FA.378.2001 copy - FINAL.docx

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO.378 OF 2001

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Dharmabai Balkrishna Gondhali & Ors. ....Respondents

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2462 OF 2026

IN

FIRST APPEAL NO.378 OF 2001

The City And Industrial Development

Corporation Of Maharashtra Limited ….Applicant

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Dharmabai Balkrishna Gondhali & Ors. ....Respondents

WITH

FIRST APPEAL NO.721 OF 2004

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Hari Kachar Waskar & Ors. ....Respondents

WITH

FIRST APPEAL NO.719 OF 2004

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Smt. Dharmabai Balkrishna Gondhali

is Deleted as expired

Rsp Nos. 2 To 5 Lr ....Respondents

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Aarti Palkar

AARTI

GAJANAN

PALKAR

Digitally

signed by

AARTI

GAJANAN

PALKAR

Date:

2026.10.01

17:20:09

+0530

FA.378.2001 copy - FINAL.docx

WITH

CIVIL APPLICATION NO.103 OF 2004

IN

FIRST APPEAL NO.719 OF 2004

The State of Maharashtra ….Applicant

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Smt. Dharmabai Balkrishna Gondhali

is Deleted as expired

Rsp Nos. 2 To 5 Lr ....Respondents

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO.8951 OF 2026

IN

FIRST APPEAL NO.719 OF 2004

The City And Industrial Development

Corporation Of Maharashtra Limited ….Applicant

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Smt. Dharmabai Balkrishna Gondhali

is Deleted as expired

Rsp Nos. 2 To 5 Lr ....Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPLICATION NO.4529 OF 2008

IN

FIRST APPEAL NO.719 OF 2004

The State of Maharashtra ….Applicant

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Smt. Dharmabai Balkrishna Gondhali

is Deleted as expired

Rsp Nos. 2 To 5 Lr ....Respondents

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WITH

CROSS OBJECTION (ST) NO.29055 OF 2007

IN

FIRST APPEAL NO.719 OF 2004

The State of Maharashtra ….Applicant

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Smt. Dharmabai Balkrishna Gondhali

is Deleted as expired

Rsp Nos. 2 To 5 Lr ....Respondents

WITH

FIRST APPEAL NO.718 OF 2004

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Smt. Chhindhibai Ganpat Thakur

Deceased Through Her Lrs.1

Smt. Bhimabai Bashri Masane & Ors. ....Respondents

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO.8943 OF 2026

IN

FIRST APPEAL NO.718 OF 2004

The City And Industrial Development

Corporation Of Maharashtra Limited ….Applicant

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Smt. Chhindhibai Ganpat Thakur

Deceased Through Her Lrs.1

Smt. Bhimabai Bashri Masane & Ors. ....Respondents

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WITH

FIRST APPEAL NO.720 OF 2004

The State of Maharashtra ….Appellant

Versus

Hari Kacher Waskar & Anr. ....Respondents

Mr. A.R. Patil, Addl.G.P. for State.

Mr. S.S. Punde a/w. Deepa Punde, for Respondents.

Ms Aruna G. Koli i/b. Ganesh Koli, for Respondent Nos.2 to 4.

Mr. G.S. Hegde, Sr. Counsel a/w. Ms P.M. Hansali, for Respondent-

CIDCO.

Adv. Shriram Kulkarni, for Land Losers.

CORAM: SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.

RESERVED ON:APRIL 18, 2026

PRONOUNCED ON : OCTOBER 1, 2026

JUDGEMENT:

Context and Background:

1. Interim Application No.2462 of 2026 (“Impleadment Application”) is

filed by City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Limited

(“CIDCO”) seeking to be impleaded in the State’s First Appeal No.378 of 2001

(“Appeal”) on the premise that CIDCO would be vitally affected by the decision

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in the Appeal and that justice, equity and good conscience require it to be

heard.

2. The Impleadment Application is strongly opposed on behalf of the land

losers. The same issue arises across multiple First Appeal proceedings under

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“LA Act”) in connection with the Navi

Mumbai Project (“Project”), for which land had been acquired in the 1970s

and the 1980s. The Impleadment Application and Appeal are taken as the lead

matter, all the captioned proceedings being similarly placed on this issue.

3. The parties agree that a decision in the Impleadment Application would

be dispositive of that issue in all the captioned proceedings, and by consent it

was taken up for final hearing before the May vacation.

CIDCO’s Contentions:

4. Mr. G.S. Hegde, Learned Senior Advocate on behalf of CIDCO, submits

that CIDCO is entitled to intervene and be heard in these First Appeals on the

following grounds:-

A] Various parcels of land acquired by the State of Maharashtra have

been vested in CIDCO, which was designated as a company that would

defray the compensation payable for the land acquisition, and CIDCO

would therefore foot the bill for any enhanced compensation granted

either by the Reference Court or by this Court in disposal of the First

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Appeal. It is contended that CIDCO must be heard, its inputs and its

expertise on the value of the land being vital for a fair and appropriate

adjudication of the issues arising in the First Appeals;

B] CIDCO is not merely a recipient of the land acquired by the State

but also discharges a portion of the compensation for the land,

particularly under the 12.5% incentive scheme (“12.5% Scheme”), by

which CIDCO provides land losers developed land equivalent to 12.5% of

the land area acquired from them under the Project. That 12.5 Scheme

was formulated by Government Resolution dated March 6, 1990 (“1990

GR”), under which farmers from whom possession of land had been

taken, but who had not accepted the compensation as of February 6,

1986 despite declaration of awards, would be allotted 12.5% of the area

of land acquired from them, subject to the Land Ceiling laws. The land

so provided being developed land, the cost of development having been

borne by CIDCO, and the cost of developed land being approximately

33% of the land acquisition cost as judgements of the Supreme Court

have held, CIDCO has a clear interest in the discharge of consideration

for the land acquisitions, which gives it locus;

C] Section 50 of the LA Act envisages the role played by a local

authority or company. Under Section 50(1), where the provisions of the

Act are put in force for acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled

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or managed by a local authority or of any company, the charges of and

incidental to such acquisition are to be defrayed from such fund or

company; and under Section 50(2), such local authority or company

may appear and adduce evidence, in any proceeding before the Collector

or a Court, for determining the amount of compensation, though it

cannot demand a reference under Section 18 of the Act. CIDCO plays

such a role in respect of the 12.5% Scheme, and is therefore entitled to

be heard in the course of the First Appeal;

D] In certain Special Leave Petitions filed before the Supreme Court

by CIDCO, being aggrieved by the enhanced compensation granted by

this Court, the Supreme Court has been pleased to remand the matters,

thereby allowing CIDCO's Appeals. Once an Appeal filed at CIDCO's

instance has been allowed by way of a remand, implicit in such remand

is a ruling by the Supreme Court that CIDCO is entitled to be heard.

5. On these grounds, Mr. Hegde would contend that the law declared by a

Learned Single Judge (

Coram: Abhay S. Oka J.) and by a Learned Division

Bench (

Coram: A.M. Khanwilkar and K.K. Tated, JJ.) in appeal, in

Pareira

1

, no

longer holds the field, the Supreme Court having remanded subsequent

matters at CIDCO's behest and thereby dealt with the entitlement of CIDCO to

1

Single Bench: Percival Joseph Pareira v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Ors. - (2010)

5 Bom CR 344 and 2010 (1) Mh.L.J. 985; Division Bench: City and Industrial Development

Corporation (CIDCO) v. Percival Joseph Pareira & Ors. - 2013 (4) Mh.L.J. 762 and 2013

(4) Bom.C.R. 829

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be heard in these Appeals. He would also rely on DDA

2

, where the Delhi

Development Authority (“DDA”), the authority in charge of town planning,

was held to be a

“person interested” within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the

Act and thereby entitled to notice under Section 50(2), giving it an opportunity

to adduce evidence when determining compensation, an omission to do so

vitiating the award; the same opportunity ought to have been granted by the

Reference Court and must be granted in the First Appeal. CIDCO being on par

with DDA so far as Navi Mumbai is concerned, CIDCO should have a right to

be heard and to adduce evidence when compensation is determined in the

First Appeal.

Land Losers’ Contentions:

6. In sharp contrast, Mr. Shriram Kulkarni, Learned Advocate on behalf of

the land losers, would point to the scheme of the Act, and in particular to

Sections 3(b), 11, 18, 20(b) and 50, to indicate that even in the first instance,

the authority determining the compensation did not consider CIDCO to be a

person interested and issued no notice. He would also point out that, under

the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (“MRTP Act”),

CIDCO was declared the New Town Development Authority in terms of

Section 113(3A) to implement the regional plan for the new town known as

2

Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma - (2011) 2 SCC 54

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Navi Mumbai. He would point to Section 113A of the MRTP Act to indicate

that it is the State Government that would acquire, either by agreement or in

terms of the LA Act, and the State Government that paid for such acquisition,

the land so acquired merely vesting in CIDCO for purposes of this Chapter.

7. Mr. Kulkarni's submission is that CIDCO had no role whatsoever in the

acquisition of the land under the LA Act, or in discharging any consideration

or compensation in respect of the land so acquired. Even if the State

Government directed that CIDCO would defray any enhanced compensation

granted in reference or appellate proceedings, CIDCO is but an agent paying

on behalf of the State, and it is the State that is the acquirer and has

discharged compensation for the acquisition.

8. According to Mr. Kulkarni, the allusion to the 12.5% Scheme is a bogey,

the scheme being an independent and distinct incentive scheme brought into

force only in 1990, and that too in respect of acquisitions prior to February 6,

1986, where the agricultural land losers had not accepted the compensation

computed under the awards. The 12.5% land is not given to the land losers

free of cost; the 1990 GR expressly stipulates the terms on which consideration

must be discharged by the land losers for it. The allotment is thus a distinct

and independent transaction, which could never confer upon CIDCO the

status of a company or an authority discharging consideration within the

meaning of Section 50(1) of the LA Act.

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9. Mr. Kulkarni would also submit that Sections 113 and 113A of the MRTP

Act are significantly different from the provisions of the Delhi Development

Authority Act, 1957 (“DD Act”). Under the DD Act, DDA is the entity that pays

the consideration for the land acquired, and therefore has the specific role of

being the person at whose instance the acquisition takes place. In sharp

contrast, in all the matters under consideration it is the State Government at

whose behest the acquisitions for the Project took place, with CIDCO playing

no distinct, independent or separate role in the payment of compensation

under the Act.

10. Mr. Kulkarni would point to the ingredients of Section 23 of the LA Act

to show what factors are to be taken into consideration in computing the

compensation, and would point out that none of them has any nexus

whatsoever with CIDCO for CIDCO to have any role at all in respect of the

compensation. He would further contend that Section 50 requires the

provisions of the LA Act to have been brought into force for acquiring land at

the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority, or of any

company at whose behest the compensation and costs incidental to the

acquisition are to be defrayed.

11. The decision in Pareira has squarely dealt with this issue and

demonstrated that it was not at the behest of CIDCO that the State

Government effected any acquisition; on the contrary, the State Government

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effected the acquisition and simply vested the same in CIDCO to carry out the

connected activity as an agent of the State Government, without CIDCO

having any interest in the title to the land acquired or in the decision to

acquire. This, he would submit, was correctly dealt with in Pareira, and even if

this Court were to take a different view, judicial discipline would require the

Learned Division Bench's judgment in Pareira to bind this Single Bench.

12. Mr. Kulkarni would also point to the stance adopted by CIDCO in

income tax proceedings, when CIDCO was called upon to pay tax on the

money it received from the State Government. CIDCO there successfully

argued that its dealings with the State Government were not on a principal to

principal basis and that it was merely a pass through for the flow of cash and

operational convenience. On that basis it was held not amenable to tax,

having no role to play in respect of the land acquisition and acting merely as

an operational agent for the convenience of the State Government. The

Learned Division Bench in Pareira has therefore rightly held that CIDCO

cannot approbate and reprobate by taking diametrically opposite positions in

different proceedings.

13. Mr. Kulkarni would also contend that holding CIDCO to be a

“person

interested”

would have far reaching consequences. If the

DDA judgment were

to be applied, although DDA stands on a completely different footing, CIDCO

would have to be heard in each of the land references, before the Reference

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Court and thereafter before this High Court, and all the acquisitions handled

since the 1970s would be rendered a nullity, particularly when CIDCO had no

role whatsoever in the decision making of instigating or triggering the land

acquisition, in sharp contrast with DDA.

Coordinate Bench in Jayprakash Patil :

14. After the matter was heard and reserved, it is found that after the May

vacation, a Coordinate Bench of this Court has decided the same question and

all the very same issues raised by and against CIDCO. In Jayprakash Patil

3

(Coram: Amit Borkar J), applications by CIDCO to be joined as party

respondent in other First Appeals filed by the State against an award of the

Reference Court enhancing compensation for lands at Village Bokadvira,

Taluka Uran, District Raigad, acquired for the Navi Mumbai Project, have

been comprehensively rejected.

15. There too, Mr. Hegde appeared for CIDCO and Mr. Shriram Kulkarni

for the land losers, and the grounds urged on either side were substantially

those summarised above. How Jayprakash Patil addresses each of those

grounds is summarised below:

3

The City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (Applicant) in

State of Maharashtra v. Jayprakash Janardan Patil – Interim Application No.5184 of 2026 in

First Appeal No.1987 of 2025 with Interim Application No.5185 of 2026 in First Appeal

No.1983 of 2025, pronounced on July 31, 2026

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A] On the financial burden (set out at ground [A] above), Jayprakash

Patil has accepted that an authority which has to bear a financial burden

may be concerned with the result of the case, but financial burden alone

cannot decide legal status. The Court must still examine whether the

statute recognises such authority as a necessary or at least a proper

party. In any case, acquisition expenses are borne by the State, and

CIDCO only receives administrative charges. Therefore, CIDCO does not

get the status of necessary or proper party on the basis of this contention

(

Paragraphs 37 and 52

);

B] On the 12.5% Scheme (set out at ground [B] above), Jayprakash

Patil recorded the submission of CIDCO that Pareira had not considered

the burden of giving developed land under the 12.5% Scheme and the

1990 GR and also the submission of the land losers that the allotment is

an additional benefit for consideration separate from the statutory

compensation payable to the land losers, under the policy of the State

Government recorded in the 1990 GR, which CIDCO merely implements

as an agent. CIDCO has been held to not be a

“person interested” merely

because it develops the acquired lands or that the developed land is

offered to the land losers (

Paragraphs 10, 16 and 60

);

C] On Section 50 of the LA Act (set out in ground [C] above), after

setting out the second proviso to Section 6(1) and

Explanation 2 thereto,

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Section 3(b) and Section 50, Jayprakash Patil has held that Section 50 is

attracted only where the acquisition is

“at the cost” of the local authority

or company concerned, which cannot be assumed merely because an

authority spends money. The finding in

Pareira that the Section 6

notification records acquisition at the instance and at the cost of the

State Government remains in place. No fund controlled or managed by

CIDCO bore that land acquisition cost, and the considerations

underlying the decision in Pareira are not displaced and continue to

operate (

Paragraphs 30 to 34 and 43 to 47

);

D] On the ground of implications of remand by the Supreme Court

(set out in ground [D] above), Jayprakash Patil held that those orders

direct a fresh hearing and reconsideration of the issues involved and

nowhere hold CIDCO to be a

“person interested” or a necessary or

proper party. It is found that the power under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India on whether to grant leave to appeal is

discretionary, and the disposal of the special leave petitions is not a

declaration of law on the issue of CIDCO being a necessary or proper

party (

Paragraphs 19 and 38

);

E] On parallels drawn by Mr. Hegde with DDA, Jayprakash Patil has

held that DDA, and indeed other judgements Neyveli Lignite

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Corporation

4

, Himalayan Tiles

5

and U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad

6

, all

proceed on the basis that the authority claiming the right is the

beneficiary for whose benefit the land is acquired or the authority

actually bears the liability of acquisition unlike CIDCO, within the

meaning of Section 50 of the LA Act. For the reasons alluded to above,

this foundation is held to be absent in the instant case because, under

Section 113(3A) of the MRTP Act, CIDCO functions as an agent of the

State Government and not as the acquiring body; A decision of the

Karnataka High Court holding the beneficiary to be a necessary party

was distinguished, the controversy here being governed by the MRTP

Act and the judgements interpreting it (

Paragraphs 53 to 58

);

F] On the stance taken before the income tax authorities and judicial

discipline, Jayprakash Patil has noticed the reference by the Learned

Division Bench in Pareira to the position taken by CIDCO before the

Income Tax Appellate Authority that it acted only as an agent, and held

that CIDCO cannot claim a different character. It has been held that, in

the absence of any change in the statutory provisions or any later

pronouncement overruling them, Pareira would continue to govern the

issue (

Paragraphs 39, 52, 60 and 61

); and

4

Neyvely Lignite Corporation Limited Vs. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyvely –

(1995) 1 SCC 221

5

Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Limited Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho – (1980) 3 SCC 223

6

U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Gyan Devi – (1995) 2 SCC 326

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G] On the material said to be held by CIDCO on valuation, it was held

in Jayprakash Patil that CIDCO may possess relevant records regarding

development of the project, but possession of useful evidence confers no

statutory right of impleadment. Going by the governing provisions of

statute and the status of the person concerned, CIDCO would not have

the right to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings (

Paragraph 59

).

16. Consequently, the operative order in Jayprakash Patil (Paragraph 62)

rejects CIDCO’s applications holding that it is neither a necessary party nor a

proper party.

17. I have to say that not only have all the issues presented before this

Bench been comprehensively answered in Jayaprakash Patil, but also that I

completely concur with the analysis made in it. I have no reason to disagree

with the well-reasoned erudite exposition, which I wholeheartedly endorse

and adopt. In the interest of brevity, I see no point in a prolix replication of the

reasoning that resonates with me, which is why I have summarised the

findings on the grounds presented before me, as above.

Ruling in Shrachi Burdwan:

18. Before parting with this Order, I must place on record the Court’s

sincere appreciation of the contribution by Mr. Aseem Naphade, Learned

Amicus Curiae who provided clear and articulate submissions on the issue.

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Suffice it to say the submissions made by Mr. Naphade align with the outcome

in Jayprakash Patil even while further nuance and detail was presented by

him. It is only because it is unnecessary for the outcome that I am refraining

from listing out all his submissions here, save one, which merits attention and

further reinforces my view.

19. Mr. Naphade placed before me the judgement of a Learned Division

Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Shrachi Burdwan

7

(

Coram: Sanjib

Banerjee and Suvra Ghosh, JJ.

), which has since been affirmed by the

Supreme Court. Land at Burdwan was acquired by the State of West Bengal at

the instance of the Burdwan Development Authority (

“BDA”), a development

authority constituted under the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and

Development) Act, 1979, for a satellite township. Before the acquisition was

set in motion, BDA had selected a private partner to develop the township, and

Shrachi Burdwan Developers Pvt. Ltd. (“SBDPL”), which stepped into the

shoes of that partner, was under its agreement with BDA, obligated to bear the

entire cost of the acquisition, including any enhancement awarded in

references under Section 18 of the LA Act.

20. Compensation was substantially enhanced in the land references.

SBDPL neither applied to be impleaded in them nor preferred any appeal, but

moved a writ petition over two years later to have the enhancements set aside

7

Abdul Aziz & Ors v. Shrachi Burdwan Developers Private Limited & Ors – 2019 SCC

OnLine Cal 4348 (FMA 887 of 2019, decided on September 11, 2019)

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for want of notice to it, which the Single Bench allowed by remanding the

references. In the appeal by the land losers, the Learned Division Bench of the

Calcutta High Court framed the following four questions:

A] Whether the person implementing the public project under an

agreement with the requiring body is a

“person interested” within the

meaning of Section 3(b) of the LA Act;

B] Whether in that status it was entitled to be a party to the reference

under Section 18;

C] Whether the Reference Court or the land losers were obliged to

give it notice or implead it before enhancing compensation; and

D] Whether the writ petitioners were entitled to the order they had

obtained.

21. On the facts, the Learned Division Bench found that the land had been

acquired at the behest of BDA and not for the benefit of SBDPL, whose role

was to develop the land, the public purpose being the township itself, and that

SBDPL could neither assert an identity independent of BDA nor upstage it

(

Paragraphs 37, 50 and 52

). What is decisive, it was held, is the character or

status of the person asserting the interest and the nature of its association with

the land, and not the timing of that association. A person does not become a

person interested merely because the price it pays is linked to the

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compensation, or because it ultimately bears that compensation ( Paragraphs

50 and 51).

22.Himalayan Tiles and U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad and the other

authorities relied upon

8

were each read as conferring the right of participation

on the requiring body, or on the person at whose behest and for whose benefit

the acquisition was made. This was held to be incapable of extension to a

person standing behind the requiring body. The line of decisions holding that

an allottee of acquired land is not a person interested unless the land was

acquired for its benefit was applied (

Paragraphs 32, 37 and 39 to 44

). The

Learned Division Bench also drew a distinction between

“person interested” in

Section 3(b) and

“any person interested” in Section 18, the latter being

tempered by the proviso to Section 50 (

Paragraph 44

).

23. The four questions framed by the Learned Division Bench were

answered as follows:

A] It is doubtful that SBDPL was a person interested at all, although

no conclusive answer was necessary because its conduct in not pursuing

the proceedings available to it at the appropriate stage disentitled it to

relief;

8

Union of India v. Sher Singh – (1993) 1 SCC 608; Abdul Rasak Vs. Kerala Water Authority

– (2002) 3 SCC 228; Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya, Jind Vs. Municipal Committee, Jind –

1988 Supp SCC 719; Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan Vs. State of Karnataka – (2015) 10 SCC

469; and Satish Kumar Gupta Vs. State of Haryana – (2017) 4 SCC 760

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B] SBDPL did not appear to be entitled to be a party to the reference;

C] Neither the Reference Court nor the land losers were obliged to

give SBDPL notice of the reference proceedings; and

D] SBDPL as a writ petitioner was entitled to no relief.

24. The appeal was allowed, the writ petition dismissed with costs, and

SBDPL was left free to pursue such other remedies as may be available to it.

25. I endorse this reasoning by the Learned Division Bench of the Calcutta

High Court. I find it to fit squarely with the issues raised before me. The test

applied is one of status and not of who ultimately foots the bill. The enquiry is

into who required the land and for whose benefit the land was acquired. The

question of whether the person claiming to be the beneficiary and thereby the

interested party, necessitating notices to such person in the first instance by

the Reference Court has also been articulated. Mr. Kulkarni’s contention that

the necessary corollary would be to vitiate all reference proceedings prior to

the First Appeal is evidently correct.

26. I agree that the answer to the enquiry is not altered by an arrangement

under which some other entity bears the cost. That is the very distinction on

which Pareira proceeded, and which Jayprakash Patil too has since reiterated.

CIDCO, functioning under Section 113(3A) of the MRTP Act as an agent of the

State Government, stands in no better position than SDBPL, the implementing

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partner in Shrachi Burdwan. Its role in discharge of compensation or financial

impact on some element of the outcome in the reference and appeal cannot

clothe it with a status independent of the State.

Conclusion:

27. For the aforesaid reasons, I follow the ruling in Jayprakash Patil and

indeed in Pareira and Shrachi Burdwan to dismiss CIDCO’s Impleadment

Application and its contentions about it being a necessary or even a proper

party in the First Appeals. All other similar applications filed the captioned

First Appeals also stand dismissed.

28. The First Appeals in which these Impleadment Applications were filed,

shall be placed before the Bench in whose roster these appeals fall. Liberty to

the parties to mention them before the Roster Bench.

29. All actions required to be taken pursuant to this order shall be taken

upon receipt of a downloaded copy as available on this Court’s website.

[SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN J.]

Page 21 of 21

October 1, 2026

Aarti Palkar