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State of U.P. Vs. Krishna Gopal & Anr.

  Supreme Court Of India Criminal Appeal /891/1985
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PETITIONER:

STATE OF U.P.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

KRISHNA GOPAL & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/08/1988

BENCH:

VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)

BENCH:

VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)

SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:

1988 AIR 2154 1988 SCR Supl. (2) 391

1988 SCC (4) 302 JT 1988 (3) 544

1988 SCALE (2)632

ACT:

Constitution of lndia 1950: Article 136-Supreme Court

does not interfere with findings of fact reached by High

Court unless vitiated by serious errors.

HEADNOTE:

The respondents were put on trial for offences under

section 302 read with section 34, IPC. At the trial the

prosecution mainly relied on the eye-witnesses and the

statement of the deceased recorded by the Investigating

Officer, which was sought to be used as a dying declaration.

The defence assailed the credibility of the eye-witnesses as

well as the authenticity of the dying declaration. The

Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution case that

notwithstanding the somewhat serious injuries inflicted on

him, the deceased was in a position to instant the

preparation of the First Information Report and to make the

statement before the Investigating Officer. The respondents

were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

In the appeal, the High Court, on re-assessment of the

evidence, accepted the defence pleas, allowed the appeal and

ordered acquittal.

Before this Court it was urged by the State that the

High Court fell into a serious error in its assumptive

predication that injuries on the person on deceased were

such as were likely to render him unconscious immediately

and incapacitate him from making the dying declaration. It

was accordingly urged that because the High Court had

reversed the conviction on conjectures and not on sound

reasoning. this Court should interfere.

On behalf of the respondents, it was urged that this

Court should not interfere under Article 136 even if two

views were possible on the evidence and the one in favour of

the prosecution could be reached on reappreciation of the

evidence as long as the view opted for could not be said to

be altogether impossible on the evidence.

Allowing the appeal partly and remitting the case to the

High Court for disposal on merits afresh, it was,

PG NO 391

PG NO 392

HELD: (1) It was, no doubt, true that as a self-made

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rule of practice, this Court did not interfere with the

findings of fact reached by the High Court, but judicial

pronouncements themselves qualify this rule and justify

interference where serious errors of assumption vitiated the

findings. [398A]

State of U.P. v. Jashoda Nandan Gupta, AIR 1974 SC 753;

State of Punjab v. Sucha Singh. AIR 1974 SC 343; State of

A.P. v. P. Anjaneyulu, AIR 1982 SC 1598; State of U.P. v.

Pussu, [l983] 3 SCR 294; Shivaji Sahebrao Bopade v. State of

Maharashtra, [1974] 1 SCR 489 referred to.

(2) The principles laid down regarding the scope of the

powers of the appellate Court in appeals against acquittal

did not detract from the platitude of the Courts powers to

review and reappreciate the evidence if the order of

acquittal on review of the evidence was found to be grossly

erroneous. These powers were not different from or

inconsistent with those that the appellate Court had in an

appeal against conviction; the difference was more in the

manner of approach and the perspective rather than in the

content of the power. The expressions "very substantial

reasons" etc. used in several pronouncements which tend to

qualify these powers did no more than to convey these

principles. There was thus no immunity to an erroneous order

from a strict appellate scrutiny. But the appellate court

wherever it found justification to reverse an acquittal must

record reasons why it found lower court wrong. [400E-H]

Sheo Swarup's case, 61 Indian Appeals 398; Noor

Mohammad's case AIR 1945 PC 151; Sanwat Singh v. State of

Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715; Chandra Kanta Debnath v. State

of Tripura, AIR 1986 SC 606, referred to.

(3) Eye witnesses account would require a careful

independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility

which should not be adversely prejudged making any other

evidence, including medical-evidence, as the sole touchstone

for the test of such credibility. [403B]

(4) What degree of probability amounted to `proof' was

an exercise particular to each case. The concepts of

probability, and the degrees of it, could not obviously be

expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated

PG NO 393

as to how many of such units constituted proof beyond

reasonable doubt. There was an unmistakable subjective-

element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and

the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last

analysis, rest on a robust common-sense and, ultimately, on

the trained intuitions of the judge. [403D; 404B-C]

(5) Doubts would be called reasonable if they were free

from a zest for abstract speculation. A reasonable doubt was

not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a

fair doubt based upon reason and common-sense. It must grow

out of the evidence in the case. [403H; 404A-B]

6. The appellant's submission that the judgment under

appeal was rendered infirm on several counts could not be

said to be without substance. The appeal before the High

Court must, therefore, receive a reconsideration. [401B]

Qamreeddin v. Acqeel, AIR l982 SC 12 29 adopted.

JUDGMENT:

CRlMINAL APPELLATE JURISDlCTlON: Criminal Appeal No. 891

of 1985.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.9.1983 of the

Allahabad High Court in Crl. A. No. 1320 of 1982.

Prithvi Raj, Dalveer Bhandari and Ms. Rachna Joshi for

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the Appellant.

U.R. Lalit and Shakil Ahmed Syed for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATACHALIAH, J. This appeal, by special leave, is by

the State of Uttar Pradesh preferred against the Judgment

dated 30.9.1983 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

setting aside the conviction and sentence passed against the

two Respondent-accused in Sessions Trial No. 256 of 1981 on

the file of the Sessions Judge, Bareilly, for offences under

Section 302 read with Section 304, IPC. The learned Sessions

Judge had handed down a sentence of imprisonment for life,

but the High Court, in reversal of that conviction and

sentence, acquitted the respondents.

2. The case of the prosecution may briefly stated:

PG NO 394

At 2.00 PM on 31.1.1981 in the town of Mirganj in the

District Bareilly, in front of the house of a certain Lalan,

the two respondents- Krishna Gopal and Vijai-who are related

to each other as uncle and nephew, set-upon and attacked

Harish, S/o Mihilal, with knives causing serious injuries to

which Harish succumbed at 6.40 PM the same day at the

District Hospital, Bareilly, to which he was removed after

the incident. The incident was witnessed by Omkar (PW 1),

Khiali Ram (PW 2) who saw the attack from a close distance

of about 20 paces and on account of whose protestations the

accused persons hastened away from the scene, one of them

leaving behind the knife used in the attack; Paranvir (PW 6)

came on the spot soon thereafter and wrote the First

Information Report (Ex. Ka. 1) at the scene as per

instructions of injured Harish who signed it. Thereafter,

Harish was taken to Mirganj Police Station which was just

two furlongs away from the scene in an auto-rickshaw by

Omkar (PW 1) and Mihilal, the father of Harish, who had also

reached the spot by then. Ex. Ka. 1 was delivered at

Station-house by injured Harish himself at 2.15 PM. Harish

who had also brought with him one of the knives left behind

by the assailants, was deposited in the Station-house under

Memo (Ex. Ka. 2) prepared in that behalf. Injured-Harish

signed that Memo.

Thereafter, Harish was taken to the Public Health Centre

at Mirganj accompanied by a constable. The investigating

officer, Nanak Chand Sharma, (PW 7) who carne to the

Station-house at 2.30 PM proceeded to Mirganj Hospital and

recorded Harish's statement (Ex. Ka. 7). As no doctors were

available at the Public Health Centre at Mirganj, injured-

Harish was taken to the District Hospital at Bareilly in a

motor-vehicle. Dr. Rajeev Aggarwal (PW 3) examined Harish at

about 4.40 PM and noted the injuries on the person of Harish

in the list, Ex. Ka. 3. Despite treatment at the District

Hospital by the Surgeon Dr. Pundani and Dr. Sharma, Harish

died at 6.40 PM at the hospital.

The accused Krishna Gopal was arrested at 6.30 PM on the

same day. His Kurtha (Ex. 4) and his blood-stained Paijama

(Ex. 5) were recovered, under Memo Ex. Ka. 10. The accused

Vijai was arrested on 8.2.1981. Accused were put-up for

trial for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34,

IPC. The motive for the killing was previous enmity between

the accused-persons and Mihilal. the father of the deceased.

The accused denied the charge and pleaded not guilty.

According to the drift of the suggestions made to the

prosecution witnesses at the trial and from their statements

under Section 313 Cr. PC, they indicated that deceased-

Harish was a gambler and had sustained injuries at about

PG NO 395

3.00 PM that day in a gambling-brawl and that occasion was

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exploited by Paranvir (PW 6) and others to foist a false

case against them owing to previous enmity. Accused Krishna-

Gopal while admitting the seizure of his clothes under Ex.

Ka. 10, however, denied that at the time of recovery they

were blood stained.

3. At the trial, before the learned Sessions Judge, the

prosecution examined and relied upon the two eye witnesses,

Omkar (PW 1) and Khiali Ram (PW 2). Dr. Rajeev Aggarwal (PW

3) spoke to the injury report (Ex. Ka. 3), prepared by him.

Dr. Balbir Singh (PW 5), who conducted the post-mortem

examination spoke to the post-mortem report Ex. Ka. 6;

Paranvir (PW 6) who was the scribe of Ex. Ka. 1, and Habib

(PW 8) who had witnessed the seizure of the clothes on the

person of Krishna Gopal under Ex. Ka. 10 were also called.

Nanak Chand Sharma, investigating officer, tendered evidence

as PW 7. Serologist's report was marked as Ex. Ka. h. The

other witnesses were formal witnesses.

The prosecution relied, in the main, on the eye-

witnesses and on the Ex. Ka 1 and Ex. Ka. 7 which it sought

to use as dying declarations.

4. In the trial, it was urged for the defence that,

having regard to the serious nature of the injuries

sustained by the deceased which included a 4 cm. long

slashing of the tongue and the shock and the profuse-

bleeding the injuries admittedly had caused, injured-Harish,

would have lost consciousness very soon and that, at all

events, even if he had retained consciousness he would not

be in a position to articulate his speech. These

circumstances would, it was urged, wholly improbablise, if

not render altogether false, the two, dying declarations.

The defence also assailed the credibility of the eye-

witnesses on what, according to the defence, were the

intrinsic discrepancies in the version of the two eye-

witnesses who were characterised as chance and, otherwise

interested, witnesses.

5. On an appraisal and assessment of the evidence on

record, the learned Sessions Judge found the eye-witnesses

trust-worthy and their version credible and acceptable. The

learned Sessions Judge on the basis of the medical-evidence

of PW 3 accepted the prosecution case that notwithstanding

the somewhat serious injuries inflicted on him, Harish was

in a position to instruct the preparation of Ex. Ka. 1 and

to make the statement before the investigating officer as

per Ex. Ka. 7. Learned Sessions Judge considered the

sequence of events, that the First Information Report

PG NO 396

reached the Station-house within fifteen minutes of the

occurrence; that injured was physically present at the

station which the learned Judge considered undisputable

having regard to the signature on Ex. Ka. 10 and that the

circumstance that one of eye-witnesses, (PW 1) had

accompanied the injured to the police station within a few

minutes of the occurrence, suggested his presence at the

scene, had established the prosecution case against the

accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. The accused were,

accordingly, convicted and sentenced.

6. In the appeal by the convicted persons, the High

Court on a re-assessment of the entire evidence persuaded

itself to the view that having regard to the nature and

severity of the injuries, Harish could not reasonably be

expected to have been in a position to make the dying-

declarations attributed to him; that the discrepancies in

the evidence of the eye-witnesses rendered them unsafe to be

relied upon and that with the rejection of the dying-

declarations and the eye-witness-account, nothing remained

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which would connect the accused persons with the crime. The

High Court, accordingly, allowed the appeal and acquitted

the accused.

The State has challenged the acquittal as one arrived at

as much by a basically erroneous approach to the matter as

by a non-consideration of material evidence on record,

resulting in a serious miscarriage of justice.

7. Shri Prithviraj learned senior Counsel for the State

submitted that in discarding the two dying declarations (Ex.

Ka. I & Ex. Ka. 7), the High Court fell into a serious error

in its assumptive predication that the injuries on the

person of Harish were such as were likely to render him

unconscious immediately and incapacitate him from making the

dying declarations attributed to him. In posting this, the

High Court, contends counsel, ignored the positive and firm

opinion of Dr. Rajeev Aggarwal (PW 3), who had had the

opportunity of examining the injured person at 4.40 PM that

very day, that "the deceased could survive and speak for an

hour after being injured." Learned Counsel submitted that

the High Court, quite erroneously, preferred a hypothetical

answer of the doctor as to the mere theoretical possibility

implicit in his later answer that "in view of the injuries

(1) and (3) it is likely that the deceased might not have

been able to speak" to the certainty of the first answer.

Learned Counsel also sought to point out that the evidence

of PW 5, Dr. Balbir Singh, who conducted the post-mortem did

not also support the speculation that the injured would have

PG NO 397

lost consciousness immediately after the injury. Learned

Counsel also listed what, according to him, were certain

important circumstances which compelled an irresistable

inference as to the presence of Harish at the Station-house

in an injured condition within a few minutes of the attack.

Shri Prithviraj submitted that certain important pieces of

evidence were mis-read by the High Court which led to

serious errors and to the consequent miscarriage of justice.

Sri Prithviraj submitted that where, as here, the High Court

reverses a conviction on conjectures and not on sound

reasoning, this Court should interfere. An unjust acquittal

he said, was as much a miscarriage of justice as an unjust

conviction was. Sri Prithviraj further submitted that the

version of the eye-witnesses as to the time of the attack

was, indeed, corroborated by Medical-evidence and the

information having been lodged with the police within 15

minutes of the occurrence, there was absolutely no scope for

any deliberation and concoction. That apart, injured-Harish

or his well-wishers had no reason to shield the identity of

the real culprits and implicate innocent persons.

8. Shri U.R. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel for the

respondents, endeavoured to show that this was not a fit and

appropriate case for interference by this Court and that if

the High Court, after consideration of the whole evidence,

came to a conclusion which cannot be said to be

unsupportable on the evidence, this Court should not

interfere under Article 136, even if two views were possible

on the evidence and the one in favour of the prosecution

could be reached on re-appreciation of the evidence, as long

as the view opted for and that commended itself to the High

Court could not be said to be altogether impossible on the

evidence. Shri Lalit invited attention to certain answers of

the Medical-experts that enabled an inference that the

injuries were such as were likely to render the victim

immediately unconscious or at least inarticulate and urged

that if in view of the injuries of a grave nature and the

profuse bleeding suffered by the injured, the High Court

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considered it probable that the injured might have lost

consciousness after the attack so as to improbablise the

dying declarations and that, at all events, if, having

regard to the very serious slashing of the tongue, which,

according to the medical-evidence could in itself, in the

ordinary course have caused death. the High Court considered

it likely or probable that the injured would not be able to

speak, there was nothing in that view which would invite or

justify interference by this Court under Article 136. The

principle of penal policy would, says counsel, require that

this Court should decline to interfere.

PG NO 398

9. It is, no doubt, true that as a self-made rule of

practice, this Court does not interfere with the findings of

fact reached by the High Court, but such findings of facts

must not be vitiated by serious errors. In State of U.P. v.

Jashoda Nandan Gupta & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 753 (757) observed:

".....as a self-made rule of practice, this Court does

not interfere with the findings of fact reached by the High

Court, unless exceptional and grave circumstances exist, or

forms of legal process have been disregarded or otherwise

there has been a gross miscarriage of justice. Where the

judgment which is the subject of appeal under that Article,

is one of acquittal, this Court will not interfere with the

same in the exercise of its overriding jurisdiction unless

that judgment is clearly unreasonable, or perverse or

manifestly illegal or grossly unjust. Therefore, if in the

nicely balancing probabilities of a case, two views of the

evidence- one indicating acquittal and the other conviction-

were reasonably possible, this Court would not disturb the

High Court's order of acquittal."

In State of Punjab v. Sucha Singh & Ors., [1974] AIR SC

343 (344) this Court said:

"..... In our opinion, it was for the High Court to

appraise the evidence which was adduced in this case. In the

absence of any infirmity in the appraisement of the evidence

by the High Court, we find no cogent grounds to reappraise

the evidence. The fact that on the evidence adduced, a

different view could also have been taken in the matter,

would not induce us to interfere with the judgment of the

High Court. The appeal fails and is dismissed."

In State of A.P. v. P. Anjaneyulu, AIR 1982 SC 1598

(1599) it was held:

".......The question is one of appreciation of evidence

and the proposed appeal does not raise any substantial

question of law. Apart from that we do not ordinarily

entertain appeals against orders of acquittal if two views

of the evidence are possible ........"

In State of U.P. v. Pussu, SCR 1983 (3) 294 (309) this

Court observed:

PG NO 399

" .... We are aware of the rule of practice that

ordinarily this Court should not interfere with judgments of

acquittaI of a mere reappreciation of evidence. But if these

are glaring infirmities in the judgment of the High Court

resulting in a gross miscarriage of justice, it is the duty

of this Court to interfere. In the instant case we find that

the approach of the High Court is basically erroneous and

its judgment is founded on false assumptions, conjectures

and surmises . . . . ...

But these pronouncements themselves qualify this rule of

self-abnegation prescribed for itself by this Court, with

the qualification that where serious errors of assumption

and inference vitiate the finding, interference is

justified. In matters such as this, it is appropriate to the

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observations of this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v.

State of Maharashtra, [1974] 1 SCR 489 (492-93) :

" . . . . . The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the

rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence

and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always

good regardless of justice to the victim and the community,

demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context of

escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a

public accountability. The cherished principles or golden

thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through

the web our our law should not be stretched morbidly to

embrace every hunch, hestiancy and degree of doubt .....

" . . . . . The evil of acquitting a guilty person

light-heartedly as a learned author Glanville Williams; in

'Proof of Guilt' has sapiently observed, goes much beyond

the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone

unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general. they

tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in

turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions

against indicated 'persons' and more severe punishment of

those who are found guilty. Thus too frequent acquittals of

the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually

eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless . . . . ."

"a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal

of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the

innocent......."

PG NO 400

10. Shri Lalit, however, said that the accepted

principles of criminal jurisprudence, and administration of

criminal justice require that an appellate Court should

refrain from reversing an acquittal except for "very

substantial" and "compelling" reasons. Learned counsel

submitted that if after a discussion of the evidence and on

a consideration of probabilities, the High Court considers

that so serious a charge as of a capital offence cannot

safely be sustained on the evidence there is not only

nothing inherently erroneous in it but the omission to make

such an approach on the appraisal of criminal evidence is

itself violative of accepted rules of administration of

criminal justice whose twin principles are the presumption

of innocence and the burden of proof on the prosecution to

establish a criminal charge by standards of evidence

appropriate to criminal actions, beyond reasonable doubt.

But the submissions of Sri Lalit bearing on the

limitations of the appellate Court under the supposed rule

that unless there are "substantial" or "compelling" reasons

or "very substantial reasons" or "strong reasons", the

findings in a judgment of acquittal should not be interfered

with should not pass without some comment. This Court in

dealing with the scope of the powers of the appellate Court

in appeals against the acquittal has, by and large, approved

and accepted the lucid formulation of the law by the

judicial committee in Sheo Swarup's case, (61 Indian Appeals

399) as clarified later by the judicial committee in Noor

Mohammad's case (AlR 1945 PC 151). Those principles, as we

understand them, do not detract from the plenitude of the

power of the appellate Court to review and reappreciate the

evidence if the order of acquittal on a review of the

evidence is found to be grossly erroneous. The powers of the

appellate Court, in an appeal against the acquittal, are not

different from or inconsistent with. those that the

appellate Court has in an appeal against a conviction; the

difference is, as is sometimes stated, more in the manner of

approach and the perspective rather than in the content of

the power. The expressions "very substantial reasons",

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"substantial and compelling reasons". "strong reasons" used

in several pronouncements which tend to qualify the power

of the appellate Court do no more than to convey the

principles stated by the judicial committee in Sheo Swarup's

case (See: Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC

715; Chandra kanta Debnath v. State of Tripura, AIR 1985 SC

606). There is, thus no immunity to an erroneous-order from

a strict appellate scrutiny. But the appellate Court

wherever if finds justification to reverse an acquittal must

record reasons why it finds the lower court wrong. This, in

the ultimate analysis, is merely a reiteration of a

PG NO 401

principle which every exercise of appellate jurisdiction in

the matter of reversal of an order under appeal is subject

to.

11. In the present case, the submissions of Sri

Prithviraj that the judgment under appeal is rendered infirm

on several counts cannot be said to be without substance.

We, however, abstain from a review of the evidence ourselves

to test whether the inferences drawn by the High Court are

justified or not as, in our view, the appeal before the High

Court must receive a reconsideration. Any comment by us

might pre-judge aspects which require consideration by the

High Court.

But it would not be inappropriate to refer to the

submissions of Sri Prithviraj as to some aspects of the

evidence in the case. The High Court for instance did not

advert to the evidentiary value and effect of Ex. Ka. 2,

relating to the deposit of the knife at the Station-house by

the deceased-Harish which was said to contain Harish's

signature. The High Court did not consider either the

genuineness of Ex. Ka. 2 and of the signature of Harish

thereon and if Ex. Ka. 3 was genuine, what inferences would

follow on the cognate question as to how long Harish was

conscious after the attack. The High Court, Sri Prithviraj

points out, did not consider the evidence of the

investigating officer (PW 7) on certain important aspects.

As an instance of mis-reading of the evidence by the High

Court, Shri Prithviraj pointed out the error in the

assumption made by the High Court that according to Paranvir

(PW 6), injured-Harish had merely indicated by signs or

gestures that he was injured by the knife which was seen at

the scene of occurrence as a circumstance bearing on the

question whether Harish's speech had been affected. The High

Court referred to the evidence of PW 6 on this point and

observed:

". . . . . At one place he said that Harish has made a

sign indicating that he was injured with the knife which was

found on the scene of occurrence . . . ."

This, according to Sri Prithviraj. weighed with the High

Court in reaching such erroneous conclusions as it did in

regard to the ability of the deceased Harish to speak

immediately after the injuries-a circumstance which had a

material bearing on the genuineness of the declarations. Sri

Prithviraj pointed out that the evidence on the point was

misread by the High Court and that evidence clearly

indicated that Harish did not merely gesture, but did also

speak. Indeed, this appears to be so. PW 6 had stated:

PG NO 402

" .. . ... This knife was found at the spot. He had

indicated towards that knife saying that he was attacked

with this knife ..."

12. Sri Prithviraj pointed out certain circumstances

which stand established with a degree of probability

appropriate to the requisite criminal evidential standard

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viz., that Harish had died a homicidal death attributable to

the injuries caused by a weapon of the kind of Ex. 1; that

the attack had occurred at the place and time alleged by the

prosecution ; that Harish in the injured condition went to

the Station-house at 2. 15 PM along with Omkar (PW 1) and

lodged Ex. Ka. 2 and that Ex. Ka. 3 evidencing the deposit

of the knife was also signed by Harish at the Station-house.

The High Court, according to Sri Prithviraj. had not given

due recognition to these facts which were clearly

established and the inevitable consequences logically

flowing there-from. It was urged that the High Court did not

also displace the important reasons given by the trial court

in accepting these circumstances.

In regard to Shri Prithviraj's point that the evidence

of the investigating-officer did not receive independent

appraisal it is relevant to recall what was said in State

of Kerala v. M. M. Mathew & Anr, though in a somewhat

different context:

"...... It is true that courts of law have to judge the

evidence before them by applying the well recognised test of

basic human probabilities......"

"..... prima facie public servants must be presumed to

act honestly and conscientiously and their evidence has to

be assessed on its intrinsic worth and cannot be discarded

merely on the ground that being public servants they are

interested in the success of their case....."

l3. There might also be some justification for the

grievance of the appellant that the High Court had preferred

some observations in the medical-evidence-which Sri

Prithviraj characterised as merely conjectural answers-to

the other categoric answer by the very medical-witnesses

themselves. So Prithviraj also submitted that if would be

erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical

answers of medical-witnesses to exclude the eye-witnesses'

account which had to be rested independently and not

treated as the "variable" keeping the medical-evidence as

the "constant".

PG NO 403

It is trite that where the eye-witnesses' account is

found credible and trustworthy, medical-opinion pointing to

alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive.

Witnesses, as Bantham said, are the eyes and ears of

justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the orality of

the trial-process. Eye witnesses' account would require a

careful independent assessment and evaluation for their

credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making

any other evidence, including medical-evidence, as the sole

touch-stone for the test of such credibility. The evidence

must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent

probability of the story; consistency with the account of

other witnesses held to be credit-worthy; consistency with

the undisputed facts; the 'credit' of the witnesses; their

performance in the witness-box; their power of observation

etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes

eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative

evaluation.

A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be

convicted of an offence which is not established by the

evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though

this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no

absolute standard. What degree of probability amount to

`proof' is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to

the inter-dependence of evidence and the confirmation of one

piece of evidence by another a learned author says: (See:

"The Mathematics of Proof-II": Glanville Williams: Criminal

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 11

Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p. 340 (342).

"The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the

separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are

dependent when they tend to occur together, and the

evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In

a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to

establishing that the defendant did the prohibited art with

the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A juror

may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and

doubt whether to inter guilt from the fact that the

dependant fled from justice. But since it is generally

guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two

doubt are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of

evidence may confirm the other."

Doubts would be reasonable if they are free from a seat

for abstract speculation. taw cannot afford any favourite

other than truth. To consitute reasonable doubt, it is must

PG NO 404

be free from an over emotional response. Doubts may be

actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the

accused-person arising from the evidence, or from the lack

of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable

doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible

doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common-sense.

lt must grow out of the evidence in the case.

The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it,

cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be

mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units

constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an

unmistakable subjective-element in the evaluation of the

degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic

probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust

common-sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of

the judge. While the protection given by the criminal

process to the accused-persons is not to be eroded, at the

same time, uninformed legitimisation of trivialities would

make a mockery of administration of criminal justice.

14. In the circumstances of the case, we propose to

adopt the course which commended itself to the Court in

Qamruddin v. Acqeel & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 1229 where Fazal Ali

J. observed:

"The trial court had convicted the accused on a full and

complete appraisal-of the evidence. The High Court in appeal

has written a very cryptic judgment and has not tried to

displace some of the important reasons given by the trial

court nor has it made any attempt to scan the intrinsic

merits of the evidence. We are satisfied that the judgment

of the High Court is not in accordance: with law. In these

circumstances, therefore, we allow this appeal and remand

the case to the High Court for fresh disposal according to

law ....."

15. Accordingly this appeal is partly allowed, the

Judgment of the High Court dated 30th September, 1983, in

Crl. Appeal No. 1320 of 1982 is set aside and the appeal is

remitted to the High Court with the direction to re-admit

it, and hear and dispose of the same on the merits afresh.

We hope and trust that it will be possible for the High

Court to dispose of the appeal most expeditiously.

The High Court, should it consider it necessary or

appropriate, might consider calling for expert medical-

PG NO 405

evidence- of course with appropriate opportunity to the

defence'-on the point of the effect of the injuries on the

speech and consciousness of Harish. This is of entirely left

to the High Court.

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16. During the pendency of the appeal before the High

Court pursuant to this order, the respondents shall be

enlarged on bail to the satisfaction of the Sessions Court,

Bareilly. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.

R.S.S. Appeal allowed partly.

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