preventive detention, habeas corpus, Karnataka High Court, Goonda Act, bail, document supply, judicial review, Article 22(5)
 22 Sep, 2026
Listen in 01:58 mins | Read in 79:30 mins
EN
HI

Smt. Rukmini Vs. The State Of Karnataka

  Karnataka High Court WRIT PETITION (HABEAS CORPUS) NO. 100015 OF 2026
Link copied!

Case Background

As per case facts, the Petitioner, mother of the detenu, challenged the preventive detention order against her son, who was alleged to be involved in multiple crimes including robbery and ...

Hello! How can I help you? 😊
Disclaimer: We do not store your data.
Document Text Version

- 1 -

Reserved on : 09.09.2026

Pronounced on : 22.09.2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

DATED THIS THE 22

ND

DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

AND

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

WRIT PETITION (HABEAS CORPUS ) NO. 100015 OF 2026

BETWEEN:

SMT. RUKMINI

W/O ARJUN NAVALE

M/O.: SHRI SANJU ARJUN NAVALE

AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,

OCC. HOUSEWIFE,

R/O. 933, GANDHI NAGAR,

MUNDGOD - 581 349,

TALUK MUNDGOD AND

DISTRICT UTTARA KANNNADA.

…PETITIONER

(BY SRI SUHAS K. HOSAMANI AND

SRI T.R.PATIL, ADVOCATES)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

REPRESENTED BY ITS

ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRTARY TO

- 2 -

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME

GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,

VIDHANA SOUDHA,

BENGALURU - 560 001.

2. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE AND

DETAINING AUTHORITY

UTTARA KANNADA DISTRICT,

KARWAR - 581 301,

TALUK KARWAR,

DISTRICT UTTARA KANNADA.

3. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

UTTARA KANNADA DISTRICT,

KARWAR - 581 301,

TALUK KARWAR,

DISTRICT UTTARA KANNADA.

4. THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

SIRSI SUB-DIVISION,

SIRSI - 581 402

TALUK SIRSI,

DISTRICT UTTARA KANNADA.

5. THE POLICE INSPECTOR

MUNDGOD POLICE STATION,

MUNDGOD - 581 349,

TALUK MUNDGOD,

DISTRICT UTTARA KANNADA.

6. THE SUPERINTENDENT

DISTRICT CENTRAL PERSION,

BALLARI,

- 3 -

TALUK AND DISTRICT BALLARI - 583 103.

…RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI RAKESH M. BILKI, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE)

THIS WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO, ALLOW THIS

PETITION BY ISSUING A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND I.

DELCARING THAT THE DETENTION OF SHRI. SANJU S/O ARJUN

NAVALE BY IMPUGNED ORDER BEARING NO. DCB/MAG-

1/VIVA/88/2026-27 DATED. 08.06.2026 PASSED BY RESPO NDENT

NO.2 VIDE ANNEXURE-A (ENGLISH VERSION) AND ANNEXURE- A1

(KANNADA VERSION) AS ILLEGAL AND VOID AB-INITIO; II . PASS

SUCH OTHER ORDERS INCLUDING RELEASE OF THE DETENUE

FORTHWITH; III. AWARD COSTS.

THIS WRIT PETITION ( HABEAS CORPUS )

HAVING BEEN

HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 09.09.2026, COMING ON

FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY M.NAGAPRASANNA J., MADE

THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

and

HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

CAV ORDER

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA)

The petitioner, mother of the detenu is before the Court

calling in question the preventive detention order dated 08-06-2026

passed by the 2

nd

respondent against her son and seeks a writ in

- 4 -

the nature of habeas corpus directing release of the detenu on the

grounds set out in the petition.

2. Heard Sri Suhas K.Hosamani learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner and Sri Rakesh M. Bilki, learned Gove rnment

Advocate appearing for respondents 1 to 6.

3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

3.1. The petitioner is the mother of the detenu. T he detenu

aged 24 years is alleged to be embroiled in several cri mes. On

07-05-2026 the 5

th

respondent/ Police Inspector attached to

Mundgod Police Station submits a report to the 4

th

respondent/Deputy Superintendent of Police which is forwarded to

the Officer in hierarchy indicating that the detenu is accused in

about 5 criminal cases and his alleged involvement is act ive in

criminal activities. On 08-06-2026, based upon the said report, the

Detaining Authority passed the impugned order of prev entive

detention of the son of the petitioner invoking power under sub-

section (2) of Section 3 of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous

- 5 -

Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goo ndas,

Immoral Traffic Offenders Slum-Grabbers and Video or Audio

Pirates Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). An

order is passed by the State Government under Section 3 (3) of the

Act that the detenu has been a co-accused in commission of

heinous crimes – robbery and murder and further engage d in acts

of disturbing public peace and, therefore, the order of detention

passed by the 2

nd

respondent is to be confirmed and confirmed the

said order. This is also called in question as the confirmation order

of the detention order.

3.2. The detenu makes a representation to the 1

st

respondent

through the 6

th

respondent/Prison Superintendent on the score that

his mother is ailing and he has to pay the rent for the house in

which he stays and also states that he is not involved i n any of

criminal activities so alleged. He also further states that he has

obtained orders of bail from the concerned Courts. The State rejects

the plea of the detenu on the score that the detenu i s a part of

heinous crimes – robbery, murder and is disturbing publ ic peace.

Therefore, it was necessary for the detenu to be detained and the

- 6 -

matter is placed before the Advisory Board. The Advis ory Board

upholds the detention order of the 2

nd

respondent/Detaining

Authority. The order of the Advisory Board is produced before us by

the State in a sealed cover. The subject petition is preferred on 16-

07-2026 seeking to declare the detention of the detenu as illegal.

3.3. During the subsistence of the subject petition, o n

24-07-2026 as obtaining under sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the

Act, the confirmation order is passed after the detention order was

upheld by the Advisory Board.

4.1. The learned counsel appearing for the petition er would

vehemently contend that one of the cases which forms par t of the

detention order that is Crime No.10 of 2019, the de tenu is

convicted and thereafter his conviction in the said case is set side in

appeal. The learned counsel would further contend that the detenu

was granted bail in cases pending against him. The impugned order

is passed in English and Kannada languages. The two are not

specific in translation and thus there is variance between the orders

passed. This would constitute improper communication of gr ounds

- 7 -

of detention which would render the detention bad in law. He

would contend that legible copies of the documents relie d upon

while passing the detention order are not provided to the detenu.

The Detaining Authority has failed to furnish all the documents

which would form part of the detention order, which w ould be

complaints, statement of witnesses, mahazars, seizure repo rts,

charge sheets inter alia.

4.2. He would further contend that mere registration of

criminal cases, filing of charge sheets or pendency of crimi nal

proceedings cannot justify the order of detention. The impugned

order was furnished to the brother of the detenu and thereafter the

detenu was externed from Uttara Kannada District. On all the said

submissions, the learned counsel would seek that writ of habeas

corpus be granted and detenu be released from detention.

5. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate would

vehemently refute the submissions and contends that the present

petition is not entertainable in the light of the judgment of the

coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of HARIS PATHAN v.

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE – W.P.(H.C) No.100007 of 2026

- 8 -

decided on 16-04-2026 on the score that once the Adviso ry Board

has considered and an order is passed under Section 12(1) of the

Act, the petition under Habeas Corpus would not be ente rtainable.

He would contend that the impugned order clearly disclo ses the

conduct of the detenu and several cases registered against him

would establish regular pattern of committing violent, anti-social

offences including dacoity, riots, kidnapping for ransom and cold-

blooded contract killing. Records indicate that due to aggressive

operation of the detenu, two murders have taken place in 2026

alone and he has created fear in Mundgod Taluk. He has been

involved in several crimes for the last 7 years, the mom ent he

turned 18. The detention order and all the document s along with

grounds of detention were furnished to the detenu and his family

members. It is strictly in consonance with law. He would see k

dismissal of the petition.

6. We have given our anxious consideration to the

submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have

perused the material on record.

- 9 -

7. Two issues arise before us based upon the said

submissions and contra submissions –

(i) Whether the documents furnished to the detenu an d his

family members as is necessary in law would vitiate the

order of detention?

(ii) Whether validity of the order of detention could be gone

into by this Court?

Both these issues are no longer res integra which would require us

to delve deep into the matter. We, therefore, deem it appropriate

to notice the judicial landscape on both these issues for resolution

of the lis.

REQUIREMENT OF FURNISHING OF DOCUMENTS:

8.1. The Apex Court in JASEELA SHAJI v. UNION OF

INDIA

1

has held as follows:

“(a) As to whether the non-supply of the statement

of Ms Preetha Pradeep has affected the right of the

detenu to make an effective representation under Ar ticle

22(5) of the Constitution of India

23. In M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India [M.

Ahamedkutty v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 1: 1990 SCC (Cri)

1

(2024) 9 SCC 53

- 10 -

258] , this Court was considering the issue as to whether non-

supply of the copies of the bail application and the bail order

vitiated the right of the detenu under Article 22(5 ) of the

Constitution of India. After taking the survey of the earlier

judgments, this Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 12-13 , paras

19-20)

“19. The next submission is that of non-supply of

the bail application and the bail order. This Court, as

was observed in Mangalbhai Motiram Patel v. State of

Maharashtra [Mangalbhai Motiram Patel v. State of

Maharashtra, (1980) 4 SCC 470: 1981 SCC (Cri) 49] has

“forged” certain procedural safeguards for citizens under

preventive detention. The constitutional imperatives

in Article 22(5) are twofold: (1) The detaining

authority must, as soon as may be i.e. as soon as

practicable, after the detention communicate to

the detenu the grounds on which the order of

detention has been made, and (2) the detaining

authority must afford the detenu the earliest

opportunity of making the representation against

the order of detention. The right is to make an

effective representation and when some

documents are referred to or relied on in the

grounds of detention, without copies of such

documents, the grounds of detention would not be

complete. The detenu has, therefore, the right to

be furnished with the grounds of detention along

with the documents so referred to or relied on. If

there is failure or even delay in furnishing those

documents it would amount to denial of the right

to make an effective representation . This has been

settled by a long line of decisions : Ramchandra A.

Kamat v. Union of India [Ramchandra A. Kamat v. Union

of India, (1980) 2 SCC 270 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 414] ,

Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra [Frances Coralie

Mullin v. W.C. Khambra, (1980) 2 SCC 275 : 1980 SCC

(Cri) 419] , Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India [Icchu

Devi Choraria v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 531 :

1981 SCC (Cri) 25] , Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India

[Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 525

: 1981 SCC (Cri) 19] , Tushar Thakker v. Union of India

[Tushar Thakker v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 499 :

1981 SCC (Cri) 13] , LallubhaiJogibhai Patel v. Union of

India [LallubhaiJogibhai Patel v. Union of India, (1981) 2

SCC 427 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 463] , Kirit Kumar Chaman

- 11 -

Lal Kundaliya v. Union of India [Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal

Kundaliya v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 436 : 1981

SCC (Cri) 471] and Ana Carelina D'Souza v. Union of

India [Ana Carelina D'Souza v. Union of India, 1981

Supp SCC 53 (1) : 1982 SCC (Cri) 131(1)] .

20. It is immaterial whether the detenu already

knew about their contents or not. In Mehrunisa v. State

of Maharashtra [Mehrunisa v. State of Maharashtra,

(1981) 2 SCC 709: 1981 SCC (Cri) 592] it was held that

the fact that the detenu was aware of the contents of

the documents not furnished was immaterial and non-

furnishing of the copy of the seizure list was held to be

fatal. To appreciate this point one has to bear in mind

that the detenu is in jail and has no access to his own

documents. In Mohd. Zakir v. State (UT of Delhi) [Mohd.

Zakir v. State (UT of Delhi), (1982) 3 SCC 216: 1982

SCC (Cri) 695] it was reiterated that it being a

constitutional imperative for the detaining authority to

give the documents relied on and referred to in the

order of detention paripassu the grounds of detention,

those should be furnished at the earliest so that t he

detenu could make an effective representation

immediately instead of waiting for the documents to be

supplied with. The question of demanding the

documents was wholly irrelevant and the infirmity i n

that regard was violative of constitutional safeguards

enshrined in Article 22(5).”

(emphasis supplied)

24. It can thus be seen that this Court in M.

Ahamedkutty [M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India, (1990)

2 SCC 1 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 258] , in unequivocal term s, has

held that the constitutional requirements under Art icle

22(5) of the Constitution of India are twofold viz. : (1)

the detaining authority must, as soon as practicabl e,

after the detention communicate to the detenu the

grounds on which the order of detention has been ma de,

and (2) the detaining authority must afford the det enu

the earliest opportunity of making the representati on

against the order of detention. It has further been held

that the right is to make an effective representati on and

when some documents are referred to or relied on in the

grounds of detention, without copies of such docume nts,

the grounds of detention would not be complete. In

- 12 -

unequivocal terms, it has been held that the detenu has

the right to be furnished with the grounds of deten tion

along with the documents so referred to or relied o n. It

has been held that failure or even delay in furnish ing

those documents would amount to denial of the right to

make an effective representation.

25. This Court further went on to hold that it is

immaterial whether the detenu already knew about th eir

contents or not. This Court reiterated the position that it

being a constitutional imperative for the detaining

authority to give the documents relied on and refer red to

in the order of detention paripassu the grounds of

detention. It has been held that there is no questi on of

demanding the documents.

… … …

28. Insofar as the reliance on the judgment of this Court

in L.M.S. Ummu Saleema [L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B.

Gujaral, (1981) 3 SCC 317 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 720] is concerned,

the High Court relied on the following observations of this Court

: (SCC p. 320, para 5)

“5. … It is only failure to furnish copies of such

documents as were relied upon by the detaining

authority, making it difficult for the detenu to make an

effective representation, that amounts to a violation of

the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 22(5). In

our view it is unnecessary to furnish copies of

documents to which casual or passing reference may be

made in the course of narration of facts and which are

not relied upon by the detaining authority in making the

order of detention.”

29. There can be no doubt that it is not necessary

to furnish copies of each and every document to whi ch a

casual or passing reference may be made in the narr ation

of facts and which are not relied upon by the detai ning

authority in making the order of detention. However ,

failure to furnish copies of such document/document s as

is/are relied on by the detaining authority which w ould

deprive the detenu to make an effective representat ion

would certainly amount to violation of the fundamen tal

- 13 -

right guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constit ution

of India.

30. We may also gainfully refer to the following

observations of this Court in Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran

[Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran v. State of T.N., (2000) 9 SCC

170: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1198]: (SCC p. 173, para 8)

“8. We may make it clear that there is no legal

requirement that a copy of every document mentioned

in the order shall invariably be supplied to the detenu.

What is important is that copies of only such of those

documents as have been relied on by the detaining

authority for reaching the satisfaction that preventive

detention of the detenu is necessary shall be supplied to

him.”

31. It could thus be seen that though this Court

held that a copy of every document mentioned in the

order is not required to be supplied to the detenu, copies

of only such of those documents as have been relied on

by the detaining authority for reaching the satisfa ction

that preventive detention of the detenu is necessar y are

required to be supplied to him.

32. In J. Abdul Hakeem [J. Abdul Hakeem v. State

of T.N., (2005) 7 SCC 70: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1601], the

position was reiterated by this Court by observing thus:

(SCC p. 74, para 8)

“8. … From the aforesaid authorities it is

clear that the detenu has a right to be supplied

with the material documents on which reliance is

placed by the detaining authority for passing the

detention order but the detention order will not be

vitiated, if the document although referred to in

the order is not supplied which is not relied upon

by the detaining authority for forming of its

opinion or was made the basis for passing the

order of detention. The crux of the matter lies in

whether the detenu's right to make a

representation against the order of detention is

hampered by non-supply of the particular

document.”

- 14 -

33. In Abdullah Kadher Batcha [State of T.N. v.

Abdullah Kadher Batcha , (2009) 1 SCC 333: (2009) 1 SCC

(Cri) 497], again the position was reiterated by th is Court

thus: (SCC pp. 335-36, para 7)

“7. The court has a duty to see whether the

non-supply of any document is in any way

prejudicial to the case of the detenu. The High

Court has not examined as to how the non-supply

of the documents called for had any effect on the

detenu and/or whether the non-supply was

prejudicial to the detenu. Merely because copies of

some documents have (sic not) been supplied,

they cannot by any stretch of imagination be

called as relied upon documents. While examining

whether non-supply of a document would

prejudice a detenu, the court has to examine

whether the detenu would be deprived of making

an effective representation in the absence of a

document. Primarily, the copies which form the

ground for detention are to be supplied and non-

supply thereof would prejudice the detenu. But

documents which are merely referred to for the

purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot

be termed to be documents without the supply of

which the detenu is prejudiced.”

34. This Court reiterated that, primarily, the copi es

which form the ground for detention are to be suppl ied

and non-supply thereof would prejudice the detenu. It

has been further held that the documents which are

merely referred to for the purpose of narration of facts in

that sense cannot be termed to be documents without

the supply of which the detenu is prejudiced.

… … …

37. It is thus a settled position that though it ma y

not be necessary to furnish copies of each and ever y

document to which a casual or passing reference has

been made, it is imperative that every such documen t

which has been relied on by the detaining authority and

which affects the right of the detenu to make an ef fective

representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitut ion

has to be supplied to the detenu.

- 15 -

… … …

43. It could thus also be seen that the said Preetha

Pradeep is a vital link for transactions between the said Suresh

Babu and the detenu. It, therefore, cannot be said that the

statements of Preetha Pradeep are just a casual or a passing

reference. On the contrary, the said statements, as has been

seen from the preamble of the grounds of detention as well as

the beginning of Para 2 of the detention order dated 31-8-2023,

formed the basis for arriving at a subjective satisfaction by the

detaining authority. It is difficult to determine as to whether in

the absence of the said statements of Preetha Prade ep the

subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority

could have been arrived at or not. However, the very recording

of the factum of the statements of Preetha Pradeep make them

a relevant aspect taken into consideration by the d etaining

authority for arriving at its subjective satisfaction.

44. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the respondents on the provis ions of

Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA is concerned, no doubt that if the

detention order is made on several grounds and if the said order

is vitiated on one of the grounds and it can be sustained on the

other grounds, the detention would not be vitiated. However, a

distinction will have to be drawn between the detention order

passed on various grounds and the detention order p assed on

one ground relying on various materials. If the detention order

is passed on one ground taking into consideration 8 factual

aspects, the question would be as to whether non-supply of the

material containing the factual aspects relied on b y the

detaining authority would vitiate the detention order or not. The

question, therefore, for our consideration is as to whether

though the grounds of detention could be severed, whether the

materials which have been relied on by the detaining authority

for arriving at its subjective satisfaction could also be severed.

45. No doubt, as has been reiterated time and again by

this Court, it may not be necessary to supply each and every

document to which a passing or casual reference is made.

However, all such material which has been relied on by the

detaining authority while arriving at its subjective satisfaction

will imperatively have to be supplied to the detenu.

- 16 -

46. In our view, the documents relied on by the detaining

authority which form the basis of the material facts which have

been taken into consideration to form a chain of events could

not be severed and the High Court was not justified in coming

to a finding that despite eschewing of certain mate rial taken

into consideration by the detaining authority, the detention

order can be sustained by holding that the detaining authority

would have arrived at such a subjective satisfactio n even

without such material.

47. In this respect, we may gainfully refer to the

following observation of this Court in A. Sowkath Ali [A.

Sowkath Ali v. Union of India, (2000) 7 SCC 148: 2000 SCC

(Cri) 1304]: (SCC p. 163, para 27)

“27. … Section 5-A applies where the detention is

based on more than one ground, not where it is base d

on a single ground. Same is also the decision of th is

Court in the unreported decision of Prem Prakash v.

Union of India [Prem Prakash v. Union of India, (2000) 7

SCC 163] decided on 7-10-1996 relying on K.

SatyanarayanSubudhi v. Union of India [K.

SatyanarayanSubudhi v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (2)

SCC 153: 1991 SCC (Cri) 1013]. Coming back to the

present case we find really it is a case of one composite

ground. The different numbers of the ground of

detention are only paragraphs narrating the facts w ith

the details of the document which is being relied on but

factually, the detention order is based on one ground,

which is revealed by Ground (1)(xvi) of the grounds of

detention which we have already quoted hereinbefore .

Thus on the facts of this case Section 5-A has no

application in the present case.”

(emphasis supplied)

48. In that view of the matter, we have come to a

considered conclusion that non-supply of the statem ents of

Preetha Pradeep has affected the right of the detenu to make an

effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution

of India and as such, the detention is vitiated on the said

ground.

- 17 -

The detention in the case before the Apex Court was un der

COFEPOSA and not under the Act. The Apex Court holds that failure

to furnish copies of documents relied on by the Detaining Authority

would deprive the detenu to make an effective representation which

would certainly amount to violation of Article 22(5) of the

Constitution of India. The Apex Court holds that the detenu has a

right to be furnished with the grounds of detention along with the

documents so referred. But, at the same breath holds tha t it may

not be necessary to supply each and every document to whi ch a

passing or casual reference is made.

8.2. A Division Bench of this Court in NANDINI V., v. STATE

OF KARNATAKA

2

has held as follows:

".... .... ....

15. The decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of

Kamrunnisa Badrunnisa Sithya Aysha v. Union of Indi a

reported in (1991) 1 SCC 128 and Union of India v.

Mohammed Ahmed Ibrahim reported in 1993 Supp (1)

SCC 405, are authorities on the point that the illegibility of

certain documents by itself will not render a detention order

invalid. The extent and nature of the illegibility and its effect on

the right of representation has to be considered taking note of

the nature of the material as well. A co-equal Benc h of this

Court relying on the said judgments of the Apex Court has held

2

WP(HC) No.132 of 2025 decided on 06-04-2026

- 18 -

at paragraph No.6 in Vijaya v. Commissioner of Police and

Others reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 3200 as follows:-

"6. Therefore, in view of the above said decisions

cited on both the side what is relevant is that, whether

the illegible portions supplied to the accused was so

relevant and because of that particular portion alone the

accused/detenue could not able to make proper

representation before the Advisory Board or to the

Government. Such explanation is conspicuously absen t

in this particular case. As we have seen the illegi ble

portion in the copies, they are all bail orders passed by

the competent authorities to the accused. The other

grounds on which the detention order was passed relying

upon the conduct of detenue with reference to the

pendency of the cases against the accused which are the

main grounds taken for the purpose of passing the order

of detention. Further added to the above, when the

detenue was produced before the Advisory Board he

would have atleast made a representation with regard to

non-furnishing of legible copies to him so that he was

prevented from making any representation. The Advis ory

Board would get opportunity to deal with the matter for

a period of four weeks from the date of representat ion

by the Government to the Advisory Board. Therefore, in

this context also, we find no such strong material to give

a definite conclusion here that the illegible portion in the

document is the only reason for the detenue not to make

effective representation before the Advisory Board or to

the Government. Therefore, in view of the above sai d

facts and circumstances, we do not find any strong

reasons to interfere with the detention order. Hence, the

petition is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be

dismissed. Accordingly, dismissed."

16. We notice that the order of detention gives the

details of all the cases registered against the detenue from

2011 onwards. The first of the cases is one in whic h the

detenue was sentenced to life imprisonment on 29.08 .2013.

The second case is one which has been compromised b etween

the parties. The third, fourth and ninth cases are where the

detenue has been acquitted after trial. Therefore, pending

cases are fifth to eighth and tenth and eleven. Therefore, it is

clear that all the cases registered against the detenue are

mentioned in the order of detention. The cases, which have

- 19 -

ended in acquittal, cannot be relied on for the pur pose of

arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the de tention

is necessary. Therefore, the fact that the cases wh ere

the detenue has been acquitted are also mentioned i n

the order of detention and the FIRs in the said cas es

have also been included in the supporting documents

cannot, by itself, be a reason to state that any de ficiency

in those materials would vitiate the order of deten tion.

The fact that the FIR in a case where the detenue h as

already been acquitted is in Telugu or that the

supporting document in another case, which has also

ended in acquittal, is not fully legible, may not b e a

reason to set aside an order of detention, which is

otherwise legal. The Apex Court in the case of Jase ela

Shaji v. Union of India and others reported in (202 4) 9

SCC 53, has also held that it is not necessary to f urnish

copies of each and every document to which a casual or

passing reference may be made in the narration of f acts

and which are not relied upon by the detaining auth ority

in making the order of detention. Therefore, we are of

the opinion that the non-grant of translated versio n of

FIR in one of the cases in which the detenue has be en

acquitted would not invalidate the order of detenti on."

The Division Bench holds that illegibility of certain documents by

itself would not render a detention order invalid. The extent and

nature of illegibility and its effect on the right of representation has

to be considered taking note of the nature of the material as well.

The fact that the detenu has been acquitted also find a mention in

the order of detention and the crime in the case was also included

as supporting documents cannot be a reason to state that a ny

deficiency in those materials would vitiate the order of detention. It

- 20 -

is not necessary for the State to furnish each and every document

to which a reference is made.

8.3. Another Division Bench of this Court long befo re the

afore-quoted judgment, in a judgment reported in VIJAYA v.

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

3

, has held as follows:

".... .... ....

3. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has taken

up various contentions at the initial stages that the detention

confirmation order was not passed by the Government within

the time prescribed i.e., within 12 days from the d ate of

detention and that no sufficient opportunity was granted for the

purpose of filing his statement by the accused after furnishing of

the copies to the detenue with reference to the detention order

passed by the first respondent. Those grounds were given up

after going through the order passed by the Governm ent of

Karnataka in HD 174 SST 2016 dated 04.12.2017 which is the

authorization letter to the Commissioner of Police to exercise

the powers under Section 3 (2) of the Karnataka Pre vention of

Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers, Drug-Offender s,

Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum- Grabbers

and Video or Audio Pirates Act, 1985. Further, on psrusal of the

orders, the procedure that has been followed by the

Commissioner in passing the detention order and sen ding it to

the Government and confirmation order passed by the

Government and then submitting the same before the Advisory

Board and the Advisory Board passing the orders in accordance

with law, were all within the time prescribed under the statute.

Therefore, after going through the materials on record and after

hearing the submission made by learned AAG, perhaps the

learned counsel for the petitioner has given up the above said

ground and ultimately, he canvassed before this Court that the

3

2018 SCC OnLine Kar.3200

- 21 -

copies furnished to the accused were not eligible, therefore, he

had no opportunity to file objections or his statement or his

representation either to the Government or to the A dvisory

Board. It is evident from the records that the said submission

was not made either before the Advisory Board at th e earliest

point of time for what reason he could not make any

representation to the Government or to the Advisory Board.

Now the said objection has been raised before this Court. In this

context, he has relied upon a decision of this Court in W.P.HC.

No. 212/2014 dated 01.04.2015. Similar aspect has b een

considered by this Court at paragraph - 7 of its order wherein it

is stated that-

“it is the specific ground by the petitioner at para-

8 that, the order of detention is vitiated for the reasons

that from the relied upon documents furnished to th e

detenue, it would reveal that the documents at page

Nos. 605, 607, 610, 611, 613, 614, 616, 617, 619 an d

620 are illegible and it violates the mandatory provisions

of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and f or

failure to communicate the order of detention and

thereby affecting the detenu's right to make meaningful

representation.”

4. After considering the above said grounds the Court has

considered the substance in the submission made and after

going through the relevant pages in the copies furnished to the

judgment, the Court has come to the conclusion that , most of

the pages in the copies furnished to the accused we re not

legible and on account of the same, detenu was not able to

make proper representation before the Advisory Board to defend

his case. Therefore, relying upon a decision of the Apex Court in

Bhupinder Singh's case and other cases rendered by this Court,

allowed the said petition on that particular ground.

5. Learned AAG countering the above said arguments also

relied upon a decision passed by this Court in WPHC. No.

1/2018 vide order dated 23.02.2018 wherein similar point had

again come up for consideration. This court relying upon a

decision of the Apex Court reported Kamrunnisa Badrunnisa

Sithya Aysha v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 128 has come to

the conclusion that :

- 22 -

“it would not be sufficient to say that detenue

was not supplied with the copies of documents in time on

demand, but it must further be shown that it has

impaired detenue's right to make effective and

purposeful representation. He invites the attention of the

Court to the observations made in paragraph 14 of t he

said judgment to contend that no hard and fast rule

could be laid down in that behalf, but what would b e

essential is that detenue must show that failure to

supply documents before the meeting of the Advisory

Board had impaired and prejudiced his right, howeve r

slight or insignificant it may be.” He also relied upon a

decision rendered by this Court in WPHC. No. 96/201 6

vide order dated 14.03.2017. In this case, this Cou rt

while considering the above said grounds observed t hat

“as far as judgment regarding illegibility of certa in

documents are concerned what has to be noted is the

extent and nature of the illegibility and its effect on the

right of representation in the context of its importance or

relevance in formation of subjective satisfaction f or

detention vide Union of India v. Mohammed Ahmed

Ibrahim (1993 Supp (1) SCC 405).

6. Therefore, in view of the above said decisions

cited on both the side what is relevant is that, wh ether

the illegible portions supplied to the accused was so

relevant and because of that particular portion alo ne the

aceused/detenue could not able to make proper

representation before the Advisory Board or to the

Government. Such explanation is conspicuously absen t in

this particular case. As we have seen the illegible portion

in the copies, they are all bail orders passed by t he

competent authorities to the accused. The other gro unds

on which the detention order was passed relying upo n

the conduct of detenue with reference to the penden cy of

the cases against the accused which are the main

grounds taken for the purpose of passing the order of

detention. Further added to the above, when the det enue

was produced before the Advisory Board he would hav e

atleast made a representation with regard to non-

furnishing of legible copies to him so that he was

prevented from making any representation. The Advis ory

Board would get opportunity to deal with the matter for a

period of four weeks from the date of representatio n by

the Government to the Advisory Board. Therefore, in this

- 23 -

context also, we find no such strong material to gi ve a

definite conclusion here that the illegible portion in the

document is the only reason for the detenue not to make

effective representation before the Advisory Board or to

the Government. Therefore, in view of the above said facts

and circumstances, we do not find any strong reason s to

interfere with the detention order. Hence, the petition is devoid

of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly,

dismissed."

The Division Bench holds that the detenu is required to

demonstrate that illegible documents furnished to the detenu have

impaired his right to make effective and purposeful representation.

9. In the light of the elucidation of law as noted supra, the

order of detention is required to be noticed. It reads as follows:

"DETENTION ORDER

WHEREAS, under Section 3(2) of the Karnataka Prevent ion of

Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Gamblers,

Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-Grabber s Act,

1985 (Karnataka Act No. 12 of 1985), read with Gove rnment

Order No. HD 140 SST 2026, dated 04-03-2026, the Dis trict

Superintendent of Police, Uttara Kannada District, Karwar, via

formal Letter No. DCRB/UK/877/2026, dated 15-05-202 6, has

submitted an extensive investigation report indicating that you,

Sanju, S/o Arjun Navale, age 24 years, profession w elding

worker, resident of Gandhi Nagar, Mundgod Taluk, Ut tara

Kannada District, are actively engaged in highly dangerous and

anti-social goonda activities. The report contains an explicit

recommendation to subject you to preventive detenti on to

preserve the public order.

- 24 -

The core facts and prominent grounds highlighted in the report

submitted by the District Superintendent of Police, Uttara

Kannada, are as follows:

You were born on 16-07-2001. Your father's name is Arjun and

mother's name is Smt. Rukmini. You are currently residing with

your mother in a rented house at Gandhi Nagar, Mundgod Town.

After completing education up to the 5th Standard, you did not

continue your studies and have been moving around w ith a

group of rowdy elements, assaulting people with dea dly

weapons, engaging in unlawful activities, and intimidating and

threatening innocent persons.

You were first involved in a robbery case at the Tibetan Camp,

Mundgod, in the year 2019 and have thereafter conti nued to

involve yourself in other criminal cases. Although you were

subsequently apprehended, arrested, and produced be fore the

competent courts in a sequence of major criminal ca ses, you

successfully secured bail, immediately relapsed int o your

established criminal routines, and defiantly escala ted your

goonda operations.

A total of 05 heavy criminal cases are currently active against

you across multiple police stations, showcasing a chronic anti-

social trajectory: 01 case in 2019, 01 case in 2021, 01 case in

2023 (registered at Dharwad City Sub-Urban P.S.), 0 1 case in

2024, and 01 case in 2025 (at Mundgod P.S.).

Opening of Rowdy Sheet:

Your repetitive involvement in violent crimes poses a severe and

multifaceted threat to the society. Over the past seven years,

your direct participation in armed dacoity, riots, attempt to

murder, and murder has been fully verified. You are of an

aggressive temperament, and there are clear indications that at

any point of time you may involve yourself in criminal offences,

thereby causing breach of public peace and damage t o public

property.

Consequently, to monitor your dangerous movements, the

Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sirsi Sub-Division, via Order

No. SDPO/Sirsi/Confidential/2418/2021, dated 13-08- 2021,

- 25 -

granted authorization to open a "Class-A" Rowdy She et against

you at Mundgod Police Station Even though a Rowdy S heet was

opened and surveillance was maintained over your ac tivities,

you have continued your unlawful activities. (A total of 03 cases

have been registered against you after the opening of the

Rowdy Sheet.)

Particulars of Your Habitual Engagement in Goonda

Activities:

You started participating in criminal activities when you were 17

years old. Thereafter, as you grew older, you joined hands with

your associates and participated in heinous offences such as

robbery, armed dacoity, brutal street brawls, extor tion via

kidnapping and murder, and have continued such activities.

Your continuous participation in anti-social operat ions has

affected the public tranquility, peace, and order, causing terror

in the minds of the civilian population of Mundgod Town and its

surrounding rural areas.

You have been involved in cases causing disturbance to public

peace and in anti-social activities which adversely affect the

peace and tranquility of society. Further, you have been

behaving indecently with the people of Mundgod Town and the

surrounding villages, engaging in assaults, issuing criminal

threats, behaving indecently with women, creating a n

atmosphere of fear in society, and indulging in act s which

disturb law and order.

As you have repeatedly caused inconvenience and har dship to

the public, several cases have been registered agai nst you.

Besides causing inconvenience to the public for your personal

gain, there is also a likelihood of your activities disturbing peace

and public order in the coming days. As you have co ntinued

your criminal activities, it has become necessary to take action

against you under the provisions of the Karnataka Prevention of

Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers,

Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum Grabbers a nd Video

or Audio Pirates Act, 1985 (Karnataka Act No. 12 of 1985),

Section 3, read with Section 2(f)(ii) of the Preven tion

(Amendment) Act, 2014, and to place you under preve ntive

detention.

- 26 -

Status of Criminal Cases Registered Against You:

1. Mundgod Police Station Crime No. 10/2019

Penal Provisions: Sections 395, 397, 201 of the Indian Penal

Code (IPC)

On 20-01-2019 at about 11:30 PM, you, along with yo ur

associates, with an intention to commit dacoity and rob gold and

cash, went near the house of the complainant Shri J anjchup

Rachan S/o Tenzing and assaulted him with a sword, causing

severe deep wounds on his left hand fingers. Therea fter, you

took one Lhamo Youden D/o Phuntsok, who was present in the

house, inside the house and tied her mouth and hand s with

plastic tape. You are alleged to have robbed cash amounting to

Rs.7,00,000/-, seven mobile phones, gold ornaments worth

Rs.4,00,000/- and a Jio internet dongle from the house. In this

regard, a case was registered at Mundgod Police Sta tion in

Crime No. 10/2019 under Sections 395, 397 and 201 o f IPC.

Current Status of Case: As you were a juvenile at the specific

time of the offence, your case was tried separately by the

Juvenile Justice Board under Case No. J.C. No. 23/2 019. Vide

order dated 05-01-2023, you were ordered to be

institutionalized inside a Special Home at Bengaluru for a period

of 02 years. Your adult co-accused accomplices were tried

before the Hon'ble I Additional District and Sessio ns Court,

Karwar (sitting at Sirsi), and vide Judgment dated 05-10-2023,

were found guilty under Section 395 IPC and sentenc ed to 10

years of Rigorous Imprisonment along with a fine of

Rs. 10,000/- each, and further sentenced to 7 years of Rigorous

Imprisonment under Section 397 IPC along with a fin e of Rs.

5,000/-each. You subsequently obtained regular bail from the

Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench

2. Mundgod Police Station Crime No. 98/2021

Penal Provisions: Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)

Due to previous enmity, on 18-07-2021 at about 01:3 0 AM, on

the road leading from Mundgod Town towards Nyaasarg i Village,

near Sri Ayyappa Swamy Temple, you allegedly picked a quarrel

with Vijay S/o Manjunath Iliger, aged about 24 years, resident

of Kambaragatti Plot, Mundgod, with an intention to commit his

- 27 -

murder. You provoked him into a quarrel and, while your

associate Srinivas was holding Vijay from behind, you took out a

knife from your pant pocket and stabbed him on the chest and

slit his throat, thereby causing his death. Accordingly, a case

was registered at Mundgod Police Station in Crime No.98/2021

under Section 302 IPC.

Current Status of Case : The formal police investigation

revealed that you had traveled specifically to Yellapur town

ahead of time to buy the murder weapon from a local shop,

waiting for the perfect opportunity to attack. The final

chargesheet was submitted on 02-10-2021 before the Hon'ble I

Additional District and Sessions Court, Karwar (sitting at Sirsi),

where the matter is actively pending trial under Sessions Case

No. S.C. No. 5064/2021. Confidential intelligence r eports

indicate that you and your syndicate members are ac tively

threatening the key prosecution eye-witnesses and p anch

witnesses to force them into turning hostile before the Hon'ble

Court.

3. Mundgod Police Station Crime No. 130/2024

Penal Provisions: Section 194(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)

On 12-07-2024 at around 15:30 hours, at the highly crowded

Shivaji Circle in Mundgod Town, you along with your elder

brother Manju Arjun Navale, and local rowdies Sharath Kadagol,

Manjesh Harijan, Manjunath Roddamnavar, Abhishek Kad am,

and others, assembled unlawfully and engaged in a v iolent

street brawl. When Police Sub-Inspector Parashuram Mirjagi and

his staff (CHC-758, CHC-1477, CPC-700, CPC-1074) rush ed to

stop the rioting, your gang aggressively engaged in a physical

scuffle with the uniform police team, pushing and striking the

officers, completely disrupting public peace and displaying open

defiance of the law.

Current Status of Case : The police completed the

investigation and filed a chargesheet on 29-07-2024. The case

was tried under C.C. No. 190/2024 before the Hon'ble JMFC

Court, Mundgod. The court found all 10 accused guil ty and

imposed a fine of Rs. 300/- each.

4. Mundgod Police Station Crime No. 04/2025

- 28 -

Penal Provisions: Sections 140(2), 140(3), 61(2), 109(1),

310(2), 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)

On 09-01-2025 at about 07:15 PM, in front of the ML A Model

School at Mundgod Town four unknown persons aged ab out 25-

30 years arrived in a white car and intentionally dashed against

Scooter No. KA-31/EE-7668 being ridden by the compl ainant

Mehaboobsab S/o Mohammed Ali Nandikatti and his fri end

Jameer Ahmed S/o Nazeer Ahmed Dargawale. After caus ing

them to fall down, the accused threatened Jameer Ah med with

knives and forcibly took him away in their vehicle. Accordingly,

a case was registered at Mundgod Police Station in Crime

No.04/2025 under Sections 140(3), 351(2) read with Section

3(5) of BNS, 2023.

During investigation, the kidnapped person Jameer Ahmed was

traced on 10-01-2025 and his statement was recorded . He

stated that you and your associates abducted him in vehicle No.

KA-23/M-8185, tied a cloth around his face, robbed him of

Rs.20,000/- and his mobile phone, assaulted him and demanded

Rs.60 lakh as ransom. Being subjected to physical assault and

fearing for his life, he agreed to pay Rs.30 lakh. Thereafter,

using a WhatsApp number, the accused made him conta ct his

relatives Ashif Attar and Mallik Attar and instructed them to

arrange the ransom amount.

After several communications, when the relatives informed that

only Rs.18 lakh could be arranged instead of Rs.30 lakh, the

accused agreed to accept the amount and threatened that

Jameer Ahmed would be murdered if the matter was re ported to

the police. The relatives were instructed to hand over the money

near the Kundgol Road junction on the Hubballi Bypa ss Road.

Subsequently, after receiving the money through another group

of associates, Jameer Ahmed was released near the N elavadi

Toll on the Hubballi-Gadag Bypass Road. The police t racked

down the network, rescued the victim on 10-01-2025, and

uncovered your central role as the mastermind behin d this

kidnapping plot.

Current Status of Case : A comprehensive chargesheet was

submitted before the Hon'ble I Additional District and Sessions

Court, Karwar (sitting at Sirsi), where the trial i s actively

proceeding under S.C. No. 5034/2025. Intelligence reports show

- 29 -

that your gang is constantly intimidating the complainant and

his family to prevent them from deposing during the trial.

5. Hubli-Dharwad City, Sub-Urban Police Station Crime

No. 118/2023

Penal Provisions: Sections 143, 147, 148, 120(B), 307, 302

read with Section 149 of the IPC & Section 25 of the Arms Act

This case pertains to contract killing/syndicated m urder.

Complainant Abbasali Kudachi's father, the deceased

Mohammadsab Rehmansab Kudachi, had a financial disp ute with

prime accused Arbaz. Arbaz planned a criminal consp iracy and

hired an armed group, which included you as Accused No. 7. On

25-05-2023 between 22:30 and 23:00 hours, your gang , armed

with lethal weapons and firearms, stormed a house o pposite

Manasagangotri School on Yadwad Road, Kamalapur, Dh arwad.

The gang threw red chili powder directly into the victim's face to

blind him. Immediately, Accused No. 2, Rehman, open ed fire

using a revolver, while you and other members of th e gang

hacked and bludgeoned Mohammadsab to death. The gan g also

launched a murderous assault on the victim's younge r son,

Hazrat, who narrowly survived with severe wounds. Du ring the

chaos, one of your own gang members, an unidentifie d youth

aged about 25 years, was accidentally killed during the struggle.

Current Status of Case : Following an extensive inter-district

investigation, your direct participation as a contract killer was

established, and a chargesheet was filed. The case is currently

pending active trial before the Hon'ble IV Additional District and

Sessions Court, Dharwad, under S.C. No. 60/2023. In telligence

inputs confirm that your syndicate is actively intimidating the

eye-witnesses in Dharwad to compromise the trial.

Details of Preventive Security Cases:

1. Mundgod Police Station P.A.R. No. 24/2024 (U/s

110(e) of the Cr.PC):

Initiated due to your violent nature and continuous public

nuisance in Gandhi Nagar. It was apprehended that i f left

unchecked, your habitual misconduct was likely to disturb public

peace, tranquillity and communal harmony. A formal security

report was submitted to the Taluk Executive Magistr ate,

- 30 -

Mundgod, who executed a formal bond for good behavi or and

maintaining peace for a period of six months, dated 05-02-

2024. You violated this bond by entering into serio us crimes

within the bond period.

2. Mundgod Police Station P.A.R. No. 53/2025 (U/s

129(e) of the BNSS, 2023):

Following your continuous involvement in five distinct criminal

trials and your persistent threat to public order, a secondary

security report was filed. The Taluk Executive Magi strate,

Mundgod, executed another peace bond for six-month duration

on 19-07-2025. You breached this bond as well, show ing no

signs of reformation.

3. Mundgod Police Station P.A.R. No. 28/2026 (U/s

129(e) of the BNSS, 2023):

Filed recently on 27-04-2026 as your dangerous oper ations

continued to escalate, including your intimidation of witnesses

and extortion rackets. This preventive matter is cu rrently

pending active inquiry before the Executive Magistrate's court.

- 31 -

Satisfaction and Grounds for Preventive Detention:

Upon comprehensive evaluation of the criminal recor ds placed

before me, it is clear that you have established a regular pattern

of committing violent, anti-social offences including armed

- 32 -

dacoity, riots, kidnapping for ransom, and cold-blooded contract

killings. You have systematically leveraged your criminal track

record to intimidate the civilian population of Mundgod, ensuring

that victims are terrorized into not filing complaints and that

witnesses are afraid to depose truthfully during trials, thereby

affecting the judicial process. Your conduct poses a threat to law

and order and challenges the maintenance of a peaceful society.

The records indicates that despite being repeatedly arrested and

subsequently coming out on bail under strict guidel ines, you

have treated judicial conditions with contempt. Imm ediately

upon release, you have systematically reconstituted your armed

gang or integrated into external inter-district syn dicates

continuing your criminal operations. Ordinary punitive measures

under the Indian Penal Code, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhit a, or

preventive bonds under the Cr.PC/BNSS have failed t o restrict

or reform your violent behavior.

Your background shows that you have abandoned your lawful

trade of welding work and turned to professional crime as your

primary occupation and livelihood. You habitually pick quarrels

over trivial issues, assault members of the public, attempt to

commit murder, and create an atmosphere of fear and

insecurity. Even after being punished by courts, yo u have

displayed an attitude that neither the law nor the judiciary can

reform or punish you. Your presence at large has cr eated a

profound sense of insecurity and terror across Mundgod Taluk.

Records reveal that your syndicate's aggressive operations have

directly caused two brutal murders within Mundgod Taluk in the

current year 2026 alone. This high concentration of gang

warfare has caused massive public panic, and leading print and

digital media have continuously published reports highlighting

the breakdown of public order. There is a strong, i mmediate

danger that the local public, pushed by fear and an ger, will

stage violent counter-protests against your syndicate, triggering

widespread riots and completely breaking down the district's law

and order machinery.

Furthermore, if you are allowed to move freely with out

immediate administrative isolation, a large group of vulnerable

local youths will likely adopt your lifestyle as a model,

significantly increasing the size of local goonda syndicates and

- 33 -

creating long-term security challenges for the dist rict.

Therefore, based on the material evidence before me , I am

satisfied that you are a "Goonda' within the definition of Section

2(g) of the Act, and that your immediate preventive detention is

absolutely necessary to maintain public order.

NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the solemn statutory powers

vested in me under Section 3, Subsection (2) of the Karnataka

Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-

Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offen ders and

Slum-Grabbers Act, 1985 (Karnataka Act No. 12 of 19 85), read

with Section 2(a)(II) of the Preventive Detention (Amendment)

Act, 2014, and in strict accordance with the admini strative

powers delegated by the State Government via Notification No.

HD 140 SST 2026, dated 04-03-2026, I, Smt. K. Lakshm i Priya,

IAS, District Magistrate, Uttara Kannada District, Karwar, do

hereby issue this order that you, Sanju, S/o Arjun Navale, be

immediately arrested, taken into custody, and held under

preventive detention to District Central Prison, Ballari District.

NOTICE OF STATUTORY RIGHTS AND PROCEDURES FOR

THE DETENU:

1. You have a statutory right to submit a formal representation

challenging this detention order. You may address y our

representation to the undersigned Detaining Authori ty,

routed through the Superintendent of the Jail where you are

currently lodged.

2. If you wish to submit a representation to the St ate

Government of Karnataka against this detention orde r, you

may formally submit it through your Prison Superintendent.

3. For your information, an Advisory Board has been duly

constituted by the State Government under Section 9 of the

Goonda Act.

4. Within three (3) weeks from the date of your detention, the

State Government will place your detention order along with

all supporting records, grounds, and materials befo re the

Advisory Board. The Advisory Board will examine the

submitted documents, verify if there are sufficient and

justifiable grounds for your detention, and submit its

- 34 -

comprehensive report to the State Government within seven

(7) weeks.

5. For your further information, if you desire to s ubmit an

appeal or grievance against the detention order directly to

the Advisory Board, you have the right to submit it through

the Superintendent of your current prison.

6. If you wish to appear personally before the Advisory Board to

present your case and arguments face-to-face, you m ust

submit an application through your Prison Superinte ndent.

Upon receiving your request, necessary arrangements will be

made to physically produce you before the Advisory Board

on the designated date fixed by the Board.

7. If you wish to be assisted by an acquaintance, relative, or

friend who can present your case before the Advisory Board

on your behalf, you must submit the name of such a person

to me through your Prison Superintendent. The detai ls will

subsequently be placed before the Advisory Board. You will

be notified of the specific date scheduled by the Board, and

your designated relative or friend must remain read y to

appear before the Advisory Board on that date.

8. The acquaintance, relative, or friend representing you before

the Advisory Board must not be a practicing legal

professional (Advocate) and must not be your profes sional

associate or linked to your criminal circle.

Given under my hand and the official seal of this office, this day,

the 08 of June, 2026.

Case Reference ID: DCB/MAG-1/Viva-137/2026-27

Date of Matter:08-06-2026

Sd/-

(Smt. K. LAKSHMI PRIYA, IAS)

District Magistrate & Detaining Authority,

Uttara Kannada District, Karwar."

- 35 -

The order of detention is passed on the score that when the detenu

was aged 17 years, a rowdy sheet has been open against him for

involving in criminal activities and a crime in Crime No.10 of 2019

was registered for robbery. He was brought separately before the

Juvenile Justice Board. In terms of the averments in the petition,

the judgment of conviction has been set aside in an appe al before

the Division Bench of this Court. In Crime 130 of 2024 the detenu

and other accused were charged of Section 194(2) of the BNS for

committing affray. In two other crimes in Crime Nos. 98 of 2021

and 118 of 2023 the offence against the detenu is one punishable

under Section 302 of the IPC. Both are said to be at the stage of

trial. In another crime in Crime No.4 of 2025 the p etitioner is

alleged of offence under Section 140 of the BNS inter alia, wherein

a comprehensive charge sheet is filed. Therefore, the gr ounds of

detention are provided to the detenu along with the documents that

are necessary. The grounds of detention are as follows:

 The detenu is said to have established a pattern of

committing violent offences such as armed dacoity, riots,

kidnapping for ransom and cold-blooded contract killings;

 The detenu is said to have threatened witnesses and is n ot

allowing them to depose in trials;

- 36 -

 Despite being arrested repeatedly and subsequently bein g

released on strict conditions, the detenu is said to have

violated these conditions and indulged in crimes;

 The detenu is said to have habitually picked quarrels o ver

trivial issues, assaulted members of the public, attempted to

commit murder, and created an atmosphere of fear and

insecurity. The presence of the detenu in Mundgod Taluk is

said to have created a profound sense of insecurity of terror;

 It is stated in the grounds of detention that the detenu and

his syndicate operations have caused two murders in the year

2026.

The order of detention both in English and Kannada are the same.

In Kannada it is more elaborate due to the dialect. The contention

of the detenu that there is variance between the Engl ish version

and the Kannada version is noted only to be rejected, as on a bare

juxtaposition of the two, they reveal that they are the same.

10. Next comes the order of confirmation under Sectio n 3(3)

of the Act by the 1

st

respondent State. It reads as follows:

ResrvR dosrn: 09.26Pu

cBE: ಸಂಜು AD CWNrD 0.VO, (s: HsT' ನಗರ, ಾ: MNT9HOJU9, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ

FVO– ಇವರ cnN:1 ಗೂಂ,ಾ os45Et 0ೊರ/1ರುವ ಬಂಧನ ಆ5ೇಶವನು'

ಅನು7ೕ8ಸುವ bHOl.

- 37 -

m:Vsf,O: 1) FVs– :T3s'osw6Pu, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ಇವರ ಬಂಧನ

ಆ>ೆ ಸಂ?ೆ@:DCB/MAG-1/Viva/137/2026-27, 8: 08.06.2026.

2) ABೕC C'U“RnN, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ಇವರ ಪತF

ಸಂ?ೆ@:th[-A/ಉಕ/ಗುಂಡ/1160/2026, qesTR: 09.06.2026.

- - - -

…x(sG.eO:

” ” jUVO m:Vs: ಕFಮ ಸಂ?ೆ@ (1)ರ ಆ5ೇಶದB), ಸಂಜು AD CWNrD 0.VO, 24 .Br,

(s: HsT' ನಗರ, ಾ: MNT9HOJU9, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO– (ಪFಸು&ತ: oOUT:x osKs6"Y, ಬMಾN< ಇB)

ಬಂಧನದB)ರು ಾ&Jೆ) ಇವರ cnN:1 ResrvR ಕಳN ಭPQ =ಾ@Rಾ<ಗಳ, Sಾದಕ ವಸು&, C…Ks'6P,

WJWNoOJUnn, ಗೂಂ,ಾಗಳ, CeOTUR ವ@ವ0ಾರ C…Ks'6P, oOJPVO ಪF5ೇಶಗಳನು'

Rb2dN..n, ctWU ಅಥ=ಾ ಆ/Wೕ RೈJೇYZ [vN.PoO6P ತ,ೆ C'\EM, 1985ರ/

ಬಂಧನ ಆ>ೆಯನು' FVs– :T3s'osw6Pu, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ಇವರು 0ೊರ/1, ಸದ<

ಬಂಧನ ಆ>ೆಯನು' C0N]U:eOHsf jUVO m:Vs: ಕFಮ ಸಂ?ೆ@ (2)ರB) ABೕC C'U“RnN,

ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ಇವರು …x(sG.eOE0N) ಸB)1ರು ಾ&Jೆ.

” ” FVs– :T3s'osw6Pu, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ಇವರು …x(sG.eOE/–, bT'EN

17 .Br 06 UT6Pu .EhZ\T:VOU ಅಪJಾಧ [vN.PoO6P/– ]ಾ;^ಾಗಲು RಾFರಂ`1,

ನಂತರ 8ನಗಳB) ತನ' dY[nKOJTqHO (OUwoOJT9N ದJೋ,ೆ, oOJVOETIY aೂೕರ ಅಪJಾಧ

ಕೃತ@ಗಳB) ]ಾ;^ಾಗು ಾ& (s.rW\R eOMbqHO ಭಂಗ ತರುವಂತಹ ಪFಕರಣಗಳB) 0ಾಗೂ

ಸSಾಜdತುಕ ಕೃತ@ಗಳB) ೊಡ; ಸSಾಜದ eOMbqHO ಭಂಗವನು'ಂಟು Sಾಡುವ ಕೃತ@ಗಳB)

LOJ9foOJT9N MNT9HOJU9 ಪಟQಣ 0ಾಗೂ ಸುತ&Bನ Y2’6P/–0 W0KOJTqHO ಅಸಭ@=ಾ;

.UrdN.e:N, 0ೊ,ೆ5ಾಟ, (ೕವ fO:woO, 0ೆಣುg MRh‘OiTqHO ಅಸಭ@=ಾ; .Urh, ಸSಾಜದB)

ಭಯದ =ಾ ಾವರಣ ಉಂಟು Sಾ/, (s.rW\Rn/– ಭಯ/`ೕUಯನು'ಂಟು Sಾಡುವeದು, jಾkೕನು

ಷರತು&ಗಳನು' ಉಲ)ಂlಸುವ R"Ip62T: (s.rW\R mಾಂU, eOMbqHO RTvRRsxEesf:N5,

ಈತನು ]ಾ;^ಾ;ರುವ ಅಪJಾಧ ಪFಕರಣಗಳB) os0J0N RxMoOTHOJTtnN.e:0N) VOohd,O,

jಾkೕನು ಪ,ೆದು A9N63O^s: ನಂತರ ಪeನಃ os0J0Nfsqn ಕೃತ@ಗಳನು'

ಮುಂದುವJೆ1ರುವeದ<ಂದ, ಈತನ :NBrIp62T: (s.rW\R dN.p.(Os ಮತು& (s.rW\R

mಾಂU, eOMbqEN 0ಾMಾಗುವeದನು' \ಯಂUF1, ನಗರದB) (s.rW\R dN.p.(OsE0N)

dN\tuIHOJ2d_N ಗೂಂ,ಾ os45-1985ರ/ qesTR:08.06.2026 ರಂದು 0ೊರ/1ರುವ ಬಂಧನ

ಆ5ೇಶವನು' ಸದ< os45E ಕಲಂ 3(3)ರನvಯ 1s<ೕಕ<ಸುವಂ ೆ ABೕC C'U“RnN, ಉತ&ರ

ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ರವರು oOJUwnNLsGKO

- 38 -

” ” bT'E cnN:1 ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn: MNT9HOJU9 ABೕC wಾxೆಯB) 04

…xRnc6Pu 0ಾಗೂ YNby2’-zಾರ=ಾಡ ನಗರದ ಸ{ CbrD ABೕC wಾxೆಯB) 01

ಪFಕರಣದಂ ೆ ಈ oOPRT9 ಒಟುQ 05 ಅಪJಾಧ …xRnc6Pu ,s}VsfnNIGzO:-

” ” FVs– :T3s'osw6Pu~ ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–~ osnzsn ಇವರ …x(sG.eOE0N)

…wtU/dVsf~ ಈ oOPRT9 CT86Pu ಕಂಡುಬರುತ&=ೆ:-

I Iೕಲhಂಡಂ ೆ bT'E cnN:1 ,s}VsfnN. 05 ಪFಕರಣಗಳB), 03 …xRnc6Pu Sಾನ@

esp^s_E: cVsnxO ಹಂತದB)ರುತ&=ೆ. 01 ಪFಕರಣದB) Sಾನ@ esp^s_E.e 07 .Br6P

,s}VsfnN.e:N ಕಂಡುಬರುತ&=ೆ. ಈ ಪFಕರಣಗಳB) ಕFಮ ಸಂ?ೆ@: (1), (2)ರ ಪFಕರಣಗಳB)

ಾಲೂ)ಕು :T3s'osw62T: MN[u2oO …3O:NoOJP’Vsf,O ಕFಮ 0.(3). cVsnxOE/–nN.e:N

ಕಂಡುಬರುತ&5ೆ.

III. ಗೂಂ,ಾ os45E ಕಲಂ.2(a)(II)ರB) U2hnN.TLO ]ಾರತ ದಂಡ ಸಂq ೆಯ ಅzಾ@ಯ 15, 16,

- 39 -

ಒಳಪಡು ಾ&Jೆ.

IV. bT'E ಜನb qesTR: 16.07.2001 ಆ;ದು., ಬಸವನಗರ q<ಯ RಾFಥkಕ msVOE/– 2

<ಂದ 4eOU In6UE.KOHO c,sp]spd Sಾ/ರುವeದು …:eOJU0)I ಮು?ೊ@ೕRಾzಾ@ಯರು,

dnosw q<ಯ RಾFಥkಕ msVO, ಬಸವನಗರ, MNT9HOJU9 ಇವರ qesTR: 06.05.2026ರ

ವರ8ಯB) ಕಂಡುಬರುತ&5ೆ.

V. bT'EN ದJೋ,ೆ, oOJVOEI), oOJVO, ,OJTA ಮುಂ ಾದ ಪFಕರಣಗಳB) ]ಾ;^ಾಗುU&ದು.,

ಅಪJಾಧ qeO)VOEeO)U ಬಂಡ=ಾಳ SstoOJT9N, ತನ' dY[nKOJTqHO (OUwoOJT9N ಅಕFಮ ಕೂಟ

RPQoOJT9N (s.rW\RwHO 0ೆದ<1, ^ಾವe5ೇ :JnN6Pu fಾರದಂ ೆ 0ಾಗೂ esp^s_E:/–

:JnN6Pu (sAULs6:TLO eOJUtoOJPu’UG:N5, jಾkೕನು ಷರತು&ಗಳನು' ಉಲ)ಂl1 ಪeನಃ

ಅಪJಾಧ [vN.PoO6P/– LOJ9foOJPu’UGnN.e:N ವರ8ಯB) ಕಂಡುಬರುತ&5ೆ.

VI. bT'E Jೌ/ [vN.PoO6P0N) \ಯಂUFಸಲು 0ಾಗೂ ಈತನ jUVO \Hs.qd_N ABೕC

wಾxೆಯB) 'ಎ' Jೌ/ಪPQಯನು' ೆJೆದು \.rYxOE0N) SಾಡುU&ರುವeದು ಕಂಡುಬರುತ&5ೆ.

VII. qUHO bT'E cnN:1 ,s}VsfnN. ಪFಕರಣಗಳB), Jೌ/ 0ಾMೆಯನು' ೆJೆದು

\Hs.qdVsf:5nN ಮತು& ದಸ&;< Sಾ/ esp^s_E bTi0oOh ಒಳಪ/1ದ.ರೂ ಸಹ, ತನ'

(ೕವನ mೈBಯB) ^ಾವe5ೇ b:Vs.xO IT:NoOJP’,O, bT'HO \ೕ/ದ jಾkೕನು ಷರತು&ಗಳನು'

ಮತು& ಉತ&ಮ <ೕUಯB) ಬದುಕಲು \ೕ/ರುವ C.os86P0N) ಉಲ)ಂl1, \ರಂತರ=ಾ; Sಾನ@

esp^s_E: cVsnxO62HO 0ಾಜJಾಗ5ೇ, ಅಪJಾಧ [vN.PoO6P/– LOJ9foOJT9N ಸSಾಜದ

dN.p.(Os (Public Order)HO Sಾರಕ=ಾ;ರುವeದ<ಂದ, bT'E0N)” 6JT3sos45E0vE

ಬಂಧನದB)ಡುವeದು ಅ ಾ@ವಶ@ಕ=ಾ;ರುವeದು ಕಂಡು ಬರುತ&5ೆ.

- 40 -

ಸಂಜು AD CWNrD 0.VO, (s: HsT' ನಗರ, ಾ: MNT9HOJU9, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO– ಇವರನು'

ಪFUಬಂಧಕ=ಾ; ಬಂಧನದB)ಡುವeದು ಅವಶ@ಕ=ಾ;ರುವeದ<ಂದ, ಸದ<ಯವರ cnN:1 ResrvR

ಅಪJಾಧ oOJPVO ಪF5ೇಶಗಳನು' ಅಕFಮ=ಾ; [RxkhoOJPu’., ctWU ಅಥ=ಾ ಆ/Wೕ

RೈJೇYZ [vN.PoO6P ತ,ೆ C'\EM, 1985ರ (1985ರ ResrvR C'\EM 12) ಕಲಂ 3

ಉಪ ಕಲಂ (1) & (2) ರನvಯ FVs–, :T3s'osw6Pu, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ಇವರು

0ೊರ/1ರುವ qesTR: 08.06.2026ರ ಬಂಧನ ಆ5ೇಶವನು' ಸದ< C'\EM: ಕಲಂ

3(3)ರನvಯ ಅನು7ೕ8ಸುವeದು ಸೂಕ&=ೆಂದು dosrn.e UUSsr\h,O. ಆದ.<ಂದ ಈ oOPRT9

ಆ5ೇಶ.

qesTR”: 18.06.2026

” ” …x(sG.eOE/– c.whnN. CT862T: ಮತು& ResrvR ಕಳN ಭPQ, =ಾ@Rಾ<ಗಳ, Sಾದಕ

ವಸು& C…Ks'6P, WJWNoOJUnn, ಗೂಂ,ಾಗಳ, CeOTUR ವ@ವ0ಾರ C…Ks'6P, oOJPVO

ಪF5ೇಶಗಳನು' Rb2dN..n, ctWU ಅಥ=ಾ ಆ/Wೕ RೈJೇYZ [vN.PoO6P ತ,ೆ

C'\EM, 1985ರ (1985ರ ResrvR C'\EM 12) ಕಲಂ 3(3)ರ/ ಪFದತ&=ಾದ

(2)ರ/ಯB), ಸಂಜು AD CWNrD 0.VO, 24 .Br, (s: HsT' ನಗರ, ಾ: MNT9HOJU9,

ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO– ಇವರ cnN:1, FVs– :T3s'osw6Pu, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ಇವರು

0ೊರ/1ರುವ ಬಂಧನ ಆ>ೆ ಸಂ?ೆ@:DCB/MAG-1/Niva/137/2026-27, qesTR:

08.06.2026ನು' ಅನು7ೕ815ೆ.

ResrvR Jಾಜ@Rಾಲರ [,OUms0N(sn

ಮತು& ಅವರ 0ೆಸ<ನB)

ಸq/-

(es6KsWN ಎC.)

dosrn: C'U0 osEr:tr

|‘s92I QVsyO (os0J0N & dN.p.(Os)"

- 41 -

Based upon the aforesaid detention, the detenu has mad e a

representation to the 1

st

respondent/State. The State rejects the

same on 06-07-2026. The order of rejection reads as follows:

ResrvR dosrn

”” ” ” ” ” ” fOT6PinN~”qesTR :: 06.07.2026

qಂಬರಹ

MT92, Sಾನ@ ಉಚu esp^s_E, fೆಂಗಳiರು ಇವರನು' c‘shh

ಸB)1ರುವ \ಮb M0c bHOl.

SVO–U}: 1) FVs– :T3s'osw6Pu, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ಇವರ

ಬಂಧನ ಆ>ೆ ಸಂ?ೆ@::DCB/MAG-1/Viva/137/2026-27,

qesTR:08.06.2026.

2) ABೕC C'U“RnN, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ಇವರ ಪತF

ಸಂ?ೆ@:th[-A/ಉಕ/ಗುಂಡ/1160/2026, qesTR: 09.06.2026.

qesTR: 18.06.2026.

4) C'U“RnN(ಪe), oOUT:x osKs6"Y, ಬMಾN< ಇವರ ಪತF

ಸಂ?ೆ@:oOUosb/6Jc/2791/2026, qesTR:23.06.2026, ಇವರ

ಮೂಲಕ ಸB)1ರುವ M0c.

qesTR:24.06.2026.

- - - -

- 42 -

”FVs– :T3s'osw6Pu, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ಇವರು SVO–U}(1)ರB) \ಮb

cnN:1 ಗೂಂ,ಾ os45Et ಬಂಧನ ಆ5ೇಶವನು' 0ೊರ/1, SVO–U}(2)ರ ಮೂಲಕ ABೕC

C'U“RnN, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO– osnzsn ಇವರು C0N]U:eOHsf …x(sG.eOE0N) dosrnoOh

ಸB)1ರು ಾ&Jೆ. ಸದ< ಬಂಧನ ಆ>ೆಯನು' dosrn.e SVO–U}(3)ರ ಆ5ೇಶದB) ಅನು7ೕ81ರುತ&5ೆ.

ಇವರನು' c‘shh SVO–U}(4)ರB) \ೕವe ಸB)1ರುವ qesTR:23.06.2026ರ M0cEN ಈ

ಗೂಂ,ಾ …x(sG.eOEN ಸಲ0ಾ MT92E ಮುಂ5ೆ ಇರುವeದ<ಂದ, SVO–U}(5)ರB) ಸದ<

esp^s_E ಮತು& ಸಲ0ಾ MT92E ಅಧ@Dರು 0ಾಗೂ Sಾನ d:dpnN6Pu, fೆಂಗಳiರು

“es0N FVs– :T3s'osw6Pu, ಉತ&ರ ಕನ'ಡ FVO–, osnzsn ರವರ

ಆ5ೇಶದಂ ೆ 'ಪFಸು&ತ ಬMಾN< oOUT:x osKs6"Y:/– bTi0:/–nNLOGUeO. es0N (s:

(ಸಂಘ) 2 ರB) VOJUD LOHO:NoOJTtnNLOGUeO. VOJUD ಕಟQಲು, fstHO MeOE/–:N5

fstHO” RvQ_N” INTfs” LOJT:KO^sfnNIG,O. ನನ' ಬಂಧನ ಆ5ೇಶದB) ಹಲವe

esp^s_EqT: jಾkೕನು …3OqnNLOGUeO. esp^s_E”as6J”os0J0N osRs9N.

dತುಕ [vN.PoO6P/– ]ಾ;^ಾ;ರುವe8ಲ). FVs–'osw6P ಬಂಧನ ಆ5ೇಶವನು'

ರದು.ಪ/1 A9N63O ಆ5ೇಶ \U9fOUoOT:N ಇ ಾ@8^ಾ; .... oOJUwnNUGUw."

Iೕಲhಂಡಂ ೆ ಸB)1ರುವ \ಮb M0cE0N)” SVO–U}(1) ಮತು& (2) ರವರ

…x(sG.eOWTqHO ಪ<tೕB15ಾಗ, \ೕವe 17 .Br 06 UT6Pu .EhZ\T:VOU ಅಪJಾಧ

[vN.PoO6P/– ]ಾ;^ಾಗಲು RಾFರಂ`1, ನಂತರ 8ನಗಳB) \ಮb dY[nKOJTqHO (OUwoOJT9N

ದJೋ,ೆ, oOJVOETIY aೂೕರ ಅಪJಾಧ ಕೃತ@ಗಳB) ]ಾ;^ಾಗು ಾ& (s.rW\R eOMbqHO ಭಂಗ

ತರುವಂತಹ ಪFಕರಣಗಳB) 0ಾಗೂ ಸSಾಜdತುಕ ಕೃತ@ಗಳB) ೊಡ; ಸSಾಜದ eOMbqHO

ಭಂಗವನು'ಂಟು Sಾಡುವ ಕೃತ@ಗಳB) LOJ9foOJT9N MNT9HOJU9 ಪಟQಣ 0ಾಗೂ ಸುತ&Bನ

Y2’6P/–0 W0KOJTqHO ಅಸಭ@=ಾ; .UrdN.e:N, 0ೊ,ೆ5ಾಟ, (ೕವ fO:woO, 0ೆಣುg MRh‘OiTqHO

- 43 -

ಅಸಭ@=ಾ; .Urh, ಸSಾಜದB) ಭಯದ =ಾ ಾವರಣ ಉಂಟು Sಾ/, (s.rW\Rn/–

ಭಯ/`ೕUಯನು'ಂಟು Sಾಡುವeದು, jಾkೕನು ಷರತು&ಗಳನು' ಉಲ)ಂlಸುವ R"Ip62T: (s.rW\R

mಾಂU, eOMbqHO RTvRRsxEesf:N5, \ೕವe ]ಾ;^ಾ;ರುವ ಅಪJಾಧ ಪFಕರಣಗಳB) os0J0N

RxMoOTHOJTtnN.e:0N) VOohd,O, jಾkೕನು ಪ,ೆದು A9N63O^s: ನಂತರ ಪeನಃ os0J0Nfsqn

ಕೃತ@ಗಳನು' ಮುಂದುವJೆ1ರುವeದ<ಂದ, \ಮb :NBrIp62T: (s.rW\R dN.p.(Os ಮತು&

(s.rW\R mಾಂU, eOMbqEN 0ಾMಾಗುವeದನು' \ಯಂUF1, ನಗರದB) (s.rW\R

dN.p.(OsE0N) dN\tuIHOJ2d_N ಗೂಂ,ಾ os45-1985ರ/ ಬಂಧನ ಆ5ೇಶ 0ೊರ/1ರುವeದು

ಕಂಡುಬರುತ&5ೆ.

\ಮb cnN:1 ,s}VsfnN. …rRnc6P/–, Jೌ/ 0ಾMೆಯನು' ೆJೆದು

\Hs.qdVsf:5nN ಮತು& ದಸ&;< Sಾ/ esp^s_E bTi0oOh ಒಳಪ/1ದ.ರೂ ಸಹ, \ಮb

(ೕವನ mೈBಯB) ^ಾವe5ೇ b:Vs.xO IT:NoOJP’,O, \MHO \ೕ/ದ jಾkೕನು ಷರತು&ಗಳನು'

ಮತು& ಉತ&ಮ <ೕUಯB) ಬದುಕಲು \ೕ/ರುವ C.os86P0N) ಉಲ)ಂl1 Sಾನ@ esp^s_E:

asPu Sಾಡುವ ಪFವೃU&ಯ ಅಪJಾಧ ಕೃತ@ಗಳನು' ಮುಂದುವJೆ1, (s.rW\R dN.p.(Os (Public

Order)HO Sಾರಕ=ಾ;ರುವeದು ಕಂಡುಬರುತ&5ೆ.

\ಮb M0cE/– \ಮb cnN:1” ,s}VsfnN. ಆJೋಪಗಳನು' ಅಲ)ಗMೆಯುವಂತಹ

ಅಂಶಗಳನು' ಪ<tೕB1, ಮುಖ@ C'U“RnN, oOUT:x osKs6"Y, ಬMಾN< ಇವರ ಮೂಲಕ

SVO–U}(4)ರB) ಸB)1ರುವ \ಮb M0cE0N) dosrn.e Uರಸh<15ೆ.

ಸq/-

(es6KsWN ಎC.)

dosrn: C'U0 osEr:tr

|‘s92I QVsyO (os0J0N & dN.p.(Os)"

The matter is then placed before the Advisory Board. The order of

the Advisory Board is placed before us. We have perused the same

and do not find any ground or documents missing as conten ded.

The confirmation order under sub-section (1) of Section 12 is

- 44 -

passed on 24-07-2026. This is also found in the sealed cover. This

is by the Committee of the High Court. No where no la cuna in

following the Act in passing the order of detention or otherwise is

seen by us. Therefore, the contention that documents wer e short

furnished is a contention that is noted only to be rejected.

11. The judicial review on the validity of the det ention order

has its limitation. These are elucidated by the Apex in AMEENA

BEGUM v. STATE OF TELANGANA

4

, where the Apex Court lays

down guidelines for examination of the detention ord er in the

following paragraphs:

".... .... ....

28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional

court when called upon to test the legality of orde rs of

preventive detention would be entitled to examine whether:

28.1. The order is based on the requisite

satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the detaining authority,

for, the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence

of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the

exercise of the power is predicated, would be the s ine

qua non for the exercise of the power not being

satisfied;

28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the

detaining authority has applied its mind to all relevant

4

(2023) 9 SCC 587

- 45 -

circumstances and the same is not based on material

extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute;

28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving

the purpose for which it has been conferred, or exercised

for an improper purpose, not authorised by the statute,

and is therefore ultra vires;

28.4. The detaining authority has acted

independently or under the dictation of another body;

28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-

created rules of policy or in any other manner not

authorised by the governing statute, has disabled itself

from applying its mind to the facts of each individ ual

case;

28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining authority

rests on materials which are of rationally probativ e

value, and the detaining authority has given due regard

to the matters as per the statutory mandate;

28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at

bearing in mind existence of a live and proximate l ink

between the past conduct of a person and the imperative

need to detain him or is based on material which is

stale;

28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite

satisfaction is/are such which an individual, with some

degree of rationality and prudence, would consider as

connected with the fact and relevant to the subject -

matter of the inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction

is to be reached;

28.9. The grounds on which the order of

preventive detention rests are not vague but are precise,

pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clari ty,

inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detentio n,

giving him the opportunity to make a suitable

representation; and

28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law,

have been strictly adhered to.

- 46 -

.... .... ....

59. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid excerpts

from the detention order lay bare the Commissioner' s attempt

to transgress his jurisdiction and to pass an order of detention,

which cannot be construed as an order validly made under the

Act. The quoted observations are reflective of the intention to

detain the detenu at any cost without resorting to due

procedure. It is neither the case of the respondents that the

detenu had not complied with the terms of the notic e issued

under Section 41-ACrPC, nor has it been alleged tha t the

conditions of bail had been violated by the detenu. It is

pertinent to note that in the three criminal procee dings

where the detenu had been released on bail, no

applications for cancellation of bail had been move d by

the State. In the light of the same, the provisions of the

Act, which is an extraordinary statute, should not have

been resorted to when ordinary criminal law provide d

sufficient means to address the apprehensions leadi ng to

the impugned detention order. There may have existe d

sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail order s, but

the circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of

ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an extraor dinary

measure of the law of preventive detention.

60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain

Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361]

, Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was)

observed : (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)

32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive

detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly

construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a

person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely

within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of

preventive detention should not be used merely to c lip

the wings of an accused who is involved in a crimin al

prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping

a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law

it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of

bail, unless the material available is such as woul d

satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions

authorising such detention. When a person is

enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court,

- 47 -

great caution should be exercised in scrutinising

the validity of an order of preventive detention

which is based on the very same charge which is to

be tried by the criminal court.”

(emphasis supplied)

61. Resonance of these principles is traceable in Banka

Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana [Banka Sneha Sheela v.

State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 415 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri)

446] . There, while examining an order of detention passed with

reference to 5 (five) offences involving Sections 420, 406 and

506IPC, in respect whereof the detenu had obtained orders of

bail/anticipatory bail, this Court had the occasion to say that :

(SCC p. 427, para 15)

“15. … A close reading of the detention order

would make it clear that the reason for the said Order is

not any apprehension of widespread public harm, dan ger

or alarm but is only because the detenu was success ful

in obtaining anticipatory bail/bail from the Courts in each

of the five FIRs. If a person is granted anticipato ry

bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies in the

ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can

always appeal against the bail order granted and/or

apply for cancellation of bail. The mere successful

obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail orders being th e

real ground for detaining the detenu, there can be

no doubt that the harm, danger or alarm or feeling

of insecurity among the general public spoken of in

Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of

Dangerous Activities Act is make-believe and

totally absent in the facts of the present case .”

(emphasis supplied)"

The Apex Court holds that preventive detention cannot be resorted

to when ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to address

the apprehensions leading to the detention order. Th e State had

not raised any contention on the violation of conditions of bail in

- 48 -

AMEENA BEGUM supra. It is trite law that preventive detention

cannot circumvent the grant of bail. However, a perusa l at the

orders of detention and confirmation and the order of the Advisory

Board would indicate that the detenu has been involved in heinous

criminal activities and commission of offences such as murder after

bail was granted to him. What would now require con sideration is,

whether the order of detention warrants judicial review. In this

regard, it becomes apposite to refer to the judgment o f the

coordinate Bench, in ABDUL RASHEED ASSADI v. STATE OF

KARNATAKA

5

, wherein referring to the guidelines in AMEENA

BEGUM by the Apex Court, it has held as follows:

".... .... ....

8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ameena

Begum v. State of Telangana

1

has held in paragraph 28 as

under:

28. In the circumstances of a given case, a

constitutional court when called upon to test the legality

of orders of preventive detention would be entitled to

examine whether:

28.1. The order is based on the requisite

satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the detaining authority,

for, the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence

of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the

5

2025 SCC OnLine Kar. 27690

- 49 -

exercise of the power is predicated, would be the s ine

qua non for the exercise of the power not being

satisfied;

28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the

detaining authority has applied its mind to all relevant

circumstances and the same is not based on material

extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute;

28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving

the purpose for which it has been conferred, or exercised

for an improper purpose, not authorised by the statute,

and is therefore ultra vires;

28.4. The detaining authority has acted

independently or under the dictation of another body;

28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-

created rules of policy or in any other manner not

authorised by the governing statute, has disabled itself

from applying its mind to the facts of each individ ual

case;

28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining authority

rests on materials which are of rationally probativ e

value, and the detaining authority has given due regard

to the matters as per the statutory mandate;

28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at

bearing in mind existence of a live and proximate l ink

between the past conduct of a person and the imperative

need to detain him or is based on material which is

stale;

28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite

satisfaction is/are such which an individual, with some

degree of rationality and prudence, would consider as

connected with the fact and relevant to the subject -

matter of the inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction

is to be reached;

28.9. The grounds on which the order of

preventive detention rests are not vague but are precise,

pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clari ty,

inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detentio n,

- 50 -

giving him the opportunity to make a suitable

representation; and

28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law,

have been strictly adhered to.

9. Keeping in mind the above legal position and the

enunciation of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

referred supra, it would be useful to extract the relevant dates

and events for the purpose of examining the complia nce of

mandate of law as follows:

(a) The respondent No. 2 has passed the order of

detention along with the grounds of detention on

26.07.2024.

(b) The order of detention and the grounds of detention

were served on the detenue on 26.07.2024 which is

evident from the original order of detention

available in the file.

(c) The detenue has submitted written representati on

dated 28.07.2024 through the Superintendent,

Central Prison, Kalaburagi.

(d) The representation of the detenue was forwarde d

by the Superintendent, Central Prison, Kalaburagi

to the Advisory Board on 28.07.2024.

(e) On 03.08.2024, the State Government considered

the representation submitted by the detenue and

rejected the same by issuing endorsement.

(f) On 03.08.2024, the State Government approved

the order of detention of the respondent No. 2.

(g) On 04.08.2024, the detenue was informed about

the rejection of his representation.

(h) The order of detention, grounds of detention along

with the approval of the State Government and the

- 51 -

records were placed before the Advisory Board on

05.08.2024.

(i) The Advisory Board fixed a meeting on 20.08.20 24.

On the said day, the detenue was produced before

the Advisory Board through video conference from

the Central Prison, Kalaburagi. The Advisory Board

heard the detenue, perused the material and

expressed that sufficient cause and grounds have

been made out for detention of Sri. Abdul Rakib

Assadi.

The aforesaid dates and events clearly indicate that the

mandate of Sections 3, 8, 10, 11 and 13 of the Goonda Act has

been complied by the respondent - Authorities and there is no

violation as alleged by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

10. Insofar as the contention of the petitioner that the

impugned order of detention is passed without appli cation of

mind and there is no subjective satisfaction, the application of

mind of the Authorities is evident from the order of detention

and the grounds of detention produced at Annexures- A and B.

The respondent No. 2 has taken note of the fact tha t the

detenue is in the habit of committing the offence a nd

abetting the commission of offence. The finding of the

Detaining Authority that the name of the detenue wa s

entered in the rowdy register and the detenue is in volved

in heinous crimes like preparation and assembly for

dacoity, attempt to murder, rioting, molestation, t heft

and offence under the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter

referred to as ‘the Arms Act’), as well as the Narc otic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the NDPS Act’). The ac t of the

detenue from 2023 to 2024 has affected the human li fe of

the area, and his conduct is prejudicial to maintai n the

public order which is evident from the reasons assi gned

in the impugned order of detention. The subjective

satisfaction of the Detaining Authority cannot be

substituted or adjudged by the writ Court as the

Appellate Authority nor it can substitute its views . The

writ court is required to look into as to whether t he

Detaining Authority, while passing the order of det ention,

- 52 -

has taken into consideration the relevant

factors/material to pass the order of detention and the

said material is sufficient to come to the conclusi on that

the conduct and the act of the detenue is detriment al to

the public order. In the case on hand, the Detainin g

Authority has considered the pendency of 10 cases

against the detenue from 2023 to 2024 and recorded the

detailed reasons that despite booking of the case a gainst

the detenue, his activities could not be controlled . The

finding of the Detaining Authority is that the acti vities of

the detenue are detrimental to the public order and his

activities cannot be curbed to the ordinary laws. I n view

of the specific finding and consideration of the re levant

material by the Detaining Authority, we are of the view

that the impugned order of detention passed by the

respondent No. 2 has withstood the test of subjecti ve

satisfaction. The contrary contention urged by the

learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected."

(Emphasis supplied at each instance)

The Division Bench holds that the Detaining Authority had passed a

detailed order detaining the detenu, since despite reg istering

criminal cases against the detenu the activities continued

detrimental to public order, which could not be curbed by ordinary

laws. These observations would fit into the case of the detenu aptly

and there is no warrant for issuance of a writ in the n ature of

habeas corpus.

- 53 -

12. Therefore, the petition must fail and is according ly

dismissed.

Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed.

Sd/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA)

JUDGE

Sd/-

(HEMA KULKARNI)

JUDGE

BKP

Description

Navigating Preventive Detention: A Deep Dive into the Karnataka High Court's Stance on `Preventive Detention Order` and `Habeas Corpus Challenge` – Now on CaseOn

The Karnataka High Court, Dharwad Bench, recently delivered a significant ruling in Writ Petition (Habeas Corpus) No. 100015 of 2026, affirming the validity of a preventive detention order. This judgment, now accessible on CaseOn, addresses critical aspects of individual liberty versus public order, making it an essential read for legal professionals.

CaseOn.in provides succinct 2-minute audio briefs to help legal professionals quickly grasp the essence of such pivotal rulings.

Issue

The central issues before the Karnataka High Court were twofold: Firstly, whether the documents provided to the detenu and his family were legally sufficient, and if any deficiency vitiated the detention order. Secondly, whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, could review the validity of the detention order, especially after its confirmation by the Advisory Board.

Rule

The Court relied on established principles governing preventive detention, drawing from various Supreme Court and High Court pronouncements:

Requirement of Furnishing Documents:

  • The Apex Court, in JASEELA SHAJI v. UNION OF INDIA (2024) 9 SCC 53, reiterated that Article 22(5) of the Constitution mandates the detaining authority to communicate grounds of detention and afford the earliest opportunity for representation. Documents *relied upon* in the grounds must be furnished to the detenu to ensure an effective representation. However, documents merely *referred to casually* in the narration of facts are not necessarily required.
  • This principle was further solidified in M. AHAMEDKUTTY v. UNION OF INDIA (1990) 2 SCC 1, emphasizing that failure or delay in furnishing relied-upon documents denies the right to effective representation. The detenu's prior knowledge of document contents is immaterial.
  • In RADHAKRISHNAN PRABHAKARAN v. STATE OF T.N. (2000) 9 SCC 170, it was clarified that not every document mentioned needs to be supplied, only those relied upon for subjective satisfaction.
  • The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in NANDINI V., v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (WP(HC) No.132 of 2025) and VIJAYA v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (2018 SCC OnLine Kar 3200) held that illegibility of certain documents alone does not invalidate a detention order unless the detenu demonstrates that such illegibility impaired their right to make an effective representation.

Limitations of Judicial Review:

  • The Supreme Court in AMEENA BEGUM v. STATE OF TELANGANA (2023) 9 SCC 587 laid down comprehensive guidelines for constitutional courts to examine the legality of preventive detention orders. These include checking for requisite subjective satisfaction, application of mind to relevant circumstances, proper purpose of power exercise, independent action by the detaining authority, rational probative value of materials, live link between past conduct and detention, non-vagueness of grounds, and strict adherence to timelines.
  • Crucially, the Apex Court has held that preventive detention cannot be used to circumvent the grant of bail when ordinary criminal law provides sufficient remedies (BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. STATE OF TELANGANA (2021) 9 SCC 415). However, if the detenu commits heinous crimes after being granted bail, this principle needs careful consideration.
  • The High Court in ABDUL RASHEED ASSADI v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (2025 SCC OnLine Kar. 27690) reiterated these limitations, stating that the writ court cannot substitute its views for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority but must examine if relevant factors were considered.

Analysis

The petitioner, mother of the detenu, challenged the preventive detention order against her son, arguing several grounds including improper communication of grounds, non-supply of legible copies of relied-upon documents, and variance in English and Kannada translations of the order.

Factual Background:

  • The detenu, aged 24, had a history of criminal activities since he was 17.
  • A 'Class-A' Rowdy Sheet was opened against him in 2021.
  • He was involved in multiple severe cases including robbery, murder, dacoity, and rioting. Despite being granted bail in some cases, he allegedly relapsed into criminal activities.
  • The detention order specifically highlighted his continuous involvement in violent crimes, intimidation of witnesses, and creation of public fear, leading to two murders in 2026 alone.
  • His representation against the detention was rejected by the State.

Court's Examination:

  • The Court meticulously examined the detention order and the subsequent confirmation by the State and the Advisory Board.
  • Regarding the contention of non-supply of documents, the Court noted that all necessary documents and grounds were furnished. It observed that the detenu was granted bail in some cases, but his continuous involvement in heinous crimes, even after bail, demonstrated a persistent threat to public order.
  • On the alleged variance between English and Kannada versions of the detention order, the Court found, upon juxtaposition, that they were essentially the same, rejecting this ground for challenge.
  • The Court found no lacuna in the process followed by the detaining authority or the Advisory Board, specifically noting that the Advisory Board's order was also reviewed and found complete.
  • Applying the principles from *Ameena Begum*, the Court determined that the detaining authority had applied its mind to all relevant circumstances, and the satisfaction for detention was based on rationally probative material, maintaining a live link between the detenu's past conduct and the imperative need for detention. The grounds were precise and pertinent.
  • The Court acknowledged that while preventive detention should not circumvent bail, the detenu's involvement in heinous crimes *after* being granted bail, including murders, justified the extraordinary measure, as ordinary criminal laws were insufficient to curb his activities detrimental to public order.

Conclusion

Based on a comprehensive review of the record and the established legal principles, the Karnataka High Court concluded that the detention order was valid. The Court found that the detaining authority had sufficiently demonstrated subjective satisfaction, and the procedural safeguards mandated by law were duly observed. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the `preventive detention order` and rejecting the `habeas corpus challenge`.

Why This Judgment is an Important Read for Lawyers and Students

This judgment serves as a vital precedent for understanding the intricate balance between individual liberty and the state's power to maintain public order through preventive detention. For lawyers, it clarifies the scope and limitations of challenging detention orders, particularly concerning document disclosure, language discrepancies, and the narrow window of judicial review. For law students, it offers a practical application of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and the Goonda Act, illustrating how courts apply principles of 'subjective satisfaction' and 'live link' in preventive detention cases. It also highlights the court's stance on recidivism post-bail and its impact on detention decisions.

Disclaimer

All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.

Legal Notes

Add a Note....

Advance Search Tool

💡 How to Get the Best Legal Answers:

1. Keep it simple: Frame your question in plain language.

2. Add scope: Tag @ a court, judge, year, or act section for accurate results.

3. Attach files: Upload a PDF only if you are using a private document.

🌍 Ask in your language: English • Hindi • Assamese • Bangla • Gujarati • Kannada • Malayalam • Marathi • Odia • Punjabi • Tamil • Telugu • Urdu


💡 New Advocate? Don’t worry! Working without senior support today? Turn on Client Advisory to get instant legal strategies, practical angles, and precedent-backed options for your client.

Add research context Type to filter