IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.11480 of 2017

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Sushil Kumar Singh Son of Bhagwati Singh, Resident of Village-Mohanpur

Karja, P.S.-Barhara, District-Bhojpur

... ... Petitioner/s

Versus

1.The State Of Bihar

2.The Director General of Police, Government of BIhar, Patna.

3.The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Champaran Range, Bettiah,

District-West Champaran.

4.The Superintending of Police, East Champaran, Motihari.

5.The Inspector of Police mufassil Section,East Champaran, Motihari-Cum-

Enquiry Officer.

... ... Respondent/s

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Appearance :

For the Petitioner/s: Mr. Aditya Narayan Singh, Adv.

Mr. Ajay Kumar Singh, Adv.

Mr. Binod Kumar, Adv.

For the Respondent/s: Mr. Md. Nashrul Hoda Khan- SC-1

Md. Fazle Karim, AC to SC-

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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KUMAR MANISH

CAV JUDGMENT

Date : 03-09-2026

1.Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and Learned Counsel

appearing on behalf of the State Respondents.

2.By way of the instant writ application, the Petitioner interalia prays for

the following reliefs:14 pt

1.For setting aside the order passed in Departmental Enquiry No. 04/99

bearing memo no. 888 dated 09.08.2007, by the Superintendent of Police,

East Champaran, Motihari whereby and whereunder punishment of

dismissal from service has been passed against the Petitioner;14 pt

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2.For setting aside the order bearing memo no. 202 dated

11.03.2008, passed by the Deputy Inspector of General

Police, Champaran Range, Bettiah by which the Appeal

preferred by the Petitioner against the order of dismissal has

been rejected;

3.For setting aside order bearing memo no. 3478 dated

15.03.2017, passed by the Director General of Police, Bihar,

by which Appeal memorial preferred by the Petitioner has

been rejected;

4.For directing the respondent authorities to reinstate the

Petitioner in service with effect from 09.08.2007, with all

consequential benefits;

5.For any other reliefs which the Petitioner is legally entitled

to.

3.Brief facts emerging out of the pleadings are that the Petitioner

was working as Constable

No. 765, along with Constable No. 771, namely, Nebulal Prasad

and Constable No. 691, namely, Prithvi Nath Dubey. All of them

were deputed in Mehsi Circle Guard, East Champaran. On the

intervening night of 22/23.03.1998, the petitioner, along with the

aforementioned constables, is alleged to have gone to Somlata

Theatre without the Guard Havildar. While at the theatre,

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Constable Nebulal Prasad opened fire, allegedly to control an

unruly mob, resulting in the death of two persons on the spot and

injury to one other person

4.In connection with the said occurrence, Mehsi P.S. Case

No. 15 of 1998 dated 23.03.1998, was registered against the

Petitioner and others, under Sections 302/307/34 of the Indian

Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. On supervision, the

case was found true under Sections 304(A)/308/109 of the

Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The

Petitioner was thereafter, taken into custody in connection with

the said case.

5.Subsequently, Departmental Enquiry No. 04 of 1999 was

drawn up against the petitioner, and a memo of charge dated

28.03.1999 (Annexure-1) was issued against the Petitioner. The

Superintendent of Police, East Champaran, Motihari, by order

dated 17.02.2004 bearing Memo No. 571 (Annexure-2), inflicted

the punishment of dismissal from service on the Petitioner in the

said Enquiry No. 04/99.

6.Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the Petitioner preferred

an appeal memorial before the Director General-cum-Inspector

General of Police, Bihar, inter alia on the ground that copies of

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the statements of witnesses recorded during the departmental

enquiry had not been supplied to him.

The said appeal was allowed by the Director General of

Police vide order dated 23.10.2006, bearing Memo No. 5567

(Annexure-3), with a specific direction to the disciplinary

authority to conduct the enquiry afresh. In pursuant to the said

order, the Superintendent of Police, East Champaran, Motihari,

by order dated 14.11.2006 bearing Memo No. 3954 (Annexure-

4), directed the petitioner to resume his duties and informed him

regarding the appointment of a new Enquiry Officer.

7.According to the Petitioner, the newly appointed Enquiry

Officer, though directed to hold the enquiry afresh, did not

examine a single witness named in the memo of charge and

merely relied upon the statements of witnesses recorded by the

earlier Enquiry Officer, thereby reducing the fresh enquiry to a

formality of merely handing over the earlier statements.

The Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated

18.12.2006 (Annexure-5), holding the charges to be proved.

Thereafter, a second show-cause notice dated 17.01.2007,

bearing Memo No. 191 (Annexure-6) was issued to the

petitioner, calling upon him to show cause against the proposed

punishment of dismissal.

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The petitioner submitted his reply dated 04.02.2007

(Annexure-7), specifically pleading that on the relevant date he

had gone to Somlata Theatre under the orders of the Circle

Officer and the Guard-in-charge, Nebulal Prasad. It was also

stated that there was no evidence to suggest that he had gone to

the said place on his own. The Petitioner also contended that he

was never accorded with any opportunity to adduce evidence in

his defense.

8.Without considering the reply of the show cause filed by

the petitioner and without appreciating that no enquiry had, in

substance, been conducted afresh, the Superintendent of Police,

East Champaran, Motihari, by order dated 09.08.2007, bearing

Memo No. 888 (Annexure-8), once again imposed the

punishment of dismissal on the Petitioner.

9.Assailing the aforesaid order of dismissal from service,

the Petitioner, once again preferred an appeal before the Director

General of Police (Annexure-9), and the same was forwarded to

the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Champaran Range,

Bettiah, vide Memo No. 2255 dated 27.04.2007. The Deputy

Inspector General of Police, without considering the appeal on

merits and misconstruing the fact, that it was the Petitioner who

started firing culminating into loss of lives of two persons,

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dismissed the appeal vide order dated 11.03.2008, bearing

Memo No. 202 (Annexure-10).

10.The Petitioner then preferred an appeal memorial dated

15.07.2015 (Annexure-11), reiterating that he had gone to

Somlata Theatre under the orders of the Circle Officer, Mehsi,

and that only one round of firing took place, that too by

Constable Nebulal Prasad.

The Petitioner also pointed out that Constable Prithvi

Nath Dubey, against whom the departmental proceeding was

also initiated on the very same charge, had died during the

pendency of the departmental proceeding, and subsequent to his

demise, his son was given appointment on compassionate

grounds.

11.Meanwhile, for the criminal case, which was lodged,

Sessions Trial No. 28 of 1999, arising out of Mehsi P.S. Case

No. 15 of 1998 proceeded, and the Petitioner, along with the

other accused persons, was acquitted vide judgment dated

09.08.2016, passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-

13, East Champaran, Motihari. Following his acquittal, the

petitioner moved an application dated 26.09.2016, before the

Director General of Police, Bihar, Patna, praying for his

exoneration from the charges.

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12.The Director General of Police, Bihar, on misconstruing

the facts in totality, recorded that fresh evidence had been

collected in the fresh enquiry, on the basis of which the order of

dismissal was passed against the Petitioner, thereby dismissing

the appeal memorial of the Petitioner vide order dated

15.03.2017, bearing Memo No. 3478 (Annexure-12). The said

authority placed greater emphasis on the Petitioner's application

dated 26.09.2016 than on the appeal of memorial itself. This

order was communicated to the petitioner vide Memo No. 1759

dated 17.05.2017.

13.It is in this background that the petitioner has approached

this Court, inter alia, on the grounds that the Enquiry Officer in

the fresh enquiry did not examine any witness and relied solely

on depositions recorded in the earlier enquiry.

The very foundation of the second round of the

departmental enquiry stood vitiated inasmuch as, the Enquiry

Officer appointed pursuant to the order of the Director General

of Police dated 23.10.2006 (Annexure-3), though specifically

directed to conduct the enquiry afresh, did not examine a single

witness cited in the memo of charge, and merely appropriated

the depositions recorded by the earlier Enquiry Officer in the

proceeding that already stood set aside.

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It is submitted, that the same, reduced the fresh enquiry to

an empty formality and denied the petitioner any real

opportunity to test the departmental evidence through cross-

examination.

14. Furthermore, the counsel for the Petitioner submits that

the charges cannot be said to have been proved in the

departmental enquiry when no proper opportunity was accorded

to the petitioner to examine his witnesses, the same being the

reason for vitiating the enquiry for breach of natural justice.

It is also submitted that the punishment is founded on a

pre-determined opinion, rendering the enquiry an empty

formality and that the order of punishment is a non-speaking

order, unsupported by cogent evidence. It is also submitted that

the disciplinary and appellate authorities failed to apply their

mind inasmuch as, the charge against the petitioner has been

found on the very occurrence, in respect of which, he has been

acquitted in the criminal proceedings. The judgment acquitting

the Petitioner has been brought on record by way of rejoinder to

the counter affidavit.

15.Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondents states

that the Petitioner, being Constable No. 765, along with

Constable No. 771 Nebulal Prasad and Constable No. 691

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Prithvi Nath Dubey, went to the Sonamlata Theatre on his own

will and without the Guard Havildar, and opened fire on the

public mob, resulting in the death of two persons and injury to

others. In furtherance of the alleged incident, Mehsi P.S. Case

No. 15 of 1998 dated 23.03.1998, was registered under Sections

302/307/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, and, on

supervision, the same was found to be true under Sections

304(A)/308/109 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Simultaneously Departmental Proceeding No. 04 of 1999

was initiated, and the charges against the Petitioner was found to

be proved, resulting into the order of dismissal from service

being passed against him.

The Petitioner preferred an appeal before the DGP, Patna,

and was allowed vide Memo No. 5567 dated 23.10.2006, with a

specific direction of conducting the enquiry afresh. After re-

conducting the proceeding, the charges against the Petitioner

were found to be proved, and the Superintendent of Police,

Motihari, vide Memo No. 888/conf. dated 09.08.2007, passed

the order of dismissal against the Petitioner under Rule 824(a)

(b)(c) of the Bihar Police Manual.

16.Further the Respondent State contends that in their

counter affidavit, the facts stated in the writ petition, concerning

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the institution of Mehsi P.S. Case No. 15 of 1998, the initiation

and conduct of Departmental Proceeding No. 04 of 1999, the

orders passed therein, as well as the result of Sessions Trial No.

28 of 1999, in which the Petitioner has acquitted, are matters

borne out from the records and, therefore, require no separate or

specific reply.

The said stand of the respondents indicates that both the

criminal prosecution and the departmental proceeding arose out

of the same occurrence and formed part of the same factual

background.

17.Having heard the rival contentions of the both the parties

the primary issues which stands out for determination is

enunciated hereunder:

i.Whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witnesses, and

circumstances of the case, the charges in the criminal

proceedings are substantially identical to those in the

departmental proceedings, and such that an acquittal in the

criminal case would render the findings in the disciplinary

proceedings vulnerable.

ii.Whether the enquiry conducted "afresh" pursuant to the

order of the Director General of Police dated 23.10.2006

(Annexure-3), was, in substance, a fresh enquiry in

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compliance with the said direction and the principles of

natural justice, or whether it was rendered an empty formality

on account of non-examination of witnesses.

18.It is expedient to dwell into the fact that the Petitioner has

been honorably acquitted in Sessions Trial No. 28 of 1999,

arising out of Mehsi P.S. Case No. 15 of 1998, which was found

on the very same occurrence, the very same set of facts, as that

contained in the departmental memo of charge.

For the aforementioned issue, reliance has been placed

on G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in (2006) 5

SCC 446, and on the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of

India in Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors.

having Civil Appeal No. 5497 of 2025, arising out of SLP(C)

No. 9818 of 2017, which itself concerns with the dismissal of a

Bihar Police constable for the proposition that where the

departmental and criminal proceedings rest on an identical or

substantially similar factual matrix, and the criminal acquittal is

on merits and not on a mere technicality or benefit of doubt,

sustaining a contrary finding of guilt in the departmental

proceeding would be unjust, unfair and oppressive.

19.Nonetheless, this Court is cognizant of the settled position of

law that mere acquittal in a criminal trial does not, ipso facto, entitle a

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delinquent employee to reinstatement, since the standard of proof and

the nature of enquiry in a departmental proceeding are materially

different from those governing a criminal trial. However, by

appreciating the material facts and circumstances of the given case at

hand, it is imperative to adduce the governing principles of law by way

of the following judicial pronouncements.

20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of

Gujarat & Anr., reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446, the Supreme Court

was concerned with a case where the delinquent government servant,

having been found guilty and dismissed from service in a departmental

enquiry, was subsequently and honourably acquitted in a criminal trial

arising from the very same facts and evidence. Dealing with the effect

of such an acquittal on the departmental finding, the Supreme Court, in

paragraph 31 has held as follows (paraphrased in substance, the

material portion of the reasoning being):

"...In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the

department as well as criminal proceedings were the

same..." — that where the facts and evidence relied upon

in the departmental proceeding and in the criminal case

are one and the same, without any material difference

between the two, the distinction ordinarily drawn between

departmental and criminal proceedings, founded on

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differing approaches and differing standards or burden of

proof, ceases to have application; and that,

notwithstanding a valid finding recorded in the domestic

enquiry, an honourable acquittal of the employee,

rendered during the pendency of proceedings challenging

the dismissal, is a circumstance that must be given due

weight, in line with the earlier decision of the Court in

Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999)

3 SCC 679.

21. Even in the case of, Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar

& Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5497 of 2025 arising out of SLP(C) No.

9818/2017, reported in (2025 INSC 554) it can be seen that the

principle in G.M. Tank (supra) has been reiterated and applied by the

Supreme Court, in a case remarkably similar on facts. Maharana

Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors. (supra), too, was a case of a

Constable of the Bihar Police, dismissed from service in a

departmental proceeding arising out of an occurrence which also gave

rise to a criminal prosecution, in which the delinquent constable was

ultimately acquitted. The Supreme Court, formulated, amongst others,

the following question for determination:

"Whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witnesses, and

circumstances of the case, the charges in the criminal

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proceedings are substantially identical to those in the

departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in the

criminal case would render the findings in the

disciplinary proceedings vulnerable?"

22. Answering the said question, and reaffirming the ratio in G.M.

Tank (supra), the Supreme Court held, in substance, that while a mere

acquittal in a criminal case does not by itself entitle an employee to

have his dismissal set aside, where the charges, evidence, witnesses

and circumstances in the departmental and criminal proceedings are

identical or substantially similar, upholding a contrary finding of guilt

in the departmental enquiry would be unjust, unfair and oppressive.

The Court further held that expressions such as "benefit of

doubt" and "honourable acquittal" are not to be treated as mere

formalities or labels — the duty of the Court is to look to the substance

of the judgment of acquittal, and not merely to the terminology

employed therein.

The Supreme Court also held that failure on the part of the

State to produce the complete departmental enquiry file, when

specifically called upon to do so, attracts an adverse inference under

Section 114 (g), of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

23. Charges which are vague, indefinite or lacking material particulars

vitiate the resultant disciplinary finding; and denial to the delinquent

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employee of a real and effective opportunity to cross-examine a

material departmental witness causes prejudice sufficient enough, to

vitiate the enquiry, notwithstanding that the technical rules of evidence

applicable to a criminal trial do not, as such, govern a departmental

proceeding.

24. On applying the aforementioned principles of law, which has been

laid down by way of the afore noted judicial pronouncements, it is

relevant to point out the memo of charge contains the same allegation

which has been registered against the Petitioner in the criminal case.

In fact, the very genesis of the memo of charge happens to be

the registration of FIR bearing Mehsi P.S. Case No. 15 of 1998 dated

23.03.1998 under sections 302, 307/34 of IPC section 27 of the Arms

Act.

25. At this juncture, it is not out of place to mention that the

departmental proceeding and Mehsi P.S. Case No. 15 of 1998, which

ultimately gave rise to Sessions Trial No. 28 of 1999, arose out of the

same occurrence of the night intervening 22/23.03.1998 at Somlata

Theatre. The allegations in both proceedings emanated from the same

factual background and occurrence.

The respondents, in their counter affidavit, have also referred to

the criminal case, the departmental proceeding and the result of the

criminal trial as matters borne out from the records. Thus, it is not in

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dispute that the criminal prosecution and the departmental proceeding

arose out of the same occurrence and were founded on substantially

overlapping factual allegations.

26. The petitioner was acquitted in Sessions Trial No. 28 of 1999 by

judgment dated 09.08.2016. It is the specific case of the petitioner, as

pleaded in his reply to the counter affidavit, that the acquittal was on

merits and not merely on the ground of benefit of doubt.

The petitioner has further asserted that, upon appreciation of the

evidence adduced during the criminal trial, no material sufficient to

substantiate the charge against him was found. The respondents have

not specifically controverted the said assertion by filing any further

affidavit.

The acquittal of the petitioner, arising out of the same

occurrence which formed the basis of the departmental proceeding, is,

therefore, a relevant circumstance to be taken into consideration while

examining the sustainability of the impugned departmental action.

27. Moreover, independently of the effect of the acquittal, the manner

in which the fresh departmental enquiry was conducted pursuant to the

order of the Director General of Police dated 23.10.2006, bearing

Memo No. 5567 (Annexure-3), raises a serious issue relating to

compliance with the principles of natural justice.

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The earlier departmental proceeding had been set aside and a

fresh enquiry was directed to be conducted, the grievance of the

petitioner being that the statements of the departmental witnesses had

not been supplied to him. However, according to the specific case of

the petitioner, which finds support from the enquiry report dated

18.12.2006 (Annexure-5), the newly appointed Enquiry Officer did not

independently examine the witnesses cited in the memo of charge and

proceeded on the basis of the statements recorded during the earlier

enquiry.

Consequently, the petitioner was deprived of an effective and

meaningful opportunity to test the departmental evidence and to cross-

examine the witnesses. Such a procedure which was adopted, prima

facie also defeated the very purpose of the order directing a fresh

enquiry and rendered the fresh proceeding vulnerable on the ground of

violation of the principles of natural justice.

28. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the governing

principles of law enunciated hereinabove, this Court finds it

appropriate to hold that the enquiry purportedly conducted afresh,

pursuant to the order dated 23.10.2006 (Annexure-3), was not, in

substance, a fresh enquiry, but a mere continuation, in form, of the

earlier vitiated proceeding, inasmuch as, no witness was examined

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afresh and the petitioner was denied any real opportunity of cross-

examination.

Further, the departmental proceeding and the criminal

prosecution arose out of the same occurrence and were founded on

substantially overlapping factual allegations.

29. It is needless to state that the petitioner was acquitted in Sessions

Trial No. 28 of 1999 by judgment dated 09.08.2016. The said acquittal,

arising out of the same occurrence, is a relevant circumstance to be

taken into account while examining the sustainability of the

departmental action.

30. Having regard to the fact that the departmental proceeding and the

criminal prosecution arose of the same occurrence, and, more

importantly, that the fresh departmental enquiry was conducted without

independently recording the evidence of the departmental witnesses

and without according the Petitioner an effective opportunity of cross-

examination, the impugned departmental actions cannot be sustained in

law.

31. In view of the findings recorded hereinabove, this writ petition

stands allowed in the following terms:

(i)The order dated 09.08.2007 bearing Memo No. 888 (Annexure-

8), passed by the Superintendent of Police, East Champaran,

Motihari; the order dated 11.03.2008, bearing Memo No. 202

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(Annexure-10), passed by the Deputy Inspector General of

Police, Champaran Range, Bettiah; and the order dated

15.03.2017, bearing Memo No. 3478 (Annexure-12), passed by

the Director General of Police, Bihar, Patna, are hereby quashed

and set aside.

(ii)The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in

service. The question as to the manner in which the intervening

period is to be treated and the consequential monetary benefits,

if any, shall be determined by the competent authority in

accordance with law by passing of a reasoned order.

(iii)The question of payment of back wages, and the quantum

thereof, is left open to be determined by the respondents.

32. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the writ

petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

33. There shall be no order as to costs.

sanjeev/-

(Kumar Manish, J)

AFR/NAFR AFR

CAV DATE 17.08.2026

Uploading Date 03.09.2026

Transmission Date