W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 1 of 15

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Order reserved on: 09.09.2026

Order pronounced on: 25.09.2026

Order uploaded on: 25.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010423722026

+ W.P.(C) 13077/2026, CM APPL. 60825/2026 and CM APPL.

60826/2026

M/S VERTILINK MEDIA SOLUTIONS PRIVATE LIMITED

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Alok Kumar Pandey, Adv.

versus

ANTI EVASION BRANCH & ORS. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Akash Panwar, Adv.

Mr. Sumit K. Batra and Ms.

Priyanka Jindal, Advs.

Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC along

with Mr. Dipak Raj, Mr.

Aryaman Singh Chouhan and

Mr. Aditya Chaudhary, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNEESH KUMAR GUPTA

O R D E R

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:

1. Through the present Writ Petition, the Petitioner seeks quashing

of the Show Cause Notice dated 29.05.2024 issued by Respondent

No.2 under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act,

2017 [“CGST Act”], as also the consequential order dated 29.08.2024

bearing reference No. ZDO70824102713J, whereby a demand of

Rs.10,57,75,250/- has been created against the Petitioner.

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 2 of 15

2. The principal grievance of the Petitioner is that the proceedings

initiated by Respondent No.2 are without jurisdiction in view of the

proceedings earlier initiated by the Directorate General of GST

Intelligence [“DGGI”] against the Petitioner and several other

noticees. The Petitioner places reliance upon Section 6(2)(b) of the

CGST Act to contend that two authorities could not have initiated

parallel proceedings in respect of the same subject matter.

3. The substantive reliefs sought by the Petitioner, as contained in

the Writ Petition, read as under:

“A. Issue a Writ of certiorari or any other appropriate

writ/order/direction against the respondent no 2, by quashing the

show-cause notice dated 29.05.2024 as well as subsequent

proceedings and declare the same as illegal, without jurisdiction and

bad in law. AND

B. Issue a Writ of certiorari or any other appropriate

writ/order/direction against Order under section 73 of the

CGST/DGST Act 2017dated 29.08.2024 vide reference no

ZDO70824102713J is illegal, without jurisdiction and bad in law and

declare invalid order. And/or

C. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate

writ/order/direction to respondent no 2 to close the proceeding

against the same subject matter already been adjudicated by the

respondent no 4.”

FACTUAL MATRIX :

4. In order to appreciate the controversy involved, the relevant

facts, in brief, are required to be noticed.

5. The Petitioner is a private limited company engaged, inter alia,

in the business of providing script services to Zee Entertainment

Enterprises Ltd. The Petitioner is registered with the Delhi GST

authorities.

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 3 of 15

6. The record placed before this Court shows that search

proceedings were conducted in connection with the affairs of the

Petitioner. On 03.03.2021, a search was conducted at the office of the

Petitioner as well as at the residential premises of Mr. Naresh

Dhoundiyal, stated to be the Director of the Petitioner. The Petitioner

further states that the said Director was arrested.

7. Thereafter, the investigation in respect of the Petitioner came to

be dealt with by the DGGI, Mumbai Zonal Unit. The Petitioner states

that, pursuant to the transfer of investigation, it joined the

investigation and appeared before the investigating authorities in

response to summons.

8. On 31.03.2023, the DGGI issued a common Show Cause Notice

to as many as forty-five (45) noticees, including the Petitioner and Mr.

Naresh Dhoundiyal, the former Director of the Petitioner. The said

proceedings were initiated under the provisions of the CGST Act, the

Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 [“MGST Act”] and

the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 [“IGST Act”]. The

proceedings, according to the Petitioner itself, concerned allegations

relating to fraudulent availment of Input Tax Credit and consequential

liability under the provisions applicable to cases involving

suppression, fraud or wilful misstatement.

9. While the aforesaid proceedings were pending, Respondent

No.2, namely the Sales Tax Officer, Class-II, Ward-64, Zone-IV,

Delhi, issued a separate Show Cause Notice dated 29.05.2024 under

Section 73 of the CGST Act. The said notice concerned the period

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 4 of 15

April 2019 to March 2020 and alleged that the Petitioner had not

declared its correct tax liability.

10. The Petitioner submitted a reply dated 28.06.2024 to the

aforesaid Show Cause Notice. The principal objection raised by the

Petitioner was that the investigation in respect of the Petitioner had

already been undertaken by the Anti-Evasion Branch and thereafter

transferred to the DGGI, and that the DGGI had already issued a Show

Cause Notice covering the relevant transactions. According to the

Petitioner, therefore, the initiation of proceedings by Respondent No.2

was barred by Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.

11. Respondent No.2, however, proceeded with the adjudication

and passed the impugned order dated 29.08.2024. By the said order,

Respondent No.2 held that the Petitioner had not declared the correct

tax liability and had also availed Input Tax Credit from taxpayers who

had not discharged the corresponding tax liability on their outward

supplies. On this basis, the benefit of ITC was denied with reference

to Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act and a total liability of

Rs.10,57,75,250/- was created against the Petitioner.

12. The Petitioner did not avail the statutory remedy of appeal

against the aforesaid order within the prescribed period. Instead, the

Petitioner states that it filed an application for rectification on

07.04.2025, reiterating its objection that the proceedings initiated by

Respondent No.2 were barred by Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.

13. In the meantime, the proceedings initiated pursuant to the Show

Cause Notice issued by the DGGI against the forty-five noticees

culminated in an Order-in-Original. It was found in those proceedings

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 5 of 15

that the main noticee, namely M/s Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd.,

had paid the entire amount of ITC demanded in the Show Cause

Notice along with applicable interest and penalty at the rate of 25 per

cent of such tax. Consequently, the proceedings against the remaining

noticees were treated as concluded in terms of clause (ii) to

Explanation 1 to Section 74 of the CGST Act and the corresponding

provisions of the MGST Act read with Section 20 of the IGST Act.

14. The Petitioner states that the aforesaid order was brought to the

notice of Respondent No.2 and that the Petitioner again requested

Respondent No.2 to dispose of the rectification application in light of

the conclusion of the DGGI proceedings.

15. The grievance of the Petitioner is that, despite being apprised of

the aforesaid development, Respondent No.2 has not disposed of the

rectification application. The Petitioner has, therefore, invoked the

writ jurisdiction of this Court.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER:

16. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the initiation of

proceedings by Respondent No.2 was contrary to the mandate

contained in Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act. According to him, once

the Anti-Evasion Branch had initiated investigation and the

investigation had thereafter been transferred to the DGGI, the

jurisdiction to proceed in respect of the subject matter vested with the

authority which had initiated the intelligence-based investigation.

17. It is further submitted that the DGGI had issued a

comprehensive Show Cause Notice dated 31.03.2023 against the

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 6 of 15

principal noticee as well as the Petitioner and other co-noticees. Thus,

according to the Petitioner, the subsequent Show Cause Notice dated

29.05.2024 issued by Respondent No.2 pertained to the very same

transactions and the same financial period and was consequently

barred under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.

18. Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment of this Court

in Amit Gupta v. Union of India

1

, to contend that Section 6(2)(b)

incorporates the legislative intent of preventing multiple proceedings

by different GST authorities in respect of the same subject matter.

19. Learned counsel further submits that the subsequent conclusion

of the proceedings initiated by the DGGI assumes significance.

According to him, once the proceedings against the Petitioner

pursuant to the DGGI Show Cause Notice stood concluded on account

of the payment made by the principal noticee, the Petitioner could not

be subjected to a separate demand in respect of the same transactions.

20. Reliance has also been placed upon Section 75(13) of the CGST

Act. It is contended that, in view of the conclusion of the earlier

proceedings, the Petitioner cannot be subjected to a penalty for the

same act or omission in the proceedings initiated by Respondent No.2.

21. The learned counsel accordingly submits that the impugned

Show Cause Notice as well as the order dated 29.08.2024 deserve to

be quashed and the pending proceedings before Respondent No.2

deserve to be brought to an end.

1

2023 SCC OnLine Del 6664

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 7 of 15

ANALYSIS & FINDINGS:

22. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by learned

counsel for the Petitioner and has perused the material placed on

record.

23. At the outset, it is necessary to notice that the Petitioner seeks to

invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court against an order

dated 29.08.2024 whereby a demand has been raised under the CGST

Act. The statutory scheme provides a remedy of appeal against such

an order. The Petitioner admittedly did not avail the said statutory

remedy within the prescribed period.

24. The existence of an efficacious alternative statutory remedy is a

material consideration while exercising discretionary jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Petitioner has not

demonstrated any circumstance which would warrant bypassing the

statutory appellate mechanism in the present case. The challenge

raised by the Petitioner essentially concerns the jurisdictional and

factual aspects of the demand raised against it, which can

appropriately be examined in the statutory appellate proceedings.

25. The delay with which the present Petition has been instituted

also assumes significance. The Impugned Order was passed on

29.08.2024, whereas the present Writ Petition has been instituted only

in August 2026. Thus, there is a substantial lapse of time between the

passing of the Impugned Order and the institution of the present

proceedings.

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 8 of 15

26. The only explanation offered by the Petitioner is that it filed an

application for rectification on 07.04.2025 and that the same is

pending. The filing of a rectification application, however, cannot by

itself obliterate the delay in challenging the original order, particularly

when the Petitioner consciously chose not to avail the statutory

remedy of appeal against the order dated 29.08.2024.

27. The writ jurisdiction of this Court is discretionary and equitable

in nature. A party seeking to challenge an order after allowing the

statutory period of appeal to lapse must satisfactorily explain the

delay. No such satisfactory explanation has been furnished in the

present case. The petition, therefore, suffers from unexplained delay

and laches.

28. Even otherwise, the principal contention of the Petitioner based

upon Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act does not merit acceptance on

the facts of the present case.

29. The legislative scheme embodied in Section 6 of the CGST Act

contemplates cross-empowerment of officers of the Central and State

tax administrations while, at the same time, seeking to avoid

multiplicity of proceedings in respect of the same subject matter.

Section 6(2)(b) is intended to prevent initiation of parallel proceedings

where proceedings on the same subject matter have already been

initiated by the other tax authority.

30. The expression “same subject-matter” occurring in Section

6(2)(b) is therefore of central significance. The mere fact that two

proceedings arise out of the affairs of the same assessee, relate to

overlapping periods, or originate from transactions having some

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 9 of 15

common factual background, does not, by itself, establish that the two

proceedings concern the same subject matter.

31. The nature and scope of the two proceedings have, therefore, to

be examined.

32. In the present case, the Show Cause Notice dated 29.05.2024

issued by Respondent No.2 under Section 73 of the CGST Act

concerns the allegation that the Petitioner had not declared its correct

tax liability for the period April 2019 to March 2020. The Impugned

Order dated 29.08.2024 further records the allegation that the

Petitioner had availed ITC from taxpayers who had not paid the tax on

their outward supplies and, consequently, that the Petitioner was not

entitled to the ITC with reference to Section 16(2)(c) of the CGST

Act.

33. The proceedings initiated by the DGGI, on the other hand, arose

out of a different set of allegations. The Show Cause Notice dated

31.03.2023 was issued against forty-five (45) noticees, including the

Petitioner and the former Director of the Petitioner. The proceedings

were under Section 74 and concerned allegations of fraudulent

availment of ITC without actual supply of goods or services.

34. Thus, although the proceedings may have some factual or

transactional overlap, the statutory provisions invoked, the nature of

the allegations and the liability sought to be determined in the two

proceedings are materially different.

35. The proceedings under Section 73 pursuant to the Show Cause

Notice dated 29.05.2024 were directed towards determination of the

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 10 of 15

Petitioner’s correct tax liability for the specified period, including the

question of admissibility of ITC under Section 16(2)(c). The

proceedings initiated by the DGGI under Section 74, on the other

hand, were founded upon allegations of fraudulent availment of ITC

without actual supply of goods or services and involved forty-five

noticees.

36. Consequently, the Petitioner cannot succeed merely by

demonstrating that both proceedings relate to transactions undertaken

during the same financial period or arise from the broader business

dealings of the Petitioner. For the bar under Section 6(2)(b) to operate,

it must be shown that the two proceedings are in respect of the same

subject matter. On the material placed before this Court, that

requirement is not satisfied.

37. The reliance placed by the Petitioner upon the principle against

parallel proceedings, therefore, does not advance its case. The

statutory provision does not impose a blanket prohibition against

every proceeding initiated by a Central or State tax authority

concerning an assessee who has previously been subjected to

proceedings by another GST authority. The prohibition is confined to

proceedings on the same subject matter.

38. The distinction between the two proceedings becomes further

apparent from the fact that the DGGI proceedings were initiated under

Section 74, whereas the impugned proceedings were initiated under

Section 73. The two statutory provisions operate in materially

different circumstances. The mere use of common expressions such as

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 11 of 15

“ITC”, “tax liability” or the existence of common transactions cannot

render the subject matter of the two proceedings identical.

39. The Petitioner has also sought to rely upon the subsequent

conclusion of the proceedings initiated by the DGGI. This contention

also does not assist the Petitioner in the manner suggested.

40. The proceedings initiated pursuant to the DGGI Show Cause

Notice were ultimately concluded on account of the payment made by

the principal noticee, M/s Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., of the

tax liability along with applicable interest and penalty at the

prescribed rate. On that basis, the proceedings against the co-noticees,

including the Petitioner, were treated as concluded in terms of the

statutory provision contained in Explanation 1 to Section 74 of the

CGST Act and the corresponding provisions.

41. The consequence of the aforesaid conclusion is that no tax,

interest or penalty has been directed to be recovered from the

Petitioner in those proceedings. The Petitioner, therefore, cannot rely

upon the said conclusion to contend that the separate liability

determined against it by Respondent No.2 under the impugned order

automatically stands extinguished.

42. The subsequent conclusion of the DGGI proceedings cannot

retrospectively invalidate the proceedings independently initiated by

Respondent No.2, particularly when the latter proceedings concerned

a different statutory basis and a different subject matter.

43. The Petitioner has also relied upon Section 75(13) of the CGST

Act. The said contention proceeds on the assumption that the

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 12 of 15

Petitioner has already been subjected to a penalty for the same act or

omission in the earlier proceedings.

44. The record, however, does not support such an assertion. The

proceedings pursuant to the DGGI Show Cause Notice were

concluded against the Petitioner by treating the proceedings against

the co-noticees as deemed concluded in consequence of the payment

made by the principal noticee. The Petitioner itself does not point out

any order whereby it has been called upon to discharge any tax,

interest or penalty pursuant to those proceedings.

45. In these circumstances, the bar contained in Section 75(13)

cannot be invoked merely on the basis that the Petitioner was named

as a co-noticee in the earlier Show Cause Notice. The provision relied

upon by the Petitioner would require a prior imposition of penalty for

the same act or omission. No such prior penalty imposed upon the

Petitioner has been shown to this Court.

46. There is yet another aspect which cannot be overlooked. The

Petitioner had the opportunity to challenge the order dated 29.08.2024

before the competent appellate authority. Instead of pursuing the

statutory remedy within the prescribed period, the Petitioner allowed

the statutory period to lapse and thereafter filed a rectification

application. The present Writ Petition has subsequently been instituted

after considerable delay.

47. The pendency of the rectification application cannot confer

upon the Petitioner a fresh or extended period of limitation for

challenging the original adjudication order. Nor can the mere

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 13 of 15

pendency of such an application constitute a sufficient explanation for

the prolonged delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

48. The Court is also conscious of the fact that the Petitioner has

questioned the jurisdiction of Respondent No.2. Ordinarily, a plea of

lack of jurisdiction may warrant consideration notwithstanding the

availability of an alternative remedy. However, in the present case, as

noticed hereinabove, the jurisdictional objection itself is founded upon

the applicability of Section 6(2)(b), and the said provision is not

attracted since the two proceedings cannot, on the material placed

before this Court, be treated as proceedings on the same subject

matter.

49. The reliance placed by the Petitioner on the judgment of this

Court in Amit Gupta (supra) also does not alter the conclusion

reached herein. The said decision recognizes the statutory scheme

intended to prevent multiple proceedings on the same subject matter.

It does not dispense with the statutory requirement that the

proceedings sought to be interdicted must actually concern the same

subject matter. That foundational requirement is absent in the present

case.

50. The Petitioner’s contention that the DGGI proceedings had

exclusive jurisdiction merely because the investigation was first

initiated by the Anti-Evasion Branch and subsequently transferred to

the DGGI is also not sufficient to sustain the present petition. The

transfer of an investigation in respect of one set of allegations cannot,

in the absence of identity of subject matter, operate as a blanket ouster

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 14 of 15

of the jurisdiction otherwise available to another proper officer under

the GST enactment.

51. The Court is, therefore, unable to accept the submission that the

Show Cause Notice dated 29.05.2024 was rendered without

jurisdiction merely because the DGGI had earlier issued a Show

Cause Notice dated 31.03.2023 against the Petitioner and other

noticees.

52. The challenge to the Impugned Order is consequently liable to

fail on more than one ground.

i. First, the Petitioner had an efficacious statutory remedy

of appeal against the order dated 29.08.2024, which it failed to

avail within the prescribed period.

ii. Second, the present Writ Petition suffers from

unexplained delay and laches.

iii. Third, on merits also, the two proceedings are not shown

to concern the same subject matter so as to attract the bar under

Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.

iv. Fourth, the reliance upon Section 75(13) is misplaced

since no penalty has been shown to have been imposed upon the

Petitioner in the earlier proceedings for the same act or omission.

53. Before concluding, it is clarified that this Court has considered

the challenge only for the purpose of determining whether the

Petitioner has made out a case for exercise of the extraordinary writ

jurisdiction of this Court against the impugned proceedings. Nothing

W.P.(C) 13077/2026 Page 15 of 15

contained herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion on any

issue which may properly arise before the competent statutory

authority in accordance with law.

CONCLUSION:

54. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present Writ Petition is

found to be devoid of merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

55. The Petitioner may, in accordance with law, avail such remedy

as may be available against any order that may be passed by the

competent authority on its pending rectification application. If such

remedy is otherwise maintainable in law, the competent authority shall

consider the same in accordance with the applicable statutory

provisions. The observations made in the present order shall not be

construed as a final expression on the merits of any such proceedings.

56. All the pending applications stand closed.

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

RAJNEESH KUMAR GUPTA , J.

SEPTEMBER 25, 2026

s.godara/pal