Jharkhand High Court, F.A. No. 247 of 2026, divorce appeal, cruelty, desertion, Special Marriage Act, family court dismissal, ex-parte, marital dissolution
 09 Oct, 2026
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Rekha Kumari @ Rekha Vs. Rakesh Kumar

  Jharkhand High Court F.A. No. 247 of 2026
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Case Background

As per case facts, the appellant-wife sought divorce alleging her husband's alcohol addiction, domestic violence, and failure to support the family, which forced her and their children to leave the ...

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Document Text Version

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

F.A. No. 247 of 2026

Rekha Kumari @ Rekha, aged about 36 years, wife of Sri

Rakesh Kumar and daughter of Sri Kishun Lal Sahu,

resident of Qtr. No.32, Cable Town, Security Line, P.O.

and P.S. Golmuri, Town Jamshedpur, District -East

Singhbhum-831003.

…Petitioner/Appellant

Versus

Rakesh Kumar, son of Late Jaidev Prasad, resident of Qrt

No.26, Cable Town, Security Line, P.O. and P.S. Golmuri,

Town Jamshedpur, District-East Singhbhum-831003.

… …Respondent/Respondent

-------

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD

-------

For the Appellant : Mr. Prabhash Kumar, Advocate

Mr. Ganesh Ram, Advocate

For the Respondent : ...

----------------------------

CAV/Reserved on 25.08.2026 Pronounced on 09 /10/2026

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

Prayer:

1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Court

Act, 1984 is directed against order/judgment dated

09.02.2026 and decree signed on 16.02.2026 passed by the

learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court

No. 1, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum in Original Suit No.59

of 2024, whereby and whereunder the suit, filed under

Section 27(1)(b) and (d) of the Special Marriage for grant of

decree of divorce, was dismissed ex parte.

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Brief facts of the case:

2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the

original suit, needs to be referred herein, which reads as

under:

3. The appellant is the legally married wife of the Respondent

and their marriage was solemnized and registered on

20.10.2010 before the Marriage Officer at Sub -Registry

Office, Jamshedpur and was also performed as per the

Hindu belief and customs of both the parties. After marriage

the Petitioner-appellant went to her In-law's house to lead

their conjugal life harmoniously. Out of the said wedlock,

the Petitioner-appellant gave birth of a female child namely

Dimple Kumari on 11

th January 2012 and one male child

namely Lokesh Kumar born on 1

st October 2015. It is

averred that after birth of the son, the Respondent started

committing domestic violence. The Respondent used to

consume alcohol and also assaulted the Petitioner, abusing

vulgar words. However, the Petitioner-appellant silently

tolerated with the hope that the behaviour of the Respondent

may change in future. It is further averred that the

Petitioner's father in law suddenly died in 2015. After his

death, the Respondent became more furious and cruel. He

became habitual drunker. He stopped to do job. The

Respondent has stopped to fulfill the essential needs of the

family. As such, the Petitioner was facing difficulties to

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maintain herself along with said two minor children. The life

of the Petitioner became hell. However, she, was, anyhow,

pulling her days inspite of cruelty and mental torture,

caused at the instance of her husband. Subsequently on

15th March 2018 the Petitioner-appellant was driven away

along with her two children by the Respondent party from

the in-law's house of the Petitioner. Consequently, the

Petitioner took shelter in the house of her father and still she

is living with her parents. It is further averred that Petitioner

is working in private job and out of her meager income she is

maintaining herself as well as her children. The parents of

the Petitioner are old and poor but they are sensible, they

both are protecting the Petitioner and her said two children.

The aforesaid two children of the Petitioner are studying in

school. Their educational expenses are any how borne by the

Petitioner. Respondent has become habitual drunkard; he

treated the Petitioner with cruelty. He has deserted the

Petitioner continuously for five years. He does not take care

of children. He is not sound in mind. He is indulging himself

in all negative activities by making threats out of

intoxication. It is further averred that Petitioner tried her

level best to change the behavior of the opposite party, but

all went in vain.

4. In the aforesaid background, the petitioner-wife, had filed

the suit wherein prayer had been made to pass a decree for

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dissolution of marriage in favour of the petitioner/ appellant

herein.

5. Before the family court, notice was issued through post as

also notice was published in the Newspaper but the

respondent did not appear in spite of proper service of

notice, hence, the suit proceeded ex-parte vide order dated

05.05.2025.

6. Accordingly, the suit proceeded and evidence was adduced

on behalf of appellant as also some documents were

exhibited.

7. The learned additional family court, on the basis of materials

available before the Court, dismissed the suit ex-parte filed

by the petitioner-wife under Section 27(1)(b) and (d) of the

Special Marriage Act 1954 (herein referred as Act 1954) for

grant of decree of divorce.

8. The petitioner-wife (appellant herein) being aggrieved with

the order passed by the learned additional family court has

approached this Court by filing the instant appeal.

9. This Court vide order dated 8

th June, 2026 issued notice to

the respondent-husband.

10. As per office note dated 17.07.2026, prepared on the basis of

the service report of the process server, as available at Flag

„X‟ the notice was shown to be received personally by the

respondent and the respondent also put his signature on the

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back side of the notice. Further, the tracking report of the

notice sent through speed post also reflects that the notice

has been delivered to the address, but, in spite of valid

service of notice, the respondent-husband did not appear, as

such the present appeal proceeded ex-parte accordingly. For

ready reference, order dated 20

th July, 2026 is quoted as

under:

“1. This Court has issued notice upon the respondent, vide

order dated 8th June, 2026.

2. As per the office note dated 17.07.2026 prepared on the

basis of the service report of the process server as available at

flag-“X” that the notice has been received personally.

3. We have perused the service report as available at flag-“X”

and found that respondent has received the notice and put his

signature on the back side of the notice.

4. We have also perused the notice sent through speed post

with tracking report as available at flag-“y” and found that the

notice has been delivered to addressee.

5. There is no appearance as yet on behalf of the respondent,

even though, the notice has been received personally.

I.A. No.6123 of 2026

6. This interlocutory application has been preferred under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 17

days in preferring the instant appeal.

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

8. Considering the sufficient cause as has been referred at

paragraph-3 of the interlocutory application, the delay of 17

days in preferring the appeal, is hereby, condoned.

9. Accordingly, I.A. No.6123 of 2026 stands allowed.

First Appeal No.247 of 2026

10. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

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11. Call for the Trial Court Records. 12. List this matter on

24th August, 2026 under the appropriate heading.

11. Accordingly, the matter proceeded and argument has been

advanced on behalf of appellant.

Submission of learned counsel for the appellant-wife

12. Mr. Prabhash Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant-wife

has submitted that element of cruelty and desertion in its

true perspective and tenor has not been considered by the

learned additional family court, as such the judgment

passed by the learned additional family court is perverse.

13. Further submission has been made that learned family court

failed to consider the fact that in spite of valid service of

notice, the Respondent/Husband did not appear in the suit

to defend his case and to place any objection with regard to

the reliefs claimed in the suit and thereafter indirectly and

obliquely admitted the reliefs claimed in the Original Suit.

14. It has been submitted while pressing the issue of cruelty the

learned family court failed to appreciate the fact that

petitioner-wife had informed to police against her husband

for torture in the Golmuri Police Station in February, 2024

and despite of repeated attempts by the Police and well-

wisher the Respondent husband did not mend his conduct.

15. So far as the issue of desertion is concerned, submission has

been made that it is the Respondent/Husband who has

abandoned his wife, daughter and son and has driven away

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forcibly from the matrimonial home and is not maintaining

his family, therefore, the Petitioner along with daughter and

son has taken shelter in her father's house.

16. It has been submitted that the husband of the petitioner is

addicted to liquor and often used to demand money from her

and on her inability to fulfill such demand, he used to beat

her and which causes petitioner mentally and physically

tortured.

17. It has been submitted that though there was sufficient

material to prove the element of cruelty and desertion on the

part of respondent-husband but the learned family court has

wrongly interpreted the terms of cruelty and desertion

without appreciating the admitted fact that Respondent-

husband is continuous ly and regularly torturing the

petitioner both mentally and physically and as such

cohabitation of husband and wife has come to an end and

they are living separately since 15

th March, 2018 and there

is no effort by husband for resumption of their conjugal life

and husband is not maintaining his family and did not take

care of welfare, education of his daughter and son.

18. It has been submitted that it is the degree of cruelty meted

out to the petitioner which forced the petitioner to go to her

matrimonial house, but these facts have not properly been

appreciated by learned additional family court while passing

the impugned judgment.

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19. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that

the learned family court in the concluding paragraph has

observed that "it is evident that there was never any attempt

on behalf of Respondent to establish conjugal relationship

with the Petitioner since 15/03/2018 and more so the

conduct of the Respondent since 15/03/2018 shows animus

deserendi on the part of the Respondent" but thereafter

wrongly came to the finding that it cannot be inferred that

the Respondent husband is guilty of desertion towards the

Petitioner/wife and failed to realise that instant marriage of

parties has irretrievably broken down due to non -

resumption of conjugal life since 15/03/2018.

20. Learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant on the aforesaid

grounds has submitted that the instant appeal be allowed by

quashing and setting aside the order passed by learned

additional family court.

Analysis:

21. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and gone

through the pleading available on record as also the finding

recorded by learned Additional Principal Judge, Addl. Family

Court, Jamshedpur and other materials available on record.

22. This Court before proceeding further needs to refer herein

the factual aspect of the matter.

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23. The marriage of the petitioner-appellant and respondent-

husband was solemnized and registered on 20.10.2010

before the Marriage Officer at Sub -Registry Office,

Jamshedpur and was also performed as per the Hindu belief

and customs of both the parties.

24. After marriage the Petitioner-appellant went to her In-law's

house to lead their conjugal life harmoniously. Out of the

said wedlock, the Petitioner-appellant gave birth of a female

child namely Dimple Kumari on 11

th January 2012 and one

male child namely Lokesh Kumar born on 1

st October 2015.

It is alleged that after birth of the son, the Respondent

started committing domestic violence and used to consume

alcohol and also used to assault the Petitioner using abusive

language. However, the Petitioner-appellant silently tolerated

with the hope that the behaviour of the Respondent may

change in future. It is further alleged after the death of her

father-in-law in the year 2015, the Respondent became more

furious and cruel and stopped to do job and fulfill the

essential needs of the family.

25. Therefore, the Petitioner was facing difficulties to maintain

herself along with said two minor children. Subsequently on

15th March 2018 the Petitioner-appellant was driven away

along with her two children by the Respondent party from

the in-law's house of the Petitioner. Consequ ently, the

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Petitioner took shelter in the house of her father and still she

is living with her parents.

26. Before, the learned additional family court the respondent-

husband did not appear, as such the suit proceeded ex-parte

and the learned additional family court dismissed the suit,

against which the instant appeal has been filed.

27. Before this Court also, the notice was validly served upon

the respondent-husband but he chose not to appear as such

the case proceeded.

28. This Court in the aforesaid backdrop facts and submission

requires to consider as to:

“Whether the judgment and decree rendered by the

learned Family Court, whereby the prayer of the

petitioner-appellant wife for dissolution of marriage on the

grounds of cruelty under Section 27(1)(d) and desertion

under Section 27(1)(b) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954,

having been declined, warrants interference in appellate

jurisdiction by this Court.”

29. This Court, in order to appreciate the testimony available on

record, has gone through the testimony of the witness, as

available in the impugned order.

30. In this case the petitioner-appellant has adduced one

witness i.e., the petitioner herself, in support of her case.

31. P.W.1 Rekha Kumari, in her evidence in chief given by way

of affidavit dated 08.07.2025 has stated that their marriage

was performed under the Special Marriage Act before the

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Marriage Officer, Jamshedpur. They have blessed with a

daughter namely, Dimple Kumari and a son Lokesh. Her

husband does not do any work and he is addicted of liquor

and often used to demand money from her and on her

inability to fulfill such demand he used to beat her. She was

mentally and physically tortured and distressed by her

husband cruel behaviour. Her husband also abused both of

her children, they were afraid of him and as a result of that

she found it difficult to live with him. She has also deposed

that she has also informed her husband's torture to the

Golmuri P.S. and despite repeated attempts by the police

and well-wishers, the Respondent has not mended his

misconduct.

32. While answering to court question she has stated that apart

from this case, there is no pending case between her and the

Respondent nor was there any case in the past. Her

husband tortured her in the month of January, 2024 both at

her parents‟ house and at her in-laws house. He assaulted

her and her parents. She has filed complaint to this effect at

the Golmuri P.S. in February, 2024. She works as Nurse

with doctors, even right after the incident, she did her job

well as a nurse, she had no problems working.

33. Besides oral evidence, she has also adduced documentary

evidence. Exhibit 1 is the true copy of marriage certificate;

Exhibit 2 is the photograph of the petitioner and the

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respondent, as husband and wife; and exhibit 3 is the

newspaper publication of the service of notice of the suit for

appearance of the respondent.

34. On the basis of the pleading of the petitioner, the learned

Additional Principal Family Judge after appreciating the

evidence, dismissed the suit ex-parte filed for dissolution of

marriage by decree of divorce, against which the present

appeal has been preferred.

35. It needs to refer herein that since appellate jurisdiction has

been invoked herein, therefore, before entering into merit of

the case, at this juncture it would be purposeful to discuss

the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court.

36. It needs to refer herein that under section 7 of the Family

Courts Act, the Family Court shall have and exercise all the

jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Sub-

ordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force

in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature which are

described in the explanation to section 7(1).

37. Sub-section (1) to section 19 of the Family Courts Act

provides that an appeal shall lie from every judgment or

order not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to

the High Court "both on facts and on law". Therefore, section

19 of the Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of which has been dealt

with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in series of judgments.

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38. The law is well settled that the High Court in a First Appeal

can examine every question of law and fact which arises in

the facts of the case and has powers to affirm, reverse or

modify the judgment under question. In "Jagdish Singh v.

Madhuri Devi" (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon'ble Supreme

Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court acting as

the First Appellate Court to enter into not only questions of

law but questions of fact as well and the appellate Court

therefore can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire

evidence and can come to its own conclusion. For ready

reference the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is

being quoted as under:

“It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising

power as the first appellate court and hence it was open to

the Court to enter into not only questions of law but

questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal is

a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a rehearing of the

main matter and the appellate court can reappraise,

reappreciate and review the entire evidence--oral as well

as documentary--and can come to its own conclusion.”

39. Further, it needs to refer herein that under section 3 of the

Indian Evidence Act a fact is said to be proved when the

Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so

probable that a prudent man under the circumstances

would proceed on the supposition that such fact really

exists. Therefore, the normal rule of preponderance of

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probability is the rule which governs the civil proceedings

like this.

40. The expression "preponderance of probability" is not capable

of exact definition nor can there be any strait-jacket formula

or a weighing machine to find out which side the balance is

tilted. The preponderance of probability would imply a

positive element about possibility of existence of a fact. This

means a higher degree of probability of happening of

something and existence of a fact.

41. In "A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur " (2005) 2 SCC 22 the

Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the concept, a proof

beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal

trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of

such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and

wife.

42. Since this Court is exercising the power of appeal as referred

hereinabove and as per the settled position of law which

require the consideration of the appellate Court is that the

order/judgment passed by the appropriate Forum, if suffers

from perversity, the same is to be taken as a ground for its

reversal.

43. This Court, while appreciating the word perversity, needs to

refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has

been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means

that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the

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evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs.

State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr.,

(2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word

perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of

fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material

or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the

finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice

of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then,

the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs,

i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as

under:

“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a

number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1

SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse”

means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not

supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against

the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.

25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co.

Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse

finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of

evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni

Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994

SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can

be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no

evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person

would have arrived at those findings.

26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant

58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious

violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.

In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed

that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is

not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against

the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court

defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted

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from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right,

proper, correct, etc.

27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various

dictionaries in the following manner:

1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English,

6th Edn.

“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a

way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or

unreasonable.”

2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English ,

International Edn.

Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and

reasonable.

3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.

Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence

or the direction of the judge on a point of law.

4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English

Language (Deluxe EncyclopedicEdn.)

Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected

behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or

petulant.

5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.

“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one

that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether

against the evidence.”

44. From the aforesaid it is evident that if any order

made in conscious violation of pleading and law then it will

come under the purview of perverse order. Further "perverse

verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not only

against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the

evidence.

45. Thus, "perversity" refers to a finding or decision so

unreasonable or irrational that no reasonable person acting

judicially could have reached it. It signifies a gross and

unreasonable assessment of evidence or law by a court.

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46. Further Perversity is a high threshold for

intervention, distinguishing it from a mere error of fact or

law. The "safest approach on perversity is the classic

approach on the reasonable man's inference on the facts but

inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is

not perversity, reference in this regard be made to the

judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 14 SCC 197.

47. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of

law this Court is now adverting to the contention of the

learned counsel for the appellant as well as factual matrix of

the case.

48. Since in the present matter, a submission has been

advanced on behalf of the appellant -wife that the

respondent-husband subjected her to mental cruelty, it

becomes necessary to advert to the statutory element of

cruelty as contemplated under Section 27(1)( d) of the

Special Marriage Act, 1954. It is pertinent to note that a pari

materia provision relating to cruelty is also embodied in

Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the

judicial exposition under that enactment serves as a guiding

principle for construing cruelty under the Special Marriage

Act.

49. So far the allegation of cruelty is concerned, it needs

to refer herein the definition of „cruelty’ as has been defined

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by Hon‟ble Apex in the judgment rendered in Dr. N.G.

Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane [(1975) 2 SCC 326], wherein

it has been held that the Court is to enquire as to whether

the charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in

the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that,

it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the

respondent.

50. The cruelty has also been defined in the case of

Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi [(1988) 1 SCC 105],

wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents

demanded dowry. The Hon‟ble Apex Court emphasized that

“cruelty” can have no fixed definition.

51. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the

“conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct

in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations”. It is the

conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty

can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or

unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your

spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty;

intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be

present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a

question of fact and degree.”

52. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed

therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty

that it is important for the Court to not search for a

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standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty

in another case. What must be considered include the kind

of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social

conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which

they attach importance.”

53. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal

conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations

against the spouse in the written statement filed before the

court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute

cruelty.

54. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC

337, the wife alleged in her written statement that her

husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid

disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of

“lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family

while he was conducting cross-examination. The Hon‟ble

Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to

constitute “cruelty”.

55. In Vijay Kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela

Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex

Court has observed by taking into consideration the

allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement

that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity

with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having

an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context

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of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute

“cruelty” itself.

56. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v.

Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742 , has been

pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct

is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct,

which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of

the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to

make one live with the other. The conduct may take the

form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental

pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct

complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial

irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not

constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.

57. “Cruelty” has an inseparable nexus with human

conduct and is always dependent on social strata or milieu

to which parties belong, their ways of life, relationship,

temperaments and emotions that are conditioned by their

social status, reference be made to the judgment rendered

by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case Vishwanath

Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal , (2012) 7 SCC

288.

58. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of K. Srinivas

Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 has observed that

cruelty is evident where one spouse so treats other and

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manifests such feelings in other, as to cause reasonable

apprehension in mind of other that it would be harmful or

injurious to reside with other spouse and cruelty may be

physical or mental. It has further been observed that

staying together under the same roof is not a precondition

for mental cruelty. Spouse can cause mental cruelty by his

or her conduct even while he or she is not staying under the

same roof.

59. In matrimonial relationship cruelty mean absence of

mutual respect and understanding between spouses which

embitters relationship. Sometimes it may take form of

violence, or at times may just be an attitude or approach.

Silence in some situations may also amount to cruelty

reference be made to the case of Ravi

Kumar v. Julmidevi, (2010) 4 SCC 476.

60. For considering dissolution of marriage at instance

of a spouse who alleges mental cruelty, result of such

mental cruelty must be such that it is not possible to

continue with matrimonial relationship reference may be

taken from the judgment rendered by th e Hon‟ble Apex

Court in the case of Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal

Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742.

61. Further the word „cruelty‟ is used relation to human

conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to

or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

22

course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the

other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or

unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct

complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or

illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other

spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such

cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is

proved or admitted, reference in this regard be made to the

judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of

Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778.

62. Further, in the case of Manish Tyagi v. Deepak

Kumar, (2010) 4 SCC 339 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has

categorically observed that to constitute „cruelty‟, it is

enough that conduct of one of parties is so abnormal and

below accepted norm that another spouse could not

reasonable be expected to put up with it. Conduct is no

longer required to be so atrociously abominable which

would cause reasonable apprehension that it would b e

harmful of injurious to continue cohabitation with another

spouse. Hence, it is not necessary to establish physical

violence. Continued ill-treatment, cessation of marital

intercourse, studied neglect, indifference may lead to

inference of cruelty.

63. The word “cruelty” either under Section 13 (1)(a) of

the Hindu Marriage Act or under Section 27(1)(d) of the

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

23

Special Marriage Act has got no static connotation, and

therefore, gives a very wide discretion to the Court to apply

it liberally and contextually.

64. What is cruelty in one case may not be the same for

another and has to be applied from person to person while

taking note of the attending circumstances. Harm or injury

to health, reputation, the working-career or the like, would

be important considerations in determining whether the

conduct of the defending spouse amounts to cruelty. It has

to be shown that the defending spouse has treated him with

cruelty to cause reasonable apprehension in his/her mind

that it will be harmful or injurious to live with t he

contesting spouse.

65. Herein desertion stipulated under Section 27 (1) (b)

of the Act 1954has also been taken as ground by the

appellant for decree of divorce, therefore it would be apt to

discuss herein the word “desertion”. Desertion has also

been embodied in Section 13(1) (i-b) of Hindu Marriage Act

1955.

66. As per its meaning provided under the statute,

Special Marriage Act, that either of the spouse is

withdrawing on its own volition from the house then it will

not amount to desertion but vice-versa to that if the wife or

husband, as the case may be, is being forced to leave the

house then it will not amount desertion.

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

24

67. Desertion has been defined in the statute book and

has been interpreted by Hon‟ble Apex Court in catena of

decision.

68. It is pertinent to note that the word „desertion‟, as

has been defined in Explanation part of Section 27 of the

Special Marriage Act, which means that means desertion of

the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without

reasonable cause and without the consent or against the

wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the

petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its

grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be

construed accordingly.

69. Rayden on Divorce, which is a standard work on

the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised the case-

law on the subject in these terms:

“Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the

other, with an intention on the part of the deserting

spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an

end without reasonable cause and without the

consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of

departure by one spouse does not necessarily make

that spouse the deserting party.”

70. The legal position has been admirably summarised

in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws

of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:

“In its essence desertion means the intentional

permanent forsaking and abandonment of one

spouse by the other without that other's consent,

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

25

and without reasonable cause. It is a total

repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view

of the large variety of circumstances and of modes

of life involved, the Court has discouraged

attempts at defining desertion, there being no

general principle applicable to all cases.

71. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but

from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is

the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of

the married state; the state of things may usually be

termed, for short, „the home‟. There can be desertion

without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the

marriage having been consummated. The person who

actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the

deserting party.

72. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct

which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground

for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years

immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or,

where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer.

73. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the

statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence

founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete,

but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a

continuing offence.

74. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of

meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

26

of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from

wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in

a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust,

without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will

not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far

as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential

conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of

separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation

permanently to an end.

75. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the

deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent,

and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the

spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary

intention aforesaid.

76. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs.

Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the

definition of „desertion‟ on the basis of the judgment

rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman

Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which

has been consistently followed in several decisions of this

Court.

77. The law consistently has been laid down by this

Court that desertion means the intentional abandonment of

one spouse by the other without the consent of the other

and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

27

prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an

intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the

cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there

should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting

spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of

the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse

should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse

to leave the matrimonial home.

78. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions

on the issue of cruelty and desertion, has gone through the

testimony of witness and other materials available on

record.

79. So far as the issue of cruelty is concerned, this

Court has considered the evidence of the appellant-wife,

who has specifically stated that she was subjected to torture

in the drunk stage by her husband, the respondent herein,

and not only that he used to assault for the purpose to take

money. It has also been stated that even the two children

are being subjected to torture by the respondent-husband.

However, the learned trial court has given the finding that

since no criminal case has been instituted to that effect, as

such the element of cruelty cannot be said to be proved.

80. In this regard, this Court has also duly considered

the evidence adduced by the appellant and finds that she

specifically referred to the information furnished to the

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

28

Golmuri Police Station regarding the torture and assault

perpetrated by her husband. However, the learned Family

Judge failed to take cognizance of this material fact,

perhaps on the premise that no formal First Information

Report was drawn.

81. This Court is of the considered view that, in

matrimonial disputes, when either party adduces evidence

to substantiate the element of cruelty particularly the wife

the mere fact of non-institution of a formal First Information

Report cannot, by itself, be treated as a ground to discredit

such testimony. The appellant-wife, even if she did not lodge

a formal FIR, has nonetheless explained the torture and

assault suffered at the hands of the respondent-husband.

The pertinent question that arises is why she would

voluntarily choose to live alone and endure the rigours of

solitude and financial hardship, unless compelled by the

cruelty meted out to her. This circumstance lends credibility

to her statement and cannot be brushed aside merely on

extraneous consideration.

82. The aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been

duly taken into consideration by the learned Additional

Family Judge while adjudicating the issue of cruelty.

Without appreciating this vital circumstance, the learned

Additional Family Court proceeded to record an erroneous

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

29

finding that none of the allegations of cruelty levelled by the

petitioner against the respondent stood proved.

83. Consequently, the finding so recorded by the

learned Additional Family Court falls within the ambit of

perversity, insofar as the determination with respect to

cruelty is concerned, the same having been rendered

without proper appreciation of the material evidence

available on record.

84. So far as the issue of desertion is concerned, this

Court observes that under the statutory scheme of both the

Special Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act, desertion

contemplates a voluntary withdrawal by either spouse from

the matrimonial home with the intention of perm anently

terminating cohabitation. Conversely, where the wife or

husband, as the case may be, is compelled or forced to leave

the matrimonial home due to circumstances created by the

other spouse, such departure cannot, in law, amount to

desertion.

85. This Court for the purpose of appreciation of the

fact about the element of desertion has again delve into the

testimony of appellant, wherein it has specifically been

stated that the respondent-husband used to take liquor as a

habit and also used to assault for the purpose of snatching

away the money since the appellant for her and for survival

of her two children is doing job of nurse in private hospital.

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

30

86. It has been clearly stated in the evidence that,

under compelling circumstances and in order to safeguard

her own life as well as the lives of her two children, the

appellant-wife was constrained to leave the matrimonial

home and take shelter in her parental house. She has been

residing there continuously since the year 2018, which fact

further demonstrates that her separation was not voluntary

but necessitated by the cruelty and peril she faced at the

hands of the respondent-husband.

87. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the

considered view that the departure of the appellant-wife

from the matrimonial home cannot be construed as a wilful

abandonment of the respondent-husband. Rather, it was a

compelled act necessitated by the cruelty inflicted upon her,

thereby amounting itself to cruelty in law.

88. The cruelty and desertion are inter-related to some

extent. If the cruelty is meted out to the wife, then wife is

compelled to leave the house and, in such situation, it

cannot be alleged it is the wife who on own volition has left

the matrimonial house.

89. From the record it is further evident that despite

valid service of notice/summons, the respondent-husband

has deliberately abstained from appearance both before the

learned Family Court as well as before this Court. Such

conduct unmistakably demonstrates that the respondent

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

31

has no inclination to preserve or protect the marital bond

and has chosen to remain completely aloof from the

proceedings. His persistent non -appearance,

notwithstanding due service, reflects a conscious disregard

of the judicial process and underscores his indifference

towards saving the matrimonial relationship.

90. This Court, upon a comprehensive appraisal of the

grounds urged, the precedents cited, and the testimony of

the appellant, while adverting to the judgment rendered by

the learned Additional Family Court, finds that the said

Court, in assigning reasons for declining the decree of

divorce, has wholly omitted consideration of the material

evidence regarding the respondent -husband‟s drinking

habit and the assault and torture inflicted upon the

petitioner/appellant-wife, which compelled her to leave her

matrimonial home. Furthermore, the learned Family Court

failed to take into account that the parties have been living

separately since 2018, thereby rendering the marriage a

mere dead wood incapable of revival. It is further manifest

from the testimony of the appellant -wife that she is

unwilling to continue her marital life, being unable to

endure the cruelty and torture at the hands of the

respondent-husband, and being an independent lady, she

cannot be compelled to reside with him.

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

32

91. For the discussions made hereinabove, this Court is

of the view that the desertion by the wife of her husband is

under compelling circumstances and not the voluntary one.

92. Accordingly, issue as framed by this Court is

decided in favour of the appellant-wife.

93. This Court, upon a detailed discussion of the factual

aspects in conjunction with the settled legal position, while

adverting to the consideration undertaken by the learned

Additional Family Judge in the impugned judgment, finds

that the issues relating to cruelty and desertion alleged

against the appellant-husband have not been properly

examined.

94. On a careful appraisal of the aforesaid discussion,

this Court is of the considered view that the impugned

judgment and decree rendered by the learned Family Judge

fall within the ambit of perversity, inasmuch as there has

been no conscious consideration of the evidence available

on record.

95. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds

that the impugned judgment dated 09.02.2026 and the

decree signed on 16.02.2026 by the learned Additional

Principal Judge, Additional Family Court No. 1,

Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum in Original Suit No.59 of

2024 cannot be sustained in law and, accordingly, the same

is hereby quashed and set aside.

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

33

96. Consequently, the prayer as made in the original

suit stands allowed and the marriage between the parties

i.e., the appellant and the respondent, stands dissolved.

97. The Registry of this Court is directed to issue decree

of dissolution of Marriage.

98. It goes without saying that the Right to inheritance

of the children will remain intact and will have no bearing

with the dissolution of marriage, which is being allowed.

99. It needs to refer herein that the wife has not

approached the court for getting the maintenance which

reflects bona fide on the part of the appellant-wife, for the

reason that she has got a job of Nurse in the private

hospital to sustain herself and her two children.

100. However, this Court is of the view that though the

wife herself has not chosen to file an application for

maintenance of herself but that does not preclude her from

claiming maintenance for her minor children for their

sustenance and study.

101. As such, it is also left open upon for the appellant to

claim the maintenance for her children from the

respondent-husband by filing appropriate application before

the appropriate forum.

102. With the aforesaid directions and observations, the

instant appeal stands allowed and as such disposed of.

2026:JHHC:30306-DB

34

103. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands

disposed of.

I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

(Sanjay Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.)

9

th October, 2026

Alankar/A.F.R.

Uploaded on 09.10.2026

Description

Legal Notes

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