Form No. J(1)

In the High Court at Calcutta

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

Present:

The Hon'ble Justice Rajasekhar Mantha.

And

The Hon'ble Justice Anuj Singh.

FMA 605 of 2024

MAT No. 158 of 2024

Smt. Swapna De (Datta) and others.

Versus

The Secretary, School Education Department and others.

For the Appellant: Mr. Kamalesh Bhattacharya, Adv.

Mr. Aaninda Bhattacharya, Adv.

For the State: Mr. Debapriya Gupta, Ld. AGP

Mr. Barun Ghosh, Adv.

Mr. Biswanath Banerjee, Adv.

Hearing concluded on: 14

th September, 2026

Judgment on: 23

rd September, 2026

Anuj Singh, J:

1. Being aggrieved by and/or dissatisfied with the Judgment and order

dated December 21, 2023, passed in WPA No. 10605 of 2019, [Smt.

Swapna De (Datta and others) v. The Secretary, School Education

Department and others], whereby the Learned Single Judge dismissed

the writ petition and affirmed the impugned order dated January 30,

2019, passed by the Secretary, School Education Department,

rejecting the appellants’ claim for approval of their appointment as

teaching and non-teaching staff of Sukchar Swami Mahadebnanda

Junior High School, the appellants have preferred the instant appeal.

2

CASE OF THE APPELLANTS IN THE WRIT PETITION:

2. Sukchar Swami Mahadebnanda Junior High School, (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘said school’) was established in the year 1966 and

was, in due course subsequently recognized by the West Bengal Board

of Secondary Education with effect from January 1, 1971.

3. Sometime in 1976, owing to the disturbed political scenario then

prevailing in the State, the management of the school was compelled

to close it down temporarily. However, the school resumed functioning

since the year 1984 and took active steps for revival of the recognition

earlier granted in its favour.

4. On May 2, 1988, a District Level Inspection Team, (hereinafter

referred to as “DLIT”) inspected the school and, by its report bearing

Memo No. 34/C (2) dated May 9, 1988,recommended revival of the

recognition of the said school.

5. The appellantno.1 was appointed in the said school on May 2, 1995

and joined her duties from May 5, 1995. She holds an M.A. degree in

Bengali and a B.Ed degree and claims to be serving as the

Headmistress of the said school ever since the date of her

appointment.

6. The appellant no. 2 was appointed on December 4, 1995, and joined

duties on December 8, 1995. The appellant no. 2 holds B.A. (Hons.)

and M.A. degrees and claims to be serving as an Assistant Teacher in

the said school ever since the date of his appointment.

7. The appellantno. 3 was appointed on May 13, 1996, and joined duties

on May 17, 1996. She holds B.A. and M.A. degrees and claims to be

serving as an Assistant Teacher ever since the date of her

appointment in the said school.

3

8. The appellant No. 4 was appointed on December 10, 1996, and joined

his duties on December 16, 1996. He holds an MA degree in History

and claims to be serving as an Assistant Teacher ever since the date of

his appointment.

9. The appellant No. 5 was appointed on May 13, 1997 and joined duties

on May 19, 1997. He has the Higher Secondary qualification and

claims to be serving as a Clerk ever since the date of his appointment

in the said School.

10. On February 26, 2000, the organizing Managing Committee of

the said school adopted a Resolution resolving to file a Writ Petition

before this court, inter alia praying for revival of the recognition of the

said school. It was also unanimously resolved in the said meeting that

the existing teaching and non-teaching staff working in the school

would be recommended to the Education Department for approval, if

the recognition of the school was revived. The names of all the

Appellants appeared in such resolution.

11. Accordingly, WP No. 16476 (W) of 2000 was filed by the

Managing Committee before this Court. By Judgment and order dated

March 16, 2001, the aforesaid writ petition was disposed of by this

court with a direction upon the Secretary, Education Department to

consider the matter afresh for revival of the recognition of the school

and for such purpose hold an inspection of the said school. It was

further directed that if the recognition of the school was accorded, the

Board would pass an order in relation to the existing teaching and

non-teaching staff of the said school.

12. However, as no steps were taken in terms of the order dated

March 16, 2001, a Contempt application being, WPCRC No. 3533 of

2002 was filed. By an order dated September 3, 2002, a Coordinate

4

Bench of this Hon’ble Court appointed one Mr. A.N. Banerjee,

Advocate as the Special Officer to visit the said school and submit his

report. It appears that the Special Officer duly inspected the school on

the very next day and subsequently filed his Report before this court.

In the course of his visit on September 4, 2002, the Special Officer

met the Headmaster, who claimed to have been in service since the

year 1981 and two other persons claiming to be members of the

Managing Committee. The Special Officer further recorded in his

report that he met four other persons, three female and one male, all

claiming to be teachers, and one male and one female staff member. A

perusal of the report would reveal that the Special Officer did not

recordthe names of any of those four teachers or either of those two

staff members whom he met. It was also recorded that no student was

present on the said date because the school was closed for study leave

before the quarterly examination, which was scheduled to start on

September 9, 2002.

13. It appears that subsequently the West Bengal Board of

Secondary Education, by its decision dated April 29, 2009, read with

the Memorandum dated June 21, 2011, revived the recognition of the

school with effect from May 1, 2009.

14. A supplementary affidavit was affirmed on August 2, 2011, in

the aforesaid contempt proceeding, bringing on record the names of

the appellants as teaching and non-teaching staff.

15. It has been further contended by the appellant that in part

compliance with the order dated March 16, 2001, the District

Inspector of Schools (Secondary Education), Barrackpore approved

the services of two teachers and one non-teaching staff by a

Memorandum dated February 7, 2012, and filed a compliance report

on May 9, 2012. The appointments of the present appellants were not

5

approved primarily because their names did not appear in the

aforesaid DLIT report dated May 9, 1998.

16. In view of the aforesaid, by an order dated February 14, 2013,

passed in the contempt proceeding the District Inspector of Schools

was directed to comply with the order dated March 16, 2001 in its

entirety. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the services of the

appellants herein were approved on April 5, 2013 with effect from May

1, 2009.

17. An appeal was preferred from the aforesaid order passed in the

contempt proceeding. In the aforesaid appeal, the approval of the

Appellants services was set aside by an order dated September 12,

2013. The appellants, however, were granted liberty to institute fresh

proceedings in relation to the approval of their services.

18. Pursuant to such liberty, WP No. 31042 (W) of 2013, Lina

Bhowmik vs. State of West Bengal was filed and in the said writ

petition by an order dated November 29, 2013 the District Inspector of

Schools was directed by this Court to grant approval in favour of the

appellants within a period of 2 weeks. Accordingly, their services were

once again approved by an office memorandum dated August 26,

2014 and November 13, 2014.

19. The State then proceeded to prefer five appeals against the order

dated November 29, 2013 passed by a learned Single Judge. By an

order dated April 20, 2016, a Division Bench of this Court disposed of

the aforesaid appeals and directed the Secretary, School Education

Department to pass a speaking order on the claim of the appellants in

light of the Judgment dated March 16, 2001, after granting an

opportunity of hearing to the appellants. The earlier order was set

aside only so far as it related to the rejection of the claim of the

6

appellants. Consequently, upon such order the approvals earlier

granted to them were again withdrawn on June 16, 2016.

20. The Secretary, School Education Department thereafter

conducted a hearing on August 17, 2016. In the course of such

hearing, it was submitted that the appellants had been in service from

1995 to 1997. Therefore, the DLIT report of 1988 could not have

contained their names. By memo No. 861/1(5)-SE(Law)/SL/5S-

54/2013, dated September 29, 2016, the appellants claim for

regularising their service was rejected.

21. The Appellants challenged the order dated September 29, 2016,

before this court in WP No. 959A (W) of 2017. By an order dated

August 28, 2018 the order dated September 29, 2016 was set aside

and the said authority was directed to comply with the directions

contained in the Division Bench's order dated April 20, 2016 within

the time stipulated by this court.

22. Accordingly, a further hearing was held on January 16, 2019

and the Secretary thereafter passed an order dated January 30, 2019

once again rejecting the appellant's claim. The grounds for such

rejection order were(a) that the appellants had not produced cogent

documents showing appointments in accordance with law, (b) that

there was no validly constituted Managing Committee of the school, (c)

that the appointments were not in terms of the recruitment procedure,

(d) that the Government Order dated December 19, 1984,stated that

approval of only those persons whose names appeared in the DLIT

report could be granted, and that the appellants name did not appear

in the DLIT report, (e) that the Special Officer had also not mentioned

the names of the appellants in his report filed before this Court, and

(f) that the photocopies of the attendance register filed by the

appellants were unauthenticated. Thus, on aforesaid reasons the

appellants’ claim for regularization of service was rejected.

7

23. Upon such rejection, the appellants challenged the order dated

January 30, 2019, in WPA 10605 of 2019. In the said petition, the

appellants in essence prayed for setting aside of the order and for a

direction to approve their appointments as the existing teaching and

non-teaching staff of the school with effect from May 1, 2009, together

with the monetary benefits.

24. By the impugned judgment under appeal dated December 21,

2023, the learned Single Judge dismissed the WPA 10605 of 2019.

FINDINGS OF THE LEARNED SINGLE BENCH:

25. The learned Single Judge held that although the appellants

name appeared in the Managing Committee's resolution dated

February 26, 2000, the representation dated July 15, 2011 and the

attendance registers, their names did not appear in the report of the

Special Officer who was appointed pursuant to an order of this Court.

According to the learned Single Judge, this created a serious doubt

regarding the actual existence and functioning of the appellants as

teaching and non-teaching staff of the said school. It was also held by

the learned Single Judge that since the Special Officer's Report had

never been challenged before the court and the same had attained

finality, the learned Single Judge would give greater evidentiary weight

to the Report,rather than to the documents produced by the

appellants.

26. The Single Judge distinguished the judgement relied upon by

the appellants in Niranjan Sahoo and Anr. vs. State of West

Bengal in FMA 2089 of 2015 with CAN of 2015) passed on

September 02, 2022, on the ground that, in that case, the employees

had been found to be bona fide working at the school when the

inspection was held, whereas the appellants herein were not named in

8

the Special Officer’s report. Relying upon Manindra Nath Sinha and

Ors. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2006 SCC OnLine Cal

499) and State of West and Ors. vs. Smritikana Maity and Ors.

(2007 SCC OnLine Cal 563) , the learned Single Judge further held

that appointments made without compliance with the recruitment

procedure could not be approved. Even assuming that the

appointment letters had been issued and that the appellants’ names

appeared in the subsequent resolution and representation, their

actual service and the legality of their appointments had not,

according to the Court, been established beyond doubt. The court

further held that the aforesaid disputed question of facts would

require a proper trial and could not be suitably decided in a

proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

27. The learned Single judge also observed that the scope of judicial

review was limited to examining whether the State had considered the

relevant materials and whether its decision suffered from patent

illegality. Accordingly on examining the Secretary's order dated

January 30, 2019 the Court concluded that the said authority had

duly considered the materials on record and had given reasons for

rejection of the appellants’ claim. Thus, finding no perversity or

illegally in the decision, the Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.

SUBMISSION OF THE APPELLANTS:

28. The appellants reiterated the submissions recorded in the

paragraphs above and, to buttress such argument, relied upon the

judgment reported in the matter of Hemoprova Sikdar vs. State of

West Bengal and others, reported in (1998) WBLR (Cal) 223 , to

argue that when the school started functioning, there were no

Recruitment Rules. Hence, there is no scope for raising a plea that the

appointments of the appellants as organizing teachers were not in

accordance with the Recruitment Rules since the school started

9

functioning as an organizing school, there were no Recruitment Rules.

Hence, there is no scope for arguing that the appointment of the

appellants as organizing teachers was not in accordance with the

recruitment rules. For the same proposition the Learned Counsel

relied upon another decision of this Court dated September 29, 2022,

passed in the matter of Niranjan Sahoo @ Niranjan Sahoo and

another vs. State of West Bengal and others in FMA 2089 of 2015,

which was not interfered with by the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil)

Diary No. 4340 of 2023.

SUBMISSION OF THE RESPONDENTS:

29. The Learned Counsel representing the respondents argued that,

while it is true that, if at the time of commencement of an organizing

school prior to the School Service Commission Act coming into force,

no recruitment rules in terms of the statute would apply, later on

when the teachers claim approval of service, they must show beyond

any doubt and/or reasonable doubt that they were employed as

teachers and /or staff of the school. Learned counsel for the

respondent, by referring to the DLIT report and the report filed by the

Special Officer, has contended that nowhere have the names of the

appellants appeared. It is argued that even if the names of the

petitioner had appeared in the resolution of the managing committee,

as contended by the appellants, the same could not be construed as a

document beyond reasonable doubt, and that the special officer's

report would prevail over any other documents.

30. Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment passed in

Manindra Nath Sinha and others versus State of West Bengal and

others reported in (2006) 4 CHN 513 and another judgment passed

in State of West Bengal and others versus Smiti Kana Mayti and

others reported in (2008) 2 CHN 582 , to contend that when the

10

teachers are appointed without following the due process of law and

the requirement rules, no approval should be granted by the State.

31. He has further relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India dated December 4, 2014, in Civil Appeal No. C 7897 of

2010 in the matter of Manindra Nath Sinha vs. State of West

Bengal and others (supra), and submitted that a Special Leave

Petition against the Division Bench's judgment in Manindranath

(supra) was dismissed.

32. Ld. Counsel also places reliance on the judgment of the Division

Bench of this Court in the matter of the District Inspector of

Schools (Secondary Education), Bardhaman and others versus

Abdul Barik Sheikh and others, dated July 6, 2018, delivered in

MAT 1626 of 2017.

33. It is thus contended that the appeal has no merits and the order

of the learned Single Judge deserves no interference by this court.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

1. Whether the non-mentioning of names of appellants in the Special

Officers' report dated September 4, 2002, was sufficient evidence of

their absence from the school or appointment?

2. Whether the learned Single Judge was correct in holding that, in view

of the fact that the Special Officer's report stood unchallenged and

attained finality, the same in itself is sufficient to conclude that the

appellants were never employed by the school as teaching and non-

teaching staff?

3. Whether in a proceeding of this nature the appellants were required to

prove their claim beyond reasonable doubt, or whether the claim of

the appellants had to be decided on the ordinary civil and

11

administrative standard upon fair consideration of all the relevant

materials on record?

ISSUE NOS. 1 AND 2:

34. Before dismissing the positive evidence regarding employment of

the appellants brought on record, primarily on the basis of the Special

Officer's report dated September 4, 2002, it is necessary to

understand the scope of work entrusted to the Special Officer by this

court by the order of September 3, 2002. A perusal of the Order dated

September 3, 2002, would reveal the following scope of work so

assigned to him:

“Mr. Banerjee will visit Sukchar Swami Mahadevnanda

Junior High School, Panchanantala, P.O. Sukchar, Dist.

North 24 Parganas, tomorrow at 11:30 am. Mr. Ashish

Kumar Halder, learned advocate appearing on behalf of

the alleged contemnor/opposite party, submitted that

the concerned D.I. of the school shall be informed

accordingly. He will be asked to be present at the locale

when Mr. Banerjee will be at the site. I, therefore, direct

that he may be asked to do so. Mr. Banerjee will inspect

the school building in respect of its area, room, and

condition of structure, and also the approximate number

of students attending the school, and will submit a

report on the next date.”

[Emphasis applied]

35. Upon perusal of the said order dated September 3, 2002, it

would be evident that this court did not direct the Special Officer to

ascertain and identify the teaching and non-teaching staff working at

the school. The order also did not provide that the Special Officers

shall visit the school for the purpose of verifying their appointment

letters, ascertaining their dates of joining, examining the attendance

registers, or investigating into the persons who comprised the

organizing staff of the school. On the contrary, the mandate of the

special officer was to inspect the area, rooms, and structural condition

12

of the school building, and reporting the approximate number of

students attending in the said school.

36. In light of the aforesaid clear mandate given to the Special

Officer, let us examine what the Special Officer's report reveals. The

Special Officer named the person who claimed to be the headmaster of

the school and two other persons claiming to be members of the

managing committee. He then described the remaining persons

collectively as four teachers, being three females and one male, and

two other members of non-teaching staff, one being male and the

other being a female. Thus, the Special Officer's report did not record

the name of any member present at the school. Its silence regarding

the names of the appellants was therefore general and not a finding

specifically against the appellants. The finding would have been

against the appellant if the Special Officer had recorded names of

persons present at the school while excluding the names of the

appellants.

37. This Court finds that the evidentiary value of report submitted

by a court appointed Special Officer must be looked into with

reference to the purpose for which such officer was appointed. In

Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India, reported in (1984) 3

SCC 161, paragraph 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that

the Commissioner's report provides only a prima facie evidence of the

facts reported by the Commissioner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court

further held that it remains entirely for the Court to determine the

weight to be attached to such report in light of the other materials on

record.

38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of MP Raj Tilhan

Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Marayadit versus Modi Transport

Services (2022) 14 SCC 345, paragraphs 32 to 34 held that a

Commissioner performs only a ministerial and not an adjudicatory

function, and that his report merely aids but does not bind the Court.

13

Such officer of a Court cannot adjudicate on an issue entrusted to the

court, much less an issue which was never referred to him.

39. Further, the fact that the appellants did not file an exception to

the Special Officer's report or challenge the same does not make any

difference. In Amena Bibi and Ors. v. Sk. Abdul Haque, AIR 1997

Cal 59, this Court held that even the acceptance of a Commissioner's

report does not preclude a party from referring to other evidence to

contradict the same, and that the Court must take a comprehensive

view of the entire evidence on record. In the present case, there was in

fact, no occasion for the appellants to challenge the report, since it did

not record that they were absent or did not identify them by name.

The appellants cannot be faulted for not challenging a report which

did not deny its claim.

40. This Court therefore holds that the report of the Learned Special

Officer could not therefore be given greater weight than it deserved.

The said report had to be viewed in light of the scope of work

entrusted to the Special Officer. Significantly, it is nobody's case that

the appointment letters, the resolution dated February 26, 2020, or

other records relied upon by the appellants were fabricated,

manufactured, or otherwise not genuine.

41. In view of the aforesaid, we find that the Special Officer's report

was neither adverse to the appellants’ case, nor can it be seen as

evidence against the appellants’ appointment or association with the

said school.

ISSUE NO. 3:

42. The order dated March 16, 2001,clearly directed that the

appellants’ case shall be considered afresh. The Division Bench's

order dated April 20, 2016, also directed the authorities to pass a

speaking order on the appellants’ claim in light of the earlier

judgment. In view of both the aforesaid orders, the authority was

14

bound to ascertain whether the appellants were working at the school

during the period prior to the revival of recognition of the school.

Unfortunately, the respondent proceeded to mechanically reject the

appellants' claim because their names did not appear in the DLIT

report of 1988. The reliance on the DLIT report of May 9, 1988, was

utterly misconceived and without application of mind. The appellants

were appointed between the year 1995 and May 1997. Thus, their

names could not have appeared in the report prepared several years

before their appointment.

43. The respondent authorities further failed to appreciate that the

appellants were not required to prove their claim beyond doubt. The

proceedings were not criminal or penal. The competent authority was

required to reach a reasonable administrative satisfaction on the

ordinary civil standards of preponderance of probabilities upon a fair

and collective consideration of the materials produced by the

appellants.

44. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher

Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi, 1991 (2) SCC 716, paragraph

37, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering a decision made by

the Education Standing Committee held that the applicable standard

was not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but preponderance of

probabilities. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that an

administrative inquiry must take into consideration all necessaryand

cogent evidence, although such material may not have been proved

strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act.

45. In the view of this Court, the authority was required to consider

the appointment letters, the resolution dated February 26, 2000, the

Special Officer’s report, which indicated the number of staff present

(within a day's notice) at the school, and the subsequent official

records disclosed by the appellants, and determine whether on

15

preponderance of probabilities the appellants’ claim of employment

was reasonable and acceptable.

46. In Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 , the

Hon’ble Supreme Court hold that there is a distinction between

‘illegal’ and ‘irregular’ employment. Employees who have rendered

long years of service and whose appointments were irregular ought

not to be penalised. The Court had observed:

26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to

curtail the practice of backdoor entries and ensure

appointments adhered to constitutional principles, it is

regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted or

misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-serving

employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish between

“illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It categorically

held that employees in irregular appointments, who

were engaged in duly sanctioned posts and had served

continuously for more than ten years, should be

considered for regularization as a one-time measure.

However, the laudable intent of the judgment is being

subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to

indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in

cases where their appointments are not illegal, but

merely lack adherence to procedural formalities.

Government departments often cite the judgment

in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no vested right to

regularization exists for temporary employees,

overlooking the judgment's explicit acknowledgment of

cases where regularization is appropriate. This selective

application distorts the judgment's spirit and purpose,

effectively weaponizing it against employees who have

rendered indispensable services over decades.

47. It is on this basis that the Supreme Court in Prabir Kumar

Ghosh & Ors. vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors., rendered in

SLP (C) No. 27804 of 2019:

The facility of the school in the neighbourhood was not

made available by the official agencies. In a situation

such as that the engagement of the writ petitioners

cannot strictly be called to be illegal. They were

definitely imparting education in keeping with the letter

16

and spirit of the legislation enacted by the Parliament

being Right to Education Act. In the circumstances, the

Division Bench was not justified in setting aside the

order passed by the Single Judge. Consequently, we

allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the

Division Bench and restore the order passed by the

Single Judge of the High Court. The appeal is

accordingly, allowed.

48. In (2013) 4 Cal LT 330 (Rakhal Chandra Das v. State of

West Bengal) at paragraph 26, this Court observed that such

appointments not to be construed as illegal, could be considered

irregular. In the case at hand, the appointment letters (Annexure P-

1), the Managing Committee's resolution of 26.2.2000 naming the

appellants (Annexure P-2), and its representation of 15.7.2011 again

naming them (Annexure P-6) were never challenged as forged or

fabricated. All of these are admitted facts, which suggest that the

Managing Committee did not exceed its authority and create illegal

positions.

49. Further, this Court in Dhrubajyoti Roy v. State of W.B.,

2025 SCC OnLine Cal 6059 held that:

27. Therefore, it cannot be denied that in order to impart

education to students and to satisfy the essential

criterion of maintaining a minimum number of students

in each class, the existence of an organising managing

committee is imperative. Consequently, such a

committee would necessarily be compelled to appoint

certain individuals to the posts of teaching and non-

teaching staff, to keep the school operational and

ensure its functional viability.

28. Denying the existence of such a managing

committee and the corresponding teaching and non-

teaching staff, whether by invoking the provisions of the

1997 Act, the 2005 Act, any government notification, or

even the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC

1 (which has, in some cases, been cited by the State to

withhold approval of appointments made by organising

committees), amounts to a refusal to acknowledge the

ground reality. The consequence of such denial would

be to displace the very managing committees and staff

17

members who had been instrumental in establishing

and operating the school. This, despite the State's

willingness to reap the benefits of the institutions

established and sustained by their efforts, without

offering them any recognition, approval or any benefit in

return.

29. In SLP (C) no. 27804 of 2019 (Prabir Kumar

Ghosh v. State of West Bengal) the Hon'ble Supreme

Court got an occasion to deal with a similar issue when

the Hon'ble Court despite taking note of promulgation of

1997 Act, observed as follows:

“As the record indicates that the school was set up by

the villagers. The facility of the school in the

neighborhood was not made available by the official

agencies. In a situation such as that the engagement of

the writ petitioners cannot strictly be called to be illegal.

They were definitely imparting education in keeping

with the letter and spirit of the legislation enacted by

the Parliament being Right to Education Act.”

30. Therefore, applying the reasoning laid down in the

case of Prabir Kumar Ghosh (supra), the petitioners'

appointments to the posts of teacher and non-teaching

staff cannot be deemed illegal.

50. The school could not have Recruitment Rules for organizing

staff before recognition. The Managing Committee that engaged the

appellants has never itself been under challenge. Furthermore,

through continuous litigation it is these individuals who have kept

pursuing the claims against the Respondents on behalf of the school.

There is nothing on record to suggest that the Managing Committee

was appointed illegally and exceeded its powers to appoint these

individuals. Instead, to insist that upon being recognised, the

Committee ought to have replaced these individuals, already

appointed with those to be brought in through the newly created

appointment rules would be a refusal to acknowledge the ground

reality. The school could not have remained operational or apply for

further recognition without the services of the appellants.

51. We find that the authorities failed to act in terms of the settled

principles of law while rejecting the claim of the appellants.

18

CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS:

52. MAT No. 158 of 2024 stands allowed. The judgment and order

dated December 21, 2023, passed in WPA 10605 of 2019 is set aside.

Accordingly, the order dated January 30, 2019, passed by the

Secretary, Education, School Education Department, is also set aside.

The writ petition stands allowed with the following directions :

a. The respondent authorities are directed to grant approval to the

appointments of the appellants in their respective posts held by

them, with effect from May 1, 2009, being the date of revival of

recognition of the school.

b. The respondent authority shall, for the purpose of preparing the

approval order and service records, look into the originals of the

appointments, the originals of the appointment letters, educational

qualification certificates, and other credentials of the appellants.

Such verification shall be completed within a period of 6 weeks

from the communication of the judgment. It is clarified that such

verification shall not reopen the findings recorded by the court.

c. If, in the meantime, any appellant has superannuated, his retiral

and pensionary benefits shall be revised accordingly, and payment

of such monetary benefits shall be made over to the appellant

within 12 weeks from the date of communication of this judgment.

d. There shall be no orders as to cost.

53. All parties shall act on the basis of the server copy of this order,

duly downloaded from the official website of this Court.Urgent

certified copies of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties

upon compliance of all necessary formalities.

I Agree.

(Rajasekhar Mantha, J.) (Anuj Singh, J.)