contract law, dealership dispute, commercial law
0  06 Mar, 1990
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Mahabir Auto Stores & Ors. Vs. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors.

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /1350/1990
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Case Background

As per case facts, the appellant firm, a long-standing distributor of lubricants from the respondent, a statutory corporation, faced a sudden stoppage of supplies after several decades of business. The ...

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Document Text Version

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PETITIONER:

MAHABIR AUTO STORES & ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

INDIAN OIL CORPORATION & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/03/1990

BENCH:

MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)

BENCH:

MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)

RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:

1990 AIR 1031 1990 SCR (1) 818

1990 SCC (3) 752 JT 1990 (1) 363

1990 SCALE (1)410

CITATOR INFO :

F 1991 SC 537 (32,48)

D 1991 SC 818 (18)

ACT:

Constitution of India 1950--Article 14, 32, 226 and 298

--State organ--Action of entering or not entering into

contracts with individual parties--Whether can be questioned

in writ jurisdiction.

HEADNOTE:

The appellant-firm had been carrying on the business of

distribution and sale of all kinds of lubricants received

from the respondent, a statutory corporation, since 1965. It

is the case of the appellant that it acted as Lube distribu-

tor of the respondent corporation and that it had been given

the Customer No. during the course of business. The appel-

lant claimed that from Feb. 1965 to 27th May, 1983, it had

received and uplifted the supply of lubricants/goods each

year and the total quantity, of lubricants/goods thus lifted

had gone upto the extent of 1,11,34854 litres or kgs. The

respondent suddenly stopped the supply of lubricants to the

appellant-firm on 27.5.1983. The appellant-firm made several

representations to the respondent against the aforesaid

action of the respondent but to no use. The appellant there-

upon filed a writ petition in the High Court praying for a

writ of mandamns directing the respondent to desist from

denying or discontinuing the supply of lubricants and there-

by save the appellant from being ousted from the business;

claim for damages from the date the supply was discontinued

was also made.

Before the High Court, it was inter alia contended by

the appellant that the correspondent that passed between the

appellant and respondent and the invoices issued during the

long years of business would show that the respondent always

treated the appellant as its agent and distributor; sudden

stoppage of supply violated the principles of natural jus-

tice. It therefore sought the specific performance of the

alleged contract. The respondent on the other hand ques-

tioned the maintainability of the petition as according to

it the respondent was not 'State' within the meaning of

Art. 12 of the Constitution. It further averred that there

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was no concluded contract by the respondent with the appel-

lant and that the work continued under an adhoc arrangement;

that the policies of the respondent were governed by the

guidelines/directions issued to it from time to time by the

Ministry of

819

Petroleum whereunder it was no longer possible to give

further supplies to the appellant firm.

After considering the rival contentions advanced by the

parties the High Court, dismissed the writ petition. The

appellant has filed this appeal with special leave.

Allowing and disposing of the appeal with directions, this

Court,

HELD: Every action of the State or of an instrumentality

of the State in exercise of its executive power, must be

informed by reason. In appropriate cases, actions uninformed

by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings

under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. [826D]

The respondent-company Indian Oil Corporation is an

organ of the 'State' or an 'instrumentality of the State' as

contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution. [826F]

The State acts in its executive power under Article 298

of the Constitution in entering or not entering in contracts

with individual parties. Article 14 of the Constitution

would be applicable to those exercises of power. Therefore,

the action of the State organ under Article 14 can be

checked. [826F]

Rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and dis-

crimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part

of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by

State instrumentality in dealing with citizens in a situa-

tion like as in the instant case. Even though the rights of

the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the

manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or

not entering into a contract, are subject to judicial review

on the touchstone of relevance, and reasonableness, fair

play natural justice, equality and non-discrimination in the

type of the transactions and nature of the dealing as in the

instant case. [827E-F]

The dichotomy between rights and remedies cannot be

obliterated by any straight jacket formule. It has to be

examined in each particular case. [829D]

Decision of the State/Public authority under Article 298

of the Constitution, is an administrative decision and can

be impeached on the ground that the decision is arbitrary or

violative of Article 14 of the

820

Constitution or on any of the grounds available in public

law field. It appears to us that in respect of Corporation

like Indian Oil Corporation when without informing the

parties concerned, as in the case of the appellant firm on

alleged change of policy and on that basis action to seek to

bring to an end the course of transaction over 18 years

involving large amounts of money is not fair action, espe-

cially in view of the monopolistic nature of the power of

the respondent in this field. [829F-G]

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., [1974] 4

SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr., [1978] 1

SCC 248; Ajay Nasia and Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and

Ors., [1981] 1 SCC 722; A.D. Shetty v. International Airport

Authority of India and Ors., [1979] 3 SCC 1 and Dwarkadas

Mariatia and Ors. v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bom-

bay, [1989] 3 SCC 293, referred to.

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JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1350 of

1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.2. 1989 of Delhi

High Court in C.W. No. 1904 of 1983.

Dr. L.M. Singhvi, Dr. A.M. Singvi and D. Bhandari (N.P.)

for the Appellants.

Harish N. Salve, Mrs. P. Shroff and S.A. Shroff for the

Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ. Having heard counsel for the

parties and having considered the facts, circumstances and

the contentions involved herein, we grant special leave and

dispose of the appeal by judgment herein.

This appeal arises out of the judgment and order of the

High Court of Delhi dated 9th February, 1989. Appellant No.

1 is a partnership firm. The other four appellants are the

partners of the said firm. The respondent is a company

incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and hav-

ing, inter alia, one of its regional offices at Janpath, New

Delhi. The appellants sought in the Writ Petition filed

under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court

a writ of mandamus against the respondent directing it to

desist from denying or

821

discontinuing the supply of all kinds of lubricants to the

appellant No. 1 and from ousting, black-listing, coercing or

pressurising the appellant No. 1 from the business of deal-

ing with all kinds of lubricants supplied by the respondent

company to have and to continue to supply all kinds of

lubricants to the appellant firm as was done in the past and

for the maintenance of status quo existing on the 27th May,

1953 and for payment of necessary damages for the period

from 28th May, 1983 till the date of the filing of the writ

petition before the High Court or till the decision of the

writ petition.

The appellant No. 1, herein referred to as the firm, is

a partnership firm duly registered with the Registrar of

Firms, Delhi. The said firm had been carrying on the distri-

bution and sale of all kinds of lubricants and was regis-

tered under Sales Tax Act vide Registration no. 1636 dated

22nd October, 195 1 and has a goodwill of its own, according

to the said appellants, in the entire region of Northern

India with expertise and knowledge in the distribution and

sale of all kinds of lubricants. The appellants contend that

in the past 32 years the appellant firm had acquired a very

good reputation and has earned enviable goodwill in the

trade.

As stated hereinbefore, the respondent company is a

statutory body incorporated under the Indian Companies Act,

1956 and have been dealing throughout with the appellant

firm since 1965 when the firm became, according to the

appellants, its distributor. The appellants claim that the

said firm had been appointed as Lube Distributor and the

appellant firm have been given the Permanent Customer Code

No. 63-01-3115-1022-9-X, according to the appellant. The

appellants contend that this was done in due course. It is

the further case of the appellants that the lubricants were

released by the respondent company to the said appellant

firm on 25th January, 1965 by Invoice No. 146668 and there-

after the firm had promoted the sales of the products of the

company successfully inasmuch as from February, 1965 to 27th

May, 1983 and the firm had received and uplifted the supply

of lubricants/goods each year and the total quantity of

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lubricants/goods such lifted had gone up to the extent of 1,

11,34,854 litres or kgs. The appellants claimed that the

said firm is one of the respondent company's Lube Distribu-

tor in Northern India. It was the case of the appellants

before the High Court and also before this Court that the

said firm had been carrying on business as the Lube distrib-

utor of the respondent company and had been selling all

kinds of lubricants. The appellants contend that the re-

spondent company had recognised the appellant firm during

all this period as authorised dealer and a distributor and

an agent.

822

It was the case of the appellants before the High Court

and they had tried to demonstrate with reference to the

various documents, annexures etc. filed by them that the

firm had been always carrying business as Lube Distributor

of the Company, and has been selling all kinds of lubri-

cants. The appellants further contended that the Company had

recognised the firm during all this period as authorised

dealer, distributor and agent. Certain letters were written

by the company directing various customers to contact the

firm as an authorised Lube Distributor. This contention was

stated before the High Court as well as before us. It iS

stated that annexures A-2 to A- 14 were copies of letters

written by the company directing various customers to con-

tact the firm as an authorised Lube Distributor. Annexure

A-15 is an advertisement issued in a specially published

souvenir on the occasion of All India Highway Motor Rally

held in 1972 sponsored by the Company in which the firm was

referred to as the Company's authorised Lube Distributor.

Annexures A- 16 to A-35 are copies of the letters written by

the Company to the appellants in relation to the dealing of

the appellants as Lube Distributor. There are several other

documents on which reliance was placed on behalf of the

appellants. The firm was treated as authorised dealer and

agent of the respondentcompany. It was contended that there

was a change of policy by the respondent company, and cer-

tain documents of the year 1972 were relied upon to indicate

that the supply of lubricants was stopped to those Associa-

tions and Dealers to whom ad hoc supplies were given, who

were merely re-sellers, traders and who did not have written

contracts with the Company. That was the case of the appel-

lant's firm. However, the appellants asserted, that the

supply was continued to the appellant firm being a dealer

and distributor of the Company. Reliance was placed on

Annexures P-28 to P-34 which are the Product Indent-cum-

Delivery Orders for various periods issued by the Company to

the firm. It is stated that in the said Product Indent-

cumDelivery Order there was a note indicating "For Condi-

tions of Supply Please Turnover ..... ". However, in the

copies filed with the rejoinder affidavit, there are no

terms on the reverse side of the Product Indent-cum-Delivery

Order. Although the firm has been receiving continuous

supply of lubricants from the Company, it was suddenly

stopped on 27th May, 1983 by the Company, and it was con-

tended that such an action of the Company will have the

effect of black-listing the firm and is arbitrary and

against the principles of natural justice besides being hit

by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The appellant firm,

it was contended, had made representations against the

aforesaid action of the respondent company but to no use. In

that background the reliefs mentioned here-in-before were

sought from the High Court

823

in the application filed under article 226 of the Constitu-

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tion.

The respondent-company had raised various objections to

the maintainability of the Writ Petition, namely, inter

alia, that the Company was not State within the meaning of

Article 12 of the Constitution as the Company is registered

under the Companies Act, 1956, the Writ Petition was not

maintainable as no writ to enforce alleged supply, according

to the respondent company, was maintainable and the appro-

priate remedy for the appellants was to claim damages for

breach of contract or relief for specific performance of

contract, if any. It was submitted, further, that the firm

had not any contract and was seeking to rely on an irregular

course of conduct and on an ad hoc arrangement which the

company cannot perpetuate in view of the prevailing guide-

lines and/or directions received from the Ministry of Energy

in the Department of Petroleum. Where in fact there was an

actual written agreement the Company's contractual relation-

ship with its distributors was also capable of termination

forthwith and was only subject to the normal contractual

laws and decisions in the realm of contract could not be the

subject matter of proceedings under article 226 of the

Constitution, it was submitted. The appellants case, it was

urged by the responde it-company, was at much lower footing.

The Company however deaied that the firm had even been

black-listed and it had never acted in a mala fide, or

capricious or arbitrary manner or on any extraneous, or

oblique or irrelevant consideration. There was no commit-

ment, it was suggested, to supply a fixed quantity regular-

ly, made to the appellant firm at any stage.

It appears that the procedure adopted for the supply of

lube oil products was that the party requiring supply would

write a letter to the Company 'whereupon the Divisional

Office through the Lube section would process the same and

would intimate as to how much supply was possible. Thereupon

the requisition slip would be processed and a delivery

challan/order would be made out. The conditions of the

Proluct Indent-cum-Delivery Order, inter alia, categorically

provided that "IOC also reserves the right to cancel your

order without any intimation or assigning any reason". It

further provided that "IOC took no responsibility of des-

patches/releases of stocks shall be on the basis of avail-

ability of stocks." There was no other contract in the facts

and circumstances of the case, it was urged. The letters

making the requisitions, the Product Indent-cum-Delivery

Orders, the Delivery Challans as also the payment are the

only documents constituting the dealing or transactions

between the parties. The Company had categorically reserved

its right to refuse and/or cancel the orders with-

824

out any intimation or assigning any reason and it was per-

fectly within its fight to discontinue the said arrangement.

Several obligations have been provided under the arrangement

including, inter alia, price controls, minimum off-take of

stocks, safeguards against contamination, fight to the

inspection and/or unrestricted access, right of account etc.

It was asserted' that even under the contractual transaction

as entered into with the Associated Trading Company, the

respondent company had fight of termination forthwith for

any reason whatsoever and the Company's fight to terminate

was not lettered by the doctrine of reasonableness or doc-

trine of natural justice and rights of hearing etc. as

sought to be put forward on behalf of the appellants. It is,

therefore, suggested that what was not even contractually

recognised should not be artifically given higher status, in

the facts and circumstances of the case, as the appellants

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were seeking to invoke the fight flowing from an utter

irregularity specially when the company had been made publi-

cally accountable especially when the Company does not act

unless through a written contract as also when only autho-

rised.

It was further the case of the respondent that the

company was subjected to distribution policies and guide-

lines of the Department of Petroleum in the Ministry of

Energy, Government of India. They are also bound by the

directives to the effect that lubricants are to be sold only

to consumers, to those parties who will not sell directly or

indirectly to foreign oil companies and no sale should take

place to old agents or distributor of foreign oil companies.

All sales of lubricants must take place to actual consumers

or to such small parties who will sell actually to consumers

and not to foreign oil company. Besides this, the Ministry

of Energy by the letter beating reference No. P-17011/7/82-

SUP dated 21st December, 1982 under policy number 201 had

communicated to all oil companies that no new distributor

was to be appointed for distribution of lubricating oils and

there is a ban on such appointments. In the facts and the

circumstances of the case the Company was, thus, according

to the respondent, prevented by the

directive/instruction/guidelines of the Ministry of Energy

to appoint new dealers and distributors or to formalise any

agreement constituting the dealership or distributorship. In

fact, right since 1972, 24 parties who had ad hoc arrange-

ment of supply of lube oils were discontinued, according to

the respondent. There was no assurance, whatsoever, nor any

promise nor any contract or nor any prescribed schedule to

supply any quantity of lubricants, as alleged, to the appel-

lant or to anybody else. It was further asserted in the

present case that in view of the ban imposed, no fresh

distributors could be appointed nor the oil companies empow-

ered to regularise and contract afresh for

825

dealers/distributors in lubricant oils. It was further the

case of the respondent that the customer code number is

given to authorised distributors/dealers only. The position

was explained that the mode and manner of computerisation of

accounts set out in Annexure P-25 and the allotment of

customer code number is only for the purpose of identifica-

tion and not for any other purpose nor to designate the firm

as an authorised Lube distributor. The Company had denied

that the Code 01 was allotted only to dealers/agents as

alleged. The Code 01 was applicable to all re-sellers, where

a further sale is a necessary concommitment of the first

sale. Certain particulars were given how 01 is given and it

was stated in the case of four parties the partnership was

terminated because of the new policy.

The High Court after exhaustively dealing with the rival

contentions came to the conclusion that viewed from diverse

angles, the appellants had sought the specific performance

of certain alleged contract. It was also held that the said

alleged contract was neither precise, nor definite nor

certain nor was capable of being made certain. It was not

certain, in this case, as to how much goods were required

and for how long were these required and at what considera-

tion, these were all uncertain and vague, it was submitted.

It was held by the High Court that for a Writ of mandamus

the appellants should have a legal right to enforce the

performance of alleged duty by the respondent and since no

right was shown to exist by the appellants for selling the

continuous supply of the lubricants whatsoever indefinitely

for future and no corresponding legal duty was imposed on

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the respondent to supply, the Writ of mandamus was not

maintainable. In those circumstances the Writ Application

was dismissed as not maintainable.

Aggrieved thereby the appellants have come up to this

Court, as mentioned hereinbefore.

We have heard learned counsel Dr. L.M. Singhvi as well

as Mr. Salve exhaustively. Further affidavits were filed and

documents produced before us. It was sought to be urged by

Dr. Singhvi that the respondent was an instrumentality of

State and as such the question involved was whether an

instrumentality of State can suddenly, arbitrarily, unrea-

sonably, without any relevant factors and without any notice

and determination or proceeding stop supplies of products

which, according to him, had been supplied more than-1 crore

11 lacs litres/kg of product continuously and uninterrupted-

ly over a period of more than 18 years. Dr. Singhvi suggest-

ed that the respondent IOC is an instrumentality of State

under Article 12 of the Constitution. From

826

the nature of the business carried on by the appellants, it

was manifest to us that the supply of the lubricants of the

type with which the respondent had a monopoly, could be

carried on by the appellants only as the supplier from the

reSpondent.That business was not possible otherwise. The

respondent had monopoly in that respect. This aspect is

important. The respondent firm was supplying from 1965 to

1983 large quantities of lubricant oil and from 1983 onwards

till 1989 supplies were continued on the interim order of

the High Court of Delhi. Supplies were stopped suddenly on

27th May, 1983. There is no dispute that no intimation was

given, no notice was given, no query or clarification sought

for and there was no adjudication as such. It was held that

the appellant firm was not entitled to supply, the stoppage

of supply in May 1983 was, therefore, bad. The appellant

further contended that the case of the respondent-company

IOC was never made known or revealed prior to the Counter

Affidavit in the High Court of the appellants. The conten-

tion urged on behalf of the appellants was that this is

patent violation of all canons of natural justice, fair play

and reasonableness. It is submitted that natural justice and

reasonableness of the procedure are enshrined under Article

14 of the Constitution.

It is well settled that every action of the State or an

instrumentality of the State in exercise of its executive

power, must be informed by reason. In appropriate cases,

actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary

in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Con-

stitution. Reliance in this connection may be placed on the

observations of this Court in M/s Radha Krishna Agarwal &

Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1977] 3 SCC 457.1t appears

to us, at the outset, that in the facts and circumstances of

the case, the respondent-company IOC is an organ of the

State or an instrumentality of the State as contemplated

under Article 12 of the Constitution. The State acts in its

executive power under Article 298 of the Constitution in

entering or not entering in contracts with individual par-

ties. Article 14 of the Constitution would be applicable to

those exercises of power. Therefore, the action of State

organ under Article 14 can be checked. See M/s Radha Krishna

Agarwal v. State of Bihar, (supra) at p. 462, but Article 14

of the Constitution cannot and has not been construed as a

charter for judicial review of State action after the con-

tract has been entered into, to call upon the State to

account for its actions in its manifold activities by stat-

ing reasons for such actions. In a situation of this nature

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certain activities of the respondent company which consti-

tuted State under Article 12 of the Constitution may be in

certain circumstances subject to Article 14 of the Constitu-

tion in entering or not entering into contracts and must be

reasonable and taken

827

only upon lawful and relevant consideration, it depends upon

facts and circumstances of a particular transaction whether

heating is necessary and reasons have to be stated. In case

any right conferred on the citizens which is sought to be

interfered, such action is subject to Article 14 of the

Constitution, and must be reasonable and can be taken only

upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. Where

there is arbitrariness in State action of this type of

entering or not entering into contracts, Article 14 springs

up and judicial review strikes such an action down. Every

action of the State executive authority must be subject to

rule of law and must be informed by reason. So, whatever be

the activity of the public authority, in such monopoly or

semi-monopoly dealings, it should meet the test of Article

14 of the Constitution. If a Governmental action even in the

matters of entering or not entering into contracts, fails to

satisfy the test of reasonableness, the same would be unrea-

sonable. In this connection reference may be made to E.P.

Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1974] 4 SCC 3;

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr., [1976] 1 SCC 248;

Ajay Hasia & Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., [1981]

1 SCC 722; R.D. Shetry v. International Airport Authority of

India & Ors., [1979] 3 SCC 1 and also Dwarkadas Marlaria and

sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, [1989] 3

SCC 293. It appears to us that rule of reason and rule

against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play

and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable

in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing

with citizens in a situation like the present one. Even

though the rights of the citizens are in the nature of

contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a

decision of entering or not entering into a contract, are

subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance

and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and

non-discrimination in the type of the transactions and

nature of the dealing as in the present case.

The existence of the power of judicial review however

depends upon the nature and right involved in the facts and

circumstances of the particular case. It is well settled

that there can be "malice in law". Existence of such "malice

in law" is part of the critical apparatus of a particular

action in administrative law. Indeed "malice in law" is part

the dimension of the rule of relevance and reason as

well as the rule of fair play in action.

It was submitted that the respondent had continuously,

uninterruptedly, consistently and repeatedly dealt with the

appellant and recognised the appellant, and had treated it

as a dealer. On that

828

basis the appellants and his family had acted for 19 years.

To substantiate these assertions, certain documents and

samples were referred to by the appellants. Our attention

was drawn to large number of invoices, cash memos and to the

customer code No. 013115 allotted to the appellant. It was

submitted that the prefix 01 applied only to dealers, dis-

tributors etc. The defence of the respondent was the absence

of written contract which was the standard form and not

appointment letters. The appellant contended that the appel-

lants were selling IOC products without written contract. It

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was further asserted that the IOC has sought to change its

stand and say that it does not deal with person without

contract but according to the appellants, has issued letters

of appointment to some of them and these persons, according

to the appellants, sell lubes. It was submitted that this

change of stand was an afterthought. It was further stated

that letters, in some cases, cannot lead to an exclusion of

all others to whom letters of appointment had not been

issued. It is submitted that in the fairness IOC could have

and should have issued such letter of appointment to appel-

lant No. 1 also and should have considered the case of the

appellant-firm. It was submitted that IOC has always treated

lube and non lube products on the same basis, without dis-

tinction. This distinction which was sought to be urged

before us, it was submitted, was an after thought and not

justified. The appellant contended that the IOC's purported

reliance upon the guidelines, was not justified. Further-

more, the guidelines were not mandatory or binding. These

use directory words like "may". More importantly, these

exclude all those who are part of the existing network and

apply for fresh appointment of new distributors. The appel-

lant was part of the existing network and was not to be

inducted as a new distributor and the appellant-firm falls

within the existing network and has always been so treated

continuously and uninterruptedly from 1965 to 1983, it was

the case of the appellants. It was contended that the appel-

lant-firm was entitled to relief, inter alia, on grounds of

promissory estoppels, unreasonable and arbitrary exclusion,

and discriminatory treatment under Article 14 of the Consti-

tution.

Mr. Salve on behalf of the appellants sought to urge

that the appellant firm had never been appointed as a Lube

Distributor. There is no letter of intent, letter of ap-

pointment, much less letter at all. Ad-hoc supplies of Lube

products alone had been made to the appellant from 1965

onwards. The procedure adopted for the supply of lube

products was that the appellant would write a letter to the

company whereupon the Divisional Office, Lube Section would

process the same. The policy decision in December, 1982

indicated that no new

829

Distributor for Lube products would be appointed and no new

products would be distributed either through the existing

net-work, of existing Lube Distributors or to authorised

dealers of other products such as, petrol, SKO, LDO and HSD.

It was submitted that as a result of the policy it was not

the appellant alone to whom the supplies were discontinued.

There was similar discontinuance of supplies to 24 other

parties whose names were given in the counter affidavit.

Mr. Salve submitted that in private law field there was

no scope for applying the doctrine of arbitrariness or mala

fides. The validity of the action of the parties have to be

tested, it was urged on behalf of the respondent, on the

basis of "right" and not "power". A plea of

arbitrariness/mala fides as being so gross cannot shift a

matter tailing in private law field to public law field.

According to Mr. Salve to permit the same would result in

anomalous situation that whenever State is involved it would

always be public law field, this would mean all redress

against the State would fall in the Writ Jurisdiction and

not in suits before Civil Courts.

We are of the opinion that in all such cases whether

public law or private law rights are involved, depends upon

the facts and circumstances of the case. The dichotomy

between rights and remedies cannot be obliterated by any

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straight jacket formula. It has to be examined in each

particular case. Mr. Salve sought to urge that there are

certain cases under Article 14 of arbitrary exercise of such

"power" and not cases of exercise of a "right" arising

either under a contract or under a Statute. We are of the

opinion that that would depend upon the factual matrix.

Having considered the facts and circumstances of the

case and the nature of the contentions and the dealings

between the parties and in view of the present state of law,

we are of the opinion that decision of the State/public

authority under Article 298 of the Constitution, is an

administrative decision and can be impeached on the ground

that the decision is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of

the Constitution of India on any of the grounds available in

public law field. It appears to us that in respect of Corpo-

ration like IOC when without informing the parties con-

cerned, as in the case of the appellant firm herein on

alleged change of policy and on that basis action to seek to

bring to an end the course of transaction over 18 years

involving large amounts of money is not fair action, espe-

cially in view of the monopolistic nature of the power of

the respondent in this field. Therefore, it is necessary to

reiterate that even in the field of public law, the relevant

persons

830

concerned or to be affected, should be taken into confi-

dence. Whether and in what circumstances that confidence

should be taken into consideration cannot be laid down on

any straight jacket basis. It depends on the nature of the

fight involved and nature of the power sought to be exer-

cised in a particular situation. It is true that there is

discrimination between power and fight but whether the State

or the instrumentality of a State has the right to functign

in public field or private field is a matter which,in our

opinion, depends upon the facts and circumstances of the

situation, but such exercise Of power cannot be dealt with

by the State or the instrumentality of the State without

informing and taking into confidence, the party whose fights

and powers affected or sought to be affected, into confi-

dence. In such situations most often people feel aggrieved

by exclusion of knowledge if not being taken into confi-

dence.

Such transaction should continue as an administrative

decision with the organ of the State. It may be contractual

or statutory but in a situation of transaction between the

parties for nearly two decades, such procedure should be

followed which will be reasonable, fair and just, that is,

the process which normally be accepted to be followed by an

organ of the State and that process must be conscious and

all those affected should be taken into confidence.

Having regard to the nature of the transaction, we are

of the opinion that it would be appropriate to state that in

cases where the instrumentality of the state enters the

contractual field, it should be governed by the incidence of

the contract. It is true that it may not be necessary to

give reasons but, in our opinion, in the field of this

nature fairness must be there to the parties concerned, and

having regard to the large number or the long period and the

nature of the dealings between the parties, the appellant

should have been taken into confidence. Equality and fair-

ness at least demands this much from an instrumentality of

the State dealing with a right of the State not to treat the

contract as subsisting. We must, however, evolve such proc-

ess which will work.

Therefore, we direct that the case of the respondent be

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11

put to the appellants, and let the respondent authorities

consider afresh the submissions made by the appellant firm,

namely, that the existing arrangement amounts to a contract

by which the distributorship was continued in case of the

appellant firm without any formal contract and further that

the new policy of the Government introduced in December,

1982 would not cover the appellant firm and as such the

831

appellant should continue. It will be sufficient, having

regard to the nature of the claims, for the respondent

authority to consider this aspect after taking the appellant

firm into confidence on this aspect. Nothing further need be

stated or required to be done and we give no 'directions as

to whether reasons should be recorded or hereinafter should

be given. In the facts and circumstances, it is not neces-

sary to give oral hearing or record the reasons as such for

the decision. The decision should be based on fair play,

equity and consideration by an institution like IOC. It must

act fairly.

We direct accordingly that the present arrangement to

continue until the respondent company gives the considera-

tion on the lines indicated above and makes the decision.

It is not our decision which is important but a decision

on the above basis should be arrived at which should be

fair, just and reasonable--and consistent with good govern-

ment--which will be arrived at fairly and should be taken

after taking the persons concerned whose rights/obligations

are affected, into confidence. Fairness in such action

should be perceptible, if not transparent.

The Judgment and the Order of the High Court are, there-

fore, set aside and the direction and order as aforesaid are

substituted and the application made to the High Court is

disposed of on the aforesaid terms. In the facts and circum-

stances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

Y. Lal Appeal al-

lowed.

832

Reference cases

Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India
2:00 mins | 43 | 25 Jan, 1978

Description

Mahabir Auto Stores & Ors. vs. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors.: A Deep Dive into State Instrumentality Contracts

In a landmark ruling available on CaseOn, the Supreme Court of India delivered a crucial judgment concerning Arbitrary State Action and the extent of Judicial Review of State Contracts. This case sets a significant precedent for how state instrumentalities must conduct their business, particularly when dealing with long-standing commercial relationships. Its implications are profound for both public and private entities, making it a pivotal read for legal professionals.

Case Background

The dispute arose from the sudden discontinuation of lubricant supplies by the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) to Mahabir Auto Stores, a partnership firm that had been distributing IOC's products since 1965. The appellant firm claimed to be a recognized Lube Distributor and an agent of IOC, having built an 18-year business relationship involving substantial quantities of lubricants. On May 27, 1983, IOC abruptly stopped supplies without any prior notice, explanation, or consultation.

Aggrieved, Mahabir Auto Stores filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court, seeking a mandamus to direct IOC to resume supplies and pay damages. They argued that IOC's action violated principles of natural justice, promissory estoppel, and constituted arbitrary behavior by a state instrumentality.

IOC, on the other hand, contended that there was no formal contract, only an ad-hoc arrangement, and therefore, no legal right for continuous supply. They also questioned the maintainability of a writ petition for contractual disputes, arguing that IOC was not a 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution for such matters and that their actions were guided by policy directives from the Ministry of Petroleum.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, concluding that there was no precise or definite contract that could be specifically enforced, and thus, no legal right for the appellant to claim continuous supply.

Issue Presented

The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a state instrumentality, like the Indian Oil Corporation, could arbitrarily terminate a long-standing commercial relationship (even if not formalized by a written contract) without notice or reason, and if such an action could be challenged under Article 14 of the Constitution through writ jurisdiction.

Rule of Law

The Supreme Court invoked several fundamental principles of constitutional and administrative law:

  • Articles 14, 32, 226, and 298 of the Constitution of India: These articles define the scope of equality before law, remedies for rights violations, High Court's writ jurisdiction, and the State's power to carry on trade and make contracts, respectively.
  • Arbitrariness and Reasoned Action: The Court reiterated that every action of the State or its instrumentality, whether executive or contractual, must be informed by reason and free from arbitrariness. Actions uninformed by reason can be questioned under Articles 226 or 32.
  • Applicability of Article 14 to State Contracts: Even when the State acts in its executive power under Article 298 to enter into or not enter into contracts, Article 14 of the Constitution applies. Thus, arbitrary actions by a State organ in contractual matters are subject to judicial review.
  • Principles of Fair Play and Natural Justice: The Court emphasized that rules against arbitrariness and discrimination, and principles of fair play and natural justice, are integral to the rule of law applicable to state instrumentalities in their dealings with citizens, even in situations involving contractual rights.
  • Judicial Review of Motive and Method: The manner, method, and motive of a decision by a state instrumentality to enter into or not enter into a contract are subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance, reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality, and non-discrimination.
  • Precedents: The Court referenced previous judgments like E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Ajay Hasia & Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., and Dwarkadas Marlaria v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, all of which underscore the impermissibility of arbitrary state action.

Analysis by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the arguments and facts presented:

  • IOC as a State Instrumentality: The Court confirmed that Indian Oil Corporation is an organ or instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, its actions, including those in the commercial sphere, are amenable to constitutional scrutiny.
  • Monopolistic Nature of Business: The Court observed that IOC held a monopolistic position in the lubricant market, making the appellant firm heavily dependent on its supplies. This monopolistic power further necessitated adherence to principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness.
  • Long-Standing Relationship: The 18-year continuous supply arrangement, even if deemed 'ad-hoc' by IOC, had established a relationship akin to an agency or distributorship, evidenced by customer codes, invoices, and promotional materials. This long duration and large volume of business meant that sudden termination without cause was inherently unfair.
  • Lack of Notice and Reason: The Court found that IOC's abrupt cessation of supplies on May 27, 1983, without any prior intimation, notice, or opportunity for explanation, was a clear violation of natural justice and fairness. The argument of a policy change was deemed insufficient, especially when not communicated to the affected party.
  • Dichotomy of Public vs. Private Law: While acknowledging the distinction between public and private law remedies, the Court emphasized that the nature of rights and remedies in each case must be examined individually. It clarified that arbitrary or unfair actions by state instrumentalities, even in contractual dealings, can be challenged under public law remedies.
  • Need for Confidence and Transparency: Given the long-standing relationship and the monopolistic power of IOC, the Court stressed that the state instrumentality should have taken the appellant firm into confidence before making such a drastic decision. Any action by a state organ must be fair, just, reasonable, and transparent.

For legal professionals seeking swift comprehension of such complex rulings, CaseOn.in offers invaluable 2-minute audio briefs. These concise summaries distill the core arguments and judicial pronouncements, providing an efficient way to grasp the nuances of judgments like this, particularly concerning the intricacies of state instrumentality dealings.

Conclusion and Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and issued specific directions:

  • The Court directed the Indian Oil Corporation authorities to reconsider the appellant firm's submissions afresh.
  • This reconsideration must take into account whether the existing arrangement amounted to a contract, and whether the new government policy (introduced in December 1982) would exempt the appellant firm, allowing its continued operations.
  • The process of reconsideration must involve taking the appellant firm into confidence.
  • The final decision must be fair, just, reasonable, and consistent with good governance, and its fairness should be perceptible, if not transparent.
  • The interim arrangement for supplies, which had been continuing under the High Court's order, was to remain in force until IOC made its fresh decision.

The appeal was thus allowed, and the High Court's order was substituted with these directions, with no order as to costs.

Why This Judgment is Important for Lawyers and Students

This judgment underscores the Supreme Court's commitment to ensuring fairness and transparency in all dealings involving state instrumentalities. It clarifies that even in commercial contracts, arbitrary actions by state bodies are subject to judicial scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution. Lawyers and law students will find this judgment crucial for understanding the evolving landscape of public law remedies against state actions, the application of natural justice principles in contractual settings, and the broad scope of writ jurisdiction. It reinforces the principle that state instrumentalities cannot act with unbridled discretion, even in the commercial sphere, and must always act in a manner that is fair, reasonable, and non-arbitrary.

Disclaimer:

All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are encouraged to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.

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