The Special Leave Petition was heared and decided the judgement and order passed by supreme court.
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
Page 1 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5228 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 5849 OF 2008)
MOHD. JAMAL ...APPELLANT
Vs.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ...RESPONDENTS
WITH
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J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.
1. Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5849 of
2008 filed by one Mohd. Jamal, has been heard along
Page 4 4
with several other matters where the same issue has
been raised and the reliefs prayed for are similar.
2. Leave granted in all the matters. During the
hearing of these matters, Mohd. Jamal's case was
taken up as the lead matter.
3. From the facts as disclosed in the several
Special Leave Petitions (now Appeals), there are
three groups of matters included in these Appeals.
The first group relates to the State of Karnataka,
where the Union of India is the
Petitioner/Appellant. The second group involves
matters filed by the private parties where the
jurisdiction is that of Delhi. The third group
deals with the similar question in regard to the
States of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh.
4. All the private Appellants were and are
aspirants for dealership in respect of retail
outlets of the Indian Oil Corporation and the IBP,
Page 5 5
which merged with the Indian Oil Corporation on 2nd
May, 2007. The genesis of the claim for dealership
arises out of policy guidelines, being Policy/MDPM
No.319/02 dated 8th October, 2002, for selection of
retail outlet dealers, published by the Indian Oil
Corporation after the distribution of petroleum
product had been deregulated. The said guidelines
dealt with the procedure for locations outside
Marketing Plans and also stipulated that for the
purpose of selection, the dealership would be
categorised as indicated in the guidelines and all
retail outlets would be developed only on A/C Sites
basis which finds place in clause 2 of the
guidelines dealing with the common guidelines for
all categories.
5. Appearing for the Appellant in
SLP(C)No.5842/2008 (now appeal), Mr. Pradip Ghosh,
learned Senior Advocate, submitted that after
Page 6 6
nationalisation of Oil Companies in 1976, the sale
and distribution of petroleum and petroleum
products were under the control of the Central
Government and regulated by the provisions of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955. On and from 1978
the Central Government allowed the Public Sector
Oil Companies to set up retail outlets through an
Oil Selection Board, which was subsequently renamed
as Dealer Selection Board. Mr. Ghosh submitted
that the Central Government devised a methodology
of setting up of retail outlets, by constituting
the Industrial Meeting Committee which would decide
distribution of outlets region-wise in respect of
each petroleum company. Till 1998, the production
and marketing of petroleum and petroleum products
were under the control of the Ministry of Petroleum
and Natural Gas and were executed through Public
Sector Oil Companies. In 1998, the Central
Government decided to partly deregulate the
Page 7 7
production, supply and distribution of petroleum
and its products and indicated 2002 as a cut-off
year to completely deregulate the production and
supply of petroleum and petroleum products. The
Central Government, therefore, again took steps to
meet such objectives and in that connection decided
to make certain changes with regard to the
functioning of natural oil and gas companies under
the Market Driven Pricing Regime and to workout the
modalities of setting up petrol pumps on National
and State Highways.
6. This led to the creation of the concept of
Company Owned Company Operated outlets (COCO) as a
means to enable National Oil Companies to run and
operate their own outlets which were to be run as
model retail outlets. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the
scheme thus devised was to extend and cater to all
National and State Highways and has certain salient
features which need to be spelt out in order to
Page 8 8
appreciate future developments, which form the
subject matter of the various appeals being heard
by us.
7. One of the more important objectives which
the scheme hoped to achieve was to develop the
retail outlets on relatively large plots of land
measuring 5 acres or so on the Highways. Such land
would be under the control of the marketing company
either by way of purchase or on long-term lease
basis. Such retail outlets would also have
facilities and amenities to be developed by the
Dealer in line with the norms laid down by the Oil
Companies on a standardised purchase. Such retail
outlets were to be developed outside the Marketing
Plan in a transparent manner, subject to observance
of ban on multiple dealership. Mr. Ghosh submitted
that the said scheme was to be executed in two
phases. Phase I would enable the Oil Companies to
launch the scheme on pilot project basis for
Page 9 9
setting up COCO outlets which might serve as models
for future outlets. The second phase would be
based on the experience of the first phase and the
rest of the scheme would be taken up and completed
within a period of three years.
8. Mr. Ghosh submitted that apparently a decision
had been taken by the oil companies to convert the
COCO outlets into regular dealerships. A uniform
policy was formulated for manning and controlling
of Jubilee Retail Outlets and, pursuant to such
policy, the Government approved the Indian Oil
Corporation's (IOC) decision to run 83 outlets for
which sites had been taken over and facilities
installed on COCO basis under certain guidelines.
Mr. Ghosh urged that it has subsequently come to
light that in respect of the said 82 outlets, 77
dealers or those holding Letters of Intent, had
been allotted dealership.
Page 10 10
9. However, on 1st April, 2000, the Government
of India notified its policy for operation of COCO
outlets through contractors. In February, 2002,
the Indian Oil Corporation purchased 33.58% of
Equity Shares of IBP Ltd. Till 31st March, 2002,
no oil company could by itself select its dealers
or award its dealership to them. The Government
appointed Dealer Selection Boards, who were
entrusted with the task of selection of dealers for
all oil companies. It was only from 1st April,
2002, that the Administered Price Mechanism was
dismantled and the Dealer Selection Boards were
dissolved. The Oil Companies were, thereafter,
given a certain amount of freedom to frame their
own policies, relating to the setting up of the
retail outlets by selection of dealers.
10.On 8.10.2002, IBP Ltd. devised and/or
formulated its policy and framed guidelines, inter
alia, for selection of retail outlets in the
Page 11 11
deregulated scenario. In line with the change in
policy formulated by the Government of India,
guidelines were framed which recognised the rights
of the land owners as a category of persons
entitled to dealership, subject to conditions.
Clause 3 of the scheme provided that the dealership
of such COCO outlets would first be offered to the
landlord, provided he was found suitable. In case
the landlord declined to accept the dealership, it
would be offered to Maintenance and Handling
Contractors (M&H). In the event, the Maintenance
and Handling Contractor also declined to accept the
dealership, the same would be offered to the best
candidate available.
11.Mr. Ghosh submitted that on 14th January,
2003, in line with the Respondent's policy
guidelines for selection of retail outlet dealers
in the aftermath of deregulation vide Memo
Reference Policy/MDPM No.319/02 dated 8.10.2002,
Page 12 12
and a subsequent clarification of the General
Manager (M), MHO dated 14.12.2002, the Appellant,
Mohd. Jamal, applied for a retail outlet dealership
for his land in the land owner's category. Such
application was made pursuant to an advertisement
issued by the oil company and the Appellant was
also called upon by the oil company to obtain
Dealership Agreement Form from the Divisional
Office by depositing Rs.1000/-. After obtaining
such Form, the Appellant submitted the same to the
company. Mr. Ghosh submitted that on 15th January,
2003, the Committee on Dealer Selection found the
Appellant's land suitable for developing a retail
outlet, on National Highway No.28, Sadatpur PS,
Muzaffarpur Road, Bihar. The company even sought
prior approval for the said site from the Joint
Chief Controller of Explosives, East Circle,
Calcutta. Based on the recommendation made by the
Dealer Selection Committee dated 15.1.2003, on 25th
Page 13 13
January, 2003, the General Manager (ER) of the
Respondent No.2 Company recommended that the
dealership be given to the Appellant and directed
that a Letter of Intent be issued in his favour on
receipt of the explosive licence. Mr. Ghosh
submitted that while the Appellant's matter for
grant of dealership was at the final stage, on 5th
February, 2003, the Policy adopted on 8.10.2002 was
suspended. It has, of course, been claimed on
behalf of the Appellant that the suspension of the
policy was never communicated to the land owners,
including the Appellant, Mohd. Jamal.
12.It is also the Appellant's case that it was
mutually agreed that till the issuance of the
Letter of Intent, as an interim arrangement, a
nominee of the Appellant would be appointed as the
Maintenance and Handling Contractor to run the
petrol pump, provided that an affidavit in the
prescribed form would be furnished by the
Page 14 14
Contractor. According to Mr. Ghosh, relying on
such assurance, the Appellant offered his land on
lease to the Oil Company on 14.3.2003, subject to
the condition that the monthly rental of the land
would be Rs.27,000/- and would commence from the
date of registration of the documents. Further to
the said understanding on 29th March, 2003, a
contract for Maintenance and Handling was executed
between the Oil Company and Mohd. Ishtiaq Alam, the
brother and nominee of the Appellant, for running
the said petrol pump. Before Mohd. Ishtiaq Alam
was appointed as M&H Contractor, on anticipation of
the Oil Company that he would be granted
dealership, invested a sum of about Rs.25 lakhs to
set up infrastructure. Ultimately, on 31st March,
2003, the petrol pump was commissioned and started
operating.
13.Mr. Ghosh submitted that in the above
circumstances, the Appellant executed a lease deed
Page 15 15
in favour of the Oil Company for a period of 15
years, with a clause for further periods of
renewal.
14. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the aforesaid
arrangement was understood by all the parties to be
of temporary duration, as would be evident from the
fact that the rent initially settled at Rs.
27,000/- per month in respect of the Appellant's
land at Sadatpur was reduced to Rs. 21,000/- per
month after negotiation, which upon calculation
comes to approximately 50 paise per square feet,
which in terms of the valuation made, was abysmally
low.
15. Mr. Ghosh submitted that various other
decisions were taken both by the Oil Company as
well as the Ministry concerned by which fresh
guidelines were also framed for selection of retail
outlets and SKO-LDO (Super Kerosene Oil - Light
Page 16 16
Diesel Oil) dealers. Learned counsel submitted
that by a policy circular No. 05/0405 dated
30.3.2005, introduced by the Oil Company, existing
land owners of the concerned Jubilee Retail Outlets
and the Company Owned and Company Operated Outlets
were disqualified from being appointed as dealers,
although, the same was never communicated to the
Appellant. Mr. Ghosh submitted that, in the
meantime, the temporary arrangement which had been
arrived at in the case of the Appellant, Mohd.
Jamal, has been continuing on the strength of
orders passed by this Court. Mr. Ghosh also urged
that on 6th September, 2006, the Oil Company
formulated a new policy whereby the concept of
offering dealership to land owners was abandoned to
the prejudice of the land owners whose Letters of
Intent for dealership were pending and where lands
had also been taken on long term lease by the Oil
Company at low rates of rent, on the assurance that
Page 17 17
dealership under the land owners category would be
given to them. By virtue of the new policy, the
Oil Company proposed to run outlets on their own
and/or through Labour Contractors, in supersession
of all earlier policy guidelines.
16.Mr. Ghosh submitted that one of such land
owners filed Writ Petition No. 358 of 2006 - N.K.
Bajpai Vs. Union of India and Others, challenging
the changed policy. While disposing of the Writ
Petition, the learned Single Judge of the Delhi
High Court, inter alia, held that Oil Companies
cannot assign the running of petrol pumps on the
land of the writ petitioners without their consent.
Mr. Ghosh submitted that aggrieved by the said
Notification dated 6.9.2006, the Appellant also
filed Writ Petition No. 2392 of 2007, before the
Delhi High Court for quashing of the said
Notification and to restrain the respondents from
terminating/cancelling the arrangement arrived at
Page 18 18
regarding the running of the retail outlet on the
Appellant's land through his nominee, or in the
alternative, to return the land to the Appellant if
the dealership was not granted to the Appellant.
Mr. Ghosh submitted that the learned Single Judge
of the Delhi High Court referred the matter to a
Division Bench for hearing and on 8.2.2008, the
Delhi High Court disposed of a bunch of Writ
Petitions, while retaining 11 such Writ Petitions,
which, it felt needed further consideration since
the said Writ Petitions projected an implied
promise and/or understanding having been reached
between the land owners and the Oil Companies
concerned having regard to the low lease rentals
for the lands offered by the land owners to the
companies for establishing their retail outlets.
Learned counsel submitted that the Appellant's Writ
Petition was among those bunch of petitions, which
were dismissed by the High Court, although, the
Page 19 19
Appellant's case was the same as that of the 11
Petitioners, whose matters had been retained by the
High Court for further consideration. Mr. Ghosh
submitted that it is at that stage that this Court
admitted the Appellant's Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 5849 of 2008, on 31st July, 2008, and
passed an order whereby the parties were directed
to maintain status-quo as on that day, with liberty
to the respondents to apply for variation and/or
modification of the order, if so advised.
17.The main ground of challenge canvassed by Mr.
Ghosh on behalf of the Appellant, Mr. Jamal, and
other similarly placed Appellants, was that having
acted on the basis of a policy by which the
Respondent Oil Companies had offered full
dealership to land owners and having caused such
land owners to alter their position to their
disadvantage, the Oil Companies were now estopped
from going back on their promise. Mr. Ghosh urged
Page 20 20
that the decision to discontinue the grant of
dealership and to introduce the new concept of COCO
outlets, to be run by the Maintenance and Handling
contractors, could not be used to the disadvantage
of those land owners in whose favour a decision had
already been taken to issue Letters of Intent for
grant of dealership. Mr. Ghosh submitted that
these cases were clearly covered by the doctrine
of promissory estoppel, inasmuch as, in these cases
the land owners had altered their positions to
their detriment in several ways. Mr. Ghosh
submitted that in most cases the rates of rents at
which the lands were offered to the Oil Companies
were extremely low and did not reflect the market
rental of such lands, which is one of the
indications that a promise had been made to the
land owners that they would be granted dealerships
in respect of the said lands, which was in tune
Page 21 21
with the policy, which had been declared by the Oil
Companies earlier.
18.Mr. Ghosh submitted that in other cases the
landlords had invested large sums of money, as in
the case of Mohd. Jamal, in preparing the land
offered for operating the retail outlets of
petroleum and petroleum products, ostensibly on the
promise that they would be granted dealership for
running the said outlets. Mr. Ghosh submitted that
acting on such promise the Appellant, Mohd. Jamal,
spent more than Rs.27 lakhs to prepare the site for
running the retail outlet and it would not be
unreasonable to accept the case made out on his
behalf that such expenditure was incurred in lieu
of such promise. In certain other cases, the land
owners had been persuaded to enter into long term
lease agreements, again at nominal rents, on the
assurance that their nominees would be appointed as
Maintenance and Handling Contractors of the
Page 22 22
different COCO units, pending the decision to grant
full dealership in respect of such retail outlets,
in keeping with the earlier policy of reducing the
number of COCO units and retaining a few to be run
by the Oil Companies as model outlets.
19.Mr. Ghosh submitted that in these
circumstances, the Oil Companies and the Union of
India are estopped by the promises made by them to
grant dealerships to the land-owners on the basis
of the policy existing prior to 5th February, 2003
and 6th September, 2006.
20. Mr. Ghosh submitted that one of the earliest
decisions of this Court regarding the doctrine of
promissory estoppel was in Union of India Vs. M/s.
Indo-Afghan Agencies Limited [(1968) 2 SCR 366],
wherein it was held that even though the case did
not fall within the scope of Section 115 of the
Evidence Act, it was still open to a party who had
Page 23 23
acted on a representation made by the Government to
claim that the Government should be bound to carry
out the promise made by it, though not recorded in
the form of a formal contract.
21. Reference was then made to the celebrated
decision in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd.
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [(1979) 2 SCC
409], commonly known as the "M.P. Sugar Mills
case", wherein a Bench of Two Judges went into a
detailed enquiry regarding the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel and
observed that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
is not really based on the principle of estoppel,
but is a doctrine evolved by equity in order to
prevent injustice. It has also been observed that
there is no reason as to why it should be given a
limited application by way of defence and that it
could also be the basis of a cause of action and
Page 24 24
all that was necessary for attracting the said
doctrine was that the promisee should have altered
his position in relying on the promise. It was
emphasized that it was not necessary that the
promise should suffer any detriment as well.
22. Mr. Ghosh submitted that a somewhat different
view had been taken also by a Bench of Two Judges
in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar Vs. State of Haryana [(1981)
1 SCC 11], but the differing view expressed in the
said case was overruled by a Bench of Three Judges
in Union of India and Others Vs. Godfrey Philips
India Limited [(1985) 4 SCC 369], wherein the
decision in the M.P. Sugar Mills case (supra) was
pronounced as being the correct law.
23. Various other decisions have also been cited in
support of the aforesaid doctrine of promissory
estoppel or equitable estoppel, but it will suffice
to refer to one of the latest decisions in this
Page 25 25
regard in State of Bihar Vs. Kalyanpur Cement
Limited [(2010) 3 SCC 274], wherein it was
emphasized that in order to invoke the aforesaid
doctrine, it has to be established that a party had
made an unequivocal promise or representation by
word or conduct, to the other party, which was
intended to create legal relations or affect the
legal relationship to arise in the future, and that
the party invoking the doctrine has altered its
position relying on the promise.
24. Mr. Ghosh submitted that having held out a
promise to grant a dealership to the Appellant and
the other Appellants in the connected matters, in
respect of the lands offered by them for setting up
retail outlets for the sale of petroleum and
petroleum products and having acted thereupon just
prior to the stage of grant of Letters of Intent,
it was no longer available to the Oil Companies to
renege on their promise, particularly when the
Page 26 26
aspirants for dealership had altered their position
and had spent enormous sums of money to make the
sites ready for setting up the retail outlets. As
was observed in the M.P. Sugar Mills case (supra),
it was not even necessary for the land owners to
have suffered any prejudice on account of such
alteration. It was sufficient that, pursuant to
the promise made of grant of dealership, they had
altered their position and had spent large sums of
money to make the sites ready for occupation.
25.To bolster his submissions, Mr. Ghosh referred
to the Single Bench decision of the Karnataka High
Court dated 28th July, 2009, in Writ Petition No.
1016 of 2007, filed by one Shri Y.T. Narendra Babu
and other connected Writ Petitions, wherein the
facts identical to the facts in these cases were in
issue. In fact, SLP(C) No. 9655 of 2010 (now
Appeal) has been filed by the Indian Oil
Corporation Limited against Y.T. Narendra Babu,
Page 27 27
against the appellate order of the Karnataka High
Court dated 19.11.2009, in Writ Appeal No. 3248 of
2009, endorsing the judgment of the learned Single
Judge in the Writ Petition. In the same set of
facts, where lands had been taken on lease on the
assurance that the land owners would be appointed
as dealers in due course and that till then the
retail outlet would be treated as a COCO unit to be
run by a nominee of the land owner, the learned
Single Judge was of the view that in view of the
assurance given to the land owners and
notwithstanding the change in policy guidelines
regarding the allotment of dealership in favour of
the land owners, the doctrine of promissory
estoppel and of legitimate expectation would apply
to the case. The learned Single Judge, therefore,
allowed the Writ Petition and directed the
Respondents to process the applications filed by
the Petitioners or their nominees for grant of
Page 28 28
dealership on a co-terminus basis with the period
of the lease of the land on which the retail
outlets are established. As indicated hereinbefore,
the said views were approved by the Division Bench,
which did not interfere with the decision or the
directions given consequent thereto by the learned
Single Judge.
26.Mr. Ghosh then turned to another aspect, which
had been considered in the cases heard and
determined by the Gujarat High Court, namely, the
issuance of Comfort Letters in several cases where
the lease deed had been executed prior to 8th
October, 2012, assuring the land owners of the
demised plots that they would enjoy the right of
first refusal if COCO outlets set up on their lands
were to be converted into dealerships. Mr. Ghosh
pointed out that some of the Comfort Letters
addressed to the land owners issued on behalf of
the IBP Company Limited, by its Divisional Manager,
Page 29 29
have been annexed to the Special Leave Petitions
(now Appeals), filed by those aggrieved by the
judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High
Court, setting aside the orders of the learned
Single Judge. Upon holding that the Comfort
Letters issued to individual land owners could not
be relied upon, as being a policy decision of the
Company, the Division Bench came to the conclusion
that the learned Single Judge was in error in
giving a finding of fact in a Writ Petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly when
the facts were disputed and the entire evidence was
yet to be disclosed. Mr. Ghosh submitted that,
while allowing the Writ Appeals filed by the Oil
Companies, the Division Bench of the Gujarat High
Court had misconstrued the submissions made with
regard to the doctrine of promissory estoppel,
which would be available from the surrounding facts
Page 30 30
and circumstances, even if the same had not been
explicitly spelt out.
27. In support of his submissions, Mr. Ghosh
referred to the decision of this Court in
Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt Vs. State of Gujarat
[(2011) 6 SCC 312], wherein the learned Judges,
while considering the scope of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution,
held that even during a final hearing the Supreme
Court was not precluded from considering the
controversy in its entire perspective and that the
power under Article 142 was to do complete justice,
unless there was an express provision of law to the
contrary. Mr. Ghosh urged that this Court had
always held that technical objections should not
come in the way of the Supreme Court doing complete
justice to the parties.
Page 31 31
28.Mr. Ghosh submitted that in the light of the
above, the Oil Companies should either be directed
to act in terms of the promise made to grant
dealerships or in the event of their unwillingness
to do so, they may be directed to restore
possession of the lands leased out to them in
accordance with the doctrine of restitution.
29. Mr. Rana Mukherjee, who appeared for some of
the Petitioners (now Appellants) in this batch of
cases and had also assisted Mr. Pradip Ghosh, while
reiterating the submissions made by Mr. Ghosh,
referred to some of the factual differences in the
individual Writ Petitions and urged that, being in
a dominant position, the Government cannot act
arbitrarily. Having made a promise to grant
dealership licences to some of the land owners, who
had on the basis of such assurances demised their
lands to the Oil Companies for rents which were
Page 32 32
markedly lower than the existing rents in the area
and had also spent large amounts in making such
sites ready, the Oil Companies could not go back on
such assurances on the plea that there had been a
change in the policy for grant of dealership. Mr.
Rana Mukherjee submitted that the window period,
which had been identified by this Court, between
8th October, 2002 and 5th February, 2013, was a
period when the policy to grant dealerships was in
full force and the applications received and
processed during the said period would have to be
treated differently from the applications made
thereafter, after the change in the policy. Mr.
Mukherjee, in fact, contended that in some of the
cases, where applications had been made for grant
of dealership pursuant to advertisements published
in the Press, but in whose cases the decision to
issue Letters of Intent had been kept in abeyance
prior to 8th October, 2002, were also entitled to
Page 33 33
the same benefits in keeping with the doctrine of
promissory equity.
30. Mr. Mukherjee, who also appeared in SLP(C) No.
5756 of 2008 (now Appeal), filed by one Khurshid
Ahmed Chippa, submitted that this Court in Kumari
Shrilekha Vidyarthi Vs. State of U.P. [(1991) 1 SCC
212], wherein the doctrine of natural justice fell
for consideration, and it was held that every State
action, in order to survive, must not be
susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness, which
forms the essence of Article 14 of the
Constitution. While interpreting Article 14 of the
Constitution, this Court has consistently held that
non-arbitrariness is a necessary concomitant of
the rule of law and is, in substance, fair play in
action. In the said decision, it was further
observed that whether an impugned act is arbitrary
or not, is ultimately to be decided on the facts
Page 34 34
and circumstances of each case, but an obvious test
to apply is to see whether there is any discernible
principle emerging from the impugned act and, if
so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. It
was further observed that every State action must
be informed by reason and it follows that an act,
uninformed by reasons, is arbitrary.
31.Mr. Mukherjee also referred to the decision of
this Court in Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons Vs. Board
of Trustees of the Port of Bombay [(1989) 3 SCC
293] and Mahabir Auto Stores Vs. Indian Oil
Corporation [(1990) 3 SCC 752], wherein similar
views have consistently been expressed. Mr.
Mukherjee also prayed for the same reliefs as
prayed for by Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned Senior
Advocate, on behalf of some of the Appellants.
32.Mr. Jitender Mohan Sharma, learned Advocate who
appeared with Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned Senior
Page 35 35
Advocate, in some of the Appeals, also appeared
individually for some of the other Appellants, such
as Tirath Ram Chauhan, Sohan Singh, etc. In facts
which were similar to that of the facts in Mohd.
Jamal's case and in almost all the other cases, Mr.
Sharma repeated and reiterated the submissions made
by Mr. Ghosh in general and reiterated Mr. Ghosh's
submissions with regard to the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, since the Appellants in all
the cases in which Mr. Sharma appeared, had altered
their position after being given an assurance that
they would be given dealership in respect of the
retail outlets to be established on the demised
lands. In their cases interim arrangements were
required to be made as the grant of dealerships
were likely to take some time. Mr. Sharma also
urged that the decision of the Respondents to alter
their policy regarding grant of dealership, when
matters had almost reached the final stage of
Page 36 36
allotment of dealership, was against all norms of
fair play and was liable to be quashed.
33. Mr. Sanjay Sharawat, learned Advocate
appearing for some of the Respondents, also adopted
the submissions made by Mr. Ghosh and pointed out
that the lease deeds executed by the land owners
and the Maintenance and Handling Contracts were
kept separate, since it was the intention of the
Oil Companies that in terms of the policy of the
Indian Oil Corporation dated 23.7.2003, despite the
two contracts being separate, as and when the
Policy permitted, dealership would be awarded to
the land owners or their nominees. It was,
however, pointed out that in all the cases it had
been decided to grant Maintenance and Handling
Contracts to nominees of the land owners to enable
them to run the retail outlets till a final
decision was taken in the matter. Mr. Sharawat
submitted that the very fact that in the Policy of
Page 37 37
the Indian Oil Corporation dated 23.7.2003, the
Company had specifically permitted the land owners
to nominate anyone from the family or from outside
the family for being appointed as the Maintenance
and Handling Contractor, was sufficient indication
that it was the intention of the Respondents to
grant permanent dealership to the land owners once
a clarification had been received in the matter.
Mr. Sharawat submitted that the problem had
been created only on account of the decision of the
Oil Companies to go back on their promise which
brought all these cases squarely within the
doctrine of promissory estoppel.
34. Much the same arguments were advanced by Mr.
Rajiv Dutt, learned Senior Advocate appearing for
the Writ Petitioner, Tirath Ram Chauhan, in Writ
Petition (Civil) No.528 of 2008. Mr. Dutt urged
that pursuant to the advertisement issued by IBP
Page 38 38
Oil Company on 12th April, 2001, the Petitioner
(now Appellant) had offered his land on NH-1A
Jalandhar-Pathankot, but no decision had been taken
by the Respondents on such offer. On the other
hand, on 8th October, 2002, the Company introduced
a Policy regarding allotment of retail outlets
under the land owners category. Thereafter, as in
the other cases, on the Appellant's land being
found suitable a lease deed was executed and the
Appellant's nominee was appointed as the
Maintenance and Handling Contractor to run the
outlet on 16.12.2002. On 30.11.2002, the pump began
operational. Operations were continued in the
retail outlet by virtue of the said contract, which
was extended annually.
35. While the aforesaid arrangement was continuing,
on 6.9.2006, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
Gas issued a Notification directing all the
Page 39 39
marketing companies to phase out the existing COCO
retail units within a year.
36. Mr. Dutt submitted that the Writ Petitions
which had been filed before the Delhi High Court
for quashing the said Policy dated 6.9.2006 were
dismissed by the High Court on 8.2.2008 against
which the several Special Leave Petitions were
filed. As far as the Writ Petitions are concerned,
the present Writ Petition was filed under Article
32 of the Constitution and was entertained by this
Court on 28.11.2008, when this Court issued Notice
and directed the parties to maintain status-quo,
which order is still subsisting. Mr. Dutt also
relied on the decisions which had been cited by Mr.
Pradip Ghosh and in addition he also relied on the
often cited decision of this Court in Ramana
Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority
of India & Ors. [(1979) 3 SCC 489], wherein a
question had arisen regarding the right of the
Page 40 40
Petitioner to challenge the actions of the
International Airports Authority of India, which
was an instrumentality or agency of the Government.
It was held that where the Corporation is an
instrumentality or the agency of the Government, it
would be subject to the same constitutional or
public law limitations as the Government, which
cannot act arbitrarily and enter into a
relationship with any person it likes at its sweet
will, but its action must be in conformity with
some principle which meets the test of reason and
relevance. Reference was also made to the
decisions of this Court in the cases of E.P.
Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974) 4 SCC 3]
and Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC
248], wherein it was held that Article 14 strikes
at arbitrariness in State action and ensures
fairness and equality of treatment. It requires
that State action must not be arbitrary, but must
Page 41 41
be based on some rational and relevant principle
which is non-discriminatory.
37. In some of the other cases, learned counsel
appeared and pointed out that the applications for
dealership had been made during the window period
between 8.10.2002 and 5.2.2003, making them
eligible for being considered for grant of
dealership on the strength of the Policy, which was
then prevalent and was subsequently stayed on
5.2.2003 and was replaced by the decision taken on
6.9.2006 to phase out the existing COCO Units.
38.Special Leave Petition (C) No.9010 of 2008
(now Appeal) arising out of Writ Appeal No.2445 of
2007, from the Delhi High Court is a case similar
to that of Mohd. Jamal. Appearing on behalf of the
Appellant, Satyanarayan Kumar Singh, Mr. Ravi
Shankar Prasad, learned Senior Advocate, repeated
the submissions made by Mr. Pradip Ghosh. Mr.
Page 42 42
Prasad submitted that although the Appellant had
applied for full dealership, the COCO unit was
thrust upon him and the same had to be reconverted
into the Appellant's claim for full dealership.
39.Appearing for two of the Appellants in
respect of Civil Appeal @SLP(C)No.20908 of 2011
(Kamar Ahmed Yusuf Lulat & Ors. Vs. IBP Co. Ltd. &
Ors.) and Civil Appeal @SLP(C)No.22831 of 2011
(Jaswantsinh A Rana (D) by LRs. & Ors. Vs. IBP Co.
Ltd. & Ors.), Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned Senior
Advocate, also based the claim of the Appellants on
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In fact, the
case of the two Appellants is the same as the case
of most of the Appellants and Writ Petitioners,
where the learned Single Judge had allowed the Writ
Petitions while the Division Bench reversed the
same on the ground that all the writ petitions had
been disposed of by a common reasoning. Mr. Gupta
contended that the new policy formulated on and
Page 43 43
from 10th August, 2002, was really a culmination of
the earlier policy of the Oil Companies dated
31.5.2001, which provided for grant of full
dealership in respect of the lands offered by new
applicants. As in the case of the other claimants,
the claim of the Appellant did not fructify on
account of the change in policy and was kept in
abeyance also, as there was a further change in the
policy by which the Oil Companies decided to phase
out the COCO units which were being run by
Maintenance and Handling Contractors. Mr. Gupta
referred to the "comfort letters", which had been
provided by the Government, assuring the land
owners that the decision to run the COCO units with
the help of the Maintenance and Handling
Contractors, was only a temporary arrangement and
as soon as it would be possible, the land owners
would be given the first option for dealership in
respect of the retail outlet. Mr. Gupta also
Page 44 44
relied on the decisions of this Court on the
doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate
expectation cited by Mr. Pradip Ghosh, Mr. Rana
Mukherjee and the other learned counsel and urged
that the directives issued by the Oil Company on
6.9.2006 were liable to be quashed.
40.Appearing for several of the claimants for
dealership, Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior
Advocate, submitted that the facts in all these
cases were similar to the matters in which
submissions had earlier been made. However, in
some of the matters, Mr. Gupta urged that the
decision to grant dealership had been taken before
8.10.2002 and nowhere in the Letters of Intent, is
there any indication that the retail outlets were
COCO Units. However, after the change in policy,
the concept of COCO Units was introduced and the
nominees of the land owners were appointed as
Maintenance and Handling Contractors to run the
Page 45 45
said outlets. Thus, there was a tenuous connection
between the execution of the lease documents and
the grant of Maintenance and Handling Contracts.
Mr. Gupta submitted that apparently, the separation
of the lease from the Maintenance and Handling
Contracts, was done with the deliberate intention
that the land owners would not have any role to
play with the running of the outlet till the matter
relating to dealership of the retail outlet was
settled.
41.Mr. Gupta also adopted the submissions made by
Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned Senior Advocate for the
Appellants and urged that the decision taken by the
Oil Companies not to grant dealerships in respect
of the COCO Units ran counter to the fact situation
which would indicate that the Oil Companies had
intended to grant dealership to the land owners,
which would be evident from the following summary
of facts :-
Page 46 46
(a) While in most cases, the issuance of the
Letters of Intent were pending,
Maintenance and Handling Contracts were
given to run the retail outlets to the
nominee and/or near relation of the land
owners.
(b) The rents initially asked for by the land
owners for grant of lease for the lands
offered for setting up the retail outlets
were substantially reduced when the lease
deeds were executed.
(c) The investments made by the landlords in
making the plots ready for setting up the
petrol pumps.
(d) Correspondence exchanged between the
parties.
(e) Existence of the policy to offer the land
owners the right of first refusal for the
Page 47 47
Maintenance and Handling Contracts
prior to grant of dealership.
(f) Annual grant of dealership.
42.Mr. Gupta urged that the lease deeds executed
between the parties do not represent the totality
of the matter, but is only a part of the
transaction. Mr. Gupta submitted that the cases of
the claimants were clearly covered by the doctrine
of promissory estoppel and as had been urged by Mr.
Ghosh and the other learned counsel, the decision
of the Oil Companies arrived at on 6.9.2006 not to
grant any further dealership but to operate through
COCO Units, was bad and was liable to be quashed.
43.In all the other cases, the fact situations
were almost identical as were the submissions
advanced on their behalf. The Gujarat matters
which were taken up in the said bunch were not very
different from the other matters wherein also
Page 48 48
applications for grant of dealership had been made
within the window period when the Policy relating
to grant of dealership was subsisting and steps
similar to those taken in the other matters were
also taken with regard to the Special Leave
Petitions filed against the change in Policy
contained in the Notification dated 6.9.2006.
44.Appearing for the Indian Oil Corporation, the
learned Attorney General confined his submissions
to the legal issues raised during the hearing of
this batch of Appeals and left it to Ms. Meenakshi
Arora, learned Advocate, to deal with the factual
aspect.
45.On the question of the common grounds taken
on behalf of the Appellants and the Writ
Petitioners that their respective cases were
covered by the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the
learned Attorney General submitted that such a
Page 49 49
stand was entirely misconceived. Once an Agreement
is entered into, the parties are bound by the terms
of the said Agreement which extinguishes any claim
of promissory estoppel, which may have arisen prior
to the signing of the Agreement. Referring to the
application made by the Appellant, Mohd. Jamal, on
14th March, 2003, providing the specifications of
the land and indicating that the same, including
the building thereupon, had been made ready and
that there was no problem in giving the same to the
Company for running the petrol pump in any manner
it liked, the learned Attorney General submitted
that the same destroyed any promise that may have
been made before the aforesaid offer was made by
the Appellant. The learned Attorney General
pointed out that in the said letter, while offering
the land and structures thereon in question to the
Oil Company to establish a petrol pump and to run
it in any manner it liked, certain terms and
Page 50 50
conditions had been indicated by the Appellant,
including the monthly rental and the increments
thereof after every 5 years, together with the
period of the lease with an option of renewal. The
learned Attorney General submitted that once such
an offer had been made, which was supported by an
affidavit affirmed and filed by the land owner's
nominee for being awarded the Maintenance and
Handling Contract, wherein it was undertaken that
the said nominee would have no claim on the retail
outlet dealership at any time and would not seek
any legal help at a future date to stall smooth
handing over of the site as and when desired,
nothing remained of the promise, if such an offer
had at all been made and the same could be
construed to be an offer which attracted the
doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable
estoppel.
Page 51 51
46.The learned Attorney General submitted that
the aforesaid letter was written by the Appellant
at a point of time when the Policy dated 8.10.2002
had already been suspended. Further, the said
letter had not only been suppressed but had even
been disowned by the Appellant. Even after
disowning the said letter, the Appellant has again
relied on the same in order to make out a case that
he had agreed to make the said offer on the
assurance given by the Oil Company that he would be
granted full dealership once the proceedings before
the Court were cleared. The learned Attorney
General pointed out that in none of the documents
executed between the Appellants had any foundation
been laid in support of the assertion that a
compromise had been made that a dealership would be
given to land owners and that the awarding of
Maintenance and Handling contracts was only an
interim measure. The learned Attorney General
Page 52 52
submitted that given the disputed nature of the
claim, the matter cannot be gone into in a Writ
Petition which was, therefore, misconceived. In
this regard, the learned Attorney General referred
to the decision of this Court in A.P. Transco Vs.
Sai Renewable Power (P) Ltd. [(2011) 11 SCC 34], in
which while considering the doctrine of promissory
estoppel and legitimate expectation in regard to
various communications extending certain incentives
to producers of electricity from non-conventional
energy resources, it was held that the parties had
voluntarily signed the Power Purchase Agreements by
which they were governed and neither the doctrine
of promissory estoppel nor legitimate expectation
could, therefore, have any application in regard to
the correspondence exchanged between the parties,
whereby the Government had extended certain
incentives to the producers of electricity from
non-conventional energy resources. The learned
Page 53 53
Attorney General also referred to the decision in
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax
Officer [(2005) 1 SCC 625]; State of Himachal
Pradesh Vs. Ganesh Wood Products [(1995) 6 SCC
363]; Kasinka Trading Vs. Union of India [(1995) 1
SCC 274] and Sethi Auto Service Station Vs. D.D.A.
[(2009) 1 SCC 180],wherein the same doctrine had
been considered.
47.Supplementing the submissions made by the
learned Attorney General, Ms. Meenakshi Arora,
learned Advocate, submitted that the cases being
heard in this batch of matters can be divided into
four categories, namely:
(i)Agreements entered into between the Oil
Companies and the land owners prior to
8.10.2002;
(ii)Maintenance and Handling contracts signed
between 8.10.2002 and 5.2.2003;
Page 54 54
(iii)Offers made by land owners and lease
Agreements executed within the aforesaid
period;
(iv)Petrol pumps commissioned upon lease being
executed after the new Policy came into
existence on 5.2.2003.
48.Ms. Arora submitted that prior to the Policy
No. 319 dated 8.10.2002, the Oil Companies granted
dealership in respect of retail outlets on the
basis of applications invited for the said purpose.
Several land owners had responded to the said
applications and had offered their lands to the Oil
Companies for setting up retail outlets on main
Highways. However, the Oil Companies were also
considering a scheme whereby they would be able to
retain control over the various retail outlets by
operating them as Company Owned and Company
Operated (COCO) units, which provided for retail
outlets to be owned fully by the Oil Companies, but
Page 55 55
the operation thereof was outsourced to M&H
contractors, who would not have any right to
dealership of the outlet.
49.Ms. Arora submitted that the cases of the
applicants in the third category would have to be
treated differently from applicants whose claims
were based on decisions to grant dealership which
had been arrived at prior to 8.10.2002. In certain
cases, on the basis of the leases granted, petrol
pumps had already been commissioned and were
functioning, but with the help of M&H contractors.
Ms. Arora submitted that once the policy to grant
full dealerships was suspended and the new policy
was adopted in September, 2003, barring a few cases
no further dealerships were given in respect of the
retail outlets and all the units were, thereafter,
run as Company Owned and Company Operated units
where the Company retained control of the outlets,
Page 56 56
but left the day to day management thereof to the
contractors.
50.Taking the case of Mohd. Jamal, Ms. Arora
submitted that, as was submitted by the learned
Attorney General, the Appellant, whose application
for grant of Letters of Intent was pending, entered
into a separate Agreement with the Oil Company on
14.3.2003, when the earlier policy had already been
discontinued and after execution of the lease,
named his brother, Mohd. Ishtiaq Alam, as his
nominee, to function as the M&H contractor in
respect of the outlet established on his land. Ms.
Arora submitted that Mohd. Ishtiaq Alam was found
suitable to act as M&H contractor and a Agreement
was, therefore, executed on 29.3.2003, which also
included an affidavit affirmed by Mohd. Ishtiaq
Alam. Pointing to the contents of the said
letters, which had been referred to by the learned
Attorney General, Ms. Arora submitted that the
Page 57 57
Appellant executed the lease Agreement, being fully
aware of the consequences thereof, and so was the
nominee who affirmed an affidavit clearly
indicating that he was only managing the unit and
had no claim to the dealership of the said outlet
in lieu of being awarded the contract.
51.Ms. Arora urged that once Policy No.MDPM-
319/02 dated 8.10.2002, was replaced by the new
Policy dated 19.9.2003, all future transactions
between the Appellants/Petitioners and the Oil
Companies would have to be considered in the light
of the new policy, which dealt with COCO outlets
only. Ms. Arora submitted that as the lease
agreement between Md. Jamal and the Oil Company was
executed after the policy dated 8.10.2002 was
suspended, it was a clear indication that the land
owner was aware of his actions in offering his land
to the companies for establishing a petrol pump
thereupon, without any conditions attached except
Page 58 58
for the rental and period of the lease. Even, if
Ms. Arora's submission that the appointment of M&H
Contractors was connected with the signing of the
lease agreement is to be accepted, even then the
land owner could have no claim to the dealership in
respect of the said retail outlet being operated as
a COCO unit. Ms. Arora submitted that as has
already been indicated hereinbefore, the concept of
COCO units was that the land and the infrastructure
would either be owned or taken on long-term lease
by the oil company but the operation of the petrol
pump would be outsourced to a M&H Contractor, who
submitted an affidavit affirmed by him while
applying for the M&H Contract that he neither had
nor would in future have any claim to the
dealership of the said retail outlet.
52.Ms. Arora submitted that the case made out by
the land owners after the grant of M&H Contracts,
was not bona fide, and, in any event, could not be
Page 59 59
related to the transactions under the earlier
policies which had been replaced by fresh
agreements entered into by the parties on the basis
of the new policy. Ms. Arora urged that neither
was the doctrine of promissory estoppel nor
legitimate expectation applicable in the instant
case where there was no foundation for such a
claim. Ms. Arora reiterated her submissions that
Policy No. MDPM-319/02 dated 8.10.2002, was related
to selection of dealers and not to COCO outlets and
it was denied that the Appellant had leased out the
property upon any understanding that he or his
nominee would be allowed to run the retail outlet.
On the other hand, the land owner was not even
eligible to be appointed as the M&H Contractor.
53.Ms. Arora lastly submitted that since the
present batch of matters related to COCO outlets,
the question of returning the demised land to the
land owner did not also arise. Ms. Arora submitted
Page 60 60
that the entire exercise was nothing but an attempt
on the part of the land owners, who had consciously
entered into lease agreements, to try and resile
from the contract once it became evident that there
was no likelihood of a further change in the policy
for grant of dealership in respect of the COCO
units.
54.Referring to the decision of this Court in
Sethi Auto Service Station (supra), Ms. Arora urged
that the doctrine of legitimate expectation, had
been considered in the said case where the
Appellant's claim was based on an old policy and it
was held that the Appellant merely had an
expectation for being considered for resitement.
It was also held that a person basing his claim on
the doctrine of legitimate expectation has to
establish that he had relied on the said
representation and had altered his position and
that denial of such expectation worked to his
Page 61 61
detriment. The Courts can interfere only if the
decision taken by the authority is found to be
arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power
or in violation of principles of natural justice
and contrary to public interest. It was also
reiterated that the concept of legitimate
expectation has no role to play where said action
is a matter of public policy or in the public
interest, unless, of course, the action taken
amounted to an abuse of power. It was further
emphasized that in order to establish a claim of
promissory estoppel, it must be proved that there
was such a definite promise and not any vague offer
which could not be enforced. In this regard, Ms.
Arora also submitted that the "comfort letters"
referred to by learned counsel for the Appellants,
purported to have been issued by the State of
Gujarat, would have no avail as a promise made in
such a letter does not constitute a promise which
Page 62 62
could be enforced. Ms. Arora submitted that the
Appeals and Petitions were liable to be dismissed
with costs.
55. Learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr.
P.P. Malhotra, appearing for the Union of India,
submitted that the dispute involved in this batch
of matters was between the Oil Companies and the
land owners with whom agreements had been entered
into by the Oil Companies. The learned ASG
submitted that the Union of India has little to do
with the dispute between the parties, except to the
extent that it has been given a supervisory
function to ensure proper distribution of petrol
and petroleum products. Mr. Malhotra urged that
anything which was not in public interest, but was
likely to affect the public interest, cannot be
retained and has to be quashed. As will be evident
from the submissions made on behalf of the
respective parties, the case of the Appellants and
Page 63 63
the Writ Petitioners, in most of the cases, is
based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel on the
basis of a promise apparently made by the
Respondents to the land owners that they would be
granted dealerships in lieu of the lands offered by
them for setting up of the retail outlets. From
the facts as disclosed, there is sufficient
evidence to indicate that initially negotiations
had been conducted by the Oil Companies with
aspiring land owners that in lieu of the lease to
be granted they would be provided with dealerships.
The applications made pursuant to the advertisement
published by the Oil Companies were also duly
processed and were acted upon. However, it is only
the suspension of the Policy dated 8.10.2002, which
prevented such dealerships for being given to the
various applicants.
56. Upon deregularisation of the distribution of
petroleum products, the Oil Companies issued
Page 64 64
guidelines dealing with the procedure for locations
outside the marketing plans. It was also stipulated
that for the purpose of selection, the dealerships
would be categorised as indicated in the guidelines
and all retail outlets would be developed only on
A/C sites basis, which finds place in Clause (2) of
the guidelines.
57. The said guidelines referred to grant of
dealership which is completely different from the
grant of long-term leases by the land owners to the
Oil Companies upon the condition that the same
could be used by the lessees in any way they liked,
which included the right to sublet the demised
plot. The concept of Company Owned and Company
Operated outlets was sought to be introduced on
6.9.2003, in supersession of Policy No.MDPM-319/02
dated 8.10.2002 and the two cannot be co-related
unless a link can be established by the Appellants
that they had entered into the lease agreements
Page 65 65
with the Oil Companies upon the understanding that
once the earlier policy was restored, the land
owners would be given the option of having the COCO
units converted into regular retail outlets.
58. In order to appreciate the difference between
the two concepts, it has to be understood that the
concept of a dealership in respect of a retail
outlet is completely alien to the concept of a COCO
unit. While the former deals with the right of the
dealer to independently operate the retail outlet,
in the case of a COCO unit, the entire set up of
the retail outlet is owned by the Oil Companies and
only the day-to-day operation thereof is outsourced
to a M&H Contractor. With the discontinuance of
the earlier policy of granting dealerships in
respect of retail outlets and the introduction of a
new policy awarding M&H Contracts in respect of the
COCO outlets, in our view, the land owners who had
entered into fresh lease agreements after the
Page 66 66
policy to grant dealerships had been suspended,
cannot now claim any right on the basis of the
earlier policy in the absence of any Letter of
Intent having been issued thereunder. Had any
Letter of Intent, which tantamounts to grant of
dealership, been issued and then in respect of the
same lands COCO units were established, the
situation would have been different. Placed in
such a position, the land owners cannot claim any
relief in these proceedings and, if any loss or
damages have been suffered by them on account of
the assurance earlier given regarding grant of
dealership, particularly in making the sites ready
therefor, the remedy of such applicants would lie
elsewhere. The policy guidelines and, in
particular, Clauses 1.2 and 1.2.2 thereof are not
available to the Appellants and the Petitioners in
these proceedings, which are concerned mainly with
Page 67 67
COCO units which have no connection with the
concept of dealership.
59. We are inclined to hold that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, as
canvassed on behalf of the Appellants and the
Petitioners, cannot be made applicable to these
cases where the leases have been granted by the
land owners on definite terms and conditions,
without any indication that the same were being
entered into on a mutual understanding between the
parties that these would be temporary arrangements,
till the earlier policy was restored and the claim
of the land owners for grant of dealership could be
considered afresh. On the other hand, although,
the nominees of the lessors were almost in all
cases appointed as the M&H Contractors, that in
itself cannot, in our view, convert any claim of
the land owner for grant of a permanent dealership.
As has been indicated hereinbefore, even the M&H
Page 68 68
Contractor had to submit an affidavit to the effect
that he did not have and would not have any claim
to the dealership of the retail outlet and that he
would not also obstruct the making over possession
of the retail outlet to the Oil Company, as and
when called upon to do so. The decisions cited on
behalf of the Appellants/Petitioners, are not,
therefore, relevant for a decision in these cases.
Although, the Appeals have been filed on account of
the denial to the land owners of the grant of
dealership in respect of the lands demised by them
to the Oil Companies, the entire focus has shifted
to COCO outlets on account of the fresh lease
agreements entered into by the Appellants with the
Oil Companies which has had the effect of
obliterating the claim of the land owners made
separately under earlier lease agreements. The
claims of the Appellants/Petitioners in the present
batch of matters have to be treated on the basis
Page 69 69
of the agreements subsequently entered into by the
Oil Companies, as submitted by the learned Attorney
General.
60.These Appeals and Petitions must, therefore,
fail and are dismissed. C.A. No.5259 of 2013 filed
by the Indian Oil Corporation, stands allowed. The
four Transfer Petitions, being T.P.(C) Nos. 971-973
of 2010 and T.P.(C) No. 1260 of 2011, which were
heard along with these Appeals and Petitions, are
allowed. The Writ Petitions, which are transferred
as a consequence thereof, are also dismissed along
with other matters. Accordingly, the Transferred
Cases, arising out of T.P.(C) Nos. 971-973 of 2010
and T.P.(C) No. 1260 of 2011, are disposed of.
However, it will be open to the Appellants and the
Petitioners to approach the proper forum in the
event they have suffered any damages and loss,
which they are entitled to recover in accordance
with law.
Page 70 70
61.Having regard to the peculiar facts of these
cases, the parties are left to bear their
individual costs.
...................CJI.
(ALTAMAS KABIR)
..................... J.
(J. CHELAMESWAR)
New Delhi
Dated: July 8, 2013.
CORRIGENDUM
No.F.3/Ed.B.J./48/2013 dated 31.07.2013 issued
(in judgment delivered by ALTAMAS KABIR,
CJI.)(reportable -450/2013) In Page No.69,
Para No.60, Line No.2 of para, FOR 'are dismissed. The
four...' READ:' are dismissed. C.A. No.5259 of 2013
filed by the Indian Oil Corporation, stands
allowed. The four...'
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