As per case facts, the Plaintiff, Smt. Manju Khanna, filed a suit for possession and damages against M/S Ronuk Industries Ltd., claiming the defendant was a tenant who had defaulted. ...
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 13
th
July, 2026
Pronounced on: 23
rd
September, 2026
Uploaded on: 23
rd
September, 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010131262019
+ RSA 48/2019
M/S RONUK INDUSTRIES LTD
Through its Director/President,
11-A, Abdul Ghaffar Khan Road,
Mumbai -400025
.... Appellant
Through: Mr. Rajesh Baweja, Ms. Anjali Gupta
and Ms. Poonam Kandari, Advocates
versus
MANJU KHANNA
W/o Sh. Uma Shankar Khanna
R/o A-1/62, Safdarjung Enclave,
New Delhi
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Gaurav Chauhan, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1. Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 read with Section 115
and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) has been filed against
the judgment dated 07.11.2016 whereby the learned Additional District
Judge has upheld the decree of possession granted by the learned Civil
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Judge, under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
2. The Plaintiff/Respondent, Smt. Manju Khanna, had instituted a
Suit, subsequently numbered as Civil Suit No. 1534/2016 (Old No.
157/2016), seeking Possession, Damages/Mesne Profits for use and
occupation of premises bearing No. 4405/2, Kothi No. 5, First Floor,
Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi, admeasuring about 1,000 square
feet (hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”) and interest.
3. The case of the Plaintiff as the owner of the suit property, had
inducted Defendant, M/s Ronuk Industries Ltd., as a tenant in the suit
property at a monthly rent of Rs.9,000/-, vide a Lease Agreement dated
29.07.1986.
4. According to the Plaintiff, she had been desirous of recovering
possession of the suit property since 1992 and had addressed a Letter dated
17.01.1992 seeking enhancement of rent. However, the Defendant continued
to pay Rs.9,000/- per month, as rent. The Plaintiff thereafter, served a Legal
Notice dated 07.08.2003, terminating the tenancy and calling upon the
Defendant to hand over possession of the suit property.
5. Thereafter, the Suit was instituted seeking Possession and Damages at
the rate of Rs.1,000/- per day with effect from 01.09.2003, till handing over
of possession, along with interest @ 18% per annum.
6. The Defendant, in its Written Statement, raised preliminary
objections that the Suit had not been instituted by a duly authorised person;
that the Court lacked jurisdiction; that the plaint did not disclose any cause
of action; and that material facts had allegedly been concealed.
7. The Defendant also specifically denied having been served with the
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Notice of termination of tenancy, prior to the institution of the Suit and
asserted that the averments made in the plaint were false and frivolous.
8. On merits, it was asserted that the description of the suit property did
not correspond with the description in the Sale Deed or with the premises in
actual possession of the Defendant. The ownership of the Plaintiff was also
disputed and a plea was taken that the Suit was barred under the Benami
Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and that the Plaintiff had no locus
standi to maintain the Suit.
9. The Defendant further asserted that the Lease Agreement dated
29.07.1986 was unregistered and insufficiently stamped and therefore, could
not be read in evidence for the purpose of establishing the terms sought to be
created thereunder.
10. Without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions, the Defendant asserted
that it had initially been inducted as a tenant in the suit property, on the
basis of an oral agreement with Sh. Uma Shankar Khanna, husband of the
Plaintiff, who had represented himself to be the owner of the property and
the rent was regularly paid to him. Sh. Uma Shankar Khanna received the
so-called rent and margin money, etc., through his wife, the Plaintiff, in
order to save income tax, house tax, etc.
11. Having regard to the long-standing commercial venture of the
Defendant, it was mutually agreed that the Defendant would remain in
possession of the suit property, on a permanent basis. Accordingly, an
exorbitant amount was allegedly charged by Sh. Uma Shankar Khanna
through the Plaintiff, towards premium/security in consideration of such
permanent possession. It was further asserted that the uninterrupted
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extension and renewal of the Defendant's possession on a permanent basis,
had been specifically agreed upon and recorded in the unregistered
Agreement as well as in subsequent Agreements. The Defendant, thus,
denied that the tenancy had been created in terms of the Rent Agreement and
asserted that its possession was intended to be permanent. According to the
Defendant, the terms of the unregistered Agreement dated 29.07.1986, were
self-explanatory and contemplated an unlimited and perpetual tenancy.
12. The Defendant further denied that the Plaintiff had been desirous of
recovering possession of the suit property, in the year 1992. It was explained
that upon expiry of the initial period of five years on 28.07.1991, Sh. Uma
Shankar Khanna and the representatives of the Plaintiff held a series of
meetings wherein, according to the Defendant, its requirement of permanent
possession was mutually agreed. It was asserted that the so-called rent of
Rs.9,000/- per month, though exorbitant considering the location and
condition of the property, had been fixed in consideration of the Defendant
being granted permanent possession of the suit property.
13. It was further agreed that the said amount of Rs.9,000/- per month,
would continue to be paid for the next 20 years, as a guarantee/security for
the permanent possession of the Defendant. Thus, according to the
Defendant, the alleged rent also included a component towards refundable
security, in addition to the amount already paid. The Defendant claimed that
it had been regularly paying the said amount of Rs.9,000/- per month to Sh.
Uma Shankar Khanna through the Plaintiff, which had been accepted
without any protest.
14. It was further asserted that the said understanding and other related
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matters agreed upon in the said meetings, were also put in writing in various
forms to corroborate and substantiate the oral agreement between the
Defendant and Mr. Uma Shankar and these facts had been deliberately and
intentionally concealed by the Plaintiff.
15. The Defendant stated that the Plaintiff be directed to produce the said
writings, as the same are most important documents to adjudicate upon this
frivolous Suit. It was thus, submitted that the Suit is without merits and was
liable to be dismissed.
16. The issues were framed on 05.04.2004, as under:-
“1. Whether the defendant was tenant under the plaintiff as alleged
in the plaint? OPP
2. Whether the tenancy of the defendant has been duly terminated
vide legal notice dated 07-08-2003 as alleged in the plaint?
OPP.
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree for recovery of
possession of the suit property as sought in the plaint ? OPP
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of damages/ mesne
profits, if so, at what rate and for which period ? OPP
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any interest on the amount of
damages I mesne profits, if so at what rate and for which
period ? OPP .
6. Relief.”
17. Additional issues were further framed on 14.12.2007 are as under:-
“1. Whether the Plaintiff has valued the suit for the purpose of
proper court fees? OPD.
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2. Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the
present suit? OPD.
3. Whether the suit is barred by Benami Transaction Act? OPD.”
18. The evidence was then commenced to be led by the parties.
19. At this stage, Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC dated
03.05.2016 was filed on behalf of the Plaintiff seeking a decree of
possession on admissions.
20. The Application was contested by the Defendant wherein similar
defence as in the Written Statement were taken, in reply thereof.
21. It was explained that an exorbitantly high rate of rent @ Rs.9,000/-
per month was fixed, even though the similarly located property in the same
area could have been taken for Rs.1,000/- to Rs.1,250/- per month, in the
1980s. Since the possession was sought to be of permanent nature, the
Defendant had agreed to pay an amount of Rs.9,000/- per month as EMI for
the next 20 years for possession in perpetuity in the suit premise. It was thus,
submitted that there was no categorical admission in regard to the relation of
landlord and tenant between the parties and the Suit cannot be decreed under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
22. The learned Civil Judge, vide Judgment/Order dated 07.11.2016,
upon considering the rival contentions of the parties, observed that the
admissions contained in the Written Statement, were sufficient to disentitle
the Defendant from resisting the Plaintiff’s claim for possession of the suit
property. It was observed that the manner in which the Written Statement
had been drafted, sought to create a semblance of a legitimate defence;
however, when tested on the touchstone of the applicable law, such defence
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could not be sustained. It was further concluded that the Defendant had
admitted in the Written Statement the payment of Rs.9,000/- per month as
rent, which was admittedly in excess of Rs.3,500/- per month.
23. The challenge raised by the Defendant to the title of the Plaintiff was
held to be unavailable, in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 and the principles governing estoppel against a tenant. Reliance was
also placed upon Sky Land International Pvt. Ltd. v. Kavita P. Lalwani, 191
(2012) DLT 594.
24. The learned Civil Judge further considered the objection that an
earlier Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC had already been decided. It
was further observed that first Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC
read with Order 39 Rule 10 CPC had been filed by the Plaintiff for arrears
of rent in the sum of Rs.72,000/-, and did not contain any prayer for
possession, which was allowed. Thereafter, the second Application under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC was filed for seeking possession. It was held that the
first Application was only in respect of rent and it cannot be said that the
second Application for possession, was barred under law.
25. The alleged understanding between the husband of the Plaintiff and
the representatives of the Defendant, whereby Rs.9,000/- was allegedly
agreed to be paid for 20 years to secure permanent possession, was also
considered. It was observed that a right to continue in possession in
perpetuity or for a term exceeding one year, could not be created in the
manner asserted, in the absence of a registered instrument as contemplated
under the Registration Act, 1908 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
26. Furthermore, according to the Defendant, it was mutually agreed that
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the initial unregistered Agreement of tenancy for 05 years, gradually having
paid substantial amount for more than 20 years as EMIs towards the sale
consideration, the Defendant has acquired a right/lien over the suit property.
However, such averments of the Defendant were held to be against the
Transfer of Property Act and Registration Act, and were not tenable.
27. The Defendant had further claimed that Sh. Uma Shankar, husband of
the Plaintiff had presented himself as owner and decision maker in respect
of the suit property, and that the suit property may have been purchased
benami by him, in the name of his wife. Furthermore, it was claimed that the
Sale Deed relied upon by the Plaintiff showing the ownership was not
complete, as it did not specify the portion of the suit property in which the
Plaintiff was claiming his ownership.
28. According to the Defendant, the issue of ownership was required to be
tested on the touchstone of trial. However, this contention was rejected on
the ground that the Defendant, who was a tenant from month to month, had
no legal competency to challenge the Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff or
to raise the defence of Benami Transaction Act.
29. It was held that there was a Lease Agreement dated 29.07.1986,
executed between the parties, which has not been denied in the Written
Statement. The only defence is of there being an understanding inter se the
parties, for which there was no basis.
30. The Defendant itself stated the Written Statement that after the
expiring of period of 05 years on a 28.07.1991, Sh. Uma Shankar and the
representative of the Defendant, held a series of meetings in regard to the
need of the Defendant for permanent possession of suit property.
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31. The 05 years referred to in the Written Statement, could only be from
the Lease Agreement dated 29.07.1986, which indicates that the Defendant
himself was relying on the Lease Deed. It was thus, concluded that the two
versions about the Defendant coming into possession of the suit property,
first being given by the Plaintiff, and thereafter, the possession being
pursuant to an oral Agreement between the representative of the Defendant
and Mr. Uma Shankar, was thus, contradictory.
32. Moreover, any alleged transaction between Defendant and Sh. Uma
Shankar, was of no consequence, in regard to the creation of right, title,
interest in the suit property, which was owned by the Plaintiff.
33. It was thus, concluded that on the basis of the admissions made in the
pleadings, the Plaintiff was entitled to the Suit for possession while the
claim for relief of Damages, Mesne Profits, was held to be determinable
only after recording of evidence. Accordingly, the Application under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC was allowed, for the decree of possession.
34. Aggrieved, the Defendant/Appellant preferred RCA No. 61994/2016
challenging the judgment on possession dated 07.11.2016.
35. The learned ADJ, on independent appreciation of the record held
that there existed a relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties. The
Defendant had admitted in the Written Statement that he had been regularly
paying the rent to the Plaintiff, who had been accepting it. The challenge to
the ownership of the Plaintiff was not sustainable, since it was not the
subject matter of the Suit.
36. As reflected from the pleadings, Plaintiff was the owner of the suit
property and the family members of the Plaintiff, could not deal with the
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property, without necessary authorisation. In case there was any such
Agreement, it was voidable under Section 19 of Indian Contract Act, 1872
and could be repudiated by the Plaintiff.
37. The Defendants having admitted paying rent to the Plaintiff, could not
deflect from his admissions. Moreover, the defence of there being an
Agreement for perpetual Lease Deed, the same was held to be barred under
Section 17 Registration Act. Consequently, it was held that the Suit of the
Plaintiff for possession, has been rightly granted under Order XII Rule 6
CPC. The Appeal was accordingly, dismissed.
38. The Regular Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 read
with Order XLII CPC by the Defendant/Appellant.
39. The grounds of challenge are that it has been erroneously held by the
learned ADJ that there were admissions when there were none which
existed. The Defendant had never admitted execution of the Lease Deed
dated 1981-1986 with the Plaintiff or with her husband. There was no clear,
unambiguous or specific admission on record, on which the decree under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC, could be passed.
40. The relation between the Plaintiff and her husband were presumed to
be good or that the Plaintiff had given consent to her husband that she had
not withdrawn her consent, was held to be admitted even though there being
challenge to the same. The same assumption is made when admittedly there
was no authorization by the Plaintiff to her husband, for entering into any
Agreement or to receive the rent.
41. The tenancy was required to be proved beyond doubt by the Plaintiff.
Despite there being no registered document showing an alleged tenancy of
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05 years, and despite no month-to-month tenancy admitted by the
Defendant, the judgment has been passed on baseless assumptions of
assumed admissions.
42. The documents of perpetual rights of the Defendant in the suit
property, have been concealed by the Plaintiff in the first Application under
Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. The said Application was kept pending despite
arguments being heard, but the second Application under Order XII Rule 6
CPC, had been decided.
43. The evidence of the Plaintiff had been partly concluded and none of
the prior learned Judges had treated the issue No. 1 as preliminary issue, due
to the very nature of the objections and the facts of the present matter.
44. Further, the learned Civil Judge committed an error in treating the
issue No. 1 as preliminary issue and thereafter, heard the arguments to
decide the issues No. 4 and 5, as well. However, no arguments were heard
by learned Civil Judge on Issues no. 4 and 5. The learned ADJ failed to
consider this aspect.
45. The judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC has been passed in undue
haste and against the legal principles. Once the evidence is commenced, the
Appellant should have been given an opportunity to lead its evidence.
Without giving any reasons, the course of decision, had been changed.
46. It was further asserted that instead of deciding the Application under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the Suit has been decided on merits, as if evidence
has been led and documents are proved. It has also not been appreciated for
the fair decision, the evidence of the parties was required, since the Plaintiff
was herself ready to return the consideration accepted by the Defendant in
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the form of bank draft. It has not been considered that the bank draft dated
08.02.2016 drawn on HDFC Bank dated 08.02.2016 for Rs.19,50,000/-, had
been prepared by the Plaintiff in favour of the Defendant with a promise to
pay it to the Defendant upon its surrendering the possession to the Plaintiff
or her husband. In fact, Rs.19,50,000/- was the actual amount of premium
accepted and utilised by the Plaintiff, from the Defendant.
47. The contentions of the Defendant/Appellant have not been
appreciated in the correct perspective; while on the one hand, it has been
observed that unregistered Lease Deeds are not maintainable, but on the
other hand, these observations have been contradicted by gathering vague
admissions of the Defendant from the duly denied Lease Deeds.
48. Furthermore, the service of Legal Notice dated 07.08.2003 had been
specifically denied by the Plaintiff, which was a disputed fact and could be
adjudicated only after recording of evidence.
49. Moreover, by filing an Application under Order XI Rule 12 CPC
along with Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the Plaintiff herself
was asking for decision on the Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC
after the disposal of the Application under Order XI Rule 12 CPC.
50. It is asserted that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
Submissions heard and record perused.
51. This is a Second Regular Appeal and the most pertinent question,
which arises is whether any substantial question of law arises in the present
Appeal.
52. The Plaintiff had filed a Suit for Possession and Mesne Profits
wherein it was specifically averred that the Defendant Company had been
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inducted as a for 11 months, vide Rent Agreement dated 29.07.1986.
53. The Defendant in the Written Statement, had claimed that the
Defendant had taken the premises initially as a tenant on the basis of oral
Agreement with Mr. Uma Shankar, husband of the Plaintiff, who had
represented himself as the owner of the property and the rent was being
regularly paid to him. The relevant extract of the Written Statement reads as
under:
“...initially inducted as a tenant in the suit premises on the basis of
oral agreement wherein Uma Shankar Khanna, husband of Plaintiff,
represented himself as the owner of the property and demanded the
rent, which was regularly paid to him.”
54. Therefore, the Defendant had admitted in his Written Statement about
his induction in the suit property, being in the capacity of a tenant.
Pertinently, it fails to give the date on which he entered into the premises as
a tenant.
55. Even thought the Plaintiff had relied on a Lease Agreement dated
29.07.1986, the execution of which was denied by the Defendant, but the
Defendant himself has admitted his induction in the suit premises, as a
tenant.
56. He has also admitted that „he had also been paying the monthly rent
of Rs.9,000/- to Mr. Uma Shankar through the Plaintiff‟. Therefore, there
are clear admissions in the Written Statement that the rent of Rs.9,000/- per
month being paid to the Plaintiff, though asserted to be intended for the
husband.
57. The Plaintiff had acquired the ownership by virtue of a Sale Deed and
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the Defendant has entered into the property owned by the Plaintiff. Even if it
is accepted that the defendant was dealing with the husband of the Plaintiff,
that does not take away the ownership of the Plaintiff in the suit premises or
her right to claim possession from the Defendant, who is admittedly a tenant
in the suit premises.
58. The sole defence taken was that there was an Agreement between the
husband of the Plaintiff and the representatives of the Defendant, that the
tenancy would be on permanent basis and for this reason, the exorbitant
rent of Rs.9,000/- per month was agreed to be paid, even though similarly
situated properties in the area could be taken on rent for Rs.1,500/- per
month.
59. This contention raised by the Defendant had been duly considered by
the two Courts and it was observed that any such creation of possession on
permanent basis, could have been done only through registered document,
which admittedly did not exist and thus, such contention was patently barred
under Section 17 Registration Act.
60. The Appellant in the present Appeal, had also contended that the
Plaintiff had got prepared a draft of Rs.19,50,000/- in the name of the
Defendant to return the money taken over the number of years, for getting
the possession of the suit property. This in fact, establishes that the Plaintiff
who has been out of possession since 1981, was keen to get back the
possession on whatever terms and was even willing to pay the money
received till date, by way of the demand draft in lieu thereof. This in no way
reflects that the suit premises had been taken by the Defendant, on
permanent basis.
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61. The last contention raised by the Appellant was that there was no
service of Legal Notice dated 07.08.2003 and it had been specifically denied
by him.
62. However, even if this contention is accepted, it is well settled that the
filing of a Suit for eviction under the general law, itself amounts to a notice
to quit, upon the tenant. The Supreme Court in M/s Nopany Investments (P)
Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF), (2008) 2 SCC 728, has observed that even in
the absence of a Notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, the institution of the Suit itself constitutes a notice to quit upon the
tenant. Thus, there can be no infirmity in the finding that the tenancy of the
Defendants, stood validly terminated.
63. It may be hereby noted that in the impugned order, it has been clearly
observed that the question of Mesne Profits required evidence, which was
kept pending. There is also a mention of Application under Order XI Rule
12 CPC filed by the Plaintiff, but that in any case, may be relevant for
deciding the Mesne Profits, but in the light of admissions of the Defendant
in the Written Statement, the decree of possession was not required to be
deferred, as it has been rightly passed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
64. The two Courts have rightly appreciated the facts of this case to
conclude that Defendant was a tenant @ Rs.9,000/- per month and was
liable for eviction and have rightly decreed the Suit of the Plaintiff for
possession.
Conclusion:
65. In the light of aforesaid discussion, it is held that there is no
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substantial question of law that has arisen, in the present Appeal. There is no
merit in the present Appeal, which is hereby, dismissed.
66. Pending Applications, if any, are disposed of accordingly.
(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 23, 2026
N
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