Manipur High Court, NDPS Act, Article 22(2), judicial custody, illegal detention, fundamental rights, drug trafficking, bail, Narcotics Control Bureau, Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026
 17 Nov, 2026
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Tinneihing Khongsai Vs. Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB)

  Manipur High Court Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026
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Case Background

As per case facts, the wife of an accused (Accused No. 2) challenged a remand order related to a drug trafficking case. The accused was stopped and detained by NCB ...

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Document Text Version

[1]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR

AT IMPHAL

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026

(Ref:- NCB Crime No. 10/NCB/IMP/2025

u/s 8(c), 22(c), 25 and 29 NDPS Act)

Tinneihing Khongsai, aged about 40 years, W/o Letminthang

Khongsai a permanent R/O Sugnu Utangpokpi, P.O. & P.S.

Sugnu, Chandel District, Manipur, presently residing at

Fabricated Relief Camp Sangaikot P.O., P.S. & District

Churachandpur, Manipur.

… Petitioner

-Versus-

Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) represented by Superintendent

of Police Zonal Unit, Imphal, Airport Road, Uchekon Changangei,

Imphal West-795140.

… Respondent/ Complainant

BEFOR E

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH

For the petitioner :: Mr. Serto T. Kom, Advocate

For the respondent :: Mr. W. Darakishwor, Sr. PCCG

Date of judgment & order :: 17-11-2026

JUDGMENT & ORDER

[1] The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (‘BNSS’ for short) with a prayer

for quashing the order dated 26-09-2025 passed by the Special

Judge (ND & PS), Chandel in connection with NCB Crime No.

10/NCB/IMP/2025 dated 25-09-2025 u/s 8(c), 22(c), 25 & 29 NDPS

[2]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

Act, 1985, remanding two accused persons to judicial custody and also

praying for releasing one of the accused person, viz., Letminthang

Khongsai, aged about 42 years, S/o Jamsei Khongsai, resident of

Sugnu, Utangpokpi, Chandel District, Manipur.

[2.1] The brief factual matrix of the present case as disclosed by

the respondent in its affidavit-in-opposition is that acting on a specific

information received from a reliable source about the trafficking and

transportation of suspected illegal drugs of undisclosed quantity of

‘Methamphetamine/ WY tablets’ by two persons namely, (i) Mr.

Seimang Kipgen (45 years), S/o Lenkhopao Kipgen, resident of House

No. 08, New Leikot Village, Moreh (ST), Tengnoupal District and (ii) Mr.

Letminthang Khongsai (42 years) (hereafter referred to as “Accused

No. 2”), S/o Jamsei Khongsai, resident of Sugnu, Utangpokpi,

Chandel, Manipur, in a Maruti Gypsy vehicle bearing Registration No.

NL01H3374 and escorted by a black Kenbo bike coming from a

General area Monlghat towards General area Hengsi, the same was

taken down in writing and submitted to immediate superior officer Sh.

Aram Anth, Superintendent, NCB, Imphal by Sh. Prashant Kumar

Yadav, Sub-Inspector at around 1700 hrs. of 24-09-2025.

[2.2] Thereafter, in pursuance of an office order No. 10/NCB/

IMPH/2025 dated 24-09-2025 and on the direction of the

[3]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

Superintendent, NCB, Imphal, a team of NCB, Imphal, comprising of

Sh. Prashant Kumar Yadav, S.I. detailed as Seizing Officer, Sh. Aquib

Ahmad, S.I., Sh. Ankur, Sepoy and Sh. Sanchit Kumar Sahu, Sepoy

leaved Imphal on 24-09-2025 at around 1830 hrs. and proceeded

towards 01

st

Assam Rifles, which is around 118 Km. from NCB,

Imphal office and reached the 01

st

Assam Rifles at around 1245 hrs. of

25-09-2025.

[2.3] A requisition letter to provide necessary assistance for

security purpose and providing 02 witnesses to witness search-sum-

seizure process was submitted to the 01

st

Assam Rifles, Chandel, at

around 0100 hrs. Thereafter, the said NCB team along with a team of

01

st

Assam Rifles, Chandel, led by Sh. RNG Shungwar, Assistant

Commandant of 01

st

Assam Rifles, Chandel, proceeded towards

General Bala point along with two independent witnesses. The said

NCB team along with the said 01

st

Assam Rifles team reached General

Bala Point at around 0230 hrs. of 25-09-2025.

[2.4] Thereafter, the said team conducted a reconnaissance of the

area and set up Naka and mounted surveillances at General Bala point

Aibol Joupi, Sehlon, Chandel. At around 0300 hrs., one black colour

bike Kenbo without a number plate followed by a white colour Maruti

Gypsy vehicle bearing Registration No. NL01H3374 were seen coming

[4]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

from the General area Molngat and moving towards General area

Hengsi side. The NCB team signalled the said vehicle to stop, on which

both the vehicles stopped at general Bala point for verification.

[2.5] There were 01 occupant in the Maruti Gypsy and 01

occupant on the Kenbo bike. The NCB team then introduced

themselves as officials of the NCB, Imphal, to the persons seating in

the Maruti Gypsy vehicle and Kenbo bike and requested them to get

off from the vehicles. Thereafter, both the persons came down from

their respective vehicles and introduced themselves as Mr. Seimang

Kipgen (45 years), S/o Lenkhopao Kipgen, resident of House No. 08

New Leikot Village, Moreh (ST), Tengnoupal District (driving Maruti

Gypsy) and Mr. Letminthang Khongsai (42 years) (Accused No. 2), S/o

Jamsei Khongsai, resident of Sugnu Utangpokpi, Chandel, Manipur

(driving Kenbo bike).

[2.6] The team of NCB, Imphal, thereafter disclosed the secret

information received by them and expressed the intention to conduct

search of the bike and Maruti Gypsy and both the said two persons

were willing to cooperate in the search proceeding. On searching the

said vehicles, 03 sacks of white colour were found on the back seat of

the Maruti Gypsy and on cutting them opened 29 packets of black

colour packets wrapped in transparent plastic were found. Thereafter,

[5]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

each black packets was cut opened using a box cutter and a yellow

packet was found and inside the said yellow packet, a blue packet was

found, which contained pink colour tablets and one tablet from each

packet was taken out and crushed and mixed homogenously and

tested with the Drug Detection Kid available with the NCB team, which

gave positive result for presence of ‘Methamphetamine’.

The total weight of all the 29 packets was found to be 67.19

Kg. and both the abovenamed two persons admitted that they were

carrying consignment of illegal Methamphetamine to deliver it in the

illegal market.

[2.7] On having reasonable believe that an offence has been

committed under Section 8(c), 22(c), 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985

(as amended), the recovered contraband, OPPO Mobile Phones,

Redmi Mobile Phone, Maruti Gypsy vehicle of white colour bearing

Registration No. NLO1H3374, back Kenbo bike without registration

number and other recovered documents were seized by the Seizing

Officer.

[2.8] The search-cum-seizure list was prepared on the spot by

typing on a laptop by the Seizing Officer and completed at about 0630

hrs. of 25-09-2025 without causing any damage to any person or

property and in the presence of two independent witnesses. The

[6]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

content of search-cum-seizure list was read over and explained to the

two accused persons and the two independent witnesses and

thereafter, the signatures of both the accused persons, two

independent witnesses and the Seizing Officer were obtained and the

impression of brass seal NCB IMPHAL 01 was affixed on the last page

of the search-cum-seizure list.

[2.9] Thereafter, notice under Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act, 1985

was given to both the two accused persons and asked them to appear

at 01

st

Assam Rifles, Chandel, Manipur, at 1400 hrs. Accordingly, both

the two accused persons appeared before the NCB officer for recording

their voluntary statement under Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act, 1985.

In their voluntary statement, both the two accused persons confessed

their involvement in trafficking of the seized Methamphetamine/ WY

Tablets. On the basis of recovery of contraband, the confessional

statements made by the said two accused persons and on the

reasonable believe that an offence had been committed in violation of

the provisions of Section 8(c), which attracts penal provisions under

Section 22(c), 25 and 29 of NDPS Act, 1985, both the said two accused

persons were arrested on 25-09-2025 at 1300 hrs. and 1330 hrs.

[2.10] Thereafter, both the accused persons were taken to the

District Hospital, Chandel, for medical examination and after

[7]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

completion of the legal formalities, the arrested accused persons and

the seized contraband were produced before the Court of Special

Judge (ND & PS) Court, Chandel on 26-09-2025. Thereafter, the

Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, passed the impugned order dated

26-09-2025 remanding both the arrested accused persons to judicial

custody.

[3] The present petition had been filed by the wife of Mr.

Letminthang Khongsai (Accused No. 2) raising many points in assailing

the impugned remand order. Even though many grounds have been

raised in the present petition, Mr. Serto T. Kom, learned counsel

appearing for the petitioner pressed only one point in assailing the

impugned remand order and praying for releasing the Accused No. 2

from judicial custody. It has been submitted by the learned counsel

appearing for the petitioner that the NCB, Imphal, failed to produce the

arrested two accused persons to the nearest Magistrate within 24

hours of their arrest thereby resulting in violation of the Accused

No. 2’s fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22(2) of the

Constitution of India and as such, the impugned order dated 26-09-

2025 passed by the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, remanding the

said accused persons in judicial custody as well as his detention in

judicial custody are illegal.

[8]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

[4] To buttress his argument, it has been submitted by the

learned counsel that even though in the Arrest Memo dated

25-09-2025 issued in respect of accused No. 2, the NCB recorded the

place of arrest as at 01

st

Assam Rifles, Shelon, Chandel, Manipur, and

the time of arrest as 1330 hrs. (01:30 PM) of 25-09-2025, the actual

time of arrest is at 0300 hrs. of 25-09-2025, when the said accused

person was stopped and restrained by the official of the NCB.

According to the learned counsel, the statutory period of 24 hrs. as

provided under Article 22(2) of the Constitution will commence from

0300 hrs. of 25-09-2025 and will expire at 0300 hrs. of 26-09-2025. The

learned counsel submitted that as 0300 hrs. is in the early morning, the

Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, would not be on duty at such hour

and that it can reasonably be inferred that the accused was produced

after 0300 hrs. of 26-09-2025 thereby resulting in a clear violation of

the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22(2) of the Constitution

of India.

It has also been submitted by the learned counsel that

according to the NCB, the search-cum-seizure process was said to be

completed at 06:30 AM of 25-09-2025 and the accused persons could

have been produced on 25-09-2025, however, they were produced

only on 26-09-2025 after the statutory period of 24 hours. Therefore,

the impugned remand order dated 26-09-2025 and the detention of the

[9]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

Accused No. 2 in judicial custody is ultra vires the mandate of Article

22(2) of the Constitution of India and accordingly, the same are

rendered illegal. The learned counsel, accordingly, prays for quashing

the impugned remand order dated 26-09-2025 and to direct the

respondent to release the Accused No. 2 from judicial custody

forthwith.

[5] The learned counsel pressed into service the following case

laws in support of his contentions:-

(a) (1980) 2 SCC 559 “Niranjan Singh & anr. Vs. Prabhakar

Rajaram Kharote & ors.” wherein it has been held by the

Hon’ble Apex Court as under:-

“7. When is a person in custody, within the meaning of

Section 439 CrPC? When he is in duress either because

he is held by the investigating agency or other police or

allied authority or is under the control of the court having

been remanded by judicial order, or having offered

himself to the court's jurisdiction and submitted to its

orders by physical presence. No lexical dexterity nor

precedential profusion is needed to come to the realistic

conclusion that he who is under the control of the court

or is in the physical hold of an officer with coercive power

is in custody for the purpose of Section 439. This word is

of elastic semantics but its core meaning is that the law

has taken control of the person. The equivocatory

quibblings and hide-and-seek niceties sometimes heard

in court that the police have taken a man into informal

custody but not arrested him, have detained him for

interrogation but not taken him into formal custody and

other like terminological dubieties are unfair evasions of

the straightforwardness of the law. We need not dilate on

[10]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

this shady facet here because we are satisfied that the

accused did physically submit before the Sessions Judge

and the jurisdiction to grant bail thus arose.”

(b) 1990 SCC OnLine Bom 3 “Ashak Hussain Allah Detha @

Siddique & anr. Vs. The Assistant Collector of Customs

(P) Bombay & anr.” wherein a learned Single Judge of

Bombay High Court held as under:-

“10. It is thus clear that arrest being a restraint on the

personal liberty, it is complete when such restraint by an

authority, commences. Whether a person is arrested or

not does not depend on the legality of the act. It is

enough if an authority clothed with the power to arrest,

actually imposes the restraint by physical act or words.

Whether a person is arrested depends on whether he

has been deprived of his personal liberty to go where he

pleases.

4

It stands to reason, therefore, that what label

the Investigating Officer affixes to his act of restraint is

irrelevent. For the same reason, the record of the time of

arrest is not an index to the actual time of arrest, The

arrest commences with the restraint placed on the

liberty of the accused and not with the time of “arrest”

recorded by the Arresting Officers.”

(c) (1994) 3 SCC 440 “Directorate of Enforcement Vs.

Deepak Mahajan & anr.” wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court

held as under:-

“46. The word ‘arrest’ is derived from the French word

‘Arreter’ meaning “to stop or stay” and signifies a

restraint of the person. Lexicologically, the meaning of

the word ‘arrest’ is given in various dictionaries

depending upon the circumstances in which the said

expression is used. One of us, (S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.

as he then was being the Judge of the High Court of

Madras) in Roshan Beevi v. Joint Secretary,

[11]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

Government of T.N. had an occasion to go into the

gamut of the meaning of the word ‘arrest’ with reference

to various textbooks and dictionaries, the New

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Halsbury's Laws of England,

A Dictionary of Law by L.B. Curzon, Black's Law

Dictionary and Words and Phrases. On the basis of the

meaning given in those textbooks and lexicons, it has

been held that:

“[T]he word ‘arrest’ when used in its ordinary

and natural sense, means the apprehension or

restraint or the deprivation of one's personal liberty.

The question whether the person is under arrest or

not, depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on

whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty

to go where he pleases. When used in the legal

sense in the procedure connected with criminal

offences, an arrest consists in the taking into

custody of another person under authority

empowered by law, for the purpose of holding or

detaining him to answer a criminal charge or of

preventing the commission of a criminal offence.

The essential elements to constitute an arrest in the

above sense are that there must be an intent to

arrest under the authority, accompanied by a

seizure or detention of the person in the manner

known to law, which is so understood by the person

arrested.”

“48. Thus the Code gives power of arrest not only to a police

officer and a Magistrate but also under certain

circumstances or given situations to private persons.

Further, when an accused person appears before a

Magistrate or surrenders voluntarily, the Magistrate is

empowered to take that accused person into custody

and deal with him according to law. Needless to

emphasize that the arrest of a person is a condition

precedent for taking him into judicial custody thereof. To

put it differently, the taking of the person into judicial

[12]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

custody is followed after the arrest of the person

concerned by the Magistrate on appearance or

surrender. It will be appropriate, at this stage, to note

that in every arrest, there is custody but not vice versa

and that both the words ‘custody’ and ‘arrest’ are not

synonymous terms. Though ‘custody’ may amount to an

arrest in certain circumstances but not under all

circumstances. If these two terms are interpreted as

synonymous, it is nothing but an ultra legalist

interpretation which if under all circumstances accepted

and adopted, would lead to a startling anomaly resulting

in serious consequences, vide Roshan Beevi.”

“49. While interpreting the expression ‘in custody’ within the

meaning of Section 439 CrPC, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking

for the Bench in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram

Kharote observed that: (SCC p. 563, para 9)

“He can be in custody not merely when the

police arrests him, produces him before a

Magistrate and gets a remand to judicial or other

custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody

when he surrenders before the court and submits to

its directions.”

(d) 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240 “Directorate of Enforcement

Vs. Subhash Sharma” wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held

as under:-

“6. This argument cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the LOC

was issued at the instance of the appellant-Directorate of

Enforcement. By executing the LOC, the Bureau of

Immigration detained the respondent at IGI Airport from

4

th

March 2022 on behalf of the Appellant. The finding of

fact recorded in paragraph 10 is that undisputedly, the

physical custody of the respondent was taken over by the

appellant from the Bureau of Immigration at 11.00 hours

on 5

th

March, 2022. Thereafter, at 1.15 hours on 6

th

March

2022, an arrest memo was prepared by ED at Raipur. He

[13]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

was produced before the Court at 3 p.m. on 6

th

March,

2024. The perusal of the arrest order(Annexure p-1)

shows that the typed order was kept ready. The date and

time of arrest were kept blank which appear to have been

filled in by hand. Admittedly, the respondent was not

produced before the nearest learned Magistrate within 24

hours from 11.00 a.m. on 5

th

March, 2022. Therefore, the

arrest of the respondent is rendered completely illegal as

a result of the violation of clause 2 of Article 22 of the

Constitution of India. Thus, the continuation of the

respondent in custody without producing him before the

nearest Magistrate within the stipulated time of 24 hours

is completely illegal and it infringes fundamental rights

under clause 2 of Article 22 of the Constitution of India.

Therefore, his arrest gets vitiated on completion of 24

hours in custody. Since there is a violation of Article 22(2)

of the Constitution, even his fundamental right to liberty

guaranteed under Article 21 has been violated.”

“8. Once a Court, while dealing with a bail application, finds

that the fundamental rights of the accused under Articles

21 and 22 of the Constitution of India have been violated

while arresting the accused or after arresting him, it is the

duty of the Court dealing with the bail application to

release the accused on bail. The reason is that the arrest

in such cases stands vitiated. It is the duty of every Court

to uphold the fundamental rights guaranteed under

Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution.”

(e) 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 6017 “Biswajit Mandal Vs.

Inspector, Narcotic Control Bureau” wherein a learned

Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala held as

under:-

“20. Hence the period of twenty-four hours to produce an

accused before the Magistrate commences not when the

actual time of arrest is recorded by the police, but runs

[14]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

from the time when the accused was effectively detained

or his liberty was curtailed.”

[6] Mr. W. Darakishwor, learned Sr. PCCG appearing on behalf

of the respondent submitted that acting on a specific information

received from a reliable source about the trafficking and transportation

of illegal drugs of undisclosed quantity and after following due

procedure established by law, a team of Narcotics Control Bureau,

Imphal, with the assistance of a team of 01

st

Assam Rifles, Chandel,

along with two independent witnesses conducted a reconnaissance of

the area and set up Naka and mounted surveillances at General Bala

point Aibol Joupi, Shelon, Chandel at around 0300 hrs. of 25-09-2025.

At around 0300 hrs. of 25-09-2025, the said NCB team stopped the two

accused persons – one riding a white colour Maruti Gypsy vehicle

bearing Registration No. NL01H 3374 and one black colour bike Kenbo

without registration number and conducted search of the bike and the

gypsy vehicle and on searching the said vehicles, a commercial

quantity of contraband drugs, Methamphetamine/ WY Tables having a

total weight of 67.19 Kg. was recovered.

[7] The learned Sr. PCCG submitted that the search and seizure

of the contraband drugs were strictly after following all the procedures

established by law and the Seizing Officer completed the seizure of the

contraband drugs and other articles at about 0630 hrs. of 25-09-2025.

[15]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

It has also been submitted by the learned counsel that notice under

Section 67(c) of the ND & PS Act, 1985 was given to both the two

accused persons asking them to appear at the 01

st

Assam Rifles,

Chandel, Manipur, at 1400 hrs. In compliance with the said notice, both

the two accused persons appeared before the NCB officials for

recording their voluntary statement under Section 67(c) of the NDPS

Act, 1985 and that the said two accused persons confessed their

involvement in trafficking of the seized Methamphetamine/ WY Tablets.

Thereafter, on the basis of recovery of the said contraband drugs, the

confessional statements and on a reasonable believe that an offence

has been committed in violation of the provisions of Section 8(c) of the

NDPS Act, 1985, both the said two accused persons were formally

arrested on 25-09-2025 at 1300 hrs. and 1330 hrs. It has also been

submitted that after completing the medical examination of the said two

accused persons and the legal formalities, both the accused persons

were produced before the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, on

26-09-2025 within a stipulated period of 24 hrs. as provided under

Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India.

[8] The learned Sr. PCCG also submitted that the date, time and

place of arrest of the accused No. 2 is clearly reflected in the Arrest

Memo. as 25-09-2025 at 1330 hrs. from 01

st

Assam Rifles, Shelon,

Chandel, Manipur. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel

[16]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

for the respondent that the commencement of the stipulated period of

24 hrs. as provided under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India

should be counted only from the time and date of formal arrest of the

accused persons as recorded in the Arrest Memo and that the period

taken in effecting search and seizure and completing of the necessary

formalities as provided under the NDPS Act and the rules made

thereunder should be excluded while counting the stipulated period of

24 hrs. The learned Sr. PCCG submitted that as the Accused No. 2

was produced before the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, within

the 24 hrs. period, the present petition is liable to be rejected as being

devoid of merit.

[9] In support of his contentions, the learned Sr. PCCG cited the

following case laws:-

(a) 2026 SCC OnLine Mad 6652 “Kannan Vs. State of Tamil

Nadu, represented by the Inspector of Police, Othakadai

Police Station” wherein a learned Single Judge of the

Hon’ble High Court of Madras held as under:-

“28. The Supreme Court has categorically held that the

procedure contemplated under Sections 42 and 50 of

NDPS Act are imperative in nature and non-compliance of

the same would render the conviction and sentence

unsustainable. Section 42(d) of NDPS Act points out that

a Law Enforcing Agency is empowered to detain and

search and if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he

has reason to believe to have committed any offence

[17]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

punishable under this Act. Section 50 lays down an

elaborate procedure for conducting personal search. The

accused persons should be given two options that either

they may get searched before a gazetted officer or before

the Magistrate.”

“29. Section 50(2) points out that if the accused persons

request to search themselves through a gazetted officer

or the Magistrate, the accused persons have to be

detained till such officer arrives. Therefore, it is clear that

the detention prior to search or at the time of search

cannot be considered to be arrest under NDPS Act. Unless

search is completed and the officer of the Law Enforcing

Agency finds that the accused persons are in possession

of contraband, he cannot arrest them.”

“30. Section 50(3) of NDPS Act points out that in case if the

accused persons choose to get themselves searched

before the gazetted officer or the Magistrate, the

concerned officer, if they see that there is no reasonable

ground for search, the accused persons have to be

forthwith discharged. On the other hand, if the concerned

officer finds that there are reasonable ground for search,

he can direct that search be made.”

“31. For a search to be conducted as per Section 50, unless a

person is detained, personal search cannot be conducted.

Only after completion of the personal search, in case, if

the contraband is found in possession of any person, the

Law Enforcing Officer can proceed to arrest him. In fact,

Section 50(2) clearly points out that till the arrival of

gazetted officer or Magistrate, the person who is believed

to be in possession of contraband, has to be detained.”

“32. Even Section 43(b) (relating to power of search and arrest

in the public place) points out that the detention and

search have to precede the arrest and the arrest can be

made only if any person was found to be in possession of

contraband and such possession appears to unlawful.

Therefore, it is clear that under Section 42(d) and 43(b), the

[18]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

word detention and search are used in contradistinction

with the word arrest.”

“33. The word arrest has not been defined either in BNSS or in

any other statute. Section 43(1) of BNSS only explains how

an arrest can be made. Though detention and arrest

involve placing restriction on the movement of any

person, they are conceptually distinct. While detention is

investigatory in nature based on reasonable suspicion,

arrest is accusatory in nature after confirmation of

commission of offence. Since the provisions under NDPS

Act are imperative in nature, the officers of Law Enforcing

Agency are expected to strictly follow the same before

effecting search, seizure or recovery. Otherwise that may

result in vitiating the conviction and sentence. Therefore,

the said procedure as contemplated under Sections 42, 43

and 50 have to be strictly complied with by the authorities

concerned. Without complying the same, any arrest made

by them, would not be of any help to the prosecution and

the same is likely to result in acquittal.”

“34. These precautionary procedures have been mandated

under the Act only to safeguard the accused persons from

any false cases being foisted as against them. Therefore,

the time taken by the authorities concerned, to fulfil the

statutory mandate, prior to arrest, cannot be included for

calculation of 24 hours custody as contemplated under

Section 58 of BNSS. When the other statutes do not

provide for a distinction between the detention and the

arrest, the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the

petitioner would not be applicable for detention and arrest

under NDPS Act cases.”

“35. In the present case, the Car was intercepted at 5.00 p.m.,

the consent letter was prepared between 5.10 p.m. to 5.40

p.m. and the search was conducted between 5.40 p.m. to

5.50 p.m. and thereafter, arrest memo was prepared

between 5.50 p.m. to 6.20 p.m. The petitioners were

arrested at 6.30 p.m. and there is no unreasonable

detention of the accused persons than what is required for

[19]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

conducting search by following the mandate of Section 42

and Section 50 of NDPS Act. When 24 hours is calculated

from 6.30 p.m. on 9-10-2024, production of accused before

Jurisdictional Magistrate at 5.30 p.m. on 10-10-2024 is well

within 24 hours. Therefore, the impugned remand order of

Jurisdictional Magistrate is perfectly in order and does not

call for any interference.”

(b) 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 13043 “Arun K. Thomas Vs.

Narcotic Control Bureau, represented by the Sub-

Inspector” wherein a learned Single Judge of the Hon’ble

High Court of Kerala held as under:-

“20. Section 42 of the NDPS Act deals with the power of entry,

search of any building, conveyance or place, seizure and

arrest without warrant or authorisation. Of relevance in the

present context is Section 42(d) which says “detain and

search”, and if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom

he has reason to believe to have committed any offence

punishable under the Act. Section 43 deals with the power

of seizure and arrest in a public place. Here also, the

section uses the expression “detain and search an y

person”……under the Act, and if such person has any …..,

arrest him and any other person in his company. Thus,

both Sections 42 and 43 preserve a doctrinal distinction

between investigative detention and custodial arrest. It is

significant to note that “detention for the purpose of

search” is distinct and different from the “arrest and

detention in custody” that forms the underpinning of Art.

22(2) of the Constitution. Under the scheme of the NDPS

Act, “detain and search” is only temporary restraint and

does not involve infraction of personal liberty.”

“20(a) The Supreme Court in Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat (2024

SCC OnLine SC 520) has held that the statutory provisions

conferring authorities with the power to search and seize

are a mere temporary interference with the right of the

accused as they stand well regulated by reasonable

[20]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

restrictions emanating from the statutory provisions

themselves and such a power cannot be considered as a

violation of any fundamental rights of the person

concerned. Consistent with the jurisprudence that a search

and seizure procedure does not violate any fundamental

rights, the restraint on a person in the event of a search

under the circumstances indicated in the Act is therefore

not an infraction of any fundamental right.”

“20(b) In the context of Section 42 of the NDPS Act, the arrest

contemplated therein is triggered on the satisfaction or on

the threshold of “reason to believe” and not on the mere

finding of the contraband. In the context of Section 43(b) of

the NDPS Act i.e. the search in a public place, it is triggered

on the finding itself failing which the threshold does not

reach. In either case, it is to be noticed that the detention

for the purpose of search following the statutory procedure

does not amount to detention in custody following an

arrest or effective detention.”

“20(c) Whether the search and seizure procedure has been

deliberately or unduly delayed and whether such delay

would have consequences is another matter. However, as

a general proposition, the arrest and consequently the

twenty-four hour rule for the purpose of Art. 22(2)

commences only from the completion of the “search and

seizure” that may lead to the arrest and detention in

custody of the person. This is so because there is no

element of detention in custody in the context of Art. 22(2)

amid a search and seizure and it is only when the arrest

and detention in custody occurs that the twenty-four hour

rule gets attracted. The constitutional reckoning of time

begins only from arrest, not from antecedent detention

during search or enquiry.”

“21. Rule 3 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

(Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 (for

short, NDPS Disposal Rules) prescribes the procedure for

classification, weighing, packaging and numbering of

seized narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and

[21]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

controlled substances. Sub-rule (4) mandates that these

processes shall be carried out in the presence of the

search witnesses and the person from whose possession

the contraband was recovered, with a specific recital to

that effect in the panchnama drawn at the place of seizure.

Sub-rule (5) further requires that a detailed inventory of the

packages, containers, conveyances and other seized

articles be prepared and appended to the panchnama.”

“21(a) The statutory scheme thus accords due sanctity to the

disposal process, which was earlier regulated only by

executive Standing Orders. The Rule integrates the acts of

classification, weighing, packaging and numbering into

the seizure procedure itself, thereby making them part of

the continuum of search and seizure. In consequence, the

time consumed in implementing these safeguards is

statutorily absorbed into the investigative stage. Such

restraint or detention during seizure does not ipso facto

amount to arrest. Accordingly, the period taken for

compliance with Rule 3— being incidental to seizure and

essential for evidentiary integrity— stands outside the

ambit of the twenty-four hour mandate under Article 22 of

the Constitution. The constitutional reckoning of time

commences only upon formal arrest, not during

antecedent detention necessitated by statutory

procedures of seizure and inventory.”

“22. Section 50 of the NDPS Act deals with conditions under

which a search of a person shall be conducted. It ordains

that when an empowered officer proposes to search the

person of a suspect, such individual must be apprised of

the right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a

Magistrate. In effectuating this statutory mandate, the

officer may necessarily detain the suspect until the choice

is exercised and the search duly conducted. Such

detention, however, is investigative in character. It is a

procedural restraint designed to secure compliance with

the statutory safeguard, and does not ipso facto amount to

arrest. Arrest occurs only when liberty is formally curtailed

[22]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

after incriminating material is found and custody is

imposed. It is only at that stage that the constitutional and

statutory guarantees of production before a Magistrate

within twenty-four hours under Article 22(2) of the

Constitution and Section 58 of BNSS (57 of CrPC) are

attracted.”

“25. Taken together, these provisions delineate a graduated

spectrum of interaction between enforcement authorities

and individuals“ranging from mere enquiry or information

gathering to examination upon summons and finally formal

arrest followed by detention. Each stage is hedged by

statutory procedure, constitutional safeguards, and the

principle of proportionality, thereby ensuring that any

restraint upon personal liberty is justified, documented,

and effected strictly in accordance with the “procedure

established by law” under Article 21. The distinction

between investigative detention for purposes of enquiry

and custodial arrest is critical: the former permits

temporary restraint under statutory authority, while the

latter alone attracts the full panoply of custodial

safeguards, including the commencement of the twenty-

four hour reckoning for production before a Magistrate.

These statutory schemes underscore the legislature's

careful balance between investigational necessity and the

protection of fundamental rights. Compliance with

prescribed procedure is the very essence of Article 21; any

restraint imposed dehors statutory authority or without

adherence to procedural safeguards degenerates into

illegal detention.”

Findings and Conclusions

“26. The upshot of the above discussion is that though the

statutory and constitutional period of twenty-four hours to

produce an accused before a Magistrate commences from

the time the accused was effectively detained or his liberty

was curtailed, without the sanction of law, as held in

Biswajit Mandal (supra), it cannot be said to invariably

[23]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

begin from the moment a person is detained in all cases.

Pre-arrest detention is permissible where explicitly

authorised by statute-such as under Sections 179(1) and

35(3) of BNSS (160(1) and 41-A of CrPC), Sections 67, 42,

43 and 50 of the NDPS Act, Rule 3 of the NDPS Disposal

Rules, Section 50 of the PMLA, or Sections 107 and 108 of

the Customs Act-which provide a clear procedural

framework for enquiry or limited restraint of liberty. In such

cases, the reckoning of the twenty-four hours begins only

upon formal arrest. In all other circumstances, any

deprivation of liberty prior to arrest must be treated as part

of the detention period, and the statutory timeline for

judicial oversight is triggered at that point. This

understanding, evolved through judicial precedents,

ensures uniform compliance with procedural safeguards,

prevents arbitrary delay, and upholds the constitutional

protection of personal liberty, while permitting

investigatory authorities to act within the bounds of law

where specific statutory provisions allow pre-arrest

detention for enquiry. It preserves the equilibrium between

the necessity of effective investigation and the prohibition

against arbitrary or wanton restraint of liberty. Whether a

person has been subjected to illegal detention prior to the

formal recording of arrest is a matter to be carefully

assessed in the light of the circumstances disclosed in

each case.”

[10] The learned Sr. PCCG further submitted that the principle of

law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court at para. 7 of Niranjan Singh

(supra) has been considered and explained by a Full Bench of the

Hon’ble High Court of Madras in the case of “Roshan Beevi & ors.

Vs. Joint Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu & ors.”

reported in 1983 SCC OnLine Mad 163 and that the explanation given

by the Full Bench is applicable in the present case. The relevant

[24]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

paragraphs relied on by the learned Sr. PCCG of Roshan Beevi are

reproduced hereunder:-

“21. In support of his proposition, Mr. Rangavajjula would draw

the attention of this Court to the decision of the Supreme

Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar, AIR 1980 SC 785 : (1980

Cri LJ 426), wherein S. 439, Cr. P.C. came up for

consideration. In that case, the Supreme Court posed a

question for consideration and answered the same as

follows:

“When is a person in costody within the meaning of

S. 439, Cr. P.C.? When he is in duress either because he

is held by the investigating agency or other police or

allied authority or is under the control of the Court, having

been remanded by judicial order or having offered himself

to the Court's jurisdiction and submitted to its order by

physical presence. No lexical dexerity or precedential

profession is needed to come to the realistic conclusion

that he who is under the control of the Court or in the

physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in

custody for the purpose of Section 439. This word is of

elastic semantics and its core meaning is that the law has

taken control of the person. Equivocatory quibblings and

the hide-and-seek niceties sometimes heard in Court that

the police have taken a man into informal custody but not

arrested him, have detained him for interrogation but

not taken him into formal custody and the other like

terminological dubieties (sic) are unfair evasions of the

straight-forwardness of the law. We need not dilate on

this shady facet here because we are satisfied, that the

accused did physically submit before the Sessions Judge

and the jurisdiction to grant bail thus arose. Custody in

the context of S. 439 (we are not, be it noted, dealing with

anticipatory bail under S. 438) is physical control or at

least physical presence of the accused in Court with

submission to the jurisdiction and order of the Court. He

can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him,

[25]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

produces him before a Magistrate and gets a remand to

judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial

custody when he surrenders before the Court and

submits to its directions.”

“22. In order to fully understand the above view expressed by the

Supreme Court, let us have a cursory glance of Section 439,

Cr. P.C. (which corresponds to S. 498 of the old Code). The

unfettered discretionary power of the High Court and the

Court of Session under Sec. 439 of the Code in granting bail

can be exercised only on the satisfaction of two conditions:

Firstly, the person who moves for bail must be a person

accused of an offence, bailable or non-bailable, and secondly

he must be in custody. The Supreme Court in Niranjan

Singh's case (AIR 1980 SC 785) : (1980 Cri LJ 426), on being

satisfied that the first condition has been fulfilled, gave the

meaning of the term ‘in custody’ while considering the

fulfilment of the second condition. Be it noted that in the said

case their Lordships did not express the view that the mere

taking of a person into custody by an authority empowered to

arrest, or the mere presence of the accused is enough to

constitute the arrest of the accused, but only emphasized that

the physical control or at least physical appearance of the

accused in Court should be coupled with the submission to

the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. In other words, the

person who is accused of an offence should submit himself

to the jurisdiction or orders of the authority empowered to

arrest.”

“23. Coming to the Customs Act, a person who appears before any

officer of Customs on being required for an enquiry in

connection with the smuggling of any goods, under Section

107 of the Customs Act, or a person who attends before any

gazetted officer of Customs on summons in connection with

an enquiry relating to the smuggling of any goods, under S.

108 of the said Act, is not a person accused of an offence at

that stage. Therefore, the submission of Mr. Rangavajjula that

since the person so required or summoned under the above

said provisions comes under the custody of the Customs

[26]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

Officials, he must be deemed to have been arrested in the

light of the interpretation by the Supreme Court of the term ‘in

custody’ occurring in S. 439 of the Code in Niranjan's case

(1980 Cr LJ 426), cannot be accepted. In fact, their Lordships

themselves have pointed out in that judgment that there is a

shady facet in the expression of the term in ‘custody’. Hence,

this decision cannot be availed of by the learned counsel in

support of his contention that the mere taking of a person into

custody would amount to arrest.”

[11] After a careful examination of all the materials available on

record and after a careful consideration of the rival submission made

by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, this court is of the

considered view that only one issue needs to be considered and

decided in the present case. The issue is from which point of time, the

period of 24 hours as stipulated under Article 22(2) of the Constitution

will commence? In my humble opinion, this issue is no longer

res-integra.

In a recent judgment dated 05-11-2026 passed by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Sri Sujit Das & ors. Vs. Union

of India, 2026 INSC 1195”, this issue has been considered elaborately

and held as under:-`

“69. In the circumstances, we would like to summarize our

conclusions as under:

(i) the 24 hours timeline as mandated under clause (2) of

Article 22 of the Constitution of India would commence

from the date and time of detention of the person detained

when his liberty stands curtailed and not from the time of

his formal arrest;

[27]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

(ii) in the event, such detention continues beyond 24 hours

before the person is produced before a magistrate, he

shall be forthwith released from custody;

(iii) while computing the 24 hours deadline, no other time

period is permitted to be excluded therefrom except the

time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to

the court of the magistrate;

(iv) the decisions of the Orissa High Court in Aryaman

Pattnayak, Madras High Court in Kannan and Kerala High

Court in Arun K. Thomas do not lay down the correct law

qua interpretation of clause (2) of Article 22 of the

Constitution of India;

(v) the detaining authority should keep in mind not only the

24 hours deadline mandated by clause (2) of Article 22 of

the Constitution but also ensure that such detention

should not extend beyond a reasonable period within the

24 hours period considering the circumstances of the

case in terms of Section 58 BNSS (Section 57 CrPC);

(vi) at the time of production, the magistrate is duty bound to

record the actual date and time of detention of the person

produced before him when his liberty stood curtailed and

examine whether the 24 hours deadline has been

complied with or not from the time of such detention. If

there is breach of the 24 hours deadline, the concerned

person shall be released forthwith from detention;

(vii) the magistrate shall also examine at the time of

production whether the production of the person

produced, though is within the time frame of 24 hours,

has exceeded the period which can be construed to be

reasonable in the circumstances of the case. If he is

satisfied that detention in custody has been for a longer

period that what is reasonable, he may decline remand;

(viii) in so far the present case is concerned, for the reasons

cited in paragraphs 65, 66 and 67 above, the detention of

the appellants was not only in breach of clause (2) of

Article 22 of the Constitution of India but was for a period

[28]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

beyond what can be construed to be a reasonable period

considering all the circumstances of the case which was

in contravention of Section 58 BNSS (Section 57 CrPC);

(ix) consequently, we set aside the impugned judgment and

order of the High Court dated 24.04.2026 and direct that

the appellants shall be produced before the jurisdictional

Special Court within a maximum period of 7 days from

today whereafter they shall be released on bail on such

terms and conditions as may be deemed appropriate.”

[12] At para 69(iv) of Sri Sujit Das (supra), the Hon’ble Apex

Court has held that the decisions of the Orissa High Court in Aryaman

Pattanayak, Madras High Court in Kannan and Kerala High Court

in Arun K. Thomas, which have been relied on by the Sr. PCCG on

behalf of the respondent, do not lay down the correct law qua

interpretation of clause (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India.

[13] Keeping in view the ratio decidendi and in the light of the

decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

Sri Sujit Das (supra), this court proceeded to consider the present

case. In the present case, it is an admitted fact and on record that the

two accused persons were stopped and detained by the team of NCB

at 0300 hrs. of 25-09-2025 and the search-cum-seizure of the

contraband drugs and other articles were completed at about 0630 hrs.

of 25-09-2026. It is also an undisputed fact and on record that the two

accused persons were produced before the Special Judge (ND & PS),

Chandel, on 26-09-2025. In the present case, considering these

[29]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

undisputed facts, this court has no hesitation to arrive at a conclusion

that the 24 hrs. period as stipulated under Article 22(2) of the

Constitution of India shall commence on and from 0300 hrs. of

25-09-2025, when the said two accused persons were stopped and

detained by the NCB team.

[14] Even though neither the petitioner nor the respondent

have stated the exact time of the production of the said accused

persons before the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, this court

can reasonably arrived at a conclusion that the accused persons

were produced before the said court only after 0300 hrs. of 26-09-2025

as it will be unreasonable to presume that the said Special Judge would

be on duty at such an early hour. It will be also reasonable to arrive

at a conclusion that the NCB team must have produced the said

two accused persons after 10:00 AM of 26-09-2025, i.e., during court

hours.

[15] In view of the above, the reasonable conclusion is that the

said two accused persons were produced before the court beyond the

period of 24 hours as mandated under Article 22 thereby resulting in

violation of the fundamental rights of the said two accused persons as

guaranteed by Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, this

court is of the considered view that the impugned remand order dated

[30]

Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-

26-09-2025 and the detention of the Accused No. 2 in judicial custody

is rendered illegal. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 26-09-2025

passed by the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, is hereby quashed

and set aside. Consequently, the respondent is hereby directed to

produce the Accused No. 2, viz., Letminthang Khongsai, aged

about 42 years, S/o Jamsei Khongsai, resident of Sugnu,

Utangpokpi, Chandel District, Manipur, before the Special Judge

(ND & PS), Chandel, within a maximum period of seven days from

today whereafter he shall be released on bail on such terms and

conditions as may be deemed appropriate.

With the aforesaid directions, the present petition is hereby

disposed of.

JUDGE

FR/ NFR

Devananda

Reference cases

Description

Manipur High Court Quashes Remand Order in Landmark NDPS Act Bail Case

In a significant ruling that underscores the constitutional rights of arrested individuals, the High Court of Manipur at Imphal recently delivered a pivotal judgment in a high-stakes NDPS Act Bail case, Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026, Tinneihing Khongsai vs. Narcotics Control Bureau. This decision, a critical Illegal Detention Case, highlights the stringent requirements for producing arrestees before a magistrate and is now prominently featured on CaseOn, offering comprehensive insights for legal professionals.

Understanding the Case: Tinneihing Khongsai vs. Narcotics Control Bureau

The Core Issue: When Does the 24-Hour Clock Start?

The central legal question before the Manipur High Court was precise: From what point in time does the crucial 24-hour period, stipulated under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India for producing an arrested person before a magistrate, commence? This issue was at the heart of the petitioner's challenge against a remand order issued by the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel.

Factual Background

The case involved the arrest of Letminthang Khongsai (Accused No. 2), whose wife, Tinneihing Khongsai, filed the petition. According to the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), acting on specific intelligence, a team intercepted two individuals, including Accused No. 2, at approximately 03:00 hrs. on September 25, 2025. During the subsequent search, a commercial quantity of Methamphetamine/WY tablets (67.19 Kg) was recovered.

The search and seizure operations concluded around 06:30 hrs. on September 25, 2025. The formal arrest of Accused No. 2, as per the Arrest Memo, was recorded at 13:30 hrs. on the same day. Subsequently, both accused were produced before the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, on September 26, 2025, leading to the impugned remand order.

The petitioner argued that the 24-hour period should commence from 03:00 hrs. on September 25, 2025, when Accused No. 2 was first stopped and detained, rendering any production after 03:00 hrs. on September 26, 2025, a violation of constitutional rights. Conversely, the respondent contended that the clock should start from the time of formal arrest at 13:30 hrs., making the production on September 26, 2025, compliant with the 24-hour rule.

Relevant Legal Rules and Precedents

Constitutional Mandate: Article 22(2)

Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India mandates that every person arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate.

Statutory Framework: NDPS Act and BNSS

The case was filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (‘BNSS’), pertaining to offences under Sections 8(c), 22(c), 25, and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The interpretation of 'arrest' and 'custody' in relation to the NDPS Act and the BNSS (formerly CrPC) became crucial.

Guiding Supreme Court Judgments

The High Court relied heavily on recent Supreme Court pronouncements, particularly the judgment in Sri Sujit Das & ors. Vs. Union of India, 2026 INSC 1195 (dated 05-11-2026). This landmark decision unequivocally clarified that:

  • The 24-hour timeline under Article 22(2) commences from the date and time of *detention* when a person's liberty is curtailed, not from the time of formal arrest.
  • If detention continues beyond 24 hours before production, the person must be forthwith released.
  • No time period is excluded except for the journey to the magistrate's court.
  • Magistrates have a duty to record the actual date and time of detention and ensure compliance with the 24-hour deadline.

Notably, the Sujit Das ruling also stated that previous High Court decisions (e.g., in Kannan and Arun K. Thomas, cited by the respondent in this case) did not correctly interpret Article 22(2) regarding this specific issue.

For legal professionals seeking swift comprehension of such critical rulings, CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that distill complex judgments like Sri Sujit Das & ors. Vs. Union of India into easily digestible summaries, aiding in rapid analysis and strategic planning for NDPS Act Bail and Illegal Detention Case matters.

Analysis: Applying the Rule to the Facts

The Manipur High Court, guided by the authoritative pronouncement in Sri Sujit Das, concluded that the 24-hour period for Accused No. 2 commenced at 03:00 hrs. on September 25, 2025, when he was stopped and effectively detained by the NCB team. Despite the formal arrest being recorded later at 13:30 hrs., the curtailment of his liberty began at 03:00 hrs.

Considering that the Special Judge (ND & PS) would not be on duty at such an early hour, the court reasonably inferred that Accused No. 2 was produced before the magistrate only after 03:00 hrs. on September 26, 2025 (likely during regular court hours after 10:00 AM). This timing clearly exceeded the mandated 24-hour period from the point of detention.

The court therefore found a clear violation of Accused No. 2's fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion

Based on the violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution, the Manipur High Court held that the impugned remand order dated September 26, 2025, and the continued detention of Accused No. 2 were illegal. The court accordingly quashed and set aside the remand order.

The respondent (NCB) was directed to produce Accused No. 2, Letminthang Khongsai, before the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, within a maximum period of seven days from the date of the judgment. Following this, Accused No. 2 is to be released on bail, subject to appropriate terms and conditions determined by the Special Judge.

Summary of the Original Content

This High Court of Manipur judgment meticulously examines the timeline of detention and arrest in an NDPS Act case. It reinforces the principle that constitutional safeguards under Article 22(2) regarding the 24-hour production rule commence from the moment an individual's liberty is curtailed, irrespective of the formal arrest time. By applying the Supreme Court's ruling in *Sri Sujit Das*, the High Court found a breach of fundamental rights, leading to the quashing of the remand order and the direction for bail.

Why This Judgment is an Important Read for Lawyers and Students

This judgment serves as a vital precedent for several reasons:

  • Clarifies 'Arrest' vs. 'Detention': It definitively resolves the ambiguity regarding the commencement of the 24-hour production period, emphasizing that 'detention' (curtailment of liberty) is the trigger, not 'formal arrest'. This is crucial for *habeas corpus* petitions and challenging illegal detentions.
  • Reinforces Constitutional Safeguards: It highlights the judiciary's role in upholding fundamental rights, particularly Article 22(2) and Article 21 (Right to Liberty), ensuring law enforcement agencies adhere strictly to procedural mandates.
  • Impact on NDPS Cases: For lawyers dealing with NDPS Act Bail matters, this ruling provides a powerful tool to challenge remand orders where procedural lapses regarding timely production exist. It underscores the high standard of proof required from the prosecution regarding adherence to arrest procedures.
  • Guidance for Magistrates: The judgment reminds magistrates of their duty to scrupulously examine the actual time of detention and production, and to decline remand if there's a breach of the 24-hour rule or unreasonable detention.
  • Understanding Jurisprudence Evolution: For students, it's an excellent example of how Supreme Court judgments clarify and evolve legal principles, with High Courts dutifully applying these interpretations, as seen with the reliance on *Sri Sujit Das* and the rejection of earlier conflicting High Court views in this Illegal Detention Case.

Disclaimer: All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues. CaseOn is not responsible for any actions taken based on the information provided herein.

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