevant

provisions of the Act, it is apparent that the criminal

liability arising out of Bhopal gas leak disaster is not the

subject-matter of this Act and cannot be said to have been

in any way affected, abridged or modified by virtue of this

Act. This was the contention of learned counsel on behalf of

the victims. It is also the contention of the learned Attor-

ney General. In our opinion, it is the correct analysis and

consequence of the relevant provisions of the Act. Hence,

the submissions made on behalf of some of the victims that

the Act was bad as it abridged or took away the victims'

right to proceed criminally against the delinquent, be it

UCC or UCIL or jointly or severally the Govt. of India,

Govt. of Madhya Pradesh or Mr. Arjun Singh, the erstwhile

Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, is on a wrong basis. There

is no curtailment of any right with respect to any criminal

liability. Criminal liability is not the subject-matter of

the Act. By the terms of the Act and also on the concessions

made by the learned Attorney General, if that be so, then

can non-prosecution in criminal liability be a consideration

or valid consideration for settlement of claims under the

Act?

677

This is a question which has been suggested and articulated

by learned counsel appearing for the victims. On the other

hand, it has been asserted by the learned Attorney General

that that part of the order dated 14/15th February, 1989

dealing with criminal prosecution or the order of this Court

was by virtue of the inherent power of this Court under

Articles 136 & 142 of the Constitution. These, the learned

Attorney General said, were in the exercise of plenary

powers of this Court. These are not considerations which

induced the parties to enter into settlement. For the pur-

pose of determination of constitutional validity of the Act,

it is however necessary to say that criminal liability of

any of the delinquents or of the parties is not the

subject-matter of this Act and the Act does not deal with

either claims or rights arising out of such criminal liabil-

ity. This aspect is necessary to be reiterated on the ques-

tion of validity of the Act.

90. We have set out the language and the purpose of the

Act, and also noted the meaning of the expression 'claim'

and find that the Act was to secure the claims connected

with or arising out of the disaster so that these claims

might be dealt with speedily, affectively, equitably and to

the best advantage of the claimants. In our opinion, Clause

(b) of Section 2 includes all claims of the victims arising

out of and connected with the disaster for compensation and

damages or loss of life or personal injury or loss to the

business and flora and fauna. What, however, is the extent

of liability, is another question. This Act does not purport

to or even to deal with the extent of liability arising out

of the said gas leak disaster. Hence, it would be improper

or incorrect to contend as did Ms. Jaising, Mr Garg and

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other learned counsel appearing for the victims, that the

Act circumscribed the liability--criminal, punitive or

absolute of the parties in respect of the leakage. The Act

provides for a method or procedure for the establishment and

enforcement of that liability. Good deal of argument was

advanced before this Court on the question that the settle-

ment has abridged the liability and this Court has lost the

chance of laying down the extent of liability arising out of

disaster like the Bhopal Gas Leak disaster. Submissions were

made that we should lay down clearly the extent of liability

arising out of these types of disasters and we should fur-

ther hold that the Act abridged such liability and as such

curtailed the rights of the victims and was bad on that

score. As mentioned hereinbefore, this is an argument under

a misconception. The Act does not in any way except to the

extent indicated in the relevant provisions of the Act

circumscribe or abridge the extent of the rights of the

victims so far as the liability of the delinquents are

concerned. Whatever are the rights of the victims and what-

ever claims arise out of the

678

gas leak disaster for compensation, personal injury, loss of

life and property, suffered or likely to be sustained or

expenses to be incurred or any other loss are covered by the

Act and the Central Govt. by operation of Section 3 of the

Act has been given the exclusive right to represent the

victims in their place and stead. By the Act, the extent of

liability is not in any way abridged and, therefore, if in

case of any industrial disaster like the Bhopal Gas Leak

disaster, there is right in victims to recover damages or

compensation on the basis of absolute liability, then the

same is not in any manner abridged or curtailed.

91. Over 120 years ago Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] Vol.

3 LR E & I Appeal Cases 330 was decided in England. There A,

was the lessee of certain mines. B, was the owner of a mill

standing on land adjoining that under which the mines were

worked. B, desired to construct a reservoir, and employed

competent persons, such as engineers and a contractor, to

construct it. A, had worked his mines up to a spot where

there were certain old passages of disused mines; these

passages were connected with vertical shafts which communi-

cated with the land above, and which had also been out of

use for years, and were apparently filled with marl and the

earth of the surrounding land. No care had been taken by the

engineer or the contractor to block up these crafts, and

shortly after water had been introduced into the reservoir

it broke through some of the shafts, flowed through the old

passage and flooded As mine. It was held by the House of

Lords in England that where the owner of land, without

wilfulness or negligence, uses his land in the ordinary

manner of its use, though mischief should thereby be occa-

sioned to his neighbour, he will not be liable in damages.

But if he brings upon his land any thing which would not

naturally come upon it, and which is in itself dangerous,

and may become mischievous if not kept under proper control,

though in so doing he may act without personal wilfulness or

negligence, he will be liable in' damages for any mischief

thereby occasioned. In the background of the facts it was

held that A was entitled to recover damages from B, in

respect of the injury. The question of liability was high-

lighted by this Court in M.C. Mehta's case (supra) where a

Constitution Bench of this Court had to deal with the rule

of strict liability. This Court held that the rule in Ry-

lands v. Fletcher, (supra) laid down a principle that if a

person who brings on his land and collects and keep there

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anything likely to do harm and such thing escapes and does

damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage

caused. This rule applies only to nonnatural user of the

land and does not apply to things naturally on the land or

where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a

stranger or the default of the person injured or where the

things which escape

679

are present by the consent of the person injured or in

certain cases where there is a statutory authority. There,

this Court observed that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,

(supra) evolved in the 19th century at a time when all the

developments of science and technology had not taken place,

and the same cannot afford any guidance in evolving any

standard of liability consistent with the constitutional

norms and the needs of the present day economy and social

structure. In a modern industrial society with highly de-

veloped scientific knowledge and technology where hazardous

or inherently dangerous industries are necessary to be

carried on as part of the developmental process, Courts

should not feel inhibited by this rule merely because the

new law does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute

liability in case of an enterprise engaged in hazardous and

dangerous activity. This Court noted that law has to grow in

order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and

keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in

the country. Law cannot afford to remain static. This Court

reiterated there that if it is found necessary to construct

a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situa-

tion which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future

on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries

which are concomitant to an industrial economy, the Court

should not hesitate to evolve such principle of liability

merely because it has not been so done in England. According

to this Court, an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous

or inherently dangerous industry which poses potential

threat to the health and safety of the persons working in

the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an

absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure

that no harm results to anyone. The enterprise must be held

to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or

inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be

conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any

harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the

operation of such activity resulting, for instance, in

escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolute-

ly liable to compensate all those who were affected by the

accident as part of the social cost for carrying on such

activity, regardless of whether it is carried on carefully

or not. Such liability is not subject to any of the excep-

tions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of

strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. If

the enterprise is permitted to carry on a hazardous or

dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that

such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing

the cost of any accident arising on account of such activity

as an appropriate item of its overheads. The enterprise

alone has the resources to discover and guard against haz-

ards or dangers and 'to provide warning against potential

hazards.

680

This Court reiterated that the measure of compensation in

these kinds of cases must be correlated to the magnitude and

capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must

have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the

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enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation

payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident

in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous

activity by the enterprise. The determination of actual

damages payable would depend upon various facts and circum-

stances of the particular case.

92. It was urged before us that there was an absolute

and strict liability for an enterprise which was carrying on

dangerous operations with gases in this country. It was

further submitted that there was evidence on record that

sufficient care and attention had not been given to safe-

guard against the dangers of leakage and protection in case

of leakage. Indeed, the criminal prosecution that was

launched against the Chairman of Union Carbide Shri Warren

Anderson and others, as indicated before, charged them along

with the defendants in the suit with delinquency in these

matters and criminal negligence in conducting the toxic gas

operations in Bhopal. As in the instant adjudication, this

Court is not concerned with the determination of the actual

extent of liability, we will proceed on the basis that the

law enunciated by this Court in M.C. Mehta's case (supra) is

the decision upon the basis of which damages will be payable

to the victims in this case. But then the practical question

arises: what is the extent of actual damages payable, and

how would the quantum of damages be computed? Indeed, in

this connection, it may be appropriate to refer to the order

passed by this Court on 3rd May, 1989 giving reasons why the

settlement was arrived at at the figure indicated. This

Court had reiterated that it had proceeded on certain prima

facie undisputed figures of death and substantially compen-

sating personal injury. This Court has referred to the fact

that the High Court had proceeded on the broader principle

in M.C. Mehta's case (supra) and on the basis of the capaci-

ty of the enterprise because the compensation must have

deterrent effect. On that basis the High Court had proceeded

to estimate the damages on the basis of Rs.2 lakhs for each

case of death and of total permanent disability, Rs. 1 lakh

for each case of partial permanent disability and Rs.50,000

for each case or' temporary partial disability. In this

connection, the controversy as to what would have been the

damages if the action had proceeded, is another matter.

Normally, in measuring civil liability, the law has attached

more importance to the principle of compensation than that

of punishment. Penal redress, however, involve both compen-

sation to the person injured and punish-

681

ment as deference. These problems were highlighted by the

House of Lords in England in Rookes v. Barnard, [1964]AC

1129, which indicate the difference between aggravated and

exemplary damages. Salmond on the Law of Torts, 15th Edition

at p. 30 emphasises that the function of damages is compen-

sation rather than punishment, but punishment cannot always

be ignored. There are views which are against exemplary

damages on the ground that these infringe in principle the

object of law of torts, namely, compensation and not punish-

ment and these tend to impose something equivalent to fine

in criminal law without the safeguards provided by the

criminal law. In Rookes v. Barnard (supra), the House of

Lords in England recognised three classes of cases in which

the award of exemplary damages was considered to be justi-

fiable. Awards must not only, it is said, compensate the

parties but also deter the wrong doers and others from

similar conduct in future. The question of awarding exem-

plary or deterrent damages is said to have often confused

civil and criminal functions of law. Though it is considered

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by many that it is a legitimate. encroachment of punishment

in the realm of civil liability, as it operates as a re-

straint on the transgression of law which is for the ulti-

mate benefit of the society. Perhaps, in this case, had the

action proceeded, one would have realised that the fall out

of this gas disaster might have been formulation of a con-

cept of damages, blending both civil and criminal liabili-

ties. There are, however, serious difficulties in evolving

such an actual concept of punitive damages in respect of a

civil action which can be integrated and enforced by the

judicial process. It would have raised serious problems of

pleading, proof and discovery, and interesting and challeng-

ing as the task might have been, it is still very uncertain

how far decision based on such a concept would have been a

decision according to 'due process' of law acceptable by

international standards. There were difficulties in that

attempt. But as the provisions stand these considerations do

not make the Act constitutionally invalid. These are matters

on the validity of settlement. The Act, as such does not

abridges or curtail damages or liability whatever that might

be. So the challenge to the Act on the ground that there has

been curtailment or deprivation of the rights of the victims

which is unreasonable in the situation is unwarranted and

cannot be sustained.

93. Mr. Garg tried to canvass before us the expanding of

horizons of human rights. He contended that the conduct of

the multinational corporations dealing with dangerous gases

for the purpose of development specially in the conditions

prevailing under the Third world countries requires closer

scrutiny and vigilance on the part of emerging nations. He

submitted that unless courts are alert and active

682

in preserving the rights of the individuals and in enforcing

criminal and strict liability and in setting up norms com-

pelling the Govt. to be more vigilant and enforcing the

sovereign will of the people of India to oversee that such

criminal activities which endanger even for the sake of

developmental work, economy and progress of the country, the

health and happiness of the people and damage the future

prospects of health, growth and affect and pollute the

environment, should be curbed and, according to him, these

could only be curbed by insisting through the legal adjudi-

cation, punitive and deterrent punishment in the form of

damages. He also pleaded that norms should be set up indi-

cating how these kinds of dangerous operations are to be

permitted under conditions of vigilance and survillence.

While we appreciate the force of these arguments, and en-

dorse his plea that norms and deterrence should be aspired

for, it is difficult to correlate that aspect with the

present problem in this decision.

94. We do reiterate, as mentioned in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights that people are born free and

the dignity of the persons must be recognised and an effec-

tive remedy by competent tribunal is one of the surest

method of effective remedy. If, therefore, as a result of

this tragedy new consciousness and awareness on the part of

the people of this country to be more vigilant about meas-

ures and the necessity of ensuring more strict vigilance for

permitting the operations of such dangerous and poisonous

gases dawn, then perhaps the tragic experience of Bhopal

would not go in vain.

95. The main question, however, canvassed by all learned

counsel for the victims was that so far as the Act takes

away the right of the victims to fight or establish their

own rights, it is a denial of access to justice, and it was

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contended that such denial is so great a deprivation of both

human dignity and right to equality that it cannot be justi-

fied because it would be affecting right to life, which

again cannot be deprived without a procedure established by

law which is just, fair and reasonable.

96. On this aspect, Shri Shanti Bhushan tried to urge

before us that sections 3 & 4 of the Act. in so far as these

enjoin and empower the Central Govt. to institute or prose-

cute proceedings was only an enabling provision for the

Central Govt. and not depriving or disabling provisions for

the victim. Ms. Jaising sought to urge in addition, that in

order to make the provisions constitutionally valid, we

should eliminate the concept of exclusiveness to the Central

Govt. and give the victims right to sue along with the

Central Govt. We are unable to accept these submissions.

683

97. In our opinion, Sections 3 & 4 are categorical and

clear. When the expression is explicit, the expression is

conclusive, alike in what it says and in what it does not

say. These give to the Central Government an exclusive right

to act in place of the persons who are entitled to make

claim or have already made claim. The expression 'exclusive'

is explicit and significant. The exclusivily cannot be

whittled down or watered down as suggested by counsel. The

said expression must be given its full meaning and extent.

This is corroborated by the use of the expression 'claim'

for all purposes. If such duality of rights are given to the

Central Govt. along with the victims in instituting or

proceeding for the realisation or the enforcement of the

claims arising out of Bhopal gas leak disaster, then that

would be so cumbersome that it would not be speedy, effec-

tive or equitable and would not be the best or more advanta-

geous procedure for securing the claims arising out of the

leakage. In that view of the matter and in view of the

language used and the purpose intended to be achieved, we

are unable to accept this aspect of the arguments advanced

on behalf of the victims. It was then contended that by the

procedure envisaged by the Act, the victims have been de-

prived and denied.their rights and property to fight for

compensation. The victims, it has been asserted, have been

denied access to justice. It is a great deprivation, it was

urged. It was contended that the procedure evolved under the

Act for the victims is peculiar and having good deal of

disadvantages for the victims. Such special disadvantageous

procedure and treatment is unequal treatment, it was sug-

gested. It was, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution, that is the argument advanced.

98. The Act does provide a special procedure in respect

of the rights of the victims and to that extent the Central

Government takes upon itself the rights of the victims. It

is a special Act providing a special procedure for a kind of

special class of victims. In view of the enormity of the

disaster the victims of the Bhopal gas leak disaster, as

they were placed against the multinational and a big Indian

corporation and in view of the presence of foreign contin-

gency lawyers to whom the victims were exposed, the claim-

ants and victims can legitimately be described as a class by

themselves different and distinct, sufficiently separate and

indentifiable to be entitled to special treatment for effec-

tive, speedy, equitable and best advantageous settlement of

their claims. There indubitably is differentiation. But this

differentiation is based on a principle which has rational

nexus with the aim intended to be achieved by this differen-

tiation. The disaster being unique in its character and in

the recorded history of industrial disasters situated as the

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victims were against a mighty multinational with

684

the presence of foreign contingency lawyers. looming on the

scene, in our opinion, there were sufficient grounds for

such differentiation and different treatment. In treating

the victims of the gas leak disaster differently and provid-

ing them a procedure, which was just, fair, reasonable and

which was not unwarranted or unauthorised by the Constitu-

tion, Article 14 is not breached. We are, therefore, unable

to accept this criticism of the. Act.

99. The second aspect canvassed on behalf of the victims

is that the procedure envisaged is unreasonable and as such

not warranted by the situation and cannot be treated as a

procedure which is just, fair and reasonable. The argument

has to be judged by the yardstick, as mentioned hereinbe-

fore, enunciated by this Court in State of Madras v. V.G.

Rao, (supra). Hence, both the restrictions or limitations on

the substantive and procedural rights in the impugned legis-

lation will have to be judged from the point of view of the

particular Statute in question. No abstract rule or standard

of reasonableness can be applied. That question has to be

judged having regard to the nature of the rights alleged to

have been infringed in this case, the extent and urgency of

the evil sought to be remedied, disproportionate imposition,

prevailing conditions at the time, all these facts will have

to be taken into consideration. Having considered the back-

ground, the plight of the impoverished, the urgency of the

victims' need, the presence of the foreign contingency

lawyers, the procedure of settlement in USA in mass action,

the strength for the foreign multinationals, the nature of

injuries and damages, and the limited but significant right

of participation of the victims as contemplated by s.4 of

the Act, the Act cannot be condemned as unreasonable.

100. In this connection, the concept of 'parens patriae'

in jurisprudence may be examined. It was contended by the

learned Attorney General that the State had taken upon

itself this onus to effectively come in as parens patriae,

we have noted the long line of Indian decisions where,

though in different contexts, the concept of State as the

parent of people who are not quite able to or competent to

fight for their rights or assert their rights, have been

utilised. It was contended that the doctrine of parens

patriae cannot be applicable to the victims. How the concept

has been understood in this country as well as in America

has been noted. Legal dictionaries have been referred to as

noted before. It was asserted on behalf of the victims by

learned counsel that the concept of 'parens patriae' can

never be invoked for the purpose of suits in domestic juris-

diction of any country. This can only be applied in respect

of the claims out of the

685

country in foreign jurisdiction. It was further contended

that this concept of 'parens patraie' can only be applied in

case of persons who are under disability and would not be

applicable in respect of those who are able to assert their

own rights. It is true that victims or their representatives

are sui generis and cannot as such due to age, mental capac-

ity or other reason not legally incapable for suing or

pursuing the remedies for the rights yet they are at a

tremendous disadvantage in the broader and comprehensive

sense of the term. These victims cannot be considered to be

any match to the multinational companies or the Govt. with

whom in the conditions that the victims or their representa-

tives were after the disaster physically, mentally, finan-

cially, economically and also because of the position of

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litigation would have to contend. In such a situation of

predicament the victims can legitimately be considered to be

disabled. They were in no position by themselves to look

after their own interests effectively or purposefully. In

that background, they are people who needed the State's

protection and should come within the umbrella of State's

sovereignty to assert, establish and maintain their rights

against the wrong doers in this mass disaster. In that

perspective, it is jurisprudentially possible to apply the

principle of parens patriae doctrine to the victims. But

quite apart from that, it has to be borne in mind that in

this case the State is acting on the basis of the Statute

itself. For the authority of the Central Govt. to sue for

and on behalf of or instead in place of the victims, no

other theory, concept or any jurisprudential principle is

required than the Act itself. The Act empowers and substi-

tutes the Central Govt. It displaces the victims by opera-

tion of Section 3 of the Act and substitutes the Central

Govt. in its place. The victims have been divested of their

rights to sue and such claims and such rights have been

vested in the Central Govt. The victims have been divested

because the victims were disabled. The disablement of the

victims vis-a-vis their adversaries in this matter is a

self-evident factor. If that is the position then, in our

opinion, even if the strict application of the 'parens

patriae' doctrine is not in order, as a concept it is a

guide. The jurisdiction of the State's power cannot be

circumscribed by the limitations of the traditional concept

of parens patriae. Jurisprudentially, it could be utilised

to suit or alter or adapt itself in the changed circum-

stances. In the situation in which the victims were, the

State had to assume the role of a parent protecting the

rights of the victims who must come within the protective

umbrella of the State and the common sovereignty of the

Indian people. As we have noted the Act is an exercise of

the sovereign power of the State. It is an appropriate

evolution of the expression of sovereignty in the situation

that had arisen. We must recognize and accept it as such.

686

101. But this right and obligation of the State has

another aspect. Shri Shanti Bhushan has argued and this

argument has also been adopted by other learned counsel

appearing for the victims that with the assumption by the

State of the jurisdiction and power as a parent to fight for

the victims in the situation there is an imcumbent obliga-

tion on the State, in the words of Judge Keenan, 'as a

matter of fundamental human decency' to maintain the victims

until the claims are established and realised from the

foreign multinationals. The major inarticulate premise

apparent from the Act and the scheme and the spirit of the

Act is that so long as the rights of the victims are prose-

cuted the State must protect and preserve the victims.

Otherwise the object of the Act would be defeated, its

purpose frustrated. Therefore, continuance of the payments

of the interim maintenance for the continued sustenance of

the victims is an obligation arising out of State's assump-

tion of the power and temporary deprivation of the rights of

the victims and divestiture of the rights of the victims to

fight for their own rights. This is the only reasonable

interpretation which is just, fair and proper. Indeed, in

the language of the Act there is support for this interpre-

tation. Section 9 of the Act gives power to the Central

Govt. to frame by notification, a scheme for carrying into

effect the purposes of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 9

provides for the matters for which the scheme may provide.

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Amongst others, clause (d) of Section 9(2) provides for

creation of a fund for meeting expenses in connection with

the administration of the Scheme and of the provisions of

the Act; and clause (e) of Section 9(2) covers the amounts

which the Central Govt. "may after due appropriation made by

Parliament by law in that behalf, credit to the fund re-

ferred to in clause (d) and any other amounts which may be

credited to such fund". Clause (f) of Section 9(2) speaks of

the utilisation, by way of disbursal (including apportion-

ment) or otherwise, of any amounts received in satisfaction

of the claims. These provisions are suggestive but not

explicit. Clause (b) of Section 10 which provides that in

disbursing under the scheme the amount received by way of

compensation or damages in satisfaction of a claim as a

result of the adjudication or settlement of the claim by a

court or other authority, deduction shall be made from such

amount of the sums, if any, paid to the claimant by the

Govt. before the disbursal of such amount. The Scheme framed

is also significant. Clause 10 of the Scheme provides for

the claims and relief funds and includes disbursal of

amounts as relief including interim relief to persons af-

fected by the Bhopal gas leak disaster and Clause 11(1)

stipulates that disbursal of any amounts under the scheme

shall be made by the Deputy Commissioner to each claimant

through credit in a bank or postal saving account, stressing

that the legislative policy underlined

687

the Bhopal Act contemplated payment of interim relief till

such time as the' Central Govt. was able to recover from the

Union Carbide full amount of compensation from which the

interim reliefs already paid were to be deducted from the

amount payable to them for the final disbursal. The Act

should be construed as creating an obligation oh the Central

Govt. to pay interim relief as the Act deprives the victims

of normal and immediate right of obtaining compensation from

the Union Carbide. Had the Act not been enacted, the victims

could have and perhaps would have been entitled not only to

sue the Union Carbide themselves, but also to enter into

settlement or compromise of some sort with them. The provi-

sions of the Act deprived the victims of that legal right

and opportunity, and that deprivation is substantial depri-

vation because upon immediate relief depends often the

survival of these victims. In that background, it is just

and proper that this deprivation is only to be justified if

the Act is read with the obligation of granting interim

relief or maintenance by the Central Government until the

full amount of the dues of the victims is realised from the

Union Carbide after adjudication or settlement and then

deducting therefrom the interim relief paid to the victims.

As submitted by learned Attorney General, it is true that

there is no actual expression used in the Act itself which

expressly postulates or indicates such a duty or obligation

under the Act. Such an obligation is, however, inherent and

must be the basis of properly construing the spirit of the

Act. In our opinion, this is the true basis and will be in

consonance with the spirit of the Act. It must be, to use

the well-known phrase 'the major inarticulate premise' upon

which though not expressly stated, the Act proceeds. It is

on this promise or premise that the State would be justified

in taking upon itself the right and obligation to proceed

and prosecute the claim and deny access to the courts of law

to the victims on their own. If it is only so read, it can

only be held to be constitutionally valid. It has to be

borne in mind that the language of the Act does not militate

against this construction but on the contrary, Sections 9,

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10 and the scheme of the Act suggest that the Act contains

such an obligation. If it is so read, then only meat can be

put into the skeleton of the Act making it meaningful and

purposeful. The Act must, therefore, be so read. This ap-

proach to the interpretation of the Act can legitimately be

called the 'constructive intuition' which, in our opinion,

is a permissible mode of viewing the Acts of Parliament. The

freedom to search for 'the spirit of the Act' or the quanti-

ty of the mischief at which it is aimed (both synonymous for

the intention of the parliament) opens up the possibility of

liberal interpretation "that delicate and important branch

of judicial power, the concession of which is dangerous, the

denial ruinous". Given this freedom it is a rare

688

opportunity though never to be misused and challenge for the

Judges to adopt and give meaning to the Act, articulate and

inarticulate, and thus translate the intention of the Par-

liament and fulfil the object of the Act. After all, the Act

was passed to give relief to the victims who, it was

thought, were unable to establish their own rights and fight

for themselves. it is common knowledge that the victims were

poor and impoverished. How could they survive the long

ordeal of litigation and ultimate execution of the decree or

the orders unless provisions be made for their sustenance

and maintenance, especially when they have been deprived of

the fight to fight for these claims themselves? We, there-

fore, read the Act accordingly.

102. It was, then, contended that the Central Govt. was

not competent to represent the victims. This argument has

been canvassed on various grounds. It has been urged that

the Central Govt. owns 22% share in UCIL and as such there

is a conflict of interest between the Central Govt. and the

victims, and on that ground the former is disentitled to

represent the latter in their battle against UCC and UCIL. A

large number of authorities on this aspect were cited.

However, it is not necessary in the view we have taken to

deal with these because factually the Central Govt. does not

own any share in UCIL. These are the statutory independent

organisations, namely, Unit Trust of India and Life Insur-

ance Corporation, who own 20 to 22% share in UCIL. The Govt.

has certain amount of say and control in LIC and UTI. Hence,

it cannot be said, in our opinion, that there is any con-

flict of interest in the real sense of the matter in respect

of the claims of Bhopal gas leak disaster between the Cen-

tral Govt. and the victims. Secondly, in a situation of this

nature, the Central Govt. is the only authority which can

pursue and effectively represent the victims. There is no

other organisation or Unit which can effectively represent

the victims. Perhaps, theoretically, it might have been

possible to constitute another independent statutory body by

the Govt. under its control and supervision in whom the

claim of the victims might have been vested and substituted

and that Body could have been entrusted with the task of

agitating or establishing the same claims in the same manner

as the Central Govt. has done under the Act. But the fact

that that has not been done, in our opinion, does not in any

way affect the position. Apart from that, lastly, in our

opinion, this concept that where there is a conflict of

interest, the person having the conflict should not be

entrusted with the task of this nature, does not apply in

the instant situation. In the instant case, no question of

violation of the principle of natural justice arises, and

there is no scope for the application of the principle that

no man should be a Judge in his own cause. The Central

689

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Govt. was not judging any claim, but was fighting and ad-

vancing the claims-of the victims. In those circumstances,

it cannot be said that there was any violation of the prin-

ciples of natural justice and such entrustment to the Cen-

tral Govt. of the right to ventilate for the victims was

improper or bad. The adjudication would be done by the

courts, and therefore there is no scope of the violation of

any principle of natural justice.

103. Along with this submission, the argument was that

the power and the right given to the Central Govt. to fight

for the claims of the victims, is unguided and uncanalised.

This submission cannot be accepted. Learned Attorney General

is right that the power conferred on the Central Govt. is

not uncanalised. The power is circumscribed by the purpose

of the Act. If there is any improper exercise or transgres-

sion of the power then the exercise of that power can be

called in question and set aside, but the Act cannot be said

to be violative of the rights of the victims on that score.

We have noted the relevant authorities on the question that

how power should be exercised is different and separate from

the question whether the power is valid or not. The next

argument on behalf of the victims was that there was con-

flict of interest between the victims and the Govt. viewed

from another aspect of the matter. It has been urged that

the Central Govt. as well as the Govt. of Madhya Pradesh

along with the erstwhile Chief Minister of the State of

Madhya Pradesh Shri Arjun Singh were guilty of negligence,

malfeasance and non-feasance, and as such were liable for

damages along with Union Carbide and UCIL. In other words,

it has been said that the Govt. of India and the Govt. of

Madhya Pradesh along with Mr. Arjun Singh are joint tort-

feasors and joint wrong doers. Therefore. it was urged that

there is conflict of interest in respect of the claims

arising out of the the gas leak disaster between the Govt.

of India and the victims and in such a conflict, it is

improper, rather illegal and unjust to vest in the Govt. of

India the rights and claims of the victims. As noted before,

the Act was passed in a particular background and, in our

opinion, if read in that background, only covers claims

against Union Carbide or UCIL. "Bhopal gas leak disaster" or

"disaster" has been defined in clause (a) of Section (2) as

the occurrence on the 2nd and 3rd days of December, 1984

which involved the release of highly noxious and abnormally

dangerous gas from a plant in Bhopal (being a plant of the

UCIL, a subsidiary of the UCC of U.S.A.) and which resulted

in loss of life and damage to property on an extensive

scale.

690

104. In this context, the Act has to be understood that

it is in respect of the person responsible, being the person

in-charge-of the UCIL and the parent company UCC. This

interpretation of the Act is further strengthened by the

fact that a "claimant" has been defined in clause (c) of

Section 2 as a person who is entitled to make a claim and

the expression "person" in Section 2(e) includes the Govt.

Therefore, the Act proceeded on the assumption that the

Govt. could be a claimant being a person as such. Further-

more, this construction and the perspective of the Act is

strengthened if a reference is made to the debate both in

the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha to which references have been

made.

105. The question whether there is scope for the Union

of India being responsible or liable as a joint tort feasor

is a difficult and different question. But even assuming

that it was possible that the Central Government might be

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liable in a case of this nature, the learned Attorney Gener-

al was right in contending that it was only proper that the

Central Government should be able and authorised to repre-

sent the victims. In such a situation, there will be no

scope of the violation of the principles of natural justice.

The doctrine of necessity would be applicable in a situation

of this nature. The doctrine has been elaborated, in Hals-

bury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, p, 89, paragraph 73,

where it was reiterated that even if all the members of the

Tribunal competent to determine a matter were subject to

disqualification, they might be authorised and obliged to

hear that matter, by virtue of the operation of the common

law doctrine of necessity,, An adjudicator who is subject to

disqualification on the ground of bias or interest in the

matter which he has to decide may in certain circumstances

be required to adjudicate if there is no other person who is

competent or authorised to be adjudicator or if a quorum

cannot be formed without him or if no other competent tribu-

nal can be constituted. In the circumstances of the case, as

mentioned hereinbefore, the Government of India is only

capable to represent the victims as a party. The adjudica-

tion, however, of the claims would be done by the Court. In

those circumstances, we are unable to accept the challenge

on the ground of the violation of principles of natural

justice on this score. The learned Attorney General, howev-

er, sought to advance, as we have indicated before, his

contention on the ground of de facto validity. He referred

to certain decisions. We are of the opinion that this prin-

ciple will not be applicable. We are also not impressed by

the plea of the doctrine of bona fide representation of the

interests of victims in all these proceedings. We are of the

opinion that the doctrine of bonafide representation would

not be quite relevant and as

691

such the decisions cited by the learned Attorney General

need not be considered.

106. There is, however, one other aspect of the matter

which requires consideration. The victims can be divested of

their rights i.e. these can be taken away from them provided

those rights of the victims are ensured to be established

and agitated by the Central Govt. following the procedure

which would be just, fair and reasonable. Civil Procedure

Code is the guide which guides civil proceedings in this

country and in other countries procedure akin to Civil

Procedure Code. Hence, these have been recognised and ac-

cepted as being in consonance with the fairness of the

proceedings and in conformity with the principles of natural

justice. Therefore, the procedure envisaged under the Act

has to be judged whether it is so consistent. The Act, as

indicated before. has provided the procedure under sections

3 and 4. Section 11 provides that the provisions of the Act

and of any Scheme flamed thereunder shall have effect not-

withstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in

any enactment other than the Act or any instrument having

effect by virtue of any enactment other than the Act. Hence,

if anything is inconsistent with the Act for the time being,

it will not have force and the Act will override those

provisions to the extent it does. The Act has not specifi-

cally contemplated any procedure to be followed in the

action to be taken pursuant to the powers conferred under

section 3 except to the extent indicated in section 4 of the

Act. Section 5, however, authorises the Central Government

to have the powers of a civil court for the purpose of

discharging the functions pursuant to the authority vested

under sections 3 and 4 of the Act. There is no question of

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Central Government acting as a court in respect of the

claims which it should enforce for or on behalf or instead

of the victims of the Bhopal gas leak disaster. In this

connection, it is necessary to note that it was submitted

that the Act, so far as it deals with the claims of the

victims, should be read in conformity with Civil Procedure

Code and/or with the principles of natural justice; and

unless the provisions of/the Act are so read it would be

violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution in the

sense that there will be deprivation of rights to/fife and

liberty without following a procedure which is just, fair

and reasonable. That is the main submission and contention

of the different counsel for the victims who have appeared.

The different view points from which this contention has

been canvassed have been noted before. On the other hand, on

behalf of the Government, the learned Attorney General has

canvassed before us that there were sufficient safeguards

consistent with the principles of natural justice within

this Act and beyond what has been provided for

692

in a situation for which the Act was enacted, nothing more

could be provided and further reading down the provisions of

the Act in the manner suggested would defeat the purpose of

the Act. The aforesaid section 3 provides for the substitu-

tion of the Central Government with the' right to represent

and act in place of (whether within or outside India) every

person who has made, or is entitled to make, a claim in

respect of the disaster. The State has taken over the rights

and claims of the victims in the exercise of sovereignty in

order to discharge the constitutional obligations as the

parent and guardian of the victims who in the situation as

placed needed the umbrella of protection. Thus, the State

has the power and jurisdiction and for this purpose unless

the Act is otherwise unreasonable or violative of the con-

stitutional provisions, no question of giving a hearing to

the parties for taking over these fights by the State

arises. For legislation by the Parliament, no principle of

natural justice is attracted provided such legislation is

within the competence of the legislature, which indeed the

present Act is within the competence of the Parliament. We

are in agreement with the submission of the learned Attorney

General that section 3 makes the Central Government the

dominus litis and it has the carriage of the proceedings,

but that does not solve the problem of by what procedure the

proceedings should be carried.

107. The next aspect is that section 4 of the Act,

which, according to the learned Attorney General gives

limited rights to the victims in the sense that it obliges

the Central Government to have due regard to any matters

which such person may require to be urged with respect to

his claim and shall, if such person so desires, permit at

the expense of such person, a legal practitioner of his

choice to be associated in the conduct of any suit or other

proceeding relating to his claim". Therefore, it obliges the

Central Government to have 'due regard' to any matters, and

it was urged on behalf of the victims that this should be

read in order to make the provisions constitutionally valid

as providing that the victims will have a say in the conduct

of the proceedings and as such must have an opportunity of

knowing what is happening either by instructing or giving

Opinions to the Central Government and/or providing for such

directions as to settlement and other matters. In other

words, it was contended on behalf of the victims that the

victims should be given notice of the proceedings and there-

by an opportunity, if they so wanted, to advance their view:

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and that to make the provisions of s. 4 meaningful and

effective unless notice was given to the victim, disabled as

he is, the assumption upon which the Act has been enacted,

could not come and make suggestion in the proceedings. If

the victims are not informed and given no opportunity, the

purpose of s. 4 cannot be attained.

693

108. On the other hand, the learned Attorney General

suggested that s. 4 has been complied with, and contended

that the victims had notice of the proceedings. They had

knowledge of the suit in America, and of the order passed by

Judge Keenan. The private plaintiffs who had gone to America

were represented by foreign contingency lawyers who knew

fully well what they were doing and they had also joined the

said suit along with the Government of India. Learned Attor-

ney General submitted that s. 4 of the Act clearly.enabled

the victims to exercise their right of participation in the

proceedings. According to him, there was exclusion of vic-

tims from the process of adjudication but a limited partici-

pation was provided and beyond that participation no further

participation was warranted and no further notice was just-

fied either by the provisions of the Act as read with the

constitutional requirements or under the general principles

of natural justice. He submitted that the principles of

natural justice cannot be put into strait jacket and their

application would depend upon the particular facts and the

circumstances of a situation. According to the learned

Attorney General, in the instant case, the legislature had

formulated the area where natural justice could be applied,

and upto what area or stage there would be association of

the victims with the suit, beyond that no further applica-

tion of any principle of natural justice was contemplated.

109. The fact that the provisions of the principles of

natural justice have to be complied with, is undisputed.

This is well-settled by the various decisions of the Court.

The Indian Constitution mandates that clearly, otherwise the

Act and the actions would be violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution and would also be destructive of Article

19(1)(g) and negate Article 21 of the Constitution by deny-

ing a procedure which is just, fair and reasonable. See in

this connection, the observations of this Court in Maneka

Gandhi's case (supra) and Olga Tellis's case (supra). Some

of these aspects were noticed in the decision of this Court

in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (supra). That was

a decision which dealt with the question of taking over of

the industries under the Industries (Development and Regula-

tion) Act, 1951. The question that arose was whether it was

necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before

issuing a notification under section 18A(1) of the Act. It

was held by the majority of Judges that in the facts of that

case there had been non-compliance with the implied require-

ment of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at

the pre-decisional stage. The order in that case could be

struck down as invalid on that score but the court found

that in view of the concession a heating would be afforded

to the company, the case was remitted

694

to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective

hearing. It was held that the phrase 'natural justice' is

not capable of static and precise definition. It could not

be imprisoned in the straight-jacket or a cast-iron formula.

Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence, it

was not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such

rules. This Court reiterated that audi ateram partem is a

highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a

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statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is

calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse

of power. The rules of natural justice can operate only in

areas not covered by any law validly made. The general

principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform

application seems to be that where a statute does not in

terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a

post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the

original order on merits then such a statute would be con-

strued as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the

pre-decisional stage. If the statute conferring the power is

silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing

to the person affected the administrative decision after

post-decisional hearing was good.

110. The principles of natural justice have been exam-

ined by this Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsi Ram

Patel & Ors., (supra). It was reiterated, that the princi-

ples of natural justice are not the creation of Article 14

of the Constitution. Art. 14 is not the begetter of the

principles of natural justice but their constitutional

guardian. The principles of natural justice consist, inter

alia, of the requirement that no man should be condemned

unheard. If, however, a legislation or a Statute expressly

or by necessary implication excludes the application of any

particular principle of natural justice then it requires

close Scrutiny of the Court.

111. It has been canvassed on behalf of the victims that

the Code of Civil Procedure is an instant example of what is

a just, fair and reasonable procedure, at least the princi-

ples embodied therein and the Act would be unreasonable if

there is exclusion of the victims to vindicate properly

their views and rights. This exclusion may amount to denial

of justice. In any case, it has been suggested and in our

opinion, there is good deal of force in this contention,

that if a part of the claim, for good reasons or bad, is

sought to be compromised or adjusted without at least con-

sidering the views of the victims that would be unreasonable

deprivation of the rights of the victims. After all, it has

to be borne in mind that injustice consists in the sense in

the minds of the people affected by any act or inaction a

feeling that their grievances. views or claims have gone

'unheeded or not considered. Such a

695

feeling is in itself an injustice or a wrong. The law

must,be so construed and implemented that such a feeling

does not generate among the people for whose benefit the law

is made. Right to a hearing or representation before enter-

ing into a compromise seems to be embodied in the due proc-

ess of law understood in the sense the term has been used in

the constitutional jargon of this country though perhaps not

originally intended. In this connection, reference may be

made to the decision of this Court in Sangram Singh v.

Election Tribunal, Kotah, [1955] 2 SCR 1. The Representation

of the People Act, 1951 contains section 90 and the proce-

dure of Election Tribunals under the Act was governed by the

said provision. Sub-section (2) of section 90 provides that

"Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made

thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the

Tribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the proce-

dure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to

the trial of suits". Justice Bose speaking for the court

said that it is procedure, something designed to facilitate

justice and further its ends, and cannot be considered as a

penal enactment for punishment or penalties; not a thing

designed to trip people up rather then help them. It was

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reiterated that our laws of procedure are grounded on the

principle of natural justice which requires that men should

not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be

reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect

their lives and property should not continue in their ab-

sence and that they should not be precluded from participat-

ing in them. Of course, there may be exceptions and where

they are clearly defined these must be given effect to. But

taking by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws

of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasona-

bly possible, in the light of that principle. At page 9 of

the report, Justice Bose observed as under:

"But that a law of natural justice exists in

the sense that a party must be heard in a

Court of laW, or at any rate be afforded an

opportunity to appear and defend himself,

unless there is express provision to the

contrary, is, we think, beyond dispute. See

the observations of the Privy Council in

Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar, (ILR 40

Mad. 793, 800) and especially in T.M. Barter

v. African Products Ltd., (AIR 1928 PC 261)

where Lord Buckmaster said "no forms or proce-

dure should ever be permitted to exclude the

presentation of a litigant's defence". Also

Hari Vishnu's case which we have just quoted.

In our opinion, Wallace J. was right in Venka-

tasubbiah v.

696

Lakshminarasimham, (AIR 1925 Mad. 1274) in

holding that "One cardinal principle to be

observed in trials by a Court obviously is

that a party has a right to appear and plead

his cause on all occasions when that cause

comes on for hearing", and that "It follows

that a party should not be deprived of that

right and in fact the Court has no option to

refuse that right, unless the Code of Civil

Procedure deprives him of it".

112. All civilised countries accept the right to be

heard as part of the due process of law where questions

affecting their rights, privileges or claims are considered

or adjudicated.

113. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 746

at 765, Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for this Court observed

that the concept that justice must not only be done but must

manifestly be seen to be done, is basic to our system. It

has been reiterated that the principles of natural justice

know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would

have made any difference if natural justice had been ob-

served. The non-observance of natural justice is itself

prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of

proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary and it has

been said that it will come from a person who has denied

justice that the person who has been denied justice, is not

prejudiced. Principles of natural justice must, therefore,

be followed. That is the normal requirement:

114. In view of the principles settled by this Court and

accepted all over the world, we are of the opinion that in

case of this magnitude and nature, when the victims have

been given some say by Section 4 of the Act, in order to

make that opportunity contemplated by section 4 of the Act,

meaningful and effective, it should be so read that the

victims have to be given an opportunity of making their

representation before the court comes to any conclusion in

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respect of any settlement. How that opportunity should be

given, would depend upon the particular situation. Fair

procedure should be followed in a representative mass tort

action. There are instances and some of these were also

placed before us during the hearing of these matters indi-

cating how the courts regulate giving of the notice in

respect of a mass action where large number of people's

views have to be ascertained. Such procedure should be

evolved by the court when faced with such a situation.

115. The Act does not expressly exclude the application of

the

697

Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11 of the Act provides the

overriding effect indicating that anything inconsistent with

the provisions of the Act in other law including the Civil

Procedure Code should be ignored and the Act should prevail.

Our attention was drawn to the provisions of Order 1 Rule

8(4) of the Code. Strictly speaking, Order 1 Rule 8 will not

apply to a suit or a proceeding under the Act. It is not a

case of one having common interest with others. Here the

plaintiff, the Central Govt. has replaced and divested the

victims.

116. Learned Attorney General submitted that as the

provisions of the Code stood before 1976 Amendment, the High

Courts had taken the view that hearing of the parties repre-

sented in the suit, was not necessary, before compromise.

Further reference was made to proviso to Order XXIII Rule 1.

As in this case there is no question, in our opinion, of

abandonment as such of the suit or part of the suit, the

provisions of this Rule would also not strictly apply.

However, Order XXIII Rule 3B of the Code is an important and

significant pointer and the principles behind the said

provision would apply to this case. The said rule 3B pro-

vides that no agreement or compromise in a representative

suit shall be entered into without the leave of the court

expressly recorded in the proceedings; and sub-rule (2) of

rule 3B enjoins that before granting such leave the court

shall give notice in such manner as it may think fit in a

representative action. Representative suit, again, has been

defined under Explanation to the said rule vide clause (d)

as any other suit in which the decree passed may, by virtue

of the provisions of this Code or of any other law for the

time being in force, bind any person who is not named as

party to the suit. In this case, indubitably the victims

would be bound by the settlement though not named in the

suit. This is a position conceded by all. If that is so, it

would be a representative suit in terms of and for the

purpose of Rule 3B of Order XXIII of the Code. If the prin-

ciples of this rule are the principles of natural justice

then we are of the opinion that the principles behind it

would be applicable; and also that section 4 should be so

construed in spite of the difficulties of the process of

notice and other difficulties of making "informed decision

making process cumbersome", as canvassed by the learned

Attorney General.

117. In our opinion, the constitutional requirements,

the language of the Section, the purpose of the Act and the

principles of natural justice lead us to this interpretation

of Section 4 of the Act that in case of a proposed or con-

templated settlement, notice should be given to the victims

who are affected or whose rights are to be affected to

ascertain their views. Section 4 is significant. It enjoins

the Central

698

Govt. only to have "due regard to any matters which such

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person may require to be urged". So, the obligation is on

the Central Govt. in the situation contemplated by Section 4

to have due regard to the views of the victims and that

obligation cannot be discharged by the Central Govt. unless

the victims are told that a settlement is proposed, intended

or contemplated. It is not necessary that such views would

require consent of all the victims. The Central Govt. as the

representative of the victims must have the views of the

victims and place such views before the court in such manner

it considers necessary before a settlement is entered into.

If the victims want to advert to certain aspect of the

matter during the proceedings under the Act and settlement

indeed is an important stage in the proceedings, opportuni-

ties must be given to the victims. Individual notices may

not be necessary. The Court can, and in our opinion, should

in such situation formulate modalities of giving notice and

public notice can also be given inviting views of the vic-

tims by the help of mass media.

118. Our attention was drawn to similar situations in other

lands , where in mass disaster actions of the present type

or mass calamity actions affecting large number of people,

notices have been given in different forms and it may be

possible to invite the views of the victims by announcement

in the media, Press, Radro, and TV etc. intimating the

victims that a certain settlement is proposed or contemplat-

ed and inviting views of the victims within a stipulated

period. And having regard to the views, the Central Govt.

may proceed with the settlement of the action. Consent of

all is not a pre-condition as we read the Act under Section

4. Hence, the difficulties suggested by the learned Attorney

General in having the consent of all and unanimity, do not

really arise and should not deter us from construing the

section as we have.

119. The next aspect of the matter is, whether in the

aforesaid light Section 4 has been complied with. The fact

that there was no

Learned Attorney General, however, sought to canvas the view

that the victims had notice and some of them had participat-

ed in the proceedings. We are, however, unable to accept the

position that the victims had notice of the nature contem-

plated under the Act upon the underling principle of Order

XXIII Rule 3B of the Code. It is not enough to say that the

victims must keep vigil and watch the proceeding. One as-

sumption under which the Act is justified is that the vic-

tims were disabled to defend themselves in an action of this

type. If that is so, then the Court cannot presume that

the victims were a lot, capable

699

and informed to be able to have comprehended or contemplated

the settlement. In the aforesaid view of the matter, in our

opinion, notice was necessary. The victims at large did not

have the notice.

120. The question, however, is that the settlement had

been arrived at after great deal of efforts to give immedi-

ate relief to the victims. We have noticed the order dated

4th May, 1989 passed by this Court indicating the reasons

which impelled the Court to pass the orders on 14/15th

February, 1989 in terms and manner as it did. It has been

urged before us on behalf of some of the victims that jus-

tice has not been done to their views and claims in respect

of the damages suffered by them. It appears to us by reading

the reasons given by this Court on 4th May, 1989 that jus-

tice perhaps has been done but the question is, has justice

appeared to have been done and more precisely, the question

before this Court is: does the Act envisage a procedure or

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contemplate a procedure which ensures not only that justice

is done but justice appears to have been done. If the proce-

dure does not ensure that justice appears to have been done,

is it valid? Therefore, in our opinion, in the background of

this question we must hold that Section 4 means and entails

that before entering into any settlement affecting the

rights and claims of the victims some kind of notice or

information should be given to the victims; we need not now

spell out the actual notice and the manner of its giving to

be consistent with the mandate and purpose of section 4 of

the Act.

121. This Court in its order dated 4th May, 1989 had

stated that in passing orders on 14th/15th February, 1989,

this Court was impelled by the necessity of urgent relief to

the victims rather than to depend upon the uncertain promise

of law. The Act, as we have construed, requires notice to be

given in what form and in what manner, it need not be

spelled out, before entering into any settlement of the type

with which we are concerned. It further appears that that

type of notice which is required to be given had not been

given. The question, therefore, is what is to be done and

what is the consequence? The Act would be bad if it is not

construed in the light that notice before any settlement

under S. 4 of the Act was required to be given. Then arises

the question of consequences of not giving the notice. In

this adjudication, we are not strictly concerned with the

validity or otherwise of the settlement, as we have indicat-

ed hereinbefore. But constitutional adjudication cannot be

divorced from the reality of a situation, or the impact of

an adjudication. Constitutional deductions are never made in

the vacuum. These deal with life's problems in the reality

of a given situation. And no constitutional adjudication is

also possible unless

700

one is aware of the consequences of such an adjudication.

One hesitates in matters of this type where large conse-

quences follow one way or the other to put as under what

others have put together. It is well to remember, as did

Justice Holmes, that time has upset many fighting faiths and

one must always wagar one's salvation upon some prophecy

based upon imperfect knowledge. Our knowledge changes; our

perception of truth also changes. It is true that notice was

required to be given and notice has not been given. The

notice which we have contemplated is a notice before the

settlement or what is known in legal terminology as 'pre-

decisional notice'. But having regard to the urgency of the

situation and having regard to the need for the victims for

relief and help and having regard to the fact that so much

effort has gone in finding a basis for the settlement, we,

at one point of time, thought that a post-decisional hearing

in the facts and circumstances of this case might be consid-

ered to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of

principles of natural justice as embodied under s. 4 of the

Act. The reasons that impelled this Court to pass the orders

of 14th/15th February, 1989 are significant and compelling.

If notice was given, then what would have happened? It has

been suggested on behalf of the victims by counsel that if

the victims had been given an opportunity to be heard, then

they would have perhaps pointed out, inter alia, that the

amount agreed to be paid through the settlement was hope-

lessly inadequate. We have noted the evidence available to

this Court which this Court has recorded in its order dated

4th May, 1989 to be the basis for the figure at which the

settlement was arrived at. It is further suggested that if

an opportunity had been given before the settlement, then

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the victims would have perhaps again pointed out that crimi-

nal liability could not be absolved in the manner in which

this Court has done on the 14th/l5th February, 1989. It was

then contended that the Central Government was itself sued

as a joint tort feasor. The Central Government would still

be liable to be proceeded in respect of any liability to the

victims if such a liability is established; that liability

is in no way abridged or affected by the Act or the settle-

ment entered into. It was submitted on behalf of the victims

that if an opportunity had been given, they would have

perhaps pointed out that the suit against the Central Gov-

ernment, Government of Madhya Pradesh and UCIL could not

have been settled by the compromise. It is further-suggested

that if given an opportunity, it would have been pointed out

that the UCIL should have also been sued. One of the impor-

tant requirements of justice is that people affected by an

action or inaction should have opportunity to have their

say. That opportunity the victims have got when these appli-

cations were heard and they were heard after utmost publici-

ty and they would have further

701

opportunity when review application against the settlement

would be heard.

122. On behalf of the victims, it was suggested that the

basis of damages in view of the observations made by this

Court in M.C. Mehta's case (supra) against the victims of

UCC or UCIL would be much more than normal damages suffered

in similar case against any other company or party which is

financially not so solvent or capable. It was urged that it

is time in order to make damages deterrent the damages must

be computed on the basis of the capacity of a delinquent

made liable to pay such damages and on the monitory capacity

of the delinquent the quantum of the damages awarded would

vary and not on the basis of actual consequences suffered by

the victims. This is an uncertain promise of law. On the

basis of evidence available and on the basis of the princi-

ples so far established, it is difficult to foresee any

reasonable possibility of acceptance of this yardstick. And

even if it is accepted, there are numerous difficulties of

getting that view accepted internationally as a just basis

in accordance with law. These, however, are within the realm

of possibility.

123. It was contended further by Shri Garg, Shri Shanti

Bhushan and Ms. Jaising that all the further particulars

upon which the settlement had been entered into should have

been given in the' notice which was required to be given

before a settlement was sanctified or accepted. We are

unable to accept this position. It is not necessary that all

other particulars for the basis of the proposed settlement

should be disclosed in a suit of this nature before the

final decision. Whatever data was already there have been

disclosed, that, in our opinion, would have been sufficient

for the victims to be able to give their views, if they want

to. Disclosure of further particulars are not warranted by

the requirement of principles of natural justice. Indeed,

such disclosure in this case before finality might jeopar-

dise luther action, if any, necessary so consistent with

justice of the case.

124. So on the materials available, the victims would

have to express their views. The victims have not been able

to show at all any other point or material which would go to

impeach the validity of the settlement. Therefore, in our

opinion, though settlement without notice is not quite

proper, on the materials so far available, we are of the

opinion that justice has been done to the victims but jus-

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tice has not appeared to have been done. In view of the

magnitude of the misery involved and the problems in this

case, we are also of the opinion that the setting aside of

the settlement on this ground in view of the facts

702

and the circumstances of this case keeping the settlement in

abeyance and giving notice to the victims for a post-deci-

sional hearing would not be in the ultimate interest of

justice. It is true that not giving notice, was not proper

because principles of natural justice are fundamental in the

constitutional set up of this country. No man or no man's

right should be affected without an opportunity to ventilate

his views. We are also conscious that justice is a psycho-

logical yearning, in which men seek acceptance of their view

point by having an opportunity of vindication of their view

point before the forum or the authority enjoined or obliged

to take a decision affecting their right. Yet, in the par-

ticular situations, one has to bear in mind how an infrac-

tion of that should be sought to be removed is accordance

with justice. In the facts and the circumstances of this

case where sufficient opportunity is available when review

application is heard on notice, as directed by Court, no

further opportunity is necessary and it cannot be said that

injustice has been done. "To do a great right" after all, it

is permissible sometimes "to do a little wrong". In the

facts and circumstances of the case, this is one of those

rare occasions. Though entering into a settlement without

the required notice is wrong, in the facts and the circum-

stances of this case, therefore, we are of the opinion, to

direct that notice should be given now, would not result in

dain justice in the situation. In the premises, no further

consequential order is necessary by this Court. Had it been

necessary for this Bench to have passed such a consequential

order, we would not have passed any such consequential order

in respect of the same.

125. The sections and the scheme dealing with the deter-

mination of damages and distribution of the amount have also

been assailed as indicated before. Our attention was drawn

to the provisions of the Act dealing with the payment of

compensation and the scheme framed therefore. It was submit-

ted that section 6 of the Act enjoins appointment by the

Central Government of an officer known as the Commissioner

for the welfare of the victims. It was submitted that this

does not give sufficient judicial authority to the officer

and would be really leaving the adjudication under the

scheme by an officer of the executive nature. Learned Attor-

ney General has, however, submitted that for disbursement of

the compensation contemplated under the Act or under the

orders of this Court, a notification would be issued under

section 6(3) of the Act authorising the Commissioner or

other officers to exercise all or any of the powers which

the Central Government may exercise under section 6 to

enable the victims to place before the Commissioner or

Deputy Commissioner any additional evidence that they would

like to adduce. We direct so, and such appropriate notifica-

703

tion be issued. We further direct that in the scheme of

categorisation to be done by the Deputy Commissioner should

be appealable to an appropriate judicial authority and the

Scheme should be modified accordingly. We reiterate that the

basis of categorisation and the actual categorisation should

be justifiable and judicially reviewable-the provisions in

the Act and the Scheme should be so read. There were large

number of submissions made on behalf of the victims about

amending the scheme. Apart from and to the extent indicated

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above, in our opinion, it would be unsafe to tinker with the

scheme piecemeal. The scheme is an integrated whole and it

would not be proper to amend it piecemeal. We, however, make

it clear that in respect of categorisation and claim, the

authorites must act on principles of natural justice and act

quasi-judicially.

126. As mentioned hereinbefore, good deal of arguments

were advanced before us as to whether the clause in the

settlement that criminal proceedings would not be proceeded

with and the same will remain quashed is valid or invalid.

We have held that these are not part of the proceedings

under the Act. So the orders on this aspect in the order of

14th/15th February, 1989 are not orders under the Act.

Therefore, on the question of the validity of the Act, this

aspect does not arise whether the settlement of criminal

proceedings or quashing the criminal proceedings could be a

valid consideration for settlement or whether if it was such

a consideration or not is a matter which the court reviewing

the settlement has to decide.

127. In the premise, we hold that the Act is constitu-

tionally valid in the manner we read it. It proceeds on the

hypothesis that until the claims of the victims are realised

or obtained. from the delinquents, namely, UCC and UCIL by

settlement or by adjudication and until the proceedings in

respect thereof continue the Central Government must pay

interim compensation or maintenance for the victims. In

entering upon the settlement in view of s. 4 of the Act,

regard must be had to the views of the victims and for the

purpose of giving regard to these, appropriate notices

before arriving at any settlement, was necessary. In some

cases, however, post-decisional notice might be sufficient

but in the facts and the circumstances of this case, no

useful purpose would be served by giving a post-decisional

hearing having regard to the circumstances mentioned in the

order of this Court dated 4th May, 1989 and having regard to

the fact that there are no further additional data and facts

available with the victims which can be profitably and

meaningfully presented to controvert the basis of the set-

tlement and further having regard to the fact that the

victims had their say or on

704

their behalf their views had been agitated in these proceed-

ings and will have further opportunity in the pending review

proceedings. No further order on this aspect is necessary.

The sections dealing with the payment of compensation and

categorisation should be implemented in the manner indicated

before.

128. The Act was conceived on the noble promise of

giving relief and succour to the dumb, pale, meek and

impoverished victims of a tragic industrial gas leak disas-

ter, a concomitant evil in this industrial age of technolog-

ical advancement and development. The Act had kindled high

hopes in the hearts of the. weak and worn, wary and forlorn.

The Act generated hope of humanity. The implementation of

the Act must be with justice. Justice perhaps has been done

to the victims situated as they were, but it is also true

that justice has not appeared to have been done. That is a

great infirmity. That is due partly to the fact that proce-

dure was not strictly followed as we have understood it and

also partly because of the atmosphere that was created in

the country, attempts were made to shake the confidence of

the people in the judicial process and also to undermine the

credibility of this Court. This was unfortunate. This was

perhaps due to misinformed public opinion and also due to

the fact that victims were not initially taken into confi-

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dence in reaching the settlement. This is a factor which

emphasises the need for adherence to the principles of

natural justice. The credibility of judiciary is as impor-

tant as the alleviation of the suffering of the victims,

great as these were. We hope these adjudications will re-

store that credibility. Principles of natural justice are

integrally embedded in our constitutional framework and

their pristine glory and primacy cannot and should not be

allowed to be submerged by the exigencies of particular

situations or cases. This Court must always assert primacy

of adherence to the principles of natural justice in all

adjudications. But at the same time, these must be applied

in a particular manner in particular cases having regard to

the particular circumstances. It is, therefore, necessary to

reiterate that the promises made to the victims and hopes

raised in their hearts and minds can only be redeemed in

some measure if attempts are made vigorously to distribute

the amount realised to the victims in accordance with the

scheme as indicated above. That would be a redemption to a

certain extent. It will also be necessary to reiterate that

attempts should be made to formulate the principles of law

guiding the Government and the authorities to permit carry-

ing on of trade dealing with materials and things which have

dengerous consequences within sufficient specific safeguards

especially in case of multinational corporations trading in

India. An awareness on these lines has dawned. Let

705

action follow that awareness. It is also necessary to reit-

erate that the law relating to damages and payment of inter-

im damages or compensation to the victims of this nature

should be seriously and scientifically examined by the

appropriate agencies.

129. The Bhopal Gas Leak disaster and its aftermath of

that emphasise the need for laying down certain norms and

standards the Government to follow before granting permis-

sions or licences for the running of industries dealing with

materials which are of dangerous potentialities. The Govern-

ment should, therefore, examine or have the problem examined

by an expert committee as to what should be the conditions

on which future licences and/or permission for running

industries on Indian soil would be granted and for ensuring

enforcement of those conditions, sufficient safety measures

should be formulated and scheme of enforcement indicated.

The Government should insist as a condition precedent to the

grant of such licences or permissions, creation of a fund in

anticipation by the industries to be available for payment

of damages out of the said found in case of leakages or

damages in case of accident or disaster flowing from negli-

gent working of such industrial operations or failure to

ensure measures preventing such occurrence. The Government

should also ensure that the parties must agree to abide to

pay such damages out of the said damages by procedure sepa-

rately evolved for computation and payment of damages with-

out exposing the victims or sufferers of the negligent act

to the long and delayed procedure. Special procedure must be

provided for and the industries must agree as a condition

for the grant of licence to abide by such procedure or to

abide by statutory arbitration. The basis for damages in

case of leakages and accident should also be statutorily

fixed taking into consideration the nature of damages in-

flicted, the consequences thereof and the ability and capac-

ity of the parties to pay. Such should also provide for

deterrent or punitive damages, the basis for which should be

formulated by a proper expert committee or by the Govern-

ment. For this purpose, the Government should have the

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matter examined by such body as it considers necessary and

proper like the Law Commission or other competent bodies.

This is vital for the future.

130. This case has taken some time. It was argued exten-

sively. We are grateful to counsel who have assisted in all

these matters. We have reflected. We have taken some time in

pronouncing our decision. We wanted time to lapse so that

the heat of the moment may calm down and proper atmosphere

restored. Justice, it has been said, is the constant and

perpetual disposition to render every man his due. But what

706

is a man's due in a particular situation and in a particular

circumstances is a matter for appraisement and adjustment.

It has been said that justice is balancing. The balances

have always been the symbol of even-handed justice. But as

said Lord Denning in Jones v. National Coal Board Ltd.,

[1957] 2 QB 55, at 64-let the advocates one after the other

put the weights into the scales--the 'nicely calculated less

or more'--but the judge at the end decides which way the

balance tilts, be it ever so slightly. This is so in every

case and every situation.

13 1. The applications are disposed of in the manner and

with the direction, we have indicated above.

SINGH, J. 1 have gone through the proposed judgment of

my learned brother, Sabyasachi Mukharji, CJI. I agree with

the same but I consider it necessary to express my opinion

on certain aspects.

Five years ago between the night of December 2-3, 1984

one of the most tragic industrial disasters in the recorded

history of mankind occurred in the city of Bhopal, in the

State of Madhya Pradesh, as a result of which several per-

sons died and thousands were disabled and physically inca-

pacitated for life. The ecology in and around Bhopal was

adversely affected and air, water and the atmosphere waspol-

luted, its full extent has yet to be determined. UnionCar-

bide India Limited (UCIL) a subsidiary of Union Carbide

Corporation (a Transnational Corporation of United States)

has been manufacturing pesticides at its plant located in

the city of Bhopal. In the process of manufacture of pesti-

cide the UCIL had stored stock of Methyl Isocyanate commonly

known as MlC a highly toxic gas. On the night of the trage-

dy, the MIC leaked from the plant in substantial quantity

causing death and misery to the people working in the plant

and those residing around it. The unprecedented catastrophe

demonstrated the dangers inherent in the production of haz-

ardous chemicals even though for the purpose of industrial

development. A number of civil suits for damages against the

UCC were filed in the United States of America and also in

this Country. The cases filed in USA were referred back to

the Indian courts by Judge Keenan details of which are

contained in the judgment of my learned brother Mukharji,

CJI. Since those who suffered in the catastrophe were mostly

poor, ignorant, illiterate and ill-equipped to pursue their

claims for damages either before the courts in USA or in

Indian courts, the Parliament enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak

Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act 1985 (hereinafter re-

ferred to as 'the Act') conferring power on the Union of

India to take over the conduct of litigation in this regard

in place of the

707

individual claimants. The facts and circumstances which led

to the settlement of the claims before this Court have

already been stated in detail in the judgment of Mukharji,

CJI, and therefore, I need not refer to those facts and

circumstances. The constitutional validity of the Act has

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been assailed before us in the present petitions. If the Act

is declared unconstitutional, the settlement which was

recorded in this Court, under which the UCC has already

deposited a sum of Rs.750 crores for meeting the claims of

Bhopal Gas victims, would fall and the amount of money which

is already in deposit with the Registry of this Court would

not be available for relief to the victims. Long and de-

tailed arguments were advanced before us for a number of

days and on an anxious consideration and having regard to

the legal and constitutional aspects and especially the need

for immediate help and relief to the victims of the gas

disaster, which is already delayed, we have upheld the

constitutional validity of the Act. Mukharji, CJI has ren-

dered a detailed and elaborate judgment with which I re-

spectfully agree. However, I consider it necessary to say

few words with regard to the steps which should be taken by

the Executive and the Legislature to prevent such tragedy in

future and to avoid the prolonged misery of victims of in

industrial disaster.

We are a developing country, our national resources are

to be developed in the field of science, technology, indus-

try and agriculture. The need for industrial development has

led to the establishment of a number of plants and factories

by the domestic companies and under industries are engaged

in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities which pose

potential threat to life, health and safety of persons

working in the factory, or residing in the surrounding

areas. Though working of such factories and plants is regu-

lated by a number of laws of our country, i.e. the Factories

Act, Industrial Development and Regulation Act and Workmen's

Compensation Act etc. there is no special legislation pro-

viding for compensation and damages to outsiders who may

suffer on account of any industrial accident. As the law

stands to-day, affected persons have to approach civil

courts for obtaining compensation and damages. In civil

courts, the determination of amount of compensation or

damages as well as the liability of the enterprise has been

bound by the shackles of conservative principles laid down

by the House of Lords in Ryland v. Herchief, [1868] LR 3 HL

page 330. The principles laid therein made it difficult to

obtain adequate damages from the enterprise and that too

only after the negligence of the enterprise was proved. This

continued to be the position of law, till a Constitution

Bench of this Court in M.C. Mehta

708

v. Union of India, [1987] 1 SCC 420, commonly known as

Sriram Oleum Gas Leak case evolved principles and laid down

new norms to deal adequately with the new problems arising

in a highly industrialised economy. This Court made judicial

innovation in laying down principles with regard to liabili-

ty of enterprises carrying hazardous or inherently dangerous

activities departing from the rule laid down in Ryland v.

Fletcher. The Court held as under:

"We are of the view that an enterprise which

is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dan-

gerous industry which poses a potential threat

to the" health and safety of the persons

working in the factory and residing in the

surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-

delegiable duty to the community to ensure

that no harm results to any one on account of

hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of

the activity which it has undertaken. The

enterprise must be held to be under an obliga-

tion to provide that the hazardous or inher-

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ently dangerous activity in which it is en-

gaged must be conducted with the highest

standards of safety and if any harm results on

account of such activity, the enterprise must

be absolutely liable to compensate for such

harm and it should be no answer to the enter-

prise to say that it had taken all reasonable

care and that the harm occurred without any

negligence on its part. Since the persons

harmed on account of the hazardous or inher-

ently dangerous activity carried on by the

enterprise would not be in a position to

isolate the process of operation from the

hazardous preparation of substance or any

other related element that caused the harm the

enterprise must be held strictly liable for

causing such harm as a part of the social cost

of carrying on the hazardous or inherently

dangerous activity. If the enterprise is

permitted to carry on an hazardous or inher-

ently dangerous activity for its profit, the

law must presume that such permission is

conditional on the enterprise absorbing the

cost of any accident arising on account of

such hazardous or inherently dangerous activi-

ty as an appropriate item of its overheads.

Such hazardous or inherently dangerous activi-

ty for private profit can be tolerated only on

condition that the enterprise engaged in such

hazardous or inherently dangerous activity

indemnifies all those who suffer on account of

the carrying on of such hazardous or inherent-

ly dangerous activity regardless of whether it

is carried on carefully or not. This

709

principle is also sustainable on the ground

that the enterprise alone has the resource to

discover and guard against hazards or dangers

and to provide warning against potential

hazards. We would therefore hold that where an

enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inher-

ently dangerous activity and harm results to

anyone on account of an accident in the opera-

tion of such hazardous or inherently dangerous

activity resulting, for example, in escape of

toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and

absolutely liable to compensate all those who

are affected by the accident and such liabili-

ty is not subject to any of the exceptions

which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle

of strict liability under the rule in Rylands

v. Fletcher."

The law so laid down made a land-mark departure from the

conservative principles with regard to the liability of an

enterprise carrying on hazardous or inherently dangerous

activities.

In the instant cases there is no dispute that UCIL a

subsidiary of UCC was carrying on activity of manufacturing

pesticide and in that process it had stored MIC a highly

toxic and dangerous gas which leaked causing vast damage not

only to human life but also to the flora and fauna and

ecology in and around Bhopal. In view of this Court's deci-

sion in M.C. Mehta's case there is no scope for any doubt

regarding the liability of the UCC for the damage caused to

the human beings and nature in and around Bhopal. While

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entering into the settlement the UCC has accepted its li-

ability and for that reason it has deposited a sum of Rs.750

crores in this Court. The inadequacy of the amount of com-

pensation under the settlement was assailed by the counsel

for the petitioners but it is not necessary for us to ex-

press any opinion on that question as review petitions are

pending before another Constitution Bench and more so as in

the present cases we are concerned only with the constitu-

tional validity of the Act.

The Bhopal Gas tragedy has raised several important

questions regarding the functioning of multi-nationals in

third world countries.After the Second world war colonial

rule came to end in several parts of the globe, as a number

of natives secured independence from foreign rule. The

political domination was over but the newly born nations

were beset with various problems on account of lack of

finances and development. A number of multi-nationals and

transnational corporations offered their services to the

under-developed and developing countries to provide finances

and technical know-how by

710

setting up their own industries in those countries on their

own terms that brought problems with regard to the control

over the functioning of the transnational corporations.

Multi-national companies in many cases exploited the under-

developed nations and in some cases they influenced politi-

cal and economic policies of host countries which subverted

the sovereignty of those countries. There has been com-

plaints against the multi-nationals for adopting unfair and

corrupt means to advance their interests in the host coun-

tries. Since this was a worldwide phenomena the United

Nations took up the matter for consideration. The Economic

and Social Council of the United Nations established a

Commission on Transnational Corporations to conduct research

on various political, economic and social aspects relating

to transnational corporations. On a careful and detailed

study the Commission submitted its Report in 1985 for evolv-

ing a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations. The

Code was adopted in 1986 to which large number of countries

of the world are signatories. Although it has not been fully

finalised as yet, the Code presents a comprehensive instru-

ment formulating the principles of Code of Conduct for

transnational corporations carrying on their enterprises in

under developed and developing countries. The Code contains

provisions regarding ownership and control designed to

strike balance between the competing interests of the Trans-

national Corporation and the host countries. It extensively

deals with the political, economic, financial, social and

legal questions. The Code provides for disclosure of infor-

mation to the host countries and it also provides guidelines

for nationalisation and compensation, obligations to inter-

national law and jurisdiction of courts. The Code lays down

provisions for settlement of disputes between the host

States and an affiliate of a Transnational Corporation. It

suggests that such disputes should be submitted to the

national courts or authorities of host countries unless

amicably settled between the parties. It provides for the

choice of law and means for dispute settlement arising out

of contracts. The Code has also laid down guidelines for the

determination of settlement of disputes arising out of

accident and disaster and also for liability of Transnation-

al Corporations and the jurisdiction of the courts. The Code

is binding on the countries which formally accept it. It was

stated before us that India has accepted the Code. If that

be so, it is necessary that the Government should take

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effective measures to translate the provisions of the Code

into specific actions and policies backed by appropriate

legislation and enforcing machinery to prevent any accident

or disaster and to secure the welfare of the victims of any

industrial disaster.

In the context of our national dimensions of human rights,

right

711

to life, liberty, pollution free air and water is guaranteed

by the Constitution under Articles 21, 48A and 5l(g), it is

the duty of the State to take effective steps to protect the

guaranteed constitutional rights. These rights must be

integrated and illumined by the evolving international

dimensions and standards, having regard to our sovereignty,

as highlighted by Clauses 9 and 13 of U.N. Code of conduct

on Transnational Corporations. The evolving standards of

international obligations need to be respected, maintaining

dignity and sovereignty of our people, the State must take

effective steps to safeguard the constitutional rights of

citizens by enacting laws. The laws so made may provide for

conditions for granting licence to Transnational Corpora-

tions, prescribing norms and standards for running indus-

tries on Indian soil ensuring the constitutional rights of

our people relating to life, liberty, as well as safety to

environment and ecology to enable the people to lead a

healthy and clean life. A Transnational Corporation should

be made liable and subservient to laws of our country and

the liability should not be restricted to affiliate company

only but the parent corporation should also be made liable

for any damage caused to the human being or ecology. The law

must require transnational corporations to agree to pay such

damages as may be determined. by the statutory agencies and

forum constituted under it without exposing the victims to

long drawn litigation. Under the existing civil law damages

are determined by the Civil Courts, after a long drawn

litigation, which destroys the very purpose of awarding

damages. In order to meet the situation, to avoid delay and

to ensure immediate relief to the victims we would suggest

that the law made by the Parliament should provide for

constitution of tribunals regulated by special procedure for

determining compensation to victims of industrial disaster

or accident, appeal against which may lie to this Court on

limited ground of questions of law only after depositing the

amount determined by the Tribunal. The law should also

provide for interim relief to victims during the pendency of

proceedings. These steps would minimise the misery and agony

of victims of hazardous enterprises.

There is yet another aspect which needs consideration

by the Government and the Parliament. Industrial development

in our country and the hazards involved therein, pose a

mandatory need to constitute a statutory "Industrial Disas-

ter Fund", contributions to which may be made by, the Gov-

ernment, the industries whether they are transnational

corporations or domestic undertakings public or private. The

extent of contribution may be worked out having regard to

the extent of hazardous nature of the enterprise and other

allied matters. The Fund should be permanent in nature, so

that money is

712

readily available for providing immediate effective relief

to the victims. This may avoid delay, as has happened in the

instant case in providing effective relief to the victims.

The Government and the Parliament should therefore take

immediate steps for enacting laws, having regard to these

suggestions, consistent with the international norms and

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guidelines as contained in the United Nations Code of Con-

duct on Transnational Corporations.

With these observations, I agree with the order proposed

by my learned brother, Sabyasachi Mukharji, CJI.

RANGANATHAN, J. Five years ago, this country was shaken

to its core by a national catastrophe, second in magnitude

and disastrous effects only to the havoc wrought by the

atomic explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Multitudes of

illiterate and poverty-stricken people in and around Bhopal

suffered damage to life and limb due to the escape of poi-

sonous Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) gas from one of the storage

tanks at the factory of the Union Carbide (India) Limited

(UCIL) in Bhopal, a wholly owned subsidiary of the multina-

tional giant, the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC). A number

of civil suits claiming damages from the UCC were filed in

the United States of America and similar litigation also

followed in Indian courts. Fearing the possibilities of the

exploitation of the situation by vested interests, the

Government of India enacted, the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster

(Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 ('the Act') to regulate the

course of such litigation. Briefly speaking, it empowered

the Union of India to take over the conduct of all litiga-

tion in this regard and conduct it in place of, or in asso-

ciation with, the individual claimants. It also enabled the

Union to enter into a compromise with the UCC and UCIL and

arrive at a settlement. The writ petitions before us have

been filed challenging the constitutional validity of this

statute on the ground that the divestiture of the claimants'

individual rights to legal remedy against the multinational

for the consequences of carrying on dangerous and hazardous

activities on our soil violates the fundamental rights

guaranteed under article 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

In consequence of certain proceedings before Judge

Keenan of the U.S. District Courts, the venue of the litiga-

tion shifted to India. In the principal suit filed in India

by the Union (Civil Suit No. 1113/86) orders were passed by

the trial court in Bhopal directing the UCC to deposit

Rs.370 crores (reduced to Rs.250 crores by the Madhya Pra-

desh High Court) as interim payment to the gas victims

pending disposal of the suit. There were appeals to this

Court in which the

713

UCC contested the Court's jurisdiction to pass an order for

an interim payment in a suit for money, while the Union

pleaded that a much higher interim payment should have been

granted. When the matter was being argued in this Court, a

settlement was arrived at between the Union and the UCC

under which a sum of Rs.750 crores has been received by the

Union in full settlement of all the claims of all victims of

the gas leak against the UCC. The Union also agreed to

withdraw certain prosecutions that had been initiated

against the officials of the UCC and UCIL in this connec-

tion. This settlement received the imprimatur of this Court

in its orders dated 14th & 15th February, 1989.

It is unfortunate that, though the writ petitions before

us were pending in this Court at that time, neither their

contents nor the need for considering first the issue of the

validity of the Act before thinking of a settlement in

pursuance of its provisions seem to have been effectively

brought to the notice of the Bench which put an end to all

the litigation on this topic in terms of the settlement. The

settlement thus stood approved while the issue of validity

of the Act under which it was effected stood undecided. When

this was brought to the notice of the above Bench, it di-

rected these writ petitions to be listed before a different

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Bench 'to avoid any possible feeling that the same Bench may

be coloured in its views on the issue by reason of the

approval it had given to the fait accompli viz. the settle-

ment. That is now these matters came before us.

The petitioners, claiming to represent a section of the

victims are, firstly, against any settlement at all being

arrived at with the UCC. According to them, it is more

important to ensure by penal action that multinational

corporations do not play with the lives of people in de-

veloping and under developed countries than to be satisfied

with mere compensation for injury and that the criminal

prosecutions initiated in this case should have been pur-

sued. Secondly, they are of the view that the amount for

which the claims have been settled is a pittance, far below

the amount of damages they would have been entitled to, on

the principles of strict, absolute and punitive liability

enunciated by this Court in Mehta's case [1987] 1 S.C.R.

819. Thirdly, their grievance is that no publicity at all

was given, before this court passed its order, to enable

individual claimants or groups of them to put forward their

suggestions or objections to the settlement proposed. Their

interests were sealed, they say, without complying with

elementary principles of natural justice. They contend that

the provisions of an Act which has made such a settlement

possible cannot be constitutionally valid.

714

The arguments before us ranged over a very wide ground,

covered several issues and extended to several days. This

Bench has been placed in somewhat of a predicament as it has

to pronounce on the validity of the provisions of the Act in

the context of an implementation of its provisions in a

particular manner and, though we cannot (and do not) express

any views regarding the merits of the settlement, we are

asked to consider whether such settlement can be consistent

with a correct and proper interpretation of the Act tested

on the touchstone of the fundamental rights guaranteed under

the Constitution. Mukharji, C.J., has outlined the issues,

dealt elaborately with the contentions urged, and given

expression to his conclusions in a learned, elaborate and

detailed judgment which we have had the advantage of perus-

ing in draft. Our learned brother K.N. Singh, J., has also

highlighted certain aspects in his separate judgment. We

are, in large measure, in agreement with them, but should

like to say a few words on some of the issues in this case,

particularly those in regard to which our approach has been

somewhat different:

1. The issue regarding the validity of the Act turns

principally on the construction of sections 3 and 4 of the

Act. We are inclined to hold that the fact that a settlement

has been effected, or the circumstances in which or the

amount for which the claims of the victims have been set-

tled, do not have a bearing on this question of interpreta-

tion and have to be left out of account altogether except as

providing a contextual background in which the question

arises. Turning therefore to the statute and its implica-

tions, the position is this. Every person who suffered as a

consequence of the gas leak had a right to claim compensa-

tion from the persons who, according to him, were liable in

law for the injury caused to him and also a fight to insti-

tute a suit or proceeding before any court or authority with

a view to enforce his right to claim damages. In the normal

course of events, such a claimant who institute a suit or

proceeding would have been at complete liberty to withdraw

the said suit or proceeding or enter into any compromise he

may choose in that regard. Section 3 undoubtedly takes away

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this fight of the claimant altogether: (a) except to the

limited extent specified in the proviso to S. 3(3) and (b)

subject to the provisions of S. 4, for this section clearly

states that it is the Central Government and the Central

Government alone which has the right to represent and act in

place of the claimants, whether within or outside India, for

all purposes in

715

connection with the enforcement of his claims. We may first

consider how far the main provision in S. 3 (leaving out of

account the proviso as well as section 4) is compatible with

the Constitution

The first question that arises is whether the legisla-

ture is justified in depriving the claimants of the right

and privilege of enforcing their claims and prosecuting them

in such manner as they deem fit and in compulsorily inter-

posing or substituting the Government in their place. We

think that, to this question, there can be only one answer.

As pointed out by our learned brother, the situation was

such that the victims of the tragedy needed to be protected

against themselves as their adversery was a mighty multi-

national corporation and proceedings to a considerable

extent had been initiated in a foreign country, where the

conduct of the cases was entrusted to foreign lawyers under

a system of litigation which is unfamiliar to us here. In

the stark reality of the situation, it cannot even be plau-

sibly contended that the large number of victims of the gas

leak disaster should have been left to fend for itself and

merely provided with some legal aid of one type or another.

It is necessary to remember that, having regard to the

identity of the principal ground of claim of all the vic-

tims, even if a single victim was not diligent in conducting

his suit or entered into a compromise or submitted to a

decree judging the issues purely from his individual point

of view, such a decision or decree could adversely affect

the interests of the innumerable other victims as well. In

fact, it appears that a settlement between one set of claim-

ants and the adversary corporation was almost imminent and

would perhaps have been through out for the timely interven-

tion of the Government of India. The battle for the enforce-

ment of one's rights was bound to be not only prolonged but

also very arduous and expensive and the decision of the

legislature that the fight against the adversary should be

consolidated and its conduct handed over to the Government

of India--it may perhaps have been better if it had been

handed over to an autonomous body independent of the Govern-

ment but, as pointed out by our learned brother, the course

adopted was also not objectionable--was perhaps the only

decision that could have been taken in the circumstances.

This is indeed a unique situation in which the victims, in

order to realise to the best advantage their rights against

UCC, had to be helped out by transposing that right to be

enforced by the Government.

We did not indeed understand any learned counsel before

us to say that the legislature erred in entrusting the

Government of India

716

with the responsibility of fighting for the victims. The

only grievance is that in the process their right to take

legal proceedings should not have been completely taken away

and that they should also have had the liberty of partici-

pating in the proceedings right through. In fact, though the

Act contemplates the Central Government to completely act in

place of the victims, the Government of India has not in

fact displaced them altogether. In all the proceedings

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pending in this country, as well as those before Judge

Keenan, the Government of India has conducted the proceed-

ings but the other victims or such of them as chose to

associate themselves in these proceedings by becoming par-

ties were not shut out from taking part in the proceedings.

In fact, as the learned Attorney General pointed out, one of

the groups of litigants did give great assistance to the

trial judge at Bhopal. But even if the provisions of S. 3

had been scrupulously observed and the names of all parties,

other than the Central Government, had been got deleted from

the array of parties in the suits and proceedings pending in

this country, we do not think that the result would have

been fatal to the interests of the litigants. On the con-

trary, it enabled the litigants to obtain the benefit of all

legal expertise at the command of the Government of India in

exercising their rights against the Union Carbide Corpora-

tion. Such representation can well be justified by resort to

a principle analogous to, if not precisely the same as that

of, "parens patriae". A victim of the tragedy is compelled

to part with a valuable right of his in order that it might

be more efficiently and satisfactory 'exploited for his

benefit than he himself is capable of. It is of course

possible that there may be an affluent claimant or lawyer

engaged by him, who may be capable of fighting the litiga-

tion better. It is possible that the Government of India as

a litigant may or may not be able to pursue the litigation

with as much determination or capability as such a litigant.

But in a case of the present type one should not be con-

founded by such a possibility. There are more indigent

litigants than affluent ones. There are more illiterates

than enlightened ones. There are very few of the claimants,

capable of finding the financial wherewithal required for

fighting the litigation. Very few of them are capable of

prosecuting such a litigation in this country not to speak

of the necessity to run to a foreign country. The financial

position of UCIL was negligible compared to the magnitude of

the claim that could arise and, though eventually the battle

had to be pitched on our own soil, an initial as well as

final recourse to legal proceedings in the United States was

very much on the cards, indeed inevitable. In this situa-

tion, the legislature was perfectly justified in coming to

the aid of the victims with this piece of legislation and in

asking the Central Government to shoulder the responsibility

by substituting itself in place of the victims

717

for all purposes connected with the claims. Even if the Act

had provided for a total substitution of the Government of

India in place of the victims and had completely precluded

them from exercising their rights in any manner, it could

perhaps have still been contended that such deprivation was

necessary in larger public interest.

But the Act is not so draconian in its content. Actual-

ly, as we have said a little earlier, the grievance of the

petitioners is not so much that the Government was entrusted

with the functions. of a dominus litis in this litigation.

Their contention is that the whole object and purpose of the

litigation is to promote the interests of the claimants, to

enable them to fight the UCC with greater strength and

determination, to help them overcome limitations of time,

money and legal assistance and to realise the best compensa-

tion possible consistent not only with the damage suffered

by them but also consistent with national honour and pres-

tige. It is suggested that the power conferred on the Gov-

ernment should be construed as one hedged in by this domi-

nant object. A divestiture of the claimant's right in this

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situation would be reasonable, it is said, only if the

claimant's rights are supplemented by the Government and not

supplanted by it.

Assuming the correctness of the argument, the provisions

of the proviso to S. 3(3) and of section 4 furnish an answer

to this contention. While the provision contained in the

main part of section 3 may be sufficient to enable the

Government of India to claim to represent the claimants and

initiate and conduct suits or proceeding on their behalf,

the locus standi of the Government of India in suits filed

by other claimants before the commencement of the Act out-

side India would naturally depend upon the discretion of the

court enquiring into the matter. That is why the proviso to

section 3 makes the right of the Government of India to

represent and act in place of the victims in such proceed-

ings subject to the permission of the court or authority

where the proceedings are pending. It is of course open to

such court to permit the Central Government even to displace

the claimants if it is satisfied that the authority of the

Act is sufficient to enable it to do so. In the present case

it is common ground that the proceedings before Judge Keenan

were being prosecuted by the Central Government along with

various individual claimants. Not only did Judge Keenan

permit the association of the Government of India in these

proceedings but the Government of India did have a substan-

tial voice in the course of those proceedings as well.

Again section 4 mandates that, notwithstanding anything

718

contained in section 3, the Central Government, in repre-

senting and acting in place of any person in relation to any

claim, shall have due regard to any matters which such

person may require to be urged with respect to his claim. It

also stipulates that if such person so desires, the Central

Government shall permit, at the expense of such person, a

legal practitioner of his choice to be associated in the

conduct of any suit or other proceeding relating to his

claim. In other words, though, perhaps, strictly speaking,

under section 3 the Central Government can totally exclude

the victim himself or his legal practitioner from taking

part in the proceedings (except in pending suits outside

India), section 4 keeps the substance of the rights of the

victims in tact. It enables, and indeed obliges, the Govern-

ment to receive assistance from individual claimants to the

extent they are able to offer the same. If any of the vic-

tims or their legal advisers have any specific aspect which

they would like to urge, the Central Government shall take

it into account. Again if any individual claimant at his own

expense retains a legal practitioner of his own choice, such

legal practitioner will have to be associated with the

Government in the conduct of any suit or proceeding relating

to his claim. Sections 3 and 4 thus combine together the

interests of the weak, illiterate, helpless and poor victims

as well as the interests of those who could have managed for

themselves, even without the help of this enactment. The

combination thus envisaged enables the Government to fight

the battle with the foreign adversary with the full aid and

assistance of such of the victims or their legal advisers as

are in a position to offer any such assistance. Though

section 3 denies the claimants the benefit of being eo

nominee parties in such suits or proceedings, section 4

preserves to them substantially all that they can achieve by

proceeding on their own. In other words, while seeming to

deprive the claimants of their right to take legal action on

their own, it has preserved those rights, to be exercised

indirectly. A conjoint reading of sections 3 and 4 would, in

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our opinion, therefore show that there has been no real

total deprivation of the right of the claimants to enforce

their claim for damages in appropriate proceedings before

any appropriate forum. There is only a restriction of this

right which, in the circumstances, is totally reasonable and

justified. The validity of the Act is, therefore, not liable

to be challenged on this ground.

The next angle from which the validity of the provision

is attacked is that the provision enabling the Government to

enter into a compromise is bad. The argument runs thus: The

object of the legislation can be furthered only if it per-

mits the Government to prosecute the litigation more effec-

tively and not if it enables the Government to

719

withdraw it or enter into a compromise. According to them,

the Act fails the impecunious victims in this vital aspect.

The authority conferred by the Act on the Government to

enter into a settlement or compromise, it is said, amounts

to an absolute negation of the rights of the claimants to

compensation and is capable of being so exercised to render

such rights totally valueless, as in fact, it is said, has

happened.

It appears to us that this contention proceeds on a

misapprehension. It is common knowledge that any authority

given to conduct a litigation cannot be effective unless it

is accompanied by an authority to withdraw or settle the

same if the circumstances call for it. The vagaries of a

litigation of this magnitude and intricacy could not be

fully anticipated. There were possibilities that the litiga-

tion may have to be fought out to the bitter finish. There

were possibilities that the UCC might be willing to ade-

quately compensate the victims either on their own' or at

the insistence of the Government concerned. There was also

the possibility, which had already been in evidence before

Judge Keenan, that the proceedings might ultimately have to

end in a negotiated settlement. One notices that in most of

the mass disaster cases reported, proceedings finally end in

a compromise if only to avoid an indefinite prolongation of

the agonies caused by such litigation. The legislation,

therefore, cannot be considered to be unreasonable merely

because in addition to the right to institute a suit or

other proceedings it also empowers the Government to with-

draw the proceedings or enter into a compromise.

Some misgivings were expressed, in the course of the

hearing, of the legislative wisdom (and, hence the validity)

of entrusting the carriage of these proceedings and, in

particular, the power of settling it out of Court, to the

Union of India. It was contended that the union is itself a

joint tort-feasor (sued as such by some of the victims) with

an interest (adverse to the victims) in keeping down the

amount of compensation payable to the minimum so as to

reduce its own liability as a joint tort-feasor. It seems to

us that this contention in misconceived. As pointed out by

Mukharji, C.J., the Union of India itself is one of the

entities affected by the gas leak and has a claim for com-

pensation from the UCC quite independent of the other vic-

tims. From this point of view, it is in the same position as

the other victims and, in the litigation with the UCC, it

has every interest in securing the maximum amount of compen-

sation possible for itself and the other victims. It is,

therefore, the best agency in the circumstances that could

be looked up to for fighting the UCC on its own as well as

on behalf of the victims. The suggestion that the Union is a

joint tort-lessor has been

720

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stoutly resisted by the learned Attorney General. But, even

assuming that the Union has some liability in the matter, we

fail to see-how it can derive any benefit or advantage by

entering into a low settlement with the UCC. as is pointed

out later in this judgment and by Mukharji, C.J., the Act

and Scheme thereunder have provided for an objective and

quasi-judicial determination of the amount of damages pay-

able to the victims of the tragedy. There is no basis for

the fear expressed during the hearing that the officers of

the Government may not be objective and may try to cut down

the amounts of compensation, so as not to exceed the amount

received from the UCC. It is common ground and, indeed, the

learned Attorney General fairly conceded, that the settle-

ment with the UCC only puts an end to the claims against the

UCC and UCIL and does not in any way affect the victims'

rights, if any, to proceed against the Union, the State of

Madhya Pradesh or the ministers and officers thereof, if so

advised. If the Union and these officers are joint tort-

lessors, as alleged, the Union will not stand to gain by

allowing the claims against the UCC to be settled for a low

figure. On the contrary it will be interested in settling

the claims against the UCC at as high a figure as possible

so that its own liability as a joint tort-feasor (if made

out) can be correspondingly reduced. We are, therefore,

unable to see any vitiating element in the legislation

insofar as it has entrusted the responsibility not only of

carrying on but also of entering into a settlement, if

thought fit.

Nor is there basis for the contention that the Act

enables a settlement to be arrived at without a proper

opportunity to the claimants to express their views on any

proposals for settlement that may be mooted. The right of

the claimant under section 4 to put forward his suggestions

or to be represented by a legal practitioner to put forth

his own views in the conduct of the suit or other proceeding

certainly extends to everything connected with the suit or

other proceeding. If, in the course of the proceedings there

should arise any question of compromise or settlement, it is

open to the claimants to oppose the same and to urge the

Central Government to have regard to specific aspects m

arriving at a settlement. Equally it is open to any claimant

to employ a legal practitioner to ventilate his opinions in

regard to such proposals for settlement. The provisions of

the Act, read by themselves, therefore, guarantee a complete

and full protection to the rights of the claimants in every

respect. Save only that they cannot file a suit themselves,

their right to acquire redress has not really been abridged

by the provisions of the Act. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act

properly read, in our opinion, completely vindicate the

objects and reasons which compelled Parliament to enact this

piece of legislation.

721

Far from abridging the rights of the claimants in any man-

ner, these provisions are so worded as to enable the Govern-

ment to prosecute the litigation with the maximum amount of

resources, efficiency and competence at its command as well

as with all the assistance and help that can be extended to

it by such of those litigants and claimants as are capable

of playing more than a mere passive rule in the litigations

But then, it is contended, the victims have had no

opportunity of considering the settlement proposals mooted

in this case before they were approved by the Court. This

aspect is dealt with later.

2. One of the contentions before us was that the UCC and

UCIL are accountable to the public for the damages caused by

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their industrial activities not only on a basis of strict

liability but also on the basis that the damages to be

awarded against them should include an element of punitive

liability and that this has been lost sight of while approv-

ing of the proposed settlement. Reference was made in this

context to M.C. Mehta's case (supra). Whether the settlement

should have taken into account this factor is, in the first

place, a moot question. Mukharji, C.J. has pointed out--and

we are inclined to agree-that this is an "uncertain province

of the law" and it is premature to say whether this yard-

stick has been, or will be, accepted in this country, not to

speak of its international acceptance which may be necessary

should occasion arise for executing a decree based on such a

yardstick in another country. Secondly, whether the settle-

ment took this into account and, if not, whether it is bad

for not having kept this basis in view are questions that

touch the merits of the settlement with which we are not

concerned. So we feel we should express no opinion here on

this issue. It is too far-fetched, it seems to us, to con-

tend that the provisions of the Act permitting the Union of

India to enter into a compromise should be struck down as

unconstitutional because they have been construed by the

Union of India as enabling it to arrive at such a settle-

ment.

The argument is that the Act confers a discretionary and

enabling power in the Union to arrive at a settlement but

lays down no guidelines or indications as to the stage at

which, or circumstances in which, a settlement can be

reached or the type of settlement that can be arrived at;

the power conferred should, therefore, be struck down as

unguided, arbitrary and uncanalised. It is difficult to

accept this contention. The power to conduct a litigation,

particularly in a case of this type, must, to be effective,

necessarily carry with it a power to settle it at any stage.

It is impossible to provide statutorily any detailed

722

catalogue of the situations that would justify a settlement

or the basis or terms on which a settlement can be arrived

at. The Act. moreover, cannot be said to have conferred any

unguided or arbitrary discretion to the Union in conducting

proceedings under the Act. Sufficient guidelines emerge from

the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act which makes

it clear that the aim and purpose of the Act is to secure

speedy and effective redress to the victims of the gas leak

and that all steps taken in pursuance of the Act should be

for the implementation of the object. Whether this object

has been achieved by a particular settlement will be a

different question but it is altogether impossible to say

that the Act itself is bad for the reason alleged. We,

therefore, think it necessary to clarify, for our part, that

we are not called upon to express any view on the observa-

tions in Mehta's case and should not be understood as having

done so.

3. Shri Shanti Bhushan, who supported the Union's stand

as to the validity of the Act, however, made his support

conditional on reading into its provisions an obligation on

the part of the Union to make interim payments towards their

maintenance and other needs consequent on the tragedy, until

the suits filed on their behalf ultimately yield tangible

results. That a modern welfare State is under an obligation

to give succour and all kinds of assistance to people in

distress cannot at all be gainsaid. In point of fact also,

as pointed out by the learned Chief Justice, the provisions

of the Act and scheme thereunder envisage interim payments

to the victims; so, there is nothing objectionable in this

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Act on this aspect. However, our learned brother has accept-

ed the argument addressed by Shri Shanti Bhushan which goes

one step further viz. that the Act would be unconstitutional

unless this is read as "a major inarticulate promise" under-

lying the Act. We doubt whether this extension would be

justified for the hypothesis underlying the argument is, in

the words of Sri Shanti Bhushan, that had the victims been

left to fend for themselves, they would have had an "immedi-

ate and normal right of obtaining compensation from the

Union Carbide" and, as the legislation has vested their

rights in this regard in the Union, the Act should be con-

strued as creating an obligation on the Central Government

to provide interim relief. Though we would emphatically

reiterate that grant of interim relief to ameliorate the

plight of its subjects in such a situation is a matter of

imperative obligation on the part of the State and not

merely 'a matter of fundamental human decency' as Judge

Keenan put it, we think that such obligation flows from its

character as a welfare State and would exist irrespective of

what the statute may or may not provide. In our view the

validity of the Act does not depend upon its

723

explicitly or implicitly providing for interim payments. We

say this for two reasons. In the first place, it was, and

perhaps still is, a moot question whether a plaintiff suing

for damages in tort would be entitled to advance or interim

payments in anticipation of a decree. That was, indeed, the

main point on which the interim orders in this case were

challenged before this Court and, in the context of the

events that took place, remains undecided. It may be men-

tioned here that no decided case was brought to our notice

in which interim payment was ordered pending disposal of an

action in tort in this country. May be there is a strong

case for ordering interim payments in such a case but, in

the absence of full and detailed consideration, it cannot be

assumed that, left to themselves, the victims would have

been entitled to a "normal and immediate" right to such

payment. Secondly, even assuming such right exists, all that

can be said is that the State, which put itself in the place

of the victims, should have raised in the suit a demand for

such interim compensation--which it did--and that it should

distribute among the victims such interim compensation as it

may receive from the defendants. To say that the Act would

be bad if it does not provide for payment of such compensa-

tion by the Government irrespective of what may happen in

the suit is to impose on the State an obligation higher than

what flows from its being subrogated to the rights of the

victims. As we agree that the Act and the scheme thereunder

envisage interim relief to the victims, the point is perhaps

only academic. But we felt that we should mention this as we

are not in full agreement with Mukharji, C.J., on this

aspect on the case.

4. The next important aspect on which much debate took

place before us was regarding the validity of the Act qua

the procedure envisaged by it for a compromise or settle-

ment. It was argued that if the suit is considered as a

representative suit no compromise or settlement would be

possible without notice in some appropriate manner to all

the victims of the proposed settlement and an opportunity to

them to ventilate their views thereon (vide Order XXIII, r.

3B, C.P.C.). The argument runs thus: S. 4 of the Act either

incorporates the safeguards of these provisions in which

event any settlement effected without compliance with the

spirit, if not the letter, of these provisions would be

ultra vires the Act. Or it does not, in which event, the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 99 of 104

provisions of S. 4 would be bad as making possible an arbi-

trary deprivation of the victims' rights being inconsistent

with, and derogatory of, the basic rules established by the

ordinary Law of the land viz. the Code of Civil Procedure.

We are inclined to take the view that it is not possible to

bring the suits brought under the Act within the categories

of representative action envisaged in the Code of Civil

procedure. The Act

724

deals with a class of action which is sui generis and for

which a special formula has been found and encapsuled in S.

4. The Act divests the individual claimants of their right

to sue and vests it in the Union. In relation to suits in

India, the Union is the sole plaintiff, none of the others

are envisaged as plaintiffs or respondents. The victims of

the tragedy were so numerous that they were never defined at

the stage of filing the plaint nor do they need to be de-

fined at the stage of a settlement. The litigation is car-

ried on by the State in its capacity, not exactly the same

as but somewhat analogous to that of a "parens patriae". In

the case of a litigation by karta of a Hindu Undivided

Family or by a guardian on behalf of a ward, who is non-sui

juris, for example, the junior members of the family or the

wards, are not to be consulted before entering into a set-

tlement. In such cases, the Court acts as guardian of such

persons to scrutinise the settlement and satisfy itself that

it is in the best interest of all concerned. It is later

discovered that there has been any fraud or collusion, it

may be open to the junior members of the family or the wards

to call the karta or guardian to account but, barring such a

contingency, the settlement would be effective and binding.

In the same way, the Union as "parens patriae" would have

been at liberty to enter into such settlement as it consid-

ered best on its own and seek the Court's approval there-

fore.

However, realising that the litigation is truly fought

on behalf and for the benefit of innumerable, though not

fully identified victims the Act has considered it necessary

to assign a definite role to the individual claimants and

this is spelt out in S. 4. This section directs:

(i) that the union shall have due regard to

any matters which such person may require to

be urged with respect to his claim; and

(ii) that the Union shaH, if such person so

desires, permit at the expense of such person,

a legal practitioner of his choice to be

associated in the conduct of any suit or other

proceeding relating to his claim.

This provision adequately safeguards the interests of indi-

vidual victims. It enables each one of them to bring to the

notice of the Union any special features or circumstances

which he would like to urge in respect of any matter and if

any such features are brought to its notice the Union is

obliged to take it into account. Again, the individual

claimants are also at liberty to engage their own counsel to

associate with the State counsel in conducting the proceed-

ings. If the suits in this

725

case had proceeded, in the normal course, either to the

stage of a decree or even to one of settlement the claimants

could have kept themselves abreast of the developments and

the statutory provisions would have been more than adequate

to ensure that the points of view of all the victims are

presented to the court. Even a settlement or compromise

could not have been arrived at without the court being

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 100 of 104

apprised of the views or any of them who chose to do so.

Advisedly, the statute has provided that though the Union of

India will be the dominus litis in the suit, the interests

of all the victims and their claims should be safeguarded by

giving them a voice in the proceedings to the extent indi-

cated above. This provision of the statute is an adaptation

of the principle of O.I.r. 8 and of Or. XXIII r. 3 of the

Code of Civil Procedure in its application to the suits

governed by it and, though the extent of participation

allowed to the victims is somewhat differently enunciated in

the legislation, substantially speaking, it does incorporate

the principles of natural justice to the extent possible in

the circumstances. The statute cannot, therefore, be fault-

ed, as has been pointed out earlier also, on the ground that

it denies the victims an opportunity to present their views

or places them at any disadvantage in the matter of having

an effective voice in the matter of settling the suit by way

of compromise.

The difficulty in this case has arisen, as we see it,

because of a fortuitous circumstance viz. that the talks of

compromise were mooted and approved in the course of the

hearing of an appeal from an order for interim payments.

Though compromise talks had been in the air right from the

beginning of this episode, it is said that there was an

element of surprise when they were put forward in Court in

February, 1989. This is not quite correct. It has been

pointed out that even when the issue regarding the interim

relief was debated in the courts below, attempts were made

to settle the whole litigation. The claimants were aware of

this and they could--perhaps should--have anticipated that

similar attempts would be made in this Court also. Though

certain parties had been associated with the conduct of the

proceedings in the trial court--and the trial judge did

handsomely acknowledge their contribution to the proceed-

ings--they were apparently not alert enough to keep a watch-

ing brief in the Supreme Court, may be under the impression

that the appeal here was concerned only with the quantum of

interim relief. One set of parties was present in the Court

but, apart from praying that he should be forthwith paid a

share in the amount that would be deposited in Court by the

UCC in pursuance of the settlement, no attempt appears to

have been made to put forward a contention that the amount

of settlement was inade-

726

quate or had not taken into account certain relevant consid-

erations. The Union also appears to have been acting on the

view that it could proceed ahead on its own both in its

capacity as "parens patraie" as well as in view of the

powers of attorney held by it from a very large number of

the victims though the genuineness of this claim is now

contested before us. There was a day's interval between the

enunciation of the terms of the settlement and their approv-

al by the Court. Perhaps the Court could have given some

more publicity to the proposed settlement in the newspapers,

radio and television and also permitted some time to lapse

before approving it, if only to see whether there were any

other points of view likely to emerge. Basically speaking,

however, the Act has provided an adequate opportunity to the

victims to speak out and if they or the counsel engaged by

some of them in the trial court had kept in touch with the

proceedings in this court, they could have most certainly

made themselves heard. If a feeling has gained ground that

their voice has not been fully heard, the fault was not with

the statute but was rather due to the developments leading

to the finalisation of the settlement when the appeal

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 101 of 104

against the interim order was being heard in this Court.

One of the points of view on which considerable emphasis

was laid in the course of the arguments was that in a case

of this type the offending parties should be dealt with

strictly under the criminal law of the Land and that the

inclusion, as part of the settlement, of a term requiring

the withdrawal of the criminal prosecutions launched was

totally unwarranted and vitiates the settlement. It has been

pointed out by Mukharji, C.J. ,--and we agree--that the Act

talks only of the civil liability of, and the proceedings

against, the UCC or UCIL or others for damages caused by the

gas leak. It has nothing to say about the criminal liability

of any of the parties involved. Clearly, therefore, this

part of the settlement comprises a term which is outside the

purview of the Act. The validity of the Act cannot, there-

fore, be impugned on the ground that it permits--and should

not have permitted-the withdrawal of criminal proceedings

against the delinquents. Whether in arriving at the settle-

ment, this aspect could also have been taken into account

and this term included in it, is a question concerning the

validity of the settlement. This is a question outside the

terms of reference to us and we, therefore, express no

opinion in regard thereto.

5. A question was mooted before us as to whether the

actual settlement--if not the statutory provision--is liable

to be set aside on the grounds that the principles of natu-

ral justice have been flagrantly

727

violated. The merits of the settlement as such are not in

issue before us and nothing we say can or should fetter the

hands of the Bench hearing a review petition which has

already been filed, from passing such orders thereon as it

considers appropriate.

Our learned brother, however, has, while observing that

the question referred to us is limited to the validity of

the Act alone and not the settlement, incidentally discussed

this aspect of the case too. He has pointed out that justice

has in fact been done and that all facts and aspects rele-

vant for a settlement have been considered. He has pointed

out that the grievance of the petitioners that the order of

this Court did not give any basis for the settlement has

since been sought to be met by the order passed on 4th May,

1989 giving detailed reasons, This shows that the Court had

applied its mind fully to the terms of the settlement in the

light of the data as well as all the circumstances placed

before it and had been satisfied that the settlement pro-

posed was a fair and reasonable one that could be approved.

In actions of this type, the Court's approval is the true

safety valve to prevent unfair settlements and the fact is

that the highest Court of the land has given thought to the

matter and seen it fit to place its seal of approval to the

settlement. He has also pointed out that a post-decisional

hearing in a matter like this will not be of much avail. He

has further pointed out that a review petition has already

been filed in the case and is listed for hearing. The Court

has already given an assurance in its order of May 4, 1989,

that it will only be too glad to consider any aspects that

may have been overlooked in considering the terms of the

settlement. Can it be said, in the circumstances, that there

has been a failure of justice which compels us to set aside

the settlement as totally violative of fundamental rights?

Mukharji, C.J., has pointed out that the answer to this

question should be in the negative. It was urged that there

is a feeling that the maxim: "Justice must not only be done

but must also appear to be done" has not been fully complied

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 102 of 104

with and that perhaps, if greater publicity had attended the

hearing, many other facts and aspects could have been high-

lighted resulting in a higher settlement or no settlement at

all. That feeling can be fully ventilated and that deficien-

cy can be adequately repaired, it has been pointed out by

Mukharji, C.J., in the hearing on the review petition pend-

ing before this Court. Though we are prima facie inclined to

agree with him that there are good reasons why the settle-

ment should not be set aside on the ground that the princi-

ples of natural justice have been violated, quite apart from

the practical complications that may arise as the result of

such an order, we would not express any final opinion on the

validity of the settlement but would leave it open to be

agitated, to the

728

extent permissible in law, in the review petition pending

before this Court.

There is one more aspect which we may perhaps usefully

refer to in this context. The scheme of the Act is that on

the one hand the Union of India pursues the litigiation

against the UCC and the UCIL; on the other all the victims

of the tragedy are expected to file their claims before the

prescribed authority and have their claims for compensation

determined by such authority. Certain infirmities were

pointed out on behalf of the petitioners in the statutory

provisions enacted in this regard. Our learned brother has

dealt with these aspects and given appropriate directions to

ensure that the claims will be gone into by a quasi judicial

authority (unfettered by executive prescriptions of the

amounts of compensation by categorising the nature of in-

juries) with an appeal to an officer who has judicial quali-

fications. In this manner the scheme under the Act provides

for a proper determination of the compensation payable to

the various claimants. Claims have already been filed and

these are being scrutinised and processed. A correct picture

as to whether the amount of compensation for which the

claims have ben settled is meagre, adequate or excessive

will emerge only at that stage when all the claims have been

processed and their aggregate is determined. In these cir-

cumstances, we feel that no useful purpose will be served by

a post-decisional hearing on the quantum of compensation to

be considered adequate for settlement.

For these reasons, it would seem more correct and proper

not to disturb the orders of 14-15 February, 1989 on the

ground that the rules of natural justice have not been

complied with, particularly in view of the pendency of the

review petition.

6. Before we conclude, we would like to add a few words

on the state of the law of torts in this country. Before we

gained independence, on account of our close association

with Great Britain, we were governed by the common law

principles. In the field of torts, under the common law of

England, no action could be laid by the dependants or heirs

of a person whose death was brought about by the tortious

act of another on the maxim actio personalis moritur cum

persona, although a person injured by a similar act could

claim damages for the wrong done to him. In England this

situation was remedied by the passing of the Fatal Accidents

Act, 1846, popularly known as Lord Campell's Act. Soon

thereafter the Indian Legislature enacted the Fatal acci-

dents Act, 1855. This Act is fashioned on the lines of the

English Act

729

of 1846. Even though the English Act has undergone a sub-

stantial change, our law has remained static and seems a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 103 of 104

trifle archaic. The magnitude of the gas leak disaster in

which hundreds lost their lives and thousands were maimed,

not to speak of the damage to livestock, flora and fauna,

business and property, is an eye opener. The nation must

learn a lesson from this traumatic experience and evolve

safeguards atleast for the future. We are of the view that

the time is ripe to take a fresh look at the outdated cen-

tury old legislation which is out of tune with modern con-

cepts.

While it may be a matter for scientists and technicians

to find solutions to avoid such large scale disasters, the

law must provide an effective and speedy remedy to the

victims of such torts. The Fatal Accidents Act, on account

of its limited and restrictive application, is hardly suited

to meet such a challenge. We are, therefore, of the opinion

that the old antiquated Act should be drastically amended or

fresh legislation should be enacted which should, inter

alia, contain appropriate provisions in regard to the fol-

lowing matters:

(i) The payment of a fixed minimum compensa-

tion on a "no-fault liability" basis (as under

the Motor Vehicles Act), pending final adjudi-

cation of the claims by a prescribed forum;

(ii) The creation of a special forum with

specific power to grant interim relief in

appropriate cases;

(iii) The evolution of a procedure to be

followed by such forum which will be conducive

to the expeditious determination of claims and

avoid the high degree of formalism that at-

taches to proceedings in regular courts; and

(iv) A provision requiring industries and

concerns engaged in hazardous activities to

take out compulsory insurance against third

party risks.

In addition to what we have said above, we should like

to say that the suggestion made by our learned brother, K.N.

Singh J., for the creation of an Industrial Disaster Fund

(by whatever name called) deserves serious consideration. We

would also endorse his suggestion that the Central Govern-

ment will be well advised if, in future, it insists on

certain safeguards before permitting a transnational company

to do business in this country. The necessity of such safe-

guards, atleast in the following two directions, is high-

lighted in the present case:

730

(a) Shri Garg has alleged that the processes

in the Bhopal Gas Plant were so much shrouded

in secrecy that neither the composition of the

deadly gas that escaped nor the proper anti-

dote therefore were known to anyone in this

country with the result that the steps taken

to combat its effects were not only delayed

but also totally inadequate and ineffective.

It is necessary that this type of situation

should be avoided. The Government should

therefore insist, when granting licence to a

transnational company to establish its indus-

try here, on a right to be informed of the

nature of the processes involved so as to be

able to take prompt action in the event of an

accident.

(b) We have seen how the victims in this case

have been considerably handicapped on account

of the fact that the immediate tort-feasor was

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 104 of 104

the subsidiary of a multi-national with its

Indian assets totally inadequate to satisfy

the claims arising out of the disaster. It is,

therefore, necessary to evolve, either by

international consensus or by unilateral

legislation, steps to overcome these handicaps

and to ensure (i) that foreign corporations

seeking to establish an industry here, agree

to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts in

India in respect of actions for tortious acts

in this country; (ii) that the liability of

such a corporation is not limited to such of

its assets (or the assets of its affiliates)

as may be found in this country, but that the

victims are able to reach out to the assets of

such concerns anywhere in the world; (iii)

that any decree obtained in Indian Courts in

compliance with due process of law is capable

of being executed against the foreign corpora-

tion, its affiliates and their assets without

further procedural hurdles, in those other

countries.

Our brother, K.N. Singh, J., has in this context dealt

at some length with the United Nations Code of Conduct for

multi-national Corporations which awaits approval of various

countries. We hope that calamities like the one which this

country has suffered will serve as catalysts to expedite the

acceptance of an international code on such matters in the

near future.

With these observations, we agree with the order pro-

posed by the learned Chief Justice.

G.N. Petitions dis-

posed of.

731

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