As per case facts, the appellant-wife sought divorce alleging her husband's alcohol addiction, domestic violence, and failure to support the family, which forced her and their children to leave the ...
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No. 247 of 2026
Rekha Kumari @ Rekha, aged about 36 years, wife of Sri
Rakesh Kumar and daughter of Sri Kishun Lal Sahu,
resident of Qtr. No.32, Cable Town, Security Line, P.O.
and P.S. Golmuri, Town Jamshedpur, District -East
Singhbhum-831003.
…Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
Rakesh Kumar, son of Late Jaidev Prasad, resident of Qrt
No.26, Cable Town, Security Line, P.O. and P.S. Golmuri,
Town Jamshedpur, District-East Singhbhum-831003.
… …Respondent/Respondent
-------
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Prabhash Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Ganesh Ram, Advocate
For the Respondent : ...
----------------------------
CAV/Reserved on 25.08.2026 Pronounced on 09 /10/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer:
1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Court
Act, 1984 is directed against order/judgment dated
09.02.2026 and decree signed on 16.02.2026 passed by the
learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court
No. 1, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum in Original Suit No.59
of 2024, whereby and whereunder the suit, filed under
Section 27(1)(b) and (d) of the Special Marriage for grant of
decree of divorce, was dismissed ex parte.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
2
Brief facts of the case:
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the
original suit, needs to be referred herein, which reads as
under:
3. The appellant is the legally married wife of the Respondent
and their marriage was solemnized and registered on
20.10.2010 before the Marriage Officer at Sub -Registry
Office, Jamshedpur and was also performed as per the
Hindu belief and customs of both the parties. After marriage
the Petitioner-appellant went to her In-law's house to lead
their conjugal life harmoniously. Out of the said wedlock,
the Petitioner-appellant gave birth of a female child namely
Dimple Kumari on 11
th January 2012 and one male child
namely Lokesh Kumar born on 1
st October 2015. It is
averred that after birth of the son, the Respondent started
committing domestic violence. The Respondent used to
consume alcohol and also assaulted the Petitioner, abusing
vulgar words. However, the Petitioner-appellant silently
tolerated with the hope that the behaviour of the Respondent
may change in future. It is further averred that the
Petitioner's father in law suddenly died in 2015. After his
death, the Respondent became more furious and cruel. He
became habitual drunker. He stopped to do job. The
Respondent has stopped to fulfill the essential needs of the
family. As such, the Petitioner was facing difficulties to
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
3
maintain herself along with said two minor children. The life
of the Petitioner became hell. However, she, was, anyhow,
pulling her days inspite of cruelty and mental torture,
caused at the instance of her husband. Subsequently on
15th March 2018 the Petitioner-appellant was driven away
along with her two children by the Respondent party from
the in-law's house of the Petitioner. Consequently, the
Petitioner took shelter in the house of her father and still she
is living with her parents. It is further averred that Petitioner
is working in private job and out of her meager income she is
maintaining herself as well as her children. The parents of
the Petitioner are old and poor but they are sensible, they
both are protecting the Petitioner and her said two children.
The aforesaid two children of the Petitioner are studying in
school. Their educational expenses are any how borne by the
Petitioner. Respondent has become habitual drunkard; he
treated the Petitioner with cruelty. He has deserted the
Petitioner continuously for five years. He does not take care
of children. He is not sound in mind. He is indulging himself
in all negative activities by making threats out of
intoxication. It is further averred that Petitioner tried her
level best to change the behavior of the opposite party, but
all went in vain.
4. In the aforesaid background, the petitioner-wife, had filed
the suit wherein prayer had been made to pass a decree for
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
4
dissolution of marriage in favour of the petitioner/ appellant
herein.
5. Before the family court, notice was issued through post as
also notice was published in the Newspaper but the
respondent did not appear in spite of proper service of
notice, hence, the suit proceeded ex-parte vide order dated
05.05.2025.
6. Accordingly, the suit proceeded and evidence was adduced
on behalf of appellant as also some documents were
exhibited.
7. The learned additional family court, on the basis of materials
available before the Court, dismissed the suit ex-parte filed
by the petitioner-wife under Section 27(1)(b) and (d) of the
Special Marriage Act 1954 (herein referred as Act 1954) for
grant of decree of divorce.
8. The petitioner-wife (appellant herein) being aggrieved with
the order passed by the learned additional family court has
approached this Court by filing the instant appeal.
9. This Court vide order dated 8
th June, 2026 issued notice to
the respondent-husband.
10. As per office note dated 17.07.2026, prepared on the basis of
the service report of the process server, as available at Flag
„X‟ the notice was shown to be received personally by the
respondent and the respondent also put his signature on the
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
5
back side of the notice. Further, the tracking report of the
notice sent through speed post also reflects that the notice
has been delivered to the address, but, in spite of valid
service of notice, the respondent-husband did not appear, as
such the present appeal proceeded ex-parte accordingly. For
ready reference, order dated 20
th July, 2026 is quoted as
under:
“1. This Court has issued notice upon the respondent, vide
order dated 8th June, 2026.
2. As per the office note dated 17.07.2026 prepared on the
basis of the service report of the process server as available at
flag-“X” that the notice has been received personally.
3. We have perused the service report as available at flag-“X”
and found that respondent has received the notice and put his
signature on the back side of the notice.
4. We have also perused the notice sent through speed post
with tracking report as available at flag-“y” and found that the
notice has been delivered to addressee.
5. There is no appearance as yet on behalf of the respondent,
even though, the notice has been received personally.
I.A. No.6123 of 2026
6. This interlocutory application has been preferred under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 17
days in preferring the instant appeal.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Considering the sufficient cause as has been referred at
paragraph-3 of the interlocutory application, the delay of 17
days in preferring the appeal, is hereby, condoned.
9. Accordingly, I.A. No.6123 of 2026 stands allowed.
First Appeal No.247 of 2026
10. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
6
11. Call for the Trial Court Records. 12. List this matter on
24th August, 2026 under the appropriate heading.
11. Accordingly, the matter proceeded and argument has been
advanced on behalf of appellant.
Submission of learned counsel for the appellant-wife
12. Mr. Prabhash Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant-wife
has submitted that element of cruelty and desertion in its
true perspective and tenor has not been considered by the
learned additional family court, as such the judgment
passed by the learned additional family court is perverse.
13. Further submission has been made that learned family court
failed to consider the fact that in spite of valid service of
notice, the Respondent/Husband did not appear in the suit
to defend his case and to place any objection with regard to
the reliefs claimed in the suit and thereafter indirectly and
obliquely admitted the reliefs claimed in the Original Suit.
14. It has been submitted while pressing the issue of cruelty the
learned family court failed to appreciate the fact that
petitioner-wife had informed to police against her husband
for torture in the Golmuri Police Station in February, 2024
and despite of repeated attempts by the Police and well-
wisher the Respondent husband did not mend his conduct.
15. So far as the issue of desertion is concerned, submission has
been made that it is the Respondent/Husband who has
abandoned his wife, daughter and son and has driven away
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
7
forcibly from the matrimonial home and is not maintaining
his family, therefore, the Petitioner along with daughter and
son has taken shelter in her father's house.
16. It has been submitted that the husband of the petitioner is
addicted to liquor and often used to demand money from her
and on her inability to fulfill such demand, he used to beat
her and which causes petitioner mentally and physically
tortured.
17. It has been submitted that though there was sufficient
material to prove the element of cruelty and desertion on the
part of respondent-husband but the learned family court has
wrongly interpreted the terms of cruelty and desertion
without appreciating the admitted fact that Respondent-
husband is continuous ly and regularly torturing the
petitioner both mentally and physically and as such
cohabitation of husband and wife has come to an end and
they are living separately since 15
th March, 2018 and there
is no effort by husband for resumption of their conjugal life
and husband is not maintaining his family and did not take
care of welfare, education of his daughter and son.
18. It has been submitted that it is the degree of cruelty meted
out to the petitioner which forced the petitioner to go to her
matrimonial house, but these facts have not properly been
appreciated by learned additional family court while passing
the impugned judgment.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
8
19. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that
the learned family court in the concluding paragraph has
observed that "it is evident that there was never any attempt
on behalf of Respondent to establish conjugal relationship
with the Petitioner since 15/03/2018 and more so the
conduct of the Respondent since 15/03/2018 shows animus
deserendi on the part of the Respondent" but thereafter
wrongly came to the finding that it cannot be inferred that
the Respondent husband is guilty of desertion towards the
Petitioner/wife and failed to realise that instant marriage of
parties has irretrievably broken down due to non -
resumption of conjugal life since 15/03/2018.
20. Learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant on the aforesaid
grounds has submitted that the instant appeal be allowed by
quashing and setting aside the order passed by learned
additional family court.
Analysis:
21. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and gone
through the pleading available on record as also the finding
recorded by learned Additional Principal Judge, Addl. Family
Court, Jamshedpur and other materials available on record.
22. This Court before proceeding further needs to refer herein
the factual aspect of the matter.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
9
23. The marriage of the petitioner-appellant and respondent-
husband was solemnized and registered on 20.10.2010
before the Marriage Officer at Sub -Registry Office,
Jamshedpur and was also performed as per the Hindu belief
and customs of both the parties.
24. After marriage the Petitioner-appellant went to her In-law's
house to lead their conjugal life harmoniously. Out of the
said wedlock, the Petitioner-appellant gave birth of a female
child namely Dimple Kumari on 11
th January 2012 and one
male child namely Lokesh Kumar born on 1
st October 2015.
It is alleged that after birth of the son, the Respondent
started committing domestic violence and used to consume
alcohol and also used to assault the Petitioner using abusive
language. However, the Petitioner-appellant silently tolerated
with the hope that the behaviour of the Respondent may
change in future. It is further alleged after the death of her
father-in-law in the year 2015, the Respondent became more
furious and cruel and stopped to do job and fulfill the
essential needs of the family.
25. Therefore, the Petitioner was facing difficulties to maintain
herself along with said two minor children. Subsequently on
15th March 2018 the Petitioner-appellant was driven away
along with her two children by the Respondent party from
the in-law's house of the Petitioner. Consequ ently, the
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
10
Petitioner took shelter in the house of her father and still she
is living with her parents.
26. Before, the learned additional family court the respondent-
husband did not appear, as such the suit proceeded ex-parte
and the learned additional family court dismissed the suit,
against which the instant appeal has been filed.
27. Before this Court also, the notice was validly served upon
the respondent-husband but he chose not to appear as such
the case proceeded.
28. This Court in the aforesaid backdrop facts and submission
requires to consider as to:
“Whether the judgment and decree rendered by the
learned Family Court, whereby the prayer of the
petitioner-appellant wife for dissolution of marriage on the
grounds of cruelty under Section 27(1)(d) and desertion
under Section 27(1)(b) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954,
having been declined, warrants interference in appellate
jurisdiction by this Court.”
29. This Court, in order to appreciate the testimony available on
record, has gone through the testimony of the witness, as
available in the impugned order.
30. In this case the petitioner-appellant has adduced one
witness i.e., the petitioner herself, in support of her case.
31. P.W.1 Rekha Kumari, in her evidence in chief given by way
of affidavit dated 08.07.2025 has stated that their marriage
was performed under the Special Marriage Act before the
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
11
Marriage Officer, Jamshedpur. They have blessed with a
daughter namely, Dimple Kumari and a son Lokesh. Her
husband does not do any work and he is addicted of liquor
and often used to demand money from her and on her
inability to fulfill such demand he used to beat her. She was
mentally and physically tortured and distressed by her
husband cruel behaviour. Her husband also abused both of
her children, they were afraid of him and as a result of that
she found it difficult to live with him. She has also deposed
that she has also informed her husband's torture to the
Golmuri P.S. and despite repeated attempts by the police
and well-wishers, the Respondent has not mended his
misconduct.
32. While answering to court question she has stated that apart
from this case, there is no pending case between her and the
Respondent nor was there any case in the past. Her
husband tortured her in the month of January, 2024 both at
her parents‟ house and at her in-laws house. He assaulted
her and her parents. She has filed complaint to this effect at
the Golmuri P.S. in February, 2024. She works as Nurse
with doctors, even right after the incident, she did her job
well as a nurse, she had no problems working.
33. Besides oral evidence, she has also adduced documentary
evidence. Exhibit 1 is the true copy of marriage certificate;
Exhibit 2 is the photograph of the petitioner and the
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
12
respondent, as husband and wife; and exhibit 3 is the
newspaper publication of the service of notice of the suit for
appearance of the respondent.
34. On the basis of the pleading of the petitioner, the learned
Additional Principal Family Judge after appreciating the
evidence, dismissed the suit ex-parte filed for dissolution of
marriage by decree of divorce, against which the present
appeal has been preferred.
35. It needs to refer herein that since appellate jurisdiction has
been invoked herein, therefore, before entering into merit of
the case, at this juncture it would be purposeful to discuss
the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court.
36. It needs to refer herein that under section 7 of the Family
Courts Act, the Family Court shall have and exercise all the
jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Sub-
ordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force
in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature which are
described in the explanation to section 7(1).
37. Sub-section (1) to section 19 of the Family Courts Act
provides that an appeal shall lie from every judgment or
order not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to
the High Court "both on facts and on law". Therefore, section
19 of the Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of which has been dealt
with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in series of judgments.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
13
38. The law is well settled that the High Court in a First Appeal
can examine every question of law and fact which arises in
the facts of the case and has powers to affirm, reverse or
modify the judgment under question. In "Jagdish Singh v.
Madhuri Devi" (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court acting as
the First Appellate Court to enter into not only questions of
law but questions of fact as well and the appellate Court
therefore can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire
evidence and can come to its own conclusion. For ready
reference the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is
being quoted as under:
“It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising
power as the first appellate court and hence it was open to
the Court to enter into not only questions of law but
questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal is
a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a rehearing of the
main matter and the appellate court can reappraise,
reappreciate and review the entire evidence--oral as well
as documentary--and can come to its own conclusion.”
39. Further, it needs to refer herein that under section 3 of the
Indian Evidence Act a fact is said to be proved when the
Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man under the circumstances
would proceed on the supposition that such fact really
exists. Therefore, the normal rule of preponderance of
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
14
probability is the rule which governs the civil proceedings
like this.
40. The expression "preponderance of probability" is not capable
of exact definition nor can there be any strait-jacket formula
or a weighing machine to find out which side the balance is
tilted. The preponderance of probability would imply a
positive element about possibility of existence of a fact. This
means a higher degree of probability of happening of
something and existence of a fact.
41. In "A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur " (2005) 2 SCC 22 the
Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the concept, a proof
beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal
trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of
such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and
wife.
42. Since this Court is exercising the power of appeal as referred
hereinabove and as per the settled position of law which
require the consideration of the appellate Court is that the
order/judgment passed by the appropriate Forum, if suffers
from perversity, the same is to be taken as a ground for its
reversal.
43. This Court, while appreciating the word perversity, needs to
refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has
been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means
that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
15
evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs.
State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr.,
(2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word
perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of
fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material
or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice
of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then,
the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs,
i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as
under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a
number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1
SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse”
means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not
supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against
the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co.
Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse
finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of
evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni
Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994
SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can
be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no
evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person
would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant
58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious
violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.
In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed
that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against
the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court
defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
16
from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right,
proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English,
6th Edn.
“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a
way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or
unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English ,
International Edn.
Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence
or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe EncyclopedicEdn.)
Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or
petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one
that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence.”
44. From the aforesaid it is evident that if any order
made in conscious violation of pleading and law then it will
come under the purview of perverse order. Further "perverse
verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.
45. Thus, "perversity" refers to a finding or decision so
unreasonable or irrational that no reasonable person acting
judicially could have reached it. It signifies a gross and
unreasonable assessment of evidence or law by a court.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
17
46. Further Perversity is a high threshold for
intervention, distinguishing it from a mere error of fact or
law. The "safest approach on perversity is the classic
approach on the reasonable man's inference on the facts but
inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is
not perversity, reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 14 SCC 197.
47. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of
law this Court is now adverting to the contention of the
learned counsel for the appellant as well as factual matrix of
the case.
48. Since in the present matter, a submission has been
advanced on behalf of the appellant -wife that the
respondent-husband subjected her to mental cruelty, it
becomes necessary to advert to the statutory element of
cruelty as contemplated under Section 27(1)( d) of the
Special Marriage Act, 1954. It is pertinent to note that a pari
materia provision relating to cruelty is also embodied in
Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the
judicial exposition under that enactment serves as a guiding
principle for construing cruelty under the Special Marriage
Act.
49. So far the allegation of cruelty is concerned, it needs
to refer herein the definition of „cruelty’ as has been defined
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
18
by Hon‟ble Apex in the judgment rendered in Dr. N.G.
Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane [(1975) 2 SCC 326], wherein
it has been held that the Court is to enquire as to whether
the charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in
the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that,
it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the
respondent.
50. The cruelty has also been defined in the case of
Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi [(1988) 1 SCC 105],
wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents
demanded dowry. The Hon‟ble Apex Court emphasized that
“cruelty” can have no fixed definition.
51. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the
“conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct
in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations”. It is the
conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty
can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or
unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your
spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty;
intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be
present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a
question of fact and degree.”
52. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed
therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty
that it is important for the Court to not search for a
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
19
standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty
in another case. What must be considered include the kind
of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social
conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which
they attach importance.”
53. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal
conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations
against the spouse in the written statement filed before the
court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute
cruelty.
54. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC
337, the wife alleged in her written statement that her
husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid
disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of
“lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family
while he was conducting cross-examination. The Hon‟ble
Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to
constitute “cruelty”.
55. In Vijay Kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela
Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex
Court has observed by taking into consideration the
allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement
that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity
with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having
an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
20
of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute
“cruelty” itself.
56. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v.
Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742 , has been
pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct
is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct,
which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of
the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to
make one live with the other. The conduct may take the
form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental
pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct
complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial
irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not
constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
57. “Cruelty” has an inseparable nexus with human
conduct and is always dependent on social strata or milieu
to which parties belong, their ways of life, relationship,
temperaments and emotions that are conditioned by their
social status, reference be made to the judgment rendered
by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case Vishwanath
Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal , (2012) 7 SCC
288.
58. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of K. Srinivas
Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 has observed that
cruelty is evident where one spouse so treats other and
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
21
manifests such feelings in other, as to cause reasonable
apprehension in mind of other that it would be harmful or
injurious to reside with other spouse and cruelty may be
physical or mental. It has further been observed that
staying together under the same roof is not a precondition
for mental cruelty. Spouse can cause mental cruelty by his
or her conduct even while he or she is not staying under the
same roof.
59. In matrimonial relationship cruelty mean absence of
mutual respect and understanding between spouses which
embitters relationship. Sometimes it may take form of
violence, or at times may just be an attitude or approach.
Silence in some situations may also amount to cruelty
reference be made to the case of Ravi
Kumar v. Julmidevi, (2010) 4 SCC 476.
60. For considering dissolution of marriage at instance
of a spouse who alleges mental cruelty, result of such
mental cruelty must be such that it is not possible to
continue with matrimonial relationship reference may be
taken from the judgment rendered by th e Hon‟ble Apex
Court in the case of Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal
Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742.
61. Further the word „cruelty‟ is used relation to human
conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to
or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
22
course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the
other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or
unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct
complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or
illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other
spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such
cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is
proved or admitted, reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of
Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778.
62. Further, in the case of Manish Tyagi v. Deepak
Kumar, (2010) 4 SCC 339 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has
categorically observed that to constitute „cruelty‟, it is
enough that conduct of one of parties is so abnormal and
below accepted norm that another spouse could not
reasonable be expected to put up with it. Conduct is no
longer required to be so atrociously abominable which
would cause reasonable apprehension that it would b e
harmful of injurious to continue cohabitation with another
spouse. Hence, it is not necessary to establish physical
violence. Continued ill-treatment, cessation of marital
intercourse, studied neglect, indifference may lead to
inference of cruelty.
63. The word “cruelty” either under Section 13 (1)(a) of
the Hindu Marriage Act or under Section 27(1)(d) of the
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
23
Special Marriage Act has got no static connotation, and
therefore, gives a very wide discretion to the Court to apply
it liberally and contextually.
64. What is cruelty in one case may not be the same for
another and has to be applied from person to person while
taking note of the attending circumstances. Harm or injury
to health, reputation, the working-career or the like, would
be important considerations in determining whether the
conduct of the defending spouse amounts to cruelty. It has
to be shown that the defending spouse has treated him with
cruelty to cause reasonable apprehension in his/her mind
that it will be harmful or injurious to live with t he
contesting spouse.
65. Herein desertion stipulated under Section 27 (1) (b)
of the Act 1954has also been taken as ground by the
appellant for decree of divorce, therefore it would be apt to
discuss herein the word “desertion”. Desertion has also
been embodied in Section 13(1) (i-b) of Hindu Marriage Act
1955.
66. As per its meaning provided under the statute,
Special Marriage Act, that either of the spouse is
withdrawing on its own volition from the house then it will
not amount to desertion but vice-versa to that if the wife or
husband, as the case may be, is being forced to leave the
house then it will not amount desertion.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
24
67. Desertion has been defined in the statute book and
has been interpreted by Hon‟ble Apex Court in catena of
decision.
68. It is pertinent to note that the word „desertion‟, as
has been defined in Explanation part of Section 27 of the
Special Marriage Act, which means that means desertion of
the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without
reasonable cause and without the consent or against the
wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the
petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its
grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be
construed accordingly.
69. Rayden on Divorce, which is a standard work on
the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised the case-
law on the subject in these terms:
“Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the
other, with an intention on the part of the deserting
spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an
end without reasonable cause and without the
consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of
departure by one spouse does not necessarily make
that spouse the deserting party.”
70. The legal position has been admirably summarised
in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws
of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:
“In its essence desertion means the intentional
permanent forsaking and abandonment of one
spouse by the other without that other's consent,
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
25
and without reasonable cause. It is a total
repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view
of the large variety of circumstances and of modes
of life involved, the Court has discouraged
attempts at defining desertion, there being no
general principle applicable to all cases.
71. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but
from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is
the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of
the married state; the state of things may usually be
termed, for short, „the home‟. There can be desertion
without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the
marriage having been consummated. The person who
actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the
deserting party.
72. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct
which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground
for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or,
where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer.
73. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the
statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence
founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete,
but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a
continuing offence.
74. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of
meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
26
of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from
wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in
a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust,
without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will
not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far
as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of
separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation
permanently to an end.
75. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the
deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent,
and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the
spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary
intention aforesaid.
76. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs.
Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the
definition of „desertion‟ on the basis of the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman
Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which
has been consistently followed in several decisions of this
Court.
77. The law consistently has been laid down by this
Court that desertion means the intentional abandonment of
one spouse by the other without the consent of the other
and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
27
prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an
intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the
cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there
should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting
spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of
the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse
should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse
to leave the matrimonial home.
78. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions
on the issue of cruelty and desertion, has gone through the
testimony of witness and other materials available on
record.
79. So far as the issue of cruelty is concerned, this
Court has considered the evidence of the appellant-wife,
who has specifically stated that she was subjected to torture
in the drunk stage by her husband, the respondent herein,
and not only that he used to assault for the purpose to take
money. It has also been stated that even the two children
are being subjected to torture by the respondent-husband.
However, the learned trial court has given the finding that
since no criminal case has been instituted to that effect, as
such the element of cruelty cannot be said to be proved.
80. In this regard, this Court has also duly considered
the evidence adduced by the appellant and finds that she
specifically referred to the information furnished to the
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
28
Golmuri Police Station regarding the torture and assault
perpetrated by her husband. However, the learned Family
Judge failed to take cognizance of this material fact,
perhaps on the premise that no formal First Information
Report was drawn.
81. This Court is of the considered view that, in
matrimonial disputes, when either party adduces evidence
to substantiate the element of cruelty particularly the wife
the mere fact of non-institution of a formal First Information
Report cannot, by itself, be treated as a ground to discredit
such testimony. The appellant-wife, even if she did not lodge
a formal FIR, has nonetheless explained the torture and
assault suffered at the hands of the respondent-husband.
The pertinent question that arises is why she would
voluntarily choose to live alone and endure the rigours of
solitude and financial hardship, unless compelled by the
cruelty meted out to her. This circumstance lends credibility
to her statement and cannot be brushed aside merely on
extraneous consideration.
82. The aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been
duly taken into consideration by the learned Additional
Family Judge while adjudicating the issue of cruelty.
Without appreciating this vital circumstance, the learned
Additional Family Court proceeded to record an erroneous
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
29
finding that none of the allegations of cruelty levelled by the
petitioner against the respondent stood proved.
83. Consequently, the finding so recorded by the
learned Additional Family Court falls within the ambit of
perversity, insofar as the determination with respect to
cruelty is concerned, the same having been rendered
without proper appreciation of the material evidence
available on record.
84. So far as the issue of desertion is concerned, this
Court observes that under the statutory scheme of both the
Special Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act, desertion
contemplates a voluntary withdrawal by either spouse from
the matrimonial home with the intention of perm anently
terminating cohabitation. Conversely, where the wife or
husband, as the case may be, is compelled or forced to leave
the matrimonial home due to circumstances created by the
other spouse, such departure cannot, in law, amount to
desertion.
85. This Court for the purpose of appreciation of the
fact about the element of desertion has again delve into the
testimony of appellant, wherein it has specifically been
stated that the respondent-husband used to take liquor as a
habit and also used to assault for the purpose of snatching
away the money since the appellant for her and for survival
of her two children is doing job of nurse in private hospital.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
30
86. It has been clearly stated in the evidence that,
under compelling circumstances and in order to safeguard
her own life as well as the lives of her two children, the
appellant-wife was constrained to leave the matrimonial
home and take shelter in her parental house. She has been
residing there continuously since the year 2018, which fact
further demonstrates that her separation was not voluntary
but necessitated by the cruelty and peril she faced at the
hands of the respondent-husband.
87. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the
considered view that the departure of the appellant-wife
from the matrimonial home cannot be construed as a wilful
abandonment of the respondent-husband. Rather, it was a
compelled act necessitated by the cruelty inflicted upon her,
thereby amounting itself to cruelty in law.
88. The cruelty and desertion are inter-related to some
extent. If the cruelty is meted out to the wife, then wife is
compelled to leave the house and, in such situation, it
cannot be alleged it is the wife who on own volition has left
the matrimonial house.
89. From the record it is further evident that despite
valid service of notice/summons, the respondent-husband
has deliberately abstained from appearance both before the
learned Family Court as well as before this Court. Such
conduct unmistakably demonstrates that the respondent
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
31
has no inclination to preserve or protect the marital bond
and has chosen to remain completely aloof from the
proceedings. His persistent non -appearance,
notwithstanding due service, reflects a conscious disregard
of the judicial process and underscores his indifference
towards saving the matrimonial relationship.
90. This Court, upon a comprehensive appraisal of the
grounds urged, the precedents cited, and the testimony of
the appellant, while adverting to the judgment rendered by
the learned Additional Family Court, finds that the said
Court, in assigning reasons for declining the decree of
divorce, has wholly omitted consideration of the material
evidence regarding the respondent -husband‟s drinking
habit and the assault and torture inflicted upon the
petitioner/appellant-wife, which compelled her to leave her
matrimonial home. Furthermore, the learned Family Court
failed to take into account that the parties have been living
separately since 2018, thereby rendering the marriage a
mere dead wood incapable of revival. It is further manifest
from the testimony of the appellant -wife that she is
unwilling to continue her marital life, being unable to
endure the cruelty and torture at the hands of the
respondent-husband, and being an independent lady, she
cannot be compelled to reside with him.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
32
91. For the discussions made hereinabove, this Court is
of the view that the desertion by the wife of her husband is
under compelling circumstances and not the voluntary one.
92. Accordingly, issue as framed by this Court is
decided in favour of the appellant-wife.
93. This Court, upon a detailed discussion of the factual
aspects in conjunction with the settled legal position, while
adverting to the consideration undertaken by the learned
Additional Family Judge in the impugned judgment, finds
that the issues relating to cruelty and desertion alleged
against the appellant-husband have not been properly
examined.
94. On a careful appraisal of the aforesaid discussion,
this Court is of the considered view that the impugned
judgment and decree rendered by the learned Family Judge
fall within the ambit of perversity, inasmuch as there has
been no conscious consideration of the evidence available
on record.
95. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds
that the impugned judgment dated 09.02.2026 and the
decree signed on 16.02.2026 by the learned Additional
Principal Judge, Additional Family Court No. 1,
Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum in Original Suit No.59 of
2024 cannot be sustained in law and, accordingly, the same
is hereby quashed and set aside.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
33
96. Consequently, the prayer as made in the original
suit stands allowed and the marriage between the parties
i.e., the appellant and the respondent, stands dissolved.
97. The Registry of this Court is directed to issue decree
of dissolution of Marriage.
98. It goes without saying that the Right to inheritance
of the children will remain intact and will have no bearing
with the dissolution of marriage, which is being allowed.
99. It needs to refer herein that the wife has not
approached the court for getting the maintenance which
reflects bona fide on the part of the appellant-wife, for the
reason that she has got a job of Nurse in the private
hospital to sustain herself and her two children.
100. However, this Court is of the view that though the
wife herself has not chosen to file an application for
maintenance of herself but that does not preclude her from
claiming maintenance for her minor children for their
sustenance and study.
101. As such, it is also left open upon for the appellant to
claim the maintenance for her children from the
respondent-husband by filing appropriate application before
the appropriate forum.
102. With the aforesaid directions and observations, the
instant appeal stands allowed and as such disposed of.
2026:JHHC:30306-DB
34
103. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands
disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.)
9
th October, 2026
Alankar/A.F.R.
Uploaded on 09.10.2026
Legal Notes
Add a Note....