CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 1 of 25

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 2026

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025)

New Okhla Industrial Development

Authority & Anr. ...Appellant (s)

Versus

Rajveer Singh & Ors. ...Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T

K. VINOD CHANDRAN , J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant is the requestioning authority, which is

aggrieved by the application filed by the party respondents;

directed to be entertained under Section 28A of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894

1

and allowed, by the impugned order.

3. The party respondents claim under their

predecessors-in-interest whose lands were proceeded

against under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Act of

1894 and acquired. An award was passed on 15.02.1977 and

1

Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1894’

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 2 of 25

the entire compensation, admittedly, was received by the

predecessors-in-interest, who did not file any application for

reference under Section 18 of the Act of 1894. But others,

whose lands were also acquired by the very same

notification, sought a reference under Section 18, which

though referred, was rejected by the Additional District

Judge, Ghaziabad, by a judgment and decree dated

25.11.1981. An appeal was filed therefrom under Section 54

of the Act of 1894, being First Appeal No.458 of 1982, which

by Annexure P1, was disposed of on 18.04.2022. The party

respondents, hence, filed an application under Section 28A

of the Act of 1894 on 23.05.2022, within three months from the

date of Annexure P1. No consideration having been carried

out, the applicants filed a writ petition, in which expeditious

decision was ordered. The application under Section 28A,

subsequently stood rejected as not maintainable since it was

filed on the basis of the decision passed in First Appeal and

not based on an order passed by the Reference Court under

Section 18 of the Act of 1894.

4. Various decisions were relied on by the applicants

before the High Court, in a challenge to the order of the

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 3 of 25

Collector. The High Court, by the impugned order, found that

the decision of a three Judge Bench in Union of India and

Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others

2

, regulated the

issue. Therein the three Judge Bench had categorically found

that the benefit under Section 28A accrues not only from the

first award passed on reference under Section 18 but also

from any one of the awards after coming into force of Section

28-A, right of determination not being confined to the earliest

award made by the Court. The said view was reaffirmed in

Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and

Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (HSIIDC)

and Another

3

wherein on an identical situation of the

reference being rejected, the entitlement to file an

application within three months from an award passed in an

appeal by the High Court, was permitted.

5. The questions, as to who would be entitled under

Section 28A and when the limitation commences, ha ve

engaged this Court’s attention in numerous cases. The

decisions having come from Benches of varying strength, we

2

(1995) 2 SCC 736

3

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3685

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 4 of 25

need to look at those decisions to put the law in the correct

perspective.

6. Pradeep Kumari

2

was by a three Judge Bench,

wherein the award was made by the Land Acquisition Officer

(LAO) and the respondents therein did not seek a reference

under Section 18, but other landowners did. Some of the

references were disposed of prior to 24.09.1984, on which

date, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984,

introduced Section 28A in the Act of 1894. The Union of India

(UoI) contended that the earliest award by the Reference

Court after Section 28A came into force, was on 27.12.1984.

The application filed by Pradeep Kumari was within the

period of three months from a subsequent award dated

21.02.1987. The Collector, under Section 28A awarded

enhanced compensation, equal to that in the subsequent

award. An appeal was filed before the High Court by the UoI.

One other landowner, Savitri Devi, sought for the benefit of a

decision dated 05.09.1986 of the High Court in an appeal, to

be extended to her, which application under Section 28A was

dismissed by the Collector, finding that Section 28A would

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 5 of 25

be available only on the basis of the award of the Reference

Court, which too was challenged before the High Court.

7. The High Court, in the challenge from the two orders

held that all that is required under Section 28A is that there

should be an award made under Part III of the Act by the

Court, in which an excess amount is allowed and Section 28A

nowhere provides that it should be the first award after

coming into force of the Amendment Act. The other

requirement under Section 28A was that the land of the

person applying, should be covered by the very same

notification which is the subject matter of the award of Court,

but such an application can be made only once before the

Collector. The claim of Savitri Devi was allowed on the basis

of another award made on 10.11.1986 while the enhancement

of compensation to Pardeep Kumari based on the award

dated 21.02.1987 was affirmed. The Civil Appeals filed

against the said orders were dismissed and the cited

decision was rendered in a review. Here we have to

immediately notice that the dictum in the three judge bench

was only that Section 28A could be invoked on any of the

successive awards made by the Refence Court.

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 6 of 25

8. Pradeep Kumari

2

visualized various situations,

especially, in the context of the introduction of Section 28A. It

was held that in the first award passed on reference, if the

applicant could not produce adequate evidence in support of

his claim for enhancement and in another reference

subsequently, such evidence is produced, then in the

subsequent award, there would be a higher amount

determined as compensation. There can be no restriction of

the benefit of Section 28A to the first award. If there be denial

of invocation of Section 28A after three months from the first

award, it results in redetermination of compensation only on

the basis of a lesser amount, depriving the benefit of the

larger amount subsequently granted, that too on a reference

from the very same acquisition notification.

9. The three Judge Bench also considered a situation

where the notification under Section 4(1) covers lands falling

in various villages and a number of references are made by

owners having lands in the different villages. An award may

be made with respect to one village, which the owner, in

another village who had not sought for a reference, would not

be aware of. But if there is a subsequent award made at the

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 7 of 25

instance of a person belonging to the same village, then

before the expiry of the period of three months from the date

of such award, a person of the same village would be entitled

to invoke Section 28A. If redetermination under Section 28A

is restricted to the first award made, such a construction

would result in perpetuating the inequality in payment of

compensation; which was sought to be removed by Section

28A, was the finding.

10. Section 28A, thus construed, was found to enable an

application, if the following conditions are satisfied:

i) An award has been made by the court under

Part III after the coming into force of Section 28-

A;

(ii) By the said award the amount of

compensation in excess of the amount awarded

by the Collector under Section 11 has been

allowed to the applicant in that reference;

(iii) The person moving the application under

Section 28A is interested in other land covered

by the same notification under Section 4(1) to

which the said award relates;

(iv) The person moving the application did not

make an application to the Collector under

Section 18;

(v) The application is moved within three months

from the date of the award on the basis of which

the redetermination of amount of compensation

is sought; and

(vi) Only one application can be moved under

Section 28A for redetermination of compensation

by an applicant.

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 8 of 25

11. It was thus held that the limitation for moving an

application under Section 28A will begin to run only from the

date of the award, on the basis of which, redetermination of

compensation is sought, especially in the context of the

introduction of Section 28A, while the references were

pending. We have to reiterate that Pradeep Kumari

2

only

contemplated invocation of Section 28A from an award under

Section 26 on a reference made under Section 18 and not

from an order in first appeal by the High Court.

12. A two Judge Bench doubted the proposition in

Pradeep Kumari

2

and referred it to a larger Bench. The Chief

Justice of India, following the time-honoured principle of a

two Judge Bench being disabled from making a reference of

a larger Bench decision; though entitled to doubt it, placed

the matter before the three Judge Bench itself, which was

considered in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese and

Another v. Land Acquisition Collector and Another

4

.

13. Jose Antonio Cruz

4

was concerned with two questions

as referred by the two Judge Bench. One, whether the award

4

(1996) 6 SCC 746

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 9 of 25

of the Court would include the appellate order under Section

54, or would be restricted to an award made under Section

26 on a reference under Section 18. Then, the question as to

whether each successive award or judgment and decree

would give a fresh cause of action to file an application under

Section 28A. Therein a certain parcel of land was sought to

be acquired and following the procedure in the Act of 1894,

the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation on

02.08.1972. A reference was made, in which the District

Judge revised and enhanced the compensation. In two other

awards, there was a larger enhancement granted. The High

Court reduced the enhancement and passed an award in First

Appeal. Within three months of the award of the High Court,

an application under Section 28A was filed, which was

dismissed on the ground of limitation from the award passed

on reference, having expired. Pradeep Kumari

2

was

specifically noticed and the three Judge Bench in Jose

Antonio Cruz

4

looked at the words employed in Section 28A,

which spoke of an amount of compensation allowed by a

Court, in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector

under Section 11 and found that it has reference only to a

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 10 of 25

Court to which a reference is made by a Collector under

Section 18. It was held that the limitation, hence, would start

to run from the date of the Reference Court’s order and not

from an order in appeal. The second question referred with

respect to entitlement arising under Section 28A from

successive awards or judgments and decrees, was held to be

not arising in that case and hence, the Bench refused to

answer the same.

14. Later, a different issue was referred to a Constitution

Bench which was considered in Union of India and Another

v. Hansoli Devi and Others

5

. The questions referred and

decided, is not relevant for our purpose, but we will refer to

it briefly, with one intent. Therein, the referred questions

were with respect to (i) whether dismissal of an application

seeking the reference on the ground of delay amounts to not

filing an application within the meaning of Section 28A and

(ii) entitlement of a person whose application was dismissed

on the ground of delay or on any other technical ground, to

maintain an application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894.

5

(2002) 7 SCC 273

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 11 of 25

The third question was as to whether a person who received

the compensation without demur, could be considered ‘a

person aggrieved’ under Section 28A. The Constitution

Bench categorically found that the dismissal of an application

seeking reference under Section 18, whatever be the

ground, would come within the ambit of Section 28A and such

landowner would be entitled to make an application

thereunder. As to the third question referred, it was held that

for the purpose of Section 28A, the receipt of compensation,

with or without protest, is of no consequence and the

landowner would definitely fall within the meaning of person

aggrieved under Section 28A.

15. We referred to the Constitution Bench only to

emphasize that the decisions in Pradeep Kumari

2

and Jose

Antonio Cruz

4

, was specifically noticed. It was found in

Paragraph 6 that Jose Antonio Cruz

4

,

observed that the

question as to entitlement on the basis of successive awards,

when arising in an appropriate case, could be referred. The

five Judge Bench held that the said observation indicates that

the three Judge Bench in Jose Antonio Cruz

4

doubted the

correctness of the ratio in Pradeep Kumari

2

. The legal

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 12 of 25

proposition in Pradeep Kumari

2

however still survives, as the

same has not been considered or even referred to a larger

Bench and we would defer to that. The ratio of Section 28A

being possible of invocation within three months of any

award passed by the Reference Court.

16. In Union of India and Another v. Hansoli Devi and

Others

6

, a two Judge Bench reaffirmed the principle laid

down in Jose Antonio Cruz

4

that the limitation of three months

has to be computed from the date of the award of the

Reference Court, on the basis of which, redetermination is

sought and not the order of the Appellate Court dealing with

the appeal against the order of the Reference Court.

17. Popat Bahiru Govardhane and Others v. Special

Land Acquisition Officer and Another

7

, was a case in which

the appellants, who were landowners, did not seek reference

under Section 18, while some others did, one of which, was

decided on 03.04.2006. The appellants applied for a certified

copy on 17.05.2006 and despite the copy being ready for

delivery on 29.04.2006, obtained it only on 03.06.2006.

6

(2010) 15 SCC 483

7

(2013) 10 SCC 765

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 13 of 25

Application under Section 28A was filed on 18.08.2006, which

was rejected on the ground of limitation. The argument of the

appellants was that since Section 28A is a beneficial

provision, it should be interpreted liberally, and limitation

should be considered and determined on equitable grounds.

Limitation, hence, should commence only from the date of

knowledge of the order or award, was the argument. This

Court rejected it on the settled legal proposition that the law

of limitation, though, may affect a particular party harshly,

nevertheless, it has to be applied with all its rigour when the

statute so prescribes.

18. Bharatsing s/o Gulabsingh Jakhad and Others v.

State of Maharashtra and Others

8, again was a case in which

the application of appellants for enhancement of

compensation based on awards, which are pending in appeal

before the High Court, was directed to be kept in abeyance

till the appeal is finally decided by the High Court. Therein,

the Collector proceeded to consider the application based

on the award of the Reference Court and when there was an

8

(2018) 11 SCC 92

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 14 of 25

enhancement made in appeal by the High Court, the fresh

application filed was rejected. A two Judge Bench held that

the principle of only a single application being maintainable,

though unassailable, since the appeal against the award was

pending before the High Court, the application under Section

28A ought to have been kept in abeyance by the Collector.

This was in reiteration of the principle that invocation of

Section 28A is possible only from an award of the Reference

Court and if an appeal is filed from the order of the reference

court, the consideration of the application shall be kept in

abeyance so as to facilitate any enhancement granted by the

High Court also inuring to the benefit of the applicant.

19. Now, we come to the second decision relied on in the

impugned order i.e., Banwari and Others

3, wherein the

situation was identical to the present case. On acquisition

being made, an award dated 01.03.2006 was passed by the

Collector. Certain landowners preferred a reference which

was rejected by the Reference Court by order dated

17.01.2012. The said landowners preferred a Regular First

Appeal before the High Court, in which the compensation

was redetermined and enhanced by the High Court on

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 15 of 25

02.05.2016. On 30.06.2016, an application under Section 28A

was filed before the Collector, as the applicants had not

sought for a reference under Section 18. A Division Bench of

this Court held so in Paragraph 15 relying on Pradeep

Kumari

2

:

“15. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the

First Appeal which was allowed by the High Court

vide judgment and order dated 2nd May 2016 was

in respect of the land which was covered by the

same notification under which notification the

appellants' land is also covered. It is also not in

dispute that the amount awarded by the High

Court in the said First Appeal is in excess of the

amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11

of the 1894 Act in the case of the land of the

appellants. It is also not in dispute that the

appellants had not made an application to the

Collector under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It is also

not in dispute that the application made by the

appellants under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act to

the Collector was within a period of three months

from the date of the judgment and order of the

High Court.”

20. This Court by the aforesaid decision conferred

entitlement on a landowner who has not sought for a

reference under Section 18, to make an application under

Section 28A, after an order being passed by the High Court

in First Appeal from the order of the Reference Court. At first

blush, this may look contrary to the decision in Jose Antonio

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 16 of 25

Cruz

4

and even Pradeep Kumari

2

, by two different three

Judge Benches and a two Judge Bench in Hansoli Devi

6. But,

on closer scrutiny, the distinction is insofar as the reference

under Section 18 by the other landowners having been

rejected without any enhancement. The first enhancement

was in First Appeal before the High Court, which identical

facts come out in the instant case.

21. Going by the proposition in Banwari and Others

3, it

can be found that when a reference under Section 18 is

rejected in toto, without any enhancement, no cause of action

arises under Section 28A. Only in that circumstance, when

there is an enhancement made by the High Court in First

Appeal, the landowner who had not sought for a reference

under Section 18, gets a benefit under Section 28A; the

enhancement having been made at the first instance and the

enabling provision under Section 28A having come to

operation only on such enhancement being granted.

22. However, in the present case, what is glaring is that by

Annexure P1-order, in First Appeal No.458 of 1982, the High

Court merely relied on an order in First Appeal No.593 of

1982, which was passed on 08.07.2019. Annexure P1 did not

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 17 of 25

create an entitlement at the first instance to make an

application under Section 28A as also it did not by itself grant

any enhancement of compensation. In fact, it is very clear

from Annexure P1 that the appellants therein were

concerned with the acquisition in the same village, under the

same notification, as in First Appeal No.593 of 1982; which

identical claim is raised by the party respondents herein. The

party respondent’s claim under Section 28A, limitation of

which commenced on 08.07.2019, stood barred on expiry of

three months therefrom.

23. Here we have to immediately notice the decision in

Popat Bahiru Govardhane and Others

7

, which held

unequivocally that the date on which limitation commences

under Section 28A, is the date of award and not the date of

knowledge. The date of first enhancement by the High Court

is on 08.07.2019, and the three-month limitation expires on

07.10.2019. There is no fresh limitation arising on 18.04.2022,

when Annexure P1 was passed, merely following the earlier

appellate order.

24. Learned Counsel for the party respondents had

vehemently contended based on Pradeep Kumari

2

that

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 18 of 25

when successive awards give rise to a fresh cause of action,

the appellate orders, if made successively, should give rise

to such entitlement under Section 28A, especially, in the

context of the beneficial legislation. However, we are

constrained to hold otherwise, noticing the context in which

the successive awards were found to have given rise to fresh

entitlement under Section 28A in Pradeep Kumari

2

.

25. In Pradeep Kumari

2

, after

Section 28A was

introduced, there were successive awards passed, the latter

enhancing compensation, more than the earlier awards. The

situation was such that, in the earlier references, the

enhancement was lesser than that in the latter ones, wherein

sufficient evidence was produced to commend a still higher

compensation. Then again, the three Judge Bench noticed the

difficulties insofar as a landowner in one village not being

aware of a reference made with respect to a land in another

village, covered by the same notification. This has no

application to the present case, since the specific case of the

party respondents was that their lands were in the same

village, as the lands covered by the order in First Appeal

No.458 of 1982, wherein the contention was identical with

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 19 of 25

reference to First Appeal No.593 of 1982, which was disposed

of in 2019. The lands of the respondents herein, were in the

same village as the lands in both the said appeals.

26. We cannot but also observe that the Constitution

Bench in Hansoli Devi

6 specifically spoke of the three Judge

Bench having doubted the proposition of a Co-ordinate

Bench in Pradeep Kumari

2

, with respect to successive

awards giving rise to fresh cause of action, which question

was not referred for consideration by a larger Bench only

because that question did not arise in the said case; nor does

it arise in the present case.

27. In the present case, we are bound by Banwari and

Others

3 which found the entitlement arising from an order

made by the High Court in First Appeal, though, contrary to

earlier Co-ordinate and a larger Bench decisions, but in the

peculiar circumstance of the reference having been rejected

and no cause of action under Section 28A having arisen on

the rejection of the reference. We are also bound by the

three Judge Bench decision in Pradeep Kumari

2

with respect

to successive awards and the context in which such a

declaration was made; which context of lands in different

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 20 of 25

villages being covered by successive awards or a later

award enhancing the earlier award, not arising in the present

case.

28. Learned Counsel for the respondent then relies on a

two Judge Bench decision of this Court in Andanayya and

Ors. v. Deputy Chief Engineer and Ors.

9, wherein the

Division Bench relied on Babua Ram and Ors. v. State of U.P.

and Anr.

10, Bharatsing s/o Gulabsingh Jakhad

8 and Pradeep

Kumari

2 to find that even a second application made under

Section 28A of the Act, after an award is passed by the High

Court would be maintainable, applying the doctrine of

merger. We are unable to accept the said proposition, with

respect, especially looking at Section 28A in its entirety. At

the risk of repetition, sub-section (1) as has been held by this

Court in the various decisions referred to by us, allows a land

owner aggrieved by the award of the Collector, despite a

reference not having been sought under Section 18, to make

an application to redetermine the compensation; if in a

reference by another land owner under the same notification,

9

2026 SCC OnLine SC 482

10

(1995) 2 SCC 689

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 21 of 25

there has been enhancement of compensation by the

Reference Court, within three months from the date of such

award by the Reference Court. Sub-section (2) empowers the

Collector to redetermine the compensation and make an

award on an application under sub-section (1). Pertinently

sub-section (3) enables the applicant under sub-section (1)

to seek for a reference from an award under sub-section (2)

of Section 28A, if he is not satisfied with the award.

29. Section 28A hence, can be invoked only from an award

of the Reference Court. However, after the application is filed

under Section 28A, if an appeal is pending before the High

Court, the proper procedure would be for the Collector to

keep it in abeyance as held in Bharatsing s/o Gulabsingh

Jakhad

8. Yet again if an applicant makes an application under

Section 28A within time and compensation is enhanced, as

per the award of the Reference Court, then the applicant

could seek for a reference under sub-section (3) and if later

the appeal before the High Court is disposed of; further

enhancing compensation, necessarily the Reference Court

would be bound by such enhancement.

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 22 of 25

30. Be that as it may, the said issue does not have any

application in the present case and hence despite doubting

the proposition, where the learned Judges went a step ahead

from Bharatsing

8, we do not think a reference is expedient in

the facts of the present case. This proposition, if accepted,

would result in an application for enhancement based on the

award in First Appeal, which stands contrary to the decision

of a three Judge Bench in Jose Antonio Cruz

4

and a two Judge

Bench in Hansoli Devi

6. Even in Pradeep Kumari

2

, the three

Judge Bench dealing with the appeal of Savitri Devi, invoking

Section 28A on the basis of an order in First Appeal, allowed

it only as against the award of the Reference Court dated

10.11.1986. Andanayya

9 hence would be directly in conflict

with two three Judge Bench decisions and a Coordinate

Bench decision.

31. Babua Ram

10 was overruled in Pradeep Kumari

2,

insofar as an application under Section 28A having been

restricted to the first award made after a reference under

Section 18. Pradeep Kumari

2 held that successive awards of

the Reference Court could also lead to an application under

Section 28A. As we noticed in Pradeep Kumari

2, one of the

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 23 of 25

appeals was concerned with the application made by Savitri

Devi, who sought for enhancement as per the award of the

High Court in a first appeal. The High Court while extending

the benefit of the enhanced compensation, referred to an

award made by the District Judge on 10.11.1986 in another

Land Reference No.15 of 1984 (Para 2), impliedly rejecting

the contention that an application would lie from an order in

appeal by the High Court; which was upheld by this Court.

32. Babua Ram

10 relied on by the learned Judges in

Andanayya

9, in paragraph 39 only noticed that if an

application is filed within time from an award by the

Reference Court enhancing the compensation and there is an

appeal pending from that, the application be kept pending

till the appeal is decided since there could be a benefit of

further enhancement by the High Court conferred on the

applicant by the doctrine of merger. This proposition, in fact

recognises the disability of an applicant who has once filed

an application under Section 28 A and got the compensation

redetermined to file further application under Section 28A

after the High Court passes the order in first appeal. The

proposition would also go against the authoritative

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 24 of 25

pronouncement of Pradeep Kumari

2, a three Judge Bench

specifically with respect to condition (vi) stipulated therein;

of only one application under Section 28A , for

redetermination of compensation by an applicant being

permitted.

33. In support of the three Judge Bench in Pradeep

Kumari

2

and Jose Antonio Cruz

4

and a two Judge Bench in

Hansoli Devi

6 as to disentitlement of an application under

Section 28A, from an order in appeal under section 54, when

there is enhancement granted under Section 26, we again

notice sub-section (3) of Section 28-A. Sub-section (3)

provides for a further remedy of reference if the award

passed under sub-section (2) is not acceptable; which

definitely cannot arise when the enhancement is granted by

the High Court in an appeal from the award, made under

Section 26. Hence, the device of an application under Section

28A, from an order in appeal, when the reference is declined

by the reference court, is a caussus omissus, ensuring the

beneficial legislation not being stultified in the event of a

reference under Section 18 being rejected as laid down in

CA@ SLP (C) No.18801 of 2025 Page 25 of 25

Banwari and Ors.

3; a situation not contemplated by the

legislature, obviously.

34. We also have to emphasize that there is no question of

successive orders in First Appeal, conferring fresh cause of

action under Section 28A, since in First Appeal, the High

Court being a Court of Record is bound by an order passed

at the first instance, by a Coordinate Bench.

35. We, hence, allow the appeal, setting aside the

impugned order and rejecting the application under Section

28-A of the Act of 1894.

36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand rejected.

.......…….……………………. J.

(J. B. PARDIWALA)

....……….……………………. J.

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN )

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 21, 2026.