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PETITIONER:

PRITAM PAL

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH,JABALPUR THROUGH REGISTRAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/02/1992

BENCH:

PANDIAN, S.R. (J)

BENCH:

PANDIAN, S.R. (J)

REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)

CITATION:

1992 AIR 904 1992 SCR (2) 864

1993 SCC Supl. (1) 529 JT 1992 (2) 41

1992 SCALE (1)416

ACT:

Constitution of India, 1950:

Articles 129 and 215-Contempt Jurisdiction-Power of

Supreme Court/High Court to punish for Contempt of itself-

Whether could be curtailed or abridged by ordinary

legislation or Rules-Procedure for contempt proceedings

being summary, power to be used sparingly-Procedure to be

fair and contemner to be given an opportunity of defending

himself.

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

Sections 2(b), 17 and 20-Criminal Contempt-Advocate,

practising at High Court making libellous allegations

against sitting High Court Judges-Whether amounts to

interference with administration of justice and affects the

image, dignity and high esteem of office of judge of High

Court-Sentence of two months' simple imprisonment awarded by

High Court-Whether justified.

HEADNOTE:

The appellant, an Advocate practising in the High Court

was earlier working in the Defence Accounts Department, on

re-employment, after retiring from the Army. He had filed a

Writ Petition before the High Court, claiming certain

benefits like pension, gratuity, pay and allowances etc.,

pertaining to the service rendered by him in the Defence

Accounts Department and the Army. The High Court dismissed

the Writ Petition. It also dismissed the appellant's review

application. This Court also dismissed his Special Leave

Petition against the High Court's order.

Thereafter, the appellant, moved a Contempt Petition

under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 making

some serious allegations against the two Judges of the High

Court, who dismissed his Writ Petition and also the Review

Petition. A Division Bench of the High Court summarily

dismissed the contempt petition.

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Meanwhile, the Registry of the High Court examined the

allegations made in the affidavit filed by the appellant

under Rule 5 of the Rules regarding contempts framed by the

High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court, before which

the matter was placed on the order of the Chief Justice,

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took cognizance of the criminal contempt and directed issue

of notice to the appellant directing him to show cause as to

why he should not be punished for contempt of Court. The

appellant filed his reply raising certain preliminary

objections, contending that the notice was bad for the

reasons that (1) the Section of the Act under which

cognizance had been taken was not specifically mentioned;

(2) the notice did not show sufficient cause as to why the

words and expressions used in the offending portions marked

had been construed as contemptuous (3) the procedure

followed by the High Court was contrary to the rules framed

by it; and (4) no consent of the Advocate General had been

obtained, and prayed for discharge of the rule of contempt.

Meanwhile, on the basis of the High Court's Order, the

appellant inspected the Court records relating to this

matter, and thereafter, he was also informed that the

proceedings were under the provisions of Article 215 of the

Constitution of India.

After examining the remarks made by the appellant in his

contempt petition the High Court rejected the objections of

the appellant/contemner and held that the contemner was

guilty of criminal contempt of not only scandalising the

Court and lowering its authority but also substantially

interfering with the due course of justice. Taking note of

the defiant attitude of the contemner who even did not think

it necessary to apologise but tried to justify the

aspersions, the High Court sentenced the contemner to suffer

simple imprisonment for two months.

In the appeal before this Court, the contemner who

appeared before the Court in person, contended that the

order of the High Court should be set aside on the ground of

procedural irregularities in that (1) that the offending

remarks had not been communicated to him as per Rules 5 and

9 framed by the High Court; (2) that the cognizance of the

criminal contempt had not been taken in conformity with

Section 15 of the Act; (3) that the procedure, after

cognizance as prescribed under Section 17 of the Act had not

been followed; and (4) that Article 215 of the Constitution

of India did not prescribe any procedure to be followed. He

866

also contended that he had not been given a fair and full

hearing and that the Judges had browbeaten and unjustly

convicted him ignoring the well settled principle that every

person had an inalienable right of making fair criticism,

and that the order in question was pre-conceived and pre-

judged one. In his written statement also he made certain

remarks about the Judges of the High Court, in attempting to

justify his action which had led to the initiation of

proceedings for contempt of Court before the High Court.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: 1.1 The power conferred upon the Supreme Court and

the High Court, being Courts of Record under Articles 129

and 215 of the Constitution respectively, is an inherent

power and the jurisdiction vested is a special one not

derived from any other statute, but derived only from

Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India.

Therefore, the constitutionally vested right cannot be

either abridged by any legislation including Contempt of

Courts Act or abrogated or cut down. Nor can they be

controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision of

the Code of Criminal Procedure or any Rules. The special

feature of the procedure to be followed in a contempt

proceeding being summary procedure, which is recognised not

only in India but also abroad, the caution that has to be

observed in exercising this inherent power by summary

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procedure is that the power should be used sparingly, that

the procedure to be followed should be fair and that the

contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and

given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. [883B-D]

Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of

the PEPSU High Court, [1954] SCR 454; R.L. Kapur v. State of

Madras, [1972] 1 SCC 651; Delhi Judicial Service Association

v. State of Gujarat, [1991] 4 SCC 406; S. Mulgaokar, [1978]

3 SCC 339; Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The State of

Uttar Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1169; and D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan

Lal, [1988] 3 SCC 26 relied on.

Hira Lal Dixit v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 743;

Advocate General, Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries, [1980] 3

SCC 311; Ashram M. Jain v. A.T. Gupta, [1983] 4 SCC 125 and

M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and

867

Haryana, [1991] 3 SCC 600, referred to.

State of Bombay v. P. 1958 Bom. Law Reporter, (60) Page

873, referred to.

Clements and the Republic Costa Rica v. Erlanger, [1877]

46 L.J. Ch. 375 page 383, Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307,

9 S.Ct. 77 80 (1888); Matsusow v. United Sates, 229 F.2d

335, 339 (5th Cir.) 1956; Sukhdev Singh Sodhi, C.K.

Daphtary; Re Abdool v. Mahtab, (1867) 8 WR Cr. 32 page 33;

1900 (2) Q.B. 36 at 40; Andre Paul v. Attorney General, AIR

1936 PC 141, Attorney General v. Butterworth, (1963) 1 Q.B.

696; Reg. v. Odham's Press Ltd. Ex parte A.G., (1957) 1 Q.B.

73; Morris, v. The Crown Office, (1970) 1 All.E.R. 1079,

1081, Offutt v. U.S., (1954) 348 US 11 Jennison v. Baker,

[1972] 1 All ER 997 1006, referred to.

Belchamber's Practice of the Civil Court, 1884 Ed. P.

241; Contempt of Court. By Oswald and Halbury's Law of

England (4th Edition) by Lord Hailsham page 3, referred to.

1.2. In the instant case, the offending criticism and

the scandalising allegations made by the appellant/contemner

are most fatal and dangerous obstruction of justice shaking

the confidence of the public in the administration of

justice and calling for a more rapid and immediate punitive

action. These calculated contemptuous remarks and the

sweeping allegations are derogatory in character, not only

to the dignity of the Judges and casting aspersions on their

conduct in the discharge of their judicial functions but

also wounds the dignity of the Court. It is highly painful

to note that the appellant/contemner who is none other than

an Advocate practising in the same highest Court of the

State after having failed to wrench a decision in his favour

in his own cause which he prosecuted as party in person has

escalatingly scandalised the Court by making libellous

allegations which are scurrilous, highly offensive, vicious,

intimidatory, malacious and beyond condonable limit. Even a

cursory reading of the remarks made against the Judge of the

High Court unambiguously show that the potentially

prejudicial utterances and the outrageous allegations

rumbustiously and invectively made by the contemner with

malicious design of attempting to impair the administration

of justice have struck a blow on the judiciary and also

seriously sullied the image, dignity and high esteem which

the office of the Judge of the High Court carried with it

and thus impeded the course of justice by fouling its source

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and stream. The incident in question is a flagrant onslaught

on the independence of the judiciary, destructive of the

orderly administration of justice and a challenge to the

supremacy of the Rule of Law. The maxim "Salus populi

suprema lex", that is, "the welfare of the people is the

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supreme law" adequately enunciates the idea of law. This can

be achieved only when justice is administered lawfully,

judicially, without fear or favour and without being

hampered and thwarted, and this cannot be effective unless

respect for it is fostered and maintained. [888E-H,889A-C]

1.3.To punish an Advocate for Contempt of Court, no

doubt, must be regarded as an extreme measure, but to

preserve the proceedings of the Courts from the being

deflected or interfered with, and to keep the streams of

justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of

the Court, though painful, to punish the contemner in order

to preserve its dignity. No one can claim immunity from the

operation of the law of contempt, if his act or conduct in

relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is

calculated to obstruct the due course of justice. In view of

the heinous type of scandalising the Court, the finding of

the High Court that the appellant/contemner has made himself

guilty of criminal contempt is confirmed. [889D-E]

1.4 As regards the sentence, it is clear from the order

of the High Court that the appellant had adopted a defiant

attitude and tried to justify the aspersions made by him

even without thinking it necessary to apologise. Before this

Court also, the appellant has neither expressed any

contrition nor has he any repentance for the vicious

allegations made against the Judges of the High Court. But,

on the other hand, he has exhibited a dogged determination

to pursue the matter, come what may. A reading of his

memorandum of grounds and the written and signed arguments

show that he was ventured into another bout of allegations

against the High Court Judges and persisted in his campaign

of vilification. His conduct in this Court has aggravated

rather than mitigating his offence. [889F-H]

1.5. Therefore, having regard to the sentencing policy

that punishment should be commensurate with the gravity of

the offence, the sentence of 2 months' imprisonment in no

way calls for interference and is accordingly confirmed.

[890A]

JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 258

of 1981.

869

From the Judgment and Order dated 12th Feb. 1981 of the

Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Criminal Case No. 617 of

1980.

Appellant in person.

Uma Nath Singh for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN,J. The appellant, Mr. Pritam Pal

Dhingra is a practising Advocate in the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh at Jabalpur, having joined the Bar on 4.2.1979.

Earlier to joining the Bar, he was serving in the Army and

retired on 23.12.65. Thereafter, he was re-employed in the

Defence Accounts Department on 7.2.1966 as U.D.C. (Auditor).

On 29.2.76, the appellant served three months' notice of

resignation upon the departmental authorities for the

reasons mentioned in the said notice and also requested to

pay him the contributory provident fund benefits for his 10

years service though the date of his superannuation in the

said post was 30.9.1986. The Department not only refused to

accept his resignation but also did not relieve him even

after the expiry of three months. According to the

appellant, there was neither any departmental enquiry

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pending nor contemplated against him during those three

months i.e. between 29.2.76 and 31.5.76. However, a charge

sheet dated 21.12.76 for imposing a major penalty on a

complaint by Jt. C.D.A. Vehicle Factory was served on him

to which he submitted his written statement. Then he served

a final quit notice w.e.f. 8.1.77. Though on the basis of

the show cause notice, an enquiry was started, nothing came

out of it. Therefore, the appellant moved the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur by filing Writ Petition M.P. No.

786 of 1978 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

sworn on 27.11.78 requesting several prayers inclusive of

issuance of directions to the respondent therein (the

departmental authorities) to accept his resignation so as to

enable him to take any other profession of his liking and to

declare the retention of his service against his will after

31.5.1976 as illegal and malafide and to re-imburse pay and

allowances for the period of his enforced absence after the

expiry of three months notice period etc. The High Court

issued show cause notice to the respondents 1 to 3 in the

Writ Petition. The respondent No. 3 thereafter accepted the

resignation dated 29.2.76 of the appellant w.e.f. 15.1.79 by

870

which time the appellant claims to have completed 31 years

of combined military and civil service i.e. from 29.11.47 to

15.1.79. Meanwhile, the departmental enquiry initiated

against him was dropped. Then the appellant submitted

supplemental applications praying that his resignation

should be converted into one of voluntary retirement and

that his military services should be counted with civil

service and that he should be given all service benefits

like pension, gratuity etc. as well as consequential

benefits on account of the delay in acceptance of his

resignation. Two applications being I.A.No. 908/79 and I.A.

No. 4246/78 were filed by the appellant, they being one for

amendment of the petition and the other for taking some

additional grounds. Both applications were allowed by a

Division Bench of the High Court comprising of Mr. Justice

J.S. Verma (as he then was) and Mr. Justice U.N. Bachawat,

as the counsel for the respondents had no objection and

granted one week time for incorporating the amendments in

the petition. At the request of the counsel for the

respondent, Shri R.P. Sinha, the Court granted two weeks

time to file the additional return by order dated 16.3.79.

The case was listed for further hearing on 2.4.79 on which

date the writ petition was dismissed. The appellant then on

16.4.79 moved an application to review the order dated

2.4.79. The application was registered as M.C.C. No. 209 of

1979. This application was too dismissed on 23.4.79 with the

following observation:

"The grievance of the petitioner in this review

petition is that the writ petition (M.P. No.

786/78) was dismissed in motion hearing without

hearing the petitioner. The substance of the order

dismissing the Writ Petition in motion hearing as

stated earlier indicates that this averment made by

the petitioner is not correct. We also distinctly

recollect that the petitioner was heard fully on

the question of admission and it was only

thereafter that the petition was dismissed by

dictating that order in the Court in the presence

of the petitioner. We would, therefore, reiterate

that this grievance of the petitioner that he was

not heard at the time of motion hearing is wholly

incorrect.

The submissions made by the petitioner in support

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of this review application are (1) that there is

error apparent on the face of the record because

the writ petition was dismissed in motion hearing

without hearing the petitioner; (2) that, sum-

871

marily dismissal of the writ petition was arbitrary

because after notice had been issued to the

respondents 1 to 3 show cause why the petition be

not admitted, it was incumbent on the Court to

admit the writ petition and hear both sides at

length before passing any order; and (3) that, on

account of above position, the petitioner was not

given a fair deal before dismissing the writ

petition in motion hearing.

As earlier stated, the petitioner was heard fully

at the end of motion hearing and so also the

counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 3, Shri R.P.

Sinha. The main averment on the basis of which all

the aforesaid submissions are based, i.e. lack of

full opportunity to the petitioner is, therefore,

wholly non-existent. We are constrained to observe

that in making these submissions, the petitioner

who is now enrolled as an Advocate, has not been

fair to the Court. The petitioner who is now

enrolled as a lawyer was expected to exhibit at

least the minimum decorum and sense of

responsibility which is expected from a members of

this noble profession. We are pained to observe

that the petitioner took a very unreasonable

attitude and exhibited a behaviour which could not

be appreciated even by the member of the Bar who

were present when this order was being dictated in

the Court room after the hearing. However, taking

into account the fact that the petitioner is a new

entrant in the Bar, we have chosen not to take

serious notice of the conduct of the petitioner in

the hope that the petitioner having now become a

member of the Bar will try to follow the high

traditions of the Bar which he has chosen to join.

There is no merit in this Review application. It is

summarily dismissed."

On being aggrieved by the above order of dismissal dated

2.4.79, the appellant filed Special Leave Petition No. 570

of 1979 before this Court but was not successful as the SLP

was dismissed on 25.7.79.

The appellant on being disturbed by the dismissal of his

Writ Petition moved a Contempt Petition on 16.4.80 under

Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter

referred to as `the Act') making some

872

serious allegations against the two Hon'ble Judges of the

High Court who dismissed his Writ Petition on 2.4.79 and

thereafter the Review Petition on 23.4.79 and also impleaded

Shri R.P. Sinha as the third respondent in that petition.

According to the appellant, the contempt petition was

registered as M.C.C. No. 136 of 1980 and placed before a

Division Bench on 29.4.1980 which after hearing the

appellant summarily dismissed contempt petition.

While it was so, the Registry of the High Court examined

the allegations made in the affidavit filed by the appellant

in M.C.C. No. 136/80 under Rule 5 of Rules regarding

contempts framed by the High Court (Notification No. 8958 -

Nagpur dated the 24th October, 1953) and placed the matter

before the learned Chief Justice of the said High Court who

on that motion/reference passed an order on 2.5.1980 to

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place the matter before a Division for further action. The

Division Bench before which the matter was placed took

cognizance of criminal contempt and directed issue of notice

on 13.5.80 to the appellant directing to show cause as to

why he should not be punished for contempt of Court to which

the appellant filed his reply raising certain preliminary

objections stating that the notice was bad for the reasons,

namely, (1) The Section of the Act under which cognizance

had been taken was not specifically mentioned; (2) Though

the offending portions are marked the notice does not show

sufficient cause as to why the words and expressions used

therein have been construed as contemptuous; (3) The

procedure followed by the High Court was contrary to the

rules framed by it; and (4) No consent of the Advocate

General has been obtained. The appellant, on the basis of

the above objections prayed to discharge the rule of

contempt.

On 11.7.80 when the case came up for hearing, the

learned Advocate General filed his reply to the preliminary

objection and served a copy of the same to the appellant. On

the same day, the High Court passed an order reading thus:

"........The Government Advocate further gives

notice to the respondent that the contempt

proceedings are under Art. 215 of the Constitution.

Let the respondent take inspection of the original

record in case he would like to know the offending

portions marked both

873

underlined and side marked and let him file his

reply on merits within 15 days."

Admittedly, the appellant inspected the Court records

relating to this matter. Even thereafter when the appellant

persistently requested as under what Section of the Act he

has been charged, he was informed that the proceedings were

under the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution of

India.

For the proper understanding of the issue in question,

we feel that it would be necessary to reproduce the

offending words and passages as appearing in the contempt

petition. They are as follows:

"7. That on 2.4.79, when the case came up for

hearing, the judicial process required that it was

the non-applicant, Shri R.P.Sinha who should have

been heard in the first instance and he should have

been asked by the Court whether he has filed the

addition return but on account of misfortune of the

petitioner and misconduct of the Presiding Judge,

Justice Shri J.S. Verma that he while coming out of

the chamber and occupying the seat in the temple of

justice called out the petitioner and told him that

after the acceptance of the resignation, the

petition had become infructuous as such he was

dismissing it summarily. The petitioner was shocked

to witness the most illegal and unconstitutional

legal process adopted by the Hon'ble

Judge..............................................

...... When the petitioner started arguing his case

that his Fundamental Rights were infringed, the

Hon'ble Presiding Judge not only stopped the

petitioner from arguing his case but threatened him

for dire consequences in case the petitioner argued

any more. This amounts to desacrilege the sanctity

of his own Court by the Judges.

8. .......................

9. ....... The Review Petition was heard by the

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same Bench in utter disregard of judicial cannon

since no person against whom serious allegations

have been levelled (against) can be a Judge in his

own case. The Review Petition was also

874

rejected summarily repeating the false averments

more in explicit terms that they heard the

petitioner as well as the counsel for the

respondents thus super-imposing the seal of truth

over the falsehood.

GROUNDS

1. The petitioner charges the Hon'ble Court

especially Justice J.S. Verma for adopting a most

illegal and unconstitutional judicial process in

utter disregard of cannons and principles of

adjudication, for showing rude behaviour towards

the petitioner. The amounts to desacrilege the

sanctity of his Court.

2. That when the attention of Justice Verma was

drawn on 2.4.79, that he was violating the legal

process, he misbehaved with the petitioner without

any valid reason which amounts to misconduct of the

Judges.

3. That again on 23.4.1979 when the Review Petition

was being argued, he threatened the

applicant/petitioner for dire consequences for no

valid reasons.

4. That the High Court is a Temple of Justice and

the Judges who occupy the seat of justice are just

like Dharamraj. Dharamraj's are not supposed to

utter falsehood atleast while occupying this sacred

seat of Justice. The Hon'ble Judges have not only

uttered falsehood in their order dated 2.4.79 (

Annexure `B') but super - imposed their false

averments in their order dated 23.4.79 in which

they stated that they distinctly recollect that the

petitioner as well as the counsel for the

respondents were heard. The petitioner's charge

that they do not remember as to what they

heard................

5. ...............................................

6. The charge against Justice U.N. Bachawat (the

associate Judge) is that he silently witnessed the

proceedings throughout. He never uttered a single

word or intervened when his senior faltered out and

succumbed to the false averments

875

of the Presiding Judge as if was not an independent

Judge but serving faithfully and obediently to his

master.

7. ...............................................

8. That the petitioner avers that both the

contemner Judges have acted and bad faith and have

fouled the seat of justice by clear malafides act

of theirs and as such no protection can be extended

to them under cover a bonafide act done in good

faith as Judges.

9. That both the Judges have violated the sanctity

attached to the seat of Justice and have committed

a Contempt of their own Court. Both have acted

malafidely in bad faith.

PRAYER

It is, therefore, prayed that Contempt Proceedings

under Section 16 of the Contempt of Court Act,

1971, may be initiated against Justice J.S. Verma

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and Justice U.N. Bachawat of the Madhya Pradesh

High Court on the aforesaid grounds."

The High Court after examining the above scandalising

remarks made by the appellant in his contempt petition

rejected the objections of the appellant/contemner holding

that the cognizance of the criminal contempt was taken by it

on suo moto, that the contemner was informed that the Court

was invoking its jurisdiction under Article 215 of

Constitution of India to punish him for contempt, that the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not confer any new

jurisdiction by its authority, that in a suo moto action by

the High Court, consent of the Advocate General was not

necessary, that non quoting of the provisions Section in the

notice is immaterial and that the contemner had full notice

of the charge of contempt levelled against him and

concluded, "We see no defect in the notice served upon the

contemner, nor do we find defect in the procedure followed."

Then after referring to certain decisions of this Court

in Perspective Publications v. State of Maharashtra, [1969]

2 SCR 779; C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, [1971] 1 SCC 626 and

Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of

876

Orissa High Court, [1974] 1 SCC 374, the High Court made the

following observation with reference to the facts of the

case:

"16. The offending portions in paras 7 and 9, and

repeated in grounds 1,2,3 and 4,8 and 9 attribute

to Mr. Justice J.S. Verma (a) improper motive, (b)

unfairness and undue basis in dealing with the

case, (c) being a Judge who administers justice in

a cursory manner without giving thought to the

points involved, (d) of being intemperate in

language, impatient and unjust, (e) who would arise

false proceedings and when falsity has been brought

his notice, would have the audacity to stick to the

falsehood.

17. If the words have this import, the inevitable

effect is undermining the confidence of the public

in the judiciary. The person who has indulged in

scurrilous abuse of the Judge, must suffer in

punishment."

On the basis of the above observations, the High Court

recorded its finding thus:

"20. In our reading of the offending portions duly

marked in paras 7,9 and grounds 1,2,3 and 4,8 and 9

of the application dated 16.4.1980 in the context

in which they have been written, there are

imputations of malafides, bias and prejudice

against Mr. Justice J.S. Verma. The contempt

involved in these passages is grossly scandalous.

21. Coming to the allegations in Ground No. 6

relating to Mr. Justice Bachawat, it was said that

"he silently witnessed the proceedings. He never

uttered a single word or intervened when his senior

faltered and succumbed to false averments of the

Presiding Judge as if he was not an independent

Judge but serving faithfully and obediently his

master."

Finally, the High Court held that the contemner, Mr.

Pritam Lal is guilty of criminal contempt of not only

scandalising the Court and lowering its authority but also

substantially interfering with the due course of justice.

Coming to the question of sentence, the High Court taking

note of the defiant attitude of the contemner who even did

not think it necessary to

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877

apologise but tried to justify the aspersions, sentenced the

contemner to suffer simple imprisonment for two months.

Hence the present appeal.

The Contemner, Mr. Pritam Lal appeared before us in

person and advanced his arguments which are similar to the

submissions made before the High Court, inter alia

contending that the impugned order of the High Court should

be set aside with costs and suitable compensation on the

ground of procedural irregularities in that (1) that the

offending remarks have not been communicated to him as per

Rules 5 and 9 framed by the High Court; (2) that the

cognizance of the criminal cotmpt has not been taken in

conformity with Section 15 of the Act; (3) that the

procedure after cognizance as prescribed under Section 17 of

the Act has not been followed; and (4) that Article 215 of

the Constitution of India does not prescribe any procedure

to be followed. According to him he has not been given a

fair and full hearing but on the other hand, the learned

Judges have browbeaten and unjustly convicted him ignoring

the well settled principle that every person has got an

inalienable right of making fair criticism. He has further

added that the impugned order was pre-conceived and pre-

judged one. In addition to the oral arguments, he has filed

detailed written arguments, signed on 15.11.88 citing a

number of decisions which in our view, do not have any

relevance to the facts of the case. In the written

submissions also, he has again made certain outrageous and

contemptuous remarks about the Judges of the High Court, in

attempting to justify his action which has led to the

initiation of the proceedings of contempt of Court before

the High Court.

As rightly pointed out by the High Court, these

contentions in our opinion do not merit any consideration

since every High Court which is a Court of Record is vested

with `all powers' of such Court including the power to

punish for contempt of itself and has inherent jurisdiction

and inalienable right to uphold its dignity and authority.

Whilst Article 129 deals with the power of the Supreme

Court as Court of Record, Article 215 which is analogous to

Article 129 speaks of the power of the High Court in that

respect.

Prior to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it was held

that the High Court has inherent power to deal with a

contempt of itself summarily and

878

to adopt its own procedure, provided that it gives a fair

and reasonable opportunity to the contemner to defend

himself. But the procedure has now been prescribed by

Section 15 of the Act in exercise of the powers conferred by

Entry 14, List III of the Seventh Schedule of the

Constitution. Though the contempt jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court and the High Court can be regulated by

legislation by appropriate Legislature under Entry 77 of

List I and Entry 14 of List III in exercise of which the

Parliament has enacted the Act 1971, the contempt

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court is

given a constitutional foundation by declaring to be `Courts

of Record' under Articles 129 and 215 of the constitution

and, therefore, the inherent power of the Supreme Court and

the High Court cannot be taken away by any legislation short

of constitutional amendment. In fact, Section 22 of the Act

lays down that the provisions of this Act shall be in

addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any

other law relating to contempt of courts. It necessarily

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follows that the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court and the High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot

be curtailed by anything in the Act of 1971. The above

position of law has been well settled by this Court in

Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges and

Judges of the PEPSU High Court, [1954] SCR 454 holding thus:

"In any case, so far as contempt of a High Court

itself is concerned, as distinct from one of a

subordinate Court, the Constitution vests these

rights in every High Court, so no Act of a

legislature could take away that jurisdiction and

confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority."

It has been further observed:

"The High Court can deal with it summarily and

adopt its own procedure. All that is necessary is

that the procedure is fair and that, the contemner

is made aware of the charge against him and given a

fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself."

In R.L. Kapur v. State of Madras, [1972] 1 SCC 651 a

question arose did the power of the High Court of Madras to

punish contempt of itself arise under the Contempt of

Courts Act, 1952 so that under Section 25 of the General

Clauses Act, 1897, Sections 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and

879

the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure

would apply. This question was answered by this Court in the

following words:

"The answer to such a question is furnished by

Article 215 of the Constitution and the provisions

of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 themselves.

Article 215 declares that every High Court shall

be a court of record and shall have all powers of

such a court including the power to punish for

contempt of itself. Whether Article 215 declares

the power of the High Court already existing in it

by reason of its being a court of record, or

whether the article confers the power as inherent

in a court of record, the jurisdiction is a special

one, not arising or derived from the Contempt of

Courts Act, 1952, and therefore, not within the

purview of either the Penal Code or the Code of

Criminal Procedure."

After giving the above answer to the query raised, this

Court has reiterated the view held in the case of Sukhdev

Singh Sodhi (referred supra).

The view expressed in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi and followed

in R.L. Kapur been referred with approval in a recent

decision in Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of

Gujarat, [1991] 4 SCC 406, holding that the view of this

Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi is "that even after the

codification of the law of contempt in India, the High

Court's jurisdiction as a Court of Record to initiate

proceedings and take seisin of the matter remained

unaffected by the contempts of Courts Act, 1926."

Beg, C.J. in Re S. Mulgaokar, [1978] 3 SCC 339 has

explained the special power of the Supreme Court under

Article 129 stating. "This Court is armed, by Article 129 of

the Constitution, with very wide and special powers, as a

Court of Record, to punish its contempts."

In Delhi Judicial Service Association case (supra), it

has been pointed out as follows:

"Article 129 provides that the Supreme Court shall

be a court of record and shall have all the powers

of such a court including the power to punish for

contempt of itself. Article 215 contains

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880

similar provisions in respect of a High Court. Both

the Supreme Court as well as High Courts are courts

of record having powers to punish for contempt

including the power to punish for contempt of

itself."

Yet another question whether the provisions of the Code

of Criminal Procedure are applicable to such Proceedings,

has been negatively answered by this Court in Sukhdev Singh

Sodhi case (supra) stating thus:

"We hold therefore that the Code of Criminal

Procedure does not apply in matters of contempt

triable by the High Court. The High Court can deal

with it summarily and adopt its own procedure. All

that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and

that the contemner is made aware of the charge

against him and given a fair and reasonable

opportunity to defend himself."

See also Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The State

of Uttar Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1169.

From the above judicial pronouncements of this Court, it

is manifestly clear that the power of the Supreme Court and

the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied under

Articles 129 and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and

trammelled by any ordinary legislation including the

provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and their inherent

power is elastic, unfettered and not subjected to any limit.

It would be appropriate, in this connection, to refer

certain English authorities dealing with the power of the

superior Courts as Courts of Record.

The 1884 edition of Belchamber's Practice of the Civil

Court says at page 241 that -

"Every superior court of record, whether in the

United Kingdom, or in the colonial possessions or

dependencies of the Crown has inherent power to

punish contempts, without its precincts, as well as

in facie curiae............."

In 9 Halsbury's Law of England (4th Edition) by Lord

Hailsham at page 3 under the caption "Criminal Contempt",

the following passage is found:

881

"The superior courts have an inherent jurisdiction

to punish criminal contempt....."

It is further stated at page 3 itself that the power to

commit by summary process is arbitrary and unlimited, but

that power should be exercised with the greatest caution.

In Re Clements and the Republic of Costa Rica v.

Erlanger, [1877] 46 L.J.Ch. 375 at page 383, Lord Jessel,

M.R. said:

"......this jurisdiction of committing for contempt

being practically arbitrary and unlimited should be

most jealously and carefully watched, and

exercised....,"

Reference also may be bad to a decision of the Division

Bench of the Bombay High Court in State of Bombay v. P.,

1958 Bom. Law Reporter, (60) Page 873 wherein it has been

held that the jurisdiction which each Judge of the High

Court possesses and uses as constituting a Court of Record

is a jurisdiction which is inherent in the Court itself for

punishment for contempt of Court, whether it is ex facie the

Court or otherwise and that for the exercise of that

jurisdiction it is not necessary to refer either to the

Letters Patent or the Rules framed by the Court thereunder

and that it is a jurisdiction which is being exercised in

the same manner as was exercised in the Court of King's

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Bench Division in England.

In special feature of the procedure to be followed in a

contempt proceeding is the summary procedure which is

recognised not only in India but also abroad.

It is an outstanding characteristic of the law of

contempt both in England and Scotland that it makes use of a

particular and summary procedure which is unknown to any

other branch of those countries. In England, this summary

procedure began to be adopted by the common law Courts

inspite of trial by jury and that the trial by jury for

contempt has steadily declined and has now fallen entirely

into disuse. In other words, consequent upon the use of the

summary procedure in England, a person alleged to be in

contempt does not enjoy the benefit of some of the

safeguards of the ordinary criminal law such as those

provided by the Judges' Rules in England and Wales and the

right to trial by jury.

882

Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure of United

States reads that ``A criminal contempt may be punished

summarily if the Judge certifies that he saw or heard the

conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed

in the actual presence of the Court."

In Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307, 9 S.Ct. 77, 80

(1888) and in Matsusow v. United States, 229 F.2d 335, 339

(5th Cir. 1956), it has been ruled that "If the contempt be

committed in the face of the court, the offender may be

instantly apprehended and imprisoned at the discretion of

the judges, without any further proof or examination."

In the Contempt of Court by Oswald, the following

passage relating to the summary power of punishment is

found:

"The summary power of punishment for contempt has

been conferred on the courts to keep a blaze of

glory around them, to deter people from attempting

to render them contemptible in the eyes of the

public. These powers are necessary to keep the

course of justice free, as it is of great

importance to society."

In the year 1899, Lord Moriss in delivering the judgment

of the Judicial Committee in Mc Leod v. St. Aubin 1899 AC

549 (C) said:

"The power summarily to commit for contempt is

considered for the proper administration of

justice."

This has long been the practice in India also.

The power under Articles 129 and 215 is a summary power

as held in the cases of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi, C.K. Daphtary

(referred to above) and in Hira Lal Dixit v. State of U.P.,

AIR 1954 SC 743.

Peacock, C.J.laid down the rule quite broadly in the

following words in Re Abdool v. Mahtab, 1867 (8 WR) Cr. 32

at page 33:

"there can be no doubt that every court of record

has the power of summarily punishing for contempt."

The above view is re-stated in a number of decisions of

this Court.

In the case of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi it has been observed:

883

".......the power of a High Court to institute

proceedings for contempt and punish where necessary

is special jurisdiction which is inherent in all

courts of record and section 1 (2) of the Code

expressly excludes special jurisdiction from its

scope."

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The position of law that emerges from the above

decisions is that the power conferred upon the Supreme Court

and the High Court, being Courts of Record under Articles

129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively is an inherent

power and that the jurisdiction vested is a special one not

derived from any other statute but derived only from

Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India (See D.N.

Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, [1988] 3 SCC 26) and therefore the

constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged by

any legislation or abrogated or cut down. Nor can they be

controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision of

the Code of Criminal Procedure or any Rules. The caution

that has to be observed in exercising this inherent power by

summary procedure is that the power should be used

sparingly, that the procedure to be followed should be fair

and that the contemner should be made aware of the charge

against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defend

himself.

If we examine the facts of the present case in the

backdrop of the proposition of law, the contentions raised

by the appellant challenging the procedure followed by the

High Court do not merit any consideration since the

appellant has been served with a notice of contempt and

thereafter permitted to go through the records and finally

has been afforded a fair opportunity of putting forth his

explanation for the charge levelled against him. Incidently,

we may say that the submission of the contemner that the

impugned order is vitiated on the ground of procedural

irregularities and that Article 215 of the Constitution of

India is to be read in conjunction with the provisions of

Sections 15 and 17 of the Act of 1971, cannot be

countenanced and it has to be summarily rejected as being

devoid of any merit.

The remaining important question for consideration are

whether the statements which we have extracted in the

preceding part of this judgment, made by the contemner

amount to a scurrilous attack on the integrity, honesty and

judicial impartiality of the learned Judges of the High

Court and whether the contemner by his conduct as well as by

making such

884

written scandalising statements and invective remarks have

interfered and seriously disturbed the system of

administration of justice by bringing it down to disrespect

and disrepute.

There is an abundance of empirical decisions upon

particular instances of conduct which has been held to

constitute contempt of Court. We shall now refer to a few.

Lord Russel of Killowen, L.C.J. has laid down the law of

Contempt in 1900 (2) Q.B. 36 at 40 as follows:

"Any act done or writing published calculated to

bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into

contempt, or to lower his authority, is a Contempt

of Court."

The above proposition has been approved and followed by

Lord Atkin in Andre Paul v. Attorney General, AIR 1936 PC

141.

Lord Justice Donovan in Attorney General v. Butterworth,

1963 (1) Q.B 696, after making reference to Reg. v. Odham's

Press Ltd., ex parte A.G. 1957 (1) Q.B. 73 said, "Whether or

not there was an intention to interfere with the

administration of justice is relevant to penalty, not to

guilt." This makes it clear that an intention to interfere

with the proper administration of justice is an essential

ingredient of the offence of contempt of court and it is

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enough if the action complained of is inherently likely so

to interfere.

In Morris v. The Crown Office, (1970) 1 All.E.R. 1079 at

page 1081, Lord Denning M.R. said:

"The course of justice must not be deflected or

interfered with. Those who strike at it strike at

the very foundations of our society."

In the same case, Lord Justice Salmon spoke:

"The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to

give our courts the power effectively to protect

the rights of the public by ensuring that the

administration of justice shall not be obstructed

or prevented."

885

Frank Further, J in Offutt v. U.S., [1954] 348 US 11

expressed his view as follows:

"It is a mode of vindicating the magesty of law, in

its active manifestation against obstruction and

outrage."

In Jennison v. Baker, [1972] 2 All ER 997 at page 1006,

it is stated:

"The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while

those who defy it go free, and those who seek its

protection lose hope."

Chinnappa Reddy, J. Speaking for the Bench in Advocate

General, Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries, [1980] 3 SCC 311

citing those two decisions in the ases of Offut and Jennison

(supra) stated thus:

"......it may be necessary to punish as a contempt,

a course of conduct which abuses and makes a

mockery of the judicial process and which thus

extends its pernicious influence beyond the

parties to the action and affects the interest of

the public in the administration of Justice. The

public have an interest, an abiding and a real

interest, and a vital stake in the effective and

orderly administration of justice, because, unless

justice is so administered, there is the peril of

all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has

the duty of protecting the interest of the public

in the due administration of justice and, so it is

entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt of

Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the

Court against insult or injury as the expression

"Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but to

protect and to vindicate the right of the public

that the administration of justice shall not be

prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered

with."

Krishna Iyer, J. in his separate Judgment in re S.

Mulgaokar (supra) while giving the broad guidelines in

taking punitive action in the matter of Contempt of Court

has stated:

".......if the Court considers the attack on the

judge or judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory

or malicious beyond condonable limits, the strong

arm of the law must, in the name of public interest

and public justice, strike a blow on him who

886

challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by

fouling its source and stream."

In the case of Brahma Prakash (supra), this Court after

referring to various decisions of the foreign countries as

well as of the Privy Council stated thus:

"It will be an injury to the public if it tends to

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create an apprehension in the minds of the people

regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the

Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants

from placing complete reliance upon the Court's

administration of justice, or if it is likely to

cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge

himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It

is well established that it is not necessary to

prove affirmatively that there has been an actual

interference with the administration of justice by

reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough

if it is likely, or trends in any way, to interfere

with the proper administration of law."

In Ashram M.Jain v. A.T. Gupta, [1983] 4 SCC 125 the

facts were thus:

The petitioner who filed a special leave petition

accompanying by an affidavit affirming the statement made in

the said SLP indulged in wild and vicious diatribe against

the then Chief Justice of the High Court of Maharashtra.

When the SLP was heard, this Court directed notice to be

issued to the petitioner as to why he should not be

committed for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act,

1971. After hearing the parties and then not accepting the

unconditional apology of the petitioner, this Court

convicted the petitioner for contempt and sentenced him to

suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two months. In

that case, Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench said:

"The strains and mortification of litigation

cannot be allowed to lead litigants to tarnish,

terrorise and destroy the system of administration

of justice by vilification of judges. It is not

that judges need be protected; judges may well take

care of themselves. It is the right and interest of

the public in the due administration of justice

that has to be protected."

887

Reference may be made to a recent decision of this Court

in M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, [1991] 3

SCC 600. In that case, the appellant, a practising advocate

having failed to persuade the learned Subordinate Judge to

grant an ad-interim injunction pending filing of a counter

by the opposite party, made certain derogatory remarks

against the learned Judge who instead of succumbing to such

unprofessional conduct made a record of the derogatory

remarks and forwarded the same to the High Court through the

District Judge to initiate proceedings for Contempt of Court

against the appellant. The High Court holding that the

remarks made on the learned Sub Judge are disparaging in

character and derogatory to the dignity of the judiciary

found the appellant guilty of Section 2 (c) (i) of the

Contempt of Courts Act. The appellant therein though denied

to have made the remarks, however, offered an unqualified

apology. But the High Court without accepting the apology

punished the appellant therein with a fine of Rs. 1,000.

Ahmadi, J. of this Court in his separate judgment has

observed:

"The tendency of maligning the reputation of

judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail

to secure the desired order is ever on the increase

and it is high time it is nipped in the bud. And,

when a number of the profession resorts to such

cheap gimmiks with a view to browbeating the judge

into submission, it is all the more painful. When

there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which

would shake the confidence of the litigating public

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in the system, the damage caused is not only to the

reputation of the concerned judge but also to the

fair name of the judiciary. Veiled threats,

abrasive behaviour, use of disrespectful language

and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like the

present one are often designedly employed with a

view to taming a judge into submission to secure a

desired order. Such cases raise larger issues

touching the independence of not only the concerned

judge but the entire institution. The foundation of

our system which is based on the independence and

impartiality of those who man it will be shaken if

disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against

the presiding judicial officers with impunity. It

is high time that we realise that the much

cherished judicial independence has to be protected

not only from the executive or

888

the legislature but also from those who are an

integral part of the system."

After having made the above observation, the learned

judge concerned with the conclusion of Agarwal, J.

dismissing the appeal and while doing so, he expressed his

painful thought as follows:

"When a member of the bar is required to be

punished for use of contemptuous language it is

highly painful - it pleases none - but painful

duties have to be performed to uphold the honour

and dignity of the individual judge and his office

and the prestige of the institution. Courts are

generally slow in using their contempt jurisdiction

against erring members of the profession in the

hope that the concerned Bar Council will chasten

its member for failure to maintain proper ethical

norms. If timely action is taken by the Bar

Councils, the decline in the ethical values can be

easily arrested."

We are in full agreement with the above view.

Reverting to the facts of the case, the offending

criticism and the scandalising allegations made by the

appellant/contemner are most fatal and dangerous obstruction

of justice shaking the confidence of the public in the

administration of justice and calling for a more rapid and

immediate punitive action. These calculated contemptuous

remarks and the sweeping allegations which we have

extracted above are derogatory in character not only to the

dignity of the learned Judges casting aspersions on their

conduct in the discharge of their judicial functions but

also wounds the dignity of the Court. It is highly painful

to note that the appellant/contemner who is none other than

an Advocate practising in the same highest Court of the

state after having failed to wrench a decision in his favour

in his own cause which he prosecuted as party in person has

escalatingly scandalised the Court by making libellous

allegations which are scurrilous, highly offensive, vicious,

intimidatory, malacious and beyond condonable limit. Even a

cursory reading of the remarks made against the learned

Judge of the High Court unambiguously show that the

potentially prejudicial utterances and the outrageous

allegations rumbustiously and invectively made by the

contemner with malacious design of attempting to impair

889

the administration of justice have struck a blow on the

judiciary and also seriously sullied the image, dignity and

high esteem which the office of the Judge of the High Court

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carries with it and thus impeded the course of justice by

fouling its source and steam. In our opinion, the incident

in question is a flagrant onslaught on the independence of

the judiciary, destructive of the orderly administration of

justice and a challenge to the supremacy of the Rule of Law.

The maxim "Salus populi suprema lex", that is "the

welfare of the people is the supreme law" adequately

enunciates the idea of law. This can be achieved only when

justice is administered lawfully, judicially, without fear

or favour and without being hampered and thwarted, and this

cannot be effective unless respect for it is fostered and

maintained.

To punish an Advocate for Contempt of court, no doubt,

must be regarded as an extreme measure, but to preserve the

proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered

with, and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and

undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court, though painful,

to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. No

one can claim immunity from the operation of the law of

contempt, if his act or conduct in relation to Court or

Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to

obstruct the due course of justice.

In view of the above heinous type of scandalising the

Court, we unhesitatingly confirm the finding of the High

Court that the appellant/contemner has made himself guilty

of criminal contempt.

Coming to the question of sentence, it appears from

order of the High Court that the appellant had adopted a

defiant attitude and tried to justify the aspersions made by

him even without thinking it necessary to apologise. Before

this Court also, the appellant has neither expressed any

contrition nor has he any repentance for the vicious

allegations made against the learned Judges of the High

Court. But on the other hand, he has exhibited a dogged

determination to pursue the matter, come what may. A reading

of his memorandum of grounds and the written and signed

arguments show that he was ventured into another bout of

allegations against the High Court Judges and persisted in

his campaign of vilification. His present conduct has

aggravated rather than mitigating his offence.

890

Therefore, having regard to the sentencing policy that

punishment should be commensurate with the gravity of the

offence, we hold that the sentence of 2 months, imprisonment

in no way calls for interference and accordingly the

sentence is confirmed.

For the reasons aforementioned, the Criminal Appeal is

dismissed.

N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.

891