Cr.A.234-2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 234 of 2018

Tahir Khan S/o. Tasbbar Khan Pathan                                          

Aged about 37 years

R/o Room No. 3219, 

Zuppadpati, Shah Bhaga, 

Rander, Surat,Gujarat State                                                           ...APPELLANT  

   v/s.

1. State of Maharashtra

2. Union Territory of Daman                                                       ...RESPONDENTS

Ms. Nafeesa Khan a/w Ms. Sheeba Khan a/w Adv. Mr. N.V. Khan a/w Mr. Samer

Sharif for Appellant.

Mr. Amit Munde APP for the Respondent No. 1- State.

Mr. Ashwin Thool a/w Ms. Archishmati Chandramore for Respondent No. 2-

Union Territory.

 CORAM:MANISH PITALE &

SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.

                       RESERVED ON: 24

th

  JUNE, 2026

       PRONOUNCED ON: 22

nd

 SEPTEMBER, 2026

----------------

JUDGMENT (Per Shreeram Shirsat, J.)

1. The present Appeal has been filed challenging the impugned judgment and

order dated 24.05.2017 passed by the Court of Session at Daman in Sessions Case

No.   27/2013,   whereby   the   Appellant   has   been   convicted   for   the  offence

punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and has been

sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) for Life and to pay a fine of Rs.

500/- and in default, to suffer R.I. for 15 days in Crime No. 20/2013 registered

by the Coastal Police Station, Moti Daman.

Vishal Parekar ….1

VISHAL

SUBHASH

PAREKAR

Digitally signed by

VISHAL SUBHASH

PAREKAR

Date: 2026.09.22

15:08:54 +0530

Cr.A.234-2018

2. Brief facts of the prosecution case are as under:

a. It is the case of the prosecution that Hasruddin Sarafuddin Shaikh

(deceased) and the Appellant were acquainted with each other. Both

were fruit sellers and room partners. They were both residing in

Surat.

b. On 21.05.2013 i.e. the day of the incident, both the Appellant as

well as the deceased had gone to Daman, they consumed liquor in an

open compound near Girish Bar, Kachigaon. At about 2:00 a.m.,

while they were preparing to go back to Surat, the Appellant asked

the deceased to lift the bag that contained wine and beer. Upon the

denial of the deceased to lift the said bag, the Appellant assaulted

him with a knife, caused him several injuries and fled away.

c. In   the   early   morning   of   22.05.2013,   a   waiter   from   Girish  Bar,

Kachigaon, saw the deceased lying in an injured condition in an

abandoned building. Thereafter, the owner of the said bar informed

the police. The police sent the deceased to Government Hospital,

Marward, where the deceased underwent surgery. 

d. Thereafter FIR bearing CR No 20/2013 came to be registered on

22/5/2013 at Coastal Police Station, Moti Daman, under section 307

and 504 IPC.

e. As the condition of Hasruddin Sarafuddin Shaikh was not improving,

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he   was   shifted   to   J.J.   Hospital,   Mumbai   on   26.05.2013.   While

undergoing   treatment   at   J.J.   Hospital,   Mumbai,   the   deceased

succumbed to his injuries on 04.06.2013. The offence which was

initially registered under section 307 IPC  was converted to 302 IPC.

f. During the course of the investigation, the Appellant came to be

arrested   on   06.07.2013.   After   completion   of   investigation,   the

chargesheet   was   filed   before   the   Judicial   Magistrate   First   Class

(JMFC), Daman. Thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of

Sessions,  Moti  Daman and  was  registered   as Sessions  Case  No.

27/2013. The charge came to be framed under Section 302 of the

IPC on 12.10.2015.

g. To bring home the guilt of the Appellant, the prosecution examined

11 witnesses (P.W. 1 to P.W. 11):

P.W. NAME ROLE

1. Shyam Bahadur Waiter at the Girish Bar who �rst saw the

Victim (deceased) in an injured condition

2. Kiranbhai Patel Head Constable

3. Dharmendrabhai

Bhandari

Panch Witness to the spot of the incident

(Hostile)

4. Yogendra Kanojia Panch Witness to the search and seizure of

the Appellant on 06.07.2013

5. Dr. Sudarshan ThakurMedical O�cer at Govt. Hospital, Marward

who was present at the time of recording

Dying Declaration on 22.05.2013

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Cr.A.234-2018

6. Dr. Harshulash

Panshiwaikar

Medical O�cer at J.J. Hospital, Mumbai who

conducted the post-mortem on 04.06.2013

7. Dr. Hetav Sadadiwal Medical O�cer who collected the blood

samples of the Appellant

8. Devendra Patel Panch Witness to the spot of the incident

(Hostile)

9. Dhiren Laraya Nodal O�cer, Vodafone, who produced

CDRs of numbers 9978556508 and

7874924397

10. Kailesh Chaudhary Photographer of the spot of incident

11. PSI Suresh Shah Investigating O�cer (I.O.)

3. Upon   completion   of   the   prosecution   evidence,   the   statement   of   the

Appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The case of the Appellant was

that of total denial and false implication. The Appellant in his statement recorded

under section 313 Cr.P.C. stated that the Police impleaded him by calling him to

the police station and one other person who was already present in the police

station was released and a false case was registered against him. However, the

Appellant neither led any defence evidence to substantiate his claims, nor did he

examine himself on oath.

4. After hearing the arguments adduced by the prosecution as well as the

defence and after going through all the evidence on record, the Sessions Judge,

Daman vide judgment and order dated 24.05.2017, was pleased to convict the

Appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and was

sentenced to undergo R.I. for Life and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- and in default, to

suffer R.I. for 15 days.

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Cr.A.234-2018

5. Being   aggrieved   by   the   judgment   and   order   of   conviction   dated

24.05.2017, in Sessions Case No. 27/2013, the Appellant has approached this

Court by way of the present Appeal.

6. Heard Learned Counsel Adv. Nafeesa Khan for the Appellant, Ld. APP Adv.

Amit Munde for the Respondent No. 1- State and Ld. Counsel Mr. Ashwin Thool

for Respondent No. 2- Union Territory.

7. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the prosecution has failed

to establish that the statement given by the deceased assumes the validity of a

dying declaration within the four corners of law.  It was argued that the said

statement was recorded on 22.05.2013 at Govt. Marwar Hospital in Daman,

when the victim  was in a semi-conscious state and therefore it was highly

improbable   that   the   deceased   could   have   narrated   the   facts   in   the   dying

declaration   as   is   claimed   by   the   prosecution   witnesses.   Moreover,   the

endorsement of the doctor, to the effect that the injured was fit to give a

statement, is absent. Further, it was also argued that the dying declaration was

not recorded before a Magistrate. Therefore, it was submitted that the dying

declaration cannot be regarded as a reliable and trustworthy piece of evidence. It

was further argued that the victim died after a period of 15 days from the date of

incident i.e on 04.06.2013 at J.J. Hospital in Mumbai and therefore no causal

connection or nexus can be attributed between the dying declaration and the

eventual death of the injured victim at such a later date. It was submitted by the

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Cr.A.234-2018

Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that the post-mortem recorded 59 injuries as

opposed to only 15 injuries and except 3 injuries, all the injuries were simple in

nature, which were noted at Govt. Marwar Hospital. It was argued that the rest of

the injuries must have appeared subsequently and that no explanation has been

provided for the same. It was also argued by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant

that the death of the deceased can be attributed to complications caused by lack

of proper treatment. The recovery of the weapon of assault i.e. the knife and

other articles has been contested by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant as the

panch witness for the spot panchnama has turned hostile. 

8. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has further argued that there is no

cogent evidence showing that the Appellant and the deceased were seen together

at the relevant time. Thereafter, the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant questioned the

non-production of the supplementary statement allegedly recorded by the police

in Marathi on 26.05.2017 at J.J. Hospital, Mumbai. It was also argued by the Ld.

Counsel for the Appellant that phone numbers of both, the deceased as well as

the Appellant were not registered in their own names, they were registered but,

in the name of certain unknown persons and further the prosecution failed to

establish how the said phones were connected to each of them. Thus, the Ld.

Counsel for the Appellant argued that the evidence on record is not cogent and it

does not inspire confidence and therefore the Appellant deserves to be acquitted.

9. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant relied upon Irfan @ Naka v. The State of

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Uttar Pradesh

1

.

10.

Per contra, the Ld. APP submitted that the Sessions Court rightly convicted

the  Appellant.  The  Ld. APP  submitted  that  the deceased  made  three dying

declarations which are consistent. It was pointed out that the statements made

before P.W. 1- the waiter, P.W. 2- the Head Constable and before P.W. 11- the

I.O. in the hospital are all consistent. It was submitted that there are no material

inconsistencies in any of the statements and the same were made voluntarily. As

regards the absence of a separate medical certificate, it was contended by the  Ld.

APP  that no such requirement arose at that stage. It was submitted that during

his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the Appellant admitted that the mobile

phone was recovered from him. As regards the discrepancy in injuries, the Ld.

APP submitted that the admission report was prepared at a preliminary stage and

only   major   injuries   were   noted   therein.   The   post-mortem   report,   however,

recorded all external and internal injuries, including abrasions, and therefore the

difference in the number of injuries stands satisfactorily explained. It was argued

by the Ld. APP that during the physical search of the Appellant, one Samsung-

make mobile handset along with a sim card was recovered from him, which

further lends corroboration to the mobile number given by the deceased to P.W.

11. The Ld. APP urged that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable

doubt and therefore the conviction be maintained.

11. The Ld. APP for the Respondent-State relied upon the following judgments

1 2023 INSC 758

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Cr.A.234-2018

to buttress their arguments:

1) Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Others

2

2) Tehal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab

3

3) State of Haryana v. Mange Ram and Others

4

4) Neeraj Kumar alias Neeraj Yadav vs. State of U.P. and Others

5

5) Sundar alias Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police

6

6) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mahipal

7

7) State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru

8

12. Although there is no eye witness to the actual incident, the entire case

hinges on the dying declaration made by the deceased to several witnesses.

Before adverting to the analysis of the evidence on record, this Court finds it

pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, 2002

9

, wherein it was held as under:

“3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such

declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when

every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and

the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth.

Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the

weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many

circumstances which may a�ect their truth. The situation in which a man is on

death bed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his

statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are

dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the court

insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full

con�dence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however

has to always be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a

result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also

must further decide that the deceased was in a �t state of mind and had the

opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in

2 (2000) 5 SCC 207

3 1980 (Supp) SCC 400

4 (2003) 1 SCC 637

5 2025 SCC OnLine Sc 2639

6 (2024) 12 SCC 764

7 (2018) 14 SCC 111

8 (2005) 11 SCC 600

9 (2002) 6 SCC 710

Vishal Parekar ….8

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order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a �t mental condition to make the

dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses

state that the deceased was in a �t and conscious state to make the declaration, the

medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no

certi�cation of the doctor as to the �tness of the mind of the declarant, the dying

declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in

any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or

otherwise will su�ce provided the indication is positive and de�nite. In most

cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is

reduced to writing by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a police o�cer.

When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate is

absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a

magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is

no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a

magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no

speci�ed statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value

or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts

and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the

person who records a dying declaration must be satis�ed that the deceased was in

a �t state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the

declarant was �t to make the statement even without examination by the doctor

the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to

voluntary and truthful. A certi�cation by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution

and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be

established otherwise.”

13.  This Court finds it necessary to delve into the dying declarations- both oral

and written, which forms the edifice of the prosecution case. Admittedly, as there

is no eye witness in the case, the evidentiary value of dying declaration gains

primary importance. However, before proceeding to weigh the dying declarations

relied upon by the prosecution, it would be appropriate to first record a finding as

to the nature of the death of the deceased.

14. To ascertain the nature of the death of the deceased, reference must be

made to the medical evidence and post-mortem report on record.

A] HOMICIDAL DEATH

15. P.W. 5- Dr. Sudarshan Thakur is the doctor who treated the deceased at

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Government  Hospital,  Marward.  He  deposed  that  on 22.05.2013,  he was  a

Medical Officer at Government Hospital, Daman, and on that day, the police had

brought one person by name Hasmuddin with the history of assault by somebody.

He deposed that at that time, Hasmuddin was semi-conscious. He further noted

the external injuries found on examination. 

“

(i) Incised wound having 6 x 5 x 0.5 cm. on the right side of the upper

chest laterally.

(ii) Incised wound having 5 x o.5 x 0.5 cm. on the right side of the pelvis

laterally.

(iii) Incised wound measuring 3 x 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm. on the left side of upper

chest.

(iv) Incised wound measuring 4 x 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm on neck.

(v) Incised wound measuring 4 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm on the neck.

(vi) Incised wound measuring 4 x 1 x0.5 cm. on the left side of upper chest

horizontally.

(vii) Incised wound measuring 4 x 1 x 0.5cm. on the left side of shoulder.

(viii) Incised wound measuring 2 cm 0.5 x 0.5 cm. On the left arm

horizontally.

(ix) Incised wound measuring 3 cm 0.5 cm 0.5 cm. On the right arm.

(x) Abrasion measuring 3 cm x 2 cm. on left arm.

(xi) Incised stab wound measuring 3 x 0.5 cm x0.5 cm. on back side laterally,

as well as another incised wound measuring 4 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm. on back side of

body laterally.

(xii) Incised wound measuring 4 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm. on the upper chest left side.

(xiii) Incised wound measuring 2 cm 0.5 x 0.5 cm on the right hand.

(xiv)Incised stab wound 4 cm x 2 cm. going straight inside on right side of

abdomen intestine blue pretending.

(xv) Incised wound measuring 2 cm x .5 x .5 on the right side of eyebrow.

”

16. P.W. 5 further deposed that the injuries were possible by hard and sharp

weapon. He also deposed that the injuries on upper chest and abdomen were

grievous in nature. He further deposed that on 22.05.2013, police came to the

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hospital and recorded the statement of the patient in his presence and that the

patient was semi-conscious, but was able to give his statement. He deposed that

he put his endorsement on the statement given by the patient( Exhibit 23). He

deposed that on 25.05.2013, the police had given him a letter seeking permission

to record the further statement of the injured and to collect the blood sample. He

further deposed that he collected the blood sample of the injured and sent it to

the Moti Daman Police Station vide letter dated 29.05.2013. He further deposed

that he was shown the knife (Article 4) and further deposed that the injuries

found on the person of the injured may be possible by this knife. In the cross-

examination, it was tried to be suggested that the injuries were possible if

someone falls on a broken glass bottle or on tin sheet or if someone falls from

height and rolls down or if someone falls on a sharp cutting instrument. It was

also tried to be brought on record that after 25.05.2013, the patient was referred

to another hospital as his condition was deteriorating. In the cross-examination,

this witness categorically admitted that within (during) those four days, the

patient was able to talk. Apart from this, there is nothing significant that has been

brought on record to discredit the credibility of this witness.

17. P.W. 6 is the Medical Officer at J.J. Hospital, Mumbai who examined the

deceased and conducted his post-mortem. He deposed that a patient namely,

Ashruddin Sharafuddin Sheikh was admitted in J.J. Hospital on 26.05.2013 after

being referred from Marward Hospital, Daman. He deposed that the victim died

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during treatment on 04.06.2013 at around 7 p.m. and that the body was sent for

post-mortem. He further deposed that the cause of the death was septicemia with

perforative peritonitis as a result of the complications caused by the incised stab

injuries and that the same was unnatural. P.W. 6 deposed that 59 injuries were

found on the body of the deceased as per Column No. 17. As per Column No. 19,

another 5 injuries were also found. He also categorically deposed that all the

injuries were ante-mortem. He also deposed that the “

stab and incised injuries

were serious type injuries and those were sufficient to cause the death in the

ordinary course of nature

.” He further deposed that the injuries might have been

possible by sharp and pointed weapons like knife, scissors, etc. P.W. 6 upon being

shown the weapon that is the knife (Article 4), stated that the injuries noticed by

him during the post-mortem might have been possible by such a weapon. It has

come in the cross-examination of P.W. 6 that the residue found in the stomach

i.e. the yellow fluid was not sent to the forensic laboratory. He further stated that

the same was not done as it had no significance. P.W. 6, in his cross-examination,

had stated that if proper treatment was not provided particularly in this case,

septicemia may be caused. Lastly, upon being asked in his cross-examination,

whether the deceased died due to the injuries and whether septicemia was

caused due to the injury to which this witness replied in the affirmative.

18. The evidence of P.W. 5 and P.W. 6, read together, establishes the case of

the prosecution on the circumstance of the nature of death. P.W. 5 found the

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deceased bearing multiple incised and stab injuries, caused by a hard and sharp

weapon, with the injuries on the chest and abdomen being grievous in nature.

P.W. 6, upon examination found the injuries to be of a serious nature, sufficient

in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It would be pertinent to note that

the testimony of these witnesses have not been shaken on this point in the cross-

examination. No suggestion was put to either of them that the death was natural,

self-inflicted, or owed to any cause independent of the assault. Even though PW 5

has expressed, when a suggestion was put, that injuries were possible if someone

falls on a broken glass bottle or on a tin sheet or if someone falls from height and

rolls down or if someone falls on a sharp cutting instrument, we are of the

opinion that the injuries are caused by knife and as also opined by PW 6 that  the

injuries noticed by him during the post-mortem might have been possible by knife

shown to him. We accordingly hold that there can be no doubt that the death of

the deceased was homicidal in nature. 

19. It was urged by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that the death of the

deceased cannot be attributed to the injuries said to have been inflicted upon

him,   inasmuch   as   the   deceased   did   not   succumb   immediately,   but   after   a

considerable   period   and   passed   away   only   on   04.06.2013,   on   account   of

septicemia with perforative peritonitis. It was therefore submitted that no nexus

could be established between the inflicted injuries and the eventual death, and

that in the absence of such a nexus, the case would not fall within the purview of

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culpable homicide.

20. It is now a settled position of law that where death occurs after an interval

of   time   on   account   of   septicemia   or   other   complications   supervening   upon

injuries which were themselves fatal, or sufficient in the ordinary course of nature

to cause death, the person responsible for inflicting those injuries does not stand

absolved merely by reason of the passage of time. In this regard, we may draw

valuable guidance from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

10

 which held as under:

“69. We may highlight few broad principles that the courts must keep in mind.

a. If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to cause death,

though the death occurred after several days of septicaemia or other

complications having supervened, yet it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls

within the �rst limb of Section 300 of the IPC.

b. If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were su�cient to cause death

in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is established that those injuries were

the intended injuries, though the death might have occurred after septicaemia

or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would

squarely fall under the third limb of Section 300 of the IPC and the accused is

therefore liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC.

c. If it is proved that the injuries were imminently dangerous to life, though

the death had occurred after septicaemia or other complications had

supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the fourth

limb of Section 300 of the IPC, provided, the other requirements like

knowledge on the part of the accused, etc. are satis�ed and so the accused

would be liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC. Here also, the

primary cause of the death is the injuries and septicaemia.

d. In judging whether the injuries in�icted were su�cient in the ordinary

course of nature to cause death, the possibility that skilful and e�cient

medical treatment might prevent the fatal result is wholly irrelevant.

e. If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused, then the

person in�icting the injuries is liable for causing death, even if death was not

the direct result of the injuries.

10 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1960

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f. Broadly speaking, the courts would have to undertake the exercise to

distinguish between two types of cases; �rst, where the intervening cause of

death, like peritonitis, is only a remote and a rather improbable consequence

of the injury; then it can be said that the injury is one which may, in particular

circumstances, result in death, but which may not in ordinary course of nature

be likely to lead to it. Secondly, where the complication which is the

intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the

injury. In that event, the probability is very high indeed, amounting to

practical certainty i.e., death is a result in due course of natural events. A deep

abdominal thrust with a knife followed by injury to the internal organs is

practically certain to result in acute peritonitis causing death. It is clearly a

case of murder under Section 302 and not merely of culpable homicide.

g. Even when the medical evidence does not say that any one of the injuries on

the body of the deceased was su�cient to cause death in the ordinary course

of nature, yet it is open to the Court to look into the nature of the injuries

found on the body of the deceased and infer from them that the assailants

intended to cause death of the deceased. If none of the injuries alone were

su�cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased,

cumulatively, they may be su�cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause

his death.

h. What the courts must see is whether the injuries were su�cient in the

ordinary course of nature to cause death, or to cause such bodily injuries as the

accused knew to be likely to cause death although death was ultimately due to

supervention of some other cause. An intervening cause or complication is by

itself not of such signi�cance. What is signi�cant is whether death was only a

remote possibility, or is one which would have occurred in due course.

i. To sum it up, where death is delayed due to later complications or

developments, the courts should consider the nature of the injury,

complications or the attending circumstances. If the complications or

developments are the natural, or probable, or necessary consequence of the

injury, and if it is reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury could be

said to have caused death. If on the other hand, the chain of consequences is

broken, or if there is unexpected complication causing new mischief, the

relation of cause and e�ect is not established, or the causal connection is too

remote then the injury cannot be said to have caused death. If the original

injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no di�erence that death is actually

caused by a complication naturally �owing from the injury and not the injury

itself, since causal connection is proximate.”

21. Applying this principle to the facts before us, we find that the deceased

sustained multiple grievous injuries on his upper chest and abdomen. P.W. 5,

who first examined the deceased, deposed that the injuries on the upper chest

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and abdomen were grievous in nature and were possible by a hard and sharp

weapon. P.W. 6 who conducted the post-mortem, deposed that the stab and

incised injuries were of a serious nature and were sufficient in the ordinary

course of nature, to cause death. In his cross-examination, this witness also

deposed that the septicemia which ultimately claimed the life of the deceased was

a   direct   result   of   the   complications   following   these   very   injuries.  P.W.   6

categorically mentions in the post-mortem report which is exhibited as Exhibit 29

that, the probable cause of death is attributable to “

Septicemia with perforative

peritonitis   as   a   result   of   complications   following   incised   stab   injuries

(Unnatural)”

. There is nothing on record which suggests the presence of any

independent or intervening cause, nor did the defence put any such suggestion to

either of the witnesses in the cross-examination. In these circumstances, we hold

that the interval before the deceased succumbed to his injuries does not, by itself,

detract from the homicidal nature of his death.

22. It was further contended by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that the

number of injuries found on the person of the deceased shows a marked variance.

It was submitted that P.W. 5 examined the deceased at the time of his admission

and noted only fifteen(15) external injuries, however P.W. 6, who conducted the

post-mortem after his death at J.J. Hospital, Mumbai, recorded as many as fifty-

nine(59)   injuries.   Hence,   it   was   thereby   urged   by   the   Ld.   Counsel   for  the

Appellant that such a stark escalation in the number of injuries casts serious

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doubt on the veracity of the   case of the prosecution. We find that this very

contention   was   considered   by   the   Sessions   Court   in   paragraph   46   of   the

impugned judgment by observing that that there was no evidence to show that

the deceased was assaulted at any point during the period of his treatment, from

the date of his admission at the Government Hospital, Daman, until his death at

J.J. Hospital, Mumbai.  It appears that the injuries which were noted at the time

when the injured was admitted to the Government Hospital Marward, Daman,

were at the preliminary stage when the injured was in an imminent need of the

treatment and therefore possibility cannot be ruled out that only prominent

injuries were noted. No doubt it raises a suspicion, however in the absence of any

material   brought   on   record   to   establish   anything   to   the   contrary,   the   said

argument of the defence pales into insignificance.

B] DYING DECLARATIONS :

23. Since this case hinges on the dying declaration it will be pertinent to

carefully analyse the multiple dying declarations in order to find out whether the

dying declarations inspire confidence and are not an outcome of any tutoring.

24. P.W. 1 Shyam Bahadur deposed that he was working as a waiter at Girish

Bar, Kachigam. He further deposed that on 21st May, 2013, his working hours

were 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. He further deposed that

at around 7:00 a.m., he saw one person lying in the land of Mohanbhai, and

therefore he woke up Kamal Sharma, who in turn woke up Vishnu Bhandari. He

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has further deposed that they went near that person and saw that he had no

clothes and had injuries on his neck, hands, and upper portion of the body, and

those injuries were bleeding. He further deposed that Vishnu asked that person as

to what had happened to him, to which he told that he came with his friend Tahir

from Surat and they drank. He further submitted that he also told that Tahir

asked him to lift the bag which he refused, hence he was assaulted with a knife.

He further deposed that Vishnu told this to Seth who then called the police and

the police came and took him. In the cross-examination, it has come by way of

omission that this witness has stated while giving his statement that the injured

had injuries on his neck, hands, and upper part, and had not worn upper wears.

Apart from the above omission, there is nothing to disbelieve the said witness, or

nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination. There is no cross-examination

on the core issue about what was narrated to Vishnu in the presence of P.W. 1

about Tahir assaulting the deceased. Apart from the suggestion that P.W. 1 was

not present when the deceased was narrating the incident to Vishnu, which has

been denied, the cross examination does not in any manner dislodge the evidence

of P.W. 1.

25. P.W.   2   Kiranbhai   Govandbhai   Patel,   Head   Constable,   Coastal   Police

Station, deposed that on 22nd May, 2013 at 7:10 a.m., he received a phone call

from one Vijaybhai in the outpost that one person was lying in injured condition

in the building situated in the compound of his land. He further deposed that he,

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along with Home Guard driver Praful Patel, went there and saw one person lying

on the corrugated box and that he had injuries on his neck, chest, hands, as well

as on the stomach and therefore he called the ambulance on 108. He further

deposed that he asked his name, to which he said that his name was Asharuddin

Shaffuddin Shaikh. He further deposed that he asked Asharuddin Shaikh as to

who assaulted him, to which he told that Tahir Pathan assaulted him with a big

knife. He further deposed that thereafter he informed the incident to PSI Mr. S.M.

Shah and Head Constable Kishan Halpati and asked them to reach Marwad

Hospital, Nani Daman. He further deposed that the injured Asharuddin Shaikh

told him that he was from UP and three days ago he had come to Surat which

was the place of the accused and he was selling fruits in Surat. He further

deposed that Asharuddin told him that on 21st May, 2013, he had been to Daman

with the accused for a tour and both of them had consumed liquor at Girish Bar.

He further deposed that Asharuddin told him that Tahir had brought one bag and

had purchased wine to take to Surat and after consuming liquor, both of them

came out of Girish Bar and sat under an almond tree in the open land near the

bar. He further told that they were ready to leave at 2 o'clock and Tahir asked

him to lift that bag, to which he denied and that Tahir took a big knife from the

bag and assaulted him on his neck. He further told that when he started running,

Tahir assaulted him on his neck, hands, and chest, and when he fell down Tahir

assaulted him on his stomach and Tahir fled away from there and thereafter he

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came into the abandoned building. In the cross-examination, the said witness has

admitted that except the victim, no other person had given him the information

about the incident. 

26. In the cross-examination, P.W. 2 Kiranbhai Patel was asked whether he felt

it necessary to record the statement of the victim in the hospital, to which he

replied that as his senior officer had been to the hospital, hence he did not record

his statement. Further, in the cross-examination, much emphasis was on the point

that after receiving the information, whether the superiors were informed or

whether the incident was noted down in the station diary or the pocketbook.

Beyond   this,   there   is   nothing   much   to   discredit   the   witness   on   the   actual

narration about the assault given to this witness by the deceased. There is no

evidence brought on record to discredit the testimony of this witness.

27. P.W. 11 Suresh Maganlal Shah, PSI, Nani Daman Police Station, deposed

that in the month of May, 2013, he was posted at Kachigam Outpost as In-charge.

He further deposed that on 22/5/2013 at about 7:30 a.m., he received a phone

call from Police Constable Shri Kiran Patel that, in the open compound land of

Girish Bar at Kachigam border, one person was lying injured. He deposed that he

asked him to go to the spot with a PCR vehicle and make an arrangement to take

him (the injured) to Marwad Hospital. He further deposed that he sent a message

to Head Constable Kishan Halpati calling him to Marwad Hospital and also told

him that he was also reaching there. He further deposed that they both reached

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Marwad Hospital and in the meantime, one injured was brought to Marwad

Hospital in an ambulance by Police Constable Kiran Patel. He further deposed

that   he  made  inquiry   with   the  said  injured  person,   who   told  his name   as

Husnuddin Shaikh. He further deposed that he issued a request letter to the

Medical Officer for providing him treatment. He further deposed that while he

was under treatment, he was in a conscious state of mind and was talking. He

further deposed that the deceased told him that he and his room partner, Tahir

Khan Pathan, came to Kachigam on the 21st day in the evening and they took

wine from that bar, drank and took food in the open compound of that hotel. He

further told that at night at 2 o'clock they were prepared to go to Surat and Tahir

Khan Pathan asked him to lift one bag and go, which he had denied and that bag

was containing wine. He further told that they then had an altercation and the

accused assaulted him with a knife-like weapon on his throat, chest, and other

parts. He further told that the accused ran away leaving him there and after

gaining sensation, he got up and went into the building in the said compound. He

further told that in the morning a few waiters came to him and he told them that

Tahir Khan assaulted him. He further deposed that he had recorded his statement

as per his narration in the presence of the doctor. During deposition, he was

shown the statement of the deceased. He identified the signature and thumb

impression of the deceased as well as the endorsement of the doctor. He deposed

that the contents of the statement of the deceased were true and correct, and it

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also bears his signature. He further deposed that he lodged a report against the

accused with Coastal Police Station and a Crime bearing No. 20 of 2013 was

registered against the accused.  

28. In the cross-examination, the said witness denied the suggestion put to him

that the injured was not fully conscious at that time. He admitted that he had

seen the injuries on his person and that he took the statement of the deceased at

about 8:15 a.m. He also agreed that the doctor had put his endorsement after

recording the statement. He further stated in the cross-examination that the

recording of the statement and his medical treatment were simultaneously going

on. He also categorically admitted that he did not feel that the deceased was

giving   the   statement   under   the   influence   of   alcohol.   Further   in   the  cross-

examination, he was also asked whether he felt it necessary to get the dying

declaration recorded by the Magistrate, to which he has deposed that he did not

feel it necessary. Further in the cross-examination, he once again admitted that

during the course of recording the report, the complainant was fully conscious;

however, he also stated that he did not try to obtain a certificate from the doctor

about his full consciousness. He further stated in the cross-examination that since

22.05.2013 to 26.05.2013, when the patient was hospitalized, he visited thrice;

however, he had not recorded the statement of the doctor who operated on the

deceased. He further stated in the cross-examination that he did not obtain a

certificate regarding the condition of the injured for the period 22/5/2013 till

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26/5/2013 from the doctor. He further admitted that on 25/5/2013, he recorded

the supplementary statement of the deceased; however, he did not obtain a

certificate from the doctor with regard to his consciousness. Beyond this, there is

not much cross-examination on the actual narration given by the deceased to this

witness. 

29. Although in the cross-examination of P.W. 1, the narration that the injured

had injuries on his neck, hands, and upper part, and had not worn upper wears

has come by way of omission, P.W. 2 and P.W. 11 have categorically deposed

about the same and the said depositions have not be demolished in the cross

examination of P.W. 2 and P.W. 11.

30. Having set out the oral dying declarations made by the deceased before

P.W. 1 and P.W. 2, and the written dying declaration recorded by P.W. 11, in

extenso, it would now be apposite to test these declarations on the touchstone of

the principles governing their acceptance. 

31. In this regard, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Irfan @ Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh

11 wherein it has been

held as under:

62. There is no hard and fast rule for determining when a dying declaration

should be accepted; the duty of the Court is to decide this question in the facts

and surrounding circumstances of the case and be fully convinced of the

truthfulness of the same. Certain factors below reproduced can be considered to

determine the same, however, they will only a�ect the weight of the dying

declaration and not its admissibility: -

(i) Whether the person making the statement was in expectation of death?

11 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1060

Vishal Parekar ….23

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(ii) Whether the dying declaration was made at the earliest opportunity? “Rule

of First Opportunity”

(iii) Whether there is any reasonable suspicion to believe the dying declaration

was put in the mouth of the dying person?

(iv) Whether the dying declaration was a product of prompting, tutoring or

leading at the instance of police or any interested party?

(v) Whether the statement was not recorded properly?

(vi) Whether, the dying declarant had opportunity to clearly observe the

incident?

(vii) Whether, the dying declaration has been consistent throughout?

(viii) Whether, the dying declaration in itself is a manifestation /�ction of the

dying person’s imagination of what he thinks transpired?

(ix) Whether, the dying declaration was itself voluntary?

(x) In case of multiple dying declarations, whether, the �rst one inspires truth

and consistent with the other dying declaration?

(xi) Whether, as per the injuries, it would have been impossible for the deceased

to make a dying declaration ?

32. Upon a perusal of the oral dying declarations made by the deceased orally

to P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 and the written dying declaration made to P.W. 11, we find

that they are consistent and cogent. The deceased was able to describe the

incident in explicit detail and continued to mention ‘Tahir’ as being the individual

who caused him the stab injuries. The circumstances leading up to the injury and

the manner in which the injury was caused to him, both were described by the

deceased consistently and there is no material discrepancy in his stance for us to

conclude that the said dying declarations are false or as  a result of tutoring or

prompting or unworthy of credence.

33. Hence, on a conjoint reading of all the dying declarations on record, and

testing   them   against   the   guidelines   enumerated   in  

Irfan Naka (supra),   we

accordingly hold the dying declarations to be truthful, voluntary and worthy of

credence.

Vishal Parekar ….24

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34. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has raised doubts over the validity of the

dying declaration. It was argued that the deceased did not succumb to his injuries

immediately, and that his belated death must be taken into account. It was

therefore submitted that the statement recorded by P.W. 11 immediately after the

incident cannot be treated as a valid dying declaration, since the deceased was

not under the shadow of death or in expectation thereof when he made it. In our

considered view, a plain reading of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act makes

it abundantly clear that the provision takes into account that the statement of an

injured person, not under the expectation of death, if he dies subsequent to such

statement being recorded, then there is no bar in treating such a statement as a

dying declaration, as long as the cause of death can be attributed to the same

cause. The Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Neeraj Kumar @Neeraj

Yadav (supra) has further reinforced the fact that delay in death cannot result in

invalidation of the dying declaration, which was obtained at the time when the

deceased was not under the shadow of imminent death. It states as follows:

“

16. Additionally, in our considered view, the High Court erred in holding that

these statements cannot be treated as dying declaration(s) merely because the

death of the deceased occurred after a substantial lapse of time from their

recordings. Such an approach is clearly untenable since the law does not

require that a declarant, at the time of making the statement, to be under the

shadow of death or the expectation that death is imminent. Here the time gap

between the incident and the death is less than 2 months. In any event, Section

32 of the Evidence Act, contains no such limitation. What is pertinent is that

the statement relates either to the cause of death or the circumstances leading

to it. [See: Rattan Singh v. State of H.P.

21

; Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab

22

;

and Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan

23

]”

35. In this regard, the Ld. APP has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble

Vishal Parekar ….25

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Supreme Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Others.

12

 Upon a perusal of the

same, we find the same to be relevant as it reiterates that an expectation of

imminent death is not necessary for a statement to qualify as a dying declaration.

The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereunder:

“11. Section 32 of the Evidence Act is admittedly an exception to the general rule

of exclusion to the hearsay evidence and the statements of a person, written or

verbal, of relevant facts, after his death are admissible in evidence if they refer to

the cause of his death or to any circumstances of the transaction which resulted in

his death. To attract the provisions of Section 32, for the purposes of admissibility

of the statement of a deceased the prosecution is required to prove that the

statement was made by a person who is dead or who cannot be found or whose

attendance cannot be procured without any delay or expense or he is incapable of

giving evidence and that such statement had been made under any of the

circumstances speci�ed in sub-sections (1) to (8) of Section 32 of the Act. Section

32 does not require that the statement sought to be admitted in evidence should

have been made in imminent expectation of death. The words “as to any of the

circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death” appearing in Section

32 must have some proximate relations to the actual occurrence. In other words

the statement of the deceased relating to the cause of death or the circumstances of

the transaction which resulted in his death must be su�ciently or closely

connected with the actual transaction. To make such statement as substantive

evidence, the person or the agency relying upon it is under a legal obligation to

prove the making of such statement as a fact. If it should be proved by examining

the person who heard the deceased making the statement…..”

36. Additionally, the Ld. APP has also relied on the judgments of the Hon’ble

Apex Court in the case of 

Tehal Singh and Otrs. v. State of Punjab (supra) State

of Haryana v. Mange Ram & Ors. (supra) which elaborates upon true meaning of

Section 32 of the Evidence Act as already stated above in Kans Raj (supra).

37. It was further urged by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that the dying

declaration cannot be said to be worthy of credence, as the deceased was in a

semi-conscious state at the relevant time, and no certificate or endorsement was

obtained from the doctor as to his fitness to make a statement. It was hence

12 (2000) 5 SCC 207

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submitted that in the absence of such an endorsement, coupled with the fact that

the deceased was in a semi-conscious condition, the statement recorded by P.W.

11 cannot safely be relied upon as a dying declaration. It was further contended

that the I.O. had ample time and opportunity to get the statement of the deceased

recorded by a Magistrate, but failed to do so, and that such a lapse diminishes the

evidentiary  worth of  the statement. In  order  to counter  this argument,  the

prosecution relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeraj

Kumar (supra), which lays as under:

“We �nd these contentious bereft of any merit. We say so because it is a well-established

position of law that a statement made by a deceased person, as to the cause of his death or

to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, to a Police O�cer

and recorded under Section 161 CrPC, shall be relevant and admissible under Section

32(1) of the Evidence Act, notwithstanding the express bar provided in Section 162

CrPC. Such a statement, upon the death of the declarant, assumes the character of a

dying declaration. It is also equally settled that a dying declaration need not necessarily be

recorded in the presence of the Magistrate, and that the lack of a doctor’s certi�cation as

to the �tness of the declarant’s state of mind would not ipso facto render the dying

declaration unacceptable. This position has been recently reiterated by this Court in

Dharmendra Kumar v. State of M.P., wherein it was held:

“65. Section 161 CrPC empowers the police to examine orally any person

who is acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case under

investigation. The police may reduce such statement into writing also.

Section 162(1) CrPC, nonetheless, mandates that no statement made by

any person to a police o�cer, if reduced to writing, be signed by the

person making it, nor shall such statement be used in evidence except to

contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the

Evidence Act. However, sub-section (2) of Section 162CrPC carves out

an exception to sub- section (1) as it explicitly provides that nothing in

Section 162 shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the

ambit of clause (1) of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. In other words, a

statement made by a person who is dead, as to the cause of his death or to

the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, to a

police o�cer and which has been recorded under Section 161 CrPC, shall

be relevant and admissible, notwithstanding the express bar against use of

such statement in evidence contained therein. In such eventuality, the

statement recorded under Section 161CrPC assumes the character of a

dying declaration. Since extraordinary credence has been given to such

dying declaration, the court ought to be extremely careful and cautious in

placing reliance thereupon.”

Vishal Parekar ….27

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38. Therefore, considering the law laid down by the Apex Court and in the

peculiar facts of the case, neither the absence of a certification by the doctor

regarding the fitness of the injured nor the omission to have the statement

recorded   by   a   Magistrate   would   affect   the   evidentiary   value   of   the  dying

declaration recorded by P.W. 11, and hence the contentions urged on behalf of

the Appellant are 

dehors of any merits.

39. As regards the contention raised about the semi-conscious condition of the

deceased, we find it useful to refer to the Constitution Bench judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in 

Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (supra), wherein it

was held that:

“The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a �t state of mind

and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally,

therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a �t mental

condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But

where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a �t and conscious state

to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said

that since there is no certi�cation of the doctor as to the �tness of the mind of

the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable.”

40. P.W. 11, who recorded the dying declaration, has himself deposed that the

deceased   was   conscious   and   talking   at   the   time   the   statement   was   taken.

Therefore, applying the principles laid down in 

Laxman (supra) to the facts of the

present case, we find no merits in this submission of the Appellant.

41. Upon a perusal of the oral dying declarations made by the deceased, we

find that the cause of the said scuffle between ‘Tahir’ and the deceased has also

been consistently described by the deceased.

Vishal Parekar ….28

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  C] IDENTITY OF THE APPELLANT :

42. It is well settled that conviction can rest on a dying declaration alone,

provided the same is found to be voluntary, truthful and free from tutoring and

indeed in the present case we have come to a conclusion that we find the Dying

Declarations to be voluntary, truthful and free from any tutoring. However in the

present case a suspicion is sought to be raised by the Ld. Counsel for the

Appellant as regards the very identity  of the assailant named in the  dying

declarations. It was submitted that in the dying declarations recorded, oral as

well as written, the deceased named his assailant as ‘Tahir’, ‘Tahir Kunnu Pathan’

or ‘Tahir Pathan’, whereas the Appellant has throughout identified and signed

himself as ‘Tahir Khan’. It was further submitted that in his statement under

Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the Appellant has taken the plea that he was falsely

implicated by the police, and that he was called to the police station and arrested,

while another person already present therein was let off. It was thus urged by the

Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that even assuming for the sake of arguments the

dying declarations are held to be reliable, the prosecution has failed to establish

the elementary fact that the Appellant so convicted is the very person named by

the deceased as his assailant. 

43. On this backdrop, it would now be relevant to examine whether the

evidence on record cogently establishes that the identity of the assailant, as it

emerges  from   the   dying   declarations,   is   one  and   the   same,  as  that   of  the

Vishal Parekar ….29

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Appellant before us.

44. Upon going through the records, we do not find that the issue of identity

and the plea of false implication was raised at any point of time earlier or that

any foundation was laid during the evidence. It is only at the stage of recording

the statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C that for the first time this issue was

raised while answering Question No. 81 wherein it is stated by the Appellant that

“

Police impleaded me by calling, one other men was in police station . Police

released him and made a false case against.

”

45. The Appellant, although has raised this issue, and which he is entitled to at

the appellate stage as well, does not in any manner support it by any cogent or

convincing material. No doubt the law on this aspect is no more r

es integra that

the accused does not have to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt and can

rest his case on the preponderance of probability. However, merely making a bald

statement that he was falsely implicated is not enough as none of the allegations

about false implication or the doubt raised about his identity by the Appellant

could be established. Even at this stage, the Ld. counsel for the Appellant was not

in a position to point out any material on record which could suggest that the

Appellant was falsely implicated. Just because Appellant is referred to as Tahir’ by

P.W. 1, ‘Tahir Kunnu Pathan’ by P.W. 2 , ‘Tahir Pathan’ by P.W. 11 and he himself

referring as ‘Tahir Khan’ in itself is not sufficient to raise a doubt.  

 At this stage it

will be advantageous to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of

Vishal Parekar ….30

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Munish Mubar v. The State of Haryana

13.

“25. Moreso, it was the duty of the appellant to furnish some explanation in his

statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., as under what circumstances his car had been

parked at the Delhi Airport and it remained there for 3 hours on the date of

occurrence. More so, the call records of his telephone make it evident that he was

present in the vicinity of the place of occurrence and under what circumstances

recovery of incriminating material had been made on his voluntary disclosure

statement. Merely making a bald statement that he was innocent and recoveries had

been planted and the call records were false and fabricated documents, is not

enough as none of the said allegations made by the appellant could be established.”

46. Thus, in wake of the law laid down by the Supreme Court we do not find

any substance in the contentions raised by the Appellant about the issue of

identity. Thus, we are of a considered view that this argument is nothing but an

afterthought, raised by the Appellant in his defence.

47. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant further attempted to assail the case of

the prosecution by furthering that, the identity of the Appellant can also be said

to have been mistaken, in light of the arrest of the Appellant, which was wrongly

effected on the basis of the Call Detail Records (CDRs) and the IMEI numbers

found during the course of investigation. It was submitted that the entire chain

sought to be established by the prosecution, from the mobile number allegedly

furnished   by   the   deceased   to   the   eventual   arrest   of   the   Appellant,   rests

prominently and substantially upon the CDRs and the IMEI details obtained

through the course of the investigation. It has been primarily contended that the

CDRs relied upon by the prosecution were obtained only on 02.09.2013, whereas

the Appellant had already been arrested on 06.07.2013.

13AIR 2013 Supreme Court 912

Vishal Parekar ….31

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48. We find no merit in the contention that, merely on the ground that the

CDRs were obtained after the arrest, the arrest is to be rendered unfounded. The

delay in obtaining the said records, cannot be said to vitiate or render the arrest

illegal or to hold that it is a case of mistaken identity, as the requisite information

could have been procured by the police in the usual course of their investigation,

with the formal additional reports thereof being obtained subsequently. In any

event , the police machinery cannot be expected to reveal the source of their

information   or   how   the   information   was   obtained,   as   investigation  is   the

prerogative of the police, so long as it is not tainted. In the present case there is

no cross-examination to that effect and no doubt is raised over the investigation

on the said aspect. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the

said argument is untenable.

49. It was further submitted that the Mobile Phone No. 7874924397 was

registered in the name of Gyan Chandra Ram Ujagar (Exhibit 40) and the Mobile

Phone No. 9978556508 was registered in the name of Safdar Jamiluddin Siddiqui

(Exhibit 38), both of whose statements have not been recorded by the police.

Thus, it was argued that the mere production of CDRs does not, by itself,

establish the connection of Appellant with the said mobile numbers.

50. Thus, the issue that arises for consideration is whether the material relied

upon by the prosecution sufficiently establishes  the connection between the

Appellant and the Mobile Phone Numbers/IMEI relied upon by the Investigating

Vishal Parekar ….32

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Officer and whether the delayed subsequent procurement of the CDRs materially

affects the version of the prosecution regarding the circumstances in which the

Appellant came to be arrested.

51. It would be apposite to first set out the array of numbers as they emerge

from the records:

ROLE NUMBER IMEI

Number provided by the deceased 7874924397 351712504092424 0

Number traced by the police through the

IMEI of the old device

9978556508 3517125040924240

Number found in use upon arrest 9978556508 351712504092424 7

52. As   per   the   details   given   by   the   deceased,   the   Mobile   Phone  No.

7874924397 was the number belonging to the Appellant, and this number is

reflected against IMEI No. 3517125040924240 in the CDRs proved by P.W. 9.

Upon analysis of these very records, the police discovered that the same IMEI No.

i.e 3517125040924240, came to be subsequently associated with a new Mobile

Phone No. which was 9978556508. It was thereby concluded that the handset

itself remained the same, while only the Mobile Phone Number had changed. It

was on the strength of this discovery that the CDRs of the Mobile Phone No.

9978556508 were sought and obtained, and it was this very number that led the

police to the Appellant. Upon the arrest of the Appellant, the handset recovered

from his person was found to be in use with the very Mobile Phone Number thus

Vishal Parekar ….33

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traced as 9978556508, and bore the IMEI No. 3517125040924247. On a plain

comparison, therefore, the IMEI number first attributed to the Appellant i.e.

3517125040924240, and the IMEI number found on the handset recovered from

him upon arrest, 3517125040924247, are identical except for the last digit.

53. It was on this discrepancy that the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant contended

that variance in the final digit renders the two IMEI numbers as those of two

distinct devices and therefore, the same cannot be said to be linked to the

Appellant.

54. On this point, it would be pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in  Sundar alias Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police

(supra), wherein the very question of variance in the last digit of an IMEI number

was adequately answered. It was held as under:

“23. Similarly, the contention based on the di�erence in the IMEI number

recorded in the seizure memo and the call detail records does not a�ect the

prosecution’s case for the following reason. The di�erence in the IMEI

number recorded in the seizure memo and the call detail record pertains to

the last digit of the 15-digit IMEI number. Every device has a unique IMEI

number identifying the brand owner in the model. The �rst 8 digits are the

Type Allocation Code (TAC) digits of which the initial 2 digits identify the

reporting body and the next 6 identify the brand owner and device model

allocated by the reporting body. The next 6 digits are the unique social

number assigned to individual devices by the manufacturer.

24. These 14 digits in the petitioner’s case match in both the seizure memo

and the call detail record. The last digit in the IMEI number is the “Luhn

check digit” based on a function of the other digits using an algorithm.

Technically, the last digit, which is the only digit that is di�erent in the

seizure memo and the call detail record, can be calculated through the

algorithm on the basis of the �rst 14 digits which are the same in both the

documents. As the last digit of an IMEI number is a function of the �rst 14

digits, as long as the �rst 14 digits are a match it can only lead to one unique

device. Accordingly, it can be conclusively said that a di�erence in only the

last digit of the IMEI number cannot imply that it represents the IMEI

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number of a separate device. Therefore, the di�erence in the last digit of the

IMEI number can reasonably be assumed to be a typographical error and

does not raise a doubt in the prosecution’s case.”

55. In the peculiar facts of the present case as well, since the first fourteen

digits of the IMEI number recovered from the Appellant are identical to the first

fourteen digits of the IMEI number first attributed to him, the variance in the

final digit does not, on the reasoning as iterated in  

Sundar alias Sundarrajan

(supra), suggest two separate devices. We accordingly find that the chain of

connection stands established on each of its links.

56. It would additionally be important to note that the Mobile Phone number

given by the deceased as that of the Appellant was itself found reflected against

the very IMEI number in question. Though a new Mobile Phone number came to

be  subsequently   inserted   into   that   handset,   the   fact   that   the   handset   itself

remained the same throughout is significant. The very foundation of the arrest

link, in our view, is the IMEI number as it traced back to the number originally

given by the deceased himself pointed turned to the Appellant. The prosecution

has relied upon the judgment of  State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias

Afsan Guru (supra) to substantiate the same.

57. This Court is also conscious of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in

the case of Rajesh v. State of M.P.

14

, which deals with the user of the sim card

and actual owner of the mobile phone not being examined to establish the link.

However in view of our findings with respect to the link having been cogently

14 (2023) 15 SCC 521

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Cr.A.234-2018

established, non examination of the Safdar Jamiluddin Siddiqui in whose name

the mobile No. 9978556508 was registered and Gyan Chandra Ram Gujar in

whose name mobile No. 7874924397 was registered pales into insignificance.

58. Another argument raised by Ld. Counsel for the Appellant was that the

Supplementary Statement of the victim, which was recorded at J.J. Hospital by

PSI from J.J. Marg police station on 26.05.2013 was not brought on record. It

was contended that the contents of this statement are at variance with all the

previous dying declarations recorded by P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 11.  We are

afraid that we cannot look into any such statement, which is neither exhibited

nor brought on record as duly proved. At best, the weight that can be attributed

to such a statement is equivalent to a statement recorded under Section 161 of

the Cr.P.C., which is inadmissible in evidence.

59. We   have   also   perused   the   evidence   with   respect   to   the   FSL   reports,

however   the  FSL  reports  with  respect  to   the  clothes  of  the   deceased   were

inconclusive and therefore the same aspect is not discussed in detail.

60. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has raised a contention/ground in his

memo, though not argued at the time of final hearing of the appeal,  that the

Sessions Court had erred in treating the case as one based on dying declarations,

instead of considering it as a case founded on circumstantial evidence. Although

this Court agrees that there is no eyewitness in the present case, however in light

of the judgments referred to above and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble

Vishal Parekar ….36

Cr.A.234-2018

Supreme Court, we find that the statements made by the victim concerning his

death and the circumstances leading thereto are worthy of credence and that can

be the sole basis for conviction. We further find that the statements are cogent,

consistent and have been made voluntarily and therefore satisfy the requirements

of a dying declaration. The prosecution has rightly founded its case upon the

three dying declarations made by the victim. Accordingly, we hold that the

Sessions Court was correct in considering the present case as one resting upon

the dying declarations of the deceased.

61. We   are   therefore   of   the   opinion   that   the   Appellant   has   been  rightly

convicted   by   the   Sessions     Court,   Daman   and   accordingly   we   uphold   the

conviction of the Appellant.

  Hence, the following order.

ORDER

1] Appeal stands dismissed.

2] All pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 

  (SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.)      (MANISH PITALE, J.)

Vishal Parekar ….37