2026:JHHC:28475

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Criminal Appeal (S.J.) No. 55 of 2017

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Dilip Kumar Mahto @ Dilip Mahto, son of Late Santosh Mahto,

resident of Mohalbani, P.O. and P.S. – Sudamdhi, District -

Dhanbad ... … Appellant

Versus

The State of Jharkhand ... … Respondent

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CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

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For the Appellant : Mr. Kumar Nilesh, Advocate

For the State : Mr. Shiv Shankar Kumar, A.P.P.

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C.A.V. on 14.01.2026 Pronounced on 21.09.2026

1. Heard Mr. Kumar Nilesh, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant/convict, and Mr. Shiv Shankar Kumar, learned

A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction

dated 30.11.2016 and order of sentence dated 06.12.2016

passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-FTC-XVII at

Dhanbad in S. T. No. 409 of 2012, whereby and whereunder,

the appellant/convict has been convicted under Section 304-B

of IPC and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for

seven years.

3. In the present case, the deceased, namely Mahi Devi,

sustained burn injuries on 20.02.2012 and succumbed to

those injuries on the night of 24.02.2012. Thereafter, a written

application was addressed to the Officer-in-Charge, Chas, by

the father of the deceased, Krishna Chandra Mahto, stating

that his daughter, Mahi Devi, had married Dilip Kumar (the

appellant/convict herein) on 01.07.2009 as per Hindu rites

and customs. After the marriage, his daughter was blessed

with a baby girl within one year. Subsequently, the

appellant/convict and his mother began subjecting the

deceased to cruelty and demanded Rs. 1,00,000/-, threatening

to burn her if the demand was not met.

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4. It was further contended by the informant that on

15.02.2012, when he visited his daughter’s matrimonial home,

her husband and mother-in-law reiterated that the demanded

amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- had not been paid. The mother-in-

law, after kicking the daughter of the informant, told her to go

to her parental home with her father and return only after

bringing Rs. 1,00,000/-. The informant requested time to

arrange the amount, upon which his daughter was allowed to

remain in her matrimonial home. On 20.02.20 12, the

informant received information from the deceased’s aunt-in-law

that her hand had been burnt. He, along with his brother,

immediately rushed to her matrimonial home and learned that

she had been admitted to K.M. Memorial Hospital, Chas.

There, he saw his daughter in a severely burnt condition, and

she succumbed to her injuries during treatment on

24.02.2012.

5. This written report was forwarded to the Officer-in-Charge,

Jorapokhar (Sudamdih) Police Station, where Jorapokhar

(Sudamdih) P.S. Case No. 35 of 2012 dated 25.02.2012 was

registered under Section 304-B IPC and Sections 3/4 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act.

6. After due investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted

a charge-sheet under Section 304-B/34 IPC and Sections 3/4

of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellant/convict and

his mother, Joshna Devi, wife of late Santosh Mahto. On the

basis of the materials on record, the learned Magistrate took

cognizance of the offences under the aforesaid provisions and

committed the case to the Court of Sessions. Charges were

framed against the accused persons under Sections 304-B/34

and 302/34 IPC, which were read over and explained to them.

They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

7. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the

statements of the accused persons were recorded under

Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied the allegations and

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claimed false implication. Upon appreciation of the evidence,

the learned trial court convicted the appellant under Section

304-B IPC and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment

for seven years, while acquitting his mother, Joshna Devi.

Aggrieved thereby, the appellant/convict preferred the present

appeal.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant/convict has submitted

that the impugned judgment of conviction an d order of

sentence passed by the learned trial court is liable to be set

aside, as the police officer who prepared the inquest report of

the deceased was not examined by the prosecution, thereby

causing prejudice to the defence. It has further been submitted

that the informant, P.W.-5 Krishna Chandra Mahto, admitted

in his cross-examination that he was mentally disturbed when

he lodged the FIR and signed the inquest report, which creates

serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of the prosecution

case. Learned counsel has also submitted that the interested

witnesses have contradicted each other on material particulars,

and that there is neither a complete chain of circumstantial

evidence nor any direct evidence to establish the involvement of

the appellant.

9. It has also been contended that the learned trial court

convicted the appellant/convict merely on the basis of

presumption and that, in view of the evidence of the Doctor,

P.W.-8, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt, as the

prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable

doubt.

10. Per contra, learned A.P.P. for the State has submitted that

the appellant/convict has failed to bring on record any iota of

evidence to rebut the presumption arising under Section 113-B

of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 read with Section 304-B of

the IPC. It is further submitted that non-examination of the

police officer who prepared the inquest report of the deceased

is not fatal to the prosecution case in the presence of other

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material evidence, and therefore, the judgment of conviction

and order of sentence require no interference by this appellate

court.

11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record, more particularly the testimony of

the witnesses and the findings recorded by the learned trial

court.

12. To prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as

nine witnesses and, apart from that, several documents were

brought on record. The signature of P.W.-5 on the inquest

report has been marked as Exhibit-1; the written report has

been marked as Exhibit-2; the post-mortem report has been

marked as Exhibit-3; the registration of the case has been

marked as Exhibit-2/1; the formal F.I.R. has been marked as

Exhibit-4; the carbon copy of the inquest report has been

marked as Exhibit-1/1. The defence has also adduced evidence

as Exhibit-A, which is the sheet of attendance register showing

attendance/absence of Joshna Mahatain during the week

commencing 19.02.2012 and ending 25.02.2012.

13. The father of the deceased, Krishna Chandra Mahto

(informant), was examined as P.W.-5. In his testimony, he

stated that on 01.07.2009, his daughter, Mahi Devi, married

Dilip Mahto (appellant/convict) as per Hindu rites and

customs, and thereafter she resided in her matrimonial home

along with her husband, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law

(devar). On 20.02.2012, the appellant and his mother poured

kerosene oil on his daughter, set her on fire, and she sustained

severe burn injuries. For treatment, she was taken to K.M.

Memorial Hospital, Chas, where she succumbed to her injuries

on 24.02.2012. He also spoke about the preparation of the

death inquest report and identified his signature on the same,

which has been marked as Exhibit-1.

14. He further identified his signature on the written report

dated 25.02.2012, which has been marked as Exhibit -2. He

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categorically stated that the appellant and his mother were

demanding Rs. 1,00,000/- from him, and both reiterated this

demand on 15.02.2012, when he told them that he would

arrange the amount. The demand was made both to the

deceased and to this witness. In cross-examination, he stated

that the written report was given at about 12:00 P.M. at Chas

Police Station and that he had signed the death inquest report

at 11:00 A.M. He further stated that he visited K.M. Memorial

Hospital, Chas at 6:00 P.M. on 20.02.2012 and remained there

for five days. He clarified that the deceased was not admitted to

the hospital by the appellant but was brought there by the

appellant’s uncle and aunt. Out of the marriage between the

deceased and the appellant, a daughter was born, who was one

year old at the time of her mother’s death. He also stated that

he knew on 20.02.2012 that Mahi had been burnt by both

accused persons and that he had made an application before

the death of his daughter to Jorapokhar (Sudamdih) Police

Station, but no action was taken.

15. The defence suggested that, in the course of preparing

meals, the saree of the deceased caught fire, leading to her

burn injuries and subsequent death. The witness admitted that

he is a mechanic of auto/tempo vehicles, earning Rs. 200–300

per day, and that he was unaware of the income or

employment details of his samdhan. He described his daughter

as beautiful and virtuous, which facilitated her marriage, and

stated that he frequently visited her matrimonial home. He

further stated that the deceased’s daughter was presently with

the chhoti chachi saas of the deceased, and that the chacha

sasur forbade them from taking the child away. He fairly

conceded that from the time of marriage until the death of his

daughter, he did not lodge any complaint before the panchayat.

16. He further stated that he visited the in-laws’ house and

hospital along with his brother, Ashok Kumar Mahto (P.W.-1),

after hearing about the incident. First, they visited the in-laws’

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house and thereafter K.M. Memorial Hospital, Chas, where

they found the chhoti chachi and manjhla chacha of the

appellant, but neither the appellant nor his mother was

present. He received information at about 10 –11 P.M. on

24.02.2012 regarding the death of his daughter, and on

25.02.2012, he visited the police station. He also stated that

the written report was not in his handwriting, though it bore

his signature.

17. The defence put suggestion to this witness, that the

deceased sustained burn injuries while preparing meals and

that, the appellant removed her to the hospital for treatment

and bore the expenses incurred therein that no dowry was

given or demanded at any time, and that the present case was

lodged at the instigation of others.

18. P.W.-1, Ashok Kumar Mahto, is the uncle of the deceased.

He reiterated the facts stated by Krishna Chandra Mahto (P.W.-

5), the informant. He deposed that on 20.02.2012 at about

6:00 P.M., his brother received a phone call informing him that

his daughter’s hand had been burnt. Upon receiving this

information, he, along with P.W.-5 and four others, including

Vijay Mahto, visited the in-laws’ house of Mahi Devi, where no

one was present. Nearby persons informed them that Mahi had

been taken to K.M. Memorial Hospital, Chas, by her chacha

and chachi saas. At the hospital, they found Mahi badly burnt

and unconscious. He further stated that the deceased was

burnt due to non-fulfilment of the dowry demand of Rs.

1,00,000/- made by the appellant and his mother. He added

that whenever they visited Mahi’s matrimonial home, they tried

to reason with her in-laws. He also stated that on 15.02.2012,

he and P.W.-5 visited Mahi’s in-laws’ house, where her mother-

in-law pushed her with her leg and told her to ask for money

from her father, failing which she would not be allowed to

remain in the house. He further stated that at the time of

marriage, 80–100 baraties were present, and he himself visited

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Mahi’s sasural 15–16 times, sometimes alone and sometimes

with his brother or a friend. He added that after one and a half

months of marriage, the demand of dowry was made from Mahi

by her in-laws.

19. The defence put suggestion to this witness that Mahi’s

death was accidental, that her in-laws bore heavy medical

expenses during her treatment, and that this witness and

P.W.-5 demanded Rs. 20,00,000/- from the appellant’s mother,

lodging the present case only to extort money. This witness was

cross-examined on behalf of the appellant’s mother, but not on

behalf of the appellant. Consequently, the cross-examination

on behalf of the appellant was closed and the witness was

discharged.

20. P.W.-2, Manju Devi, the aunt of the deceased, stated that

2–4 months after the marriage, both accused demanded Rs.

1,00,000/- as dowry. As the family was poor, they could not

fulfill the demand, and consequently the deceased was burnt

on 20.02.2012. This witness was not cross-examined by the

defence and was discharged.

21. P.W.-3, Kamta Prasad Mahto, a friend of the deceased’s

father, stated that the incident was narrated to him by P.W.-5.

He further deposed that even Mahi herself had conveyed to him

that her husband and mother-in-law demanded Rs. 1,00,000/-

as dowry and threatened to kill her if the demand was not met.

He also visited K.M. Memorial Hospital, Chas, where Mahi was

undergoing treatment. The defence put a suggestion to this

witness also that Mahi sustained burn injuries while preparing

meals.

22. P.W.-4, Sonia Devi, the mother of the deceased, stated that

the husband and mother -in-law of Mahi demanded Rs.

1,00,000/- as dowry. As the family was poor, they could not

fulfil the demand, and Mahi was burnt by them. She further

stated that she visited K.M. Memorial Hospital to look after her

daughter, who was badly burnt. She admitted that no

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Panchayati was convened regarding the demand of money. On

the evening of the incident, she received telephonic information

and immediately proceeded to see Mahi. She also stated that

she informed Sudamdih Police Station, but no one came, and

the dead body was taken away by the in -laws. Mahi had a

daughter aged about one and a half years, who was being kept

by the appellant’s uncle and aunt

23. Similar suggestions, as were put to other witnesses, were

also put to this witness that Mahi was burnt while preparing

meals and that she was taken to the hospital by her husband

and mother-in-law. This witness was not cross-examined on

behalf of the appellant, though she was cross-examined on

behalf of the appellant’s mother.

24. P.W.-6, Sadhu Mallick, and P.W. -7, Rajender Marandi,

resiled from their earlier statements and were declared hostile.

25. P.W.-8, Dr. Bikash Kumar, conducted the post -mortem

examination of the deceased, aged about 20 years. He found

approximately 80% burns over the face, neck (front and back),

chest (front and back), abdomen, arms and forearms, pelvic

region, thighs, and knee joints. All injuries were ante mortem.

He opined that the cause of death was septicemia leading to

shock, caused by burn injuries. He identified the post-mortem

report and his signature, which was marked as Exh ibit-3. In

cross-examination, he stated that it could be a case of

self-burning.

26. P.W.-9, Surendra Prasad, the Investigating Officer,

inspected the place of occurrence. He stated that the deceased

and her husband resided in a room measuring 8 ft. x 7 ft.,

which contained a palang (bed). He found black smoke stains

on the western wall, one and a half feet away from the bed, and

the southern corner of the bed was burnt. He also deposed

regarding the conduct of the post-mortem examination and

preparation of the death inquest report. He recorded the

statements of witnesses. In cross-examination, he admitted

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that he did not seize the palang (bed) or collect samples of the

smoke stains. He further stated that no evidence was adduced

by the informant regarding dowry articles given at the time of

marriage, nor was any specific date disclosed as to when Rs.

1,00,000/- was demanded.

27. It is apposite to discuss herein Section 304-B IPC, which

defines, and provides the punishment for dowry demand, reads

as under:

“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by

any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal

circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that

soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by

her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with,

any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and

such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have

the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

(28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but

which may extend to imprisonment for life.”

28. From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that

Section 304-B (1) defines “dowry death” of a woman. It provides

that “dowry death” is where death of a woman is caused by

burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than u nder

normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it is

shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty

or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband,

in connection with demand for dowry. Sub-clause (2) provides

for punishment for those who cause dowry death.

29. Thus, it is evident that there are three conditions in the

aforesaid statute and if those three conditions are fulfilled then

the case will come under the purview of Section 304-B of IPC.

Three conditions which culled out from section 304-B of IPC

are as follows: (i) The death caused by burn or bodily injury or

occurs otherwise within under normal circumstance. (ii) Death

was occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) It has

been shown that soon before her death she was subjected to

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cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her

husband in connection with any demand for dowry.

30. Thus, in order to sustain the conviction under Section 304-

B of IPC, it is mandatory to establish that soon before death,

the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her

husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any

demand for dowry and the death caused by burn or bodily

injury or occurs otherwise within under normal circumstance

within seven years of victim’s marriage.

31. In the case of Major Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in

(2015) 5 SCC 201, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex

Court has laid down the guidelines, wherein it has been

specifically observed that in order to sustain the conviction

under Section 304-B of IPC, cruelty or harassment is shown to

have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.The

relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted

as under:

10. To sustain the conviction under Section 304 -B IPC, the

following essential ingredients are to be established:

(i) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily

injury or otherwise than under a “normal circumstance”; (ii) such a

death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage;

(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her

husband or any relative of her husband; (iv) such cruelty or

harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry;

and (v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted

out to the woman soon before her death.

32. It is further required to discuss herein that the cruelty or

harassment differs from case to case. Cruelty can be mental or

it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It

can be verbal or emotional like in sulting or ridiculing or

humiliating a woman. It can be depriving her of economic

resources or essential amenities of life. The list is illustrative

and not exhaustive.

33. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B of

IPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”. It is a

relative term which is required to be considered under specific

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circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be

laid down by fixing any time-limit. In relation to dowry deaths,

the circumstances showing the ex istence of cruelty or

harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular

instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such

conduct may be spread over a period of time. Proximate and

live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand

and the consequential death is required to be proved by the

prosecution.

34. The above legal proposition was emphasized by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in the case of Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana,

reported in (2021) 6 SCC 1, wherein it has been held which

reads as under:

15. Considering the significance of such a legislation, a strict

interpretation would defeat the very object for which it was enacted.

Therefore, it is safe to deduce that when the legislature used the words,

“soon before” they did not mean “immediately before”. Rather, they left

its determination in the hands of the courts. The factum of cruelty or

harassment differs from case to case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is

quite varied, as it can range from physical, verbal or even emotional.

This list is certainly not exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can

therefore be laid down by this Court to define what exactly the phrase

“soon before” entails.

17. Therefore, courts should use their discretion to determine if the

period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the victim

would come within the term “soon before”. What is pivotal to the above

determination, is the establishment of a “proximate and live link”

between the cruelty and the consequential death of the victim.

35. When the prosecution shows that “soon before her death

such woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassment for,

or in connection with, any demand for dowry”, a presumption

of causation arises against the accused under Section 113-B of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 113-B of the Evidence

Act reads as under:

113-B. Presumption as to dowry death —When the question is

whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it

is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected

by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with,

any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person

had caused the dowry death.

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Explanation —For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall

have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code

(45 of 1860).

36. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the word

“shall” has been stipulated therein which provides mandatory

application on the part of the court to presume that death had

been committed by the person who had s ubjected her to

cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry

and as such onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption

and in case of Section 113-B relatable to Section 304-B IPC,

the onus to prove shifts on the accused.

37. The Hon’ble Apex Court while relying on the provisions of

Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section

304-B IPC, where the words “soon before her death” find

mention, the following observations have been made in the

case of Surinder Singh v. State of Hary ana reported in

(2014) 4 SCC 129. The relevant paragraph is quoted here

under:

17. Thus, the words “soon before” appear in Section 113-B of the Evidence

Act, 1872 and also in Section 304-BIPC. For the presumptions contemplated

under these sections to spring into action, it is necessary to show that the

cruelty or harassment was caused soon before the death. The interpretation of

the words “soon before” is, therefore, important. The question is how “soon

before”? This would obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each

case. The cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. It relates to the

mindset of people which varies from person to person. Cruelty can be mental

or it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It can be

verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a woman. It can

be giving threats of injury to her or her near and dear ones. It can be

depriving her of economic resources or essential amenities of life. It can be

putting restraints on her movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the

outside world. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Physical cruelty

could be actual beating or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman.

Every such instance of cruelty and related harassment has a different impact

on the mind of a woman. Some instances may be so grave as to have a

lasting impact on a woman. Some instances which degrade her dignity may

remain, etched in her memory for a long time. Therefore, “soon before” is a

relative term. In matters of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. The time-

lag may differ from case to case. This must be kept in mind while examining

each case of dowry death.

18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Kans Raj

v. State of Punjab [Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC

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(Cri) 935] where this Court considered the term “soon before”. The relevant

observations are as under : (SCC pp. 222-23, para 15) „15. … “Soon before” is

a relative term which is required to be c onsidered under specific

circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by

fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity

test. The term “soon before” is not synonymous with the term “immediately

before” and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as used and understood

in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply

that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the

statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as

earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar

circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances

showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not

restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct.

Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or

harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be

deemed to be “soon before death” if any other intervening circumstance

showing the non existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before

such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that

such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the

effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is

required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or

harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be

too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having

become stale enough.‟

Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry, cruelty or

harassment, based upon such demand and the date of death. The test of

proximity will have to be applied. But,it is not a rigid test. It depends on the

facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive

approach of the court within the confines of law.

38. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of

M.P. v. Jogendra reported in (2022) 5 SCC 401 has pithily

summarized the law on Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113-

B of the Evidence Act. The relevant paragraph is quoted as

under:

17. In the above context, we may usefully refer to a recent decision of a three-

Judge Bench of this Court in Gurmeet 21 Singh v. State of Punjab [Gurmeet

Singh v. State of Punjab, (2021) 6 SCC 108 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 771] that has

restated (at SCC pp. 111-12, para 9) the detailed guidelines that have been

laid down in Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana [Satbir Singh v. Sta te of

Haryana, (2021) 6 SCC 1 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 745] , both authored by N.V.

Ramana, C.J. relating to trial under Section 304-BIPC where the law on

Section 304-BIPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act has been pithily

summarised in the following words : (Satbir Singh case [Satbir Singh v. State

of Haryana, (2021) 6 SCC 1 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 745] , SCC p. 13, para 38)

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“38.1. Section 304-B IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative

intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.

38.2. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary

ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B IPC. Once these

ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided

under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act operates against the accused.

38.3. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-BIPC cannot be

construed to mean “immediately before”. The prosecution must establish

existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or

harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

38.4. Section 304-BIPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorising

death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non -

categorisation is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under

normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

39. In the light of the aforesaid legal proposition, coming to the

case in hand, it is an admitted fact that the marriage between

the deceased victim and the accused was solemnized on

01.07.2009 and the death of the victim occurred on

24.02.2012, i.e., more than two years and six months after the

marriage. Thus, the death of the victim occurred within seven

years of marriage, thereby fulfilling one of the primary

requisites to invoke the provisions of Section 304-B IPC.

40. As regards the demand of dowry and cruelty/harassment

“soon before” the death of the deceased, it transpires that the

father of the deceased, P.W.-5 (informant), categorically stated

that the appellant and his mother demanded Rs. 1,00,000/- on

15.02.2012, and he assured them that he would arrange the

said amount. This statement is corroborated by the fardbayan.

The demand was also made directly to the deceased. P.W. -1

(uncle) further stated that the demand of dowry was made

within one and a half months of marriage and that whenever

he accompanied P.W.-5 to the matrimonial home, they tried to

pacify the in-laws. He also stated that the deceased was burnt

to death as the demand of Rs. 1,00,000/- was not fulfilled, and

that on 15.02.2012, the mother-in-law kicked the deceased

and told her to ask for money, failing which she would not be

allowed to stay.

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15

41. P.W.-2 also spoke of the demand of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the

in-laws. P.W.-3 deposed that the deceased herself conveyed to

him that her husband and mother -in-law demanded Rs.

1,00,000/- and threatened to kill her if the demand was not

met. P.W.-4, the mother of the deceased, reiterated the demand

of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the husband and mo ther-in-law and

stated that the deceased had frequent quarrels with them. She

denied the defence suggestion that the allegations of dowry

demand and harassment were false.

42. From the testimony of P.W.-1, P.W.-2, P.W.-3, P.W.-4, and

P.W.-5, it is evident that the demand of dowry was made. The

statement of P.W.-1 regarding the mother-in-law kicking the

deceased in the presence of P.W.-5, coupled with P.W.-4’s

statement about frequent quarrels, establishes that the

deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassmen t in

connection with dowry demand soon before her death.

43. As regards the cause of death, P.W.-8 (doctor) opined that

septicemia leading to shock, caused by burn injuries, was the

cause of death. He found 80% burns over the face, neck (front

and back), chest (front and back), abdomen, arms, forearms,

pelvic region, thighs, and knees. P.W.-5 stated that the

husband and mother-in-law poured kerosene oil and set the

deceased on fire, which was corroborated by P.W.-1 and P.W.-

4. However, the medical report and testimony of P.W.-8 did not

specifically confirm the manner of burning as alleged. The

appellant, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., claimed

ignorance of how his wife was burnt, stating that she caught

fire in the cooking room and in his house food is prepared

using coal.

44. From the appellant/convict’s statement, it is admitted that

a coal stove (koyla chulha) was used for cooking. A coal stove

burns solid fuel and cannot explode like a pressure stove.

Accidental burns from such a stove typically follow a vertical

path from bottom to top and rarely cover the entire body

2026:JHHC:28475

16

uniformly. The extensive, uniform 80% burns over the front

and back of the body strongly suggest the use of a liquid

accelerant such as kerosene or petrol, rather than accidental

burning from a coal stove.

45. P.W.-9 (Investigating Officer) inspected the place of

occurrence and found black smoke stains on the wall and a

burnt corner of the palang (bed) in the room where the

deceased resided. This rules out accidental burning from a coal

stove and supports the inference of deliberate burning using a

liquid accelerant. The testimony of P.W. -5, coupled with

corroboration from P.W.-1 and P.W.-4, further strengthens this

conclusion.

46. The appellant/convict’s statement under Section 313

Cr.P.C. that he was playing cricket less than a kilometer away

from his house and that at 01:00 P.M. he received information

regarding the incident from 3-4 villagers whose name he was

unable to disclose. The appellant/convict has further stated

that he reached home at 02:00 P.M. He showed his ignorance

about how his wife sustained burn injury but has stated that

she burnt in the kitchen. However, the unnamed persons from

whom he allegedly learnt of the incident were not examined by

the appellant/convict.

47. The above stated response of the appellant under Section

313 Cr.P.C. raises serious doubts about the veracity and

credibility of his version.

It is further required to be noted that, in cross-

examination, defence has put a suggestion to witnesses that

deceased has sustained burn injury while preparing meal.

However, there is no evidence available on record to

substantiate this defence. No effort was made on behalf of the

appellant/convict to bring such a fact on record, as not a single

question qua this, was put to the I.O. who had inspected the

place of occurrence.

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17

48. It is settled law that statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

can be considered to lend credence to prosecution evidence but

cannot form the sole basis of conviction. In the present case,

however, the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC stand satisfied,

and the presumption under Section 113 -B of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 operates against the appellant. The burden

shifted to him to rebut the presumption, but he failed to

adduce any evidence to establish acc idental death or his

non-involvement.

49. Considering the legal propositions and the overall facts and

circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the

appellant failed to rebut the presumption under Section 113-B

of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as no evidence was adduced

on his behalf to discharge the burden. The prosecution has

proved the charge beyond the reasonable doubt, and the

judgment of conviction and order of sentence, therefore stand

affirmed.

50. Resultantly, the instant criminal appeal being Cr. Appeal

(S.J.) No. 55 of 2017 is, hereby, dismissed.

51. Let a copy of this judgment along with the trial court

records be sent back forthwith to the court concerned for

information and needful.

52. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of.

(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)

Umesh/-

Dated, the 21.09.2026

A.F.R.