LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

LPA-2065-2026

KARAN SINGH

STATE OF HARYANA

LPA-2066-2026

LAKHMI @ LAKSHMI CHAND

STATE OF HARYANA

1 The date when the judgment is reserved

2 The date when the judgment is pronounced

3 The date when

4 Whether only operative part of the judgment is

pronounced or whether the full judgment is pronounced

5 The delay, if any of the pronouncement of full judgment,

and reasons thereof

CORAM: HON’BLE MR.

HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL

Present:

RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL, J.

CM-5005-LPA

This is an application seeking condonation of delay of

re-filing the appeal.

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-1-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

2026(O&M)

KARAN SINGH

Versus

STATE OF HARYANA & OTHERS

2026(O&M)

LAKHMI @ LAKSHMI CHAND

Versus

STATE OF HARYANA & OTHERS

The date when the judgment is reserved

The date when the judgment is pronounced

The date when the judgment is uploaded

Whether only operative part of the judgment is

pronounced or whether the full judgment is pronounced

The delay, if any of the pronouncement of full judgment,

and reasons thereof

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL

HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL

Mr. P.S. Dhaliwal, Advocate

for the appellant (In both Appeals).

Mr. Saurabh Mohunta, DAG, Haryana

for respondent No.1&2 (In both Appeals).

Mr. Vivek Saini, Advocate for respondent No.3

(In both Appeals).

*****

RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL, J.

LPA-2026 in LPA-2065 of 2026

This is an application seeking condonation of delay of

filing the appeal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

....Appellant

....Respondents

....Appellant

....Respondents

27.07.2026

18.09.2026

18.09.2026

Whether only operative part of the judgment is

pronounced or whether the full judgment is pronounced

Full

The delay, if any of the pronouncement of full judgment, Not applicable

JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL

HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL

appellant (In both Appeals).

Saurabh Mohunta, DAG, Haryana

(In both Appeals).

Advocate for respondent No.3

This is an application seeking condonation of delay of 23 days in

days in

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

Notice in the application.

For the

affidavit, the same is allowed.

Delay of

CM-5009-LPA

This is an application seeking condonation of delay of

the appeal.

Notice in the application.

For the reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

affidavit, the same is allowed.

Delay of

CM-5010-LPA

This is an

re-filing the appeal.

Notice in the application.

For the reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

affidavit, the same is allowed.

Delay of

Main Appeals

1.

the judgments dated

Single Judge in

respectively, whereby the writ

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-2-

Notice in the application.

For the reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

affidavit, the same is allowed.

Delay of 23 days in re-filing the appeal is condoned.

LPA-2026 in LPA-2066 of 2026

This is an application seeking condonation of delay of

Notice in the application.

For the reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

affidavit, the same is allowed.

Delay of 5 days in filing the appeal is condoned.

LPA-2026 in LPA-2066 of 2026

This is an application seeking condonation of delay of

filing the appeal.

Notice in the application.

For the reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

affidavit, the same is allowed.

Delay of 23 days in re-filing the appeal is

Main Appeals

The present set of Letters Patent Appeals

the judgments dated 16.04.2026 and 23.04.2026

Single Judge in CWP No. 11216 of 2026

respectively, whereby the writ petitions filed by the appellants challenging

reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

filing the appeal is condoned.

This is an application seeking condonation of delay of 5 days in filing

For the reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

days in filing the appeal is condoned.

application seeking condonation of delay of 23 days in

For the reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

filing the appeal is condoned.

The present set of Letters Patent Appeals are directed against

23.04.2026 passed by the learned

11216 of 2026 and CWP No. 37420 of 2025

petitions filed by the appellants challenging

reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

days in filing

For the reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

days in

For the reasons mentioned in the application, which is supported by an

directed against

passed by the learned

37420 of 2025

petitions filed by the appellants challenging

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

the demolition proceedings initiated by the respondent

Corporation came to be dismissed. Since both the appeals pertain to the

same land, arise out of the same set of facts and circumstances and invol

identical questions for consideration, they are being taken up together and

are being disposed of by this common order.

2.

interest, Late Ba

cultivating possession of land measuring 34 Kanals 5 Marlas, situated in

Village Sihi,

since prior to the year 1943

continued uninterrupted

in settled possession of the land.

3.

initiated proceedings for their eviction under the Haryana Public Premises

and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972. The Estate Officer, vide

order dated 23.04.1994, ordered their eviction, whic

appeal on 17.02.1995. Aggrieved thereby, the predecessor

appellants approached this Court by filing

judgment dated

remitted the matter to the Collector, Ballabgarh, with a direction to

determine, inter alia, whether the respondent

authority to seek their eviction and whether the predecessor

appellants could be treated as an unau

of the proceedings. The Collector, vide interim order dated

protected the appellants from dispossession.

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-3-

the demolition proceedings initiated by the respondent

Corporation came to be dismissed. Since both the appeals pertain to the

same land, arise out of the same set of facts and circumstances and invol

identical questions for consideration, they are being taken up together and

are being disposed of by this common order.

The appellants claim their rights through their predecessor

ate Badle, son of Chander, who was allegedly in continu

cultivating possession of land measuring 34 Kanals 5 Marlas, situated in

Sihi, Tehsil Ballabgarh, District Faridabad, as a Gair Marusi tenant

since prior to the year 1943-44. According to the appellants, the said tenancy

continued uninterrupted for several decades and their predecessor remained

in settled possession of the land.

In the year 1994, the Faridabad Complex Administration

initiated proceedings for their eviction under the Haryana Public Premises

and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972. The Estate Officer, vide

order dated 23.04.1994, ordered their eviction, whic

appeal on 17.02.1995. Aggrieved thereby, the predecessor

appellants approached this Court by filing CWP

judgment dated 14.03.1997 this Court set aside both the aforesaid orders and

the matter to the Collector, Ballabgarh, with a direction to

determine, inter alia, whether the respondent

authority to seek their eviction and whether the predecessor

appellants could be treated as an unauthorised occupant during the pendency

of the proceedings. The Collector, vide interim order dated

protected the appellants from dispossession.

the demolition proceedings initiated by the respondent-Municipal

Corporation came to be dismissed. Since both the appeals pertain to the

same land, arise out of the same set of facts and circumstances and involve

identical questions for consideration, they are being taken up together and

The appellants claim their rights through their predecessor-in-

, son of Chander, who was allegedly in continuous

cultivating possession of land measuring 34 Kanals 5 Marlas, situated in

Tehsil Ballabgarh, District Faridabad, as a Gair Marusi tenant

44. According to the appellants, the said tenancy

for several decades and their predecessor remained

In the year 1994, the Faridabad Complex Administration

initiated proceedings for their eviction under the Haryana Public Premises

and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972. The Estate Officer, vide

order dated 23.04.1994, ordered their eviction, which order was affirmed in

appeal on 17.02.1995. Aggrieved thereby, the predecessor-in-interest of the

CWP No. 18641 of 1995. Vide

this Court set aside both the aforesaid orders and

the matter to the Collector, Ballabgarh, with a direction to

determine, inter alia, whether the respondent-Corporation had the locus and

authority to seek their eviction and whether the predecessor-in-interest of the

thorised occupant during the pendency

of the proceedings. The Collector, vide interim order dated 15.09.2004

protected the appellants from dispossession. Subsequently, out of the

Municipal

Corporation came to be dismissed. Since both the appeals pertain to the

ve

identical questions for consideration, they are being taken up together and

-

ous

cultivating possession of land measuring 34 Kanals 5 Marlas, situated in

Tehsil Ballabgarh, District Faridabad, as a Gair Marusi tenant

44. According to the appellants, the said tenancy

for several decades and their predecessor remained

In the year 1994, the Faridabad Complex Administration

initiated proceedings for their eviction under the Haryana Public Premises

and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972. The Estate Officer, vide

h order was affirmed in

interest of the

Vide

this Court set aside both the aforesaid orders and

the matter to the Collector, Ballabgarh, with a direction to

Corporation had the locus and

interest of the

thorised occupant during the pendency

15.09.2004

Subsequently, out of the

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

aforesaid land, an area measuring 12 Kanals 15 Marlas came to be acquired

by the State. In Land Acquisition Case No.

22.03.2016 the learned Additional District Judge, Faridabad, recognised the

predecessor-in

of the compensation in his favour, while

Municipal Corporation as owner of the land.

4.

the recognition of the tenancy rights by the learned Additional District

Judge, the Joint Commissioner, Municipa

demolition order dated

Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, directing demolition of the

residential/agricultural structures existing on the land in question.

statutory appeal

dismissed by the Divisional Commissioner vide order dated 05.02.202

appellants thereafter approached this Court by filing

The said petition was allowed by this Court vide ord

whereby the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner was set aside and

the matter was remitted for fresh consideration.

5.

05.02.2025,

revenue records for the year

residential structure, the land being recorded as “Gair

Gairth/House” and that a Gair Marusi tenant could not alter the nature of the

land without the

appellants once again approached this Court by filing

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-4-

aforesaid land, an area measuring 12 Kanals 15 Marlas came to be acquired

the State. In Land Acquisition Case No.

the learned Additional District Judge, Faridabad, recognised the

in-interest as a Gair Marusi tenant and directed payment of 75%

of the compensation in his favour, while awarding the remaining 25% to the

Municipal Corporation as owner of the land.

Notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings and

the recognition of the tenancy rights by the learned Additional District

Judge, the Joint Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Faridabad, passed a

demolition order dated 01.09.2017 under Section

Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, directing demolition of the

residential/agricultural structures existing on the land in question.

statutory appeal preferred by the appellants against the said order was

dismissed by the Divisional Commissioner vide order dated 05.02.202

appellants thereafter approached this Court by filing

The said petition was allowed by this Court vide ord

whereby the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner was set aside and

the matter was remitted for fresh consideration.

Upon remand, the Divisional Commissioner, vide order dated

again dismissed the appeal, principall

revenue records for the year 2008-09 did not reflect the existence of any

residential structure, the land being recorded as “Gair

House” and that a Gair Marusi tenant could not alter the nature of the

land without the consent of the owner. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the

appellants once again approached this Court by filing

aforesaid land, an area measuring 12 Kanals 15 Marlas came to be acquired

the State. In Land Acquisition Case No. 411 of 2010 decided on

the learned Additional District Judge, Faridabad, recognised the

interest as a Gair Marusi tenant and directed payment of 75%

awarding the remaining 25% to the

Notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings and

the recognition of the tenancy rights by the learned Additional District

l Corporation, Faridabad, passed a

under Section 408-A of the Haryana

Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, directing demolition of the

residential/agricultural structures existing on the land in question. The

preferred by the appellants against the said order was

dismissed by the Divisional Commissioner vide order dated 05.02.2021. The

appellants thereafter approached this Court by filing CWP No. 942 of 2022.

The said petition was allowed by this Court vide order dated 07.02.2023

whereby the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner was set aside and

the matter was remitted for fresh consideration.

Upon remand, the Divisional Commissioner, vide order dated

again dismissed the appeal, principally on the ground that the

09 did not reflect the existence of any

residential structure, the land being recorded as “Gair Mumkin

House” and that a Gair Marusi tenant could not alter the nature of the

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the

appellants once again approached this Court by filing CWP No. 11216 of

aforesaid land, an area measuring 12 Kanals 15 Marlas came to be acquired

decided on

the learned Additional District Judge, Faridabad, recognised the

interest as a Gair Marusi tenant and directed payment of 75%

awarding the remaining 25% to the

Notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings and

the recognition of the tenancy rights by the learned Additional District

l Corporation, Faridabad, passed a

of the Haryana

Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, directing demolition of the

The

preferred by the appellants against the said order was

. The

942 of 2022.

07.02.2023

whereby the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner was set aside and

Upon remand, the Divisional Commissioner, vide order dated

he

09 did not reflect the existence of any

Mumkin

House” and that a Gair Marusi tenant could not alter the nature of the

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the

11216 of

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

2026 and CWP No

by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated

Single Judge, inter alia, held that the revenue record did not establish the

appellants’ possession over the portion of the land directed to be demolished

and that, insofar as the proprietary rights were concerned, the appropriate

remedy for the appellants was to institute a civil suit.

6.

preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal

7.

learned Single Judge er

appreciating that the proceedings initiated under the Haryana Public

Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, pursuant to the

remand order passed by this Court in

pending before the Collector and the question as to whether the appellants

are unauthorised occupants has not attained finality.

until the said question is finally determined by the competent authority, the

respondents could not have

occupants and proceeded to initiate demolition proceedings under Section

408-A of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. Learned counsel

submitted that such action, during the pendency of the proceedings in

the status of the appellants is itself under adjudication, would amount to pre

judging the very issue pending before the competent authority and would

effectively render the remand order passed by this Court nugatory.

7.1

appellants had remained in continuous and settled possession of the land for

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-5-

and CWP No. 37420 of 2025. The said petition came to be dismissed

by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated

Single Judge, inter alia, held that the revenue record did not establish the

appellants’ possession over the portion of the land directed to be demolished

and that, insofar as the proprietary rights were concerned, the appropriate

emedy for the appellants was to institute a civil suit.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the appellants have

preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal(s)

Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the

learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition without

appreciating that the proceedings initiated under the Haryana Public

Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, pursuant to the

remand order passed by this Court in CWP

pending before the Collector and the question as to whether the appellants

are unauthorised occupants has not attained finality.

until the said question is finally determined by the competent authority, the

respondents could not have presumed the appellants to be unauthorised

occupants and proceeded to initiate demolition proceedings under Section

A of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. Learned counsel

submitted that such action, during the pendency of the proceedings in

the status of the appellants is itself under adjudication, would amount to pre

judging the very issue pending before the competent authority and would

effectively render the remand order passed by this Court nugatory.

It was further contended that the predecessor

appellants had remained in continuous and settled possession of the land for

The said petition came to be dismissed

by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 16.04.2026. The learned

Single Judge, inter alia, held that the revenue record did not establish the

appellants’ possession over the portion of the land directed to be demolished

and that, insofar as the proprietary rights were concerned, the appropriate

emedy for the appellants was to institute a civil suit.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the appellants have

(s).

Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the

red in dismissing the writ petition without

appreciating that the proceedings initiated under the Haryana Public

Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, pursuant to the

CWP No. 18641 of 1995 are still

pending before the Collector and the question as to whether the appellants

are unauthorised occupants has not attained finality. It was contended that,

until the said question is finally determined by the competent authority, the

presumed the appellants to be unauthorised

occupants and proceeded to initiate demolition proceedings under Section

A of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. Learned counsel

submitted that such action, during the pendency of the proceedings in which

the status of the appellants is itself under adjudication, would amount to pre-

judging the very issue pending before the competent authority and would

effectively render the remand order passed by this Court nugatory.

hat the predecessor-in-interest of the

appellants had remained in continuous and settled possession of the land for

The said petition came to be dismissed

The learned

Single Judge, inter alia, held that the revenue record did not establish the

appellants’ possession over the portion of the land directed to be demolished

and that, insofar as the proprietary rights were concerned, the appropriate

Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the appellants have

Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the

red in dismissing the writ petition without

appreciating that the proceedings initiated under the Haryana Public

Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, pursuant to the

are still

pending before the Collector and the question as to whether the appellants

It was contended that,

until the said question is finally determined by the competent authority, the

presumed the appellants to be unauthorised

occupants and proceeded to initiate demolition proceedings under Section

A of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. Learned counsel

which

-

judging the very issue pending before the competent authority and would

interest of the

appellants had remained in continuous and settled possession of the land for

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

several decades as a Gair Marusi tenant. Learned counsel submitted that the

said fact is borne out from the earlier eviction proceedings ini

respondents themselves, as also from the land acquisition proceedings,

wherein the learned Additional District Judge recognised the tenancy rights

and directed payment of 75% of the compensation to the appellants’

predecessor-in

possession could not be disturbed except in accordance with law and that the

appellants were entitled to protection against dispossession otherwise than

through due process of law.

7.2

Commissioner as well as the learned Single Judge had proceeded principally

on the basis of the absence of any entry regarding the residential structure in

the revenue record for the year 2008

that the construction was unauthorised. It was contended that revenue

records are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and that mere absence

of an entry therein, by itself, cannot establish either that the construction was

raised subsequently

submitted that the Municipal Corporation had not placed on record any

independent material, such as a local inspection report, demarcation report,

municipal survey, site plan, satellite imagery or any oth

establish that the construction in question was unauthorised. It was,

therefore, contended that the impugned findings rest on presumptions and

conjectures rather than on any cogent material or evidence.

submitted that the aut

circumstances borne out from the record, including the appellants’ long and

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-6-

several decades as a Gair Marusi tenant. Learned counsel submitted that the

said fact is borne out from the earlier eviction proceedings ini

respondents themselves, as also from the land acquisition proceedings,

wherein the learned Additional District Judge recognised the tenancy rights

and directed payment of 75% of the compensation to the appellants’

in-interest. It was argued that such long

possession could not be disturbed except in accordance with law and that the

appellants were entitled to protection against dispossession otherwise than

through due process of law.

The appellants further submitted that both the Divisional

Commissioner as well as the learned Single Judge had proceeded principally

on the basis of the absence of any entry regarding the residential structure in

the revenue record for the year 2008-09 and, on that basis alone,

that the construction was unauthorised. It was contended that revenue

records are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and that mere absence

of an entry therein, by itself, cannot establish either that the construction was

raised subsequently or that the same was unauthorised.

submitted that the Municipal Corporation had not placed on record any

independent material, such as a local inspection report, demarcation report,

municipal survey, site plan, satellite imagery or any oth

establish that the construction in question was unauthorised. It was,

therefore, contended that the impugned findings rest on presumptions and

conjectures rather than on any cogent material or evidence.

submitted that the authorities failed to take into consideration the material

circumstances borne out from the record, including the appellants’ long and

several decades as a Gair Marusi tenant. Learned counsel submitted that the

said fact is borne out from the earlier eviction proceedings initiated by the

respondents themselves, as also from the land acquisition proceedings,

wherein the learned Additional District Judge recognised the tenancy rights

and directed payment of 75% of the compensation to the appellants’

was argued that such long-standing and settled

possession could not be disturbed except in accordance with law and that the

appellants were entitled to protection against dispossession otherwise than

submitted that both the Divisional

Commissioner as well as the learned Single Judge had proceeded principally

on the basis of the absence of any entry regarding the residential structure in

09 and, on that basis alone, concluded

that the construction was unauthorised. It was contended that revenue

records are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and that mere absence

of an entry therein, by itself, cannot establish either that the construction was

or that the same was unauthorised. Learned counsel

submitted that the Municipal Corporation had not placed on record any

independent material, such as a local inspection report, demarcation report,

municipal survey, site plan, satellite imagery or any other evidence, to

establish that the construction in question was unauthorised. It was,

therefore, contended that the impugned findings rest on presumptions and

conjectures rather than on any cogent material or evidence. It was further

horities failed to take into consideration the material

circumstances borne out from the record, including the appellants’ long and

several decades as a Gair Marusi tenant. Learned counsel submitted that the

tiated by the

respondents themselves, as also from the land acquisition proceedings,

wherein the learned Additional District Judge recognised the tenancy rights

and directed payment of 75% of the compensation to the appellants’

standing and settled

possession could not be disturbed except in accordance with law and that the

appellants were entitled to protection against dispossession otherwise than

submitted that both the Divisional

Commissioner as well as the learned Single Judge had proceeded principally

on the basis of the absence of any entry regarding the residential structure in

concluded

that the construction was unauthorised. It was contended that revenue

records are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and that mere absence

of an entry therein, by itself, cannot establish either that the construction was

Learned counsel

submitted that the Municipal Corporation had not placed on record any

independent material, such as a local inspection report, demarcation report,

er evidence, to

establish that the construction in question was unauthorised. It was,

therefore, contended that the impugned findings rest on presumptions and

It was further

horities failed to take into consideration the material

circumstances borne out from the record, including the appellants’ long and

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

settled possession, the earlier rounds of litigation, the orders passed by this

Court and the recognition of the tenancy rig

proceedings. Learned counsel contended that, by disregarding these material

circumstances and basing the conclusion substantially on a solitary revenue

entry, the authorities had arrived at a conclusion which was arbitrary and

unsustainable in law.

7.3

learned Single Judge introduced an entirely new ground while observing that

the appellants ought to have initiated proceedings under Section 13

Haryana Village

although neither the demolition order nor the order passed by the Divisional

Commissioner was founded upon such a consideration. It was submitted that

an administrative order has to stand or fall on the

and cannot subsequently be supplemented by reasons which did not form

part of the decision

Court cannot sustain an administrative action by supplying or assigning

reasons which wer

relevant stage.

returned mutually inconsistent findings. On the one hand, the authority

acknowledged that the legality of the appellants’

subject to determination in the pending eviction proceedings; on the other

hand, it proceeded to uphold the demolition on the premise that the

construction was unauthorised. According to learned counsel, such findings

could not stand to

and rights in respect of the land was itself pending before the competent

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-7-

settled possession, the earlier rounds of litigation, the orders passed by this

Court and the recognition of the tenancy rig

proceedings. Learned counsel contended that, by disregarding these material

circumstances and basing the conclusion substantially on a solitary revenue

entry, the authorities had arrived at a conclusion which was arbitrary and

nsustainable in law.

Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the

learned Single Judge introduced an entirely new ground while observing that

the appellants ought to have initiated proceedings under Section 13

Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and 1964 rules,

although neither the demolition order nor the order passed by the Divisional

Commissioner was founded upon such a consideration. It was submitted that

an administrative order has to stand or fall on the

and cannot subsequently be supplemented by reasons which did not form

part of the decision-making process. Learned counsel contended that the

Court cannot sustain an administrative action by supplying or assigning

reasons which were neither recorded nor relied upon by the authority at the

relevant stage. It was further argued that the Divisional Commissioner had

returned mutually inconsistent findings. On the one hand, the authority

acknowledged that the legality of the appellants’

subject to determination in the pending eviction proceedings; on the other

hand, it proceeded to uphold the demolition on the premise that the

construction was unauthorised. According to learned counsel, such findings

could not stand together, since the determination of the appellants’ status

and rights in respect of the land was itself pending before the competent

settled possession, the earlier rounds of litigation, the orders passed by this

Court and the recognition of the tenancy rights in the land acquisition

proceedings. Learned counsel contended that, by disregarding these material

circumstances and basing the conclusion substantially on a solitary revenue

entry, the authorities had arrived at a conclusion which was arbitrary and

he appellants further contended that the

learned Single Judge introduced an entirely new ground while observing that

the appellants ought to have initiated proceedings under Section 13-A of the

on Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and 1964 rules,

although neither the demolition order nor the order passed by the Divisional

Commissioner was founded upon such a consideration. It was submitted that

an administrative order has to stand or fall on the reasons recorded therein

and cannot subsequently be supplemented by reasons which did not form

making process. Learned counsel contended that the

Court cannot sustain an administrative action by supplying or assigning

e neither recorded nor relied upon by the authority at the

It was further argued that the Divisional Commissioner had

returned mutually inconsistent findings. On the one hand, the authority

acknowledged that the legality of the appellants’ possession remained

subject to determination in the pending eviction proceedings; on the other

hand, it proceeded to uphold the demolition on the premise that the

construction was unauthorised. According to learned counsel, such findings

gether, since the determination of the appellants’ status

and rights in respect of the land was itself pending before the competent

settled possession, the earlier rounds of litigation, the orders passed by this

hts in the land acquisition

proceedings. Learned counsel contended that, by disregarding these material

circumstances and basing the conclusion substantially on a solitary revenue

entry, the authorities had arrived at a conclusion which was arbitrary and

he appellants further contended that the

learned Single Judge introduced an entirely new ground while observing that

A of the

on Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and 1964 rules,

although neither the demolition order nor the order passed by the Divisional

Commissioner was founded upon such a consideration. It was submitted that

reasons recorded therein

and cannot subsequently be supplemented by reasons which did not form

making process. Learned counsel contended that the

Court cannot sustain an administrative action by supplying or assigning

e neither recorded nor relied upon by the authority at the

It was further argued that the Divisional Commissioner had

returned mutually inconsistent findings. On the one hand, the authority

possession remained

subject to determination in the pending eviction proceedings; on the other

hand, it proceeded to uphold the demolition on the premise that the

construction was unauthorised. According to learned counsel, such findings

gether, since the determination of the appellants’ status

and rights in respect of the land was itself pending before the competent

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

authority. The demolition proceedings, therefore, could not have been

sustained on the assumption of a disputed status which

adjudicated.

7.4

cause irreparable prejudice to the appellants by permanently destroying the

immovable property before their legal status and rights in respect of the land

are finally adjudicated. Learned counsel submitted that permitting

demolition at this stage would, in effect, prejudge the rights of the parties

without first resolving the principal dispute pending before the Collector. It

was argued that such action would

to the remand order passed by this Court nugatory, but would also enable the

respondents to achieve indirectly what they are yet to establish in the

pending proceedings.

7.5

judgments dated

by the Divisional Commissioner, and the demolition order dated

are legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

8.

that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge does not

suffer from any error of law warranting interference in the present intra

Court appeal. The learned Single Judge independently examined the findings

recorded by the Divisional Commissioner and rightly held that no case for

interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was

made out, as the appellants had failed to demonstrate that the findings

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-8-

authority. The demolition proceedings, therefore, could not have been

sustained on the assumption of a disputed status which

Lastly, it was contended that demolition of the structures would

cause irreparable prejudice to the appellants by permanently destroying the

immovable property before their legal status and rights in respect of the land

e finally adjudicated. Learned counsel submitted that permitting

demolition at this stage would, in effect, prejudge the rights of the parties

without first resolving the principal dispute pending before the Collector. It

was argued that such action would not only render the proceedings pursuant

to the remand order passed by this Court nugatory, but would also enable the

respondents to achieve indirectly what they are yet to establish in the

pending proceedings.

Learned counsel, accordingly, submitted

dated 16.04.2026/23.04.2026, the order dated

by the Divisional Commissioner, and the demolition order dated

are legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

Learned counsel appearing for the

that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge does not

suffer from any error of law warranting interference in the present intra

Court appeal. The learned Single Judge independently examined the findings

by the Divisional Commissioner and rightly held that no case for

interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was

made out, as the appellants had failed to demonstrate that the findings

authority. The demolition proceedings, therefore, could not have been

sustained on the assumption of a disputed status which remained to be

Lastly, it was contended that demolition of the structures would

cause irreparable prejudice to the appellants by permanently destroying the

immovable property before their legal status and rights in respect of the land

e finally adjudicated. Learned counsel submitted that permitting

demolition at this stage would, in effect, prejudge the rights of the parties

without first resolving the principal dispute pending before the Collector. It

not only render the proceedings pursuant

to the remand order passed by this Court nugatory, but would also enable the

respondents to achieve indirectly what they are yet to establish in the

Learned counsel, accordingly, submitted that the impugned

the order dated 05.02.2025 passed

by the Divisional Commissioner, and the demolition order dated 01.09.2017

are legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State submitted

that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge does not

suffer from any error of law warranting interference in the present intra-

Court appeal. The learned Single Judge independently examined the findings

by the Divisional Commissioner and rightly held that no case for

interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was

made out, as the appellants had failed to demonstrate that the findings

authority. The demolition proceedings, therefore, could not have been

remained to be

Lastly, it was contended that demolition of the structures would

cause irreparable prejudice to the appellants by permanently destroying the

immovable property before their legal status and rights in respect of the land

e finally adjudicated. Learned counsel submitted that permitting

demolition at this stage would, in effect, prejudge the rights of the parties

without first resolving the principal dispute pending before the Collector. It

not only render the proceedings pursuant

to the remand order passed by this Court nugatory, but would also enable the

respondents to achieve indirectly what they are yet to establish in the

that the impugned

passed

01.09.2017

State submitted

that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge does not

-

Court appeal. The learned Single Judge independently examined the findings

by the Divisional Commissioner and rightly held that no case for

interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was

made out, as the appellants had failed to demonstrate that the findings

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

recorded by the statutory authority were perv

or contrary to any statutory provision

8.1.

the pendency of the eviction proceedings pursuant to the remand order

passed by this Court in

proceedings relate to the question whether the appellants are unauthorised

occupants within the meaning of the Haryana Public Premises and Land

(Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, whereas the proceedings in the

present case a

Corporation Act, 1994, which governs the question of unauthorised

construction. The two proceedings operate in distinct fields and are founded

upon different statutory provisions. The pendency of one procee

therefore, does not, by itself, preclude initiation or continuation of

proceedings under the other enactment.

8.2.

appellants upon the status of their predecessor

tenant is legally untenable. A Gair Marusi tenant is essentially a non

occupancy tenant and acquires no proprietary rights in the land merely by

virtue of such tenancy. In the absence of the consent of the owner or any

statutory provision conferring s

right to raise permanent construction or alter the nature or character of the

land. No statutory provision, rule or precedent was brought to the notice of

the authorities or this Court establishing any such right

appellants. It was contended that the appellants cannot claim any greater

right merely on the basis of their alleged long

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-9-

recorded by the statutory authority were perv

or contrary to any statutory provision.

It was contended that the principal submission founded upon

the pendency of the eviction proceedings pursuant to the remand order

passed by this Court in CWP No. 18641 of 1995

proceedings relate to the question whether the appellants are unauthorised

occupants within the meaning of the Haryana Public Premises and Land

(Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, whereas the proceedings in the

present case arise under Section 408-A of the Haryana Municipal

Corporation Act, 1994, which governs the question of unauthorised

construction. The two proceedings operate in distinct fields and are founded

upon different statutory provisions. The pendency of one procee

therefore, does not, by itself, preclude initiation or continuation of

proceedings under the other enactment.

Learned counsel further submitted that reliance placed by the

appellants upon the status of their predecessor

tenant is legally untenable. A Gair Marusi tenant is essentially a non

occupancy tenant and acquires no proprietary rights in the land merely by

virtue of such tenancy. In the absence of the consent of the owner or any

statutory provision conferring such authority, such a tenant cannot claim a

right to raise permanent construction or alter the nature or character of the

land. No statutory provision, rule or precedent was brought to the notice of

the authorities or this Court establishing any such right

appellants. It was contended that the appellants cannot claim any greater

right merely on the basis of their alleged long

recorded by the statutory authority were perverse, unsupported by evidence

It was contended that the principal submission founded upon

the pendency of the eviction proceedings pursuant to the remand order

18641 of 1995 is misconceived. The said

proceedings relate to the question whether the appellants are unauthorised

occupants within the meaning of the Haryana Public Premises and Land

(Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, whereas the proceedings in the

A of the Haryana Municipal

Corporation Act, 1994, which governs the question of unauthorised

construction. The two proceedings operate in distinct fields and are founded

upon different statutory provisions. The pendency of one proceeding,

therefore, does not, by itself, preclude initiation or continuation of

Learned counsel further submitted that reliance placed by the

appellants upon the status of their predecessor-in-interest as a Gair Marusi

tenant is legally untenable. A Gair Marusi tenant is essentially a non-

occupancy tenant and acquires no proprietary rights in the land merely by

virtue of such tenancy. In the absence of the consent of the owner or any

uch authority, such a tenant cannot claim a

right to raise permanent construction or alter the nature or character of the

land. No statutory provision, rule or precedent was brought to the notice of

the authorities or this Court establishing any such right in favour of the

appellants. It was contended that the appellants cannot claim any greater

right merely on the basis of their alleged long-standing possession.

erse, unsupported by evidence

It was contended that the principal submission founded upon

the pendency of the eviction proceedings pursuant to the remand order

is misconceived. The said

proceedings relate to the question whether the appellants are unauthorised

occupants within the meaning of the Haryana Public Premises and Land

(Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, whereas the proceedings in the

A of the Haryana Municipal

Corporation Act, 1994, which governs the question of unauthorised

construction. The two proceedings operate in distinct fields and are founded

ding,

therefore, does not, by itself, preclude initiation or continuation of

Learned counsel further submitted that reliance placed by the

rusi

-

occupancy tenant and acquires no proprietary rights in the land merely by

virtue of such tenancy. In the absence of the consent of the owner or any

uch authority, such a tenant cannot claim a

right to raise permanent construction or alter the nature or character of the

land. No statutory provision, rule or precedent was brought to the notice of

in favour of the

appellants. It was contended that the appellants cannot claim any greater

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

8.3.

question was an old ancest

revenue record. The Jamabandi for the year 2008

reflecting the existence of any house, Gair Mumkin Ga

permanent structure on the disputed land. Had such a structure exist

several decades, it would ordinarily have found some reflection in the

relevant revenue record. Apart from the said assertion, the appellants failed

to produce any Khasra Girdawari, Jamabandi, mutation entry, municipal

record or other documentary ma

over the disputed site or the existence of the alleged construction.

learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly recorded that no material had been

produced to establish the nature of the appellants’ possession

disputed land. Such concurrent findings of fact, based on the material

available on record, do not warrant interference in an intra

the absence of any perversity or patent error of law.

8.4.

themselves had pleaded that the land forms part of the Shamlat Deh. Having

taken such a stand, the appellants could not simultaneously assert

independent proprietary rights therein. If the appellants cl

title or interest in the Shamlat Deh land, the appropriate remedy was to

institute proceedings under Section 13

Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961. Admittedly, no such proceedings had been

initiated. The learned S

upon the disputed questions of title in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this

Court.

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-10-

It was further argued that the assertion that the structure in

question was an old ancestral construction is not borne out from the official

revenue record. The Jamabandi for the year 2008

reflecting the existence of any house, Gair Mumkin Ga

permanent structure on the disputed land. Had such a structure exist

several decades, it would ordinarily have found some reflection in the

relevant revenue record. Apart from the said assertion, the appellants failed

to produce any Khasra Girdawari, Jamabandi, mutation entry, municipal

record or other documentary material establishing either their possession

over the disputed site or the existence of the alleged construction.

learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly recorded that no material had been

produced to establish the nature of the appellants’ possession

disputed land. Such concurrent findings of fact, based on the material

available on record, do not warrant interference in an intra

the absence of any perversity or patent error of law.

The respondents further contended that the appellants

themselves had pleaded that the land forms part of the Shamlat Deh. Having

taken such a stand, the appellants could not simultaneously assert

independent proprietary rights therein. If the appellants cl

title or interest in the Shamlat Deh land, the appropriate remedy was to

institute proceedings under Section 13-A of the Haryana Village Common

Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961. Admittedly, no such proceedings had been

initiated. The learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly declined to adjudicate

upon the disputed questions of title in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this

It was further argued that the assertion that the structure in

ral construction is not borne out from the official

revenue record. The Jamabandi for the year 2008-09 contains no entry

reflecting the existence of any house, Gair Mumkin Gairth or other

permanent structure on the disputed land. Had such a structure existed for

several decades, it would ordinarily have found some reflection in the

relevant revenue record. Apart from the said assertion, the appellants failed

to produce any Khasra Girdawari, Jamabandi, mutation entry, municipal

terial establishing either their possession

over the disputed site or the existence of the alleged construction. The

learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly recorded that no material had been

produced to establish the nature of the appellants’ possession over the

disputed land. Such concurrent findings of fact, based on the material

available on record, do not warrant interference in an intra-Court appeal in

the absence of any perversity or patent error of law.

The respondents further contended that the appellants

themselves had pleaded that the land forms part of the Shamlat Deh. Having

taken such a stand, the appellants could not simultaneously assert

independent proprietary rights therein. If the appellants claimed any right,

title or interest in the Shamlat Deh land, the appropriate remedy was to

A of the Haryana Village Common

Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961. Admittedly, no such proceedings had been

ingle Judge, therefore, rightly declined to adjudicate

upon the disputed questions of title in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this

It was further argued that the assertion that the structure in

ral construction is not borne out from the official

09 contains no entry

or other

ed for

several decades, it would ordinarily have found some reflection in the

relevant revenue record. Apart from the said assertion, the appellants failed

to produce any Khasra Girdawari, Jamabandi, mutation entry, municipal

terial establishing either their possession

The

learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly recorded that no material had been

over the

disputed land. Such concurrent findings of fact, based on the material

Court appeal in

The respondents further contended that the appellants

themselves had pleaded that the land forms part of the Shamlat Deh. Having

taken such a stand, the appellants could not simultaneously assert

aimed any right,

title or interest in the Shamlat Deh land, the appropriate remedy was to

A of the Haryana Village Common

Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961. Admittedly, no such proceedings had been

ingle Judge, therefore, rightly declined to adjudicate

upon the disputed questions of title in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

8.5.

principles of natural justice. The earlier rema

a view to affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing, which was duly

granted by the Divisional Commissioner. Upon consideration of the material

and the submissions made by the parties, the Divisional Commissioner

passed a detailed and reasoned order. No prejudice, therefore, can be said to

have been caused to the appellants on account of any alleged denial of

opportunity.

Patent Appeal is devoid of merit an

question warranting interference by this Court. It was prayed that the appeal

be dismissed with costs and that the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as

also the orders passed by the Joint Commissioner and the Di

Commissioner, be affirmed.

9.

length and have carefully perused the material available on record. Upon

thoughtful consideration of the rival submissions, we are of the considered

view that the present appeals are devoid of merit and do not warrant

interference with the well

Single Judge.

9.1.

that, since the proceedings initiate

Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, pursuant to the remand order

passed by this Court in

Collector, the respondents were legally precluded from initiating o

continuing proceedings for demolition under Section 408

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-11-

It was lastly submitted that there was no violation of the

principles of natural justice. The earlier rema

a view to affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing, which was duly

granted by the Divisional Commissioner. Upon consideration of the material

and the submissions made by the parties, the Divisional Commissioner

ed a detailed and reasoned order. No prejudice, therefore, can be said to

have been caused to the appellants on account of any alleged denial of

Learned counsel accordingly submitted that the present Letters

Patent Appeal is devoid of merit and does not give rise to any substantial

question warranting interference by this Court. It was prayed that the appeal

be dismissed with costs and that the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as

also the orders passed by the Joint Commissioner and the Di

Commissioner, be affirmed.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable

length and have carefully perused the material available on record. Upon

thoughtful consideration of the rival submissions, we are of the considered

that the present appeals are devoid of merit and do not warrant

interference with the well-reasoned judgments rendered by the learned

Single Judge.

The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is

that, since the proceedings initiated under the Haryana Public Premises and

Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, pursuant to the remand order

passed by this Court in CWP No. 18641 of 1995

Collector, the respondents were legally precluded from initiating o

continuing proceedings for demolition under Section 408

It was lastly submitted that there was no violation of the

principles of natural justice. The earlier remand by this Court was only with

a view to affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing, which was duly

granted by the Divisional Commissioner. Upon consideration of the material

and the submissions made by the parties, the Divisional Commissioner

ed a detailed and reasoned order. No prejudice, therefore, can be said to

have been caused to the appellants on account of any alleged denial of

Learned counsel accordingly submitted that the present Letters

d does not give rise to any substantial

question warranting interference by this Court. It was prayed that the appeals

be dismissed with costs and that the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as

also the orders passed by the Joint Commissioner and the Divisional

We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable

length and have carefully perused the material available on record. Upon

thoughtful consideration of the rival submissions, we are of the considered

that the present appeals are devoid of merit and do not warrant

reasoned judgments rendered by the learned

The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is

d under the Haryana Public Premises and

Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, pursuant to the remand order

18641 of 1995 are still pending before the

Collector, the respondents were legally precluded from initiating or

continuing proceedings for demolition under Section 408-A of the Haryana

It was lastly submitted that there was no violation of the

nd by this Court was only with

a view to affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing, which was duly

granted by the Divisional Commissioner. Upon consideration of the material

and the submissions made by the parties, the Divisional Commissioner

ed a detailed and reasoned order. No prejudice, therefore, can be said to

have been caused to the appellants on account of any alleged denial of

Learned counsel accordingly submitted that the present Letters

d does not give rise to any substantial

s

be dismissed with costs and that the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as

visional

We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable

length and have carefully perused the material available on record. Upon

thoughtful consideration of the rival submissions, we are of the considered

that the present appeals are devoid of merit and do not warrant

reasoned judgments rendered by the learned

The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is

d under the Haryana Public Premises and

Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972, pursuant to the remand order

are still pending before the

r

A of the Haryana

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

Municipal Corporation Act, 1994.

contention. The proceedings under the Public Premises Act and those under

Section 408-

and independent fields. The former are concerned with determination of the

status of the occupant and the legality of his occupation of public premises,

whereas the latter empowers the Municipal Corporation to regulate and

action in respect of unauthorised construction. The subject matter, purpose

and statutory foundation of the two proceedings are fundamentally different.

The mere pendency of proceedings relating to eviction cannot lead to an

automatic conclusion that

jurisdiction to examine whether any construction has been raised in violation

of the provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act. Acceptance of the

submission advanced on behalf of the appellants would amount to r

into Section 408

restriction which the Legislature has not incorporated.

9.2.

status of the predecessor

tenant. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that such status existed, the

same would not, ipso facto, confer any righ

alter the character of the land without the consent of the owner or authority

of law. A Gair Marusi tenant is admittedly not the owner of the property.

Throughout the proceedings, the appellants have failed to point out a

statutory provision, rule or binding precedent conferring upon a non

occupancy tenant an unrestricted right to raise permanent construction upon

the land in his possession. Long

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-12-

Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. We are unable to accept the said

contention. The proceedings under the Public Premises Act and those under

-A of the Haryana Municipal Co

and independent fields. The former are concerned with determination of the

status of the occupant and the legality of his occupation of public premises,

whereas the latter empowers the Municipal Corporation to regulate and

action in respect of unauthorised construction. The subject matter, purpose

and statutory foundation of the two proceedings are fundamentally different.

The mere pendency of proceedings relating to eviction cannot lead to an

automatic conclusion that the statutory authority is denuded of its

jurisdiction to examine whether any construction has been raised in violation

of the provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act. Acceptance of the

submission advanced on behalf of the appellants would amount to r

into Section 408-A of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994

restriction which the Legislature has not incorporated.

Equally untenable is the submission founded upon the alleged

status of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants as a Gair Marusi

tenant. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that such status existed, the

same would not, ipso facto, confer any right to raise permanent structures or

alter the character of the land without the consent of the owner or authority

of law. A Gair Marusi tenant is admittedly not the owner of the property.

Throughout the proceedings, the appellants have failed to point out a

statutory provision, rule or binding precedent conferring upon a non

occupancy tenant an unrestricted right to raise permanent construction upon

the land in his possession. Long-standing possession, by itself, cannot

We are unable to accept the said

contention. The proceedings under the Public Premises Act and those under

A of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act operate in distinct

and independent fields. The former are concerned with determination of the

status of the occupant and the legality of his occupation of public premises,

whereas the latter empowers the Municipal Corporation to regulate and take

action in respect of unauthorised construction. The subject matter, purpose

and statutory foundation of the two proceedings are fundamentally different.

The mere pendency of proceedings relating to eviction cannot lead to an

the statutory authority is denuded of its

jurisdiction to examine whether any construction has been raised in violation

of the provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act. Acceptance of the

submission advanced on behalf of the appellants would amount to reading

of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, a

restriction which the Legislature has not incorporated.

Equally untenable is the submission founded upon the alleged

interest of the appellants as a Gair Marusi

tenant. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that such status existed, the

t to raise permanent structures or

alter the character of the land without the consent of the owner or authority

of law. A Gair Marusi tenant is admittedly not the owner of the property.

Throughout the proceedings, the appellants have failed to point out any

statutory provision, rule or binding precedent conferring upon a non-

occupancy tenant an unrestricted right to raise permanent construction upon

standing possession, by itself, cannot

We are unable to accept the said

contention. The proceedings under the Public Premises Act and those under

rporation Act operate in distinct

and independent fields. The former are concerned with determination of the

status of the occupant and the legality of his occupation of public premises,

take

action in respect of unauthorised construction. The subject matter, purpose

and statutory foundation of the two proceedings are fundamentally different.

The mere pendency of proceedings relating to eviction cannot lead to an

the statutory authority is denuded of its

jurisdiction to examine whether any construction has been raised in violation

of the provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act. Acceptance of the

eading

a

Equally untenable is the submission founded upon the alleged

interest of the appellants as a Gair Marusi

tenant. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that such status existed, the

t to raise permanent structures or

alter the character of the land without the consent of the owner or authority

of law. A Gair Marusi tenant is admittedly not the owner of the property.

ny

-

occupancy tenant an unrestricted right to raise permanent construction upon

standing possession, by itself, cannot

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

enlarge the legal incidents of tenan

restrictions governing construction.

9.3.

authorities upon the contemporaneous revenue record. The Divisional

Commissioner has recorded that the Jamabandi

not contain any entry depicting the existence of a residential house or a Gair

Mumkin Gairth

the structure was ancestral and had existed for several decades, the

appellants failed to produce any cogent documentary material, whether in

the form of earlier revenue entries, municipal records, sanctioned building

plans, Khasra Girdawari, mutation entries or a

record to substantiate the existence and

burden to establish the existence and legality of the construction, in the facts

of the present case, lay upon the appellants. Once the official record did not

support their assertion, the concurrent factual findings reco

statutory authority and affirmed by the learned Single Judge cannot be

characterised as perverse or based on no evidence so as to warrant

interference in an intra

9.4.

land acquisition proceedings, the appellants’ predecessor

recognised as a Gair Marusi tenant and was awarded a substantial share in

the compensation. In our considered view, the said circumstance does not

advance the case of the appellants.

law determine entitlement to compensation consequent upon compulsory

acquisition. Recognition of cultivation or tenancy rights for the limited

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-13-

enlarge the legal incidents of tenancy or confer a right to disregard statutory

restrictions governing construction.

We also find no infirmity in the reliance placed by the

authorities upon the contemporaneous revenue record. The Divisional

Commissioner has recorded that the Jamabandi

not contain any entry depicting the existence of a residential house or a Gair

Gairth over the disputed land. Significantly, despite asserting that

the structure was ancestral and had existed for several decades, the

lants failed to produce any cogent documentary material, whether in

the form of earlier revenue entries, municipal records, sanctioned building

plans, Khasra Girdawari, mutation entries or a

to substantiate the existence and legality of such construction.

burden to establish the existence and legality of the construction, in the facts

of the present case, lay upon the appellants. Once the official record did not

support their assertion, the concurrent factual findings reco

statutory authority and affirmed by the learned Single Judge cannot be

characterised as perverse or based on no evidence so as to warrant

interference in an intra-Court appeal.

Considerable emphasis was placed upon the fact that, in the

land acquisition proceedings, the appellants’ predecessor

recognised as a Gair Marusi tenant and was awarded a substantial share in

the compensation. In our considered view, the said circumstance does not

advance the case of the appellants. Proceedings under the land acquisition

law determine entitlement to compensation consequent upon compulsory

acquisition. Recognition of cultivation or tenancy rights for the limited

cy or confer a right to disregard statutory

We also find no infirmity in the reliance placed by the

authorities upon the contemporaneous revenue record. The Divisional

Commissioner has recorded that the Jamabandi for the year 2008-09 does

not contain any entry depicting the existence of a residential house or a Gair

Significantly, despite asserting that

the structure was ancestral and had existed for several decades, the

lants failed to produce any cogent documentary material, whether in

the form of earlier revenue entries, municipal records, sanctioned building

plans, Khasra Girdawari, mutation entries or any other contemporaneous

legality of such construction. The

burden to establish the existence and legality of the construction, in the facts

of the present case, lay upon the appellants. Once the official record did not

support their assertion, the concurrent factual findings recorded by the

statutory authority and affirmed by the learned Single Judge cannot be

characterised as perverse or based on no evidence so as to warrant

Considerable emphasis was placed upon the fact that, in the

land acquisition proceedings, the appellants’ predecessor-in-interest was

recognised as a Gair Marusi tenant and was awarded a substantial share in

the compensation. In our considered view, the said circumstance does not

Proceedings under the land acquisition

law determine entitlement to compensation consequent upon compulsory

acquisition. Recognition of cultivation or tenancy rights for the limited

cy or confer a right to disregard statutory

We also find no infirmity in the reliance placed by the

authorities upon the contemporaneous revenue record. The Divisional

09 does

not contain any entry depicting the existence of a residential house or a Gair

Significantly, despite asserting that

the structure was ancestral and had existed for several decades, the

lants failed to produce any cogent documentary material, whether in

the form of earlier revenue entries, municipal records, sanctioned building

ny other contemporaneous

The

burden to establish the existence and legality of the construction, in the facts

of the present case, lay upon the appellants. Once the official record did not

rded by the

statutory authority and affirmed by the learned Single Judge cannot be

characterised as perverse or based on no evidence so as to warrant

Considerable emphasis was placed upon the fact that, in the

interest was

recognised as a Gair Marusi tenant and was awarded a substantial share in

the compensation. In our considered view, the said circumstance does not

Proceedings under the land acquisition

law determine entitlement to compensation consequent upon compulsory

acquisition. Recognition of cultivation or tenancy rights for the limited

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

purpose of apportionment of compensation neither confers ownership upon

the claimant nor validates a construction which is otherwise unauthorised

under the applicable municipal law. The learned Single Judge has rightly

noticed that the acquisition proceedings and the demolition proceedings arise

under different statutory regime

govern the other.

9.5.

Judge travelled beyond the impugned orders by observing that, if the

appellants claimed any independent right, title or interes

land, their appropriate remedy would be to institute proceedings under

Section 13-A of the Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act,

1961. We find no merit in the said submission. The observation made by the

learned Single Judge m

available where the appellants seek adjudication of any independent claim of

title or proprietary rights. Such observation neither supplements the reasons

recorded by the statutory authority nor supplies a f

the impugned action.

adjudicate disputed questions relating to title or proprietary rights while

exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

India.

9.6.

proceedings amounted to a pre

Collector. The question

from the land and the question whethe

unauthorised are distinct legal issues, falling for consideration under

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-14-

purpose of apportionment of compensation neither confers ownership upon

he claimant nor validates a construction which is otherwise unauthorised

under the applicable municipal law. The learned Single Judge has rightly

noticed that the acquisition proceedings and the demolition proceedings arise

under different statutory regimes and that the determination in one does not

govern the other.

The appellants have also contended that the learned Single

Judge travelled beyond the impugned orders by observing that, if the

appellants claimed any independent right, title or interes

land, their appropriate remedy would be to institute proceedings under

A of the Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act,

We find no merit in the said submission. The observation made by the

learned Single Judge merely indicates the appropriate statutory remedy

available where the appellants seek adjudication of any independent claim of

title or proprietary rights. Such observation neither supplements the reasons

recorded by the statutory authority nor supplies a f

the impugned action. The learned Single Judge correctly declined to

adjudicate disputed questions relating to title or proprietary rights while

exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

Equally devoid of merit is the submission that the demolition

proceedings amounted to a pre-determination of the issue pending before the

Collector. The question as to whether the appellants are liable to be evicted

from the land and the question whether a construction standing thereon is

unauthorised are distinct legal issues, falling for consideration under

purpose of apportionment of compensation neither confers ownership upon

he claimant nor validates a construction which is otherwise unauthorised

under the applicable municipal law. The learned Single Judge has rightly

noticed that the acquisition proceedings and the demolition proceedings arise

s and that the determination in one does not

The appellants have also contended that the learned Single

Judge travelled beyond the impugned orders by observing that, if the

appellants claimed any independent right, title or interest in the Shamlat Deh

land, their appropriate remedy would be to institute proceedings under

A of the Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act,

We find no merit in the said submission. The observation made by the

erely indicates the appropriate statutory remedy

available where the appellants seek adjudication of any independent claim of

title or proprietary rights. Such observation neither supplements the reasons

recorded by the statutory authority nor supplies a fresh basis for sustaining

The learned Single Judge correctly declined to

adjudicate disputed questions relating to title or proprietary rights while

exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

Equally devoid of merit is the submission that the demolition

determination of the issue pending before the

whether the appellants are liable to be evicted

r a construction standing thereon is

unauthorised are distinct legal issues, falling for consideration under

purpose of apportionment of compensation neither confers ownership upon

he claimant nor validates a construction which is otherwise unauthorised

under the applicable municipal law. The learned Single Judge has rightly

noticed that the acquisition proceedings and the demolition proceedings arise

s and that the determination in one does not

The appellants have also contended that the learned Single

Judge travelled beyond the impugned orders by observing that, if the

t in the Shamlat Deh

land, their appropriate remedy would be to institute proceedings under

A of the Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act,

We find no merit in the said submission. The observation made by the

erely indicates the appropriate statutory remedy

available where the appellants seek adjudication of any independent claim of

title or proprietary rights. Such observation neither supplements the reasons

resh basis for sustaining

The learned Single Judge correctly declined to

adjudicate disputed questions relating to title or proprietary rights while

exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

Equally devoid of merit is the submission that the demolition

determination of the issue pending before the

whether the appellants are liable to be evicted

r a construction standing thereon is

unauthorised are distinct legal issues, falling for consideration under

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

different statutory enactments. The determination of one issue does not

necessarily conclude the other.

therefore, cannot be treated as a legal embargo upon the exercise of statutory

powers under Section 408

1994.

9.7.

principles of natural justice has

remand order passed by this Court, the Divisional Commissioner afforded

adequate opportunity of hearing to the appellants and thereafter passed a

detailed and reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised be

No prejudice on account of denial of opportunity of hearing has been

established.

9.8.

Bench does not ordinarily sit as a Court of first appeal over

fact recorded b

Judge. Interference would be warranted only where such findings are shown

to be perverse, manifestly arbitrary, based on no evidence or founded upon a

material misreading of the record. No such i

in the present case.

or perversity in the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. The

learned Single Judge has examined the matter in its correct legal perspec

and has rightly declined to exercise the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this

Court.

10.

that the impugned judgments dated

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-15-

different statutory enactments. The determination of one issue does not

necessarily conclude the other. The pendency of the eviction proceedings,

herefore, cannot be treated as a legal embargo upon the exercise of statutory

powers under Section 408-A of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act,

We also find that no procedural illegality or violation of the

principles of natural justice has been demonstrated. Pursuant to the earlier

remand order passed by this Court, the Divisional Commissioner afforded

adequate opportunity of hearing to the appellants and thereafter passed a

detailed and reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised be

No prejudice on account of denial of opportunity of hearing has been

It is well settled that, in an intra

Bench does not ordinarily sit as a Court of first appeal over

fact recorded by the statutory authority and affirmed by the learned Single

Judge. Interference would be warranted only where such findings are shown

to be perverse, manifestly arbitrary, based on no evidence or founded upon a

material misreading of the record. No such i

in the present case. The appellants have failed to point out any material error

or perversity in the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. The

learned Single Judge has examined the matter in its correct legal perspec

and has rightly declined to exercise the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this

For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion

that the impugned judgments dated 16.04.2026

different statutory enactments. The determination of one issue does not

The pendency of the eviction proceedings,

herefore, cannot be treated as a legal embargo upon the exercise of statutory

A of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act,

We also find that no procedural illegality or violation of the

been demonstrated. Pursuant to the earlier

remand order passed by this Court, the Divisional Commissioner afforded

adequate opportunity of hearing to the appellants and thereafter passed a

detailed and reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised before him.

No prejudice on account of denial of opportunity of hearing has been

It is well settled that, in an intra-Court appeal, the Division

Bench does not ordinarily sit as a Court of first appeal over the findings of

y the statutory authority and affirmed by the learned Single

Judge. Interference would be warranted only where such findings are shown

to be perverse, manifestly arbitrary, based on no evidence or founded upon a

material misreading of the record. No such infirmity has been demonstrated

The appellants have failed to point out any material error

or perversity in the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. The

learned Single Judge has examined the matter in its correct legal perspective

and has rightly declined to exercise the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this

For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion

16.04.2026 and 23.04.2026 passed by

different statutory enactments. The determination of one issue does not

The pendency of the eviction proceedings,

herefore, cannot be treated as a legal embargo upon the exercise of statutory

A of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act,

We also find that no procedural illegality or violation of the

been demonstrated. Pursuant to the earlier

remand order passed by this Court, the Divisional Commissioner afforded

adequate opportunity of hearing to the appellants and thereafter passed a

fore him.

No prejudice on account of denial of opportunity of hearing has been

Court appeal, the Division

findings of

y the statutory authority and affirmed by the learned Single

Judge. Interference would be warranted only where such findings are shown

to be perverse, manifestly arbitrary, based on no evidence or founded upon a

nfirmity has been demonstrated

The appellants have failed to point out any material error

or perversity in the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. The

tive

and has rightly declined to exercise the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this

For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion

passed by

LPA-2065-2026(O&M) &

LPA-2066-2026(O&M)

the learned Single

warranting interference in exercise of the intra

of this Court.

11.

Consequently, the order dated

Commissioner and the order dated

Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Faridabad, are affirmed.

12.

disposed of.

(DEEPAK SIBAL)

JUDGE

18.09.2026

Puneet

(O&M) &

2026(O&M)

-16-

the learned Single Judge do not suffer from any legal or factual infirmity

warranting interference in exercise of the intra

of this Court.

The appeals, being devoid of merit, are accordingly dismissed.

Consequently, the order dated 05.02.202

Commissioner and the order dated 01.09.2017

Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Faridabad, are affirmed.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand

(DEEPAK SIBAL)

JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned

Whether reportable

Judge do not suffer from any legal or factual infirmity

warranting interference in exercise of the intra-Court appellate jurisdiction

The appeals, being devoid of merit, are accordingly dismissed.

05.02.2025 passed by the Divisional

01.09.2017 passed by the Joint

Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Faridabad, are affirmed.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand

(RUPINDERJIT CHAHAL)

JUDGE

: Yes

: Yes

Judge do not suffer from any legal or factual infirmity

Court appellate jurisdiction

The appeals, being devoid of merit, are accordingly dismissed.

passed by the Divisional

passed by the Joint

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand