As per case facts, the parties, married in 2001 with two sons, agreed to maintenance terms in a settlement in 2014, which was later modified in 2016 and incorporated into ...
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
COCP-2722-2026
Manu Chopra . . . . Pe""oner
Vs.
Parul Chopra . . . . Respondent
COCP-5513-2025
Parul Chopra . . . . Pe""oner
Vs.
Manu Chopra . . . . Respondent
****
Reserved on: 12.08.2026
Pronounced on: 17.08.2026
Pronounced fully/opera"ve part: Fully
****
CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
Argued by:- Mr. J.S. Gill, Advocate,
Mr. Aakash Sharma, Advocate and
Mr. Ramninder Singh, Advocate
for the pe##oner.
Mr. Shaurya Khanna, Advocate for the
applicant in CM-6082-CII-2026 and
CM-11271-CII-2026.
Mr. Sushant Kareer, Advocate and
Mr. Jaskaran Singh Matharu, Advocate for the
respondent in COCP-5513-2025 and for the
pe##oner in COCP-2722-2026.
****
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
By way of the present pe##on filed under Ar#cle 215 of the
Cons#tu#on of India read with Sec#ons 10 and 12 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 (hereina5er referred to as ‘the Act’), the pe##oner seeks
ini#a#on of contempt proceedings against the respondent for alleged will-
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COCP-5513-2025
ful and deliberate disobedience of the order dated 01.05.2024 (Annexure
P-5) passed by this Court in CR No.3551 of 2022, as well as the order
dated 14.08.2024 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
SLP(C) No.28065 of 2024, whereby the order dated 21.05.2022 (Annexure
P-4), passed by learned Addi#onal Principal Judge Family Court, Guru-
gram, was upheld direc#ng the respondent to pay an amount of ₹60,000/-
per month as maintenance from 09.02.2017 onwards in terms of para-
graph 10 of the Se@lement Deeds effected between the par#es.
2. The controversy essen#ally relates to the obliga#on of the
respondent to pay ₹60,000/- per month towards maintenance of the two
sons born out of the wedlock of the par#es, in terms of the se@lement en-
tered into between the par#es, which was subsequently modified and ul#-
mately incorporated in the decree of divorce by mutual consent dated
09.02.2017.
Factual Background :
3. The par#es were married on 19.10.2001. Two sons, namely,
Abhimanyu Chopra and Siddhartha Chopra, were born from the wedlock.
On account of matrimonial discord, the par#es decided to part ways and,
with a view to se@le their inter se disputes rela#ng to custody, visita#on,
maintenance and other connected issues, entered into a se@lement dated
04.08.2014 (Annexure P-1) in the presence of the learned District Judge,
Family Court, Gurugram. The se@lement was partly modified on
22.07.2016 (Annexure P-2). Therea5er, the marriage was dissolved by a
decree of divorce by mutual consent dated 09.02.2017 (Annexure P-3) un-
der Sec#on 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, incorpora#ng the terms
of se@lement.
4. Under Clause 9 of the se@lement, the respondent agreed to
pay ₹35,00,000/- towards permanent alimony and maintenance to the pe-
##oner. It was recorded that, as on the date of the se@lement, the re-
spondent was paying ₹60,000/- per month towards maintenance of the
pe##oner and the two children.
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5. Clause 10 of the se@lement, which is material for the
present controversy, provided that the respondent would con#nue to pay
₹60,000/- per month as maintenance for the two children. The same
clause further s#pulated that the respondent would bear their school fees
and other school-related expenditure, including school trips, books and
uniforms, besides providing medical insurance. Thus, the monthly mainte-
nance obliga#on and the educa#onal expenditure were separately con-
templated.
6. Clause 11 further provided that the children, who were then
studying in Ridge Valley School, Gurugram, would con#nue in the said
school #ll Class XII unless the par#es mutually agreed to withdraw either
or both of them.
7. It is not in dispute that the se@lement was acted upon to the
extent that ₹35,00,000/- was paid to the pe##oner towards permanent al-
imony and she was also given an undivided 50% share in the residen#al
property. The two children remained with the pe##oner, while the re-
spondent retained visita#on rights and shared custody during school vaca-
#ons.
8. Disputes subsequently arose regarding payment of the
monthly maintenance amount. According to the pe##oner, the respon-
dent stopped regularly making payment of ₹60,000/- per month, com-
pelling her to ini#ate execu#on proceedings before the learned Family
Court, Gurugram. The said proceedings culminated in the order dated
21.05.2022 (Annexure P-4), whereby a condi#onal warrant of arrest was
issued a5er substan#al arrears had accumulated.
9. The respondent challenged the aforesaid order before this
Court by filing CR No.3551 of 2022. This Court, vide order dated
01.05.2024 (Annexure P-5), dismissed the revision pe##on. While doing
so, the Court specifically considered the respondent's plea that the chil-
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dren had been admi@ed by him to Kodaikanal Interna#onal School, a resi-
den#al school, and that he was bearing their educa#onal expenses.
10. This Court observed that, under the se@lement, the respon-
dent could not unilaterally alter the arrangement. It was further held that
if there had been a change in circumstances warran#ng modifica#on of
the maintenance arrangement, the respondent was required to approach
the competent Court for that purpose and could not himself alter the
terms of the subsis#ng arrangement. The Court accordingly held that, un-
less the maintenance order was modified, the respondent remained
bound to obey it in its le@er and spirit. The revision pe##on was dis-
missed, though one month's #me was granted to clear the arrears, failing
which the Execu#ng Court was le5 free to proceed in accordance with law.
11. The respondent therea5er approached the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. The Special Leave Pe##on was dismissed on 14.08.2024 (Annexure
P-6) with costs of ₹50,000/-. The Hon'ble Supreme Court no#ced the very
plea that the children had been admi@ed to a residen#al school and that
the respondent had deposited substan#al amounts towards their school
fees. The Court declined to interfere with the order under challenge and
dismissed the pe##on as misconceived, with costs.
12. According to the pe##oner, although the arrears, which
were the subject ma@er of the earlier execu#on proceedings were
cleared, the respondent again defaulted in making the monthly payments
and stopped making regular payment from June 2024 onwards. It was as-
serted during arguments that an amount of ₹14,70,000/- was outstanding
as on 31.07.2026.
13. The pe##oner further alleges that, in viola#on of Clause 11
of the se@lement, the respondent unilaterally caused the children to be
shi5ed from Ridge Valley School to Kodaikanal Interna#onal School with-
out her consent and therea5er sought to rely upon the children's board-
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ing-school educa#on as a jus#fica#on for withholding the monthly mainte-
nance amount.
14. The respondent, in reply, submits that he has complied with
the order dated 01.05.2024 (Annexure P-5) and that contempt proceed-
ings cannot be ini#ated because this Court had granted one month's #me
for payment of the then exis#ng arrears and had therea5er le5 the Exe-
cu#ng Court free to proceed in accordance with law. It is also contended
that the present proceedings are essen#ally an a@empt to execute a de-
cree through contempt jurisdic#on, whereas an efficacious remedy of exe-
cu#on is available under Sec#on 18 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. Re-
liance has been placed upon Chaduranga Kanthraj Urs and another v. P.
Ravi Kumar and others, 2024 INSC 957.
15. The respondent further contends that both children have
been residing with him since 2021; that he has been bearing their educa-
#onal and other expenses and that both have now a@ained majority. He
asserts that he has made substan#al payments directly towards their edu-
ca#on and personal needs. It is therefore contended that, in view of the
changed circumstances, he is no longer liable to pay ₹60,000/- per month
to the pe##oner.
16. The respondent also alleges that the pe##oner has misu-
#lised the maintenance amount by spending it on personal expenses and
interna#onal travel. It is further alleged that she has been lePng out the
jointly owned residen#al property through Airbnb and other plaQorms
without his consent. According to the respondent, these acts are also con-
trary to the se@lement. He has already ins#tuted civil proceedings seeking
injunc#on and rendi#on of accounts in rela#on thereto.
17. The two sons have also filed applica#ons bearing CM-11271-
CII-2026 and CM-6082-CII-2026 seeking their impleadment in the present
contempt proceedings, alleging misuse of funds which, according to them,
were intended for their maintenance and welfare.
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18. It is also relevant that during pendency of the present con-
tempt pe##on, the respondent-husband ins#tuted a separate contempt
pe##on (COCP-2722-2026) against the pe##oner-wife alleging viola#on of
the se@lement on account of the alleged lePng out of the joint property
and misuse of maintenance funds. No#ce in that pe##on has not been is-
sued so far.
19. The ma@er has been heard at length. The record has been
carefully considered.
Scope of Contempt Jurisdic2on:
20. The first ques#on, which arises for considera#on is whether
the present pe##on is maintainable at all on the ground that the pe#-
#oner has an alterna#ve remedy of execu#on.
21. Sec#on 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Act defines
civil contempt as wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direc#on,
order, writ or other process of a Court, or wilful breach of an undertaking
given to a Court.
22. It is well se@led that contempt jurisdic#on is a special juris-
dic#on and has to be exercised with care and circumspec#on. The essen-
#al ingredient of civil contempt is wilful disobedience. Mere non-compli-
ance, par#cularly, where such non-compliance is occasioned by circum-
stances beyond the control of the alleged contemnor or arises from a
bona fide interpreta#on of an ambiguous order, would not necessarily
cons#tute contempt.
23. At the same #me, the mere fact that the order is executable
does not, by itself, bar contempt jurisdic#on. In Rama Narang v. Ramesh
Narang and anr., (2006) 11 SCC 114, the Hon'ble Supreme Court consid-
ered the ques#on in the context of a consent decree and held that where
consent terms are incorporated in a judicial order/decree, viola#on
thereof can amount to viola#on of the Court's order. The Court specifically
rejected the proposi#on that the mere executability of a decree takes
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away the jurisdic#on of the Court to deal with wilful viola#on under the
Contempt of Courts Act.
24. Thus, there is no absolute proposi#on that whenever an exe-
cu#on remedy is available, contempt jurisdic#on stands excluded. The real
ques#on is whether the conduct complained of cons#tutes wilful disobe-
dience of a subsis#ng and sufficiently clear judicial command so as to war-
rant exercise of contempt jurisdic#on.
25. The decision relied upon by ld. Counsel for the respondent in
Chaduranga Kanthraj Urs (supra) does not lay down any contrary abso-
lute rule. It emphasises that contempt jurisdic#on should not be used
merely as a subs#tute for execu#on and that the Court exercising con-
tempt jurisdic#on must remain within the four corners of the order al-
leged to have been violated.
26. The two principles are therefore required to be harmonised.
Where the dispute is merely one regarding recovery or computa#on of
decretal dues, the appropriate remedy may ordinarily be execu#on. How-
ever, where the alleged contemnor, despite knowledge of a clear subsist-
ing obliga#on, consciously refuses to comply with the same and seeks to
unilaterally alter its terms, the mere availability of execu#on cannot by it-
self render the contempt pe##on non-maintainable.
27. The present case, in my considered view, falls in the la@er
category.
Whether the obliga2ons under the Se5lement Deed (Annexure P-1) con-
2nues:
28. Clause 10 of the se@lement is clear in its essen#al terms.
The respondent agreed to con#nue paying ₹60,000/- per month towards
maintenance of the two children. The same clause separately required
him to bear their school fees and other school-related expenditure. There-
fore, payment of school fees cannot, by itself, be treated as a subs#tute
for the monthly maintenance obliga#on.
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29. The respondent's principal defence is that circumstances
have subsequently changed; that the children were shi5ed to a boarding
school, they started residing with him, he ensured their educa#onal and
other expenses and, eventually, both a@ained majority.
30. These circumstances may cons#tute grounds for seeking
modifica#on of the exis#ng arrangement. But the crucial ques#on is
whether such circumstances authorised the respondent to unilaterally dis-
con#nue payment under a subsis#ng decree.
31. The answer has already been furnished by this Court in CR
No.3551 of 2022 (Annexure P-5). The respondent had specifically raised
the boarding-school and expenditure-related defence before this Court.
The Court considered the same and observed that the respondent could
not unilaterally alter the terms of the se@lement. If circumstances had
changed, he was required to approach the competent Court for modifica-
#on. Un#l such modifica#on, he remained bound to obey the exis#ng or-
der.
32. The respondent challenged that order before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. The SLP was dismissed with costs. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court specifically no#ced the respondent's conten#on that he had paid
₹12,25,000/- per child towards residen#al-school fees and that nothing
further should be payable, but declined to interfere.
33. It is important to clarify that the order of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court should not be understood as an adjudica#on of every con-
ceivable future ques#on concerning the maintenance obliga#on. What is
significant for the present proceedings is that the respondent's then-exist-
ing defence was not accepted and the order of this Court remained opera-
#ve.
34. Therea5er, the respondent did not obtain any order from
the competent Court modifying, suspending or sePng aside the obliga#on
contained in the se@lement deed/decree.
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35. The respondent cannot, therefore, himself assume the juris-
dic#on to modify a subsis#ng judicial order. If he considered that the at-
tainment of majority by the children, their residence with him, or any
other subsequent event had rendered the exis#ng arrangement in-
equitable or unworkable, the lawful course available to him was to ap-
proach the competent Court for appropriate modifica#on. Un#l such mod-
ifica#on is granted, the decree con#nues to bind the par#es.
Payment of Educa2onal & Other expenses:
36. The respondent has placed on record substan#al amounts
allegedly paid directly towards the educa#on of the children. There is no
reason to doubt, for the present purpose, that he may have incurred such
expenditure. But the ques#on before this Court is not whether the re-
spondent has discharged his parental responsibili#es in general. The ques-
#on is whether such expenditure cons#tutes compliance with the specific
obliga#on under Clause 10 of the se@lement.
37. Clause 10 itself furnishes the answer. The ₹60,000/- monthly
payment was s#pulated as maintenance for the children, while school fees
and other educa#onal expenditure were separately made the responsibil-
ity of the respondent. Consequently, the la@er cannot be treated as a uni-
lateral adjustment against the former.
38. The respondent cannot therefore contend that because he
has spent money upon the children, the monthly obliga#on automa#cally
stood discharged.
Alleged Misuse of Maintenance & Other Civil Disputes:
39. Considerable reliance has also been placed upon allega#ons
that the pe##oner misused the maintenance amount and spent it upon
personal expenses, including interna#onal travel. Similarly, allega#ons
have been made regarding lePng out the jointly owned residen#al prop-
erty through Airbnb and other plaQorms.
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40. These allega#ons may require adjudica#on in appropriate
proceedings, but they cannot be conclusively determined in the present
contempt proceedings. Significantly, the respondent has already ins#tuted
civil proceedings seeking injunc#on and rendi#on of accounts in respect of
these very allega#ons.
41. Whether the pe##oner misu#lised any amount, whether any
amount was spent for the benefit of the children, whether the property
was let out contrary to the se@lement and what income was generated
therefrom are ques#ons involving disputed facts and evidence. This Court,
while exercising contempt jurisdic#on, cannot convert the present pro-
ceedings into a trial of those civil disputes. The par#es shall be free to pur-
sue their respec#ve remedies before the competent forum.
Applica2ons Of Children [CM-11271-CII-2026 and CM-6082-CII-2026]:
42. The two sons seek impleadment on the ground that the
maintenance amount was intended for their benefit and that they have a
direct interest in its u#lisa#on.
43. The applica#ons cannot be accepted. The pe##oner has not
sought any relief against either of the children, nor is any act of contempt
alleged against them. The ques#on whether the respondent has wilfully
disobeyed the subsis#ng judicial obliga#on can be determined without
their presence. Their allega#ons regarding misuse of funds by their
mother are ma@ers, which they may pursue before the competent Court
in accordance with law. Their impleadment would unnecessarily enlarge
the scope of the present contempt proceedings.
44. Accordingly, CM-11271-CII-2026 and CM-6082-CII-2026 are
dismissed.
Limita2on Under Sec2on 20 of Contempt of Courts Act:
45. The respondent has also raised an objec#on under Sec#on
20 of the Act. According to him, the pe##oner alleges that the monthly
payment was stopped from June 2024, whereas the present contempt pe-
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##on was ins#tuted only on 21.09.2025 and is, therefore, beyond limita-
#on.
46. There can be no dispute that Sec#on 20 prescribes a period
of one year for ini#a#on of contempt proceedings from the date on which
the contempt is alleged to have been commi@ed. The provision cannot be
circumvented merely by giving an old and completed breach the nomen-
clature of a con#nuing breach.
47. Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingama-
iah and ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1764, has examined the scope of Sec#on
20 and the concept of con#nuing breach. The Court cau#oned that a stale
claim cannot be revived merely by describing it as a con#nuing wrong. At
the same #me, the Court recognised that where the allega#on of con#nu-
ing wilful breach prima facie sa#sfies the Court, the proceedings cannot
necessarily be rejected at the threshold merely because the breach origi-
nated earlier.
48. In the present case, it is not necessary to rest the en#re
maintainability of the pe##on upon the doctrine of con#nuing contempt.
The obliga#on under Clause 10 of the Se@lement deed is a recurring
monthly obliga#on. The respondent was required to make payment every
month and, according to the pe##oner, con#nued to default.
49. The present contempt pe##on was ins#tuted on 21.09.2025.
Thus, irrespec#ve of whether the ini#al default commencing in June 2024
can itself be proceeded against, the alleged defaults falling within the one-
year period immediately preceding ins#tu#on of the pe##on are within
the statutory period prescribed by Sec#on 20.
50. The respondent con#nued to remain bound by the monthly
obliga#on during that period. There is also no order passed by any compe-
tent Court during that period modifying, suspending or sePng aside the
obliga#on.
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51. The objec#on based upon Sec#on 20 is, therefore, rejected.
However, the finding of contempt recorded herein shall be understood as
rela#ng to the wilful non-compliance falling within the period legally
amenable to contempt jurisdic#on. The earlier defaults may be relevant
only to the extent permissible in apprecia#ng the background and con#-
nuity of the respondent's conduct.
Whether Wilful disobedience is established:
52. The following aspects emerge from the record:
(i) the se@lement dated 04.08.2014 was modified on 22.07.2016;
(ii) the material terms thereof were incorporated in the decree of divorce
dated 09.02.2017;
(iii) Clause 10 specifically required payment of ₹60,000/- per month to-
wards maintenance of the two children;
(iv) the same clause separately imposed upon the respondent the liability
to bear school fees and other educa#onal expenditure;
(v) the obliga#on has never been modified or set aside by any competent
Court;
(vi) the respondent had earlier raised the very defence now relied upon by
him, namely, that the children were studying in a residen#al school and
that he was bearing their expenses;
(vii) this Court, in its order dated 01.05.2024, rejected the respondent's
unilateral approach and specifically held that he must seek modifica#on
from the competent Court, if circumstances had changed;
(viii) the challenge to the said order before the Hon'ble Supreme Court
was dismissed with costs; and
(ix) notwithstanding the subsistence of the decree, the respondent did not
con#nue to make the s#pulated monthly payments.
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53. The respondent's conduct has to be examined against this
background. This is not a case, where the respondent was unaware of his
obliga#on or where the terms of the order were incapable of being under-
stood. The amount, frequency and purpose of payment were clearly s#pu-
lated. Nor is this a case where the respondent acted pursuant to a subse-
quent order modifying the liability. On the contrary, he consciously pro-
ceeded on his own assessment that the subsequent circumstances re-
lieved him of the obliga#on.
54. The Court is conscious that contempt jurisdic#on should not
be invoked where two reasonable interpreta#ons of an order are equally
possible. The present case, however, does not involve such ambiguity. The
respondent's defence is substan#ally founded upon changed circum-
stances and his own assessment that the obliga#on had ceased.
55. That is precisely what the respondent was not en#tled to do.
Once the Court had specifically informed him that any change in circum-
stances had to be placed before the competent Court for modifica#on, his
unilateral decision to discon#nue payment cannot be treated as a bona
fide interpreta#on of an ambiguous order.
56. The fact that the children subsequently a@ained majority or
came to reside with the respondent may cons#tute relevant circum-
stances for determina#on by the competent Court in appropriate pro-
ceedings. Those circumstances, however, do not retrospec#vely authorise
unilateral disobedience of a subsis#ng decree.
57. Similarly, the respondent's expenditure upon the children
may reveal that he has been discharging other parental responsibili#es,
but it does not amount to compliance with the dis#nct monetary obliga-
#on undertaken under Clause 10.
58. On the material before this Court, therefore, the respondent
had knowledge of the subsis#ng obliga#on, understood its terms, had al-
ready unsuccessfully raised substan#ally the same defence before this
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Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, yet con#nued to withhold the s#p-
ulated monthly payment without obtaining modifica#on of the decree.
59. The Court is accordingly sa#sfied that the non-compliance
falling within the period amenable to the present proceedings was wilful
and deliberate and sa#sfies the requirements of civil contempt under Sec-
#on 2(b) of the Act.
Conclusion and Opportunity to purge contempt:
60. The Court is conscious that contempt jurisdic#on is not in-
tended to become a subs#tute for execu#on and that the power to punish
for contempt is to be exercised sparingly. The purpose of civil contempt,
however, is also to secure obedience to judicial orders and to uphold the
authority of the judicial process.
61. In the present case, the obliga#on arises from a se@lement
which was incorporated into a decree of divorce. The respondent's princi-
pal defence had already been considered by this Court, and he had been
specifically directed to seek modifica#on rather than unilaterally alter the
subsis#ng arrangement. No subsequent order modifying the obliga#on
has been brought on record.
62. The Court, therefore, finds the respondent guilty of wilful
disobedience of the subsis#ng judicial obliga#on, subject to the respon-
dent being afforded an opportunity to purge the contempt before the
ques#on of punishment is considered.
63. It was no#ced by this court in its order dated 04.08.2026
that the arrears under the subsis#ng arrangement on calcula#on were
₹14,70,000/- as on 31.07.2026. The said figure represents the accumu-
lated liability under the decree and is not being treated as the measure of
punishment for contempt.
64. Keeping in view the nature of civil contempt and the primary
object of securing compliance with judicial orders, the respondent is
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granted one final opportunity to purge the contempt. The respondent is
accordingly directed to clear the arrears of ₹14,70,000/- calculated up to
31.07.2026, on or before 31.08.2026. The respondent shall further con-
#nue to pay ₹60,000/- per month in terms of Clause 10 of the
se@lement/decree, unless and un#l the obliga#on is modified, varied or
set aside by a competent Court.
65. It is clarified that nothing contained in this order shall pre-
clude the respondent from approaching the competent Court for modifi-
ca#on of the subsis#ng arrangement on account of subsequent circum-
stances, including a@ainment of majority by the children or any other cir-
cumstance relied upon by him. Any such applica#on shall be considered
by the competent Court in accordance with law.
66. It is further clarified that the present order does not adjudi-
cate the allega#ons concerning misuse of maintenance funds, interna-
#onal travel, lePng out of the jointly owned property, rendi#on of ac-
counts or any other disputed civil claim between the par#es. Those ques-
#ons shall be determined in the appropriate proceedings on the basis of
evidence and in accordance with law.
67. List on 19.09.2026 for repor#ng compliance and for hearing
the respondent on the ques#on of punishment under Sec#on 12 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
68. In case the respondent fails to comply with the aforesaid di-
rec#on, the Court shall proceed to consider the ques#on of punishment in
accordance with law.
COCP No.2722 of 2026 filed by the respondent – husband:
69. Before par#ng with the ma@er, it is necessary to deal with
the fact that the respondent-husband has ins#tuted a separate contempt
pe##on, being COCP No.2722 of 2026, alleging viola#on by the pe##oner-
wife of the terms of the se@lement, principally on the allega#ons that she
has been lePng out the jointly owned residen#al premises through
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Airbnb and other plaQorms, and has misu#lised the maintenance amount
paid for the welfare of the children.
70. No#ce in the said contempt pe##on has not been issued so
far.
71. It is not disputed that, in respect of these very allega#ons,
the respondent has already ins#tuted a civil suit seeking, inter alia, injunc-
#on and rendi#on of accounts.
72. This Court is of the considered view that the allega#ons
raised in COCP No.2722 of 2026 are essen#ally ma@ers requiring adjudica-
#on of disputed ques#ons of fact. Whether the premises were in fact let
out in viola#on of the se@lement, whether such lePng was undertaken
with or without the consent of the respondent, what income, if any, was
derived therefrom, whether the maintenance amounts were misu#lised
and, if so, to what extent, are ma@ers which cannot appropriately be de-
termined in the summary jurisdic#on exercised by this Court in contempt.
The respondent has already chosen to invoke the ordinary civil jurisdic#on
for adjudica#on of these very disputes and has sought substan#ve relief of
injunc#on and rendi#on of accounts therein. The appropriate forum for
determina#on of such disputed ques#ons, therefore, is the Civil Court
seized of the ma@er.
73. It is well se@led that contempt jurisdic#on is not intended to
provide a subs#tute for adjudica#on of substan#ve civil disputes. The
Court exercising contempt jurisdic#on is required to confine itself to the
ques#on, whether there has been wilful disobedience of a clear and sub-
sis#ng judicial command and cannot undertake a roving inquiry into dis-
puted facts, or adjudicate the underlying civil rights of the par#es. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court has cau#oned that where disputed ques#ons of
fact are involved and a dis#nct mechanism exists for their adjudica#on,
such ques#ons ought not to be converted into an inquiry in contempt ju-
risdic#on.
Page N: 16 of total 17 Pages
COCP-2722-2026
COCP-5513-2025
74. In the present case, therefore, this Court is not sa#sfied that
any useful purpose would be served by ini#a#ng contempt proceedings
against the pe##oner-wife on the basis of the allega#ons contained in
COCP No.2722 of 2026.
75. Since no#ce has not yet been issued and the allega#ons
raised therein are already the subject ma@er of substan#ve civil proceed-
ings, the said contempt pe##on is dismissed at the threshold, without is-
suing no#ce to the pe##oner-wife, leaving the respondent-husband at lib-
erty to pursue all his remedies in the pending civil suit or any other appro-
priate proceedings in accordance with law. Nothing stated herein shall be
construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the allega#ons
raised by the respondent-husband in the said civil suit.
75. Ordered accordingly. List on 19.09.2026 as directed above
for showing compliance by the respondent.
(DEEPAK GUPTA)
JUDGE
17.08.2026
-TT270F6EMTa0
Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes/No
Whether reportable? Yes/No
Uploaded on.: 17.08.2026
Page N: 17 of total 17 Pages
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