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Judgment reserved on - 04.08.2026

Judgment delivered on -20.08.2026

HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

Writ Petition No. 2511 of 2025 (MS)

M/s Deccan Charters Pvt. Ltd. ….....Petitioner

Versus

The State of Uttarakhand and others ….….Respondents

Present:-

Mr. Praveen Kumar, Mr. Suhaas Ratna Joshi, Advocates through video

conferencing and Ms. Bhavya Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Narain Dutt, Standing Counsel for the State.

Ms. Devika Tiwari, Advocate for the respondent no. 4.

Mr. Devesh Pande, Advocate for the respondent nos. 6 to 11.

Writ Petition No. 1401 of 2024 (MS)

M/s Deccan Charters Pvt. Ltd. ….....Petitioner

Versus

The State of Uttarakhand and others ….….Respondents

Present:-

Mr. Praveen Kumar, Mr. Suhaas Ratna Joshi, Advocates through video

conferencing and Ms. Bhavya Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Narain Dutt, Standing Counsel for the State.

Ms. Devika Tiwari, Advocate for the respondent no. 4.

Mr. Devesh Pande, Advocate for the respondent nos. 6 to 11.

JUDGMENT

Hon’ble Ravindra Maithani, J.

Since common questions of law and facts are involved

in all these writ petitions, they are heard together and decided by

this common judgment. However, for sake of convenience, facts

would be referred from Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2511 of 2025 and

parties shall be referred to accordingly, unless otherwise

specifically specified.

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2. It is the case of the petitioner that it has been

operating Shri Hemkund Sahibji Helicopter Shuttles for Shri

Hemkund Sahibji Yatra since 2011. The petitioner had taken on

lease certain land from respondent nos. 6 to 11 and had been

operating a helipad at Govind Ghat, Tehsil Joshimath, District

Chamoli, Uttarakhand (“the helipad”). The helipad includes

passenger lounge, ticket counter, etc. On 23.05.2024, the helipad

was temporarily acquired by the respondent State under the

provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in

Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“the

2013 Act”).

3. In WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024, the challenge is made

to that temporary acquisition done by the respondent State on

23.05.2024 on the ground that it has been acquired without

following the provisions of law and the petitioner seeks direction

that the respondents may be directed to restore the control and

possession of helipad to the petitioner. Related reliefs have also

been sought.

4. During the pendency of WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024, on

15.07.2025, on behalf of the respondent no. 4/the Uttarakhand

Civil Aviation Development Authority (“UCADA”), a statement was

given that the helipad has further been temporarily acquired on

10.06.2025. Thereafter, the petitioner challenged the temporary

acquisition order dated 27.06.2025 of the District Magistrate,

Chamoli, in WP (M/S) No. 2511 of 2025, with related reliefs.

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5. It is the case of the petitioner that it has been

operating the Shri Hemkund Sahibji Helicopter Service since 2011.

It had contract with the respondent no. 4/UCADA, but the

respondent no. 4/UCADA terminated the contract with the

petitioner and informed that the remaining period under the

contract for providing helicopter shuttles would be served by

Pawan Hans Limited (“PHL”). In view of long association with the

respondent no. 4/UCADA, the petitioner continued all support,

including helipad, lounge, toilets, electricity, water, etc. free of cost

for remaining period of the Shri Hemkund Sahibji Helicopter Shuttle

Service. But, on 14.05.2024, the respondent no. 4/UCADA

blacklisted the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that, in

fact, it had taken the land on lease from respondent nos. 6 to 11

by virtue of a registered lease deed dated 24.01.2014, whereupon

the helipad was constructed/developed by the petitioner, incurring

huge expenditure over the years. The registered lease deed came to

an end on 31.03.2024, but the lease deed was extended till

31.03.2027, however, as all the respondent nos. 6 to 11 were not

available, the extension of lease deed could not been registered.

According to the petitioner, on 23.05.2024, the respondent nos. 6

to 11 issued an undertaking confirming the petitioner that their

lease has been extended till 31.03.2027. The petitioner’s further

case is as follows:

(i) On 23.05.2024, the District Magistrate, Chamoli,

Uttarakhand through Tehsildar, Joshimath

illegally entered into the premises of the helipad;

broke open the lock and took over the

possession of the commercially functional

helipad, under the garb of an acquisition order

dated 23.05.2024. It is enclosed as Annexure

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No. 12 to WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024, which

records that the temporary acquisition was done

till the duration of Char -Dham Yatra or six

months, whichever is beyond, and it was so done

under the 2013 Act.

(ii) The Tehsildar, Joshimath along with other

revenue officials and police officers, in

compliance of the temporary acquisition order

dated 23.05.2024, entered into the premises of

the helipad and telephonically called one of the

land owners i.e. respondent no. 6, Kishore Singh

Panwar, who categorically informed the

Tehsildar that the helipad is under the lease of

the petitioner. Thereafter, the Tehsildar called

the incharge of the petitioner, namely,

Mr. Sandeep Singh and shared the acquisition

order with him. Thereafter, the Tehsildar broke

open the lock and forcibly took over the

possession of the helipad knowing well that the

petitioner is in the rightful possession of the

helipad.

(iii) The possession of the helipad has been taken

over by the State machinery from the petitioner

illegally.

(iv) The petitioner, on 24.05.2024 submitted a

complaint to the Police Station Govind Ghat,

Joshimath.

6. It is at this stage that the petitioner while claiming

possession of the helipad, filed WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024. It has

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been the case of the petitioner that PHL is operating the helicopter

service from the helipad without any agreement, consent or

commercial terms from the petitioner or the owners of the land,

where the helipad is constructed. Therefore, the challenge is made

to the acquisition order dated 23.05.2024, inter alia, on the ground

that there is no public purpose involved in the acquisition of the

helipad; the respondents have misused the authority without

following due process of law; the acquisition is contrary to the

provisions of the 2013 Act; and the acquisition is contrary to the

principle of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. Bimal Kumar

Shah and Ors.

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7. During the pendency of WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024, on

15.07.2025, a statement was given on behalf of the respondent no.

4/UCADA that the helipad has been further acquired. It is

thereafter, WP (M/S) No. 2511 of 2025 was filed challenging the

temporary acquisition order dated 27.06.2025 passed by the

District Magistrate, Chamoli. It has been the case of the petitioner

that under the 2013 Act, they have never been issued notices and

the acquisition was done in defiance to the mandatory provisions

of law and the principles of natural justice.

8. In WP (M/S) No. 2511 of 2025, the petitioner has

challenged the acquisition order dated 27.06.2025. The petitioner

has also claimed compensation in accordance with the market rate

for landing undertaken for the entire period since being most

applicable vis-a-vis the helipad Policy, 2023-24 of the respondent

no. 4/UCADA or its Landing Charges Rate List of 2018. Other

related reliefs have also been sought by the petitioner.

1

(2024) 10 SCC 533

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9. The respondent no. 3/District Magistrate, Chamoli

filed his counter affidavit in WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024 and, inter

alia, it is stated that the permission to acquire the land was given

to District Magistrate, Chamoli with the restriction and condition

that the entire expenditure for the acquisition would be borne by

the respondent no. 4/UCADA and the acquisition was done taking

due cognizance of the interests of the stakeholders. In para 4 of its

counter affidavit, the respondent no. 3/District Magistrate,

Chamoli has stated that the respondent no. 6 “Shri Kishore Pawar

etc. are not giving their consent regarding the use of the said

helipad, but the facility of heli service to the devotees and

pilgrims for the Shri Hemkund Sahi Yatra starting from

25.05.2024 must be provided to the people of Char Dham

Yatra. It is absolutely necessary to take temporary acquisition

of the interested persons like Mr. Kishore Panwar and ors, in

relation to the purpose, public interest and interest in hiring

the helipad situated in the private land”. Therefore, the

respondent no. 3/District Magistrate, Chamoli acquired the

helipad on 23.05.2024 keeping in view the urgency of Shri

Hemkund Sahib Yatra for six months or till the period of Char-

Dham Yatra, whichever is beyond and it has been done under

Section 81(2)(3) of the 2013 Act.

10. In WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024, the respondent no. 4

has, inter alia, objected that after enquiring from the office of the

Sub-Registrar, Joshimath, it was revealed that there was no

renewal of the lease deed of the helipad in question in favour of the

petitioner; therefore, the petitioner has no locus standi to file the

present writ petition challenging the order of acquisition. It is

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submitted that there was an emergent situation in terms of

providing heli services, as the Char -Dham Yatra season was to start

from 25.05.2024, and on 20.05.2024, a letter was issued to the

respondent no. 6 Kishore Singh Panwar seeking his approval for

using the helipad, but he did not reply. Thereafter, the acquisition

was done.

11. In WP (M/S) No. 2511 of 2025 also, the respondent no.

3/District Magistrate, Chamoli filed his counter affidavit and, inter

alia, stated that keeping in view the urgency of Shri Hemkund

Sahib Yatra, the temporary acquisition of private helipad was done

for the duration of Char-Dham Yatra or for six months, whichever

is beyond and it was done in accordance with the provisions of

Section 81(2)(3) of the 2013 Act. It is stated that the acquisition

order was duly served to the concerned persons by the Tehsildar,

Joshimath.

12. The respondent no. 4/UCADA has also filed its counter

affidavit in WP (M/S) No. 2511 of 2025. The grounds that were

taken in the earlier writ petition i.e. WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024,

were taken in this petition also. In para 11 of the counter affidavit

filed on behalf of the respondent no. 4/UCADA, it is recorded that,

in fact, the respondent no. 6, Kishore Singh Panwar was given a

letter on 20.05.2024 seeking his approval for using the helipad,

but despite multiple requests, the respondent no. 6 Kishore Singh

Panwar did not reply. In para 14 of its counter affidavit, the

respondent no. 4/UCADA has stated that, in fact, the land on

which the petitioner had operated the helipad is situated in Village

Pandukeshwar, Govind Ghat, belonging to the respondent nos. 6 to

11, which was taken on lease by the petitioner by virtue of

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registered lease deed uptil 31.03.2024. But, there was no

extension of this lease deed beyond 31.03.2024, as on inquiry

having been made from the Sub-Registrar, Joshimath, on

05.06.2024, it was informed that the extension of lease deed is not

registered.

13. It has been the case of the respondent no. 4/UCADA

that the respondent no. 4/UCADA is not concerned whatsoever

with the acquisition of the property in issue (Para 18 of the counter

affidavit of the respondent no. 4/UCADA). In para 42 of the

counter affidavit, it has been stated by the respondent no.

4/UCADA that the acquisition order dated 27.06.2025 was

forwarded to all the related and interested persons through

Tehsildar, Joshimath and the notices have been clearly served to

all the interest persons in the matter. It has been the case of the

respondent no. 4/UCADA that as per the provisions of Section 81

of the 2013 Act, the property can be temporarily acquired for a

period, which can be extended upto three years.

14. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

record.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

writ petition is maintainable. He would submit that the jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not restricted;

mere statutory remedy also does not bar the jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is argued that, in fact, in

the instant case, the only ground, on which the acquisition order

has been challenged by the petitioner is that the acquisition has

been done de hors the provisions of Section 81 of 2013 Act, which

provides for temporary acquisition. It is argued that it is necessary

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to give a notice to the person interested before the acquisition is

done; but, in the instant case, it has not been done. Learned

counsel has referred to the provisions of law as laid down in the

case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai

and others

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, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, inter alia,

held that the alternate remedy is not to operate as a bar atleast in

some contingencies, including when there has been a violation of

the principles of natural justice. In para 15 of the judgment, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

“15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court,

having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain

or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has

imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an

effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would

not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy

has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in

at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has

been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights

or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural

justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without

jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a

plethora of case- law on this point but to cut down this circle of

forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the

evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the

field.”

16. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4/UCADA

argued that, in fact, in the matter of temporary acquisition, title is

not taken into consideration and mere possession is taken into consideration; a detail notice under Section 81 of the 2013 Act is

not required and in case, the petitioner was aggrieved, he would

have approached the authority under the provisions of the 2013

Act and refer the matter and in case, possession is not handed

over on time, recourse could have been taken to the civil court. In

support of her contention, learned counsel for the respondent no.

2

(1998) 8 SCC 1

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4/UCADA has referred to the principle of law as laid down in the

cases of Brij Behari Sahai v. State of Uttar Pradesh

3

, the

Commissioner of Income-Tax, Punjab v. Dr. Sham Lal Narula

4

, Oil

& Natural Gas Commission Ltd. v. Pandya Prahladbhai Manilal

and others

5

and Patel Shambhubhai Bhaichanddas v. State of

Gujarat & Anr.

6

.

17. In the case of Brij Behari Sahai (supra ), the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has, inter alia, held that when temporary

occupation is taken, the title remains untouched.

18. In the case of Dr. Sham Lal Narula (supra ), the issue

was entirely different, which is as follows:

“Whether on a true interpretation of section 34 of the Land

Acquisition Act and the award given by the Collector of Pepsu on

the 30th September, 1955, the sum of Rs. 48,660 was capital

receipt not liable to tax under the Indian Income- tax Act?”

19. In that context, Section 34 of the 1894 was quoted by

the Hon’ble Punjab High Court (as it was then) and thereafter it

was recorded that “The provisions that follow do not require

any detailed notice as they deal with temporary occupation of

land, acquisition of land for companies, and miscellaneous

matters with which this court is not concerned for purposes of

this case”.

20. In the case of Pandya Prahladbhai Manilal (supra ), the

claimants were dissatisfied with the award and a reference was

made under Section 35(3) of the 1894 Act, which deals with the

temporary occupation. In that background, the Hon’ble Gujarat

High Court observed that “interested persons can ask for

3

(1986) 3 SCC 564

4

AIR 1963 P&H 411

5

2006 SCC OnLine Guj 120

6

2006 SCC OnLine Guj 227

11

reference to the Court under Section 35(3) of the Act if such

persons are not satisfied by the sufficiency of the

compensation or apportionment fixed by the Collector at the

time of taking possession for occupation of the land for a

temporary period of three years”. The Hon’ble Court further

observed that “If the acquiring body has retained the

possession of the lands after the stipulated period, the land

owners can move the Collector under Section 36 of the Act to

restore the land......”.

21. In the case of Patel Shambhubhai Bhaichanddas

(supra), a reference was made on the amount compensation for

temporary occupation under Section 35 of the 1894 Act, which is

now substituted by Section 81 of the 2013 Act. The provisions are

similar. In the case of Patel Shambhubhai Bhaichanddas (supra),

discussion has been made with regard to the history of the

provision of Section 35 of the 1894 Act and in para 20 of the

judgment, the Court held that it is obligatory upon the Collector to

restore possession at the expiration of three years. But if he fails to

return the possession on expiry of the stipulated time limit not

exceeding three years, the 1894 Act is silent on this aspect. The

possession can be termed as unauthorized and recourse to the civil

court can then be made for seeking possession.

22. During the arguments, reference to Section 51 of the

2013 Act has also been made, which deals with the disputes

relating to the land acquisition. Section 51 of the 2013 Act reads

as follows:

“51. Establishment of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation

and Resettlement Authority. – (1) The appropriate Government

shall, for the purpose of providing speedy disposal of disputes

relating to land acquisition, compensation, rehabilitation and

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resettlement, establish, by notification, one or more Authorities to

be known as “the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Authority” to exercise jurisdiction, powers and

authority conferred on it by or under this Act.

(2) The appropriate Government shall also specify in

the notification referred to in sub-section (1) the areas within

which the Authority may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and

deciding the references made to it under Section 64 or

applications made by the applicant under second proviso to sub-

section (1) of Section 64.”

23. On behalf of the respondent no. 4/UCADA, it is

submitted that, in fact, the authority under Section 51 of the 2013

Act has been constituted and the petitioner has a statutory remedy

to agitate the cause.

24. Undoubtedly, mere statutory remedy does not restrict

the Courts to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. The first petition i.e. WP (M/S) No. 1401 of

2024 was filed by the petitioner in the year 2024 and it was taken

up for the first time on 05.06.2024. It is during the pendency of

WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024, when on 15.07.2025, it was revealed

by the respondent no. 4/UCADA that further acquisition in the

year 2025 has been made. The petitioner has only raised the pure

question of law. No factual disputes are involved. All the facts are

admitted. Therefore, after two years, it may not be in the interest of

justice to relegate the petitioner to any statutory remedy. Moreover,

the claim of the petitioner is that it was never served with a notice

and it is a pure legal point. Hence, this Court is of the view that it

cannot be said that the petitions are not maintainable in view of

any statutory alternate remedy.

25. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that

initially the respondent nos. 6 to 11 had executed the lease deed in

favour of the petitioner till 31.03.2024, which was registered. But,

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subsequently, it was extended upto 31.03.2027 by an unregistered

lease deed dated 05.10.2021. He would submit that it is not always

necessary to have the lease deed registered. He would submit that

even unregistered lease deed could be used for collateral purposes

like possession. In support of his contention, learned counsel has

placed reliance on the principle of law as laid down in the case of

Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited v. Amit Chand Mitra and

another

7

.

26. In the case of Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited

(supra), in para 21 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court,

inter alia, held that nature and character of possession could

constitute collateral purpose and further that nature and character

of possession contained in a flawed document (being unregistered)

can form collateral purpose when the “nature and character of

possession” is not the main term of the lease. In para 21 of the

judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

“21. In Satish Chand Makhan [Satish Chand

Makhan v. Govardhan Das Byas , (1984) 1 SCC 369] ,

another coordinate Bench of this Court declined to accept

admissibility of an unregistered lease agreement for

determining duration of the lease (9 years in that case) on

the reasoning that terms of lease would not constitute

collateral purpose. It was observed in this judgment that

“nature and character of possession” could constitute

collateral purpose but that was not the point which was

directly in lis before this Court. In our opinion, nature and

character of possession contained in a flawed document

(being unregistered) in terms of Section 107 of the 1882

Act and Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act can

form collateral purpose when the “nature and character of

possession” is not the main term of the lease and does not

constitute the main dispute for adjudication by the court.

In this case, the nature and character of possession

constitutes the primary dispute and hence the Court is

excluded by law from examining the unregistered deed for

that purpose. In respect of the suit out of which this

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(2024) 13 SCC 219

14

appeal arises, purpose of lease is the main lis, not a

collateral incident.”

27. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 submits that,

in fact, the respondent no. 4/UCADA had sought information from

the Sub-Registrar, Joshimath on 03.06.2024 with regard to any

registered lease deed in favour of the petitioner and the Sub-

Registrar, Joshimath by its communication dated 05.06.2024

communicated that there is no registered lease deed beyond

31.03.2024. Reference has been made to Annexure 5 to the

counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 4/UCADA in

WP (M/S) No. 2511 of 2025.

28. It may be noted that the first temporary acquisition

was made by the respondent State on 23.05.2024, which means

after temporary acquisition having been made, the respondent no.

4/UCADA inquired about the registered lease deed in favour of the

petitioner. Otherwise also, it was required to be done by the

respondent State of Uttarakhand.

29. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4/UCADA also

submits that, in fact, the petitioner was blacklisted with a valid

reason; the only available helipad is the helipad in question, from

which the respondent no. 4 is operating; if the helipad goes, it will

disrupt the services.

30. Learned counsel for the State submits that, according

to the petitioner itself, the registered lease deed had expired on

31.03.2024 and thereafter there was only an unregistered lease

deed. It is argued by the learned State Counsel that the

unregistered lease deed does not create any statutory right in

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respect of an immovable property. In support of his contention,

learned counsel for the State has placed reliance on the judgment

in the case of Sevoke Properties Limited v. West Bengal State

Electricity Distribution Company Limited

8

. Reference has been

made to para 11 of the judgment, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has held “a lease of immovable property for a term

exceeding one year can only be made by a registered

instrument”.

31. Annexure 7 in WP (M/S) No. 2511 of 2025 is the report

of Tehsildar, Joshimath given to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Joshimath with regard to taking possession of the helipad on

23.05.2024. It records that after temporary acquisition order dated

23.05.2024, when he reached at the helipad, he called the

respondent no. 6 Kishore Singh Panwar on his mobile number and

asked him to join the proceedings, but he denied to come and

informed that there has been a lease agreement with the petitioner,

therefore, the petitioner should be informed. Thereafter, according

to this communication, the incharge of the petitioner, namely,

Sandeep Singh was contacted and the temporary acquisition order

was read over to him. He was asked to open the lock, to which he

denied. Thereafter, the locks were broken up and possession was

taken.

32. The respondent nos. 6 to 11 had filed an interim

application (IA No. 6 of 2025) in WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024 and

they have stated in para 4 of it that the helipad was in use and

occupation of the petitioner as a tenant after 31.03.2024 till

23.05.2024 when it was illegally taken over from the petitioner.

The respondent nos. 6 to 11 have further stated that the lease deed

8

(2020) 11 SCC 782

16

was extended by them and accordingly the lease was extended

upto 31.03.2027 vide another lease agreement dated 05.10.2021

during the continuance of the registered lease deed and advance

rent has already been received by the respondent nos. 6 to 11.

33. From the above narration of facts, a few facts are

admitted, which are as under:-

(i) The land on which the helipad was operated by

the petitioner was taken on lease by the

petitioner from the respondent nos. 6 to 11 by

virtue of the registered lease deed, which was

valid upto 31.03.2024.

(ii) Thereafter, the respondent nos. 6 to 11 executed

another lease deed in favour of the petitioner

uptil 31.03.2027. But, this lease deed was not

registered.

(iii) The petitioner was in possession of the helipad

on both the occasions i.e. on 23.05.2024 and

27.06.2025, when the helipad was temporarily

acquired under Section 81 of the 2013 Act.

(iv) When for the first time on 23.05.2024, the

helipad was acquired by the respondent State

and the possession was taken over by the

Tehsildar, Joshimath, the possession was taken

from the petitioner itself. At that time, the

respondent no. 6 was informed by the Tehsildar,

Joshimath, who told the Tehsildar, Joshimath

that the helipad was on lease to the petitioner,

therefore, petitioner may be contacted. The

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petitioner’s official at the spot was contacted to

handover the possession, to which he denied.

34. Admittedly, the petitioner was in possession of the

land on which the helipad was being operated on 23.05.2024,

when, for the first time, the helipad was temporarily acquired.

There was an unregistered lease deed in favour of the petitioner. In

fact, the record reveals that till 23.05.2024, the respondents had

no knowledge of unregistered lease deed. It came to the notice of

the respondent no. 4/UCADA on 05.06.2024 when on 03.06.2024,

they inquired about it from the Sub-Registrar, Joshimath.

35. Admittedly, the respondent nos. 6 to 11 had executed

the lease deed in favour of the petitioner. In the instant case,

nature and character of the possession is not the main dispute.

Based on the unregistered lease deed also, admittedly the

possession of the petitioner is not in dispute. The possession

through unregistered lease deed can be seen for the purpose of

possession, which forms collateral purpose. The petitioner was in

possession of the helipad.

36. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that

since lease deed of the land, on which helipad was operating, was

in favour of the petitioner, in view of Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act,

he is a person interested, who needs to be given notice before even

temporary acquisition under Section 81 of the 2013 Act.

37. Learned counsel for the State submits that the

petitioner is a company and under Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act, a

company does not fall within the definition of a person interested.

18

In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance

on the principle of law as laid down in the case of Peerappa

Hanmantha Harijan (Dead) by Legal Representatives and others v.

State of Karnataka and another

9

. Reference has been made to para

63 of it, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court under the facts and

circumstances of the case held that the company in that case was

neither the beneficiary nor interested person of the acquired land,

hence, the company in that case had no right to participate in the

award proceedings for determination of the market value and

award the compensation amount of the acquired land of the

appellants.

38. In the case of Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan (supra ),

the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not opine that a company cannot

be a person interested as defined under Section 3(x) of the 2013

Act. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel on that aspect

has less merit for acceptance.

39. Learned State Counsel has also argued that the writ

petition is not maintainable, as the petitioner is not person

interested. In support of his contention, learned counsel has

placed reliance on the principle of law as laid down in the case of

Shrachi Burdwan Developers Private Limited v. State of West

Bengal and others

10

.

40. In the case of Shrachi Burdwan Developers Private

Limited (supra ), the land was acq uired by the Burdwan

Development Authority (“BDA”) and a notification was issued

under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“the 1894 Act”).

9

(2015) 10 SCC 469

10

(2022) 15 SCC 496

19

Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Collector declared the award

under Section 12(1) of the 1894 Act. The amount was paid by the

BDA. The State took possession of the land from the farmers and it

was handed over to the BDA and the BDA handed it over to the

Bengal Shrachi. In the meanwhile, references under Section 18 of

the 1894 Act were made and the Reference Court allowed the

references and enhanced the compensation, against which four

appeals were pending before the High Court of Judicature at

Calcutta. But, the appellant also challenged the Reference Court’s

order in the writ petition. Under those facts and circumstances of

the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shrachi

Burdwan Developers Private Limited (supra ), placed reliance on the

principle of law as laid down in the case of Peerappa Hanmantha

Harijan (supra ) and in para 17 of the judgment observed that “The

question is not about maintainability of the writ petition. The

question is with respect to the entertainability of the writ

petition” and held that in fact, the writ petition should not have

been entertained challenging the judgment and award passed by

the Reference Court, when there is a special remedy of appeal

under Section 54 of the 1894 Act. Instant is not a case against the

award of a Reference Court. In the instant case, the challenge is

made to the acquisition proceeding itself.

41. Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act defines the “person

interested” as below:-

“3. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise

requires, -

.......................................................................

....................................................................

(x) “person interested” means –

20

(i) all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be

made on account of the acquisition of land under

this Act;

(ii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest

dwellers, who have lost any forest rights recognised

under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional

Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act,

2006 (2 of 2007);

(iii) a person interest in an easement affecting the land;

(iv) persons having tenancy rights under the relevant

State laws including share- croppers by whatever

name they may be called; and

(v) any person whose primary source of livelihood is

likely to be adversely affected.”

42. A bare reading of the above provision makes it

abundantly clear that a person having tenancy rights falls within

the definition of “person interested”. There has been an

unregistered lease deed in favour of the petitioner on both the

occasions, when the temporary acquisition was done. Though the

lease deed was not registered, but for the purposes of possession of

the helipad, the lease deed is admissible. It is collateral purpose.

Therefore, this Court is of the view that, in fact, the petitioner was

a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(x) of the 2013

Act.

43. Learned counsel for the State also argued that in WP

(M/S) No. 1401 of 2024, the temporary acquisition order dated

23.05.2024 has not been challenged, hence the relief of

possession, which a consequential relief, could not be granted. In

support of his contention, learned State Counsel has placed

reliance on the principle of law as laid down in the cases of

Edukanti Kistamma (Dead) Through LRs and others v. S.

21

Venkatareddy (Dead) Through LRs and others

11

and Rajasthan Art

Emporium v. Kuwait Airways and another

12

44. In the case of Edukanti Kistamma (supra ), the dispute

was with regard to the rights under the tenancy records and

ownership. In para 21 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

observed that “There is a complete embargo on the right of the

landholder to alienate the tenanted land to a third party

without giving an option to the tenant to purchase the land.”

Further, in para 22 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

observed that “It is a settled legal proposition that challenge to

consequential order without challenging the basic

order/statutory provision on the basis of which the order has

been passed cannot be entertained”.

45. In the case of Rajasthan Art Emporium (supra), in para

26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “It is a trite law

that a party is not entitled to seek relief which he has not

prayed for”. The Rajasthan Art Emporium (supra ) is a case, which

had reached to the Hon’ble Supreme Court from an order passed

by the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission.

46. On this aspect, learned counsel for the petitioner

submits that the principles of law as cited on behalf of the

respondent State are not applicable in the instant case. He would

submit that the case laws cited by the learned State Counsel are

under statutes, which are not applicable in the writ jurisdiction.

Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgments in the cases

11

(2010) 1 SCC 756

12

(2024) 2 SCC 570

22

of Union of India and others v. Bali Ram

13

and Rajesh Kumar and

others v. State of Bihar and others

14

.

47. In the case of Bali Ram (supra ), the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, inter alia, held that “the rule that requires the parties to

be strictly confined to the pleadings and the prayer clauses is

not an inflexible rule insofar as exercise of writ jurisdiction is

concerned”. In para 38 of the judgment, in the case of Bali Ram

(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-

“38. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers.

Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can

stand in its way. Even the law bends before justice. The

entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher

courts is founded on equity and fairness (see: S.

Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595). ”

48. In the case of Rajesh Kumar (supra ), the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, inter alia, held that “The High Court was, in that

view, entitled to mould the relief prayed for in the writ

petition and issue directions considered necessary not only to

maintain the purity of the selection process but also to ensure

that no candidate earned an undeserved advantage over others

by application of an erroneous key”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court

further held that “The power of the court to mould the relief,

according to the demands of the situation, was never the

subject-matter of dispute in those cases. That power is well

recognised and is available to a writ court to do complete

justice between the parties. The first limb of the argument

advanced by Mr Rao fails and is accordingly rejected”.

49. It is a writ petition. In WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024,

admittedly, the petitioner has not challenged the temporary

13

2026 SCC OnLine SC 1319

14

(2013) 4 SCC 690

23

acquisition dated 23.05.2024. But, he has pleaded that the

temporary acquisition order dated 23.05.2024 is not in accordance

with the provisions of the 2013 Act. Therefore, in view of the

settled law, this Court may definitely mould the relief, which under

the facts and circumstances may warrant.

50. Learned State Counsel also argued that both the writ

petitions have rendered infructuous because the impugned

acquisitions were for the limited period of six months and that

period has already expired, therefore, no effective or ancillary relief

can be granted.

51. This Court will first determine the case of the

petitioner in view of the arguments that have been raised by the

learned counsel for the parties and it is only thereafter it will be

seen as to whether the writ petitions have rendered infructuous.

52. In fact, the writ petitions have not been rendered

infructuous, because in WP (M/S) No. 1401 of 2024, though the

petitioner has not challenged the temporary acquisition order

dated 23.05.2024, but he has sought possession of the h elipad,

and in WP (M/S) No. 2511 of 2025, the petitioner has not only

sought the quashing of the acquisition order dated 27.06.2025,

but has also sought compensation and accountability, etc. Those

aspects require deliberation.

53. The sole ground in both the writ petitions for

challenging the acquisition orders dated 23.05.2024 and

27.06.2025 is that the petitioner was not given any notice before

the acquisition, which is mandatory. It will be examined.

24

54. This Court has already held that till 31.03.2024, the

land on which the helipad is operating was leased to the petitioner

by the respondent nos. 6 to 11 by a registered lease deed and

beyond it, till 31.03.2027, the land was leased out to the petitioner

by the respondent nos. 6 to 11 by unregistered lease deed. This

was admitted to the respondent nos. 6 to 11 also and they have

also admitted that they have taken rent also in advance. This

Court has also held that the petitioner is a person interested as

defined under Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act.

55. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

action of the respondents is in contravention to the principles of

law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment in the

case of Bimal Kumar Shah (supr a). He would submit that even in

the case of temporary acquisition, a notice is to be given to the

person interested. In this regard, he has referred to the judgment

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mankeshwar Nath and

others v. Collector, Agra and others

15

.

56. In the case of Bimal Kumar Shah (supra ), the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, inter alia, held that “The constitutional

discourse on compulsory acquisitions, has hitherto, rooted

itself within the “power of eminent domain”. Even within that

articulation, the twin conditions of the acquisition being for a

public purpose and subjecting the divestiture to the payment

of compensation in lieu of acquisition were mandated [State of

Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCC 528]”. Further, in para

30 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the

rights in that aspect as follows:

15

1983 SCC OnLine All 359.

25

“30. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this

swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property?

Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive.

These are:

(i) The duty of the State to inform the person that it

intends to acquire his property — the right to notice,

(ii) The duty of the State to hear objections to the

acquisition — the right to be heard,

(iii) The duty of the State to inform the person of its

decision to acquire — the right to a reasoned

decision,

(iv) The duty of the State to demonstrate that the

acquisition is for public purpose — the duty to

acquire only for public purpose,

(v) The duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate —

the right of restitution or fair compensation,

(vi) The duty of the State to conduct the process of

acquisition efficiently and within prescribed

timelines of the proceedings — the right to an

efficient and expeditious process, and

(vii) The final conclusion of the proceedings leading to

vesting — the right of conclusion.”

57. In the case of Mankeshwar Nath (supra ), the Hon’ble

Allahabad High Court has held that even in the case of temporary

acquisition, notices are required to be served. In para 10 of the

judgment, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has observed as

follows:-

“10. It is obvious and almost admitted that in pursuance

of the proceedings to acquire the land temporarily under

Section 35, no notices were sent to the claimants, atleast

there is no material on the record to prove otherwise. The

defendant did not controvert the statement made in the

reference application and this fact, therefore, ought to be

deemed to having been admitted by the State. Also, no

agreement was entered into between the Collector and the

appellants. That being so, the claimants could not have

asked for reference being made to the Court under sub -

clause (3) of Section 35. The action of the Collector in

occupying the land before any agreement had been

reduced the writing as required in sub-clause (2) and (3) of

section was itself illegal and cannot be taken advantage of

by the State. A party which is itself guilty of violating the

provisions of law and in failing to discharge its statutory

26

functions in accordance with law, cannot be permitted to

use the said lapse as a defence. To permit this would

amount to giving premium for the illegalities in procedure

committed by the Collector in this case. The Collector by

his own conduct is estopped from raising such a plea in

defence.”

58. There is another provision in the 2013 Act that deals

with the notice in temporary acquisition. Section 21 of the 2013

Act deals with notice to the persons interested and Section 81 of

the 2013 Act deals with temporary occupation of land. Sections 21

and 81 of the 2013 Act read as under:-

“21. Notice to persons interested.–(1) The Collector shall

publish the public notice on his website and cause public

notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land

to be taken, stating that the Government intends to take

possession of the land, and that claims to compensations

and rehabilitation and resettlement for all interests in

such land may be made to him.

(2) The public notice referred to in sub-section (1) shall

state the particulars of the land so needed, and require all

persons interested in the land to appear personally or by

agent or advocate before the Collector at a time and place

mentioned in the public notice not being less than thirty

days and not more than six months after the date of

publication of the notice, and to state the nature of their

respective interests in the land and the amount and

particulars of their claims to compensation for such

interests, their claims to rehabilitation and resettlement

along with their objections, if any, to the measurements

made under Section 20.

(3) The Collector may in any case require such statement

referred to in sub-section (2) to be made in writing and

signed by the party or his agent.

(4) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect

on the occupier, if any, of such land and on all such

persons known or believed to be interested therein, be

entitled to act for persons so interested, as reside or have

agents authorised to receive service on their behalf, within

the revenue district in which the land is situated.

27

(5) In case any person so interested resides elsewhere, and

has no such agent, the Collector shall ensure that the

notice shall be sent to him by post in letter addressed to

him at his last known residence, address of place or

business and also publish the same in at least two

national daily newspapers and also on his website.”

“81. Temporary occupation of waste or arable land,

procedure when difference as to compensation exists. –

(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government

that the temporary occupation and use of any waste or

arable land are needed for any public purpose, the

appropriate Government may direct the Collector to

procure the occupation and use of the same f or such

terms as it shall think fit, not exceeding three years from

the commencement of such occupation.

(2) The Collector shall thereupon give notice in writing

to the person interested in such land of the purpose for

which the same is needed, and shall, for the occupation

and use thereof for such term as aforesaid, and for the

materials (if any) to be taken therefrom, pay to them such

compensation, either in a gross sum of money, or by

monthly or other periodical payments, as shall be agreed

upon in writing between him and such persons

respectively.

(3) In case the Collector and the persons interested

differ as to the sufficiency of the compensation or

appointment thereof, the Collector shall refer such

difference to the decision of the Authority.”

59. An act if required to be done in a particular manner

has to be done in that particular manner and in no other manner.

In the instant case, what is involved is the right to property of the

person interested. A person may not be divested of the use of his

own land without following the due process of law. In the case of

Bimal Kumar Shah (supra ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in

fact, described those seven rights.

60. In the instant case, according to the respondent State

and the respondent no. 4/UCADA, temporary acquisition was done

on 23.05.2024 and 27.06.2025. In so far as the acquisition dated

28

23.05.2024 is concerned, what is admitted to the parties is that a

communication dated 20.05.2024 was given to the respondent no.

6 Kishore Singh Panwar, by which the approval of the respondent

no. 6 was sought for using the helipad. It is the case of the

respondent no. 4/UCADA that the respondent no. 6 never

responded to despite repeated requests and thereafter, acquisition

was made on 23.05.2024.

61. It is true that notice need not be in detail. But, prior

notice required to be given before temporary acquisition. Section

81(2) of the 2013 Act provides that the Collector shall give notice in

writing to the person interested in such land of the purpose for

which the land is needed, its term and for the materials to be

taken therefrom, etc. No notice as stipulated under Section 81(2) of

the 2013 Act was given before temporary acquisition of the helipad

on 23.05.2024.The communication which was made by the

respondent no. 4/UCADA to the respondent no. 6 Kishore Singh

Panwar is not in conformity with Section 81(2) of the 2013 Act. It

does not give the terms, etc. It seeks approval and the time given

for according approval is one day. By 21.05.2024 till 12:00 noon,

the response was required from the respondent no. 6 by the

respondent no. 4/UCADA. Can someone’s land be acquired within

a notice of twenty-four hours? Is it not a force upon a person to

accord his consent? Acquisition was made on 23.05.2024.

62. For the sake of arguments, if it is assumed that any

notice was given to the respondent no. 6 Kishore Singh Panwar on

20.05.2024 in conformity with Section 81(2) of the 2013 Act,

acquisition could not have been done on 23.05.2024. The notice

should give a reasonable time. In the instant case, no notice as

such was given to the respondent no. 6 or any other land owners

29

or the petitioner, who is the person interested, before acquisition of

the helipad on 23.05.2024. Therefore, the acquisition that was

made by the respondent State on 23.05.2024 has been done in

gross violation of the provisions of the 2013 Act.

63. In so far as the acquisition dated 27.06.2025 is

concerned, which is impugned in WP (M/S) No. 2511 of 2025,

admittedly no notice was given prior to it. Simply, the helipad was

acquired. Although, during the course of hearing on behalf of the

respondent no. 4/UCADA, it was argued that on 28.06.2025, the

persons interested w ere informed that the helipad has further been

temporarily acquired on 27.06.2025. This is not compliance of

sub-section (2) of Section 81 of the 2013 Act. Notice was to be

given prior to acquisition. Information of the notice post temporary

acquisition does not meet the requirement under Section 81(2) of

the 2013 Act.

64. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is of

the view that, in fact, the respondent State had temporarily

acquired the helipad on 23.05.2024 and 27.06.2025 in gross

violation of the provisions of the 2013 Act. Therefore, while

quashing the temporary acquisition orders dated 23.05.2024 and

27.06.2025, the writ petitions deserve to be allowed. Since, this

Court has already held that the acquisition of helipad was made in

gross violation of the provisions of the 2013 Act, this Court is also

of the view that the petitioner is entitled to compensation for the

illegal acquisition having been made by the respondent State.

65. The writ petitions are allowed. The temporary

acquisition orders dated 23.05.2024 and 27.06.2025, by which the

helipad of the petitioner was acquired are quashed.

30

66. The respondent no. 3/District Magistrate, Chamoli is

directed to restore the control and possession of the helipad at

Govind Ghat, Tehsil Joshimath, District Chamoli to the petitioner

within a period of fifteen days from today and accordingly submit a

compliance report to this Court.

67. The respondent no. 3/District Magistrate, Chamoli is

further directed to compensate the petitioner in accordance with

the market rate for landing undertaken for the entire period since

being most applicable vis -a-vis the Helipad Policy 2023-24 of the

respondent no. 4/UCADA or its Landing Charges Rate List of 2018.

(Ravindra Maithani, J.)

20.08.2026

Avneet/