WA(MD) NO. 749 of 2021

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

RESERVED ON : 28.09.2026

PRONOUNCED ON : 01.10.2026

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE M.DHANDAPANI

AND

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.DILIP KUMAR

WA(MD) NO. 749 of 2021

{CNR: HCMD010269402021}

Case QR

AND

SA(MD) NO. 434 OF 2011

1. V.Ramiah(Died)(Substituted by)R.Periasamy,

S/o. Late V.Ramiah

No.5-C, Ambasamudram Road

kulavanigarpuram

Palayamkottai Taluk

Tirunelveli District.

R.Periasamy/LR of the deceased Sole Appellant

is substituted in the place of the deceased

Sole Appellant vide court order dated 28.11.2024

made in CMP(MD)No. 7546 of 2022

in WA(MD)No. 749 of 2021

by TKRJ and NSJ.

Appellant(s)

Vs

1. J./sankarkumar

2. The Commissioner

Tirunelveli Coproation

Tirunelveli

3. The Assistant Commissioner

Melapalayam Zone https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

Tirunelveli

Respondent(s)

SA(MD) NO. 434 of 2011

1.S.Jeyaraman

2.S.Muthupandi

3.S.Murugan

Appellant(s)

Vs

1.V.Ramiah(died)

2.V.Muppidathi

3.V.Paramasivam

4.M.Chokkalingam

5.Gomathi

6.The Commissioner

Tirunelveli Coproation

Tirunelveli

7.Chendu

8.Periasamy

9.Ramalakshmi

R7 to R9 are brought on record

as Lrs of the deceased first respondent

vide Court order dated 10.08.20223

Defendant(s)

WA(MD) No. 749 of 2021

For Appellant(s):

M/s.T.Selvan

For Respondent(s):

M/s. H. Arumugam for R1

Mr.Aayiram K.Selvakumar for R2

Prayer:

To prefer this Memorandum of Grounds of Writ Appeal against the order

passed by the Learned Single Judge MR.JUSTICE G.R. SWAMINATHAN

dated 03.02.2021 made in W.P.(MD).No.15588 of 2020 on the file of this

Hon'ble Court and pray to set aside the order in the writ petition by allowing

this writ appeal for the following among other.

SA(MD) No. 434 of 2011

For Appellant(s):

M/s.H.Arumugam https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

For Defendant(s): Mr.R.T.Arivu Kumar for R8

Mr.Aayiram K.Selvakumar for R2

COMMON JUDGMENT

(Order of the Court was made by the Hon'ble M.DHANDAPANI J.)

The present Writ Appeal and the Second Appeal arise out of the dispute

between the parties concerning the property described as the fourth schedule

property in O.S.No.204 of 2006. Since the order impugned in the Writ Appeal

and the proceedings in the Second Appeal have their genesis in the same

property dispute, both matters were heard together and are disposed of by this

common judgment.

2. The plaintiff in O.S.No.204 of 2006 is the appellant in the Writ Appeal.

Defendants 1 to 3 in the suit are the appellants in the present Second Appeal.

The first respondent in the Writ Appeal is the son and legal heir of the first

defendant.

3. The suit in O.S.No.204 of 2006 was instituted by the plaintiff seeking a

declaration that the fourth schedule property absolutely belongs to him and for a

consequential injunction restraining defendants 1 to 3 from interfering with his

peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

4.The learned I Additional District Munsif, Tirunelveli, by judgment and decree

dated 07.09.2010, dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff

preferred A.S.No.101 of 2010 before the learned Principal Subordinate Judge,

Tirunelveli. By judgment and decree dated 22.02.2011, the learned First

Appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. Challenging the said

judgment and decree, defendants 1 to 3 have preferred the present Second

Appeal.

5. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that the suit properties originally

belonged to his great-grandfather, Kirubakarathevar, who died intestate leaving

behind his only son, Veerapathira Thevar. During his lifetime, Kirubakarathevar

had constructed a house in a portion of the first schedule property. After his

demise, Veerapathira Thevar inherited the properties and subsequently died

intestate leaving behind his only son, Arumuga Thevar.

6. Arumuga Thevar thereafter enjoyed the properties as absolute owner and

subsequently died intestate leaving behind his sons, namely, Shunmuga Thevar,

Subbiah Thevar, Veerapathira Thevar and Ponniah Thevar. According to the

plaintiff, after the death of Arumuga Thevar, his sons continued to enjoy the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

properties and their names were also entered in the revenue records.

7. The plaintiff's father, Veerapathira Thevar, died on 05.11.2001 leaving

behind his wife Pitchammal, the plaintiff Ramiah, the fourth defendant

Muppidathi, the fifth defendant Paramasivam and Ramalakshmi, the mother of

defendants 6 and 7, as his legal heirs.

8. According to the plaintiff, during the lifetime of Veerapathira Thevar, he and

his brothers effected an oral partition in the year 1955, under which the second

schedule property was allotted to the share of the plaintiff's father. It is stated

that thereafter Veerapathira Thevar was in exclusive possession and enjoyment

of the said property and paid the requisite taxes.

9. The plaintiff further states that on 19.10.2004 his mother executed a

registered settlement deed in respect of her undivided share in the second

schedule property in favour of the plaintiff and defendants 4 and 5. Thereafter,

in December 2004, an oral partition took place among the plaintiff and

defendants 4 and 5, under which the third schedule property was allotted to the

plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the said arrangement was acted upon and he https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

continued in possession and enjoyment of the third schedule property.

10. The fourth schedule property is stated to form part of the third schedule

property and also a portion of the second schedule property. According to the

plaintiff, defendants 1 to 3 are strangers to the plaintiff's family and are claiming

rights over the property lying to the south of the third schedule property.

11. The plaintiff claims that the property of defendants 1 to 3 is comprised in

T.S.Nos.351 and 352, whereas his property is comprised in T.S.No.305.

According to him, the property has been demarcated by survey stones from time

immemorial and the parent documents of defendants 1 to 3 themselves disclose

T.S.No.305 as their northern boundary and refer to the plaintiff's predecessors

as the owners on the northern side.

12. The plaintiff alleges that defendants 1 to 3 attempted to interfere with his

possession and sought to lay a pathway through the fourth schedule property.

He further alleges that they approached the local authority for obtaining water

supply connection to their house through the disputed property. 13. The plaintiff

relies upon Exhibits A5 to A8 in support of the subsequent exchange of notices https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

and proceedings.

14. Defendants 1 to 3 disputed the plaintiff's title as well as the alleged oral

partitions. According to them, the real dispute relates to Pandithurai 3rd Street,

which runs in the north-south direction and has a width of about 18 feet.

15. Their specific case is that Pandithurai 3

rd

Street runs through portions of

Survey Nos.351, 352 and 305 and lies on the southern side of the third schedule

property. According to them, the alleged fourth schedule property is not an

independent property at all, but forms part of the said street.

16. The defendants further contended that the street originally had a width of

about 10 feet and that the owners of the lands comprised in Survey Nos.351,

352 and 353 subsequently contributed portions measuring about 8 feet in the

north-south direction for widening and facilitating the use of the street.

According to them, the compound walls were thereafter constructed on the

northern side, leaving the said portion for the street.

17. It is also the case of the defendants that the south-eastern portion of Survey https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

No.305 did not belong to the plaintiff but belonged to his father, Sankarapandi

Thevar, who initially became a mortgagee in respect of the said property in the

year 1956 and subsequently acquired absolute title under a registered sale deed

dated 15.07.1960. According to the defendants, the said portion was also

contributed for formation of Pandithurai 3rd Street.

18. The plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and another one Arumugam as PW2

and marked Exhibits A1 to A13. On the side of the defendants, the second

defendant Muthupandi was examined as DW1 and another witness

Karuppusamy was examined, and Exhibits B1 to B9 were marked.

19. At the time of admission of the Second Appeal, the following substantial

questions of law were formulated:

“a) When the relief asked for in the suit is barred under Section

3 and Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 whether the Lower

Appellate Court is right in decreeing the suit by reversing the

judgment of Trial Court?

b) When the existence of Pandithurai 3rd street has been clearly https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

admitted in the plaint schedule various documents namely

Ex.A-1, Ex.A-2, Ex.A-5, and Ex.A-7 and the same is proved

through Ex.B-1 to B-9 whether the Lower appellate Court is

right in giving a finding that there is no such street since the

same is not found in the Municipal records?

c) When it is incumbent upon the court to see the relief is asked

for within the time or not and when the parties have contested

the suit with the knowledge of specific issue as to limitation and

the trial court has also discussed the same in detail upon the

evidence and whether the Lower of parties Appellate Court is

correct in decreeing the suit on the ground of lack of pleading

by reversing the well considered judgement of the trial court?

d) When the plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands

and suppressed material facts of the existence of Pandithurai 3rd

Street whether the and plaintiff is entitled to the discretionary

equitable relief of declaration and injunction under Section 34

and 36 of Specific Relief Act? https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

e) When the plaintiff/1st respondent has not proved his specific

case of oral partition held in 1955 and 2004 and when PW-1

admits in his evidence that there is no oral partition in the year

2004 Court is right in Appellate whether the Lower decreeing

the suit?

f) When the dispute is in respect of measurement of properties

both parties and when the appellant has specifically pleaded that

he has left 8 feet space on the northern side of his property i.e.

beyond his compound wall whether the Lower Appellate is right

in decreeing the suit without reference to the measurements of

the properties?”

20. Questions (a) and (c) relate to limitation and are therefore taken up together.

Questions (b) and (f) relate to the identity of the fourth schedule property, the

alleged Pandithurai 3

rd

Street and the measurement pleaded by the defendants

and are also taken up together. Question (e) relates to the plaintiff's title and the

alleged oral partitions. Question (d) concerns the allegation of suppression and

the entitlement to the relief of declaration and injunction. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

21. The principal defence of the appellants is that the fourth schedule property is

not an independent property belonging to the plaintiff but forms part of

Pandithurai 3rd Street. It is not disputed that Pandithurai 3

rd

Street exists in the

locality. The real controversy is as to whether the specific portion described in

the plaint as the fourth schedule property forms part of the said street.

22. The mere existence of a street in the locality cannot, by itself, establish that

the disputed fourth schedule property forms part of that street. The defendants,

having specifically pleaded that the fourth schedule property is part of the street

and that portions of the adjoining patta lands were contributed for formation or

widening of the street, were required to establish the same by acceptable

evidence correlating the alleged street with the survey particulars, boundaries

and measurements of the disputed property.

23. The plaintiff relies upon Ex.A11 rough plan and the other title and boundary

documents to establish the identity of the fourth schedule property. The

appellants, on the other hand, rely principally upon Exhibits B1 to B9 and, in

particular, Ex.B7 dated 15.07.1960. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

24. Ex.B7, namely, the sale deed executed by Subbiah Thevar and Velu Thevar

in favour of Sankarapandi Thevar, is relied upon to establish that the

predecessor of the defendants had acquired a portion of Survey No.305 and that

the same was thereafter utilised for formation of the street. However, the

boundaries contained in Ex.B7 do not satisfactorily establish that the property

covered by the document corresponds to the fourth schedule property.

Significantly, the northern boundary is shown as the property of Veerappa @

Veerapathira Thevar, the predecessor of the plaintiff. Therefore, the claim made

by the defendants that there existed a road through the aforesaid survey numbers

is not supported by any documentary evidence. The defendants have also not

produced any acceptable documentary evidence to establish that any portion of

Survey No.305 was contributed for formation or widening of Pandithurai 3rd

Street.

25. Pursuant to the direction issued by this Court in the writ appeal, a report was

also obtained regarding the existence of the alleged road and the classification

of the disputed property. The report of the local authority, after verification of

the relevant survey and revenue records, makes it clear that the land comprised

in the relevant survey number is classified and recorded as patta land. The name

of the plaintiff's father is also found recorded in the relevant revenue records.

The said property is not classified in the relevant records as Government land, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

public road, municipal road or any other public pathway.

26. The defendants' plea that eight feet of land was left on the northern side of

their property for formation of the street also remains unsupported by any

material correlating the alleged eight-foot strip with the fourth schedule

property. A mere assertion regarding the existence of an eight-foot space

cannot, without establishing its exact location, measurement and identity, prove

that the disputed property forms part of the street. The local authority has

further reported that the property of the first defendant is situated in a different

survey number and that access to the said property is available through another

access portion. The alleged pathway through the plaintiff's property has not

been established in the revenue records.

27. The decision relied upon by the appellants in Rajapalayam Municipality

though its Commissioner v. Jayabhaskaran & Ors., reported in 2013 (1) CTC

171, does not assist them on the facts of the present case. The said decision

cannot be read as laying down that a disputed property becomes a public street

merely because a street exists in the locality. The character and identity of the

particular property must still be established on evidence. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

28. Likewise, the decision in M.Rajagopal v. Suresh, reported in 2023 (4) CTC

63, relied upon by the appellants, cannot advance their case unless the factual

foundation that the fourth schedule property forms part of a public street or

pathway is first established. That foundational fact has not been proved in the

present case.

29. The learned First Appellate Court, on a careful consideration of the oral and

documentary evidence, has arrived at a categorical finding in this regard.

Exhibits A1, A2, A5 and A7, when considered together with the other

documents, do not establish the existence of any road through the disputed

fourth schedule property as claimed by the defendants. The report of the local

authority and the revenue records also do not support the case of the defendants.

30. Even the learned First Appellate Court, on appreciation of the oral and

documentary evidence, has found that the claim of defendants 1 to 3 regarding

the existence of Pandithurai 3

rd

Street through the disputed property was not

established. The learned First Appellate Court has particularly taken note of

Ex.A.9, the partition deed dated 16.07.1940, wherein the northern boundary of

the property comprised in Town Survey No.351 is stated to be the house site of

Veerapathira Thevar, the plaintiff's father, without any reference to a pathway https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

on the northern side. It has also considered Ex.A.10, the mortgage deed dated

21.12.1956, and Ex.A.7, the sale deed dated 15.07.1960, wherein the northern

boundary is similarly described as the vacant site belonging to the family of

Veerapathira Thevar. The learned First Appellate Court has further noticed that

the alleged description contained in Ex.A.6, to the effect that the father of

defendants 1 to 3 had purchased and was enjoying a portion of the property

situated on the south-eastern side of Town Survey No.305, is not borne out by

Exs.A.7 and A.10.

31. The learned First Appellate Court has also considered Ex.B.6 and found

that, though the name of Sankarapandi Thevar is mentioned therein, no

competent Revenue Department official was examined to establish the

particulars contained therein. Further, with regard to Ex.B.8, wherein it is stated

that the pathway on the northern side of Town Survey Nos.351 to 354 had been

measured and identified by the Surveyor, the said Surveyor was not examined.

Similarly, the documents relating to the alleged Pandithurai 3rd Street,

including the Field Map and Topo Sketch, which, according to DW.2, were

available with the Corporation, were not produced before the Court. The learned

First Appellate Court has therefore held that the defendants failed to establish,

by acceptable documentary or oral evidence, that the fourth schedule property

formed part of Pandithurai 3

rd

Street. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

32. Hence, the claim made by the defendants in their written statement that the

alleged road existed through Survey Nos.351, 352 and 305 is not established by

any acceptable evidence. This Court is therefore unable to accept the contention

that the fourth schedule property forms part of Pandithurai 3rd Street or that the

appellants have established the alleged eight-foot strip through the disputed

property. Accordingly, substantial questions of law (b) and (f) are answered

against the appellants.

33. The next issue relates to the title claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the

fourth schedule property and the alleged oral partitions pleaded by him.

34. Admittedly, in support of his claim of title, the plaintiff has specifically

pleaded his title and produced documentary evidence. The plaintiff's case is

based upon the succession of the property from his great-grandfather,

Kirubakarathevar, through Veerapathira Thevar and Arumuga Thevar, followed

by the alleged oral partition among the sons of Arumuga Thevar in the year

1955, under which the second schedule property is stated to have fallen to the

share of the plaintiff's father. The plaintiff thereafter relies upon the registered

settlement deed dated 19.10.2004 executed by his mother in favour of the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

plaintiff and defendants 4 and 5 and the subsequent oral partition in December

2004, under which the third schedule property is stated to have been allotted to

him.

35. The appellants contend that neither the oral partition of 1955 nor the alleged

oral partition of December 2004 has been established and that PW1 himself has

admitted in evidence that there was no oral partition in December 2004. It is

true that the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish his own title. This principle

has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Vasavi

Co-operative Housing Society Limited, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 269.

However, the said principle does not mean that the plaintiff's title has to be

established only through a single document of title. The Court is required to

consider the entire chain of title and the oral and documentary evidence placed

before it.

36. In the present case, the plaintiff has relied upon the documents relating to

succession, the settlement deed dated 19.10.2004, the subsequent arrangement

among the family members and the documents concerning possession and

enjoyment. The learned First Appellate Court, on a careful consideration of the

said materials, has arrived at a finding in favour of the plaintiff. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

37. It is also an admitted position that defendants 1 to 3 are not the legal heirs or

members of the plaintiff's family, but are strangers to the plaintiff's family. The

oral partition pleaded by the plaintiff between himself and defendants 4 and 5,

along with the rights of the other family members, has not been denied by

defendants 4 and 5 or by the mother of defendants 6 and 7, who are the family

members concerned with the said arrangement.

38. The defendants, on the other hand, have vaguely denied the oral partition

said to have taken place in December 2004 and have also referred to certain

earlier settlements. They further claimed that their predecessor-in-interest

originally owned lands comprised in Survey Nos.351, 352 and 353 and that a

portion of the said lands was utilised for forming an 18-feet road.

39. The defendants specifically denied that Survey No.305 belonged to the

plaintiff and claimed that the south-eastern portion of Survey No.305 belonged

to their father, Sankarapandi. According to them, their father had purchased the

property in the year 1956 and became the absolute owner thereof in the year

1960. Reliance was also placed upon the sale deed dated 15.07.1960, which was

marked as Ex.B7.

40. However, as already noticed, a perusal of Ex.B7 does not establish that the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

property covered by the document forms part of the fourth schedule property.

The boundaries contained in the document do not support the specific case of

the defendants. On the contrary, the northern boundary is shown as the property

of Veerappa @ Veerapathira Thevar, the predecessor of the plaintiff.

41. Therefore, the finding of the learned First Appellate Court cannot be said to

have been rendered merely on the weakness of the defendants' case. The

plaintiff's documents and the evidence led on his side have also been taken into

consideration. The appellants have not demonstrated that the finding recorded

by the First Appellate Court is based on no evidence or is so perverse that no

reasonable Court could have arrived at such a conclusion. Accordingly,

substantial question of law (e) is answered against the appellants.

42. The first issue that arises for consideration is with regard to the plea of

limitation. According to the learned counsel appearing for the

appellants/defendants, the suit is barred by limitation under Section 3 read with

Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. On the other hand, it is the contention of

the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff that the suit is not barred by

limitation.

43. It is an admitted position that the plaintiff has pleaded an oral partition https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

between himself, defendants 4 and 5 and the mother of defendants 6 and 7 in

December 2004. The same has not been specifically denied by defendants 4 and

5, including the mother of defendants 6 and 7.

44. It is also an admitted position that defendants 1 to 3 are not the legal heirs or

members of the plaintiff's family, but are strangers to the plaintiff's family.

Therefore, the oral partition pleaded by the plaintiff among the family members

cannot be challenged by defendants 1 to 3 merely on the ground that they do not

accept the same. In the present case, the family members of the plaintiff have

been impleaded as defendants 4 and 5 and the sister of the plaintiff, who is the

mother of defendants 6 and 7, has also been impleaded as a party. They have

not specifically denied the oral partition said to have taken place in December

2004.

45. It is equally an undisputed fact that there was an exchange of notices

between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3. The said notices have been marked

as Exhibits A5 and A7. Ex.A5 is the legal notice issued by the plaintiff on

10.01.2002, specifically denying the title claimed by the defendants in respect

of T.S.No.305.

46. In the said notice and the reply thereto, the defendants asserted that their

predecessor, Sankarapandi, had acquired property comprised in T.S.No.351/1, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

lying to the south of T.S.No.305, and had become the absolute owner thereof in

the year 1960. They also claimed ownership over the south-eastern portion of

the property comprised in T.S.No.305.

47. The plaintiff, on the other hand, asserted his title to the property and stated

that he had already made a complaint before the concerned police station and

had also made applications before the revenue authorities for mutation of the

revenue records in his name. In respect of the second item of the property, he

also relied upon the title documents relating to his father.

48. Thereafter, another legal notice, marked as Ex.A7, was issued by the

plaintiff in December 2004, to which the defendants sent a reply dated

13.12.2004. The same was received by the plaintiff on 14.12.2004.

49. The exchange of the aforesaid notices makes it clear that the dispute

between the parties had crystallised and that the controversy concerned the title,

identity and enjoyment of the disputed property. Therefore, the issuance of the

subsequent legal notice in the year 2004 cannot be said to be an independent

cause of action wholly disconnected from the earlier notice issued in the year

2002. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

50. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants relied upon State of

Gujarat v. Kothari and Associates, reported in (2016) 14 SCC 761, in support

of the plea of limitation. The said decision reiterates the mandate contained in

Section 3 of the Limitation Act that a suit instituted beyond the prescribed

period has to be dismissed and that the Court is required to examine limitation

in accordance with law.

51. Likewise, in Khatri Hotels Private Limited v. Union of India and another,

reported in (2011) 9 SCC 126, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained that

under Article 58 the period of limitation begins when the right to sue first

accrues and that successive violations of the same right do not ordinarily give

rise to a fresh period of limitation.

52. There can be no dispute with the above principles. The mere description of

the cause of action as a continuing one cannot, by itself, defeat the plea of

limitation in a suit for declaration. The Court has to ascertain when the right to

seek the declaration first accrued.

53. In the present case, Ex.A5 is dated 10.01.2002 and the reply thereto is dated

24.01.2002. The contents of the notice and the reply assume significance

because the defendants' assertion of title over the disputed property was raised https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

at that stage. At the same time, the plaintiff's case is that the precise dispute

regarding the fourth schedule property and the alleged pathway continued

thereafter and that there was a further exchange of notices in December 2004,

followed by the proceedings before the local authority concerning the proposed

water supply connection and the alleged attempt of interference on 24.03.2006.

The Trial Court held that the suit was barred by limitation. The First Appellate

Court, however, took the view that the subsequent assertion of title and

interference furnished the cause of action for the suit.

54. The exchange of the aforesaid notices, the subsequent proceedings before

the local authority and the alleged interference have to be considered in the

context of the precise identity and enjoyment of the fourth schedule property.

The appellants have not established that the cause of action for the precise

declaration sought in respect of the fourth schedule property had unequivocally

accrued on 10.01.2002 and that the subsequent events were merely repetitive

violations of an already accrued right.

55. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the plea of

limitation raised by the defendants cannot be accepted. The decision relied upon

by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants on the question of limitation,

though laying down the general principle governing Article 58, does not come

to the rescue of the appellants on the facts of the present case. Accordingly, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

substantial questions of law (a) and (c) are answered against the appellants.

56. The appellants contend that the plaintiff has suppressed the existence of

Pandithurai 3

rd

Street and therefore is not entitled to the discretionary relief of

declaration and injunction.

57. The contention cannot be accepted. The existence of Pandithurai 3

rd

Street

and the question whether the fourth schedule property forms part of that street

are distinct issues. The plaintiff's case has throughout been that the disputed

fourth schedule property is his patta property and that the defendants have

wrongly sought to treat the same as part of the street.

58. The pleadings and documents themselves show that the parties were

conscious of the existence of Pandithurai 3

rd

Street. Therefore, it cannot be said

that the plaintiff deliberately concealed the existence of the street. The real

dispute is whether the particular portion claimed by the plaintiff forms part of

the street or is a separate patta property.

59. More importantly, the appellants have not established that the disputed

fourth schedule property is a public street, municipal road or public pathway.

The report filed by the local authority pursuant to the direction of this Court

supports the classification of the disputed property as patta land and does not https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

establish its classification as a public road or pathway.

60. Therefore, the allegation of suppression cannot be accepted so as to

disentitle the plaintiff from the relief granted by the First Appellate Court.

Accordingly, substantial question of law (d) is answered against the appellants.

61. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the decisions in Union of

India v. Vasavi Co-operative Housing Society Limited, reported in (2014) 2

SCC 269; Rajapalayam Municipality though its Commissioner v.

Jayabhaskaran & Ors., reported in 2013 (1) CTC 171; Khatri Hotels Private

Limited v. Union of India and another, reported in (2011) 9 SCC 126;

M.Rajagopal v. Suresh, reported in 2023 (4) CTC 63; and State of Gujarat v.

Kothari and Associates, reported in (2016) 14 SCC 761.

62. The principles laid down in the said decisions are not in dispute. However,

none of the said decisions comes to the rescue of the appellants unless the

factual foundation necessary for applying those principles is established.

63. Even in the present writ appeal, the respondents/local authority have filed a

counter-affidavit and, more particularly, in paragraph No.5, have stated that, as

per the relevant survey and revenue records verified by the Corporation,

T.S.No.111 in Ward AV, Block No.5, is classified and recorded as patta land in https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

the names of Veeraputhirathevar, Pandiyathevar, Petchimuthu and

Arumugathevar. In view of the categorical stand taken by the local authority in

its counter-affidavit, it is clear that there was no existing Pandithurai 3

rd

Street.

The said property is also not classified in the relevant records as Sarkar

Poramboke land, public road, municipal road or public street. Hence, the order

passed by the learned Single Judge permitting the drawal of water connection

through the plaintiff's land requires interference.

64. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the plaintiff has

established his title to the suit property, whereas the appellants have failed to

establish their alleged right over the disputed property or the existence of the

alleged road through the suit survey numbers. The findings recorded by the

learned First Appellate Court are based upon a proper appreciation of the oral

and documentary evidence and do not suffer from any perversity or error of law

warranting interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

65. Accordingly, all the substantial questions of law are answered against the

appellants.

66. In the result, the judgment and decree dated 22.02.2011 passed by the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, in A.S.No.101 of 2010 are

confirmed. The Second Appeal is dismissed. Consequently, the Writ Appeal

stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected

miscellaneous petitions, if any, are closed.

(M.DHANDAPANI J.) (N.DILIP KUMAR J.)

01.10.2026

PKN https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

To

1.The Commissioner

Tirunelveli Coproation

Tirunelveli

2. The Assistant Commissioner

Melapalayam Zone

Tirunelveli https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

M.DHANDAPANI , J.

and

N.DILIP KUMAR, J.

PKN

W.A(MD)No.7491 of 2021 and SA(MD) No.434 of 2011

01.10.2026 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis