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PETITIONER:

RATTAN CHAND HIRA CHAND

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

ASKAR NAWAZ JUNG (DEAD) BY L.RS. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/02/1991

BENCH:

SAWANT, P.B.

BENCH:

SAWANT, P.B.

FATHIMA BEEVI, M. (J)

CITATION:

1991 SCR (1) 327 1991 SCC (3) 67

JT 1991 (1) 433 1991 SCALE (1)200

ACT:

Indian Contract Act-Sections 23, 65, 69, 70 and

73(2)-Contract whereby one party is to assist another in

recovering property and sharing proceeds by using

influence-Whether opposed to 'public policy'.

HEADNOTE:

Nawab Salar Jung III expired on March 2,

1949 leaving behind him no issue but a vast estate.

Several persons came forward to be his heirs. One of the

claimants, Sajjid Yar Jung, did not have the

wherewithal to establish his claim to a share in

the estate. He approached the plaintiff for

financial help. An agreement was executed between

them according to which Sajjid Yar Jung agreed to

return all amounts to be advanced by the plaintiff and in

addition to give him one anna share in the amount

that would be received by Sajjid Yar Jung from

the estate. Sajjid Yar Jung borrowed a total sum of

Rs-75,000 under the agreement.

The dispute was ultimately settled in the Civil

Court by compromise between the various claimants.

According to the plaintiff, the amount due to

Sajjid Yar Jung was about Rs.60 Lakhs and hence

the plaintiff claimed Rs.3 lakh as one anna share in

addition to the sum advanced, i.e. Rs.75,000. The

plaintiff filed the present suit for the recovery of

the total amount. The City Civil Court inter alia found

that the agreement was opposed to public policy as the

object of the agreement was that the plaintiff should

wield his influence with Central and State Ministers to

have the Nawab recognised as the heir to the estate in

return for his being given one anna share in the amount to

be received by the Nawab. The Court, therefore, held that

the agreement in question was not enforceable, and even

the amounts actually advanced could not be recovered

by the plaintiff.

In the appeal, the Division Bench of the High

Court held that the agreement was one whole agreement and

hence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover even the

amount of Rs.75,000 which was actually advanced. The

Division Bench also held that the agreement was public

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policy.

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This Court granted special leave only in respect of the

said amount of Rs.75,000.

Before this Court it was contended on behalf of the

plaintiff that (i) the amount of Rs.75,000 could be

separated from the other agreement or could be treated

differently; (ii) if the champertous nature of the agreement

was ignored which it was legitimate to do so in this

country, there was no other ground of public policy on

which the agreement could be struck down; (iii)

assuming that the agreement was a champertous one, it

was neither immoral nor against public policy, and

even de hors the agreement, the appellant was

entitled to the said advance of Rs.75,000 under section

70 of the Indian Contract Act. It was further urged

that both the City Civil Court as well as the High

Court had created a new head of public policy to

declare the agreement as void, although according to the

relevant statutory provisions as well as the decisions

of the court, the agreement was not void.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: Per Sawant, J.

(1) It is apparent on the face of the record that

the advance and the share in the estate were parts of

the same contract- one as a consideration for the

other. The two stand together and none can stand without the

other. [333F]

(2) A contract which has a tendency to injure

public interests or public welfare is one against public

policy. [337D]

(3) What constitutes an injury to public

interests or welfare would depend upon the times and

climes. The social milieu in which the contract is

sought to be enforced would decide the factum, the

nature and the degree of the injury. It is contrary to

the concept of pubic policy to contend that it is

immutable, since it must vary with the varying needs

of the society. What those needs are would depend

upon the consensus value-judgments of the enlightened

section of the society. These values may sometimes

get incorporated in the legislation, but sometimes

they may not. [337E]

(4) The legislature often fails to keep pace

with the changing needs and values nor is it realistic to

expect that it will have provided for all contingencies and

eventualities. [337E-F]

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(5) It is not only necessary but obligatory on the

courts to step in to fill the lacluna. When courts perform

this function undoubtedly they legislate judicially. But

that is a kind of legislation which stands implicitly

delegated to them to further the object of the

legislation and to promote the goals of the society. [337F]

(6) So long as the courts keep themselves tethered to

the ethos of the society and do not travel off its course,

so long as they attempt to furnish the felt necessities

of the time and do not refurbish them. their role in

this respect has to be welcomed. [337G]

Ghurelal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya & Ors.,

[1959] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 406; Richardson v. Mellish,

[1824] 2 Bing. 229; In re Mirams, [1891] 1 Q. B. 594,

referred to.

(7) All courts are at one time or the other felt the

need to bridge the gap between what is and what is

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intended to be. The courts cannot in such circumstances

shirk from their duty and refuse to fill the gap. In

performing this duty they do not foist upon the

society their value judgments. They respect and accept

the prevailling values, and do what is expected of

them. [338D]

(8) The courts will fail in their duty if they do

not rise to the occasion but approve helplessly of an

interpretation of a statute or a document or an action

of an individual which is certain to subvert the

societal goals and endanger the public good. [338E]

(9) The contract in the present case had been

entered into with the obvious purpose of influencing

the authorities to procure a verdict in favour of the

late Nawab and was obviously a "carrier" contract.

To enforce such a contract although its tendencies to

injure public weal are manifest is not only to abdicate

one's public duty but to assist in the promotion of a

pernicious practice of procuring decisions by

influencing authorities when they should abide by the

law. To strike down such contracts is not to invent a

new head of public policy but to give effect to its true

implications. [338F-G]

In the matter of Mr. 'G', a Senior Advocate of the

Supreme Court, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 490, referred to.

(10) A democratic society is founded on the rule

of law and any practice which seeks to subvert or

circumvent the law at its very root. When the Court

discountenances such practice, it only safeguards

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the foundation of the society. Even assuming that the

Court finds a new head of public policy to strike down

such practice, its activism is not only warranted but

desired. [338G-H]

Per Fathima Beevi, J.

(1) There is no doubt that the contract relating to

the payment of the amount is not severable from the

agreement to promote the cause of Sajjid Yar Jung by

wielding the influence the plaintiff had. [339G]

(2) Every agreement of which the object or

consideration is unlawful is void. The consideration or

object of an agreement is unlawful when the court

regards it as opposed to public policy. [339G]

(3) Public Policy is a principle of judicial

interpretation founded on the current needs of the

community. The law relating to public policy cannot

remain immutable. It must change with passage

of time. [339H-340A]

(4) A bargain whereby one party is to assist another

in recovering property and is to share in the proceeds of

the action and such assistance is by using the

influence with the administration irrespective of the

fact that the persons intended to be influenced are not

amenable to such influence is against protection and

promotion of public welfare. It is opposed to public

policy. [340B]

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 740 of

1978.

From the Judgment and Decree dated 18.3.1975 of

the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.C.C.A. No. 106 of 1969.

G.A. Shah, V.J. Francis and N.M. Popli for the

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Appellant.

S.B. Bhasme, P.K. Pillai and Dilip Pillai for the

Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SAWANT, J. Although the leave granted by this

Court is limited to the question whether the

plaintiff is entitled to an amount of Rs.75,000

which according to him he had actually advanced and

the respondents had received for the purpose of

prosecuting their litigation, and, therefore, the issue

to be answered lies within a narrow

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compass, it is necessary to state the relevant facts briefly

to understand correctly the significance of the question to

be answered.

2. Nawab Salar Jung III, a celebrity of the

erstwhile State of Hyderabad expired on March 2, 1949

leaving behind him no issue but a vast estate. As

was expected, several persons came forward claiming to

be his heirs, and among them were Sajjid Yar Jung

and Turab Yar Jung who claimed to be his first cousins.

The Nizam by a notification of May 9, 1949, appointed

a Committee to administer the estate of the late

Nawab Salar Jung. On the merger of the Hyderabad

State, the Central Government by the Nawab Salar

Jung Bahadur (Administration of Assets) Act 1950,

continued the Committee and also provided that no suit

or other legal proceeding for the enforcement of any

right or remedy in respect of any asset, shall be

instituted in any court by any person other than the

Committee except with the previous consent of the

Central Government.

3. In the meanwhile, on May 31, 1949, the

Nizam had already appointed a Commission to enquire

into the question of succession to the estate, and one

of the questions referred to the Commission was

whether the Jagir of the late Nawab Salar Jung

escheated to the Government and another was the

ascertainment of his heirs. The Commission was

unable to proceed with the inquiry as some of the

claimants filed a writ petition in the High Court of

Andhra Pradesh challenging the jurisdiction of the

Commission to enquire into the question of succession.

The High Court, by its decision of September 23,

1952 held that the Commission was not the proper

forum for determining the question of succession and

directed that the management of the estate should

remain with the Committee until the question was

settled by a Civil Court. The question was ultimately

settled by compromise between the various claimants

including the Government. The compromise was

incorporated in a decree dated March 5, 1959 passed

in a suit being Suit No. O.S. 13/58 which was filed by

some of the claimants. The present proceedings are an

offshoot of the said suit.

4. Sajjid Yar Jung who claimed to be one of the

first cousins of the late Nawab Salar Jung did not have

the wherewithal to establish his claim to a share in the

estate. He approached the plaintiff who was a

businessman of Bombay for financial help to enable

him to establish his claim. According to the plaintiff, he

agreed to do so and Sajjid Yar Jung agreed to return all

amounts to be advanced to him from time to time and

also to give the plaintiff one anna share in the

amount that

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would be received by him from the estate. The agreement was

executed in writing on June 27, 1952 which is the subject

matter of the present proceedings. Pursuant to this

agreement Sajjid Yar Jung and his agents drew large amounts

from the plaintiff from time to time, totalling to about

Rs.75,000. Sajjid Yar Jung expired before the plaintiff

received his share of the amount as per the agreement but

after Sajjid Yar Jung successfully established his claim to

the share in the estate. According to the plaintiff, the

amount due to Saijid Yar Jung from the estate was about

Rs.60 lakhs and hence he claimed Rs.3 lakhs as his share

(calculated at one anna in a rupee) in addition to the

return of the sums advanced by him which as stated above was

Rs.75,000. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the present suit

against the heirs of Sajjid Yar Jung for accounts and for

administration of his estate and for distribution of the

amount among the plaintiff and the defendants. He also

joined the receiver of the estate of Nawab Salar Jung

Bahadur as one of the defendants to the suit.

5. The heirs of the late Nawab Sajjid Yar Jung

(hereinafter referred to as "Nawab") contested the suit and

denied that the plaintiff had advanced any amounts to the

Nawab. They also raised other contentions including the

contentions that the suit was barred by limitation and that

the agreement of June 27, 1952 was unenforceable in law as

it was in the nature of a champerty deal which was opposed

to public policy and forbidden by law.

6. The City Civil Court where the suit was filed found

that the agreement was genuine, that it was admissible in

evidence, that the amounts were advanced by the plaintiff to

the Nawab and that the suit was not barred by limitation.

However, the Court found that the agreement was opposed to

public policy as the object of the agreement was that the

plaintiff should wield his influence with Central and State

Ministers to have the Nawab recognised as the heir to the

estate in return for his being given one anna share in the

amount to be received by the Nawab. The Court, therefore,

held that the agreement in question was not enforceable.

The Court also held that even the amounts actually advanced

by the plaintiff and received by the Nawab could not be

recovered by the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court

dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiff preferred an

appeal to the High Court.

7. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the

appeal had abated against all the respondents on account of

the failure of the plaintiff-appellant to bring on record

the heirs of one of the respondents, viz., Askar Nawab Jung

who had died pending the appeal. On

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merits, the Bench also held that the agreement was against

the public policy. The Court further held that the

agreement was one whole agreement and hence the

plaintiff was not entitled to recover even the amount

of Rs.75,000 which was actually advanced by him to

the Nawab for prosecuting the litigation. It is this

decision which is challenged before us.

8. As stated earlier, leave has been granted only in

respect of the said amount of Rs.75,000 and,

therefore, we are concerned in the present appeal

only with the question as to whether the conclusion

arrived at by the High Court, i.e., that the agreement

is opposed to public policy and the actual advance of

Rs.75,000 was a part of the whole agreement and was,

therefore, also tainted by the vice of being contrary

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to public policy is correct.

9. That the amount of Rs.75,000 was advanced by the

plaintiff to the Nawab for prosecuting his claim as a

sharer in the estate, is not disputed. In fact, the

Nawab had to approach the plaintiff and had to enter

into the agreement in question for the express purpose of

successfully prosecuting his claim. The plaintiff cannot

also contend that he had agreed to and did advance

the said amount of Rs.75,000 only because he wanted

and expected the Nawab to be successful in the

prosecution of his claim. The advance was not a friendly

loan or without consideration. The agreement itself

stipulated that on the successful establishment of the

claim, the Nawab would not only return the said

advance but would also pay to the plaintiff consideration

for the said advance. That consideration was agreed to be

at the rate of one anna in a rupee. It is, therefore,

apparent on the face of the record that the advance and the

share in the estate, were a part of the same contract-

one as a consideration for the other. The two stand

together and none can stand without the other. Hence, I am

not impressed by the contention advanced by Shri

Shah for the appellant that the amount of Rs.75,000

which was advanced by the appellant can be separated

from the other agreement or could be treated differently. I

am in agreement with the High Court that the agreement

has to be treated as a whole and the two parts, viz.,

the advance and the consideration for the same cannot be

separated from each other.

10. The next question is whether the advance in

question was opposed to public policy. On this question,

Shri Shah took us through the law on the subject, and

contended that both the City Civil Court as well as the

High Court have created a new head of public policy

to declare the agreement as void, although according to the

relevant

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statutory Provisions as well as the decisions of the Court,

the agreement is not void. In the first instance, he

referred us to the provisions of Sections 23, 65, 69, 70 and

Part (ii) of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act. Section

23 states that the consideration or object of an agreement

is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a

nature that, if permitted, would defeat the provisions of

any law, or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to

the person or property of another; or the Court regards it

as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these

cases the consideration or object of an agreement is said to

be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or

consideration is unlawful is void. He then pointed out to

us that the specific rule of English law against maintenance

and champerty have not been adopted in India and a

champertous agreement is not per se void in this country.

He contended that before a champertous agreement is held to

be void, it must be shown that it is against public policy

or against justice, equity and good conscience. He

contended in this connection that the Nawab admittedly did

not have sufficient finance to prosecute his claim though,

he had a valid claim as shown by the result of the

litigation in that behalf. The plaintiff, therefore, did

not do anything wrong in advancing the amount in question to

him to enable him to establish his claim successfully since

the Nawab could not have repaid the amount unless he got a

share in the estate. It was a legitimate exercise to reduce

the agreement to writing and to stipulate therein that the

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amount should be repaid along with a share in the estate

when the Nawab's claim was established. The share in the

estate being only one anna in a rupee could not also be said

to be on the high side and conscionable. The High Court has

given a finding in that behalf in favour of the appellant.

The High Court has, however, held against the appellant only

on the ground that the agreement was against public policy.

He strenuously urged that if the champertous nature of the

agreement is ignored which it is legitimate to do so in this

country, there is no other ground of public policy on which

the agreement can be struck down.

11. In this connection, he referred us to the decision

of this Court in the matter of Mr. 'G', a Senior Advocate of

the Supreme Court, [1955] 1 SCR 490 where it is reiterated

that a champertous contract would be legally unobjectionable

if no lawyer was involved and that the rigid English rules

of Champerty and Maintenance do not apply in India. In that

case, he pointed out to us that the agreement was held

unenforceable because it was agreement between a lawyer and

his client and it amounted to professional misconduct.

However, this Court has also observed there that if such an

agreement had been

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between a third party "it would have been legally

enforceable and good. It may even be that it is good in law

and enforceable as it stands though we do not so decide

because the question does not arise; but that was

argued and for the sake of argument even that can be

conceded. It follows that there is nothing morally wrong,

nothing to shock the conscience, nothing against public

policy and public morals in such a transaction per se,

that is to say, when a legal practitioner is not

concerned. But that is not the question we have to

consider. However much these agreements may be open

to other men what we have to decide is whether they

are permissible under the rigid rules of conduct enjoyed

by the members of a very close professional preserve

so that their integrity, dignity and honour may be placed

above the breath of scandal".

12. His second leg of the argument rested on the

other provisions of the Indian Contract Act to which

I have made reference above. He contended that even

assuming that it was an agreement to receive

consideration a share in the claim that was to be

established by the Nawab, it was not against public

policy. He contended that the amount in question was

admittedly advanced and an advantage of it was taken

by the Nawab to establish his claim. He had,

therefore, to return the same to the appellant. In this

connection, he referred to us to the other provisions

of the Indian Contract Act to which I have made a

reference earlier. Section 65 states that when an

agreement is discovered to be void or when a contract

becomes void, any person who has received any advantage

under such agreement or contract, is bound to restore

it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from

whom he received it. Section 69 states that a person who

is interested in the payment of moneys which another is

bound by law to pay, and who therefore pays it, is

entitled to be reimbursed by the other. Section 70

declares that where a person lawfully does anything

for another person, or delivers anything to him, not

intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person

enjoys the benefit therefore, the latter is bound to

make compensation to the former in respect of, or to

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restore, the thing so done or delivered. Part (ii) of

Section 73 states that when an obligation resembling

those created by contract has been incurred and has

not been discharged, any person injured by the

failure to discharge it, is entitled to receive the

same compensation from the party in default as if such

person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his

contract.

Shri Shah also referred us to the provisions of Section 84

of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 which reads as follows:

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"84. Where the owner of property transfers it to

another for an illegal purpose and such purpose is

not carried into execution, or the transferor is

not as guilty as the transferee, or the effect of

permitting the transferee to retain the property

might be to defeat the provisions of any law, the

transferee must hold the property for the benefit

of the transferor.

Relying on these statutory provisions as well as the

judicial decisions, he contended firstly that assuming that

the agreement was a champertous one, it was neither immoral

nor against public policy, and secondly even de hors the

agreement, the appellant is entitled to the said advance of

Rs.75,000 under Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act.

13. The High Court referred to the evidence on record

in appeal which had an intimate bearing on the nature and

the purpose of the agreement in question and came to the

following conclusions. The Court held that the plaintiff-

appellant was approached by the Nawab because being a

businessman of eminence, he was highly influencial. He had

an access to the ministers and other worthies in the

Government. He was in a position to secure to the Nawab his

claim by wielding his influence. The Nawab knew about it

and the plaintiff was also confident about it. It'was

immaterial that those whom he had approached were men of

high repute and great integrity of character. The fact that

because of his accessibility he could get things done

through them or could make use of his other standing with

them to deliver goods to the Nawab, was enough to taint the

entire agreement with the vice of introducing corruption in

public life. The High Court also found that the advance

which was made was in the nature of an investment to share

the booty. There was no reason for the plaintiff who was a

total stranger to the Nawab to undertake the financing in

question which was in those days on a considerably high-

scale. No person who was not confident of delivering the

goods would have embarked on financing on such a liberal

scale. The plaintiff admittedly was a businessman who knew

the value of each pie he was spending. He was doing it as a

fruitful investment with sure returns. That is evident from

the terms of the contract themselves since both the advance

and the consideration for which the advances were made form

part of one integral contract. On these facts which are on

record, the High Court came to the conclusion that the

parties had entered into the agreement in question with the

avowed purpose that the plaintiff would use his then

prevailing influence with the worthies in the

337

Government to secure the gains for the Nawab. The

Court On this evidence came to the conclusion that

the agreement was nothing but one obviously made to

lend services as a "go-between" or a "carrier" for

commission. This being so, it was against public interest

and detrimental to the health of body politic.

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14. The High Court further repelled the

contention that either the City Civil Court or it was

evolving a new head of public policy by referring to

a decision of this Court in Ghurelal Parakh v.

Mahadeodas Maiya & Ors., AIR 1959 SC 781=(1959)

Suppl. 2 SCR 406 and the decisions of the English

Court and to opinions of the jurists/experts in

treatises and essays on the subject of public policy.

The Court also pointed out that this was by no means a

new head of public policy and it can come under the

head "agreements tending to injure the public" as

mentioned at page 325 of Anson's Law of Contract (23rd ed).

15. I am in respectful agreement with the

conclusion arrived at by the High Court. It cannot be

disputed that a contract which has a tendency to

injure public interests or public welfare is one

against public policy. What constitutes an injury to

public interests or welfare would depend upon the

times and climes. The social milieu in which the

contract is sought to be enforced would decide the

factum, the nature and the degree of the injury. It is

contrary to the concept of public policy to contend that

it is immatable, since it must vary with the varying

needs of the society. What those needs are would

depend upon the consensus value-judgments of the

enlightened section of the society. These values may

sometimes get incorporated in the legislation, but

sometimes they may not. The legislature often fails

to keep pace with the changing needs and values nor is it

realistic to expect that it will have provided for all

contingencies and eventualities. It is, therefore, not

only necessary but obligatory on the courts to step in

to fill the lacuna. When courts perform this function

undoubtedly they legislate judicially. But that is a

kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated to

them to further the object of the legislation and to

promote the goals of the society. Or to put it

negatively, to prevent the frustration of the legislation

or perversion of the goals and values of the society.

So long as the courts keep themselves tethered to

the ethos of the society and do not travel off its

course, so long as they attempt to furnish the felt

necessities of the time and do not refurbish them,

their role in this respect has to be welcomed.

It is true that as observed by Burrough, J. in

Richardson v. Mellish, [ 1824] 2 Bing. 229 at 252 public

policy is "an unruly horse and

338

dangerous to ride" and as observed by Cave, J. in re Mirams,

[189] 1 QB 594 at 595 it is "a branch of the law, however,

which certainly should not be extended, as judges are more

to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as expounders

of what is called public policy". But as observed by Prof.

Winfield in his article 'Public Policy in the English Common

Law' [1928]42 Harv. L. Rev. 76, 91]:

"Some judges appear to have thought it [the unruly

horse of public policy] more like a tiger, and

refused to mount it at all perhaps because they

feared the fate of the young lady of Riga. Others

have regarded it like Balaam's ass which would

carry its rider nowhere. But none, at any rate at

the present day, has looked upon it as a Pegasus

that might soar beyond the momentary needs of the

community."

All courts are at one time or the other felt the need to

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bridge the gap between what is and what is intended to be.

The courts cannot in such circumstances shirk from their

duty and refuse to fill the gap. In performing this duty

they do not foist upon the society their value-judgments.

They respect and accept the prevailing values, and do what

is expected of them. The courts will, on the other hand,

fail in their duty if they do not rise to the occasion but

approve helplessly of an interpretation of a statute or a

document or of an action of an individual which is certain

to subvert the societal goals and endanger the public good.

16. The contract such as the present one which is

found by the City Civil Court as well as the High Court to

have been entered into with the obvious purpose of

influencing the authorities to procure a verdict in favour

of the late Nawab was obviously a "carrier" contract. To

enforce such a contract although its tendencies to injure

public weal is manifest is not only to abdicate one's public

duty but to assist in the promotion of a pernicious practice

of procuring decisions by influencing authorities when they

should abide by the law. To strike down such contracts is

not to invent a new head of public policy but to give effect

to its true implications. A democratic society is founded

on the rule of law and any practice which seeks to subvert

or circumvent the law strikes at its very root. When the

Court discountenances such practice, it only safeguards the

foundation of the society. Even assuming, therefore, that

the Court finds a new head of public policy to strike down

such practice, its activism is not only warranted but

desired.

339

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. In the

circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to

costs.

FATHIMA BEEVI, J. I have had the advantage of

perusing the judgment prepared by my teamed brother,

Sawant, J. I agree with him that the appeal must fail.

I wish to say a few words. The only point that arises

for decision in the appeal is whether an amount of

Rs.75,000 which the plaintiff claims to have advanced,

is recoverable from the respondents. The relevant facts

have been stated by my learned brother and it is not

necessary to repeat the same. The City Civil Court

found that the agreement on the basis of which the

plaintiff claimed relief was opposed to public policy.

The object of the agreement according to the trial

court was that the plaintiff should wield his influence

with Central and State Ministers to have Sajjid Yar

Jung recognised as the heir of late Nawab Salar Jung in

return for his being given one anna share in the

assets to be received by Sajjid Yar Jung from the estate

of late Nawab Salar Jung.

The High Court has confirmed that under the

agreement the plaintiff was to promote the cause of

Sajjid Yar Jung in his being recognised as heir of

the Nawab Salar Jung and for the help thus rendered

to receive a share of one anna in a rupee out of the

assets obtained. The plaintiff appears to have

advanced an amount of Rs.75,000 in promoting the

cause of Sajjid Yar Jung as agreed upon. The help

in promoting the cause was much more than mere

financing. On the evidence the High Court found that

the help Sajjid Yar Jung wanted from the plaintiff was

to bring to bear his influence with the Central and

State Ministers and the request for financial help

was secondary to the request to represent the cause with

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the use of influence. The High Court affirmed that

the object of agreement was to influence the Central

and State Ministers and to advance and expand all

amounts necessary in that connection.

In the face of the concurrent findings with which we

agree, I have no doubt in our mind that the contract

relating to the payment of the amount is not severable from

the agreement to promote the cause of Sajjid Yar Jung by

wielding the influence the plaintiff had. Every agreement

of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.

The consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful when

the court regards it as opposed to public policy. If

anything is done against the public law or public policy

that would be illegal in as much as the interest of the

public would suffer in case a contract against public policy

is permitted to stand. Public policy is a principle of

judicial

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interpretation founded on the current needs of the

community. The law relating to public policy cannot remain

immutable. It must change with passage of time. A bargain

whereby one party is to assist another in recovering

property and is to share in the proceeds of the action and

such assistance is by using the influence with the

administration, irrespective of the fact that the persons

intended to be influenced are not amenable to such influence

is against protection and promotion of public welfare. It

is opposed to public policy. In this view, we would hold

that the plaintiff cannot enforce the agreement to recover

the amount from the respondents.

ORDER

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to

costs.

R. S. S. Appeal dismissed.

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