MATA No.73 of 2024 Page 1 of 20

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

MATA No.73 of 2024

CNR No. ODHC010140302024

Sadasivuni Siva Santosh Kumar …. Appellant

Represented by Adv.

Mr. S.K. Dwivedy, Advocate

-Versus-

Smt. Sadasivuni Anusha Patnaik …. Respondent

Represented by Adv.

Mr. T. K. Mishra, Advocate

CORAM:

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

AND

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH

Date of Hearing: 27.08.2026

Date of Judgment: 01.10.2026

CHITTARANJAN DASH, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated

27.01.2024 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Rayagada

in C.P. No.61 of 2023, whereby the learned Court below, while

partly allowing the proceeding, dissolved the marriage between

the Appellant-Husband and the Respondent-Wife, solemnized on

20.10.2021, on the ground that the Respondent-Wife had

established cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

2. The marriage between the Appellant-Husband and the

Respondent-Wife was solemnized on 20.10.2021 according to

Hindu rites and customs. After their marriage, the parties initially MATA/73/2024

ODHC010140302024

2024:OHC:1-DB

MATA No.73 of 2024 Page 2 of 20

resided at Visakhapatnam and thereafter shifted to Hyderabad,

where both were employed in the Information Technology sector.

The parties, both being B.Tech. graduates, lived together as

husband and wife. The parties, however, subsequently developed

differences and the Respondent-Wife left the matrimonial home in

June, 2023 and went to Rayagada along with her parents.

Thereafter, the Respondent-Wife instituted C.P. No.61 of 2023

before the learned Family Court, Rayagada seeking dissolution of

the marriage on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of

the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Appellant-Husband contested

the proceeding. Upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence

adduced by the parties, the learned Family Court, by judgment

dated 27.01.2024, allowed the proceeding in part and dissolved

the marriage on the ground of cruelty. Aggrieved thereby, the

Appellant-Husband has preferred the present appeal under Section

28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 read with Section 19 of the

Family Courts Act, 1984.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant-Husband

submits that the learned Family Court has erred in dissolving the

marriage on the ground of cruelty, as the allegations levelled by

the Respondent-Wife were neither established by cogent evidence

nor sufficient to constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section

13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It is contended that the

Appellant had not subjected the Respondent to any physical or

mental cruelty and that the allegations made against him were

denied in the counter as well as in the evidence. Learned counsel

further submits that the parties had, in fact, lived together as

husband and wife at Visakhapatnam and Hyderabad and had

MATA No.73 of 2024 Page 3 of 20

enjoyed their matrimonial life. It is submitted that the Appellant,

after the parties started living separately, instituted proceedings

under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking restitution of

conjugal rights, which according to the Appellant reflected his

intention to continue the matrimonial relationship. The learned

counsel, therefore, submits that the finding of cruelty recorded by

the learned Family Court is not sustainable on the evidence

available on record.

4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent-

Wife supports the impugned judgment and submits that the

Respondent had specifically pleaded the acts of physical and

mental cruelty meted out to her during the matrimonial

relationship and had adduced evidence in support thereof. It is

contended that the conduct of the Appellant, viewed cumulatively,

caused the Respondent sustained mental agony and rendered

continuation of the matrimonial relationship impossible. Learned

counsel submits that the learned Family Court, upon appreciation

of the evidence led by the Respondent, rightly concluded that the

Respondent had established cruelty and was consequently entitled

to dissolution of the marriage. It is, therefore, submitted that no

interference with the impugned judgment is warranted.

5. The learned Trial Court, upon consideration of the

divergent pleadings of the parties, formulated the following four

issues for determination:

(i) Whether there is any cause of action?

MATA No.73 of 2024 Page 4 of 20

(ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree of divorce

by dissolving her marriage dated 20.10.2021 with the

respondent?

(iii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to return of

“Streedhan” gold ornaments and dowry cash of

₹6,00,000/-?

(iv) To what other relief(s) the petitioner is entitled to?

6. Upon appreciation of the pleadings and evidence on

record, the learned Family Court held that the Respondent-Wife

had established the allegations of physical and mental cruelty as

well as economic exploitation against the Appellant-Husband. The

learned Court relied upon the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, the

circumstances emerging from the evidence of the defence

witnesses, and the messages exchanged between the parties, and

concluded that the matrimonial relationship had broken down

beyond repair and that compelling the Respondent-Wife to

continue the matrimonial relationship would itself amount to

cruelty. It was accordingly held that the Respondent had proved

cruelty to the extent required under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu

Marriage Act and was entitled to dissolution of the marriage. The

prayer for return of “Streedhan” articles, however, was rejected on

the ground that such exclusive property of the wife was not

covered by Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

7. We have carefully examined the pleadings, the evidence

adduced by the parties and the findings recorded by the learned

Family Court. Since the principal ground on which the marriage

has been dissolved is cruelty, the question which falls for

consideration is whether the conduct attributed to the Appellant-

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Husband, as established from the evidence on record, is of such

nature and degree as would constitute cruelty within the meaning

of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

8. Before examining the individual allegations, it would be

apposite to bear in mind that the question of mental cruelty cannot

ordinarily be determined by isolating a particular incident from the

matrimonial relationship. The Court is required to examine the

conduct complained of in the context of the relationship as a

whole and to assess its cumulative effect upon the spouse alleging

cruelty. At the same time, ordinary wear and tear of married life,

trivial irritations, occasional quarrels or differences arising in the

course of matrimonial life cannot, by themselves, furnish a ground

for dissolution of marriage. The conduct complained of must be of

such a nature and degree as to cause a reasonable apprehension

that it would not be possible for the parties to continue living

together. In Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh, reported in [2007] 4

S.C.R. 428, the Supreme Court has illustratively explained the

manner in which mental cruelty is to be assessed. The relevant

paragraphs are reproduced as below:

“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for

guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some

instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in

dealing with the cases of ‘mental cruelty’. The instances

indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative

and not exhaustive.

(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of

the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as

would not make possible for the parties to live with each

other could come within the broad parameters of mental

cruelty.

(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire

matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear

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that situation is such that the wronged party cannot

reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and

continue to live with other party.

(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount

to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of

manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree

that it makes the married life for the other spouse

absolutely intolerable

(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of

deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse

caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to

mental cruelty.

(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating

treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render

miserable life of the spouse.

(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of

one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of

the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the

resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave,

substantial and weighty.

(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect,

indifference or total departure from the normal standard of

conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or

deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental

cruelty.

(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy,

selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and

dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground

for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty

(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and

tear of the married life which happens in day to day life

would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground

of mental cruelty.

(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and

a few isolated instances over a period of years will not

amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a

fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has

deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and

behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it

extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer,

may amount to mental cruelty.

(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of

sterilization without medical reasons and without the

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consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife

undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason

or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such

an act of the spouse may lead G to mental cruelty.

(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse

for considerable period without there being any physical

incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.

(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after

marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount

to cruelty.

(xiv) Where there has been a Jong period of continuous

separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial

bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction

though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that

tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of

marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the

feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations,

it may lead to mental cruelty”

9. Equally relevant is the principle that, in a matrimonial

proceeding, the Court is not required to examine the allegation of

cruelty with the same degree of proof as would be required in a

criminal proceeding. The Court has to assess the evidence on the

touchstone of the probabilities emerging from the entire

matrimonial setting. Mental cruelty, by its very nature, may not

always be capable of direct proof, and the effect of the conduct

upon the mind of the spouse has to be assessed having regard to

the circumstances, the status and background of the parties and the

nature of the relationship. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur,

reported in (2005) 2 SCC 22, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

explained the aforesaid principle. The relevant paragraphs are

reproduced as below:

“The expression “cruelty” has not been defined in the Act.

Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a

ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as

wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to

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cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as

to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger.

The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the

light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to

which the parties belong, their social values, status,

environment in which they live. Cruelty, as noted above,

includes mental cruelty, which falls within the purview of

a matrimonial wrong. Cruelty need not be physical. If from

the conduct of the spouse, same is established and/or an

inference can be legitimately drawn that the treatment of

the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the

mind of the other spouse, about his or her mental welfare

then this conduct amounts to cruelty. In a delicate human

relationship like matrimony, one has to see the

probabilities of the case. The concept proof beyond the

shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not

to civil matters and certainly not to matters of such delicate

personal relationship as those of husband and wife.

Therefore, one has to see what are the probabilities in a

case and legal cruelty has to be found out, not merely as a

matter of fact, but as the effect on the mind of the

complainant spouse because of the acts or omissions of the

other. Cruelty may be physical or corporeal or may be

mental. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct

evidence, but in the case of mental cruelty there may not at

the same time be direct evidence. In cases where there is

no direct evidence, Courts are required to probe into the

mental process and mental effect of incidents that are

brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to

consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes. To

constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be

“grave and weighty”

10. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, we may now

examine the evidence on record. P.W.1 has spoken not merely of

ordinary matrimonial differences, but of a recurring pattern of

physical and mental ill-treatment. She has stated that she was

assaulted even during night hours, at times locked inside a room

despite her knocking for the door to be opened, and subjected to

demands for money. She has further deposed about being slapped

by the Appellant in public at Bangalore on the occasion of their

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marriage anniversary and thereafter being asked to refund the

entire amount allegedly spent on the trip. These allegations, if

viewed separately, may invite scrutiny as to their independent

corroboration; viewed together, however, they disclose the nature

of the matrimonial environment of which the Respondent-Wife

complains.

11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat,

reported in (1994) 1 SCC 337, has further explained that mental

cruelty is a course of conduct which causes such mental pain and

suffering that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live

together. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced as below:

“15. If so, the question arises what kind of cruel treatment

does clause (i-a) contemplate? In particular, what is the

kind of mental cruelty that is required to be established?

While answering these questions, it must be kept in mind

that the cruelty mentioned in clause (i-a) is a ground now

for divorce as well as for judicial separation under Section

10. Another circumstance to be kept in mind is that even

where the marriage has irretrievably broken down, the Act,

even after the 1976 (Amendment) Act, does not permit

dissolution of marriage on that ground. This circumstance

may have to be kept in mind while ascertaining the type of

cruelty contemplated by Section 13(1)(i-a).

16. Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(i-a) can broadly be

defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party

such mental pain and suffering as would make it not

possible for that party to live with the other. In other

words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the

parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The

situation must be such that the wronged party cannot

reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and

continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to

prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to

the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such

conclusion, regard must be had to the social status,

educational level of the parties, the society they move in,

the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living

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together in case they are already living apart and all other

relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither

possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is

cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another

case. It is a matter to be Determined in each case having

regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a

case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be

had to the context in which they were made.”

12. The subsequent events narrated by P.W.1 are equally

significant. She has stated that when she and her parents reached

the Hyderabad residence, the Appellant contacted the house owner

and security personnel and represented that unknown persons had

entered the house and were taking away his property, resulting in

her and her parents being confronted and humiliated. She has

further stated that thereafter the Appellant and his mother

assaulted her and that, when her father intervened, he too was

assaulted. According to her, relatives were thereafter called, she

and her father were humiliated and they were asked to leave the

house on the allegation that the expectations of the Appellant’s

family had not been fulfilled. She states that these circumstances

left her feeling unsafe in the matrimonial home and ultimately

compelled her to leave for Rayagada with her parents.

13. The evidence regarding the subsequent course of the The

evidence of P.W.2, though that of the father of the Respondent-

Wife, cannot be discarded merely on that account, particularly

when he claims to have been personally present during the

incident in which he himself was assaulted while intervening on

behalf of his daughter. More importantly, material circumstances

surrounding the final episode are borne out from the defence

evidence itself. R.W.2 has admitted that on 04.06.2023 the parties

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and the Respondent-Wife’s parents and brother were present in the

Hyderabad house; that an issue arose there; that she called her

brother and other relatives; and that discussions took place

thereafter. She further admits that the Respondent-Wife left the

matrimonial home with her parents on the following day. Thus,

irrespective of the manner in which each party seeks to

characterise that incident, the defence evidence itself establishes

that the Respondent-Wife’s departure was preceded by a serious

confrontation in the matrimonial home.

14. There is yet another circumstance emerging from the

cross-examination of R.W.1. He admitted that, when the

Respondent-Wife did not answer his telephone call on an earlier

occasion, he contacted the watchman of the Hyderabad residence

and asked him to ascertain who the persons inside the house were,

notwithstanding his admission that the Respondent-Wife’s parents

had previously visited and stayed in the said residence. The

circumstance lends some support to the Respondent-Wife’s

version regarding the atmosphere of distrust and humiliation

surrounding her and her parents at the matrimonial residence.

15. The aforesaid evidence also has to be appreciated in the

manner indicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shri Rakesh

Raman v. Smt. Kavita, reported at (2023) 17 SCC 433. The Apex

Court has recognised that, in matrimonial proceedings, it may not

always be possible to pinpoint a particular act of cruelty and that

the Court must examine the entire matrimonial relationship, the

general behaviour of the parties and the effect of their conduct

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upon the spouse alleging cruelty. The relevant paragraphs are

reproduced as below:

“16. Matrimonial cases before the Courts pose a

different challenge, quite unlike any other, as we are

dealing with human relationships with its bundle of

emotions, with all its faults and frailties. It is not possible

in every case to pin point to an act of “cruelty” or

blameworthy conduct of the spouse. The nature of

relationship, the general behaviour of the parties towards

each other, or long separation between the two are relevant

factors which a Court must take into consideration. In

Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh

1

a three judge Bench of this

Court had dealt in detail as to what would constitute

cruelty under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Act. An important

guideline in the above decision is on the approach of a

Court in determining cruelty. What has to be examined

here is the entire matrimonial relationship, as cruelty may

not be in a violent act or acts but in a given case has to be

gathered from injurious reproaches, complaints,

accusations, taunts, etc. The Court relied on the definition

of cruelty in matrimonial relationships in Halsbury’s Laws

of England (Vol 13, 4th Edn, Para 1269, Pg 602) which

must be reproduced here:

“The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that the entire

matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that

rule is of special value when the cruelty consists not of

violent acts but of injurious reproaches, complaints,

accusations or taunts. In cases where no violence is

averred, it is undesirable to consider judicial

pronouncements with a view to creating certain

categories of acts or conduct as having or lacking the

nature or quality which renders them capable or

incapable in all circumstances of amounting to cruelty;

for it is the effect of the conduct rather than its nature

which is of paramount importance in assessing a

complaint of cruelty. Whether one spouse has been

guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of

fact and previously decided cases have little, if any,

value. The court should bear in mind the physical and

mental condition of the parties as well as their social

status, and should consider the impact of the personality

and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other,

1

(2007) 4 SCC 511

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weighing all incidents and quarrels between the spouses

from that point of view; further, the conduct alleged

must be examined in the light of the complainant’s

capacity for endurance and the extent to which that

capacity is known to the other spouse. Malevolent

intention is not essential to cruelty but it is an important

element where it exists.”

The view taken by the Delhi High Court in the present

case that mere filing of criminal cases by the wife does not

constitute cruelty as what has also to be seen are the

circumstances under which cases were filed, is a finding

we do not wish to disregard totally, in fact as a pure

proposition of law it may be correct, but then we must also

closely examine the entire facts of the case which are now

before us. When we take into consideration the facts as

they exist today, we are convinced that continuation of

this marriage would mean continuation of cruelty, which

each now inflicts on the other.

Irretrievable breakdown of a marriage may not be a

ground for dissolution of marriage, under the Hindu

Marriage Act, but cruelty is. A marriage can be dissolved

by a decree of divorce, inter alia, on the ground when the

other party “has, after the solemnization of the marriage

treated the petitioner with cruelty”

2

. In our considered

opinion, a marital relationship which has only become

more bitter and acrimonious over the years, does nothing

but inflicts cruelty on both the sides. To keep the façade of

this broken marriage alive would be doing injustice to both

the parties. A marriage which has broken down

irretrievably, in our opinion spells cruelty to both the

parties, as in such a relationship each party is treating the

other with cruelty. It is therefore a ground for dissolution

of marriage under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Act.”

16. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the evidence before us

cannot be reduced to a case of a stray quarrel or an isolated

matrimonial disagreement. The allegations of physical assault, the

incidents said to have occurred during the night, the public

incident at Bangalore, the episode involving the house owner and

security personnel at Hyderabad and the confrontation in which

2

Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

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the Respondent-Wife’s father is stated to have been assaulted,

taken together, present a continuing course of discord.

Significantly, portions of this account find support from

circumstances emerging from the evidence led by the Appellant

himself. The final separation on 04.06/05.06.2023 was not,

therefore, an event occurring in isolation but the culmination of an

already deteriorated matrimonial relationship.

17. The Appellant has sought to meet this evidence by

denying the allegations and by contending that the parties had

enjoyed a normal matrimonial life. However, the evidence of

R.W.2 does not entirely support such a picture. Her evidence

places the parties, along with the Respondent-Wife’s parents and

brother, in the Hyderabad residence immediately before the

Respondent-Wife left for Rayagada and acknowledges the dispute

which arose there, the summoning of relatives and the ensuing

discussions. The fact that the defence witness characterises the

conduct of the Respondent-Wife differently does not efface the

underlying circumstance that the matrimonial discord had, by

then, reached a stage requiring intervention of family members.

18. The cross-examination of R.W.1 also assumes

significance. His admission regarding contacting the watchman of

the Hyderabad residence when the Respondent-Wife did not

answer his telephone call, and asking that the persons inside the

house be identified, is difficult to reconcile with the suggestion

that the presence of her parents there was wholly unexpected or

that there was no atmosphere of distrust between the parties. This

circumstance, though not by itself determinative, lends

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corroboration to the Respondent-Wife’s account of the humiliation

and insecurity experienced by her in the matrimonial home.

19. We also cannot lose sight of the communications

exchanged between the parties. The Appellant has specifically

challenged the reliance placed by the learned Family Court upon

the messages in which he expressed regret and assured the

Respondent-Wife that the conduct complained of would not be

repeated. We agree that such messages cannot, standing alone, be

elevated into an admission of every allegation of cruelty. They

are, however, not wholly irrelevant. When read in the backdrop of

the evidence otherwise available on record, they constitute a

circumstance bearing upon the nature of the matrimonial discord

and the manner in which the parties themselves responded to it.

20. The cumulative assessment assumes further importance

because the Respondent-Wife did not merely leave the

matrimonial home following an ordinary disagreement. Her

evidence is that she left in circumstances in which she felt unsafe

and humiliated, after the events at Hyderabad, and that subsequent

efforts made by her family for reconciliation did not restore the

relationship. The evidence of the parties, therefore, reveals not

merely a difference in perception between two spouses, but a

relationship in which the essential element of mutual confidence

had substantially eroded.

21. It is in this context that the observations of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Shri Rakesh Raman (supra) become

particularly apposite. The Supreme Court has cautioned that

matrimonial cases involve human relationships and that it may not

MATA No.73 of 2024 Page 16 of 20

always be possible to pinpoint a single act of cruelty. What

requires consideration is the matrimonial relationship as a whole,

the general behaviour of the parties and the effect of the conduct

complained of upon the spouse.

22. The present case illustrates why the evidence cannot be

compartmentalised. The Respondent-Wife’s case does not rest

upon one isolated incident. The incidents spoken to by her, the

corroborative circumstances emerging from the evidence of R.W.1

and R.W.2, the circumstances attending her departure from the

matrimonial home and the subsequent failure of the relationship,

when considered together, disclose a course of matrimonial

conduct which caused her sustained mental distress. In our

considered view, the cumulative effect of these circumstances is

sufficient to bring the case within the meaning of cruelty under

Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

23. There is, thereafter, a significant development before this

Court which cannot be ignored. By order dated 20.03.2026, the

parties appeared in person before this Court and, upon interaction

in camera, were afforded an opportunity to explore the possibility

of bringing an end to the litigation through settlement. No

amicable settlement could, however, be arrived at. What is

significant is that, during such interaction, both parties expressed

their willingness to put an end to the matrimonial relationship and

proposed to place a joint affidavit to that effect before the Court.

Admittedly, this subsequent conduct does not constitute a

substitute for the statutory requirement of establishing cruelty, nor

is it being treated as a decree by mutual consent, however, it is,

MATA No.73 of 2024 Page 17 of 20

nevertheless, a relevant circumstance in appreciating the present

state of the matrimonial relationship.

24. Marriage undoubtedly carries a sanctity which the Court

must ordinarily endeavour to preserve. But the sanctity of

marriage is not served by preserving only the legal form of the

relationship when the substantive foundation of that relationship

has been substantially eroded. Mutual respect, trust,

companionship and a willingness to make reasonable adjustments

are not peripheral attributes of matrimonial life; they constitute its

very foundation. Where those attributes have been progressively

lost and the relationship has become a source of sustained mental

pain and anguish, the Court cannot shut its eyes to the reality of

the relationship merely because its deterioration cannot be fitted

into one isolated or neatly defined category of conduct.

25. In the present case, the parties had initially lived together

at Visakhapatnam and thereafter at Hyderabad. Both are educated

and professionally employed. Yet, the matrimonial relationship,

within a relatively short period, came to be marked by allegations

of physical and mental ill-treatment, serious confrontation

between the parties and their families, loss of mutual confidence

and eventual separation. Even when the parties were brought face

to face before this Court on 20.03.2026, the relationship could not

be restored; rather, both expressed their desire to bring the marital

tie to an end. The significance of this circumstance lies not in the

mere desire to separate, but in what it reveals about the extent to

which the matrimonial relationship has ceased to function as a

relationship of mutual trust and companionship.

MATA No.73 of 2024 Page 18 of 20

26. We are conscious that irretrievable breakdown of

marriage, by itself, is not a statutory ground for dissolution under

the Hindu Marriage Act. The subsequent course of the relationship

can, however, be taken into account while determining whether

the conduct proved on record has resulted in mental cruelty and

whether continuation of such a relationship has itself become a

source of further anguish. In K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa,

reported in [2013] 2 S.C.R. 126, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

recognised that while irretrievable breakdown is not, by itself, a

ground under the Act, the fact that a marriage has become beyond

repair on account of the bitterness created by the conduct of the

parties may constitute a weighty circumstance in examining the

question of cruelty. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced as

below:

“26. We are also satisfied that this marriage has

irretrievably broken down. Irretrievable breakdown of

marriage is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu

Marriage Act, 1955. But, where marriage is beyond repair

on account of bitterness created by the acts of the husband

or the wife or of both, the Courts have always taken

irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a very weighty

circumstance amongst others necessitating severance of

marital tie. A marriage which is dead for all purposes

cannot be revived by the Court’s verdict, if the parties are

not willing. This is because marriage involves human

sentiments and emotions and if they are dried-up there is

hardly any chance of their springing back to life on

account of artificial reunion created by the Court’s decree.

27. In V. Bhagat this Court noted that divorce petition was

pending for eight years and a good part of the lives of both

the parties had been consumed in litigation, yet the end

was not in sight. The facts were such that there was no

question of reunion, the marriage having irretrievably

broken down. While dissolving the marriage on the ground

of mental cruelty this Court observed that irretrievable

breakdown of marriage is not a ground by itself, but, while

MATA No.73 of 2024 Page 19 of 20

scrutinizing the evidence on record to determine whether

the grounds alleged are made out and in determining the

relief to be granted the said circumstance can certainly be

borne in mind. In Naveen Kohli, where husband and wife

had been living separately for more than 10 years and a

large number of criminal proceedings had been initiated by

the wife against the husband, this Court observed that the

marriage had been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage

and public interest and interest of all concerned lies in the

recognition of the fact and to declare defunct de jure what

is already defunct de facto. It is important to note that in

this case this Court made a recommendation to the Union

of India that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 be amended to

incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a

ground for the grant of divorce.”

27. We accordingly do not rest the decree of divorce merely

upon the fact that the parties have ceased to live together or that,

at the stage of this appeal, they have expressed a common desire

to end the marital relationship. The foundation of the decree

remains the cruelty established from the evidence. The subsequent

course of the relationship, including the unsuccessful attempt at

settlement before this Court and the statement made by both

parties on 20.03.2026, only reinforces the conclusion that the

matrimonial relationship has lost its essential character and that

compelling the Respondent-Wife to resume such a relationship

would be unrealistic.

28. The Appellant’s contention that his institution of

proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act

demonstrates his willingness to continue the marriage also

requires consideration. We do not regard that circumstance as

insignificant. It indicates that, at that stage, the Appellant sought

restoration of cohabitation. But such subsequent assertion of

willingness cannot, by itself, efface the conduct which preceded

MATA No.73 of 2024 Page 20 of 20

the separation or negate the effect which that conduct had upon

the Respondent-Wife. The question remains whether, on the

evidence as a whole, the Respondent-Wife had been subjected to

cruelty. On that question, the cumulative circumstances already

noticed furnish an affirmative answer.

29. For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the learned Family

Court was justified in concluding that the Respondent-Wife had

established cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the

Hindu Marriage Act. The finding is founded not merely upon the

fact of separation or upon the subsequent breakdown of the

relationship, but upon the cumulative effect of the conduct

established from the evidence and the circumstances in which the

matrimonial relationship deteriorated. The decree dissolving the

marriage, therefore, does not warrant interference.

30. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no infirmity

in the judgment dated 27.01.2024 passed by the learned Judge,

Family Court, Rayagada in C.P. No.61 of 2023. The appeal is,

accordingly, dismissed.

I Agree.

(Harish Tandon) (Chittaranjan Dash)

Chief Justice Judge

Bijay/Sarbani