RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 1 of 20

$~13

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: 22.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010414242025

+ RC.REV. 198/2025 & CM APPL. 39843/2025 (Stay

RAM DULARI THROUGH LR SUNITA .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Kunal Kalra and Mr. P.K.

Chauhan, Advocates.

versus

KAMLA DEVI .....Respondent

Through: Mr. B.D. Sharma, Advocate.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)

1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [“DRC Act”], assailing the Order dated

09.01.2025 [“Impugned Order”], passed by the learned ACJ-cum-

CCJ-ARC (East), Karkardooma Courts, Delhi [“learned ARC”], in

Eviction Petition being RC ARC 1217/2016 [“Eviction Petition”],

titled “Kamla Devi v. Ram Dulari”, whereby the Application seeking

leave to defend [“Leave to Defend Application”] filed on behalf of

the Petitioner herein was dismissed on the ground that the same had

not been filed within the prescribed statutory period and,

consequently, an Eviction Order was passed in favour of the

Respondent herein in respect of Property bearing shop No. IX/214,

consisting of one room with kitchen on the ground floor and one room

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 2 of 20

with toilet and bathroom on the first floor, situated at Ghas Mandi,

Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031 [“Subject Premises”].

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits

that, upon restoration of the Eviction Petition vide Order dated

27.02.2020, the statutory period for filing the Leave to Defend

Application stood revived. It is submitted that, upon such restoration,

the Petitioner became entitled to avail the statutory period prescribed

under Section 25-B of the DRC Act for filing the Leave to Defend

Application.

3. Learned counsel further submits that the Leave to Defend

Application came to be filed on 11.02.2021, during the period when

the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ

Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020, In Re: Cognizance for Extension of

Limitation

1

, were in operation. It is contended that, by virtue of the

orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court therein, the period of

limitation stood extended/excluded on account of the COVID-19

pandemic and, consequently, the period prescribed for filing the Leave

to Defend Application was required to be computed after giving effect

to the benefit granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. On this basis, it

is submitted that the Application filed on 11.02.2021 was within the

prescribed period and the learned ARC erred in holding the same to be

barred by limitation.

4. Learned counsel further submits that the learned ARC has failed

to consider the contents of the Eviction Petition as also the pleadings

and triable issues raised by the Petitioner in the Leave to Defend

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 3 of 20

Application. It is contended that the Petitioner had raised specific

grounds which disclosed triable issues and, therefore, the Leave to

Defend Application could not have been rejected without examining

the said grounds.

5. It is, accordingly, submitted that the learned ARC has failed to

properly appreciate the case set up by the Petitioner and has proceeded

to dismiss the Leave to Defend Application solely on the ground of

limitation, without examining the triable issues raised therein.

6. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the Impugned Order

dated 09.01.2025 is liable to be set aside.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:

7. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Respondent submits that there is no infirmity or illegality in the

Impugned Order and that the learned ARC has correctly rejected the

Leave to Defend Application as having been filed beyond the statutory

period prescribed under Section 25-B of the DRC Act.

8. On the aforesaid basis, learned counsel for the Respondent

submits that the present Petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be

dismissed.

9. No other submissions were advanced on behalf of the learned

counsel for the parties.

ANALYSIS:

10. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length

and, with their able assistance, perused the relevant documents as also

the Impugned Order.

1

(2020) 19 SCC 10

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 4 of 20

11. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged

on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope

and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the

proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

12. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance

Co. Ltd.

2

, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar

Singh

3

, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua

4

, has

consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court

under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory

and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of

appellate jurisdiction.

13. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied

upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj

Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.

5

, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny

Grover

6

.

14. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while

elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the

DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against

an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and

deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,

therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,

including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the

High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent

2

(1998) 8 SCC 119

3

(2014) 9 SCC 78

4

(2022) 6 SCC 30

5

2024:DHC:9322

6

2025:DHC:11285

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 5 of 20

Controller merely because another view on the material available on

record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court read as under:

“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive

power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,

being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the

decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.

Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its

views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate

jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The

scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and

except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the

record, which would only mean that in the absence of any

adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb

such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in

such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the

power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,

totally forbidden by the legislature.”

15. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,

upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),

reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the

proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that

this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of

the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the

decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned

Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an

absence of adjudication warranting interference.

16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges

is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section

25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to

undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to

arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.

Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 6 of 20

suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material

irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the

learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous

premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left

unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an

error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional

jurisdiction may be warranted.

17. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional

scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the

Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined. In

this backdrop, it would be apposite for this Court to extract the

relevant portion of the Impugned Order, which reads as under:

“4. The present petition was filed on 17.09.2016 and thereafter

notice was issued to the respondent as specified in Third Schedule

of DRC Act whereupon notices were received back with the report

of refusal on 13.10.2016. On 19.11.2016, the respondent did not

appear and the matter was fixed on 17.02.2017 and the respondent

appeared on that day. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to

03.05.2017, 27.07.2017 and ultimately on 26.10.2017, the matter

was dismissed for non-prosecution.

5. On 17.01.2018, an application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC was

filed to restore the petition which was also dismissed in default on

03.01.2019. Again, on 04.02.2019 another application under

Section 151 CPC was filed to restore the application under Order 9

Rule 4 CPC which was allowed on 10.10.2019. Finally, on

27.02.2020, the application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC was allowed

and the instant petition was restored. The respondent eventually

filed his leave to defend on 11.02.2021.

6. Before traversing through grounds taken in the leave to defend

application, it is noteworthy that the notice of the petition when

instituted was refused by the respondent on 13.10.2016 but there is

no finding on the record given by the court that the notice had been

properly served. Even if refusal given on 13.10.2016 is overlooked,

the respondent gave his appearance on 17.02.2017 and thus it could

be presumed safely that the respondent was well aware of the

proceedings going against him and still he could have filed leave to

defend application within 15 days but the same was not done.

Thereafter the matter was adjourned many times till it was

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 7 of 20

ultimately dismissed for non prosecution on 26.10.2017. Even

when the petition was eventually restored on 27.02.2020, still the

respondent did not file his leave to defend within 15 days.

7. Hence, even if maximum liberal approach is taken, the statutory

period fixed for filing leave to defend has not been complied with

by the respondent.

8. In view of the same, leave to defend filed by the respondent

cannot be read altogether and the petitioner is entitled for an

eviction order. Reliance can be placed on the decision of Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India titled as Prithipal Singh vs Satpal Singh

(Dead) through Lrs Civil Appeal No. 8501 of 2009 (Arising out of

SLP (C) No. 19921 of 2006) wherein it was held that leave to

defend has to be mandatorily be filed within 15 days from the date

of service of notice to the respondent and the said period cannot be

condoned.

9. Accordingly, eviction order is passed in favour of the petitioner

and against the respondent directing the respondent to vacate the

tenanted premises i.e shop bearing no. IX/214 consisting 1 room

with kitchen on the ground floor and 1 room with toilet &

bathroom on the first floor of the property situated at Ghas Mandi,

Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031 specifically shown in red colour in

the site plan filed by the petitioner, in terms of Section 14 (1) (e)

r/w Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The landlord,

however, shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before

the expiration of a period of six months from the date of this

order.”

18. The principal issue which arises for consideration is whether the

Leave to Defend Application, filed by the Petitioner on 11.02.2021,

could have been entertained, having regard to the statutory period

prescribed under Section 25-B of the DRC Act.

19. The record, as noticed by the learned ARC in the Impugned

Order, discloses that the Eviction Petition was instituted on

17.09.2016 and notice thereof was issued to the Petitioner, which was

received back with the report of refusal on 13.10.2016. Though

service stood effected due to the refusal of the Petitioner, no

application for leave to defend came to be filed. On 19.11.2016, the

Petitioner did not appear and the matter was thereafter fixed for

17.02.2017.

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 8 of 20

20. The Petitioner admittedly appeared personally before the

learned ARC on 17.02.2017. Even thereafter, however, the application

seeking leave to defend was not filed within the prescribed statutory

period. Thus, even if the benefit of reckoning the prescribed period

from the date of actual appearance of the Petitioner, rather than from

the earlier refusal of notice, were to be extended to the Petitioner, the

Leave to Defend Application would nevertheless remain beyond the

prescribed period.

21. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to 03.05.2017, 27.07.2017,

and, finally, to 26.10.2017, on which the date the Eviction Petition

came to be dismissed for non-prosecution. Proceedings were thereafter

undertaken by the Respondent seeking restoration of the Eviction

Petition, by way of an Application under Order IX Rule 4 of the CPC

filed on 17.01.2018, which Application came to be dismissed in

default on 03.01.2019. An Application under Section 151 of the CPC

came to be filed on 04.02.2019 seeking restoration of Application

under Order IX Rule 4 of the CPC. The Application under Section 151

of the CPC was allowed on 10.10.2019 and the Application under

Order IX Rule 4 of the CPC was restored.

22. Pursuant to the above, the Eviction Petition was eventually

restored on 27.02.2020. The Leave to Defend Application, however,

came to be filed only on 11.02.2021.

23. The legal position with respect to the statutory period

prescribed for filing an application seeking leave to defend under

Section 25-B of the DRC Act is no longer res integra. In Prithipal

Singh v. Satpal Singh (Dead) through LRs.

7

, the Hon’ble Supreme

7

(2010) 2 SCC 15

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 9 of 20

Court, while considering the very scheme of Section 25-B of the DRC

Act, held that the statutory period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for

filing an application seeking leave to defend is mandatory and that the

provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 or the CPC cannot be invoked

to extend the said period. The Court further held that, in the absence of

leave to defend, the consequences contemplated under Section

25-B(4) necessarily follow. The relevant portion of the aforesaid

Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:

“31. There is another aspect of this matter. It is difficult to

understand how an application for leave to contest having been

rejected, may be on the ground of delay, could be allowed when it

is not disputed by the respondent tenant that no application for

condonation of delay could be entertained by the Rent Controller

as the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not be attracted.

That apart, we have also carefully examined the special reason

given by the respondent tenant in the original application for leave

to contest and the present application after order of eviction was

passed. On a reading of these two applications, we find that the

same defence was taken by the tenant after the order of eviction

was passed and therefore, we do not think that such reason can be

considered to be a special reason within the meaning of Order 37

Rule 4 of the Code for allowing the tenant to defend the

proceedings if Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code applies to a special

Act.”

24. The aforesaid position has been consistently followed by this

Court. In M/s HIM Traders (P) Ltd. v. S.K. Gupta

8

, the petition under

Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act arose from an order dismissing the

application seeking leave to defend on the ground that it had been

filed beyond fifteen (15) days. This Court, following Prithipal Singh

(supra), reiterated that there cannot be a delay even of one day beyond

the prescribed period for filing an application seeking leave to defend.

The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced

8

2014 SCC OnLine Del 4052

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 10 of 20

hereinbelow:

“2. The trial court has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme

Court in the case of Prakash H. Jain v. Ms Marie Fernandes,

(2003) 8 SCC 431 : AIR 2003 SC 4591, however, now there is in

fact a direct judgment of the Supreme Court under the Delhi Rent

Control Act in the case of Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (dead)

through LRs, (2010) 2 SCC 15 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 271 which

holds that there cannot be delay of even one day beyond the period

of 15 days for filing of the leave to defend application.

3. In the present case, as per the trial court record, the petitioner

was served on 8-10-2010 by the process server. Petitioner is a

company and it was served through one Mr R.K. Gupta who is the

Director and the authorized signatory of the petitioner/company. I

note that as per the Order 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

(CPC), service on a company can be effected through a principal

officer and a Director of a company is surely a principal officer.

4. (i) As the service was effected on the petitioner/defendant on 8-

10-2010 but the leave to defend application was filed only on 25-

10-2010, whereas it had to be filed on or before 23-10-2010, the

ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal

Singh (supra) is squarely applicable.

(ii) A reference to the leave to defend application shows that the

petitioner/defendant stated that it was served only on 10-10-2010,

however, this was only a self-serving averment without any basis

because the trial court record shows that service was in fact duly

effected on the petitioner through the process server on 8-10-2010.

5. Counsel for the petitioner very vehemently sought to argue that

service should be taken as 10-10-2010 because there was a second

service by registered post on 10-10-2010, however, it is noted that

this fact is not pleaded, inasmuch as the pleading/leave to defend

application of the petitioner talks only of one service on 10-10-

2010, and it is to be noted that it is also not stated in the leave to

defend application that a second service is effected on 10-10-2010

by registered post. Further, there is nothing which is filed before

this Court in this petition which is pending since the year 2011 that

the petitioner was served through registered post for the second

time on 10-10-2010.

6. In view of the above, there is no merit in the petition, and the

same is therefore dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own

costs.”

25. Similarly, in Faridabad Manufacturing (Engineering

Products) Pvt. Ltd. v. Yashpal Arora & Anr.

9

, this Court, while

9

2014 SCC OnLine Del 3735

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 11 of 20

considering a challenge to an order refusing to condone delay in filing

the application seeking leave to defend, held that once the application

is filed beyond the prescribed period, there is no application for leave

to defend which can be considered and, consequently, in terms of

Section 25-B(4), the statements contained in the Eviction Petition are

deemed to be admitted and the landlord becomes entitled to an

Eviction Order. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is

reproduced hereinbelow:

“2. Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Prithipal Singh

v. Satpal Singh (dead) through LRs (2010) 2 SCC 15 : (2010) 1

SCC (Civ) 271 has now laid down the law that the statutory period

of 15 days which is provided under Section 25B read with relevant

form for service and the schedule is a period in which leave to

defend has positively to be filed, and if leave to defend is filed after

15 days the same cannot be looked into because delay of even one

day cannot be condoned. Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal

Singh (supra) has held that the provision of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 or the provision of CPC do not apply to the

exhaustive procedure of bonafide necessity provided under Section

25B of the Act.

3. In the present case, admittedly the application for leave to

defend has been filed beyond time because the petitioner/tenant

was served on 12-8-2010 and the leave to defend application was

filed on 9-9-2010. Once that is so, there is no application for leave

to defend which is to be considered, and in view of Section 25B(4)

the statements in the eviction petition are deemed to be admitted

and the landlord is entitled to an eviction order.”

26. In the present case, the Eviction Petition was admittedly filed

on 17.09.2016 and notice was issued to the Petitioner, which was

received back with the report of refusal on 13.10.2016. Admittedly, no

application for leave to defend was filed within the statutory period.

Assuming, arguendo, that the said refusal of receipt of the notice is

disregarded and the period is reckoned from the date on which the

Petitioner appeared before the learned ARC in person, i.e., on

17.02.2017, even thereafter, the Petitioner did not file the application

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 12 of 20

seeking leave to defend within the prescribed statutory period.

27. The matter was thereafter listed on 03.05.2017, 27.07.2017 and

consequently the matter came to be dismissed for non-prosecution on

26.10.2017. At no stage during the aforesaid period did the Petitioner

take steps to file the application seeking leave to defend. The

subsequent dismissal of the Eviction Petition for non-prosecution and

the proceedings undertaken thereafter for its restoration cannot efface

the fact that the statutory opportunity to seek leave to defend had

already not been availed within the prescribed period.

28. More significantly, even after restoration of the Eviction

Petition on 27.02.2020, the Petitioner did not file the application

seeking leave to defend within fifteen (15) days. The Leave to Defend

Application was eventually filed only on 11.02.2021. The effect of the

exclusion of the period of limitation, in terms of the Orders of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.

3/2020, In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra)

commenced only on 15.03.2020. After the restoration of the Eviction

Petition on 27.02.2020, the Petitioner could have filed the application

for leave to defend within the prescribed statutory period of fifteen

(15) days.

29. In the present case, however, the Petitioner had already failed to

avail the statutory opportunity to seek leave to defend on three

occasions, namely, after refusing to accept the notice, thereafter upon

appearing before the learned ARC on 17.02.2017, and even after the

restoration of the Eviction Petition on 27.02.2020. The subsequent

exclusion of the period from 15.03.2020 onwards, therefore, could not

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 13 of 20

revive or enlarge a statutory right which had already remained

unexercised within the prescribed period.

30. In any event, the contention of the Petitioner that restoration of

the Eviction Petition on 27.02.2020 resulted in the commencement of

a fresh period of fifteen (15) days for filing an application seeking

leave to defend cannot be accepted. Restoration of the proceedings

does not, by itself, obliterate the proceedings which had preceded the

dismissal for non-prosecution, nor does it revive an opportunity which

had already been lost by failure to comply with a statutory

requirement within the prescribed period.

31. If such a contention were to be accepted, every restoration of an

Eviction Petition dismissed for non-prosecution would result in the

tenant obtaining a fresh opportunity to file an application seeking

leave to defend, irrespective of whether the tenant had already

acquired knowledge of the proceedings and failed to avail the

statutory opportunity within time. Such an interpretation would be

inconsistent with the special and time-bound procedure contemplated

under Section 25-B of the DRC Act and would, in effect, render the

statutory period liable to recommencement upon every restoration of

the proceedings.

32. The learned ARC has, in the Impugned Order, considered the

relevant chronology of the proceedings and has specifically recorded

that the Petitioner had appeared before the Court on 17.02.2017, but

had failed to file the application seeking leave to defend within the

prescribed period. The learned ARC has further noticed that even

upon restoration of the Eviction Petition on 27.02.2020, the Leave to

Defend Application was not filed within fifteen (15) days. The

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 14 of 20

conclusion arrived at by the learned ARC was thus founded upon the

undisputed procedural history of the proceedings and the statutory

requirement governing the filing of the Leave to Defend Application.

33. In these circumstances, the further contention of the Petitioner

that the learned ARC failed to examine the triable issues or the

pleadings sought to be relied upon in the Leave to Defend Application

also requires to be considered in the correct statutory and

jurisdictional perspective. The examination of the merits of the

proposed defence would ordinarily arise when a legally entertainable

application seeking leave to defend is before the learned ARC. Where

the application itself has been filed beyond the mandatory statutory

period, the question of examining the proposed defence on merits

would ordinarily not arise. The failure to undertake such an

examination, therefore, cannot, by itself, be treated as an absence of

adjudication, unless the facts disclose a circumstance warranting

interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

34. At this stage, it would also be apposite to consider the judgment

of this Court in Director Directorate of Education v. Mohd.

Shamim

10

. The said Judgment does recognise that the mere fact that

an application seeking leave to defend has been filed beyond the

prescribed period does not, in every case, completely foreclose the

revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The relevant observations of the

aforesaid Judgment have been reproduced hereinbelow:

“20. It is significant that the proviso to Section 25B(8) uses the

words “according to law” and not the words “according to this

Act”. Thus the jurisdiction of this Court under the proviso to

Section 25B(8) is to satisfy itself that an order made by the

Controller under Section 25B is according to law. Needless to state

10

2019 SCC OnLine Del 11490

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 15 of 20

that the word “law” has much wider ambit than the word “Act”,

meaning the Delhi Rent Control Act. The jurisdiction of this Court

under the proviso to Section 25B(8), in the judgments cited by the

Senior Counsel for the respondent also, has been held to be akin to

revisionary jurisdiction. It has been held in Hindustan Petroleum

Corporation Limited

11

supra, Shiv Sarup Gupta

12

supra, Boorugu

Mahadev and Sons v. Sirigiri Narasing Rao

13

, Gandhe Vijay

Kumar

14

supra and Ravinder Jeet Singh v. Kanta Vadhera

15

that

the function of the High Court while exercising revisionary

jurisdiction extends to ensuring that no injustice is being done by

the order impugned before it by way of revision. The High Court

thus, when approached in exercise of its jurisdiction under the

proviso to Section 25B(8) against an order of eviction under

Section 25B(4), on failure of tenant to within the prescribed time

apply for leave to defend, would be entitled to consider whether

there is any substantial ground which prevented the tenant from,

within the prescribed time, applying for leave to defend and any

substantial reason which disentitles the landlord from an order of

eviction on the ground of requirement of premises on deemed

admission of such requirement by the tenant.

21. It is not as if a mere expression of requirement of the premises

for own use by the landlord has been constituted as a ground of

eviction under Section 25B. For a landlord to be entitled to eviction

of tenant on the ground of own requirement of the premises, the

requirement has to be bonafide, for occupation of the premises by

the landlord or for member of his family and further that the

landlord has no other reasonable suitable accommodation. Thus, a

tenant is entitled to leave to defend if able to demonstrate that the

requirement pleaded by the landlord is not bonafide or that the

landlord has another suitable residential accommodation. It cannot

be lost sight of that the applicability of the Rent Act, as far as Delhi

is concerned, now is mostly confined to premises let out decades

back, at the rate of rents which are now paltry in comparison to the

prevalent rents of the said properties. Eviction of such tenants

being prohibited by the Rent Act save on the grounds specified, the

ground of requirement for own use is often found to be invoked by

the landlord(s) to seek eviction of such old tenants paying paltry

rents, even though the landlord, in real sense has no requirement or

bonafide requirement of the premises for own use or has other

alternate suitable premises available to him. The tenant, if able to

demonstrate the requirement to be not bonafide or availability of

other premises, can thwart such action for eviction.

11

(2014) 9 SCC 78

12

(1999) 6 SCC 222

13

(2016) 3 SCC 343

14

(2018) 12 SCC 576

15

2018 SCC OnLine Del 13329

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 16 of 20

22. Thus, when Section 25B(7) states that the procedure of a Court

of Small Causes shall be followed while holding any inquiry in a

proceeding under Section 25B, even though the Controller may

pass an order on deemed admission, the High Court would

certainly be entitled to set aside the said order if the petitioner,

under proviso to Section 25B(8), is able to rebut the said deemed

admission and/or make out a case for being given an opportunity

for rebutting the same.

23. Mention in this regard may also be made of Ramesh Kumar v.

Kesho Ram

16

, holding a deemed admission to be different from an

actual admission.

24. The matter can be looked at from another point of view.

Section 25B(3)(b) of the Act empowers the Controller to declare

that there has been valid service of summons issued under Section

25B(3)(a) of the Act when an acknowledgement “purporting to be

signed by the tenant or his agent” is received back by the

Controller or when the registered article containing the summons is

received back with an endorsement “purporting to have been made

by a postal employee” to the effect that the tenant or his agent has

refused to take delivery of the registered article. Thereunder the

Controller is empowered to declare that there has been a valid

service merely when there is an appearance of service or refusal.

However Section 25B(4) empowers the Controller to order eviction

on failure of the tenant so served to apply for leave to defend only

when the summons is “duly served”. A summon purporting to be

served or refused cannot be said to be “duly served” if it is shown

that what was purporting to be signed by the tenant was indeed not

signed by the tenant and/or what was purporting to be refusal of the

tenant was indeed not refusal of the tenant. An order of eviction

passed on purported service if allowed to stand notwithstanding

being shown to be not duly served would be in violation of Section

37(1) prohibiting the Controller from passing any order without

giving reasonable opportunity to show cause thereagainst and

would also be in violation of the practice and procedure of a Court

of Small Causes. For this reason also in our view Prithipal Singh

supra cannot be read as closing all doors or remedy at least before

this Court.

25. We, therefore, hold that merely because the Controller has

passed an order of eviction in a proceeding governed under Section

25B, on failure of the tenant to, within the prescribed time, apply

for leave to defend and merely because the Controller vide

Prithpal Singh supra has been held to be not empowered to recall

the said order, would not prevent this Court from, in exercise of

powers under proviso to Section 25B(8), considering once a case

for the landlord to be not entitled to an order of eviction to be

16

1992 Supp (2) SCC 623

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 17 of 20

deemed admission following non-filing of leave to defend within

the prescribed time, the said order cannot be said to have been

made according to law and would qualify as being contrary to law

and liable to be set aside.

26. Having held so, we answer the question no. (A) framed in the

referral order in the affirmative and with the condition that this

Court would be empowered to set aside the order of eviction only

if the tenant passes the dual test of prevented by reasons beyond

control from applying for leave to defend within the prescribed

time (as distinct from every default) and if makes out a substantial

case for consideration of the application for leave to defend. We,

however, in deference to Prithipal Singh supra choose/opt to not

answer the question (B) framed in the referral order.”

35. The principle emerging therefrom is that, this Court, while

exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8), may

examine whether there exists a substantial ground which prevented the

tenant from applying for leave to defend within the prescribed period,

and whether there exists a substantial reason which would disentitle

the landlord from an order of eviction notwithstanding the deemed

admission contemplated under Section 25-B(4).

36. It is apparent that the only submissions articulated pertains to

the filing of the Leave to Defend Application on 11.02.2021, and on

which date the benefit of the Orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020, In Re: Cognizance for

Extension of Limitation (supra) have been sought to be applied. The

first limb of the parameters prescribed by the Hon’ble Division Bench

of this Court in Director, Directorate of Education (supra), namely,

that the tenant must demonstrate that he was prevented by reasons

beyond his control from applying for leave to defend within the

prescribed period, remains unsatisfied and resultantly there arises no

need to examine the second limb at all.

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 18 of 20

37. The Petitioner was admittedly aware of the pendency of the

Eviction Petition and had appeared before the learned ARC on

17.02.2017. Despite such appearance, no application seeking leave to

defend was filed within the prescribed period. The Petitioner

thereafter participated before the learned ARC during the subsequent

proceedings and, even after the Eviction Petition was restored on

27.02.2020, failed to file the application seeking leave to defend

within statutory period of fifteen (15) days. No circumstance has been

placed on record which prevented the Petitioner from availing the

statutory remedy within time.

38. The aforesaid conclusion also flows from the statutory

consequence envisaged under Section 25-B(4) of the DRC Act. The

statutory scheme proceeds on the basis that where the tenant fails to

apply for leave to defend within the period prescribed under the said

provision, the statements made by the landlord in the eviction petition

are deemed to be admitted. The relevant portion of Section 25-B of the

DRC Act is reproduced hereinbelow:

“25B. Special procedure for the disposal of applications for

eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. –

*****

(4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in

the ordinary way or by registered post) in the form specified in the

Third Schedule shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the

premises unless he files and affidavit stating the grounds on which

he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave

from the Controller as hereinafter provided; and in default of his

appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such

leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for

eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the

applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground

aforesaid.

***** ”

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 19 of 20

39. This is not a case where the learned ARC has rejected a timely

application seeking leave to defend after examining the proposed

defence and thereafter declined to find triable issues. Rather, the

Leave to Defend Application itself was found to be beyond the

statutory period and, consequently, incapable of being entertained in

view of the mandatory procedure under Section 25-B of the DRC Act.

As held in Faridabad Manufacturing (supra), once an application

seeking leave to defend is filed beyond the prescribed period, there

remains no legally entertainable application upon which the learned

ARC is required to undertake an examination of the proposed defence.

40. Consequently, the mere assertion that the Leave to Defend

Application contained certain pleas which, if examined independently,

may raise questions requiring adjudication, cannot by itself displace

the statutory consequence flowing from the failure to invoke the

remedy within the prescribed period. To hold otherwise would

effectively permit the merits of a belated defence to be examined

notwithstanding the statutory bar governing the very entertainability

of the application. Such an approach would dilute the special and

expeditious procedure contemplated under Section 25-B of the DRC

Act.

41. It is also pertinent that the learned ARC has not proceeded

mechanically. The Impugned Order records the procedural history of

the proceedings, notices the appearance of the Petitioner, considers the

effect of the subsequent restoration of the Eviction Petition and

thereafter applies the settled legal position governing the statutory

period for filing an application seeking leave to defend. The learned

ARC has, therefore, considered the material necessary for determining

RC.REV. 198/2025 Page 20 of 20

the issue which arose before it, namely, whether the Leave to Defend

Application, filed on 11.02.2021, could be entertained having regard

to the statutory period prescribed under Section 25-B of the DRC Act.

42. Thus, the grievance of the Petitioner is, in substance, directed

not against any absence of adjudication, but against the consequence

flowing from the finding that the Leave to Defend Application was

filed beyond the prescribed statutory period. Once the learned ARC,

upon consideration of the relevant chronology and the applicable

statutory framework, concluded that the Leave to Defend Application

could not be entertained, the non-consideration of the proposed

defence on merits cannot, in the facts of the present case, be

characterised as a material failure of adjudication or an error apparent

on the face of the record warranting interference under Section

25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

43. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the Impugned Order does not suffer from any

jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or

perversity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its

limited revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of

the DRC Act.

44. Accordingly, the present Petition, being devoid of merit, stands

dismissed.

45. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,

stands disposed of in the aforementioned terms.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J .

SEPTEMBER 22, 2026/rk/ma