cess on royalty; Madras Panchayats Act; State Legislature competence; ultra vires; land revenue; mining lease; Mines and Minerals Act; constitutional validity; Entry 49 List II; Entry 50 List II
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India Cement Ltd. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu Etc.

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /62/1970
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Case Background

As per case facts, the appellant company, manufacturing cement, was granted a mining lease for limestone by the Tamil Nadu government, paying royalty fixed under the Central Mines and Minerals ...

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Document Text Version

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PETITIONER:

INDIA CEMENT LTD.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF TAMIL NADU ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/10/1989

BENCH:

MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

BENCH:

MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (CJ)

MISRA RANGNATH

OZA, G.L. (J)

RAY, B.C. (J)

SINGH, K.N. (J)

NATRAJAN, S. (J)

CITATION:

1990 AIR 85 1989 SCR Supl. (1) 692

1990 SCC (1) 12 JT 1989 (4) 190

1989 SCALE (2)953

CITATOR INFO :

F 1992 SC 103 (4,5,8)

RF 1992 SC1264 (24)

ACT:

Madras Panchayats Act, 1958: Sections 115 and

116--Mining lease--Levy of cess on royalty--Held ultra

vires.

Constitution of India, 1950: Seventh Schedule List

II--Entries 23, 49 & 50--Levy of cess on royalty in respect

of mining lease-Sections 115 & 116 of Madras Panchayats Act

1958--Held illegal and ultra vires.

Mineral Concession Rules, 1960: Levy of cess in respect

of mining leases--Sections 115 and 116 Madras Panchayats Act

1958--Held illegal and ultra vires.

HEADNOTE:

The appellant company used to manufacture cement and was

granted mining lease for limestone and kankar by the Govern-

ment of Tamil Nadu in accordance with the Mineral Concession

Rules, 1960. The royalty was fixed under the Mines and

Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 which is a

Central Act by which the control of mines and minerals had

been taken over by the Central Government for the regulation

and development of minerals.

Sub-section 1 of section 115 of the Madras Panchayats

Act, 1958 enjoins that there shall be levied in every pan-

chayat development block, a local cess at the rate of 45

paise on every rupee of land revenue payable to the Govern-

ment in respect of any land for every Fasli. An explanation

to the said section was added, and was deemed always to have

been incorporated by the Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Amendment

and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1964. In this explanation

a fiction was created whereby even the royalty payable had

been included within the definition of "land revenue".

The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court

challenging the competence of the State legislature to levy

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cess on royalty. A learned Single Judge dismissed the writ

petition holding that the cess levied

693

under section 115 of the Madras panchayats Act was a tax on

land and, as such, fell under Entry 49 of the State List of

Schedule VII of the Constitution. The Division Bench dis-

missed the appellant's appeal and held that local cess

authorised by section 115 was not land revenue but was a

charge on the land itself, and section 115 merely quantified

the basis of the quantum of land revenue. The learned Single

Judge, as well as the Division Bench, relied on the decision

of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy v. Collector of Chittoor,

[1964] 6 SCR 666.

Before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the

appellant that the levy of cess on royalty in this case was

nothing but a tax on royalty and was therefore ultra vires

the State legislature. On the other hand, it was contended

that the cess in the present case was a levy in respect of

land and could be justified or sustained either under entry

49, 50 or 45 of List II of the 7th Schedule to the Constitu-

tion. It was further submitted that the cess having been

realised on the basis of the decision of this Court in

"H.R.S. Murthy" case, if at all, the Court shall declare the

said cess on royalty to be ultra vires prospectively.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: (E.S. Venkataramiah, C J, Sabyasachi Mukharji,

Ranganath Misra, B.C. Ray, K.N. Singh and S. Natarajan,

JJ.--per Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.)

(1) Courts of law are enjoined to gather the meaning of

the Constitution from the language used, and although one

should interpret the words of the Constitution on the same

principles of interpretation as one applied to an ordinary

law but these very principles of interpretation compel one

to take into account the nature and scope of the Act which

requires interpretation. It has to be remembered that it is

a Constitution that requires interpretation. Constitution is

the mechanism under which the laws are to be made and not

merely an Act which declares what the law is to be. [704B-C]

The Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v.

The Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales, [1908] 6 CLR

469, referred to.

(2) A Constitution must not be construed in any narrow

or pedantic sense, and construction most beneficial to the

widest possible amplitude of its powers, must be adopted. A

broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty it

is to interpret the Constitution, but

694

they are not free to stretch or pervert the language of the

enactment in the interest of any legal or constitutional

theory, or even for the purposes of supplying omissions or

correcting supposed errors. [704D-E-F]

In re.' C.P. Berar Sales of Motor Spirit & Lubricants

Taxation Act, 1938, [1939] FCR p. 1 and James v. Common-

wealth of Australia, [1936] AC 578, referred to.

(3) It is well-settled now that the various entries in

the three lists are not powers but fields of legislation.

The power to legislate is given by Article 246 and other

articles of the Constitution. [704G]

Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, [1962] Suppl.

3 SCR 1, referred to.

(4) It is well settled that widest amplitude should be

given to the language of these entries, but some of these

entries in different lists or in the same list may overlap

and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with

each other. Then, it is the duty of the court to find out

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its true intent and purpose and to examine a particular

legislation in its pith and substance to determine whether

it fits in one or the other of the lists. Each general word

should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary

matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in

it. [705A-B & D]

H.R. Banthia & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors.,

[1970] 1 SCR 479; Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon, [1971] 2

SCC 779 and D.C. Rataria v. Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd., [1955] 1

SCR 1071, referred to.

(5) It is clear that over a period of centuries, land

revenue in India has acquired a cannot active meaning of

share in the produce of land to which the King or the Gov-

ernment is entitled to receive. [707B]

N.R. Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., [1965] 2 Andhra Law

Times 297 and State ofA.P.v.N.R. Reddy & Ors., [1967] 3 SCR

28, referred to.

(6) There is a clear distinction between tax directly on

land and tax on income arising from land. [708C]

Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The State of U.P. & Anr.,

[1963] 1 SCR 220, referred to.

695

(7) Explanation to section 115(1) itself makes a dis-

tinction between land revenue as such and royalty which by

amendment is deemed to be land revenue. It is, therefore,

recognised by the very force of that explanation and the

amendment thereto that the expression 'royalty' in sections

115 & 116 of the Act cannot mean land revenue property

called or conventionally known, which is separate and dis-

tinct from royalty. [707D-E]

(8) In the instant case, cess is not on land, but on

royalty, which is included in the definition of 'land reve-

nue', None of the three lists of the 7th Schedule of the

Constitution permits or authorises a State to impose tax on

royalty.

(9) Royalty which is indirectly connected with land,

cannot be said to be a tax directly on land as a unit.

Royalty is payable on a proportion of the mineral extracted.

The Act does not use dead rent as a basis on which land is

to be valued. Hence, there cannot be any doubt that the

impugned legislation in its pith and substance is a tax on

royalty and not a tax on land. [709E]

New Manek Chand Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. & Ors.

v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Allahabad & Ors.,

[1967] 2 SCR 679; S.C. Nawn v. W.T.O. Calcutta & Ors.,

[1969] 1 SCR 108; Asstt. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax &

Ors. v. The Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. etc., [1970] 1

SCR 268; Second Gift 'Fax Officer, Mangalore etc. v. D.H.

Nazareth etc., [1971] 1 SCR 195; Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union

of India, [1981] 2 SCR 808 and The Western India Theatres

Ltd. v. The Cantonment Board, Poona Cantonment, [1959] 2

Suppl. SCR 63, referred to.

(10) Royalty is directly relatable only to the minerals

extracted and on the principle that the general provision is

excluded by the special one, royalty would be relatable to

entries 23 & 50 of List II, and not entry 49 of List II.

[713D]

(11) Royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty

being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the

State Legislature because section 9 of the Central Act

covers the field and the State Legislature is denuded of its

competence under entry 23 of List II. In any event, cess on

royalty cannot be sustained under entry 49 of List II as

being a tax on land. Royalty on mineral rights is not a tax

on land but a payment for the user of land. [713F-G]

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696

Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (1) Pvt.

Ltd., [1963] 3 SCR 209; Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of

Gujarat & Ors., [1975] 3 SCR 220; The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co.

Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Orissa & Ors., [1961] 2 SCR 537;

State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co., [1964] 4 SCR 461;

Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1970] 2 SCR 100:

M/s. Laxminarayana Mining Co. Bangalore v. Taluk Dev Board,

AIR 1972 Mysore 299; M. Lal & Ors. v. The State of Bihar &

Ors., AIR 1965 Patna 491; Bherulal v. State of Rajasthan,

AIR 1956 Rajasthan 161; Dr. S.S. Sharma & Anr. v. State of

Punjab & Ors., AIR 1969 Pb. 79; Saurashtra Cement & Chemi-

cals India Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1979 Guj. 180;

L.N. Agarwalla & Ors. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 Orissa

210 and M/s Hira lal Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. The State of

Madhya Pradesh & Ors., M.P. High Court Misc. Petition No.

410/83, referred to.

H.R.S. Murthy v. Collector of Chittoor & Anr., [1964] 6

SCR 666, overruled.

(12) The amounts of cess have been collected on the

basis of the decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy's case.

The Court is therefore justified in declaring the levy of

the said cess under section 115 to be ultra vires the power

of the State legislature prospectively only. The respondents

will not be liable for any refund of cess already paid or

collected. [714C-D & E]

Per G.L. Oza, J.

(1) Sub-clause (1) of Section 115 provides for levy of

45 naya paise for every rupee of land revenue payable to the

Government. In the explanation a fiction is created whereby

even the royalty payable has been included within the defi-

nition of 'land revenue'. [718A]

(2) The language of Entries 23 and 50 in List II clearly

subjects the authority or jurisdiction on the State Legisla-

ture to any enactment made by the Parliament. Entry 23 talks

of regulation and Entry 50 talks of taxes on mineral rights.

It therefore could not be disputed that if the cess imposed

under section 115 of the Madras Panchayats Act is a cess or

tax on mineral rights then that jurisdiction could be exer-

cised by the State Legislature subject to the law enacted by

the Parliament. [715D-E]

(3) Unit of charge of royalty is not only land but land

+ labour + capital. It is therefore clear that if royalty is

a tax or an imposition or a levy, it is not on land alone

but it is a levy or a tax on mineral (land),

697

labour and capital employed in extraction of the mineral. It

therefore is clear that royalty if it is imposed by the

Parliament it could only be a tax not only on land but on

the three things stated above. [718H; 719A]

(4) When the Legislature included royalty, it went

beyond its jurisdiction under Entry 49 of List II and there-

fore clearly is without the authority of law. [719D]

(5) This may lead to an interesting situation. As this

cess on royalty is without the authority, the result will be

that the cess is levied so far as lands other than the lands

in which mines are situated are concerned but lands where

mines are situated this levy of cess is not in accordance

with the law. This anamoly could have been averted if the

Legislature had used words 'surface rent' in place of royal-

ty. Even if the lands where mines are situated and which are

subject to licence and mining leases, even for those lands

there is a charge on the basis of the surface of the land

which is Sometimes described as surface rent or sometimes

also as 'dead rent'. [719E-F]

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JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 62 (N) of

1970 etc. etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.10. 1969 of the

Madras High Court in W.A. No. 464 of 1967.

K. Parasaran, Attorney General, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, F.S.

Nariman. T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer, A.K. Ganguli, B. Sen, L.N.

Sinha, R.N. Sachthey, R.B. Datar, R.F. Nariman, K.J. John,

H.N. Salve, Praveen Kumar, A.V. Rangam, T.Sridharan, K.D.

Prasad, Mrs. Naresh Bakshi, K. Rajendra Choudhary, Ms. Seita

Vaidialingam, V. Krishnamurthy, Ms. A. Subhashini, N. Net-

tar, G.S. Narayan, Badrinath Babu, Anip Sachthey and S.K.

Agnihotri for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court were delivered by

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. The question involved in these

appeals, special leave petitions and writ petitions is,

whether levy of cess on royalty is within the competence of

the State Legislature. In order to appreciate the question,

it is necessary to refer to certain facts. Civil appeal No.

62/79 is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and

order of the High Court of Madras, dated 13th October, 1969,

in writ appeal No. 464/67. The appellant is a public limited

698

company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913.

The Company at all relevant times, used to manufacture

cement in its factory at Talaiyuthu in Tirunelveli district,

and at Sankaridrug in Salem district of Tamil Nadu. By G.O.

Ms. No. 3668 dated 19th July, 1963, the Govt. of Tamil Nadu

sanctioned the grant to the appellant mining lease for

limestone and kankar for a period of 20 years over an extent

of 133.91 acres of land in the village of Chinnagoundanur in

Sankaridrug Taluk of Salem district. Out of the extent of

133.91 acres comprised in the mining lease, an extent of

126.14 acres was patta land and only the balance extent of

7.77 acres Govt. land. The lease deed was in accordance with

the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. The rates of royalty,

dead rent and surface rent, were as follows:

"Royalty:

LIMESTONE

Government Lands: Re.O.75 per tonne, but

subject to a rebate of Re.O.38 per tonne to be

given on Imestone beneficiated by froth flota-

tion method.

Patta Lands: Re.O.38 per tonne but subject to

a rebate of Re.O. 19 per tonne to be given on

limestone beneficiated by froth flotation

method.

KANKAR

Government Lands: Five per cent of the sale

price at the pit's mouth.

Patta Lands: 2-1/2% of the sale price at the

pit's mouth

Dead rent:

Government lands: Rs.25 (Rupees twentyfive

only) per hectare per annum.

Patta lands: Rs. 12/50 (Rupees twelve & naya

paise fifty only) per hectare per annum.

Surface rent and water rate: At such rate as

the land revenue and cess assessable on the

land are paid."

The appellant started mining operations soon after the

execution

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699

of the lease deed and has ever since been paying the royal-

ties, dead rents and other amounts payable under the Deed.

Under s. 115 of the Madras Panchayats Act (XXXV of 1958)

(hereinafter called 'the Act'), as amended by Madras Act

XVIII of 1964 (herein after called 'the amended Act'), as

royalty the appellant was required to pay local cess @ 45

paise per rupee. It may be mentioned that the said imposi-

tion was with retrospective effect along with local cess

surcharge under s. 116 of the Act. The contention of the

appellant is and was, at all relevant times, that cess on

royalty cannot be levied. This is the common question which

falls for consideration and requires determination in these

appeals and petitions.

To complete the narration of events, however, it has to

be noted that the Collector sent a communication on 10th

April, 1965, demanding cess or royalty payable under the Act

on minerals carried on during the period 1.7.1961 to

31.12.1964, and the petitioner was threatened of serious

consequences in case of default of payment on receipt of

that communication. Thereafter, writ petition No. 1864/65

was filed in the High Court of Madras. By the judgment

delivered and order passed on 23rd February, 1967. a learned

Single Judge of the Madras High Court--Justice Kailasam

dismissed the writ petition holding that the cess levied

under s. 115 of the act is a tax on land and, as such, falls

under Entry 49 of the State List of the Schedule VII of the

Constitution, and was within the competence of the State

legislature. Reliance was placed by the learned single Judge

on the decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy v. Collector

of Chittoor & Anr., [1964] 6 SCR 666. He held that the cess

levied under s. 115 was a tax on land, though fixed with

reference to the land revenue. In regard to s. 116 of the

Act, the learned Single Judge held that the maximum limit

had been prescribed by the Government by rules flamed under

the Act, and, therefore, there was no arbitrariness about

the levy.

Sub-section 1 of s. 115 of the Act enjoins that there

shall be levied in every panchayat development block, a

local cess at the rate of 45 paise on every rupee of land

revenue payable to the Govt. in respect of any land for

every Fasli. An Explanation to the said section was added

and deemed always to have been incorporated by the Tamil

Nadu Panchayats (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)

Act, 1964 being Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1964, which provided as

follows:

"[Explanation.--In this section and in section

116, 'land revenue' means public revenue due

on land and includes

700

water cess payable to the Government for water

supplied or used for the irrigation of land,

royalty, lease amount or other sum payable to

the Government in respect of land held direct

from the Government on lease or licence, but

does not include any other cess or the sur-

charge payable under section 116, provided

that land revenue remitted shall not be deemed

to be land revenue payable for the purpose of

this section.]"

Sub-section 2 of s. 115 of the Act provides that the

local cess shall be deemed to be public revenue due on all

the lands in respect of which a person is liable to pay

local cess and all the said lands, the buildings upon the

said lands and their products shall be regarded as the

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security for the local cess. Sub-section 3, 4 (a), (b), (c)

and (d) of s. 115 of the said Act deal with the application

of the cess so collected for various purposes mentioned

therein. In the controversy before us, the said provisions

need not be considered.

Section 116 of the Act is as follows:

"116. Every panchayat union council may levy

on every person liable to pay land revenue to

the Government in respect of any land in the

panchayat union a local cess surcharge at such

rate as may be considered suitable as an

addition to the local cess levied in the

panchayat development block under section 115

provided that the rate of local cess surcharge

so levied (shall not exceed two rupees and

fifty paise on every rupee of land revenue)

payable in respect of such land."

The words "shall not exceed two rupees & fifty paise on

every rupee of land revenue" were substituted for the words

"shall be subject to such maximum as may be prescribed" by

section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats' (2nd Amendment and

Validation) Act, 1970, and these words were substituted for

the words "shall not exceed one rupee and fifty paise on

every rupee of land revenue" by s. 2 of the Tamil Nadu

Panchayats (Amendment) Act, 1972.

There was an appeal from the said decision of the

learned Single Judge, to the division bench of the High

Court. The division bench by its judgment and order dated

13th October, 1969, dismissed the writ appeal, and held that

local cess authorised by s. 115 as aforesaid "was not land

revenue but is a charge on the land itself and Section 115

701

merely quantified on the basis of the quantum of land reve-

nue". The division bench held that the meaning of the Expla-

nation added to s. 115 was that the cess is levied as a tax

on land and is measured with reference to land revenue,

royalty, lease amount etc. as mentioned in the Explanation.

The division bench also relied on the decision of this Court

in H.R.S. Murthy (supra), and further held that in the

aforesaid view of the matter, it was not possible to accept

the contention that s. 115 of the Act read with the Explana-

tion contravened in any manner s. 9 of the Mines and Miner-

als (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. By leave granted

by this Court on 12th January, 1970 the appeal has been

filed.

The appellant is bound to pay royalty to the Govt.

according to the rates provided in the Second Schedule to

the said Act of 1957. Clause (1) of Part VII of the lease

document provides as follows:

"The lessee/lessees shall pay the rent, water

rate and royalties reserved by this lease at

such times and in the manner provided in Part

V and VI of these presents and shall also pay

and discharge all taxes, rates, assessment and

impositions whatsoever being in the nature of

public demand which shall from time to time be

charged, assessed or imposed by the authority

of the Central and State Government upon or in

respect of the premises and works of the

lessee/lessees in common with other premises

and work of a like nature except demands for

land revenue."

As mentioned hereinbefore, there is an obligation of the

lessee to pay rent and other charges mentioned in the said

Clause, and all other Central and State Government dues

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"except demands for land revenue". The question, therefore,

which arises is, is cess on royalty a demand of land revenue

or additional royalty?

For the appellants and/or petitioners we have heard Mr.

Nariman,_ Dr. Chitale and Mr. Salve, and for the interven-

ers, S/Shri K.D. Prasad, Rajendra Choudhary and Ms. Seita

Vaidialingam have made their submissions. For the State of

Tamil Nadu, Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer and Mr. V. Krishnamurthy

have made their submissions. We have had the advantage of

the submissions made by learned Attorney General on behalf

of Union of India. The issues are common in the writ peti-

tions as well as in the appeal and in the special leave

petitions. The question involved in the appeals and the writ

petition is about the constitutional validity of Section

115(1) of the Act, in so far as it

702

sought to levy as local cess @ 45 naya paise on every rupee

of the land revenue payable to the Government, the meaning

of land revenue being artificially expanded by the explana-

tion so as to include royalty payable under the mining

lease.

In this connection, it may be appropriate to refer to

the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the amendment which

stated, inter alia, as follows:

"Under the Explanation to section 115 of the

Act "land revenue" means public revenue due on

land and includes water-cess payable to the

Government for water supplied or used for the

irrigation of land but does not include any

other cess or surcharge payable under section

116. The Explanation does not cover "royal-

ties", lease amount or other sum payable to

the Government in respect of land held direct

from the Government on lease or licence which

were included in the definition of "land

revenue" under the Madras District Boards Act,

1920. As under the Madras District Boards Act,

1920, certain panchayat union councils contin-

ued to levy the cess and surcharge under the

Madras Panchayats Act, 1958 also. It is con-

sidered that the levy should be on the same

basis as under the Madras District Boards Act,

1920. It is, therefore, proposed to include

"royalty, lease amount and other sums payable

to the Government" in the definition of land

revenue in the Explanation to section 115 of

the Act and also to validate the levy and

collection of the cess and surcharge made

hitherto on the said basis."

It is obvious that the said amendment was intended to

bring royalty within the Explanation and the definition of

land revenue in section 115 as well as s. 116 of the Act,

and was effected by the Gazette Notification of 2nd Septem-

ber, 1964 by Act No. 18 of 1964. In order to appreciate the

controversy, it has no be understood that in this case

royalty was payable by the appellant which was prescribed

under the lease deed, the terms whereof have been noted

hereinbefore. The royalty had been fixed under the statutory

rules and protected under those rules. The royalty was fixed

under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act,

1957 which is a Central Act by which the control of mines

and minerals had been taken over by the Central Government.

It was an Act for the regulation of mines and development of

minerals under the control of Union of India. That

703

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Act was to provide for the regulation of mines and the

development of minerals under the control of the Union of

India. Sec. 2 of the Act declares that it is expedient in

the public interest that the Union of India should take

under its control the regulation of mines and the develop-

ment of the minerals to the extent provided in the Act.

Section 9 of the Act provides as follows:

"9. (1) The holder of a mining lease granted

before the commencement of this Act shall,

notwithstanding anything contained in the

instrument of lease or in any law in force at

such commencement, pay royalty in respect of

any mineral removed or consumed by him or by

his agent, manager, employee, contractor or

sub-lessee from the leased area after such

commencement, at the rate for the time being

specified in the Second Schedule in respect of

that mineral.

(2) The holder of a mining lease granted on or

after the commencement of this Act shall pay

royalty in respect of any mineral removed or

consumed by him or by his agent, manager,

employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the

leased area at the rate for the time being

specified in the Second Schedule in respect of

that mineral.

(2A) The holder of a mining lease, whether

granted before or after the commencement of

the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Devel-

opment) Amendment Act, 1972, shall not be

liable to pay any royalty in respect of any

coal consumed by a workman engaged in a col-

liery provided that such consumption by the

workman does not exceed one-third of a tonne

per month.

(3) The Central Government may, by notifica-

tion in the Official Gazette. amend the Second

Schedule so as to enhance or reduce the rate

at which royalty shall be payable in respect

of any mineral with effect from such date as

may be specified in the notification:

Provided that the Central Government

shall not enhance the rate of royalty in

respect of any mineral more than once during

any period of three years."

The Act was passed by virtue of the power of the Parliament

704

under Entry 54 of list I of the 7th Schedule. Since the

control of mines and the development of minerals were taken

over by Parliament, the question that arises here is whether

the levy or the impost by the State Legislature imposed in

this case can be justified or sustained either under entry

49, 50 or 45 of list II of the 7th Schedule.

Courts of law are enjoined to gather the meaning of the

Constitution from the language used and although one should

interpret the words of the Constitution on the same princi-

ples of interpretation as one applies to an ordinary law but

these very principles of interpretation compel one to take

into account the nature and scope of the Act which requires

interpretation. It has to be remembered that it is a Consti-

tution that requires interpretation. Constitution is the

mechanism under which the laws are to be made and not merely

an Act which declares what the law is to be. See the obser-

vations of Justice Higgins in the Attorney General for the

State of New South Wales v. The Brawery Employees Union of

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New South Wales, [1908] 6 CLR 469 at 611-2.

In re: C.P. and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit & Lubricants

Taxation Act, 1938, [1939] FCR at p. 1, Chief Justice Gwyer

of the Federal Court of India relied on the observations of

Lord Wright in James v. Common wealth of Australia, [1936]

AC 578 and observed that a Constitution must not be con-

strued in any narrow or pedantic sense, and that construc-

tion most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its

powers, must be adopted. The learned Chief Justice empha-

sised that a broad and liberal spirit should inspire those

whose duty it is to interpret the Constitution, but they are

not free to stretch or pervert the language of the enactment

in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory, or

even for the purposes of supplying omissions or correcting

supposed errors. A Federal Court will not strengthen, but

only derogate from, its position, if it seeks to do anything

but declare the law; but it may rightly reflect that a

Constitution of a country is a living and organic thing,

which of all instruments has the greatest claim to be con-

strued ut res magis valeat guam pereat.--'It is better that

it should live than that it should perish'.

Certain rules have been evolved in this period, and it

is wellsettled now that the various entries in the three

lists are not powers but fields of legislation. The power to

legislate is given by Art. 246 and other articles of the

Constitution. See the observations of this Court in Calcutta

Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, [1962] Suppl 3 SCR 1. The

entries in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule to the

Constitution,

705

are legislative heads or fields of legislation. These demar-

cate the area over which appropriate legislature can oper-

ate. It is well settled that widest amplitude should be

given to the language of these entries, but some of these

entries in different lists or in the same list may overlap

and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with

each other. Then, it is the duty of the court to find out

its true intent and purpose and to examine a particular

legislation in its pith and substance to determine whether

it fits in one or the other of the lists. See the observa-

tions of this Court in H.R. Banthia & Ors. etc. v. Union of

India & Ors., [1970] 1 SCR 479 at 489 and Union of India v.

Shri H.S. Dillon, [1971] 2 SCC 779 at 792. The lists are

designed to define and delimit the respective areas of

respective competence of the Union and the States. These

neither impose any implied restriction on the legislative

power conferred by Article 246 of the Constitution, nor

prescribe any duty to exercise that legislative power in any

particular manner. Hence, the language of the entries should

be given widest scope, D.C. Rataria v. Bhuwalka Brothers

Ltd., [1955] 1 SCR 1071, to find out which of the meaning is

fairly capable because these set up machinery of the Govt.

Each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary

or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be

comprehended in it. In interpreting an entry it would not be

reasonable to import any limitation by comparing or con-

trasting that entry with any other one in the same List. It

is in this background that one has to examine the present

controversy.

Here, we are concerned with cess on royalty. One can

have an idea as to what cess is, from the observations of

Justice Hidayatullah, as the learned Chief Justice then was,

in M/s Guruswamy & Co. etc. v. State of Mysore & Ors.,

[1967] 1 SCR 548 where at page 571, the learned Judge ob-

served:

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"The word 'cess' is used in Ireland and_. is

still in use in India although the word rate

has replaced it in England. It means a tax and

is generally used when the levy is for some

special administrative expense which the name

(health cess, education cess, road cess etc.)

indicates. When levied as an increment to an

existing tax, the name matters not for the

validity of the cess must be judged of in the

same way as the validity of the tax to which

it is an increment."

The said observations were made in the dissenting judg-

ment, but there was no dissent on this aspect of the matter.

Relying on the aforesaid observations, Mr Nariman appearing

for the appellant and

706

the petitioners suggested that the impugned levy in this

case is nothing but a tax on royalty and is therefore ultra

vires the State legislature. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer appear-

ing for the State of Tamil Nadu submitted that the cess in

question in the instant case is a levy in respect of land

for every fasli. He urged that the words "a local cess at

the rate of 45 naya paise on every rupee of land revenue

payable" qualify the words "land revenue". These words were

only intended, according to Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, to mean

cess payable. It is, however, not possible to accept this

submission, in view of the obligation indicated by the

language of the provisions. Cess is not on land, but on

royalty which is included in the definition of 'land reve-

nue'. None of the three lists of the 7th Schedule of the

Constitution permits or authorises a State to impose tax on

royalty. This levy has been sought to be justified under

Entry 45 of List II of the 7th Schedule. Entry 45 deals with

land revenue, which is a well-known concept and has existed

in India before the Constitution came into force. In N.R.

Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors., [1965] 2 Andhra Law

Times 297, Jaganmohan Reddy, J. as the learned Judge then

was of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while sitting in a

division bench observed that no land revenue Act existed in

the composite State of Madras nor had the ryotwari system

ever been established by legislative enactment. The learned

Judge at p. 306 of the report observed that in the earlier

days, sovereigns had in exercise of their prerogative right

claimed a share of the produce of all cultivated land known

as 'Rajabhagam' or by any of the various other names, and

had fixed their share or its commuted money value from time

to time, according to their will and pleasure. The learned

Judge noted that as long as the share of the sovereign was

being paid, the sovereign had no right to the possession of

the lands, and the proprietorship of these lands was vested

in the occupier, who could not be removed because another

offered more. The right of the sovereign to a share in the

produce as observed by the Govt. of Madras in 1856 "is not

rent which consists of all surplus produce after paying the

cost of cultivation and the profits of agricultural stock

but land revenue only which ought, if possible, to be so

lightly assessed as to leave a surplus or rent to the occu-

pier, when he in fact lets the land to others or retains it

in his own hands." It was noted that the amount of tax that

was levied before the Mohamedan Rule, amounted to 1/8th,

1/6th or 1/12th according to Manu depending on the differ-

ences in the soil and the labour necessary to cultivate it,

and it even went up to 1/4th part, in times of urgent neces-

sity, as of war or invasion. The later commentators, Yajnav-

alkya, Apastamba, Gautama, Baudhayana and Narada, have all

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asserted not only the right but the extent of the share.

When the British came to India they followed not only the

precedent

707

of the previous Mohamedan Rulers who also claimed enormous

land revenue, with this difference that what the Mohamedan

Rulers claimed they could never fully realise, but what the

British Rulers claimed they realised with vigour. It is not

necessary to refer in detail how land revenue developed in

India after the advent of the British Rule. There was an

appeal from the said decision of the High Court of Andhra

Pradesh and this Court dismissed the appeal in State of A.

P. v. N.R. Reddy & Ors., [1967] 3 SCR 28.

It is, however, clear that over a period of centuries,

land revenue in India has acquired a connot active meaning

of share in the produce of land to which the King or the

Govt. is entitled to receive. It was contended on behalf of

the appellants that the impugned measure being a tax, not on

share of the produce of the land but on royalty; royalty

being the return received from the produce of the land,

revenue was payable for winning minerals from the land. In

the premises it was contended that it cannot be attributable

to Entry 45 of List II of the 7th Schedule, being not a land

revenue. It has, however, to be borne in mind that Explana-

tion to Section 115(1) was added and there was an amendment

as we have noted before. That very Explanation makes a

distinction between land revenue as such and royalty which

by amendment is deemed to be land revenue. It is, therefore,

recognised by the very force of that Explanation and the

amendment thereto that the expression 'royalty' in sections

115 & 116 of the Act cannot mean land revenue properly

called or conventionally known, which is separate and dis-

tinct from royalty.

It was also contended on behalf of the respondent State

of Tamil Nadu of Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer that it could also

be justified under Entry 49 of List II of the 7th Schedule

as taxes on lands and buildings. This, however, cannot be

accepted. In this connection, reference may be made to the

decision of this Court in Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The

State of U.P. & Anr., [1963] 1 SCR 220 where at p. 229 it

was indicated that the expression 'lands' in Entry 49 is

wide enough to include agricultural land as well as non-

agricultural land. Gajendragadkar, J. as the learned Chief

Justice then was, observed that the cardinal rule of inter-

preting the words used by the Constitution in conferring

legislative power was that these must receive the most

liberal construction and if they are words of wide amplitude

the construction must accord with it. If general word was

used, it must be so construed so as to extend to all ancil-

lary or subsidiary matters that can reasonably be included

in it. So construed, there could not be any doubt that the

word 'land' in Entry 48, List II of the 7th Schedule

708

includes all land whether agricultural or non-agricultural.

Hence, since the impugned Act imposed tax on land and build-

ing which was within the competence of the State Legislature

and its validity was beyond challenge but the Court observed

that as there was Entry 46 in List H which refers to taxes

on agricultural income, it is clear that agricultural income

is not included in Entry 49. If the State Legislature pur-

ports to impose a tax on agricultural income it would not be

referable to Entry 49. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer relied on the

said principle. But in the instant case, royalty being that

which is payable on the extraction from the land and cess

being an additional charge on that royalty, cannot by the

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parity of the same reasoning, be considered to be a tax on

land. But since it was not a tax on land and there is no

Entry like Entry 46 in the instant situation like the posi-

tion before this Court in the aforesaid decision, enabling

the State to impose tax on royalty in the instant situation,

the State was incompetent to impose such a tax. There is a

clear distinction between tax directly on land and tax on

income arising from land. The aforesaid decision confirmed

the above position. In New Manek Chand Spinning & Weaving

Mills Co. Ltd. & Ors., v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of

Allahabad & Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 679 at 696, this Court after

referring to the several decisions observed that Entry 49 of

list II of the 7th Schedule only permitted levy of tax on

land and building. It did not permit the levy of tax on

machinery contents in or situated on the building even

though the machinery was there for the use of the building

for a particular purpose. Rule 7(2) of the Bombay Municipal

Corporation Rules was held to be accordingly ultra vires in

that case. In S.C. Nawn v. W.T.O., Calcutta & Ors., [1969] 1

SCR 108 this Court had occasion to consider this and upheld

the validity of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 on the ground that

it fell within Entry 86 of List I and not Entry 49 of List

II. Construing the said Entry, this Court observed that

Entry 49 list II contemplated a levy on land as a unit and

the levy must be directly imposed on land and must bear a

definite relationship to it. Entry 49 of list Il was held to

be more general in nature than Entry 86, list I, which was

held to be more specific in nature and it is well-settled

that in the event of conflict between Entry 86, list I and

Entry 49 of list II, Entry 86 prevails as per Article 246 of

the Constitution.

In Asstt. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax & Ors. v. The

Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. etc., [1970] 1 SCR 268 at

278, this Court reiterated the principles laid down in S.C.

Nawn's case (supra) and held that entry 49 of list II was

confined to a tax that was directly on land as a unit. In

Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore etc. v. D.H. Nazareth

etc., [1971] 1 SCR 195 at 200 it was held that a tax on the

gift

709

of land is not a tax imposed directly on land but only on a

particular user, namely, the transfer of land by way of

gift. In Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon, (supra), this Court

approved the principle laid down in S.C. Nawn's case as well

as Nazareth's case (supra). In Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union of

India, [1981] 2 SCR 808 at 816 this Court made a distinction

between the levy on income from house property which would

be an income tax, and the levy on house property itself

which would be referable to entry 49 list II. It is, there-

fore, not possible to accept Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer's sub-

mission and that a cess on royalty cannot possibly be said

to be a tax or an impost on land. Mr. Nariman is right that

royalty which is indirectly connected with land, cannot be

said to be a tax directly on land as a unit. In this connec-

tion, reference may be made to the differentiation made to

the different types of taxes for instance, one being profes-

sional tax and entertainment tax. In the Western India

Theatres Ltd. v. The Cantonment Board, Poona Cantonment,

[1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 63 at 69 it was held that an entertain-

ment tax is dependent upon whether there would or would not

be a show in a cinema house. If there is no show, there is

no tax. It cannot be a tax on profession or calling. Profes-

sional tax does not depend on the exercise of one's profes-

sion but only concerns itself with the right to practice. It

appears that in the instant case also no tax can be levied

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or is leviable under the impugned Act if no mining activi-

ties are carried on. Hence, it is manifest that it is nor

related to land as a unit which is the only method of valua-

tion of land under entry 49 of list II, but is relatable to

minerals extracted. Royalty is payable on a proportion of

the minerals extracted. It may be mentioned that the Act

does not use dead rent as a basis on which land is to be

valued. Hence, there cannot be any doubt that the impugned

legislation in its pith and substance is a tax on royalty

and not a tax on land.

On behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu, learned counsel

Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer sought to urge that it can also be

sustained under entry 50, list II. Entry 50 of list II of

the 7th Schedule deals with taxes on mineral rights subject

to limitation imposed by Parliament relating to mineral

development. Entry 23 of List II deals with regulation of

mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of

list I with respect to regulation and development under the

control of the Union and entry 54 in list I deals with

regulation of mines and minerals under the control of Union

declared by the Parliament by law to be expedient in public

interest. Even though minerals are part of the State List

they are treated separately, and therefore the principle

that the specific excluded the general, must be applied. See

the observations of Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon &

Co. (1) Pvt. Ltd., [1963] 3

710

SCR 209 at 220, where it was held that land in entry 49 of

list II cannot possibly include minerals.

In this connection, learned Attorney General appearing

for the Union of India submitted before us that in order to

sustain the levy, the power of the State Legislature has to

be found within one or more of the entries of list II of the

7th Schedule. The levy in question has to be either a tax or

a fee or an impost. If it is neither a tax nor a fee then it

should be under one of the general entries under List II.

The expression 'land' according to its legal significance

has an indefinite extent both upward and downwards, the

surface of the soil and would include not only the face of

the earth but everything under it or over it. See the obser-

vations in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.,

[19751 3 SCR 220 at 249. The minerals which are under the

earth, can in certain circumstances fall under the expres-

sion 'land' but as tax on mineral rights is expressly cov-

ered by entry 50 of list II, if it is brought under the head

taxes under entry 49 of list II, it would render entry 50 of

list II redundant. Learned Attorney General is right in

contending that entries should not be so construed as to

make any one entry redundant. It was further argued that

even in pith and substance the tax fell to entry 50 of list

II, it would be controlled by a legislation under entry 54

of list I.

On the other hand, learned Attorney General submitted

that if it be held to be a fee, then the source of power of

the state legislature is under entry 66 read with entry 23

of list II. Here also the extent to which regulation of

mines and mineral development under the control of the Union

is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the

public interest, to the extent such legislation makes provi-

sions will denude the State Legislature of its power to

override the provision under entry 50 of list II. In view of

the Parliamentary legislation under entry 54, list I and the

declaration made under s. 2 and provisions of s. 9 of the

Act, the State Legislature would be overridden to that

extent. S. 2 declares that it is expedient in the public

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interest that Union should take under its control the regu-

lation of mines and the development of minerals to the

extent provided therein. In this connection, reference may

be made to the decision of this Court in The Hingir-Rampur

Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Orissa & Ors., [1961] 2

SCR 537. See also the observations in State of Orissa v.

M.A. TuIloch & Co., [1964] 4 SCR 461 and Baijnath Kedia v.

State of Bihar & Ors., [1970] 2 SCR 100 at 111-115.

Our attention was drawn to the decision of the division

bench

711

judgment of the High Court of Mysore in M/s. Laxminarayana,

Mining Co., Bangalore v. Taluk Der. Board., AIR 1972 Mysore

299. There speaking for the court, one of us, Venkataramiah

J- of the Mysore High Court, as the learned Chief Justice

then was, observed that a combined reading of entries 23 and

50 in list II and entry 54 of list I, establishes that as

long as the Parliament does not make any law in exercise of

its power under entry 54, the powers of the State Legisla-

ture in entries 23 & 50 would be exercisable by the State

Legislature. But when once the Parliament makes a declara-

tion by law that it is expedient in the public interest to

make regulation of mines and minerals development under the

control of the Union, to the extent to which such regulation

and development is undertaken by the law made by the Parlia-

ment, the power of the State Legislature under entries 23 &

50 of List II are denuded. There the court was concerned

with the Mysore Village Panchayats & Local Boards Act, 1959.

Thus, it was held that it could not, therefore, be said that

even after passing of the Central Act, the state legislature

by enacting s. 143 of the Act intended to confer power on

the Taluk Board to levy tax on the mining activities carried

on by the persons holding mineral concessions. It followed

that the levy of tax on mining by the Board as per the

impugned notification was unauthorised and liable to be set

aside. At p. 306 of the said report, it was held that royal-

ty under s. 9 of the Mines and Minerals Act was really a

tax.

To the similar effects are the observations of the High

Court of Patna in M. Lal & Ors. v. The State of Bihar &

Ors., AIR 1965 Patna 491 at 494. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer,

however, referred to the decision of this Court in H.R.S.

Murthy's case (supra). There under the terms of a mining

lease the lessee worked the mines and won iron-ores in a

tract of land in a village in Chittor district and bound

himself to pay a dead rent if he used the leased land for

the extraction of iron ore, to pay a royalty on iron ore if

it were used for extraction of iron and in addition to pay a

surface rent in respect of the surface area occupied or

used. In the said decision the legislative competence of ss.

78 & 79 of the Madras District Boards Act was upheld by

which land cess was made payable on the basis of royalty.

This Court proceeded on the basis that other cess related to

land and would therefore be covered by entry 49 of list II.

It was held that land cess paid on royalty has a direct

relation to the land and only a remote relation with mining.

This, with respect, seems to be not a correct approach. It

was further observed that it was not necessary to consider

the meaning of the expression 'tax on mineral right' follow-

ing under Entry 50 of List II in as much as according to

this Court, Parliament has not made any tax on mineral

rights. This is not a correct basis.

712

In H.R.S. Murthy's case (supra), at p. 676 of the re-

port, it was observed by this Court as follows:

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"When a question arises as to the precise head

of legislative power under which a taxing

statute has been passed, the subject for

enquiry is what in truth and substance is the

nature of the tax. No doubt, in a sense, but

in a very remote sense, it has relationship to

mining as also to the mineral won from the

mine under a contract by which royalty is

payable on the quantity of mineral extracted.

But that, does not stamp it as a tax on either

the extraction of the mineral or on the miner-

al right. It is unnecessary for the purpose of

this case to examine the question as to what

exactly is a tax on mineral rights seeing that

such a tax is not leviable by Parliament but

only by the State and the sole limitation on

the State's power to levy the tax is that it

must not interfere with a law made by Parlia-

ment as regards mineral development. Our

attention was not invited to the provision of

any such law created by Parliament. In the

context of ss. 78 and 79 and the scheme of

those provisions it is clear that the land

cess is in truth a "tax on lands" within Entry

49 of the State List."

It seems, therefore, that attention of the Court was not

invited to the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development

& Regulation) Act, 1957 and s. 9 thereof. S. 9(3) of the Act

in terms states that royalties payable under the 2nd Sched-

ule of the Act shall not be enhanced more than once during a

period of 4 years. It is, therefore, a clear bar on the

state legislature taxing royalty so as to in effect amend

2nd Schedule of the Central Act. In the premises, it cannot

be right to say that tax on royalty can be a tax on land,

and even if it is a tax, if it falls within entry 50 will be

ultra vires the State legislature power in view of s. 9(3)

of the Central Act. In Hingir--Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. The

State of Orissa (supra), Wanchoo J. in his dissenting judg-

ment has stated that a tax on mineral rights being different

from a duty of excise, pertains only to a tax that is levi-

able for the grant of the right to extract minerals, and is

not a tax on minerals as well. On that basis, a tax on

royalty would not be a tax on mineral rights and would

therefore in any event be outside the competence of the

state legislature.

The Rajasthan, Punjab, Gujarat and Orissa High Courts

have held that royalty is not a tax. See. Bherulal v. State

of Rajasthan & Anr., AIR 1956 Rajasthan 161-162; Dr. S.S.

Sharma & Anr. v. State of

713

Pb. & Ors., AIR 1969 Pb. 79 at 84; Saurashtra Cement &

Chemicals India Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1979 Guj.

180 at 184 and L.N. Agarwalla & Ors. v. State of Orissa &

Ors., AIR 1983 Orissa 210.

It was contended by Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer that the

State has a right to tax minerals. It was further contended

that if tax is levied, it will not be irrational to corre-

late it to the value of the property and to make some kind

of annual value basis of tax without intending to tax the

income. In view of the provisions of the Act, as noted

hereinbefore, this submission cannot be accepted. Mr. Krish-

namurthy Iyer also further sought to urge that in entry 50

of list II, there is no limitation to the taxing power of

the State. In view of the principles mentioned hereinbefore

and the expressed provisions of s. 9(2) of the Mines &

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Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957, this submis-

sion cannot be accepted. This field is fully covered by the

Central legislation.

In any event, royalty is directly relatable only to the

minerals extracted and on the principle that the general

provision is excluded by the special one, royalty would be

relatable to entries 23 & 50 of list II, and not entry 49 of

list II. But as the fee is covered by the Central power

under entry 23 or entry 50 of list II, the impugned legisla-

tion cannot be upheld. Our attention was drawn to a judgment

of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Peti-

tion No. 410/83--M/s Hiralal Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. The

State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., which was delivered on 28th

March, 1986 by a Division Bench of the High Court. J.S.

Verma, Acting Chief Justice, as His Lordship then was, held

that development cess by s. 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Karadhan

Adhiniyam, 1982 is ultra vires. It is not necessary in the

view taken by us, and further in view that the said decision

is under appeal in this Court, to examine it in detail.

In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the

opinion that royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty

being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the

State Legislature because s. 9 of the Central Act covers the

field and the State Legislature is denuded of its competence

under entry 23 of list II. In any event, we are of the

opinion that cess on royalty cannot be sustained under entry

49 of list II as being a tax on land. Royalty on mineral

rights is not a tax on land but a payment for the user of

land.

Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, however, submitted that in any

event, the decision in H.R.S. Murthy's case (supra) was the

decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court. Cess has

been realised on that basis

714

for the organisation of village and town panchayats and

comprehensive programme of measures had been framed under

the National Extension Service Scheme to which our attention

was drawn. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer further submitted that the

Directive Principle of State Policy embodied in the Consti-

tution enjoined that the State should take steps to organise

village panchayats and endow them with power and authority

as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of

self-Government and as the amounts have been realised on

that basis, if at all, we should declare the said cess on

royalty to be ultra vires prospectively. In other words, the

amounts that have been collected by virtue of the said

provisions, should not be declared to be illegal retrospec-

tively and the State made liable to refund the same. We see

good deal of substance in this submission. After all, there

was a decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy's case (supra)

and amounts have been collected on the basis that the said

decision was the correct position. We are, therefore, of the

opinion that we will be justified in declaring the levy of

the said cess to be ultra vires the power of the State

Legislature prospectively only.

In that view of the matter, the appeals must, therefore,

be allowed and the writ petitions also succeed to the extent

indicated above. We declare that the said cess by the Act

under s. 115 is ultra vires and the respondent State of

Tamil Nadu is restrained from enforcing the same any fur-

ther. But the respondents will not be liable for any refund

of cess already paid or collected. The appeals are disposed

of accordingly. The special leave petitions and writ peti-

tions are also disposed of in those terms. In the facts and

the circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear

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their own costs.

OZA, J. While I agree with the conclusions reached by my

learned brother Hon' Mukharji, J. I have my own reasons for

the same. The main argument in favour of this levy imposed

by the State Legislature is on the basis of Entry 49 in List

II of the Seventh Schedule conferring jurisdiction on the

State Legislature. The question therefore to be determined

is whether the jurisdiction of the State Legislature under

Item 49 of List II could be so exercised to impose a cess on

the royality prescribed under Section 9 of the Mines and

Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.

The entries which are relevant for the purpose of deter-

mining this questions are:

Entry 54 List I reads:

715

"Regulation of mines and mineral development

to the extent to which such regulation and

development under the control of the Union is

declared by Parliament by law to be expedient

in the public interest."

Entry 23 List II reads:

"Regulation of mines and mineral development

subject to the provisions of List I with

respect to regulation and development under

the control of the Union."

Entry 49 List II reads:

"Taxes on lands and buildings."

Entry 50 List II reads:

"Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limi-

tations imposed by Parliament by law relating

to mineral development."

The language of Entries 23 and 50 in List I1 clearly sub-

jects the authority or jurisdiction on the State Legislature

to any enactment made by the Parliament. Entry 23 talks of

regulation and Entry 50 talks of taxes on mineral rights. It

therefore could not be disputed that if the cess imposed

under section 115 of the Madras Village Panchayat Act is a

cess or tax on mineral rights then that jurisdiction could

be exercised by the State Legislature subject to the law

enacted by the Parliament. The Parliament in Section 9(1) of

the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,

1957 has fixed the limits of royality on the mining rights.

It was therefore contended on behalf of the State that in

fact what is imposed under Section 115 is not a cess on the

mining rights or on royality but is a tax on land which

clearly falls within the authority of the State legislature

in Entry 49 of List II.

Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals

(Regulation and Development) Act reads:

"9(1) The holder of a mining lease granted

before the commencement of this Act shall,

notwithstanding anything contained in the

instrument of lease or in any law in force at

such commencement, pay royalty in respect of

any mineral removed or consumed by him or by

his gent, manager, employee, contractor or

sub-lessee from the leased area

716

after such commencement, at the rate for the

time being specified in the Second Schedule in

respect of that mineral.

(2) The holder of a mining lease granted on or

after the commencement of this Act shall pay

royalty in respect of any mineral removed or

consumed by him or by his agent, manager,

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employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the

leased area at the rate for the time being

specified in the Second Schedule in respect of

that mineral.

(2A) The holder of a mining lease, whether

granted before or after the commence of the

Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Develop-

ment) Amendment Act, 1972 shall not be liable

to pay any royalty in respect of any coal

consumed by a workman engaged in a colliery

provided that such consumption by the workmen

does not exceed one-third of a tonne per

month.

(3) The Central Government may, by notifica-

tion in the Official Gazette, amend the Second

Schedule so as to enhance or reduce the rate

at which royalty shall be payable in respect

of any mineral with effect from such date as

may be specified in the notification.

Provided that the Central Government

shall not enhance the rate of royalty in

respect of any mineral more than once during

any period of three years."

It is clear that by this Act alongwith Schedule limits on

royality has been fixed and the authority has been given to

Parliament alone to vary it and that too not more than once

in a period of three years. Admittedly royality as not based

on the area of land under mining but per unit of minerals

extracted. Section 115 of the Madras Village Panchayat Act

reads as under:

"(1) There shall not be levied in every pan-

chayat development block, a local cess at the

rate of 45 naye paise on every rupee of land

revenue payable to the Government in respect

of any land for every Fasli.

Explanation: In this Section and in

section 116, 'land revenue' means public

revenue due on land and includes water-cess

payable to the Government for water supplied

717

or used for the irrigation of land, royalty,

lease amount for other sum payable to the

Government in respect of land held direct from

the Government on lease or licence, but does

not include any other cess or the surcharge

payable under Section 116, provided that land

revenue remitted shall not be deemed to be

land revenue for the purpose of this Section.

(2) The local cess payable under this Sub-

section (1) shall be deemed to be public

revenue due on the lands in respect of which a

person is liable to pay local cess and all the

said lands, the buildings upon the said lands

and their products shall be regarded as the

security for the local cess.

(3) The provisions of the Madras Revenue

Recovery Act, 1864 (Madras Act II of 1864)

shall apply to the payment and recovery of the

local cess payable under this Act just as they

apply to the payment and recovery of the

revenue upon the lands in respect of which the

local cess under this act is payable.

(4)(a) Out of the process of the local cess so

collected in every panchayat development

block, a sum representing four-ninths of the

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proceeds shall be credited to the Panchayat

Union (Education) Fund.

(b) Out of the proceeds of the local cess

collected in every panchayat town in a pan-

chayat development block, a sum representing

two-ninths of the said proceeds shall be cred-

ited to the town panchayat fund.

(c) Out of the balance of the local cess

credited in the panchayat development block,

such percentage as the panchayat union council

may fix shall be credited to the village

panchayat fund, and the percentage shall be

fixed so as to secure as nearly as may be that

the total income derived by all the village

panchayats in the panchayat union does not

fall short of an amount calculated at 20 naye

paise for each individual of the village

population in the panchayat union.

(d) The balance of the proceeds of the

local cess collected in the panchayat develop-

ment block shall be cre-

718

dited to the funds of the panchayat union

council."

The explanation to sub-clause I is the subject matter of

controversy in this case. Sub-clause I provides for levy of

45 naye paise for every rupee of land revenue payable to the

Government in the explanation a fiction is created thereby

even the royalty payable have been included within the

definition of "land revenue". As it provides "royalty, lease

amount or any other sum payable to the Government in respect

of land." This phraseology has been incorporated by an

amendment in 1964 by the Madras Village Panchayat Amendment

Act, 1964 Section 13 wherein the explanation to Section 115

was substituted and substituted retrospectively wherein this

royalty has also been included in the definition of 'land

revenue' and it is on this ground that it was mainly con-

tended that land revenue being a tax on land is within the

authority of the State Legislature under Item 49 of List II

and therefore the cess which is a tax on land revenue itself

or an imposition on the land revenue and hence could not be

anything else but a tax falling within the ambit of tax on

land as provided by entry 49 List II and it was therefore

contended that it would not fall within the ambit of entry

50 List II as if it falls within the ambit of entry 50 of

List II, it would be beyond the authority of the State

legislature as by passing Mines and Minerals (Regulation and

Development) Act, 1957 the Parliament has denuded the State

Legislature of its authority to levy any tax on mining

rights.

Whether royality is a tax is not very material for the

purpose of determination of this question in this case. It

is admitted that royality is charged on the basis of per

unit of minerals extracted. It is no doubt true that mineral

is extracted from the land and is available, but it could

only be extracted if there are three things:

(1) Land from which mineral could be extracted.

(2) Capital for providing machinery, instruments and other

requirements.

(3) Labour

It is therefore clear that unit of charge of royalty is not

only land but land + Labour + Capital. It is therefore clear

that if royalty is a tax or an imposition or a levy, it is

not on land alone but it is a levy or a tax on mineral

(land), labour and capital employed in extraction of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 21

mineral. It therefore is clear that royalty if is imposed by

the Parlia-

719

ment it could only be a tax not only on land but no these

three things stated above.

It is not in dispute that the cess which the Madras

Village Panchayat Act proposes to levy is nothing but an

additional tax and originally it was levied only on land

revenue, apparently land revenue would fall within the scope

of entry 49 but it could not be doubted that royalty which

is a levy or tax on the extracted mineral is not a tax or a

levy on land alone and if cess is charged on the royalty it

could not be said to be a levy or tax on land and therefore

it could not be upheld as imposed in exercise of jurisdic-

tion under Entry 49 List II by the State Legislature.

Thus it is clear that by introducing this explanation to

Section 115 clause (1) widening the meaning of word 'land

revenue' for the purposes of Section 115 and 116. When the

Legislature included Royalty, it went beyond its jurisdic-

tion under entry 49 List II and therefore clearly is without

the authority of law. But this also may lead to an interest-

ing situation. This cess levied under Section 115 of the

Madras Village Panchayat Act is levied for purposes indicat-

ed in the scheme of the Act and it was intended to be levied

on all the lands falling within the area but as this cess on

royalty is without the authority the result will be that the

cess is levied so far as lands other than the lands in which

mines are situated are concerned but lands where mines are

situated this levy of cess is not in accordance with that

law. This anomaly could have been averted if the Legislature

in this explanation had used words 'surface rent' in place

of royalty. Even if the lands where mines are situated and

which are subject to licence and mining leases even for

those lands there is a charge on the basis of the surface of

the land which is sometimes described as surface rent or

sometimes also as 'dead rent'. It could not be doubted that

if such a surface rent or dead rent is a charge or an impo-

sition on the land only and therefore will clearly fall

within the purview of entry 49 List H and if a cess is

levied on that it will also be justified as tax on land

falling within the purview of entry 49 and it will also be

uniform as this cess would be levied in respect of the lands

irrespective of the fact as to whether the land is one where

a mine is situated or land which is only used for other

purposes for which land revenue is chargeable.

R.S.S. Appeal

allowed.

720

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