CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 1 of 16

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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Date of Decision: 22.09.2026

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CNR No.DLHC010452452026

DINESH KUMAR AND ANR. .....Petitioners

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026, CRL.M.A.29515/2026 & 29517/2026

Through: Mr. Karunakar Mahalok, Mr.

Manoranjan Mishra, Advs.

versus

CBI .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Premtosh K. Mishra (SPP) along

with Mr. Krish Bhatia, Mr. Vasu

Agarwal, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

SACHIN DATTA, J. (ORAL)

Crl.M.A.29516/2026 (Exemption from filing certified copies of annexures)

1. The application is disposed of with a direction to the applicant to file

the original/ clear/ legible copies of the documents referred to in the

application before the next date of hearing.

2. The petitioners have filed the present Revision Petition assailing a

common order dated 19.05.2026 passed by the Ld. Special Judge, (PC Act)

(CBI-07), Rouse Avenue Court, New Delhi, whereby the applications filed

by the petitioners seeking discharge / dropping of the proceedings on the

ground of invalidity of sanction for their prosecution were dismissed.

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 2 of 16

3. As per the facts narrated in the petition, petitioner no.1 (Mr. Dinesh

Kumar) joined the Delhi Police as a Sub Inspector in 1996 and was

promoted to the rank of Inspector by an order dated 19.04.2012 issued under

the authority of the Commissioner of Police. At the relevant time, petitioner

no.1 is stated to have been S.H.O of P.S. Sagarpur, South West District,

New Delhi.

4. Petitioner no.2 was a Head Constable, promoted on ad- hoc basis vide

order dated 26.11.2021. The ad -hoc promotion was regularized by an order

dated 23.06.2023 issued by the Office of the Commissioner of Police, Delhi.

5. The case of the prosecution is that pursuant to the verification of

complaint dated 26.03.2025 of Mrs. Shailender Kaur alleging that she was

being threatened with false implication along with her family members, in a

case under the NDPS Act unless a bribe of Rs. 5 lakhs was paid, the CBI

laid a trap in which the petitioner no.2 was apprehended while demanding

and accepting Rs. 2.5 lakhs. The same was allegedly in connivance with a

co-accused and petitioner no.1. Charge-sheet was filed in the matter on

11.07.2025 for offences punishable under Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya

Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter ‘BNS’) and Section 7 of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter ‘PC Act’).

6. The Sanction order for prosecution under Section 19 of the PC Act

was accorded vide order dated 30.06.2025. The sanction order qua the

accused (Dinesh Kumar) has been appended as Annexure A-5 to the present

petition. The same reads as under:-

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 3 of 16

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 4 of 16

7. The impugned common order dated 19.05.2026 opposes the

application filed by accused (Dinesh Kumar) as also application filed by

accused (Sanwarmal @ Samar) seeking that the proceedings be dropped on

the ground of invalidity of the sanc tion under Section 19 of the PC Act. The

relevant portion in the impugned order reads as under:-

“4. Admittedly, there is a sanction order in existence in the

present case though the accused seeks to pick holes in the manner it

has been granted by claiming that the sanctioning authority is

incompetent . However, in the opinion of the court, triable issues are

involved in determining whether the sanction according authority

was incompetent to grant the same. The prosecution has relied upon

provisions of Delhi Police Act and rules contained therein, duly

promulgated and passed by the legislature which cannot be

surpassed by an executive order. CBI has contended that the order

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 5 of 16

dated 19.04.2012 relied upon by the accused has been signed by the

Joint CP and not the Commissioner. CBI has further contended that

even for once if it is assumed that the appointment of the accused

was made by the order of the Commissioner, nevertheless it will not

take away or override the powers vested in the appropriate authority

to appoint or remove the public servant from his office. As per the

Delhi Police Act and Delhi Police promotion rules, the

Commissioner of Police is the competent authority who is

empowered to specially authorize any officer to make appointments

on his behalf. By virtue of the above said and Rule 3 of the above

referred Promotion Rules, the Appointing Authority in relation to

Inspector of Police is the Additional Commissioner of Police. Hence,

the argument of the accused that the orders dated 19.4.2012 denote

that promotion is by order of Commissioner and not by Joint

Commissioner is questionable. At this stage, the court cannot hold

that sanction is invalid by denying an opportunity to the prosecution

to explain the circumstances in which this order dated 19.4.2012 has

been issued. Further, prosecution is justified in claiming that

accused needs to satisfy the court that his earlier appointment letter

has lost its relevance and cannot be considered while deciding the

issue of validity of Sanction. As per rule 4 and 6 of the Delhi Police

Recruitment rules, the competent authority to appoint and remove an

Inspector rank police official is the Additional Commissioner. In the

case of Joint Commissioner of Police & Ors. v. Sube Singh and

ors., it has been clarified that a Joint Commissioner of Police

continues to exercise the powers of an Additional Commissioner of

Police. Furthermore, as per Sec 114(e) of Indian Evidence Act

(Corresponding Sec 119 of BSS), there is a presumption that acts

performed in the course of official duty have been performed

regularly. In the opinion of this court, issues raised by prosecution

regarding previous post held by the accused ,whether promotion has

been rightly granted, whether promotion has been granted in terms

of recommendations of the DPCC, whether cadre of the accused has

changed, whether it is the Commissioner who had appointed him

vide order dated 19.4.2012 and whether the Commissioner has

lawfully delegated his authority to the Joint/Addl. Commissioner

cannot be decided at this stage without evidence being led on the

same. The accused being entitled to raise these issues during trial

and prove his defence at subs equent stage is not entitled to claim the

benefit of this plea at this stage in the present form. His application

for discharge/dropping of proceedings is accordingly dismissed.”

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that there is no valid

sanction in the present case inasmuch as the sanction has not been accorded

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 6 of 16

by the competent authority to remove the concerned public servant/ accused

persons. Reliance is placed on Article 311 of the Constitution of India to

contend that removal of a civil servant by an authority subordinate to the

appointing authority is impermissible and proscribed under the Constitution

itself.

9. Learned Special Public Prosecutor (SPP) for CBI opposes the present

petition.

10. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988 reads as under:-

REASONING

“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—(1) No court

shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under [Sections 7,

11, 13 and 15] alleged to have been committed by a public

servant, except with the previous sanction[save as otherwise

provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013],—

(a) in the case of a person [who is employed, or as the case

may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence

employed] in connection with the affairs of the Union and is

not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of

the Central Government, of that Government;

(b) in the case of a person [who is employed, or as the case

may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence

employed] in connection with the affairs of a State and is not

removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the

State Government, of that Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent

to remove him from his office.

[Provided that no request can be made, by a person other than a

police officer or an officer of an investigation agency or other law

enforcement authority, to the appropriate Government or

competent authority, as the case may be, for the previous sanction

of such Government or authority for taking cognizance by the

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 7 of 16

court of any of the offences specified in this sub- section, unless—

(i) such person has filed a complaint in a competent court

about the alleged offences for which the public servant is

sought to be prosecuted; and

(ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint under Section

203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and

directed the complainant to obtain the sanction for prosecution

against the public servant for further proceeding:

Provided further that in the case of request from the person

other than a police officer or an officer of an investigation

agency or other law enforcement authority, the appropriate

Government or competent authority shall not accord sanction

to prosecute a public servant without providing an opportunity

of being heard to the concerned public servant:

Provided also that the appropriate Government or any

competent authority shall, after the receipt of the proposal

requiring sanction for prosecution of a public servant under

this sub- section, endeavour to convey the decision on such

proposal within a period of three months from the date of its

receipt:

Provided also that in case where, for the purpose of grant of

sanction for prosecution, legal consultation is required, such

period may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, be

extended by a further period of one month:

Provided also that the Central Government may, for the

purpose of sanction for prosecution of a public servant,

prescribe such guidelines as it considers necessary.

Explanation.— For the purposes of sub- section (1), the

expression “public servant” includes such person—

(a) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence

is alleged to have been committed; or

(b) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence

is alleged to have been committed and is holding an office

other than the office during which the offence is alleged to

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 8 of 16

have been committed.]

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to

whether the previous sanction as required under sub- section (1)

should be given by the Central Government or the State

Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given

by that Government or authority which would have been

competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time

when the offence was alleged to have been committed.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge

shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation

or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error,

omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-

section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of

justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;

(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the

ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction

granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error,

omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;

(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any

other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of

revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any

inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.

(4) In determining under sub- section (3) whether the absence of,

or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has

occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have

regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have

been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—

(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant

sanction;

(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to

any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of

a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person

or any requirement of a similar nature.”

11. It is apparent that sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the PC Act,

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 9 of 16

prohibits a Court from taking cognizance of an offence punishable under

Sections 7,11,13 and 15, against a public servant, except with the previous

sanction of the specified authority. However, sub- section (3) clearly

prescribes that no finding, sentence or order passed by a S pecial Judge shall

be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the

ground of absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction

required under sub- section (1).

12. It is thus evident that the legislature has consciously made the

objections of the kind sought to be raised in the present petition, contingent

upon “failure of justice”. The legislature has thus circumscribed/placed

limitations on objections of the kind sought to be raised by the petitioner.

13. In State of Bihar v. Rajmangal Ram, (2014) 11 SCC 388, the

Supreme Court held as under:

“4. The object behind the requirement of grant of sanction to

prosecute a public servant need not detain the court save and

except to reiterate that the provisions in this regard either

under the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 are designed as a check on frivolous,

mischievous and unscrupulous attempts to prosecute an honest

public servant for acts arising out of due discharge of duty and

also to enable him to efficiently perform the wide range of

duties cast on him by virtue of his office. The test, therefore,

always is—whether the act complained of has a reasonable

connection with the discharge of official duties by the

government or the public servant. If such connection exists and

the discharge or exercise of the governmental function is,

prima facie, founded on the bona fide judgment of the public

servant, the requirement of sanction will be insisted upon so as

to act as a filter to keep at bay any motivated, ill-founded and

frivolous prosecution against the public servant.

However,

realising that the dividing line between an act in the discharge

of official duty and an act that is not, may, at times, get blurred

thereby enabling certain unjustified claims to be raised also on

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 10 of 16

behalf of the public servant so as to derive undue advantage of

the requirement of sanction, specific provisions have been

incorporated in Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption

Act as well as in Section 465 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure which, inter alia, make it clear that any error,

omission or irregularity in the grant of sanction will not affect

any finding, sentence or order passed by a competent court

unless in the opinion of the court a failure of justice has been

occasioned. This is how the balance is sought to be struck.

xxx. xxx. xxx.

6

. In a situation where under both the enactments any error,

omission or irregularity in the sanction, which would also

include the competence of the authority to grant sanction, does

not vitiate the eventual conclusion in the trial including the

conviction and sentence, unless of course a failure of justice

has occurred, it is difficult to see how at the intermediary stage

a criminal prosecution can be nullified or interdicted on

account of any such error, omission or irregularity in the

sanction order without arriving at the satisfaction that a failure

of justice has also been occasioned

“14. … Merely because there is any omission, error or

irregularity in the matter of according sanction, that does

not affect the validity of the proceeding unless the court

records the satisfaction that such error, omission or

irregularity has resulted in failure of justice.”

. This is what was decided

by this Court in State v. T. Venkatesh Murthy [(2004) 7 SCC

763 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2140 (paras 10 and 11)] wherein it has

been inter alia observed that: (SCC p. 767, para 14)

7. The above view also found reiteration in Parkash Singh

Badal v. State of Punjab [(2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri)

193 (para 29)] wherein it was, inter alia, held that mere

omission, error or irregularity in sanction is not to be

considered fatal unless it has resulted in failure of justice. In

Parkash Singh Badal [(2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri)

193 (para 29)] it was further held that Section 19(1) of the PC

Act is a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of

jurisdiction. On the same line is the decision of this Court in R.

Venkatkrishnanv. CBI [(2009) 11 SCC 737 : (2010) 1 SCC

(Cri) 164] . In fact, a three-Judge Bench in State of M.P. v.

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 11 of 16

Virender Kumar Tripathi [(2009) 15 SCC 533 : (2010) 2 SCC

(Cri) 667] while considering an identical issue, namely, the

validity of the grant of sanction by the Additional Secretary of

the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs of the

Government of Madhya Pradesh instead of the authority in the

parent department, this Court held that in view of Section 19(3)

of the PC Act, interdicting a criminal proceeding mid-course

on ground of invalidity of the sanction order will not be

appropriate unless the court can also reach the conclusion that

failure of justice had been occasioned by any such error,

omission or irregularity in the sanction. It was further held that

failure of justice can be established not at the stage of framing

of charge but only after the trial has commenced and the

evidence is led (para 10 of the report).”

14. The Supreme Court has drawn a clear distinction between cases where

there is no sanction at all, but where sanction exits and its validity is

questioned. In this regard, the Trial Court rightly relies upon the judgment

of the Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, Airport Authority of

India, AIR 2012 SC 858, wherein, it has been categorically held by the

Supreme Court that a question of invalidity of sanction on the ground of

incompetency of the sanctioning authority could be raised by the defence at

any stage during trial. The relevant extracts from Dinesh Kumar (supra) are

as under: -

“9. While drawing a distinction between the absence of sanction

and invalidity of the sanction, this Court in Parkash Singh Badal

[(2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] expressed in no

uncertain terms that the question of absence of sanction could be

raised at the inception and threshold by an aggrieved person.

However, where sanction order exists, but its legality and

validity is put in question, such issue has to be raised in the

course of trial. Of course, in Parkash Singh Badal [(2007) 1 SCC

1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] , this Court referred to invalidity of

sanction on account of non-application of mind.

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 12 of 16

10. In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction order

exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like non-availability of

material before the sanctioning authority or bias of the

sanctioning authority or the order of sanction having been

passed by an authority not authorised or competent to grant such

sanction. The above grounds are only illustrative and not

exhaustive. All such grounds of invalidity or illegality of sanction

would fall in the same category like the ground of invalidity of

sanction on account of non-application of mind—a category

carved out by this Court in Parkash Singh Badal [(2007) 1 SCC

1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] , the challenge to which can always

be raised in the course of trial.”

15. The aforesaid judgment was followed by the Supreme Court in

numeroussubsequent cases

1

“12. Learned counsel for the State submits that the conclusions

drawn by the High Court about the impossibility of granting

sanction on 08.07.2013 when the government received the

request only on 20.12.2013, was not raised at any point of time,

neither in the discharge application before the Special Judge

nor before the High Court in revision petition. He further

submits that the argument is not even mentioned in the quashing

petition under Section 482Cr. P.C. filed before the High Court.

He also submits that this question was not put to LW -1, whose

statement is the sheet anchor for the High Court to question the

validity of the sanction. The State also explained the actual

position in the Special Leave Petition. It is explained that the

misconception about the dates arose because of a typographical

mistake of mentioning the letter requesting sanction as

20.12.2013, instead of the correct date being 20.02.2013. This is

typically the problem that would arise when the High Court

seeks to interdict proceedings and quash the criminal case

before the relevant material to support the case of the

prosecution is brought on record. Findings regarding the

.Recently, the Supreme Court in State v. G.

Easwaran, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 643, has observed as under:-

1

CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2014) 14 SCC 295; CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aswal , (2015) 16 SCC 163;

CBI v. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal, (2020) 17 SCC 664; Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India , 2024

SCC OnLine SC 2610.

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 13 of 16

legality, validity, or delay in grant of sanction were premature.

Validity of the sanction is an issue that must be examined during

the course of the trial. In Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, Airport

Authority of India, this principle is reiterated as follows:

“10. In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction

order exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like non-

availability of material before the sanctioning authority or

bias of the sanctioning authority or the order of sanction

having been passed by an authority not authorised or

competent to grant such sanction. The above grounds are

only illustrative and not exhaustive.

All such grounds of

invalidity or illegality of sanction would fall in the same

category like the ground of invalidity of sanction on

account of non-application of mind—a category carved

out by this Court in Parkash Singh Badal,

(emphasis supplied)

the challenge to

which can always be raised in the course of trial.”

13. Similar view was taken in Director, Central Bureau of

Investigation v. Ashok Kumar Aswal, where it was held that:

“15. All the above apart, time and again, this Court has

laid down that the validity of a sanction order, if one

exists, has to be tested on the touchstone of the prejudice

to the accused which is essentially a question of fact and,

therefore, should be left to be determined in the course of

the trial and not in the exercise of jurisdiction either

under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

16. The Supreme Court has also held in CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aswal,

(2015) 16 SCC 163 that validity of sanction has to be tested on the

touchstone of prejudice to the accused, which is essentially a question of fact

and should be left to be determined during the course of trial and not in

exercise of jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS or Articles 226 and

227 of the Constitution of India. The relevant extracts of the judgment

rendered in (supra) are as under:

or in a proceeding under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution.”

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 14 of 16

“15. In fact, all that the corrigendum does is to split up the

alleged “reduced” demand of bribe into two separate

amounts of Rs 25 lakhs each instead of a lump sum amount of

Rs 50 lakhs as mentioned in the sanction order dated 12-8-

2009. The corrigendum also dispenses with certain provisions

of IPC. The aforesaid exclusion of some of the specific

provisions of IPC really works to the benefit of Respondent 1-

accused and not to his prejudice. If the corrigendum does not,

as we are inclined to hold, affect the substratum of the

sanction granted initially on 8-8-2009/12- 8-2009 we will

have no reason to take the view that initial sanction order has

in any way been modified or altered so as to require the

approval of the Finance Minister once again. Surely for

correction of typographical errors the file need not have

travelled all the way up to the Finance Minister, once again.

The fact that the said sanction order has been superseded

may have been mentioned in the letter of the Under-Secretary

communicating the said order dated 21- 10-2009 to the

appellant. However, what is of relevance is that the said fact

of supersession is not supported by reference to any authority

or decision in the file and, therefore, would not deserve any

further attention of the Court. All the above apart, time and

again, this Court has laid down that the validity of a

sanction order, if one exists, has to be tested on the

touchstone of the prejudice to the accused which is

essentially a question of fact and, therefore, should be left to

be determined in the course of the trial and not in the

exercise of jurisdiction either under Section 482 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in a proceeding under

Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

17. The present case is not one of absence of sanction. The sanction

orders have been issued and cognizance has been taken on that basis. As

noticed in the impugned orders, the objection raised by the petitioners

cannot be put in a straitjacket and/or answered at this stage, on the face of

the record. Whether the Deputy Commissioner of Police or the

Joint

Commissioner

is the authority competent to remove an Inspector or Head

Constable depends upon the construction of the provisions of the Delhi

”

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 15 of 16

Police Act, 1978, the rules thereunder, the applicable notification/s

governing the powers of appointment and the subsistence/scope of the

delegations made thereunder.

18. As noticed in the impugned order, these are essentially questions

which can be comprehensively answered only upon evidence being adduced

during the trial.

19. More importantly, the further question as to whether any error in the

sanction has occasioned a ‘ failure of justice ’ within the meaning of Section

19(3) and Section 19(4) of the PC Act, can be properly answered upon

appreciation of evidence during the course of trial .

20. It may also be noted that Section 19(3) (c) expressly bars the exercise

of revisional powers in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any

inquiry, trial, appeal, or other proceedings. The order declining to drop the

proceedings or discharge the accused on an objection as regards sanction

does not terminate the objection/s . It is in the nature of an interlocutory

order which leaves it open to the accused to press the very same objection at

trial and to have it decided on evidence.

21. The impugned order is clearly of an interlocutory character and the

jurisdiction of the Court is clearly circumscribed by Section 19(3)(c) of the

PC Act.

22. The reliance placed by the petitioners on Article 311 of the

Constitution of India does not alter the position; the same article provides

safeguards against dismissal, removal by an authority subordinate to the

appointing authority. The validity of the provisions of the Delhi Police Act,

1978, Rules and/or notifications issued thereunder (on the touchstone of

Article 311) is an independent aspect. At this stage, there cannot be a

CRL.REV.P. 559/2026 Page 16 of 16

presumption that the statute and the rules are inderogation of, or ultra vires

Article 311.

23. Further, the issue as to which authority is competent to terminate the

appointment of the petitioners shall necessarily be determined, during trial.

The trial cannot be put in abeyance at this stage on the basis of the pleas

raised by the petitioners in this regard.

24. In view of the above , no ground is made out to interfere with the

impugned order/s dated 19.05.2026. The Revision Petition is, consequently,

dismissed.

25. It is, however, clarified that the petitioners shall be at liberty to raise

all contentions regarding validity of the sanction for their prosecution,

including the competence of the s anctioning authority before the learned

Special Judge in the course of trial and the same shall be considered and

decided on its own merits and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by the

observations made in this order or in the impugned order.

SACHIN DATTA, J

SEPTEMBER 22, 2026

uk, ss