jurisdiction, res judicata, Haryana Urban Rent Control Act, nullity of decree, eviction, Sushil Kumar Metha, Gobind Ram Bohra, Supreme Court, Civil Procedure Code
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Sushil Kumar Metha Vs. Gobind Ram Bohra

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /4599/1989
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Case Background

As per case facts, the respondent-landlord filed a suit for ejectment and rent arrears against the appellant-tenant, which was decreed ex-parte. The tenant's attempts to set aside the decree were ...

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Document Text Version

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 12

PETITIONER:

SUSHIL KUMAR METHA

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

GOBIND RAM BOHRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/11/1989

BENCH:

RAMASWAMY, K.

BENCH:

RAMASWAMY, K.

MISRA RANGNATH

SAWANT, P.B.

CITATION:

1989 SCR Supl. (2) 149 1990 SCC (1) 193

JT 1989 Supl. 329 1989 SCALE (2)1104

ACT:

Haryana Urban Rent Control Act, 1973--Section 13--Con-

troller has exclusive jurisdiction to order eviction Civil

Court inherently lacks jurisdiction to entertain suit for

eviction.

Code of Civil Procedure 1908: Section 11 and 47 Order 9,

Rule 13--Jurisdiction determination of--Court without juris-

diction passing decree-nullity ,and non est--Does not oper-

ate as res judicata.

HEADNOTE:

The respondent had filed a suit before the Senior Sub

Judge, against the appellant for ejectment and recovery of

arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation of the

shop, let out to him. The suit was decreed ex parte on

October 20, 1977. The application under Order 9, Rule 13.

C.P.C. to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed on

January 10, 1979 and was confirmed on appeal on August 7,

1979 and later in revision by the High Court.

When the respondent-landlord took out execution proceed-

ings for ejectment of the appellant-tenant, he objected

under Section 47 of Code of Civil Procedure contending that

the decree passed by the civil court was a nullity, as the

premises in question was governed by the Haryana Urban

(Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 11 of 1973. According to

him the Controller under the Act was the competent authority

regarding claims for ejectment and by necessary implication,

the civil Court was divested of jurisdiction to take cogni-

sance and pass a decree for ejectment. That objection was

overruled and further revision to the High Court also

failed. Simultaneously the appellant had also filed a writ

petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution which was also

dismissed. Hence this appeal by the appellant-tenant by

special leave.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: Normally a decree passed by a court of competent

jurisdiction after adjudication on merits of the rights of

the parties, operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit

or proceedings and binds the parties

150

or the persons claiming right, title or interest from the

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parties. Its validity should be assailed only in an appeal

or revision as the case may be. In subsequent proceedings,

its validity cannot be questioned. [162G]

A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the

subject matter or on other grounds which goes to the root of

its exercise of jurisdiction, lacks inherent jurisdiction.

It is a coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is

a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up

whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a

foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in

collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes

at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot

be cured by consent or waiver of the party. [162H; 163A]

(See Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors., [1955]

1, SCR 117: Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal & Anr., AIR 1979 SC

794: Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass, [1969] 2 SCR 432;

Smt. Kaushalya Devi & Ors. v. K.L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838;

Chandrika Misir & Anr. v. Bhaiya Lal, [1973] 2 SCC 474;

Ledgard v. Bull, [1886] Law Report, 13 AC 134; Bartan v.

Fincham, [1921] 2 K.B. Division, 291 at 299; Peachery

Property Corporation v. Robinson, [1966] 2 All E.R. 981,983;

Choudari Rama (dead) per L.R. Choudharv Ganapathi v. Qureshi

Bee, [1983] 2 Andhra Law Times 133 approved;)

A question relating to jurisdiction of a court or inter-

pretation of provisions of a statute cannot be deemed to

have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of a

court. Therefore the doctrine of res judicata does not apply

to a case of decree of nullity. If the court inherently

lacks jurisdiction consent cannot confer jurisdiction. Where

certain statutory rights in a welfare legislation are creat-

ed, the doctrine of waiver also does not apply to a case of

decree where the court inherently lacks jurisdiction.

[163F-G]

(See Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors. v. Dossibai

N.B. Jeejeebhey, [1970] 3 SCR 830; Tarini Charan Bhattacher-

jee's case I.L.R. 56, Cal. 723).

It is the Controller under the Act that has exclusive

jurisdiction to order ejectment of a tenant from a building

in the urban area leased out by the landlord. Thereby the

civil court inherently lacks jurisdiction to entertain the

suit and pass a decree of ejectment. [164A]

(See Barrachlough v. Brown, [1897] A.C. 615; Doe v. Bridges,

151

[1831] 1, B & Ad. 847 at 859; Premier Automobiles v. K.S.

Wadke, [1976] 1 SCR 427.

Therefore in the instant case, though the decree was

passed and the jurisdiction of the court was gone into in

issue Nos. 4 and 5 at the ex parte trial, the decree there-

under is a nullity and does not bind the appellant. There-

fore it does not operate as res judicata. The courts below

have committed grave error of law in holding that the decree

in the suit operated as res judicata and the appellant

cannot raise the same point once again at the execution.

[164B]

Hari Prashad Gupta v. Jitender Kumar Kaushik, [1982]

Vol. 84, Punjab Law Reporter, 150; Sadhu Singh v. District

Board, Gurdaspur & Anr., [1962] Punjab Law Reporter, Vol.

64, 1; Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhat Rabdul Rehman &

Ors., [1970] 1 SCC 670; Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath,

[1962] 2 SCR 747; Phool Chand Sharma & Ors. v. Chandra

Shankar Pathak dr Ors., [1963] SCR Suppl. 2 828; Mohanlal

Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee & Ors., [1953] SCR 377.

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JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4599 of

1989.

From the Judgment and order dated 16.9.1988 of the

Punjab and Haryana High Court in Review Application 22-CII

of 1988 in Civil Revision No. 2439 of 1980.

S.P. Goel, G.B. Singh and K.K. Mohan for the Appellant.

S.M. Ashri for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. RAMASWAMY, J. Special leave granted.

This appeal under Article 136 arises against the order

dated Sept. 16, 1988 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana

refusing to review the order dated August 11, 1988 made in

Civil Revision No. 2439/80 on its file. The facts leading to

the decision are that the respondent Govind Ram, the father

of the respondents/landlord laid the suit No. 118/77 (ini-

tially numbered as O.S. No. 276/75) on the file of Sr. Sub

Judge for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and

damages for use and occupation of the shop in Gurgaon, let

out to the appellant/tenant. The suit was originally laid in

the Court of Sub

152

Judge, IIIrd Class, Gurgaon, which was transferred later to

the Sr. Sub Judge, Gurgaon, which was decreed ex-parte on

October 20, 1977. The application under Order 9 Rule 13

C.P.C. to set aside the ex-parte decree was dismissed on

January 10, 1979, and was confirmed on appeal on August 17,

1979 and in revision by the High Court on October 15, 1979.

When the landlord laid the execution application for eject-

ment the appellant objected under section 47 of C.P.C.

contending that the decree of the Civil Court is a nullity

as the premises in question is governed by the Haryana Urban

(Control of Rent & Eviction) Act 11 of 1973, for short 'the

Act'. The Controller under the Act is the competent forum

regarding claims for ejectment on fulfilment of any of the

conditions enumerated under Section 13 thereof. The Civil

Court is divested of jurisdiction to take cognisance and

pass a decree for ejectment of the appellant. That objection

was overruled and on further revision the High Court dis-

missed the revision by order dated March 19, 1980. Simulta-

neously he also filed Writ Petition under Article 227 which

was dismissed on September 30, 1988. This appeal is directed

against that order of dismissal.

The contention raised by Shri S.P. Goel, the learned Sr.

counsel for the appellant is that by operation of Section 13

of the Act the only authority to pass a decree of ejectment

of the appellant tenant is the Controller under the Act and

by necessary implication the jurisdiction of the Civil Court

is ousted. The Civil Court lacked inherent jurisdiction to

take cognisance of the cause and to pass a decree. The

decree is thus a nullity. The challenge to a decree on the

ground of nullity can be raised at any stage and even in

execution. The courts below have committed manifest error of

law in not considering the legal question in its proper

perspective. The shop consists of the original building

belonging to the landlord, but a small part thereof in the

frontside was constructed on municipal land. Tenancy of the

building is governed by the Special Act and, therefore, the

decree of the Civil Court is a nullity and is inexecutable.

Shri Ashri, the learned counsel for the respondents refuted

this contention. Firstly he argued that the leave applica-

tion is barred by limitation. Secondly, he contended that

the appellant had raised the plea of want of jurisdiction at

the trial. Though he remained ex-parte, the trial court

considered the objection under issue Nos. 4 and 5 and over-

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ruled the objection. The decree became final; thereby the

decree operates as res judicata. He also further contends

that the Act does not apply to the building in question.

Under Section 3, municipal land is exempted from the provi-

sions of the Act and thereby the only forum to lay the

action is the Civil Court. The Civil Court having jurisdic-

tion has validly granted the

153

decree. The decree having been allowed to become final, it

is not open to the appellant to ask the executing court to

go behind the decree

The question that emerges is whether the Civil Court

lacked inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit for

ejectment of the appellant-tenant and the decree so passed

is a nullity. The Act was enacted with the object of con-

trolling the increase of rent of buildings and rented lands

situated within the limits of urban areas and "the eviction

of the tenants therefrom". Section 2(a) defines 'building'

which means any building or a part of a building let for any

purpose whether being actually used for that purpose or not,

including any land ........................appurtenant to

such building .................... but does not include a

room in a hotel, hostel or boarding house. Section 2(b)

defines 'Controller' as any person who is appointed by the

State Government to perform the functions of a Controller

under the Act. Landlord has been defined under Section 2(c)

and Section 2(f) defines rented lands to mean any land let

separately for the purpose of being used principally for

business or trade. 'Tenant' has been defined under Section

2(h). Section 3 authorises the State Government by notifica-

tion to exempt any particular building or rented land or any

class of building or rented lands from the application of

any or all the provisions of the Act. Section 13 contains

the provisions for eviction of tenants, Sub-s. (1) thereof

reads:

"Eviction of tenants--(1) A tenant in posses-

sion of a building or a rented land shall not

be evicted therefrom except in accordance with

the provisions of this section."

The other provisions are not necessary. The sole ground

raised by the landlord for eviction was that the appellant

had committed default in the payment of rent and thereby had

became liable for ejectment. Accordingly, he issued a notice

under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act determin-

ing the tenancy and laid this suit. Section 13 gives the

right to the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant for

default in the payment of rent. The Act provides the protec-

tion of continued tenancy and remedy of ejectment for breach

of covenants in the lease and other statutory grounds as

provided. It provides that the remedy and the forum and the

decree of ejectment passed by the Controller or the appel-

late authority or the revisional authority or confirmation

thereof either in appeal or revision is final under the Act.

Thereby the exclusive jurisdiction to take cognisance of the

cause of action for ejectment of the tenant from a building

or rented land situated in urban areas is governed by the

provisions of the Act and is

154

exclusively to be dealt with under Section 13 of the Act. By

necessary implication the jurisdiction of the Civil Court

under Section 9 of C.P.C. is excluded. It is undoubtedly

true that open land is a part of the frontage of the shop

and belonged to the municipality which the landlord had

taken on lease from the Municipality. As regards the munici-

pal land, the landlord was a lessee of the Municipal Commit-

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tee. But on construction of the building covering a portion

of the municipal land the landlord became landlord and the

appellant his tenant for the purposes of the Act. This view

was held by the full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High

Court in Hari Parshad Gupta v. Jitender Kumar Kaushik,

[1982] Vol. 84, Punjab Law Reporter, 150. We agree with the

view. Thereby though there is a notification issued by the

State Government exempting the lands belonging to Gurgaon

Municipality from the provisions of the Act, the building of

the respondent does not get exempted from the provisions of

the Act. It is the finding of the forums below that the shop

in question stands mainly on the land of the landlord and a

small portion is located on municipal land. Therefore, we

are of the view that the building was governed by the provi-

sions of the Act and the exemption accorded by the Govern-

ment under Section 3 was not attracted to the premises. In

Sadhu Singh v. District Board, Gurdaspur & Anr., [1962]

Punjab Law Reporter, Vol. 64, 1 the question was whether to

the reconstructed building governed by the provisions of

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act the exemption under

Section 3 applied. It was held to be so by the Division

Bench. But the present facts are different.

In Barrachlough v. Brown, [1897] A.C. 615 the House of

Lords held that when a special statute gave a right and also

provided a forum for adjudication of rights, remedy has to

be sought only under the provisions of that Act and the

common law court has no jurisdiction.

In Doe v. Bridges, [1831] 1 B & Ad. 847 at 859 the

famous and oft quoted words of Lord Tenterdan, occur:

"Where an Act creates an obligation and en-

forces the performance in a specified manner,

we take it to be a general rule that perform-

ance cannot be enforced in any other manner."

This statement of law was approved not only by the House

of Lords in several cases, but also by this Court in Premier

Automobiles v. K.S. Wadke, [1976] 1 SCR 427 where this Court

was called upon to consider whether the Civil Court can

decide a dispute squarely coming

155

within the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. While

considering that question, this Court laid down four propo-

sitions and third of them is relevant for consideration

here. It is as follows:

"(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the

enforcement of a fight or an obligation creat-

ed under the Act, then the only remedy avail-

able to the suitor is to get an adjudication

under the Act."

Thus on construction of relevant provisions of the Act

and in the light of the position in law it must be held that

the provisions of Section 13 of the Act applies to the

building leased out to the appellant by the landlord and the

Controller was the competent authority to pass a decree of

ejectment against the appellant and the Civil Court lacked

inherent jurisdiction to take cognisance of the cause and to

pass a decree of ejectment therein. The next question is

whether the impugned decree is a nullity and whether the

plea can be raised in execution and further whether the

decree in the suit does not operate as res judicata.

In Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors., [1955] 1 SCR

117 = AIR 1954 SC 430 the facts were that the appellant had

undervalued the suit at Rs.2,950 and laid it in the court of

the Subordinate Judge, Monghyr for recovery of possession of

the suit lands and mesne profits. The suit was dismissed and

on appeal it was confirmed. In the second appeal in the High

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Court the Registry raised the objection as to valuation

under Section 11. The value of the appeal was fixed at

Rs.9,980. A contention then was raised by the plaintiff in

the High Court that on account of the valuation fixed by the

High Court the appeal against the decree of the court of the

Subordinate Judge did not lie to the District Court, but to

the High Court and on that account the decree of the Dis-

trict Court was a nullity. Alternatively, it was contended

that it caused prejudice to the appellant. In considering

that contention at page 121, a four Judge Bench of this

Court speaking through Vankatarama Ayyar, J. held that:

"It is a fundamental principle well-estab-

lished that a decree passed by a Court without

jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its inva-

lidity could be set up whenever and wherever

it is sought to be enforced or relied upon,

even at the stage of execution and even in

collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdic-

tion, whether it is pecuniary or territorial,

or whether it is in respect of the subject-

matter of the

156

action, strikes at the every authority of the

Court to pass any decree, and such a defect

cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If

the question now under consideration fell to

be determined only on the application of

general principles governing the matter, there

can be no doubt that the District Court of

Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its

judgment and decree would be nullities."

On merits it was held that since the appellant himself

had invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court with under

valuation, the objection as to jurisdiction was not avail-

able by operation of Section 99 of the Code and as to the

territorial jurisdiction he was precluded by operation of

Section 21 of C.P.C.; and on such premise it was held that

the decree of the District Court could not be treated to be

a nullity and person who invoked the jurisdiction cannot

plead prejudice to himself by his own act.

This Court has held that it is a well established prin-

ciple that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction

is a nullity and the plea can be set up whenever and wherev-

er the decree is sought to be enforced or relied upon, and

even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings.

In the case of Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal & Anr., AIR

1979 SC 794 the facts were that the appellant was the owner

of a shop. One of the covenants under the lease was that the

lessee respondent should not sub-let the shop. On the ground

that the respondent had sub-let the shop, a suit was laid

for eviction under Section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent

Control Act, 1952. The matter was compromised and a compro-

mise decree was passed. Twice time was given for delivery of

the vacant possession by the respondent. On his failure to

deliver vacant possession the appellant filed execution to

recover possession. The tenant raised the objection that

unless any one of the grounds prescribed under Section 13 of

the Rent Control Act was satisfied, the decree even on

compromise was a nullity, and therefore, he could not be

evicted. This Court held that the order made did not show

that it was satisfied that the sub-letting complained of had

taken place, nor was there any other material on record to

show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record

that the Court had proceeded solely on the basis of the

compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so

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there was hardly any doubt that the Court was not competent

to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execu-

tion must be held to be a nullity. On that basis it was held

that the objection could be

157

raised even at the execution stage. Ultimately, the decree

was held to be void.

In Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass, [1969] 2 SCR 432

the decree under execution was made on the basis of an award

and it was held that the decree was passed in contravention

of section 13(1) of the Rent Control Act. Thereby the decree

was held to be void and hence no execution could be levied

on the basis of the void decree. A similar view was also

taken by this Court in Smt. Kaushalya Devi & Ors. v. K.L.

Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838. This was also a case under the

Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act and was on the basis of a

compromise. It was held that the decree passed on the basis

of the award was in contravention of Section 13(1) of the

Act as the Court had passed the decree without satisfying

itself that any good ground of eviction existed. Therefore,

the decree for delivery of possession was held to be a

nullity and could not be executed. This is also a decision

by a Bench of three Judges speaking through Sikri, J. as he

then was.

In Chandrika Misir & Anr. v. Bhaiya Lal, [1973] 2 SCC

474 Palekar J. speaking for a Bench of two Judges held that

the decree passed by the Civil Court in relation to matters

governed by U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules,

1952 for possession was a nullity and in the appeal it was

for the first time permitted to be raised in this Court and

the decree was declared to be a nullity.

In Ledgard v. Bull, [1886] Law Report, 13 AC, 134 the

Privy Council laid down that where the original Court in a

suit was inherently lacking jurisdiction, and was incompe-

tent to try the same, on its transfer by consent of parties,

to a Court with jurisdiction such consent did not operate as

a waiver of the plea of want of jurisdiction.

In Bartan v. Fincham, [1921] 2 Kings Bench Division, 291

at 299 it was held that:

"Parties cannot by agreement give the Courts

jurisdiction which the Legislature has enacted

they are not to have

The Court cannot give effect to an agreement

whether by way of compromise or otherwise,

inconsistent with the provisions of the Act."

In Peachery Property Corporation v. Robinson, [1966] 2 All

Eng.

158

Report 981 at 983 Winn, Lord J. took the same view.

In Choudari Rama (dead) per L.R. Choudhary Ganapathi v.

Qureshi Bee, [1983] 2 Andhra Law Times 133 one of us Ramas-

wamy, J. was called upon to consider the question on a set

of similar facts. Therein the petitioner who died subse-

quently was protected under A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy

and Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1950. The protected tenant

was given possession in exercise of statutory power under

Section 38-A of that Act. That was done during the pendency

of the suit for partition between the co-sharers. The tenant

was impleaded co-nominee defendant to the suit. A prelimi-

nary decree for partition and for possession was passed. A

final decree followed. The decree became final and execution

was levied for possession. Objection was taken that since

the tenant was a protected tenant under the Act, the decree

was a nullity and could not be executed against the legal

representatives. After considering the scope of relevant

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provisions of the Act, it was held that the Civil Court

cannot go into the legality or correctness of the Exhibit

B-I issued by the Tehsildar. The revenue authorities consti-

tuted under that Act were competent to go into the validity

thereof. Civil Court inherently lacked jurisdiction and the

decree of ejectment of the protected tenant from the lands

covered by the protected tenancy was a nullity because of

the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act. The plea can be set

up even at the stage of execution, as was rightly done in

that case. Otherwise it would have the effect of nullifying

the operation of the statutory provisions in Chapter IV of

the Act and deprived the protected tenant of his vested

interest in the land created in his favour under the tenancy

certificate (Ex. B-I). It was also held in paragraph 64 that

"Its validity can be assailed in the execution proceedings."

We approve the view of the High Court.

In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors. v. Dossibai N.B.

Jeejeebhey, [1970] 3 SCR 830 the Bench consisting of Shah,

CJ., Hegde and Grover, JJ. was called upon to consider

whether a decree passed without jurisdiction operates res

judicata. The facts therein were that the respondent leased

out the land for construction of a building to the appel-

lant, which was duly constructed. The tenant applied for

fixation of the standard rent. The Civil Court rejected the

prayer holding that the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging

House Rates Control Act, 1947 does not apply to the open

land let out for construction. But later the High Court

reversed that view in another decision and held that the Act

applied to the open land leased out. Relying upon that

judgment, an application was again filed for fixation of the

standard rent of the

159

premises. Objection was raised that the earlier rejection

operated as res judicata. In that context, in negating the

contention, this Court held that the doctrine of res judica-

ta belongs to the domain of procedure. It cannot be exalted

to the status of a legislative direction between the parties

so as to determine the question relating to the interpreta-

tion of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court

finally between them, even though no question of fact or

mixed question of law and fact relating to the right in

dispute between the parties has been determined thereby. A

decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be

res judicata in other proceedings between the same parties.

The matter in issue may be an issue of fact. The fact decid-

ed by a competent Court is final determination between the

parties and cannot be re-opened between them in another

proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone

is res judicata. The reasons for the decision are not res

judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is the right

claimed by one party and denied by the other. The claim of

right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and

application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of

law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be

deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a

previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the

right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be

placed in contest between the same parties. A previous

decision of a competent Court on facts which are the founda-

tion of the right and the relevant law applicable to the

determination of the transactions which is the source of the

right is res judicata. A previous decision on a matter in

issue is a composite decision; the decision of law cannot be

dissociated from the decision on facts on which the right is

founded. A decision on an issue of law will be res judicata

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in a subsequent proceeding if it be the same as in the

previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is

different, nor when the law has since the earlier decision

been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision

relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier

suit nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transac-

tion which is prohibited by law:

"A question of jurisdiction of the Court, or

of procedure, or a pure question of law unre-

lated to the right of the parties to a previ-

ous suit, is not res judicata in the subse-

quent suit. Rankin, CJ., observed in Tarini

Charan Bhattacherjee's I.L.R. 56 Cal. 723

case:--

"The object of the doctrine of res judicata is

not to fasten upon parties special principles

of law as applicable to them inter se, but to

ascertain their rights and

160

the facts upon which these rights directly and

substantially depend; and to prevent this

ascertainment from becoming nugatory or pre-

cluding the parties from reopening or recon-

testing that which has been finally decided."

"A question relating to the jurisdiction of a

Court cannot be deemed to have been finally

determined by an erroneous decision of the

Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of

the statute the Court holds that it has no

jurisdiction, the question would not, in our

judgment, operate as res judicata. Similarly,

by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes

jurisdiction which it does not possess under

the statute, the question cannot operate as

res judicata between the same parties, whether

the cause of action in the subsequent litiga-

tion is the same or otherwise."

(Emphasis

supplied)

In that case it was held that since it relates to the

jurisdiction of the Court as per law declared by the legis-

lature, it does not operate as res judicata.

In Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman &

Ors., [1970] 1 SCC 670 a Bench of three Judges of this Court

consisting of Shah, J., as he then was, Hegde and Grover,

JJ. was considering the question of nullity of a decree. The

facts therein were that the appellant, owner of the plot of

land, leased out the same to the respondent at an annual

rental of Rs.411. The suit was dismissed and on appeal it

was reversed and suit was decreed. On revision it was con-

firmed by the High Court. Special leave petition filed in

this Court was also dismissed. In the execution the conten-

tion was raised that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdic-

tion to entertain the suit. It was contended that the decree

was a nullity on the ground that Bombay Rents Hotel and

Lodging House Rates (Control) Act 57 of 1947 applied to the

facts in that case. In that context Shah, J., as he then

was, speaking for the Court held that challenge to a decree

which is a nullity can be raised at any time, but the Court

executing the decree cannot go behind the decree between the

parties or on their representation it cannot entertain any

objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts,

unless it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in

appeal or revision. A decree even if it be erroneous is

still binding between the parties. In that context it was

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held that the question whether the Court of Small Causes had

jurisdiction to entertain the Suit depended upon

161

the interpretation of the terms of the agreement of lease,

and the use to which the land was put at the date of the

grant of the lease. These questions cannot be permitted to

be raised in an execution proceedings so as to displace the

jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree. It was

further held that for the purpose of determining whether the

Court which passed the decree had jurisdiction to try the

suit, it is necessary to determine facts relevant to the

issue on which the question depends, and the objection does

not appear on the face of the record, the executing Court

cannot enter upon an enquiry into those facts. It is seen

that on the facts in that case it is for the first time the

executing Court is to adjudicate upon the terms of the lease

whether the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to enter-

tain that suit. It is not a case of interpretation of the

statutory provisions or inherent lack of jurisdiction. It is

already seen that in fact for the first time this Court in

Chandrika Misir's case (supra) had to go into the statutory

provisions though no case in that regard had been set up in

the courts below and held that the Civil Court lacked inher-

ent jurisdiction to pass the decree. Therefore, the ratio in

this case is not in conflict with the view taken by this

Court.

It is no doubt true that in Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri

Kali Nath, [1962] 2 SCR 747 the facts were that the suit was

instituted on the original side of the Bombay High Court

against the appellant for recovery of certain arrears out of

transactions taking place at Agra. The dispute was referred

to arbitration. The arbitrator gave his award in favour of

the respondent which was upheld on appeal by the High Court.

In execution proceedings an objection was raised by the

appellant that the Bombay High Court has no jurisdiction to

entertain the suit to make the award a decree of the Court

as no part of the cause of action had arisen within its

territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the decree was without

jurisdiction. It was held that since the parties had agreed

to refer the matter to arbitration through Court, which had

jurisdiction, he would be deemed to have waived the objec-

tion as to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. There-

fore, it is not a nullity and the appellant was held to be

estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Bombay

High Court. The ratio therein does not apply to the facts of

this case.

The case of Phool Chand Sharma & Ors. v. Chandra Shanker

Pathak & Ors., [1963] SCR Suppl. 2 828 also does not help

the respondent. It was a case where the suit was decreed and

possession was taken thereunder. On appeal by the respondent

it was dismissed. On Second Appeal before the Board of

Revenue the matter was com-

162

promised, whereunder Ramprasad was recognised as a tenant of

the land in dispute and the order of eviction was thus

nullified. When he made an application under Sec. 144 C.P.C.

for restitution it was resisted by the tenants subsequently

inducted on the ground that the respondent was inducted as

tenant by the decreeholder, and the decree does not bind

them. This was upheld by the trial court and on appeal. A

writ petition was also dismissed on merits. The decree

became final. The order of the High Court under Art. 227

became final. Then against the order of the Board of Revenue

an appeal under Art. 136 was filed in this Court. A prelimi-

nary objection was raised that the decision of the High

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Court under Art. 227 operated as res judicata. In that

context it was held by this Court that the appeal was barred

by res judicata as the decision of the High Court was on

merits and would bind the parties unless it was modified or

reversed in appeal or by other appropriate proceedings. The

facts are clearly distinguishable.

The case of Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee &

Ors., [1953] SCR 377 is also of little assistance to the

respondent. The decree passed by the Calcutta High Court on

its original side was transferred for execution to the Court

of Subordinate Judge of Asansol with proper certified copy

of the decree and order of transmission. The execution

application was dismissed for default and a certificate was

sent under Sec. 41 C.P.C. stating that the execution case

was dismissed for default without transmitting the decree or

the covering letter sent by the High Court. The decree-

holder again applied for execution. It was accordingly

executed. Then an application to set aside the sale was made

under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. on the ground that the decree

is a nullity and the Court had no jurisdiction to execute

the decree. While negating the contention it was held that

since the decree sent was not transmitted it would be re-

garded as a fresh application for execution and, therefore,

the executing Court had jurisdiction and the decree was not

a nullity. That case also is not one of inherent lack of

jurisdiction.

Thus it is settled law that normally a decree passed by

a Court of competent jurisdiction, after adjudication on

merits of the rights of the parties, operates as res judica-

ta in a subsequent suit or proceedings and binds the parties

or the persons claiming right, title or interest from the

parties. Its validity should be assailed only in an appeal

or revision as the case may be. In subsequent proceedings

its validity cannot be questioned. A decree passed by a

Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or on

other grounds which goes to the root of its exercise or

jurisdiction, lacks inherent jurisdiction. It is a corum non

163

judice. A decree passed by such a Court is a nullity and is

non est. Its validity can be set up whenever it is sought to

be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right,

even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings.

The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the

Court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or

waiver of the party. If the Court has jurisdiction but there

is defect in its exercise which does not go to the root of

its authority, such a defect like pecuniary or territorial

could be waived by the party. They could be corrected by way

of appropriate plea at its inception or in appellate or

revisional forums, provided law permits. The doctrine of res

judicata under Sec. 11 C.P.C. is founded on public policy.

An issue of fact or law or mixed question of fact and law,

which are in issue in an earlier suit or might and ought to

be raised between the same parties or persons claiming under

them and was adjudicated or allowed uncontested becomes

final and binds the parties or persons claiming under them.

Thus the decision of a competent Court over the matter in

issue may operate as res judicata in subsequent suit or

proceedings or in other proceedings between the same parties

and those claiming under them. But the question relating to

the interpretation of a statute touching the jurisdiction of

a Court unrelated to questions of fact or law or mixed

questions does not operate as res judicata even between the

parties or persons claiming under them. The reason is obvi-

ous; a pure question of a law unrelated to facts which are

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the basis or foundation of a right, cannot be deemed to be a

matter in issue. The principle of res judicata is a facet of

procedure but not of substantive law. The decision on an

issue of law founded on fact in issue would operate as res

judicata. But when the law has since the earlier decision

been altered by a competent authority or when the earlier

decision declares a transaction to be valid despite prohibi-

tion by law it does not operate as res judicata. Thus a

question of jurisdiction of a Court or of a procedure or a

pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties

founded purely on question of fact in the previous suit, is

not res judicata in the subsequent suit. A question relating

to jurisdiction of a Court or interpretation of provisions

of a statute cannot be deemed to have been finally deter-

mined by an erroneous decision of a Court. Therefore, the

doctrine of res judicata does not apply to a case of decree

of nullity. If the Court inherently lacks jurisdiction

consent cannot confer jurisdiction. Where certain statutory

rights in a welfare legislation are created, the doctrine of

waiver also does not apply to a case of decree where the

Court inherently lacks jurisdiction.

In the light of this position in law the question for

determination is whether the impugned decree of the Civil

Court can be assailed by

164

the appellant in execution. It is already held that it is

the Controller under the Act that has exclusive jurisdiction

to order ejectment of a tenant from a building in the urban

area leased out by the landlord. Thereby the Civil Court

inherently lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass

a decree of ejectment. Therefore, though the decree was

passed and the jurisdiction of the Court was gone into in

issue Nos. 4 and 5 at the ex-parte trial, the decree there-

under is a nullity, and does not bind the appellant. There-

fore, it does not operate as a res judicata. The Courts

below have committed grave error of law in holding that the

decree in the suit operated as res judicata and the appel-

lant cannot raise the same point once again at the execu-

tion.

It is seen from the dates mentioned that there is no

delay in filing the leave application. The leave application

was filed within the limitation from the date of original

order of dismissal of the revision or on a later date dis-

missing the review application. It is true that the writ

petition was filed against the order in revision, but it

does not preclude the appellant to contest its invalidity in

the appeal under Art. 136. The decree was executed pending

the special leave petition. This Court would relieve the

party from injustice in exercise of power under Art. 136 of

the Constitution when this Court notice grave miscarriage of

justice. It is always open to the appellant to take aid of

Sec. 144 C.P.C. for restitution. Therefore, merely because

the decree has been executed, on the facts when we find that

decree is a nullity, we cannot decline to exercise our power

under Art. 136 to set at nought illegal orders under a

decree of nullity. The appeal is accordingly allowed. But in

the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own

costs.

Y. Lal Appeal allowed.

165

Reference cases

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