As per case facts, a landlord initiated eviction proceedings against a tenant under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972, citing a bona fide requirement for his own ...
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PETITIONER:
KAMLESHWAR PRASAD
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
PRADUMANJU AGRAWAL (DEAD) BY LRS....
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/04/1997
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
PATTANAIK, J.
leave granted.
This appeal by special leave to appeal is directed
against the judgment dated 17.2.1997 of the Allahabad High
Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
The respondent landlord field a petition for eviction to
the appellant under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of
1972 inter alia on the ground at the bona fide requires the
premises for carrying on his own business and he has no
other means of livelihood. The tenant - appellant filed
objections before the prescribed authority stating there in
that the application for eviction has been filed on false
and baseless allegation and in fact the respondent does not
need the premises bona fide for starting his own business.
The prescribed authority on consideration of the materials
on record came to the conclusion that the landlord does not
require the premises for his own use bonafide. The said
prescribed authority also came to the conclusion that the
tenant would be comparatively harrassed if an order of
eviction for eviction having been rejected, the landlord
preferred an appeal. The appellate authority re-appreciated
the entire evidence on record and reversed the conclusion of
the prescribed authority. The said appellate authority came
to the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances to the
case of the requirement of the landlord to start a cloth
bushiness must be a bona fide requirement entitling him to
get an order of eviction under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act.
The appellate authority, therefore, set aside the order of
the prescribed authority and directed eviction of the
appellant. Being aggrieved by the order of the appellate
authority, the tenant carried the matter to the High Court
by filing a writ petition. During the pendency of the writ
petition in the High Court the landlord died and was
substituted by his legal heirs namely his widow, two sons
and the married daughter. On behalf of the tenant, it was
urged before the High Court that the landlord having died,
the bona fide requirement which was found to have existed by
the appellate authority no more survives, and therefore,
taking into consideration the subsequent event the High
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Court must quash the order of eviction passed by the
appellate authority. On behalf of the landlord it was
contended that the order of the appellate authority in the
eviction proceeding, is a decree and the decree having
become final, In a proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court will not be entitled to take
into consideration any subsequent event that had occured and
no that score it would not be appropriate for the High Court
to interfere with the decree passed by the appellate
authority. It was also contended that the requirement in
question must exist on the day the application for eviction
was filed and the same requirement having been found to be
established by the competent forum who was required to go
into the said question, it is no longer open to the High
Court to interfere with the said finding in exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The High Court by the impugned judgment came
the conclusion that the decree for eviction has become final
and the said finality cannot be disturbed on the application
under Article 226 of the Constitution by taking into account
the facts that the original landlord died during the
pendency of the writ petition.
Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant in this Court urged that the person for whose bona
fide requirement the order of eviction has been passed by
the appellate authority having died during the pendency of
the writ petition. The said bonafide requirement no longer
subsists and consequently the High Court should have taken
that fact into consideration and should have interfered with
the order passed by the appellate authority for the eviction
of the tenant. The learned counsel further urged that no
doubt the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution
is not a continuation of the eviction proceedings under the
Act, but all the same the High Court while exercising its
power of supervisions under Article 226 of the Constitution
is not denuded of its power to take into consideration the
subsequent event that had happened which is necessary to be
taken into consideration in the interest of justice.
Accordingly, The High Court committed serious error in not
taking into account the facts of the death of the landlord
for whose bona fide requirement the order of eviction had
been passed by the appellate authority, and therefore, this
Court should interfere with the said order of the High
Court. Having given and anxious consideration to the
contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant
and under the facts and circumstances of this case we are of
the considered opinion that this case does not warranted
interference by this Court under Article 136 of the
constitution. Under the Act the order of the appellate
authority is final and the said order is a decree of the
civil court and decree to a competent Court having become
final cannot be interfered with by the High Court in
exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 226
and 227 of the Constitution by taking into account any
subsequent event which might have happened. That apart, the
fact that the landlord needed the premises is question for
starting a bushiness which fact has been found by the
appellate authority. In eye of law, it must be that on the
day of application for eviction which is the crucial date,
the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the
premises. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of
the Writ petition in the High Court the bona fide need
cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question
can be carried on by his widow or any elder son. In this
view to the matter, we find no force in the contention of
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Mr, Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and we do not find any error in the impugned
judgment of the High Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution. The appeal, accordingly, fails and is
dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to
costs.
The landmark Supreme Court judgment in Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agrawal (Dead) by LRS. provides crucial clarity on the legal implications of a landlord's death during eviction proceedings and its impact on a bona fide requirement for eviction. This pivotal ruling, available on CaseOn, delves into whether subsequent events can overturn a final eviction decree, establishing a significant precedent in landlord-tenant law.
This case originated from an eviction petition filed by a landlord, Pradumanju Agrawal, against his tenant, Kamleshwar Prasad, under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The landlord sought to evict the tenant on the grounds of a bona fide requirement for the premises to carry on his own business, asserting he had no other means of livelihood. The tenant contested this, claiming the landlord's allegations were false and lacked genuine need.
The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the landlord's bona fide requirement for eviction, once established and upheld by an appellate authority, would cease to exist upon the landlord's death during the pendency of a writ petition in the High Court. Specifically, could the High Court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, disturb a final eviction decree by taking into account such a subsequent event?
The case hinged on:
Initially, the prescribed authority, after reviewing the evidence, concluded that the landlord did not genuinely require the premises and rejected the eviction plea. However, the appellate authority meticulously re-evaluated the entire evidence. It reversed the prescribed authority's finding, concluding that the landlord's need to start a cloth business was indeed a bona fide requirement under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. This led to an order for the tenant's eviction, which attained the status of a final decree.
Aggrieved, the tenant filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court. A significant development occurred during the High Court proceedings: the original landlord passed away, and his legal heirs (widow, two sons, and a married daughter) were substituted. The tenant argued that with the landlord's death, the bona fide requirement found by the appellate authority no longer existed. Therefore, the High Court should consider this subsequent event and quash the eviction order.
The landlord's heirs countered that the appellate authority's order constituted a final decree. They argued that the High Court, under Article 226/227, should not consider subsequent events to disturb such a final decree. They also contended that the bona fide need for starting a business would not lapse simply because the original landlord died, as the business could be carried on by his widow or elder sons.
The High Court sided with the legal heirs, concluding that the eviction decree had become final and could not be disturbed under its Article 226 jurisdiction by taking into account the landlord's death. It recognized that the 'crucial date' for assessing the bona fide requirement was when the eviction application was filed, and the need could still be fulfilled by the landlord's legal heirs.
For legal professionals analyzing complex rulings like Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agrawal, CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs offer an invaluable resource, distilling intricate judgments into concise, digestible formats, making it easier to grasp the nuances of judgments concerning the bona fide requirement for eviction and the implications of a landlord's death during eviction proceedings.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the tenant's appeal. The Court concurred that once the appellate authority's order establishing a bona fide requirement becomes a final decree, it should not be disturbed by the High Court under its supervisory powers (Article 226/227) by considering subsequent events like the landlord's death. Crucially, the Court emphasized that the bona fide need does not necessarily lapse if the intended business can still be carried on by the landlord's legal heirs (such as the widow or elder sons). The Court found no error in the impugned judgment of the High Court, thus reinforcing the sanctity of final decrees and limiting the scope for introducing subsequent events to overturn them in writ jurisdiction.
This judgment serves as an important read for legal professionals and students for several reasons:
All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.
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