RSA 48/2019; M/S Ronuk Industries Ltd.; Manju Khanna; Delhi High Court; Possession Decree; Order XII Rule 6 CPC; Tenancy Termination; Permanent Tenancy; Indian Evidence Act; Transfer of Property Act
 23 Sep, 2026
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M/S Ronuk Industries LTD Vs. Manju Khanna

  Delhi High Court RSA 48/2019
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Case Background

As per case facts, the Plaintiff, Smt. Manju Khanna, filed a suit for possession and damages against M/S Ronuk Industries Ltd., claiming the defendant was a tenant who had defaulted. ...

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RSA 48/2019 Page 1 of 16

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on: 13

th

July, 2026

Pronounced on: 23

rd

September, 2026

Uploaded on: 23

rd

September, 2026

# CNR No. DLHC010131262019

+ RSA 48/2019

M/S RONUK INDUSTRIES LTD

Through its Director/President,

11-A, Abdul Ghaffar Khan Road,

Mumbai -400025

.... Appellant

Through: Mr. Rajesh Baweja, Ms. Anjali Gupta

and Ms. Poonam Kandari, Advocates

versus

MANJU KHANNA

W/o Sh. Uma Shankar Khanna

R/o A-1/62, Safdarjung Enclave,

New Delhi

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Gaurav Chauhan, Advocate

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

J U D G M E N T

NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.

1. Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 read with Section 115

and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) has been filed against

the judgment dated 07.11.2016 whereby the learned Additional District

Judge has upheld the decree of possession granted by the learned Civil

RSA 48/2019 Page 2 of 16

Judge, under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

2. The Plaintiff/Respondent, Smt. Manju Khanna, had instituted a

Suit, subsequently numbered as Civil Suit No. 1534/2016 (Old No.

157/2016), seeking Possession, Damages/Mesne Profits for use and

occupation of premises bearing No. 4405/2, Kothi No. 5, First Floor,

Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi, admeasuring about 1,000 square

feet (hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”) and interest.

3. The case of the Plaintiff as the owner of the suit property, had

inducted Defendant, M/s Ronuk Industries Ltd., as a tenant in the suit

property at a monthly rent of Rs.9,000/-, vide a Lease Agreement dated

29.07.1986.

4. According to the Plaintiff, she had been desirous of recovering

possession of the suit property since 1992 and had addressed a Letter dated

17.01.1992 seeking enhancement of rent. However, the Defendant continued

to pay Rs.9,000/- per month, as rent. The Plaintiff thereafter, served a Legal

Notice dated 07.08.2003, terminating the tenancy and calling upon the

Defendant to hand over possession of the suit property.

5. Thereafter, the Suit was instituted seeking Possession and Damages at

the rate of Rs.1,000/- per day with effect from 01.09.2003, till handing over

of possession, along with interest @ 18% per annum.

6. The Defendant, in its Written Statement, raised preliminary

objections that the Suit had not been instituted by a duly authorised person;

that the Court lacked jurisdiction; that the plaint did not disclose any cause

of action; and that material facts had allegedly been concealed.

7. The Defendant also specifically denied having been served with the

RSA 48/2019 Page 3 of 16

Notice of termination of tenancy, prior to the institution of the Suit and

asserted that the averments made in the plaint were false and frivolous.

8. On merits, it was asserted that the description of the suit property did

not correspond with the description in the Sale Deed or with the premises in

actual possession of the Defendant. The ownership of the Plaintiff was also

disputed and a plea was taken that the Suit was barred under the Benami

Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and that the Plaintiff had no locus

standi to maintain the Suit.

9. The Defendant further asserted that the Lease Agreement dated

29.07.1986 was unregistered and insufficiently stamped and therefore, could

not be read in evidence for the purpose of establishing the terms sought to be

created thereunder.

10. Without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions, the Defendant asserted

that it had initially been inducted as a tenant in the suit property, on the

basis of an oral agreement with Sh. Uma Shankar Khanna, husband of the

Plaintiff, who had represented himself to be the owner of the property and

the rent was regularly paid to him. Sh. Uma Shankar Khanna received the

so-called rent and margin money, etc., through his wife, the Plaintiff, in

order to save income tax, house tax, etc.

11. Having regard to the long-standing commercial venture of the

Defendant, it was mutually agreed that the Defendant would remain in

possession of the suit property, on a permanent basis. Accordingly, an

exorbitant amount was allegedly charged by Sh. Uma Shankar Khanna

through the Plaintiff, towards premium/security in consideration of such

permanent possession. It was further asserted that the uninterrupted

RSA 48/2019 Page 4 of 16

extension and renewal of the Defendant's possession on a permanent basis,

had been specifically agreed upon and recorded in the unregistered

Agreement as well as in subsequent Agreements. The Defendant, thus,

denied that the tenancy had been created in terms of the Rent Agreement and

asserted that its possession was intended to be permanent. According to the

Defendant, the terms of the unregistered Agreement dated 29.07.1986, were

self-explanatory and contemplated an unlimited and perpetual tenancy.

12. The Defendant further denied that the Plaintiff had been desirous of

recovering possession of the suit property, in the year 1992. It was explained

that upon expiry of the initial period of five years on 28.07.1991, Sh. Uma

Shankar Khanna and the representatives of the Plaintiff held a series of

meetings wherein, according to the Defendant, its requirement of permanent

possession was mutually agreed. It was asserted that the so-called rent of

Rs.9,000/- per month, though exorbitant considering the location and

condition of the property, had been fixed in consideration of the Defendant

being granted permanent possession of the suit property.

13. It was further agreed that the said amount of Rs.9,000/- per month,

would continue to be paid for the next 20 years, as a guarantee/security for

the permanent possession of the Defendant. Thus, according to the

Defendant, the alleged rent also included a component towards refundable

security, in addition to the amount already paid. The Defendant claimed that

it had been regularly paying the said amount of Rs.9,000/- per month to Sh.

Uma Shankar Khanna through the Plaintiff, which had been accepted

without any protest.

14. It was further asserted that the said understanding and other related

RSA 48/2019 Page 5 of 16

matters agreed upon in the said meetings, were also put in writing in various

forms to corroborate and substantiate the oral agreement between the

Defendant and Mr. Uma Shankar and these facts had been deliberately and

intentionally concealed by the Plaintiff.

15. The Defendant stated that the Plaintiff be directed to produce the said

writings, as the same are most important documents to adjudicate upon this

frivolous Suit. It was thus, submitted that the Suit is without merits and was

liable to be dismissed.

16. The issues were framed on 05.04.2004, as under:-

“1. Whether the defendant was tenant under the plaintiff as alleged

in the plaint? OPP

2. Whether the tenancy of the defendant has been duly terminated

vide legal notice dated 07-08-2003 as alleged in the plaint?

OPP.

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree for recovery of

possession of the suit property as sought in the plaint ? OPP

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of damages/ mesne

profits, if so, at what rate and for which period ? OPP

5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any interest on the amount of

damages I mesne profits, if so at what rate and for which

period ? OPP .

6. Relief.”

17. Additional issues were further framed on 14.12.2007 are as under:-

“1. Whether the Plaintiff has valued the suit for the purpose of

proper court fees? OPD.

RSA 48/2019 Page 6 of 16

2. Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the

present suit? OPD.

3. Whether the suit is barred by Benami Transaction Act? OPD.”

18. The evidence was then commenced to be led by the parties.

19. At this stage, Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC dated

03.05.2016 was filed on behalf of the Plaintiff seeking a decree of

possession on admissions.

20. The Application was contested by the Defendant wherein similar

defence as in the Written Statement were taken, in reply thereof.

21. It was explained that an exorbitantly high rate of rent @ Rs.9,000/-

per month was fixed, even though the similarly located property in the same

area could have been taken for Rs.1,000/- to Rs.1,250/- per month, in the

1980s. Since the possession was sought to be of permanent nature, the

Defendant had agreed to pay an amount of Rs.9,000/- per month as EMI for

the next 20 years for possession in perpetuity in the suit premise. It was thus,

submitted that there was no categorical admission in regard to the relation of

landlord and tenant between the parties and the Suit cannot be decreed under

Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

22. The learned Civil Judge, vide Judgment/Order dated 07.11.2016,

upon considering the rival contentions of the parties, observed that the

admissions contained in the Written Statement, were sufficient to disentitle

the Defendant from resisting the Plaintiff’s claim for possession of the suit

property. It was observed that the manner in which the Written Statement

had been drafted, sought to create a semblance of a legitimate defence;

however, when tested on the touchstone of the applicable law, such defence

RSA 48/2019 Page 7 of 16

could not be sustained. It was further concluded that the Defendant had

admitted in the Written Statement the payment of Rs.9,000/- per month as

rent, which was admittedly in excess of Rs.3,500/- per month.

23. The challenge raised by the Defendant to the title of the Plaintiff was

held to be unavailable, in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act,

1872 and the principles governing estoppel against a tenant. Reliance was

also placed upon Sky Land International Pvt. Ltd. v. Kavita P. Lalwani, 191

(2012) DLT 594.

24. The learned Civil Judge further considered the objection that an

earlier Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC had already been decided. It

was further observed that first Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC

read with Order 39 Rule 10 CPC had been filed by the Plaintiff for arrears

of rent in the sum of Rs.72,000/-, and did not contain any prayer for

possession, which was allowed. Thereafter, the second Application under

Order XII Rule 6 CPC was filed for seeking possession. It was held that the

first Application was only in respect of rent and it cannot be said that the

second Application for possession, was barred under law.

25. The alleged understanding between the husband of the Plaintiff and

the representatives of the Defendant, whereby Rs.9,000/- was allegedly

agreed to be paid for 20 years to secure permanent possession, was also

considered. It was observed that a right to continue in possession in

perpetuity or for a term exceeding one year, could not be created in the

manner asserted, in the absence of a registered instrument as contemplated

under the Registration Act, 1908 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

26. Furthermore, according to the Defendant, it was mutually agreed that

RSA 48/2019 Page 8 of 16

the initial unregistered Agreement of tenancy for 05 years, gradually having

paid substantial amount for more than 20 years as EMIs towards the sale

consideration, the Defendant has acquired a right/lien over the suit property.

However, such averments of the Defendant were held to be against the

Transfer of Property Act and Registration Act, and were not tenable.

27. The Defendant had further claimed that Sh. Uma Shankar, husband of

the Plaintiff had presented himself as owner and decision maker in respect

of the suit property, and that the suit property may have been purchased

benami by him, in the name of his wife. Furthermore, it was claimed that the

Sale Deed relied upon by the Plaintiff showing the ownership was not

complete, as it did not specify the portion of the suit property in which the

Plaintiff was claiming his ownership.

28. According to the Defendant, the issue of ownership was required to be

tested on the touchstone of trial. However, this contention was rejected on

the ground that the Defendant, who was a tenant from month to month, had

no legal competency to challenge the Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff or

to raise the defence of Benami Transaction Act.

29. It was held that there was a Lease Agreement dated 29.07.1986,

executed between the parties, which has not been denied in the Written

Statement. The only defence is of there being an understanding inter se the

parties, for which there was no basis.

30. The Defendant itself stated the Written Statement that after the

expiring of period of 05 years on a 28.07.1991, Sh. Uma Shankar and the

representative of the Defendant, held a series of meetings in regard to the

need of the Defendant for permanent possession of suit property.

RSA 48/2019 Page 9 of 16

31. The 05 years referred to in the Written Statement, could only be from

the Lease Agreement dated 29.07.1986, which indicates that the Defendant

himself was relying on the Lease Deed. It was thus, concluded that the two

versions about the Defendant coming into possession of the suit property,

first being given by the Plaintiff, and thereafter, the possession being

pursuant to an oral Agreement between the representative of the Defendant

and Mr. Uma Shankar, was thus, contradictory.

32. Moreover, any alleged transaction between Defendant and Sh. Uma

Shankar, was of no consequence, in regard to the creation of right, title,

interest in the suit property, which was owned by the Plaintiff.

33. It was thus, concluded that on the basis of the admissions made in the

pleadings, the Plaintiff was entitled to the Suit for possession while the

claim for relief of Damages, Mesne Profits, was held to be determinable

only after recording of evidence. Accordingly, the Application under

Order XII Rule 6 CPC was allowed, for the decree of possession.

34. Aggrieved, the Defendant/Appellant preferred RCA No. 61994/2016

challenging the judgment on possession dated 07.11.2016.

35. The learned ADJ, on independent appreciation of the record held

that there existed a relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties. The

Defendant had admitted in the Written Statement that he had been regularly

paying the rent to the Plaintiff, who had been accepting it. The challenge to

the ownership of the Plaintiff was not sustainable, since it was not the

subject matter of the Suit.

36. As reflected from the pleadings, Plaintiff was the owner of the suit

property and the family members of the Plaintiff, could not deal with the

RSA 48/2019 Page 10 of 16

property, without necessary authorisation. In case there was any such

Agreement, it was voidable under Section 19 of Indian Contract Act, 1872

and could be repudiated by the Plaintiff.

37. The Defendants having admitted paying rent to the Plaintiff, could not

deflect from his admissions. Moreover, the defence of there being an

Agreement for perpetual Lease Deed, the same was held to be barred under

Section 17 Registration Act. Consequently, it was held that the Suit of the

Plaintiff for possession, has been rightly granted under Order XII Rule 6

CPC. The Appeal was accordingly, dismissed.

38. The Regular Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 read

with Order XLII CPC by the Defendant/Appellant.

39. The grounds of challenge are that it has been erroneously held by the

learned ADJ that there were admissions when there were none which

existed. The Defendant had never admitted execution of the Lease Deed

dated 1981-1986 with the Plaintiff or with her husband. There was no clear,

unambiguous or specific admission on record, on which the decree under

Order XII Rule 6 CPC, could be passed.

40. The relation between the Plaintiff and her husband were presumed to

be good or that the Plaintiff had given consent to her husband that she had

not withdrawn her consent, was held to be admitted even though there being

challenge to the same. The same assumption is made when admittedly there

was no authorization by the Plaintiff to her husband, for entering into any

Agreement or to receive the rent.

41. The tenancy was required to be proved beyond doubt by the Plaintiff.

Despite there being no registered document showing an alleged tenancy of

RSA 48/2019 Page 11 of 16

05 years, and despite no month-to-month tenancy admitted by the

Defendant, the judgment has been passed on baseless assumptions of

assumed admissions.

42. The documents of perpetual rights of the Defendant in the suit

property, have been concealed by the Plaintiff in the first Application under

Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. The said Application was kept pending despite

arguments being heard, but the second Application under Order XII Rule 6

CPC, had been decided.

43. The evidence of the Plaintiff had been partly concluded and none of

the prior learned Judges had treated the issue No. 1 as preliminary issue, due

to the very nature of the objections and the facts of the present matter.

44. Further, the learned Civil Judge committed an error in treating the

issue No. 1 as preliminary issue and thereafter, heard the arguments to

decide the issues No. 4 and 5, as well. However, no arguments were heard

by learned Civil Judge on Issues no. 4 and 5. The learned ADJ failed to

consider this aspect.

45. The judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC has been passed in undue

haste and against the legal principles. Once the evidence is commenced, the

Appellant should have been given an opportunity to lead its evidence.

Without giving any reasons, the course of decision, had been changed.

46. It was further asserted that instead of deciding the Application under

Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the Suit has been decided on merits, as if evidence

has been led and documents are proved. It has also not been appreciated for

the fair decision, the evidence of the parties was required, since the Plaintiff

was herself ready to return the consideration accepted by the Defendant in

RSA 48/2019 Page 12 of 16

the form of bank draft. It has not been considered that the bank draft dated

08.02.2016 drawn on HDFC Bank dated 08.02.2016 for Rs.19,50,000/-, had

been prepared by the Plaintiff in favour of the Defendant with a promise to

pay it to the Defendant upon its surrendering the possession to the Plaintiff

or her husband. In fact, Rs.19,50,000/- was the actual amount of premium

accepted and utilised by the Plaintiff, from the Defendant.

47. The contentions of the Defendant/Appellant have not been

appreciated in the correct perspective; while on the one hand, it has been

observed that unregistered Lease Deeds are not maintainable, but on the

other hand, these observations have been contradicted by gathering vague

admissions of the Defendant from the duly denied Lease Deeds.

48. Furthermore, the service of Legal Notice dated 07.08.2003 had been

specifically denied by the Plaintiff, which was a disputed fact and could be

adjudicated only after recording of evidence.

49. Moreover, by filing an Application under Order XI Rule 12 CPC

along with Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the Plaintiff herself

was asking for decision on the Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC

after the disposal of the Application under Order XI Rule 12 CPC.

50. It is asserted that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

Submissions heard and record perused.

51. This is a Second Regular Appeal and the most pertinent question,

which arises is whether any substantial question of law arises in the present

Appeal.

52. The Plaintiff had filed a Suit for Possession and Mesne Profits

wherein it was specifically averred that the Defendant Company had been

RSA 48/2019 Page 13 of 16

inducted as a for 11 months, vide Rent Agreement dated 29.07.1986.

53. The Defendant in the Written Statement, had claimed that the

Defendant had taken the premises initially as a tenant on the basis of oral

Agreement with Mr. Uma Shankar, husband of the Plaintiff, who had

represented himself as the owner of the property and the rent was being

regularly paid to him. The relevant extract of the Written Statement reads as

under:

“...initially inducted as a tenant in the suit premises on the basis of

oral agreement wherein Uma Shankar Khanna, husband of Plaintiff,

represented himself as the owner of the property and demanded the

rent, which was regularly paid to him.”

54. Therefore, the Defendant had admitted in his Written Statement about

his induction in the suit property, being in the capacity of a tenant.

Pertinently, it fails to give the date on which he entered into the premises as

a tenant.

55. Even thought the Plaintiff had relied on a Lease Agreement dated

29.07.1986, the execution of which was denied by the Defendant, but the

Defendant himself has admitted his induction in the suit premises, as a

tenant.

56. He has also admitted that „he had also been paying the monthly rent

of Rs.9,000/- to Mr. Uma Shankar through the Plaintiff‟. Therefore, there

are clear admissions in the Written Statement that the rent of Rs.9,000/- per

month being paid to the Plaintiff, though asserted to be intended for the

husband.

57. The Plaintiff had acquired the ownership by virtue of a Sale Deed and

RSA 48/2019 Page 14 of 16

the Defendant has entered into the property owned by the Plaintiff. Even if it

is accepted that the defendant was dealing with the husband of the Plaintiff,

that does not take away the ownership of the Plaintiff in the suit premises or

her right to claim possession from the Defendant, who is admittedly a tenant

in the suit premises.

58. The sole defence taken was that there was an Agreement between the

husband of the Plaintiff and the representatives of the Defendant, that the

tenancy would be on permanent basis and for this reason, the exorbitant

rent of Rs.9,000/- per month was agreed to be paid, even though similarly

situated properties in the area could be taken on rent for Rs.1,500/- per

month.

59. This contention raised by the Defendant had been duly considered by

the two Courts and it was observed that any such creation of possession on

permanent basis, could have been done only through registered document,

which admittedly did not exist and thus, such contention was patently barred

under Section 17 Registration Act.

60. The Appellant in the present Appeal, had also contended that the

Plaintiff had got prepared a draft of Rs.19,50,000/- in the name of the

Defendant to return the money taken over the number of years, for getting

the possession of the suit property. This in fact, establishes that the Plaintiff

who has been out of possession since 1981, was keen to get back the

possession on whatever terms and was even willing to pay the money

received till date, by way of the demand draft in lieu thereof. This in no way

reflects that the suit premises had been taken by the Defendant, on

permanent basis.

RSA 48/2019 Page 15 of 16

61. The last contention raised by the Appellant was that there was no

service of Legal Notice dated 07.08.2003 and it had been specifically denied

by him.

62. However, even if this contention is accepted, it is well settled that the

filing of a Suit for eviction under the general law, itself amounts to a notice

to quit, upon the tenant. The Supreme Court in M/s Nopany Investments (P)

Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF), (2008) 2 SCC 728, has observed that even in

the absence of a Notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property

Act, the institution of the Suit itself constitutes a notice to quit upon the

tenant. Thus, there can be no infirmity in the finding that the tenancy of the

Defendants, stood validly terminated.

63. It may be hereby noted that in the impugned order, it has been clearly

observed that the question of Mesne Profits required evidence, which was

kept pending. There is also a mention of Application under Order XI Rule

12 CPC filed by the Plaintiff, but that in any case, may be relevant for

deciding the Mesne Profits, but in the light of admissions of the Defendant

in the Written Statement, the decree of possession was not required to be

deferred, as it has been rightly passed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

64. The two Courts have rightly appreciated the facts of this case to

conclude that Defendant was a tenant @ Rs.9,000/- per month and was

liable for eviction and have rightly decreed the Suit of the Plaintiff for

possession.

Conclusion:

65. In the light of aforesaid discussion, it is held that there is no

RSA 48/2019 Page 16 of 16

substantial question of law that has arisen, in the present Appeal. There is no

merit in the present Appeal, which is hereby, dismissed.

66. Pending Applications, if any, are disposed of accordingly.

(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)

JUDGE

SEPTEMBER 23, 2026

N

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