Eviction, Landlord Title, Tenant, A.P. Rent Act, Bona Fide, Denial of Title, Supreme Court, Rent Control
0  19 Sep, 1989
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Majati Subbarao Vs. P.K.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) By Lrs.

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /2732/1980
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Case Background

As per case facts, the appellant-tenant was in occupation of the premises for business. The original respondent, as the owner, filed an eviction petition claiming bona fide requirement for his ...

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Document Text Version

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6

PETITIONER:

MAJATI SUBBARAO

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

P.K.K. KRISHNA RAO (DECEASED) BY LRS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/09/1989

BENCH:

KANIA, M.H.

BENCH:

KANIA, M.H.

KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:

1989 AIR 2187 1989 SCR Supl. (1) 153

1989 SCC (4) 732 JT 1989 (3) 694

1989 SCALE (2)602

CITATOR INFO :

RF 1991 SC1594 (14)

ACT:

A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act,

1960--Sections 10, 12 and 13--Eviction of tenant on ground

of denial of landlords title--When arises.

HEADNOTE:

The appellant-tenant was in occupation of the premises

and carrying on business. The original respondent who was

the owner of the said premises filed an eviction petition

against the appellant on the ground of bona fide requirement

as he wanted to set up his eldest son in business by start-

ing a photo studio in the said premises. The appellant

disputed the correctness of the claim and alleged that the

property in which the said premises were situated was the

absolute endowed property of which the original respondent

was the de facto trustee and as such he had no personal or

proprietary interest in the said property to evict the

appellant on the ground of personal use and occupation. The

respondent asserted that he was the absolute owner of the

said premises. The Rent Controller passed a decree for

eviction on the ground that the bona fide requirement of the

respondent-landlord was made out and also on the ground that

the appellant had denied the title of the respondent which

denial was not bona fide. The appellant filed an appeal

before the Appellate Authority which was dismissed upholding

the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. The

appellant preferred a revision petition to the High Court

and a Single Judge of the High Court also upheld the order

of eviction. The appellant came in an appeal to this Court

by special leave.

It was contended for the appellant that in order to

constitute a ground for eviction the denial of title must be

anterior to the filing of the eviction petition and a denial

of title in the course of eviction petition would not con-

stitute a ground for eviction. The contention on behalf of

the respondent was that the denial of the landlord's title

was not the only ground pleaded for eviction but it was also

contended that the appellant was liable to be evicted as the

respondent wanted the said premises for his personal bona

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fide use and occupation.

Dismissing the appeal by special leave, this Court,

154

HELD: The A.P. Rent Act was enacted with a view to

consolidate the law relating to regulation of leasing of

buildings, control of rent thereof and prevention of unrea-

sonable eviction of tenants in the State of Andhra Pradesh.

Section 10 of the A.P. Rent Act deals with eviction of

tenants. Sub-Section (1) of that section prohibits eviction

of tenants except in accordance with the provisions of that

section or sections 12 and 13 of that Act. [156D-E]

It is well settled that the Court hearing a suit or

appeal can take into account events which are subsequent to

the filing of the suit in order to give appropriate relief

or mould the relief appropriately. [157F]

Kundan Mal v. Gurudutta, Judgments today (1989) 1 S.C.

147, not applicable.

The landlord can recover possession of the property only

on one or more of the grounds enacted in the relevant sec-

tion of the Rent Acts. Even after the termination of the

contractual tenancy the landlord under the definitions of

the terms landlord and tenant contained in the Rent Acts,

remains a landlord and the tenant remains a tenant, because

of the express provision made in the enactments that a

tenant means or includes 'a person continuing in possession

after the termination of the tenancy in his favour'. Yet

another important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by

way of a non-obstante clause or by necessary implication

these enactments have done away with the law contained in

section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with

rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. [158D-

E]

Maharaja of Jaypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi, 46 I.A.

109; A.I.R. [1919] P.C. 1 and V. Dhanapal Chattiar v. Yeso-

dai Ammal, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 334, referred to.

Sada Ram and Others v. Gajjan Shiama, A.I.R. 1970 Punjab

JUDGMENT:

H.P. 22 and Machavaram Venkate Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli

Narayane Rao Sarada and another, [1978] 1 R.C.J. 368, relied

upon.

&

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2732 of

1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.8.1980 of the

Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. No. 7974 of 1979.

155

A.V. Rangam for the Appellant.

C. Setharamaiah, P.K. Rao, V.A. Babu and K.R. Nagaraja

for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KANIA, J. This is an appeal by Special Leave against the

judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh

High Court in Civil' Revision Petition No. 7974 of 1979. The

appellant before us is the tenant and the original respond-

ent is the landlord who is dead and is represented by his

legal representatives.

The premises in question are in Eluru Town in Andhra

Pradesh. The appellant is carrying on business in the name

and style of Sri Panduranga Engineering Company. According

to the original respondent (who will hereinafter be referred

to as "the respondent") he was the owner of the building in

which the said premises situated and hence, the owner of the

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said premises. The respondent filed an eviction petition

against the appellant on the ground of bona fide requirement

as he wanted to set up his eldest son in business by start-

ing a photo studio in the said premises. The appellant

disputed the correctness of the said claim. The appellant in

his counter to the eviction petition, inter alia, alleged

that the said property in which the said premises were

situated was the absolute endowed property of punyamurthula-

vari Choultry of which the original respondent was the de

facto trustee and that the original respondent had no per-

sonal or proprietary interest in the said property. He

asserted that the said property belonged to the said Choul-

try and that the original respondent had no manner of right

to evict the appellant on the ground of personal use and

occupation. The appellant asserted that the said premises

were not the individual property of the original respondent

but trust property. The respondent filed a rejoinder denying

that the said premises were the endowed property or that the

said property was a part of punyamurthulavari Choultry. He

asserted that he was the absolute owner of the said property

which was purchased by his father under a registered sale

deed dated 29th June, 1908. The respondent submitted that

the appellant had denied his title and, as the said denial

was not bona fide, the appellant was liable to be evicted

also on the ground of denial of title of the landlord. The

Rent Controller passed a decree for eviction on the ground

that the bona fide requirement of the landlord-respondent

was made out and also on the ground that the appellant-

tenant had denied the title of respondent-landlord which

156

denial was not bona fide. The appellant preferred an appeal

against the said decision to the Appellate Authority. The

Appellate Authority, however, dismissed the appeal upholding

both the grounds of eviction found by the Rent Controller.

Against this decision, the appellant preferred a revision

petition to the High Court. The High Court in its impugned

judgment upheld the order of eviction only on the ground of

denial of title which was not a bona fide denial. It is this

decision of the High Court which is challenged before us.

The finding that the denial of title was not bona fide,

is essentially a finding of fact and, fairly enough, no

dispute has been raised by learned counsel for the appellant

in respect of that finding. It is, however, submitted by him

that in order to constitute a ground for eviction the denial

of title .must be anterior to the filing of the eviction

petition and a denial of title in the course of eviction

petition would not constitute a ground for eviction. He drew

our attention to the provisions of section 10 of the Andhra

Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act,

1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the A.P. Rent Act"). The

A.P. Rent Act was enacted with a view to consolidate the law

relating to regulation of leasing of buildings, control of

rent thereof and prevention of unreasonable eviction of

tenants in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Section 10 of the

A.P. Rent Act deals with eviction of tenants. Sub-section

(1) of that section prohibits eviction of tenants except in

accordance with the provisions of that section or sections

12 and 13 of that Act. The relevant part of sub-section (2)

of section 10 of the A.P. Rent Act runs as follows:

"(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant

shall apply to the controller for a direction

in that behalf. If the Controller, after

giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of

showing cause against the application, is

satisfied;

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(i) x x x x

(ii) x x x x

(iii) x x x x

(iv) x x x x

(v) x x x x

(vi) that the tenant has denied the

title of the land lord or claimed a right of

permanent tenancy and that such

denial or claim was not bona fide,

the Controller shall make an order

directing the tenant to put the landlord in

possession of the building and

157

if the controller is not so satisfied he shall

make an order rejecting the application."

It was urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the

ground for eviction must come into existence before the

application to the Rent Controller for eviction is made and

hence, a denial of title which can be relied upon by the

landlord-respondent for eviction must be. anterior to the

eviction petition.

In support of his contention, Mr. Rangam, learned coun-

sel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of a

Bench of this Court in Kundan Mal v. Gurudutta, Judgments

Today (1989) 1 S.C. 147. In that case it has been observed

that in providing disclaimer as a ground for eviction of a

tenant in clause (f) of section 13(1) of the Rajasthan

Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 the Legis-

lature decided to give effect to the provisions of clause

(g) of section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. The

principle of forfeiture on disclaimer is rounded on the rule

that a man cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time.

Since the consequence of applying the rule is very serious,

it must be held that the denial of title to has to be clear

and in unequivocal terms. In our view, this decision is

hardly of any assistance to learned counsel. The principle

laid down in that case is that, in order to constitute a

ground for eviction, the denial of title has to be clear and

in unequivocal terms. In the present case, the facts found

show that the denial of title of the respondent by the

appellant was in dear and unequivocal terms. Although it is

observed in the said judgment that in providing this ground

for eviction, the Legislature of the State of Rajasthan

decided to give effect to the provisions of clause (g) of

section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the judgment

nowhere lays down that the denial of title must be anterior

to the eviction petition nor does it say that the provisions

relating to eviction of tenants under the Transfer of

Property Act are applicable to the eviction of tenants under

the Rajasthan Rent Act. In this connection we may point out

that it is well settled that the Court hearing a suit or

appeal can take into account events which are subsequent to

the filing of the suit in order to give appropriate relief

or mould the relief appropriately. Moreover, it is signifi-

cant that in the present case, the denial of the landlord's

title was not the only ground pleaded in support of the

claim for eviction but it was also contended by the respond-

ent that the appellant was liable to be evicted as the

respondent wanted the said premises for his personal bona

fide use and occupation.

158

It was argued by learned counsel for the appellant that

even accepting that there was a denial of title by the

appellant and the result would be only that the respondent-

landlord became entitled to forfeit the lease and in order

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to be a ground for eviction in a suit that forfeiture would

have to precede the suit or petition for eviction. It was

submitted by him that it was not open to a landlord to take

advantage of a denial of title by the tenant in the very

proceedings for eviction in the course of which the denial

was made. The denial must be anterior to the eviction pro-

ceedings. In support of this argument learned counsel placed

reliance on the decision in Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani

Pattamahdevi, 46 I.A. 109; AIR 1919 P.C. 1. In our view,

this argument also does not stand scrutiny. In V. Dhanapal

Chettiar v. Yesodai Arnrnal, [1980] 1 SCR 334 a Constitution

Bench of this Court comprising seven-learned Judges held

that in the matter of determination of tenancy the State

Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap his relationship

with the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to quit as

is the position under the Transfer of Property Act. The

landlord can recover possession of the property only on one

or more of the grounds enacted in the relevant section of

the Rent Acts. Even after the termination of the contractual

tenancy the landlord under the definitions of landlord and

tenant contained in the Rent Acts, remains a landlord and a

tenant remains a tenant because of the express provision

made in the enactments that a tenant means 'a person contin-

uing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in

his favour'. Yet another important feature of the Rent Acts

is that either by way of a non obstante clause or by neces-

sary implication these enactments have done away with the

law contained in section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act

dealing with rights and liabilities of the lessor and the

lessee. The difference between the position obtaining under

the Transfer of Property Act and the Rent Acts in the matter

of determination of a lease is that under the former Act in

order to recover possession of the leased premises determi-

nation of the lease is necessary because during the continu-

ance of the lease the landlord cannot recover possession of

the premises while under the Rent Acts the landlord becomes

entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the

conditions laid down in the relevant sections. He cannot

recover possession merely by determining the tenancy. Nor

can he be stopped from doing so on the ground that he has

not terminated the contractual tenancy. In the case before

us, we find that the denial of landlord's title by the

tenant has been expressly made a ground for eviction under

section 10(2)(vi) of the A.P. Rent Act which we have already

set out earlier. In view of this, the entire basis for the

argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the

proceedings for eviction under the A.P. Rent

159

Act is knocked out. In our opinion, the argument of learned

counsel for the appellant must, therefore, be rejected. We

find, on the other hand, that a number of High Courts have

taken the view that even a denial of the landlord's title by

a tenant in a written statement in an eviction petition

under the Rent Act concerned furnishes a ground for eviction

and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which a

written statement containing the denial has been filed (See:

Sada Ram and Others v. Gajjan Shiama, AIR 1970 Punjab &

Haryana 511; Shiv Parshad v. Smt. Shila Rani, AIR 1974 H.P.

22 and Machavaram Venkata Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli Nara-

yana Rao Sarada and another, [1978] 1 R.C.J. 368. As ob-

served by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to insist that a

denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken

advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only

in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would only

lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the

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landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for eject-

ment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by

the tenant's denial of his character as a tenant in the

written statement.

It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellant

that, in any event, the respondent failed to apply for

amendment of his plaint and incorporate the ground of denial

of title therein as he was bound to do so in order to get

relief on that ground which had arisen after the eviction

petition was filed. We agree that normally this would have

been so but, in the present case, we find that the Trial

Court, namely, the Rent Controller, framed an issue as to

whether the tenant's denial of the landlord's title to the

schedule property including the said premises was bona fide.

The parties went to trial on this clear issue and the appel-

lant had full knowledge of the ground alleged against him.

It was open to him to have objected to the framing of this

issue on the ground that it was not alleged in the eviction

petition that the appellant had denied the title of the

respondent and that the denial of title was bona fide. If he

had done that the respondent could have well applied for an

amendment of the eviction petition to incorporate that

ground. Having failed to raise that contention at that stage

it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction

decree could not be passed against him as the ground of

denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition. No

other argument have been advanced before us.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissal with costs.

S.K.A. Appeal dis-

missed.

160

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