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Mithilesh Kumari & Anr. Vs. Prem Behari Khare

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /2311/1978
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Case Background

As per case facts, the respondent filed a suit seeking to be declared the sole owner of a house purchased benami in the appellant's name, also requesting a permanent injunction ...

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Document Text Version

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PETITIONER:

MITHILESH KUMARI & ANR.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

PREM BEHARI KHARE

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/02/1989

BENCH:

SAIKIA, K.N. (J)

BENCH:

SAIKIA, K.N. (J)

OZA, G.L. (J)

CITATION:

1989 AIR 1247 1989 SCR (1) 621

1989 SCC (2) 95 JT 1989 (1) 275

1989 SCALE (1)358

CITATOR INFO :

RF 1991 SC1654 (40,44)

R 1992 SC 885 (6,7,8)

ACT:

Benami Transaction-(Prohibition) Act, 1988: Sections

2(a), (c), 3(2) and 4--Prohibition of right to recover

property held benami-Whether applicable to an appeal pending

on the date of commencement of Act--Delay in disposal of

appeal--Whether an action of court-Maxim actus curiae gra-

vabit nemenium--Applicability of.

Constitution of India, 1950: Art. 136--Supreme

Court--When can interfere with concurrent findings of fact.

Statutory Construction: Retrospective operation--Pre-

sumption against--When arises--Act declaratory in

nature--Whether operates from time antecedent to

enactment--Qualifying or disqualifying statute--Whether

retroactive--Remedy barred by Act--Whether corresponding

right rendered unenforceable--Law Commission's

Report--Whether can be referred as external aid to construc-

tion of provisions of statute.

Practice & Procedure: Decree passed by

courts--Appeal pending--Appellate Court--Whether competent

to take into account legislative changes subsequent to the

decree in moulding the relief to be granted.

Words and Phrases: Ubi jus ibi remedium--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:

The respondent filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge,

praying that he be declared the sole and real owner of the

suit house and that the appellant be permanently restrained

from transferring the suit house. The trial court decreed

the suit accordingly. The appellant filed an appeal before

the Additional District Judge, who dismissed the same,

agreeing with the findings of the trial court that the

respondent had paid the price and purchased the house benami

in the name of the appellant and therefore, the appellant

had no right to create an equitable mortgage or to transfer

the suit house. The appellant's second appeal was also

dismissed by the High Court. Hence, the appeal by special

leave, by the appellant. During the pendency of the appeal,

the

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622

Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 came into force.

It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the

respondent and the appellant had been living as man and wife

and out of affection for the appellant, the respondent had

purchased the suit house in the appellant's name for

Rs.8,000, for which the appellant had contributed Rs.2,000

and, therefore, the courts below had erred in holding that

the suit house was not gifted by the respondent to the

appellant but was held benami in her name, and that even if

it was so held benami, the subsequent legislation, namely,

the Benami Transactions (Prohibition Act, 1988 had put a

complete bar to the respondent's suit against the appellants

in respect of the suit house.

On behalf of the respondent, it was submitted that the

issues on gift and benami have been concluded by concurrent

findings of fact of the courts below and that the respond-

ent's right to the benami suit house having already become

final it would not be affected by the subsequent Act.

On the questions: (a) whether the concurrent findings of

fact of the courts below should be interfered with or not,

(b) whether despite the decree in favour of the respondent,

the suit or action would be affected by the subsequent

legislation, namely, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition)

Act, 1988 and its predecessor Ordinance, (c) whether, on a

proper construction, the legislature may be said to have

expressed its intention of retrospective applicability of

the legislation, and (d) whether there was a suit present

between the respondent and the appellant on the date of the

law coming into force,

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: 1.1 A retrospective operation is not to be given

to a statute, so as the impair existing right or obligation

otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that

effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the

language of the enactment. The presumption against retro-

spective operation is strong in cases in which the statute,

if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect

vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or

impair contracts or impose new duty or attach new disability

in respect of past transactions or consideration already

passed. However, a statute is not properly called a retro-

spective statute because a part of the requisites for its

action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing.

[633H; 634A-C]

623

1.2 Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested

agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is general-

ly unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and

for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole

may relate to time antecedent to their commencement. The

presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be

rebutted by necessary implication from the language employed

in the statute. It cannot be said to be an invariable rule

that a statute could not be retrospective unless so ex-

pressed in the very terms of the section which has to be

construed. The question is whether on a proper construction,

the legislature may be said to have so expressed its inten-

tion. [634C-E]

1.3 Before applying a statute retrospectively, the court

has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospec-

tive. The Courts must also look at the general scope and

purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be ap-

plied and consider what was the former state of law and what

the legislation contemplated. [634A-B]

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Craise on Statute Law, 7th ed. referred to.

1.4 Where a particular enactment or amendment is the

result of the recommendation of the Law Commission of India,

it may be permissible to refer to the relevant report. What

importance can be given to it will depend on the facts and

circumstances of the case. However, the court has to inter-

pret the language used in the Act and when the language is

clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect to. Law

Commission's Report may be referred to as external aid to

construction of the provisions. [631C; 633D]

Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 229referred

to.

In the instant case, the Law Commission was of the view

that the legislation replacing the Benanti Transactions

(Prohibition of Right to Recover Property Ordinance, 1988)

should be retroactive in operation and that no locus peni-

tentia need be given to the persons who had entered in the

benami transactions in the past. [633B]

2.1 When an Act is declaratory in nature, the presump-

tion against retrospectivity is not applicable. Acts of this

kind only declare. A statute in effect declaring the benami

transactions to be unenforceable belongs to this type.

[636A-B]

2.2 The Parliament has jurisdiction to pass a declaratory

legisla-

624

tion. As a result of the provisions of the Benami Transac-

tions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, all properties held benami at

the moment of the Act coming into force may be affected

irrespective of their beginning, duration and origin. This

will be so even if the legislation is not retrospective, but

only retroactive. [633E-F]

2.3 The expression "any property held benami" in s. 4 of

the Act is not limited to any particular time, date or

duration. Once the property iS found to have been held

benami, no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in

respect thereof shall lie, and the real owner is bereft of

any defence against the person in whose name the property is

held or any other person. In its sweep, s. 4 envisages past

benami transactions also within its retroactivity. In this

sense, the Act is both a penal and a disqualifying statute.

In Case of a qualifying or disqualifying statute, it may be

necessarily retroactive. [635E-H]

2.4 The presumption against taking away vested right

will not apply in this case inasmuch as under law it is the

benamidar in whose name the property stands, and law only

enabled the real owner to recover the property from him

which right has now been ceased by the Act. In one sense

there was a right to recover or resist in the real owner

against the benamidar. Ubi jus ibi remedium. When there is a

right, there is a remedy. Where the remedy is barred, the

right is rendered unenforceable. In this sense it is a

disabling statute. All the real owners are equally affected

by the disability provision irrespective of the time of

creation of the right. A right is a legally protected inter-

est. The real owner's right was hitherto protected and the

Act has resulted in removal of that protection. [636B-C]

2.5 When the law nullifies the defences available to the

real owner in recovering the benami property from the benam-

idar, the law must apply irrespective of the time of the

benami transactions. The expression "shall lie" in s. 4(1)

and "shall be allowed" in s. 4(2) are prospective and shall

apply to present (future stages) and future suits, claims or

actions only. [636D]

3. The hearing of appeal under the procedural law of

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India is in the nature of re-hearing and, therefore, in

moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the

appellate court is entitled to take into account even facts

and events which have come into existence after the decree

appealed against. Consequently, the appellate court is

competent to take into account legislative changes since the

decision under appeal was given and its powers are not

confined only to see whether the

625

lower court's decision was correct according to the law as

it stood at the time when its decision was given. [636F-G]

Once the decree of the High Court has been appealed

against, the matter became sub judice again and, therefore,

the Supreme Court had seisin of the whole case, though for

certain purposes, e.g. execution, the decree was regarded as

final and the courts below retained jurisdiction in that

regard. [636G-H]

Lachmeshwar v. Keshwar Lal A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 5; Shyabud-

dinsab v. The Gadag Betgeri Municipal Borough, [1955] 1

S.C.R. 1268; The King v. The General Commissioner of income

Tax, [1916] 2 K.B. 249; Mukharjee Official Receiver v.

Ramratan Kaur. [1935] L.R. 63 I.A. 47; Dayawati v. Inderjit,

[1966] 3 S.C.R. 275; Mohanlal Jain v.His Highness Maharaja

Shri Man Singh, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 702 and Amerjit Kaur v.

Pritam Singh, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 605 relied upon.

Nand Kishore Marwah v. Samundri Devi, [1987] 4 S.C.C.

382 distinguished.

4. Ordinarily, this Court in an appeal will not inter-

fere with a finding of fact which is not shown to be per-

verse or based on no evidence. But where there are material

irregularities affecting the said finding or where the court

feels that justice had failed and the finding is likely to

result in unduly excessive hardship, this Court cannot

decline to interfere merely on the ground that the finding

in question is finding of fact. [627E, H; 628A]

Babu v. Dy. Director, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 756; Prasad v.

Govindaswamy, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 84; Dhanlibhai v. State of

Gujarat, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 603; Ganga Bishan v. Jay Narayan,

AIR 1986 SC. 441; Udaychand Disst v. Saihal Sen, A.I.R. 1988

S.C. 367 and Ram Singh v. Ajay Chawla AIR 1988 S.C. 514

relied upon.

In the instant case, the concurrent findings of the

courts below are based on reasonable appreciation of evi-

dence on record and, therefore, can in no way be said to be

perverse or unreasonable. The High Court has analysed the

facts and correctly applied the tests to determine whether

the transaction was benami or not. Therefore, there is no

justification in tile appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitu-

tion for interference with the concurrent findings of fact.

[629A-C]

However, in view of the pendency of the appeal before

the Supreme Court, and consequently, the suit filed by the

respondent, on

626

the date of coming into force of s. 4 of the Benami Transac-

tions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, which nullified the defences

available to the real owner in recovering the benami proper-

ty from the benamidar, and since the law was applicable

irrespective of the time of the benami transactions, the

respondent's suit or action for recovering the suit house

held benami by the appellant cannot be decreed. [636D-E]

No doubt, nobody should suffer for an act of the Court,

but delay in disposal of an appeal cannot be termed an

action of the court. Hence the maxim actus curiae nemenim

gravabit is not applicable in this case. [637F-G]

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The decree passed by the lower courts is, therefore,

annihilated and the suit filed by the respondent is dis-

missed. [637G]

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2311 of

1978.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.3.1978 of the

Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 130 of 1975.

Awadh Behari and N.N. Sharma for the Appellants.

Yogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K.N. SAIKIA, J. This appeal by special leave is from the

judgment and order dated 27.3.1978 of the High Court of

judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench), in second appeal

No. 130 of 1975, dismissing the appeal and upholding the

decree of the plaintiff-respondent's suit.

The plaintiff-respondent Prem Behari Khare instituted

suit No. 42 of 197 1 in the court of Civil Judge, Mohanlal

Gun j, Lucknow praying for the reliefs, inter alia, that he

be declared to be the sole and real owner of the suit house,

and that the defendant-appellant be permanently restrained

from transferring the suit house. The learned Civil Judge,

Lucknow, by his judgment dated 133.1974 decreed the suit

declaring the plaintiff to be the sole and real owner of the

suit house and permanently restraining the defendant from

transferring the suit house to any other person. On first

appeal by the defendant appellant the learned Additional

District Judge; Lucknow by his judg-

627

ment dated 23.12.1974 dismissed the appeal agreeing with the

findings of the trial court that it was the plaintiff-re-

spondent who paid the consideration and purchased the suit

house benami in the name of tile defendant-appellant who,

therefore, had no right to create any equitable mortgage or

to transfer the suit house. The defendant-appellant's second

appeal thereafter was also dismissed by the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad by the impugned judgment dated

27.3.1978. Hence this appeal by special leave.

Mr. A.B. Rohtagi learned counsel for the appellant

submitS, inter alia, that the learned courts below erred in

holding that the suit house was not gifted by the plaintiff

to the defendant but was held benami in her name; and that

even if it was so held benami, the subsequent legislation,

namely, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988, has

put a complete bar to the plaintiff's suit against the

defendant in respect of the suit house.

Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad learned counsel for the respondent

refutes submitting that the issues on gift and benami have

been concluded by concurrent findings of fact of the learned

courts below; and that the plaintiff's right to the benami

suit house having already become final, it will not be

affected by the subsequent Act.

The first question, therefore, is whether or not to

interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of the

learned courts below. It has been said in a series of deci-

sions that ordinarily this court in an appeal will not

interfere with a finding of fact which is not shown to be

perverse or based on no evidence, (Babu v. Dy. Director,

A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 756), but will interfere if material cir-

cumstances are ignored by the High Court. Prasad v. Govin-

daswaray, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 84. In Dhanjibhai v. State of

Gujarat, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 603 it was observed that where a

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finding of fact has been rendered by a learned Single Judge

of the High Court as a court of first instance and thereaf-

ter affirmed in appeal by an Appellate Bench of that High

Court, this Court should be reluctant to interfere with the

finding unless there is very strong reason to do so. There

is no reason why this should not apply to cases where the

first appellate court was the district court. It was noted

in Ganga Bishan v. Jay Narayan, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 441 that

ordinarily this Court, under Article 136 of the Constitu-

tion, would be averse to interfere with concurrent findings

of fact recorded by the High Court and the Trial Court. But

where there are material irregularities affecting the said

findings or where the court feels that justice has failed

and the findings are likely to result in unduly excessive

hardship this court could not

628

decline to interfere merely on the ground that findings in

question are findings on fact. So also in Uday Chand Dutt v.

Saibal Sen, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 367 it was said that in an

appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitu-

tion of India where there are concurrent findings of the

courts below this court is not called upon to reconsider the

entire evidence in detail to ascertain whether the findings

are justified. In Ram Singh v. Ajay Chawla, A.I.R. 1988 S.C.

514 where the concurrent finding was that the appellants

were in unauthorised occupation of premises of which the

respondents were the owners this court did not interfere

with the concurrent findings of fact.

Mr. Rohtagi lays emphasis on the facts, namely, that the

plaintiff Prem Behari Khare's wife having died in 1955

leaving behind two sons aged about 2 and 3 years respective-

ly, he faced great difficulties in managing the household,

looking after his sons and carrying on his duties as employ-

ee of the Allahabad Bank; that under these circumstances he

agreed to take in the defendant Mithilesh Kumari whose

relation with her husband Ram Swarup was then estranged;

that the relation between the plaintiff and the defendant

come to be such that she bore two children to him; that

there were efforts to legalise their de facto living as man

and wife by obtaining defendant's divorce from her husband,

and in fact there was a decree for judicial separation in

1958; that the plaintiff had full confidence in, and affec-

tion towards the defendant; and that in the court he could

give no reason why he purchased the house in the name of the

defendant. Under those circumstances, counsel submits, the

purchase of the suit house in the name of the defendant was

made for Rs.8,000 out of which Rs.2,000 contributed by the

defendant, and the learned courts below ought, therefore, to

have held the transaction of purchase in the name of defend-

ant to have been a genuine gift out of love and affection

and not a benami purchase in her name.

Perusing the judgment of the Trial Court we find that

whether the transaction was a benami or it was a genuine

gift by the plaintiff to the defendant were main issues on

which parties led evidence. The averment that the defendant

contributed Rs.2,000 towards purchase price was disbelieved

by both the courts below. The plaintiff respondent proved

from the statement of his Savings Bank account of Allahabad

Bank, Exts. 6, 7 and 8, that he withdrew Rs.8,250 on

8.11.1962 and stated in witness box that he purchased the

suit house in the name of the defendant by sale deed execut-

ed on 8.11.1962 which was registered on 9.11.1962. The

plaintiff-respondent has since been staying in the suit

house. As the two were living as man and wife the

629

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custody of the sale deed was not very material. We thus find

that the concurrent findings are based on reasonable appre-

ciation of evidence on record and, therefore, can in no way

be said to be perverse or unreasonable. Counsel criticises

the observation of the High Court that the relation between

the two was of a rather objectionable nature. We do not

think that this observation was unwarranted or it had in any

way prejudiced the defendant's case. The High Court has

analysed the facts and correctly applied the tests to deter-

mine whether the transaction was benami or not discussing

the case law. We do not find any justification in the appeal

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to interfere

with the concurrent findings of fact.

The next question is whether despite the decree in

favour of the plaintiff-respondent his suit or action will

be affected by the subsequent legislation, namely, the

Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and its prede-

cessor Ordinance. In other words, whether the effectuation

of the decree has been barred. For this it is relevant to

note that the impugned High Court judgment was dated

27.3.1978. The first appellate court's judgment was dated

23.12.1974, the trial court judgment dated 13.3.1974 and the

suit was filed in 1971. The special leave to appeal was

granted by this Court on 15.11.1978. The Benami Transactions

(Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance,

1988, hereinafter referred to as 'the Ordinance', was pro-

mulgated on May 19, 1988 to come into force at once. The

Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (Act No. 45 of

1988), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', received the

asset of the President of India on September 5, 1988. The

provisions of Sections 3, 5 and 8 of the Act came into force

at once on that date and the remaining provisions were to be

deemed to have come into force on 19th day of May 1988. It

is an Act to prohibit benami transactions and the right to

recover property held benami and matters connected therewith

or incidental thereto.

Mr. Rohtagi submits that provisions of the Act cover

past benami transactions also and that to hold so it would

be permissible for this Court to refer to the 57th Report of

the Law Commission of India wherein it was suggested that

the legislation should not be applied to past transactions

but the Parliament did not accept that suggestion, and made

the law applicable to past transactions also.

Learned counsel for the respondent Submits that the

provisions of the Act are prospective and not retrospective,

and as such would not affect the respondent's established

right to the benami property. He has not controverted that

this Court can refer to Law Commission's Report.

630

To decide the controversy the relevant provisions of the

Act may be referred to. As defined in section 2(a) of the

Act "Benami Transaction" means any transaction in which

property is transferred to one person for a consideration

paid or provided by another person. As defined in section

2(c) of the Act "property" means property of any kind,

whether movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and

includes any right or interest in such property. There can,

therefore, be no doubt that the transaction by which the

suit house was transferred to the defendant-appellant for

Rs.8,000 paid or provided by the plaintiff-respondent would

be a benami transaction if this law is applicable to it.

There is also no doubt that the suit house being a tangible

immovable would be included within this definition of

'property'.

Section 3 of the Act prohibits benami transactions by pro-

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viding:

"(1) No person shall enter into any

benami transaction.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall

apply to the purchase of property by any

person in the name of his wife or unmarried

daughter and it shall be presumed, unless the

contrary is proved that the said property had

been purchased for the benefit of the wife or

the unmarried daughter.

(3) Whoever enters into any benami

transaction shall be punishable with imprison-

ment for a term which may extend to three

years or with fine or with both.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained

in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of

1974), an offence under this section shall be

non-cognisable and bailable."

The appellant having not been wife or unmarried daughter

of the respondent the exception in (2) will not be applica-

ble.

Section 4 prohibits the right to recover property held

benami by providing:

"(1) No suit, claim or action to enforce

any right in resspect of any property held

benami against the person in whose

name the property is held or against any other

person shall lie by or on behalf of a person

claiming to be the real owner of such

property.

631

(2) No defence based on any right in

respect of any property held benami, whether

against the person m whose name the property

is held or against any other person, shall be

allowed in any suit, claim or action by or on

behalf of a person claiming to be the real

owner of such property."

Having upheld the finding that the suit house has been

held benami by the respondent in the name of the appellant,

the question is whether to this transaction the Act shall be

applicable. The Act has not been made retrospective by any

specific provision. Is it permissible to refer to the Law

Commission's Report to ascertain the legislative intent

behind the provision? We are of the view that where a par-

ticular enactment or amendment is the result of recommenda-

tion of the Law Commission of India, it may be permissible

to refer to the relevant report as in this case. What impor-

tance can be given to it will depend on the facts and cir-

cumstances of each case.

In Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 229

Fazal Ali, J. in order to answer the question whether the

non-compliance with the provisions of section 235(2) of the

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 vitiated the sentence passed

by the court considered it necessary to trace the historical

background and social setting under which section 235(2) was

inserted for the first time in the 1973 Code and referred to

the research done by the Law Commission which made several

recommendations in its 48th Report for revolutionary changes

in the provision. The Statement of Objects and Reasons were

also referred to in that context. In the instance case we

find that way back in 1972 the Government of India consid-

ered it necessary to request the Law Commission of India to

examine the problem of benami held property with a view to

determining whether benami transactions should be prohibit-

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ed. The Law Commission accordingly submitted its 57th Report

on benami transactions on 7.8.1973 after studying benami

system as operating in India and in England. It also exam-

ined implications of the provisions of the Indian Trust Act,

1882 and other statutory modifications of the Benami Law as

contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Transfer of

Property Act, the Indian Penal Code and the Income-tax Act.

It also suggested in its Report the following draft of

proposed legislation:

6.33 Recommendation: In the light of the above discussion,

we recommend the enactment of a separate law containing the

following legislative provisions:

632

"(1) No suit to enforce any right in

respect of any property held benami against

the person in whose name the, property is held

or against any other person shall be institut-

ed in any court by or on behalf of a person

claiming to be the real owner of such proper-

ty.

(2) In any suit, no defence based on any

right in respect of any property held benami,

whether against the person in whose name the

property is held or against any other person,

shall be allowed in any court by or on behalf

of a person claiming to be the real owner of

such property.

(3) Nothing in this section shall apply:

(a) whether the person in whose name the

property is held is a manager of, or a co-

parcener in, a Hindu undivided family, and the

property is held for)he benefit of the co-

parceners in the family, or

(b) where the person in whose name the

property is held is a trustee or other person

standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the

property is held for the benefit of another

person for whom he is a trustee or towards

whom he stands in such capacity."

On 19th May 1988, the President of India promulgated the

Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover

Property) Ordinance, 1988 (No. 2 of 1988) "to prohibit the

right to recover property held benami and for matters con-

nected therewith and incidental thereto" based on the sug-

gestion of the Law Commission of India made as far back as

in 1973. With this Ordinance the judicial acceptance of

benami transactions was being removed with a view to help

people to keep property they were holding for others. It

remedied the age old doctrine of benami and made a benamidar

the real owner in law, of course with few exceptions.

The Ordinance was referred by the Government on July 22,

1988 to the Law Commission of India requesting the latter to

take up the question of benami transactions for detail

examination and to give its considered views as early as

possible so that a Bill to replace the Ordinance could be

drafted on the basis of its recommendations and got passed

before the close of the Monsoon Session of the Parliament.

633

The 130th Report of the Law Commission was submitted to the

Government on August 14, 1988. The Benami Transactions

(Prohibition) Bill, 1988, drafted after getting the report,

was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 31st August, 1988 and

the Bill was passed. The Law Commission devoted several

pages to justify retrospective legislation and its view was

that the legislation replacing the Ordinance should be

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retroactive in operation and that no locus penitentia need

be given to the person who had entered in the benami trans-

actions in the past. It reported at para 3.18 as follows:

"3.18. Therefore, viewed from either angle,

the Law Commission is of the firm opinion that

the legislation replacing the ordinance should

be retroactive in operation and that no locus

penitentia need be given to the persons who

had entered into benami transactions in the

past. They had notice of one and a half dec-

ades to set their house in order. No more

indulgence is called for."

However, the court has to interpret the language used in

the Act, and when the language is clear and unambiguous it

must. be given effect to. Law Commission's Reports may be

referred to as external aid to construction of the provi-

sions. It may be noted that the Act is a piece of prohibito-

ry legislation and it prohibits benami transactions subject

to stated exceptions and makes such transactions punishable

and also prohibits the right to defences against recovery of

benami transactions as defined in section 2(a) of the Act.

The Parliament has jurisdiction to pass a declaratory legis-

lation. As a result of the provisions of the Act all proper-

ties held benami at the moment of the Act coming into force

may be affected irrespective of their beginning, duration

and origin. This will be so even if the legislation is not

retrospective but only retroactive.

The learned counsel for the respondent rightly submits

that the Act contains no specific provision making its

operation retrospective. The Law Commission itself observed

that democratic culture abhors ex post facto legislation and

that it was necessary .to curb unlawful nefarious uses of

property.

We read in Maxwell that it is a fundamental rule of

English Law that no statute shall be construed to have

retrOspective operation Unless such a construction appears

very clearly at the time of the Act, or arises by necessary

and distinct implication. A retrospective operation is,

therefore, not to be given to a statute so as to impair

existing right

634

or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of

procedure .unless that effect cannot be avoided without

doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before

applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be

satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The

presumption against retrospective operation is strong

in .cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively,

would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality

of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose new

duty or attach new disability in respect of past transac-

tions or consideration already passed. However, a statute is

not properly called a retrospective statute because a part

of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time an-

tecedent to its passing. We must look at the general scope

and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be

applied, and consider what was the former State of Law and

what the legislation contemplated. Every law that takes away

or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is

retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppres-

sive- But laws made justly and for the benefit of individu-

als and the community as a whole, as in this case, may

relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The

presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be

rebutted by necessary implications from the language em-

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ployed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an invariable

rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so

expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be

construed. The question is whether on a proper construction

the legislature may be said to have so expressed its inten-

tion. Craise on Statute Law, 7th Ed. writes that the general

rule of law that statutes are not operated retrospectively

may be departed from (a) by express enactment and (b) by

necessary implication from the language employed, and the

author goes on to say:

"If it is a necessary implication from the

language employed that the legislature intend-

ed a particular section to have a retrospec-

tive operation, the courts will give it such

an operation. "Baron Parke," said Lord Hather-

ley in Pardo v. Bingham, did not consider it

an invariable rule that a statute could not be

retrospective unless so expressed in the very

terms of the section which had to be con-

strued, and said that the question in each

case was whether the legislature had suffi-

ciently expressed that intention. In fact, we

must look to the general scope and purview of

the statute, and at the remedy sought to be

applied, and consider what was the former

state of the law, what it was that the legis-

lature contemplated." But a statute is not to

be read retrospectively except of

necessity .... In Main v.

635

Stark, Lord Selborne said: "Their lordships,

of course do not say that there might not be

something in the context of an Act of Parlia-

ment, or to be collected from its language,

which might give towards prima facie prospec-

tive a larger operation, but they ought not to

receive a larger operation unless you find

some reason for giving it .... In all cases

it is desirable to ascertain the intention of

the legislature."

He went on: "Words not requiring a retrospec-

tive operation, so as to affect an existing

statute preudicially, ought not to be so

construed", but in Renold v. Att. Genl. for

Novo Scotia it was held that this rule did not

extend to protect from the effect of a repeal

a privilege which did not amount to an accrued

right." (pp. 392-393)

As defined in Section 2(a) of the Act "benami transac-

tion" means any transaction in which property is transferred

to one person for a consideration paid or provided by any

other person." A transaction must, therefore, be benami

irrespective of its date or duration. Section 3, subject to

the exceptions, states that no person shall enter into any

benami transaction. This section obviously cannot have

retrospective operation. However, section 4 clearly provides

that no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in re-

spect of any property held benami against the person in

whose name the property is held or against any other person

shall lie, by or on behalf of a person claiming to be real

owner of such property. This naturally relates to past

transactions as well. The expression "any property held

benami" is not limited to any particular time, date or

duration. Once the property is found to have been held

benami, no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 13

respect thereof Shall lie. Similarly, sub-section (2) of

section 4 nullifies the defences based on any right in

respect of any property held benami whether against the

person in whose name the property is held or against any

other person in any suit, claim or action by or on behalf of

a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. It

means that once a property is found to have been held bena-

mi, the real owner is bereft of any defence against the

person in whose name the property is held or any other

person. In other words in its sweep section 4 envisages past

benami transactions also within its retroactivity. In this

sense the Act is both a penal and a disqualifying statute.

In case of a qualifying or disqualifying statute it may be

necessarily retroactive. For example when a Law of Represen-

tation declares that all who have attained 18 years shall be

eligible to vote, those who attained 18 yearS in the past

would be as much eligible as those who

636

attained that age at the moment of the law coming into

force. When an Act is declaratory in nature .the presumption

against retrospectivity is not applicable. Acts of this kind

only declare. A statute in effect declaring the benami

transactions to be unenforceable belongs to this type. The

presumption against taking away vested right will not apply

in this case inasmuch as under law it is the benamidar in

whose name the property stands, and law only enabled the

real owner to recover the property from him which right has

now been ceased by the Act. In one sense there was a right

to recover or resist in the real owner against the benami-

dar. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is

a remedy. Where the remedy is barred, the right is rendered

unenforceable. In this sense it is a disabling statute. All

the real owners are equally affected by the disability

provision irrespective of the time of creation of the fight.

A right is a legally protected interest. The real owner's

fight was hitherto protected and the Act has resulted in

removal of that protection.

When the law nullifies the defences available to the

real owner in recovering the benami property from the benam-

idar the law must apply irrespective of the time of the

benami transactions. The expression "shall lie" in section

4(1) and "shall be allowed" in section 4(2) are prospective

and shall apply to present (future stages) and future suits,

claims or actions only. This leads us to the question wheth-

er there was a present suit between the plaintiff-respondent

and the defendant-appellant on the date of the law coming

into force. We have noted the dates of filing the suit and

judgments of the courts below. On the date of the section 4

of the Act coming into force, that is, 19th May 1988 this

appeal was pending and, of course, is still pending. Can the

suit itself be said to be pending?

Lachmeshwar v. Keshwar Lal, A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 5 is an

authority for holding that the hearing of appeal under the

procedural law of India is.in the nature of re-hearing and

therefore in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on

appeal, the appellate court is entitled to take into account

even facts and events which have come into existence after

the decree appealed against. Consequently, the appellate

court is competent to take into account legislative changes

since the decision under appeal was given and its powers are

not confined only to see whether the lower court's decision

was correct according to the law as it stood at the time

when its decision was given. Once the decree of the High

Court has been appealed against, the matter became sub

judice again and thereafter this court had seisin of the

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whole case, though for certain purposes e.g., execution, the

decree was regarded as final and the courts below retained

jurisdiction in that regard. This was followed

637

in Shyabuddinsab v. The Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough,

[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1268 where after the judgment of the High

Court and after grant of special leave by this court the

legislation was passed, and it was applied by this Court.

Their lordships, referring to The King v. The General Com-

missioner of Income Tax, [1916] 2 K.B. 249 and Mukharjee

Official Receiver v. Ramratan Kaur, [1935] L.R. 63 I.A. 47

rejected the contention that unless there are express words

in the amending statute to the effect that the amendment

shall apply to pending proceedings, it cannot affect the

proceedings. In Dayawati v. Inderjit, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 275 it

has been held that the word 'suit' includes an appeal from

the judgment in the suit. The only difference between a suit

and an appeal is that an appeal only reviews and corrects

and proceedings in a cause already constituted but does not

create the cause. 1n Mohanlal Jain v. His Highness Maharaja

Shri Man Singh, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 702 it was observed that "A

person is "sued" not only when the plaint is filed against

him, but is "sued" also when the suit remained pending

against him. The word "sued" covers the entire proceeding,

in an action." In Amerjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh, [1975] 1

S.C.R. 605 it has been held that an appeal is a reheating

and in moulding relief to be granted in a case on appeal,

the appellate court is entitled to take into account even

facts and events which have come into existence after the

passing of the decree appealed against.

For the respondent it is submitted that right of the

parties to a suit would be determined on the basis of rights

available to them on the date of filing of the suit. Reli-

ance is placed on Nand Kishore Marwah v. Samundri Devi,

[1987] 4 S.C.C. 382. That however was a case of eviction

where the rights of the parties on the date of suit were

material unlike in this case where subsequent legislation

has nullified the defences of benami holders. That case is,

therefore, distinguishable.

Counsel for the respondent lastly submits that nobody

should be allowed to suffer for fault of the court. As the

maxim goes, actus curiae neminem gravabit. Nobody should

suffer for an act of the court. However, the delay in dis-

posal of an appeal cannot be termed an action of the court.

The consequence is that the plaintiff-respondent's suit or

action cannot be decreed under the law; and hence the decree

passed by the lower courts is annihiliated and the suit

dismissed.

In .the result, this appeal is allowed in the manner

indicated above. Under the peculiar facts and circumstances

of the case, we make no order as to costs.

N.P.V. Appeal

allowed.

638

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