Marathwada University, Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan, Vice-Chancellor powers, disciplinary action, delegation of power, ratification, administrative law, ultra vires, Supreme Court of India
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Marathwada University Vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /3927/1986
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Case Background

As per case facts, the respondent, a Deputy Registrar, was dismissed by the Vice-Chancellor following an inquiry into delayed payments. An initial inquiry had cleared him. The High Court quashed ...

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PETITIONER:

MARATHWADA UNIVERSITY

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

SESHRAO BALWANT RAO CHAVAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/04/1989

BENCH:

SHETTY, K.J. (J)

BENCH:

SHETTY, K.J. (J)

KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:

1989 AIR 1582 1989 SCR (2) 454

1989 SCC (3) 132 JT 1989 (2) 276

1989 SCALE (1)996

ACT:

Marathwada University Act, 1974: Sections 8, 10, 11, 19,

23, 24, 27 and 84--Vice Chancellor of every

university--Conscious keeper and constitutional

ruler--Responsible for over all administration of academic

affairs--To act firmly to put down indiscipline and malprac-

tice--Executive Council has power of removal 'to regulate

the work and conduct of the officers'--Whether implies power

to take disciplinary action.

Administrative Law: Delegation of power--When statute

prescribes a particular body to exercise power--That body

alone and none else can exercise it--Unless it is

delegated--Ratification--Cannot cure an ultra vires action.

HEADNOTE:

The respondent was a Deputy Registrar of the appellant

University. As the Controller of Examinations had proceeded

on leave the respondent was discharging the duties of Con-

troller of Examinations. A complaint alleging that the

respondent had delayed the payment of the bills of an out-

station party who had printed the question papers for the

annual examination was received by the University. The

Executive Council of the University appointed an Enquiry

Officer to hold an enquiry to find out whether the bills

were deliberately kept pending with any ulterior motive. The

Enquiry Officer gave a clean chit to the respondent as to

his conduct in discharging the duties as Controller of

Examinations.

The Executive Council of the University did not take any

decision on the report of the Enquiry Officer, but entrusted

the question to the Vice-Chancellor who was present at the

meeting. The Vice-Chancellor directed a departmental enquiry

against the respondent and appointed an advocate as the

Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer by his report held the

respondent guilty of all the charges levelled against him.

The Vice Chancellor after giving a show cause notice and

considering the reply of the respondent, dismissed him from

service.

The respondent moved the High Court under Article 226 chal-

455

lenging his dismissal. When the writ-petition was taken up

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for hearing the High Court directed the entire matter to be

placed before the Executive Council for an appropriate

decision. The Executive Council considered the matter at its

meeting and passed a resolution ratifying the action taken

by the Vice-Chancellor, and confirming the dismissal of the

respondent. At the final disposal of the writ petition, the

High Court examined the matter on merits and held that the

action taken by the Vice-Chancellor being without any au-

thority or power, these defects could not be cured by rati-

fication by the Executive Council in its subsequent resolu-

tion. The High Court accordingly quashed the departmental

proceedings taken against the respondent, and also the order

of termination of his services.

In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf

of the University: (i)That on a true construction of the

several provisions of the Marathwada University Act, 1974,

the termination of services of the respondent cannot be

assailed for want of power or jurisdiction on the part of

the Vice-Chancellor, and (2) that if the order was defective

or without authority, the ratification by the Executive

Council had rendered it immune from any challenge.

Dismissing the Appeal, the Court,

HELD: 1. The Vice-Chancellor in every university is the

conscious keeper of the University and the constitutional

ruler. He is the principal executive and academic officer of

the University. He is entrusted with the responsibility of

overall administration of academic as well as non-academic

affairs. [464A-B]

2. As the principal executive officer the Vice-Chancel-

lor also carries with him an implied power, the magisterial

power. This power is essential for him to maintain domestic

discipline in the academic and non-academic affairs. In a

wide variety of situations in the relationship of tutor and

pupil, he has to act firmly and promptly to put down indis-

cipline and malpractice. It may not be illegitimate if he

could call to aid his implied powers and also emergency

powers to deal with all such situations. [464D-E]

3. The Marathwada University Act, 1974 confers both

express and implied powers on the Vice-Chancellor. The

express powers include among others, the duty to ensure that

the provisions of the Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regula-

tions are observed by all concerned. [Section 11(3)] He has

a right to regulate the work and conduct of

456

Officers and teaching and other employees of the University

[Sec. 11(b)(a)]. He has also emergency powers to deal with

any untoward situation [Section 11(4)] a very significant

power. If he believes that a situation calls for immediate

action, he can take such action as he thinks necessary,

though in the normal course he is not competent to do so.

However he must report to the concerned authority or body,

who would, in the ordinary course, have dealt with the

matter. [464B-C]

4. The power 'to regulate the work and conduct of the

officers' cannot include the power to take disciplinary

action for their removal. [464F]

5. When a statute prescribes a particular body to

exercise a power, it must be exercised only by that body.

[464G]

Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 1, 4th Edn. page 32, re-

ferred to.

6. The Marathwada University Act confers power to

appoint officers on the Executive Council and it generally

includes the power to remove. This power is located under

Section 24(1) (XXIX) of the Act. [464F-G]

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7. The resolution of the Executive Council at a meet-

ing, at which the Vice Chancellor was also present, gave

full power to the Vice-Chancellor 'to take a decision on

this question'. By the power delegated under the resolution,

the Vice-Chancellor could either accept or reject the report

with intimation to the Executive Council. He could not have

taken any other action and indeed, he was not authorised to

take any other action. [465F-G]

: 8. The resolution was also not in harmony with the

statutory requirement. Approval of the Chancellor to the

delegation of power by the Executive Council to the Vice-

Chancellor was mandatory under section 24(1)(xii) read with

section/84 of the Marathwada University Act. The resolution

not being in conformity with the statutory requirement could

not confer power on the Vice-Chancellor to take action j

against the respondent. [465H; 466A-C]

9. Ratification is generally an act of principal with

regard to a contract or an act done by his agent. The prin-

ciples of ratification in the context of the law of agency

apparently do not have any application with regard to exer-

cise of power conferred under statutory provisions. The

statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred

and

457

any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab

initio void and cannot be ratified. [468A-B]

Friedman's Law of Agency (5th Edn.) Chapter 5at page 73,

Bowstead on Agency (14th Ed.) at page 39, Parmeshwari Prasad

Gupta v. Union of India, [1974] 1 SCR 304 and Bernard v.

National Dock Labour Board, [1953] 1 All Eng. Law Reports

1113.

In the instant case, there was no prior delegation of

power to the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action

against the respondent. There was no subsequent delegation

either. Therefore, neither the action taken by the Vice-

Chancellor, nor the ratification by the Executive Council

could be sustained. [469F]

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3927 of

1986.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.6. 1986 of the

Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1980.

S.K. Dholakia, A.M. Khanwilkar and Mrs. V.D. Khanna for

the Appellant.

V.M. Tarkunde, Karanjawala, Mrs. Karanjawala and H.S.

Anand for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:

K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal by leave is from a

decision of the Bombay High Court which allowed the respond-

ent's petition for a writ of certiorari. In so doing the

court quashed departmental proceedings initiated against the

respondent and the resultant order terminating his services.

The facts are substantially undisputed and may briefly

be stated as follows:

Respondent-Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan was at the rele-

vant time the Deputy Registrar of the Marathwada University.

One Mr. Yelikar was working then as Controller of Examina-

tions. In or about April 1976, Mr. Yelikar proceeded on

leave and the present respondent was directed to discharge

the duties of the Controller of Examinations. Accordingly,

he joined his new assignment and continued to hold

458

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that post when the controversy which culminated in his

dismissal took place.

It is said that one Mr. Swaminathan from Madras was

entrusted with the printing works needed to conduct annual

examinations of the University for the years 1974 and 1975.

Mr. Swaminathan submitted his bills amounting about

Rs.6,00,000 for the work performed by him. The bills were

not cleared immediately, and Mr. Swaminathan complained to

the University authorities. He also submitted a petition to

the Prime Minister of India which was forwarded to the

University for immediate action. This led to an enquiry to

find out whether the bills were deliberately kept pending

with any ulterior motive. The Executive Council of the

University appointed a four-member committee including the

Vice-Chancellor to enquire into the matter. The committee

after investigation submitted a report in November 1977

making some prima facie observations against the respondent.

Thereupon, the Executive Council desired to have the matter

thoroughly examined by another committee. It appointed Mr.

N.B. Chavan for the purpose. Mr. Chavan made a detailed

enquiry but found nothing against the respondent. On Decem-

ber 23, 1978, he submitted a report stating inter alia that

there was no delay in clearing the said bills and if there

was any delay, it was justified in the circumstances. He has

stated that the University utilised the time for internal

audit in which it was found that the claim of Mr. Swamina-

than was excessive to the extent of Rs.48,000 and odd. The

report of Mr. Chavan thus gave a clean chit to the respond-

ent as to his conduct in discharging the duties as Control-

ler of Examinations.

If the Executive Council had accepted the report and

closed the matter that would have been better. But unfortu-

nately, it was not done and another chapter was opened. On

March 22, 1979, the report of Mr. Chavan was placed before

the Executive Council which without taking any decision

entrusted the question to the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-

Chancellor was present in that meeting-and agreed to take a

decision in about a month. But what he did was entirely

different. Purporting to act under the powers given to him

by the Executive Council, he directed departmental enquiry

against the respondent. He appointed Mr. Motale, Advocate as

an Inquiry Officer who flamed three charges: First charge

impeached the respondent of intentionally delaying the

clearance of the bills of Mr. Swaminathan and thus tarnish-

ing the image of the University. Second charge alleged that

the respondent did not place before the Executive Council,

the letters , addressed by the Chancellor of the University

on July 23, 1976 and

459

August 19, 1976. Third charge accused the respondent for not

producing all the available papers for scrutiny by the one-

man committee headed by Mr. Chavan.

On October 25, 1979, Mr. Motale submitted his' enquiry

report to the Vice-Chancellor holding the respondent guilty

of the charges. After a usual procedure of giving show cause

notice and considering the reply thereto, the Vice-Chancel-

lor decided to dismiss the respondent. On January2, 1980, he

accordingly made an order.

The matter did not rest there. The respondent moved the High

Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging his

dismissal. When the writ petition first came up for hearing

in November 1985, the High Court took a very curious stand.

It observed that the entire matter be placed before the

Executive Council for taking an appropriate decision. As per

this observation, the matter came up before the Executive

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Council in the meeting held on December 26/27, 1985. The

Executive Council passed a resolution inter alia, ratifying

the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor and confirming the

dismissal of the respondent. This has added a new dimension

to the case.

At the final disposal of the writ petition, the High

Court, however, examined the merits of the matter. The High

Court held that the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor was

without authority of law. As to the ratification made by the

Executive Council, the High Court held: "That the acts done

by the Vice-Chancellor remain the acts without any authority

or powers and that defects cannot be cured by the subsequent

resolution." With these conclusions, the High Court quashed

the departmental proceedings taken against the respondent

and also the order of termination of his services.

Being aggrieved by the judgment, the Marathwada Univer-

sity by obtaining special leave has appealed to this Court.

Learned counsel for the appellant put his contention in

two ways: First, he said that on the true construction of

the relevant provisions of the Marathwada University Act,

1974, the termination of services of the respondent cannot

be assailed for want of power or jurisdiction on the part of

the Vice-Chancellor. Counsel next said that if the order was

defective or without authority, the ratification by the

Executive Council has rendered it immune from any challenge.

In order to appreciate these submissions, we must outline

the

460

statutory provisions of the Marathwada University Act, 1974

(called shortly "the Act"). Section 8 specifies the officers

of the University. The Vice-Chancellor is one of the offi-

cers. Section 10 provides for appointment of the Vice-Chan-

cellor. He shall be appointed by the Chancellor and shall

ordinarily hold office for a term. of three years. Section

11 reads, so far as material, as follows:

"11(1): The Vice-Chancellor shall be

the principal executive and academic officer

of the University, and shah in the absence of

the Chancellor, preside at the meetings of the

Senate and at any Convocation of the Universi-

ty .... "

"11(3): It shah be the duty of the

Vice-Chancellor to ensure that the provisions

of this Act, the Statutes, Ordinances and

Regulations are faithfully observed. The

Chancellor shall, for this purpose, have the

power to issue directions to the Vice-Chancel-

lor who shall give effect to any such direc-

tions."

11(4): If there are reasonable

grounds for the Vice-Chancellor to believe

that there is an emergency which requires

immediate action to be taken, he shall take

such action as he thinks necessary and shall,

at the earliest opportunity, report in writing

the grounds for his belief that there was an

emergency, and the action taken by him, to

such authority or body as would in the ordi-

nary course, have dealt with the

matter . ...."

11(6)(a): It shall be lawful for the

Vice-Chancellor, as the principal executive

and academic officer, to regulate the work and

conduct of the officers, and of the teaching,

academic and other employees of the Universi-

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ty, in accordance with the provisions of this

Act, the Statutes, Ordinances and

Regulations."

"11(7): The Vice-Chancellor shah

exercise such other powers and perform such

other duties as are prescribed by the Stat-

utes, Ordinances and Regulations."

Section 19 enumerates the authorities of

the University. The Executive Council is one

of the authorities specified thereunder.

Section 23 to the extent necessary is in the

following terms:

461

"23(1): The Executive Council shall

be the principal executive authority of the

University, and shall consist of the following

members, namely,: (i) the Vice-Chancellorex-

officio Chairman."

Section 24 deals with the powers and

duties of the Executive Council. These powers

and duties are wide and varied and it is

sufficient if we read sub-sections (1), (xxix)

and (xii) of sec. 24. They are as follows:

"24(1): Subject to such conditions as

are prescribed by or under this Act, the

Executive Council shall exercise the following

powers and perform the following duties,

namely ........ "

"24(1)(xxix): appoint officers and

other employees of the University, prescribe

their qualifications, fix their emoluments,

define the terms and conditions of their

service and discipline and where necessary,

their duties."

"24(1)(x1i): delegate, subject to

the approval of the Chancellor, any of its

powers (except the power to make Ordinances),

to the Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar or the

Finance Officer, or such other officers or

authority of the University or a committee

appointed by it, thinks fit."

Two other provisions are material, namely,

secs. 37 and 84. Section 37, omitting the

unnecessary, is in these terms:

Sec. 37 Subject to the conditions prescribed

by or under this Act, the Senate may make the

Statutes to provide for all or any of the

following matters namely:

(xvi): The term of office, duties and condi-

tions of service of officers, teachers and

other employees of the University, the provi-

sions of pension, insurance and provident fund

and the manner of termination of their service

and other disciplinary action and their quali-

fications, except those of teachers."

Section 34 is as follows:

"Delegation of powers: Subject to the provi-

sions of

462

this Act and Statutes any officer or authority

of the University may, by order, delegate his

or its powers, except.the power to make Stat-

utes, Ordinances and Regulations, to any other

officer or authority under his or its control,

and subject to the conditions that the ulti-

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mate responsibility for the exercise of the

powers so delegated shall continue to vest in

the officer or authority delegating them."

With these provisions, we turn to consider

the first question urged for the appellant.

The question is whether the Vice-Chancellor

was competent to direct disciplinary action

against the respondent. In this context, we

may make a few general observations about the

position and powers of the Vice-Chancellor.

The University Education Commission in its

report (Vol. I December 1948 to August 1949)

has summarised the powers and duties as fol-

lows (at 421):

"Duties of Vice-Chancellor--A Vice-

Chancellor is the chief academic and executive

officer of his university. He presides over

the Court (Senate) in the absence of the

Chancellor, Syndicate (Executive Council),

Academic Council, and numerous committees

including the selection committees for ap-

pointment of staff. It is his duty to know the

senior members of the staff intimately and to

be known to all members of the staff and

students. He must command their confidence

both by adequate academic reputation and by

strength of personality. He must know his

university well enough to be able to foster

its points of strength and to foresee possible

points of weakness before they become acute.'

He must be the 'keeper of the university's

conscience', both setting the highest standard

by example and dealing promptly and firmly

with indiscipline and malpractice of any kind.

All this he must do and it can be done as

constitutional ruler; he has not, and should

not have autocratic power. Besides, this he

must be the chief liaison between his univer-

sity and the public, he must keep the univer-

sity alive to the duties it owes to the public

which it serves, and he must win support for

the university and understanding of its needs

not merely from potential benefactors but from

the general public and its elected representa-

tives. Last, he must have the strength of

character to resist unflinchingly the many

forms of pressure to relax standards of all

sorts, which are being applied to universities

today."

463

This has been approved by the Education

Commission, 1964-66. In the report of the

Education Commission, 1971 (pages 610-11 para

13.32) it was stated:

"The person who is expected, above

all, to embody the spirit of academic freedom

and the principles of good management in a

university is the Vice-Chancellor. He stands

for the commitment of the university to schol-

arship and pursuit of truth and can ensure

that the executive wing of the university is

used to assist the academic community in all

its activities. His selection should, there-

fore, be governed by this overall considera-

tion."

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Dr. A.H. Homadi in his wise, little study

about the role of the Vice-Chancellor in the

university administration in developing coun-

tries has this to state (at 49):

The President or the Vice-Chancellor:

"The President must be willing to accept a

definition of educational leadership that

brings about change to the academic life of

the institution. He must be fired by a deep

concern for education. He should instil a

spirit and keeness about growth and develop-

ment in such a way that the professiriate

feels that their goals are interlinked with

those of the University, that their success

depends upon the success of the University.

The professors should be given detailed infor-

mation about the jobs that they have to per-

form and their good performance should be

given due recognition by administration lead-

ership. Even such small encouragement will

boost theft morale to greater heights. The

President should have faith in his own abili-

ties as well as on the abilities of other

professors and administrators and should

provide guidelines about the kind of efforts

he would like his professors and administra-

tors to make, setting an example by his own

actions and exercises. The negative force of

fear, when used and no one denies that an

element of hard headedness is some times

required as a persuasive inducement to profes-

sors and administrators of university should

be employed judiciously. Under no circum-

stances should the apathy and belligerence of

the professors and administrators be aroused.

These call for strong but sympathetic leader-

ship in the President."

464

The Vice-Chancellor in every university is thus the

conscious keeper of the University and constitutional ruler.

He is the principal executive and academic officer of the

University. He is entrusted with the responsibility of

overall administration of academic as well as nonacademic

affairs. For these purposes, the Act confers both express

and implied powers on the Vice-Chancellor. The express

powers include among others, the duty to ensure that the

provisions of the Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations

are observed by all concerned. (Section 11(3)). The Vice-

Chancellor has a right to regulate the work and conduct of

officers and teaching and other employees of the University

(Section 11(6)(a)). He has also emergency powers to deal

with any untoward situation (Section 11(4)). The power

conferred under sec. 11(4) is indeed significant. If the

Vice-Chancellor believes that a situation calls for immedi-

ate action, he can take such action as he thinks necessary

though in the normal course he is not competent to take that

action. He must, however, report to the concerned authority

or body who would, in the ordinary course, have dealt with

the matter. That is not all. His pivotal position as the

principal executive officer also carries with him the im-

plied power. It is the magisterial power which is, in our

view, plainly to be inferred. This power is essential for

him to maintain domestic discipline in the academic and

non-academic affairs. In a wide variety of situations in the

relationship of tutor and pupil, he has to act firmly and

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promptly to put down indiscipline and malpractice. It may

not be illegitimate if he could call to aid his implied

powers and also emergency powers to deal with all such

situations.

Counsel for the appellant argued that the express power

of the Vice-Chancellor to regulate the work and conduct of

officers of the University implies as well, the power to

take disciplinary action against officers. We are unable to

agree with this contention. Firstly, the power to regulate

the work and conduct of officers cannot include the power to

take disciplinary action for their removal. Secondly, the

Act confers power to appoint officers on the Executive

Council and it generally includes the power to remove. This

power is located under sec. 24(1)(xxix) of the Act. It is,

therefore, futile to contend that the Vice-Chancellor can

exercise that power which is conferred on the Executive

Council. It is a settled principle that when the Act pre-

scribes a particular body to exercise a power, it must be

exercised only by that body. It cannot be exercised by

others unless it is delegated. The law must also provide for

such delegation. Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol.14th Ed.

para 32) summarises these principles as follows:

465

"32. Sub-delegation of powers. In

accordance with the maxim delegatius non

potest delegare, a statutory power must be

exercised only by the body or officer in whom

it has been confided, unless sub-delegation of

the power is authorised by express words or

necessary implication. There is a strong

presumption against construing a grant of

legislative, judicial or disciplinary power as

impliedly authorising sub-delegation; and the

same may be said of any power to the exercise

of which the designated body should address

its own mind."

The counsel for the appellant next submit-

ted that the Executive Council in the instant

case had delegated its disciplinary power to

the Vice-Chancellor and the Act provides for

such delegation. In support of the contention

he relied upon the following resolution of the

Executive Council:

"Full power be given to the Vice-

Chancellor to take a decision on this question

and the Vice-Chancellor informed the Executive

Council that he will take decision in about a

month- On this decision, Shri Gangadhar Pa-

thrikar gave his opinion that the Executive

Council should take a decision on the note

dated 16.1. 1979 submitted by him and other

two members and since it was not accepted, he

does not agree with the above decision."

This resolution, in our opinion, is basically faulty at

least for two reasons. It may be recalled that the Executive

Council without considering the report of Mr. Chavan, wanted

the Vice-Chancellor to take a decision thereon. It may also

be noted that the Vice-Chancellor was present at the meeting

of the Executive Council when the resolution was passed. He

was given "full power to take a decision" which in the

context, was obviously on the report of Mr. Chavan, and not

on any other matter or question. He said that he would take

a decision in about a month. In our opinion, by the power

delegated under the resolution, the Vice-Chancellor could

either accept or reject the report with intimation to the

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Executive Council. He could not have taken any other action

and indeed, he was not authorised to take any other action.

The other infirmity in the said resolution goes deeper

than what it appears. The resolution was not in harmony with

the statutory requirement. Section 84 of the Act provides

for delegation of powers and

466

it states that any officer or authority of the University

may by order, delegate his or its power (except power to

make Ordinance and Regulations) to any other officer or

authority subject to provisions of the Act and Statutes.

Section 24(1)(xii) provides for delegation of power by the

Executive Council. It states that the Executive Council may

delegate any of its power (except power to make Ordinances)

to the Vice-Chancellor or to any other officer subject to

the approval of the Chancellor. (underlying is ours). The

approval of the Chancellor is mandatory. Without such ap-

proval the power cannot be delegated to the Vice-Chancellor.

The record does not reveal that the approval of the Chancel-

lor was ever obtained. Therefore, the resolution which was

not in conformity with the statutory requirement could not

confer power on the Vice-Chancellor to take action against

the respondent.

This takes us to the second contention urged for the

appellants. The contention relates to the legal effect of

ratification done by the Executive Council in its meeting

held on December 26/27, 1985. The decision taken by the

Executive Council is in the form of a resolution and it

reads as follows:

"Considering the issues, the Execu-

tive Council resolved as follows:

1. The Executive Council at its

meeting held on March 22, 1979, had by a

resolution given full authority to the Vice-

Chancellor for taking further proceedings and

decision in both the cases of the defaulting

officers.

2. In exercise of above authority,

the Vice-Chancellor appointed an Inquiry

Officer and as suggested by the Inquiry Offi-

cer issued Show Cause notices, obtained re-

plies from the Officers and lastly issued

orders for terminating their services;

XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX

It was further resolved that--

(i) There has been no inadequacy in the pro-

ceedings against both the officers;

(ii) The punishment ordered against both the

officers is commensurate with the defaults and

allegations proved

467

against both the officers; and

(iii) The Executive Council, therefore, whol-

ly, endorses the actions taken by the then

Vice-Chancellor against both the officers."

By this resolution, we are told that the

Executive Council has ratified the action

taken by the Vice-Chancellor. Ratification is

generally an act of principal with regard to a

contract or an act done by his agent. In

Friedman's Law of Agency (Fifth Edition)

chapter 5 at p. 73, the/principle of ratifica-

tion has been explained:

"What the 'agent' does on behalf of

the 'principal' is done at a time when the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 13

relation of principal and agent does not

exist: (hence the use in this sentence, but

not in subsequent ones, of inverted commas).

The agent, in fact, has no authority to do

what he does at the time he does it. Subse-

quently, however, the principal, on whose

behalf, though without whose authority, the

agent has acted, accepts the agent's act, and

adopts it, just as if there had been a prior

authorisation by the principal to do exactly

what the agent has done. The interesting

point, which has given rise to considerable

difficulty and dispute, is that ratification

by the principal does not merely give validity

to the agent's unauthorised act as from the

date of the ratification: it is antedated so

as to take effect from the time of the agent's

act. Hence the agent is treated as having been

authorised from the outset to act as he did.

Ratification is 'equivalent to an antecedent

authority' ."

In Bowstead on Agency (14th Ed.) at p. 39) it

is stated:

"Every act whether lawful or unlaw-

ful, which is capable of being done by means

of an agent (except an act which is in its

inception void) is capable of ratification by

the person in whose name or on whose behalf it

is done ..... The words "lawful or unlawful",

however, are included primarily to indicate

that the doctrine can apply to torts. From

them it would follow that a principal by

ratification may retrospectively turn what was

previously an act wrongful against the princi-

ple, e.g. an unauthorised sale, or against a

third party, e.g. a wrongful distress, into a

legitimate one; or become liable for the tort

of another by ratifying."

468

These principles of ratification, apparently do not have

any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred

under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot

travel beyond the power conferred and any action without

power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot

be ratified.

The counsel for the appellant, however, invited our

attention to the case of Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. The

Union of India, [1974] 1 SCR 304. It was a case of termina-

tion of services of the Secretary of a Company. The Board of

Directors decided to terminate the services of the Secre-

tary. The Chairman of the Board of Directors in fact termi-

nated his services. Subsequently, in the meeting of the

Board of Directors the action taken by the Chairman was

confirmed. In the suit instituted by the Secretary challeng-

ing the termination of his services, the Court upheld on the

principle that the action of the Chairman even though it was

invalid initially, could be validated by ratification in a

regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. Ma-

thew, J. while considering this aspect of the matter, ob-

served [at pp. 307 and 308]

"Even if it be assumed that the telegram and

the letter terminating the services of the

appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance to

the invalid resolution of the Board of Direc-

tors passed on December 16, 1953 to terminate

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 13

his services, it would not follow that the

action of the Chairman could not be ratified

in a regularly convened meeting of the BOard

of Directors. The point is that even assuming

that the Chairman was not legally authorised

to terminate the services of the appellant, he

was acting on behalf of the Company in doing

so, because, he purported to act in pursuance

of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was

open to a regularly constituted meeting of the

Board of Direction to ratify that action

which, though unauthorised, was done on behalf

of the Company. Ratification would always

relate back to the date of the act ratified

and so it must be held that the services of

the appellant were validly terminated on

December 17, 1953. The appellant was not

entitled to the declaration prayed for by him

and the trial court as well as the High Court

was right in dismissing the claim."

These principles of ratification governing

transactions of a company where the general

body is the repository of all powers not be

469

extended to the present case. We were also

referred to the decision of the Court of

Appeal in Barnard v. National Dock Labour

Board, [1953] 1 All Eng. Law Reports 1113 and

in particular the observation of Denning L.J.,

(at 1118 and 1119):

"While an administrative function

can often be delegated, a judicial function

rarely can be. No judicial tribunal can dele-

gate its functions unless it is enabled to do

so expressly or by necessary implication. In

Local Government Board v. Arlidge (2) the

power to delegate was given by necessary

implication, but there is nothing in this

scheme authorising the board to delegate this

function and it cannot be implied. It was

suggested that it would be impracticable for

the board to sit as a board to decide all

these cases, but I see nothing impracticable

in that. They have only to fix their quorum at

two members and arrange for two members, one

from each side, employers and workers, to be

responsible for one week at a time.

"Next, it was suggested that, even if

the board could not delegate their functions,

at any rate they could ratify the actions of

the port manager, but, if the board have no

power to delegate their functions to the port

manager, they can have no power to ratify what

he has already done. The effect of ratifica-

tion is to make it equal to a prior command,

but as a prior command, in the shape of dele-

gation, would be useless, so also is a ratifi-

cation."

These observations again are of little assistance to us

since we have already held that there was no prior delega-

tion of power to the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary

action against the respondent. There was no subsequent

delegation either. Therefore, neither the action taken by

the Vice-Chancellor, nor the ratification by the Executive

Council could be sustained.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 13

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed

with costs.

N.V.K. Appeal dis-

missed.

470

Reference cases

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