FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 1 of 22

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 16.09.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 28.09.2026

Judgment uploaded on: 28. 09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010220872025

+ FAO (COMM) 96/2025 and CM APPL. 23361/2025

UMENDRA EXPORTS PRIVATE LIMITED

.....Appellant

Through: Ms. Aditi Sharma, Adv.

versus

FOUR CUBES INVESTMENTS LTD & ORS. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Preet Pal Singh, Mr. Virat

Raj Mishra, Ms. Simran

Kumari, Ms. Pooja, Advs. for

R-3 & 4.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

J U D G M E N T

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:

1. The present Appeal filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(a) of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, CPC), by the Appellant,

who was the Plaintiff in the Suit, assails the Orders dated 09.10.2024

and 17.12.2024 passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial

Court), South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi. By the first

Order, the Application filed by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 under Order

VII Rule 10 CPC was allowed. By the second, the Plaint was returned

for presentation before a Court at Mumbai.

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 2 of 22

2. For ease of reference, the parties shall hereafter be referred to

by the description assigned to them in the Suit before the learned

Commercial Court.

3. The dispute arises from a Suit in which the Plaintiff has joined

claims emanating from the sale of goods with claims concerning their

subsequent transportation. The learned Commercial Court held that

the claims against Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 were governed by the

Multimodal Transportation of Goods Act, 1993

1

and that Mumbai

Courts had jurisdiction over them. Since the claims against the

remaining Defendants were considered inseparable, the entire Plaint

was directed to be returned.

4. The question in Appeal is whether the existence of claims

arising from the multimodal transportation arrangement justified

return of the entire Plaint, notwithstanding the Plaintiff‟s case that a

distinct part of the cause of action arising from the underlying sale

transaction had accrued in Delhi.

5. The Plaintiff is engaged in the business of supplying and

exporting personal care and allied products. Defendant No. 1, a

company based in Zambia, acting through Defendant No. 2, its

Managing Director, placed an order for supply of cosmetic products.

A Proforma Invoice dated 23.05.2018 was issued by the Plaintiff for a

total value of US$114,463.30. The transaction was on FOB (Free on

Board) terms, and the goods were proposed to be dispatched in four

consignments.

1

Hereinafter, the „1993 Act‟

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 3 of 22

6. The Plaintiff pleads that the Proforma Invoice, after being

signed and stamped on behalf of Defendant No. 1, was received by it

through email at New Delhi. It is on this basis that the Plaintiff asserts

that the sale transaction has a material territorial connection with

Delhi. Whether the contract can finally be said to have been concluded

in Delhi is not required to be determined at this stage.

7. Defendant No. 3, East West Freight Carriers Ltd., was engaged

as the freight forwarder for transportation of the goods. Its principal

office is at Mumbai, though it also has a branch office at Mahipalpur,

New Delhi. Defendant No. 4 is its employee. The Written Statement

of Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 records that they were not parties to, and

were unaware of, the commercial terms governing the sale between

the Plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2.

8. For carriage of the consignments to Lusaka, Zambia, Defendant

No. 3 issued two Multimodal Transport Documents/House Bills of

Lading dated 31.08.2018 and 20.10.2018. According to Defendant

Nos. 3 and 4, since the destination was Lusaka and transportation

beyond the port at Beira, Mozambique, involved road carriage, their

House Bills were issued so that their associate could arrange onward

transportation from Beira to Lusaka.

9. The first consignment was covered by an invoice dated

22.08.2018 for US$31,511.09. The Plaintiff alleges that the

consignment was delivered to Defendant No. 1 without surrender of

the original House Bill of Lading and without payment of the entire

sale consideration. Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 dispute any collusion but

admit that delivery was taken without submission of the original

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 4 of 22

House Bill of Lading, describing the occurrence as an unintended

lapse on the part of their agent.

10. Thereafter, an amount of US$21,000 was remitted towards the

first consignment and was received in the Plaintiff‟s bank account at

Nehru Place, New Delhi. According to the Plaintiff, the balance

amount of US$10,511.09 remained unpaid and was also payable at

New Delhi.

11. In the meanwhile, the second consignment was shipped on

20.10.2018 and reached Beira on 05.12.2018. The Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant No. 3 withheld the consignment on account of

outstanding freight charges and thereafter delayed its rerouting to

Durban, where the goods were to be supplied to another purchaser.

Defendant Nos. 3 and 4, on the other hand, attribute the delay and the

accumulation of charges to circumstances including non-payment of

freight and detention charges, completion of re-export formalities and

the time taken by the shipping line and authorities at Beira.

12. On 27.05.2019, Defendant No. 3 raised a Tax Invoice upon the

Plaintiff for ₹18,23,924/-, comprising, inter alia, freight, detention,

demurrage, port and re-export related charges. The Plaintiff disputed

its liability and asserted that the demand itself formed part of the

wrongful conduct complained of in the suit. The invoice bears, at its

foot, the stipulation “SUBJECT TO MUMBAI JURISDICTION”.

13. The Plaintiff thereafter instituted the underlying Commercial

Suit seeking recovery of ₹1,12,46,657/- against Defendant Nos. 1 to 4

jointly and severally. It also sought a declaration that the demand

dated 27.05.2019 raised by Defendant No. 3 was illegal and void, a

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 5 of 22

permanent injunction restraining Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 from

enforcing the said demand, and consequential relief concerning the

second container. It may also be noticed that Defendant Nos. 1 and 2

were proceeded ex parte on 15.09.2022, while Defendant Nos. 5 and 6

were deleted from the array of parties on 16.04.2024.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMERCIAL COURT

14. Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 filed an application under Order VII

Rule 10 CPC seeking return of the plaint for want of territorial

jurisdiction. They contended that the claims against them arose from

multimodal transportation of the consignments and were governed by

the Multimodal Transportation of Goods Act, 1993 and the

Multimodal Transport Documents issued by Defendant No. 3.

Reliance was placed upon the execution of those documents at

Mumbai, the principal place of business of Defendant No. 3 at

Mumbai, taking charge of the goods at Nhava Sheva, Section 25 of

the 1993 Act and Clause 23 appearing on the reverse of the

Multimodal Transport Documents.

15. Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 also relied upon the stipulation

“SUBJECT TO MUMBAI JURISDICTION” contained in the Tax

Invoice dated 27.05.2019 and sought return of the Plaint for

presentation before a competent Court at Mumbai.

16. The Plaintiff opposed the Application. It maintained that the

Suit was founded upon the Proforma Invoice, non-payment of the sale

consideration by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the alleged concerted

wrongdoing of the Defendants, and that the Multimodal Transport

Documents did not constitute the contract in dispute. On territorial

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 6 of 22

jurisdiction, it relied upon receipt of the accepted Proforma Invoice at

New Delhi, receipt of part-payment in its bank account at Nehru

Place, the pleaded obligation to pay the balance amount there and the

presence of a branch office of Defendant No. 3 in Delhi.

17. The learned Commercial Court held that the claims and reliefs

against Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 fell within Section 13 of the 1993 Act

2

and that jurisdiction in respect of those claims was governed by

Section 25. It further relied upon the execution of the Multimodal

Transport Documents at Mumbai, the principal place of business of

Defendant No. 3 at Mumbai, taking charge of the goods at Nhava

Sheva and Clause 23 of the Multimodal Transport Documents.

18. Since the claims against Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and those

against Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 were considered incapable of

separation, the learned Commercial Court directed return of the entire

Plaint for presentation before a Court at Mumbai. The application

RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT O PERATOR

2

13. Basis of liability of multimodal transport operator.—(1) The multimodal transport

operator shall be liable for loss resulting from— (a) any loss of, or damage to, the consignment;

(b) delay in delivery of the consignment and any consequential loss or damage arising from such

delay, where such loss, damage or delay in delivery took place while the consignment was in his

charge:

Provided that the multimodal transport operator shall not be liable if he proves that no fault or

neglect on his part or that of his servants or agents had caused or contributed to such loss, damage

or delay in delivery:

[Provided further that the multimodal transport operator shall not be liable for loss or damage

arising out of delay in delivery including any consequential loss or damage arising from such

delay unless the consignor had made a declaration of interest in timely delivery which has been

accepted by the multimodal transport operator.]

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “delay in delivery” shall be deemed to occur

when the consignment has not been delivered within the time expressly agreed upon or, in the

absence of such agreement, within a reasonable time required by a diligent multimodal transport

operator, having regard to the circumstances of the case, to effect the delivery of the consignment.

(2) If the consignment has not been delivered within ninety consecutive days following the date of

delivery expressly agreed upon or the reasonable time referred to in the Explanation to sub-section

(1), the claimant may treat the consignment as lost.

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 7 of 22

under Order VII Rule 10 CPC was accordingly allowed on 09.10.2024

and the Plaint was thereafter returned by order dated 17.12.2024. Both

orders are impugned in the present Appeal.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES :

19. Learned counsel representing the Appellant-Plaintiff submits

that the learned Commercial Court erred in treating the Suit as one

governed entirely by the 1993 Act. According to the Plaintiff, the Suit

is founded upon the Proforma Invoice dated 23.05.2018, non-payment

of the sale consideration by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the concerted

acts of the Defendants. It is contended that the Multimodal Transport

Documents are not themselves under challenge and do not constitute

the contract on which the principal claim in the Suit is founded.

20. On territorial jurisdiction, the Plaintiff relies upon receipt of the

accepted Proforma Invoice at New Delhi, receipt of part-payment in

its bank account at Nehru Place and the pleaded obligation to pay the

balance amount there. It disputes the conclusion that the jurisdictional

regime governing the multimodal transport arrangement required

return of the entire Suit to Mumbai.

21. Defendant Nos. 3 and 4, on the other hand, support the

impugned orders. They maintain that the claims concerning carriage,

delivery and the charges raised by Defendant No. 3 arise from the

multimodal transport arrangement and are governed by the 1993 Act

and the Multimodal Transport Documents. They rely upon the

principal place of business of Defendant No. 3 at Mumbai, execution

of the Multimodal Transport Documents at Mumbai, taking charge of

the goods at Nhava Sheva, Clause 23 of those documents and the

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 8 of 22

jurisdiction stipulation contained in the Tax Invoice dated 27.05.2019.

They further contend that the claims against the Defendants have been

framed as part of one composite Suit and cannot be separated.

22. The principal question before this Court is whether the learned

Commercial Court was justified in returning the entire Plaint for

presentation before a Court at Mumbai.

23. The answer requires consideration of three connected issues:

the nature of the causes of action joined in the Plaint, the territorial

jurisdiction governing the sale and transportation-related claims, and

the procedural consequence if the Court at Delhi has jurisdiction over

one substantive cause of action but not another.

ANALYSIS & FINDINGS:

24. At the threshold stage at which an objection under Order VII

Rule 10 CPC is considered on demurrer, the Court proceeds on the

averments contained in the Plaint, read with the documents filed

therewith, and assumes those averments to be correct for that limited

purpose. The Plaint must nevertheless be read meaningfully and as a

whole to ascertain the true nature of the Suit and the reliefs claimed.

This threshold inquiry does not entail adjudication of disputed

questions of fact on evidence. The principles governing this exercise

were explained in Begum Sabiha Sultan v. Nawab Mohd. Mansur

Ali Khan

3

.

25. Territorial jurisdiction in an ordinary civil suit is governed,

inter alia, by Section 20 CPC. Under clause (c), a suit may be

3

(2007) 4 SCC 343

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 9 of 22

instituted before a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the cause

of action arises wholly or in part. In contractual disputes, the place

where the contract is made or performed, where payment is required

to be made and where the breach occurs may constitute material parts

of the cause of action. The principles governing this inquiry were

explained by the Supreme Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P.

Agencies

4

.

26. The present Suit, however, also contains claims arising from

multimodal transportation of the consignments. The Multimodal

Transportation of Goods Act, 1993 therefore becomes relevant to

those claims. Section 13 of the Act deals with the liability of a

multimodal transport operator for specified loss, damage and delay,

while Section 25 of the Act identifies the Courts before which an

action under the multimodal transport contract may be instituted.

Section 29

5

gives the Act overriding effect to the extent of any

inconsistency.

27. It is unnecessary in the present Appeal to decide whether

Section 25 excludes every forum that may otherwise be available

under Section 20 CPC. The immediate question is whether the

particular cause of action sought to be adjudicated arises from the

multimodal transport contract. A provision governing jurisdiction over

one legal relationship cannot determine the forum for a distinct cause

of action arising from another.

4

(1989) 2 SCC 163

5

29. Act to override other enactments.—The provisions of this Act shall have effect

notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in

force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 10 of 22

28. The learned Commercial Court proceeded on the basis that

Defendant No. 3 was the freight forwarder, Defendant No. 4 was its

employee, and multimodal transport services had been rendered to the

Plaintiff. From this, it concluded that the disputes, claims and prayers

against them fell within Section 13 of the 1993 Act. The Plaint

requires a more differentiated examination.

29. The first legal relationship pleaded in the Plaint arises from the

contract for sale of goods between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1.

The obligation relied upon is the buyer‟s obligation to pay the agreed

price. The claim for the unpaid balance of the first consignment is

founded upon that obligation.

30. A separate legal relationship arose when Defendant No. 3

undertook transportation of the consignments and issued the

Multimodal Transport Documents. The allegations concerning

delivery of the first consignment without surrender of the original

House Bill of Lading, retention and rerouting of the second

consignment, delay in transportation, and the freight, detention and

demurrage charges raised by Defendant No. 3 arise from that

arrangement.

31. The obligations flowing from these two relationships are

distinct. The liability of Defendant No. 1 to pay the agreed sale price

can be examined independently of any breach by the multimodal

transport operator. Likewise, a claim concerning unauthorised

delivery, detention or delay in transportation can be examined

irrespective of whether the buyer ultimately paid the seller.

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 11 of 22

32. The reliefs claimed in the Suit reinforce this distinction. Apart

from the joint and several monetary claim against Defendant Nos. 1 to

4, the Plaintiff seeks a declaration against the demand raised by

Defendant No. 3 on 27.05.2019, an injunction restraining its

enforcement and consequential relief concerning the second container.

These reliefs arise from obligations different from the buyer‟s

obligation to pay the sale consideration.

33. The Plaint also alleges that the Defendants acted in concert and

that the events relating to the two consignments formed part of a

common course of conduct. Those allegations remain relevant. They

do not, however, alter the distinct legal basis of the obligations

asserted against the respective Defendants. A common factual

narrative may connect different causes of action without making them

indivisible.

34. The Plaint is therefore composite in character. It joins claims

arising from the underlying sale transaction with claims arising from

the subsequent multimodal transportation arrangement, while alleging

collusion on the part of the Defendants. This conclusion concerns only

the nature of the pleading and expresses no view on the truth of the

allegations or the ultimate liability of any Defendant.

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SALE

TRANSACTION

35. Once the two legal relationships are kept distinct, territorial

jurisdiction over the claim arising from the sale transaction requires

separate consideration. In paragraph 89 of the Plaint, the Plaintiff

pleads that the accepted Proforma Invoice was received by email at

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 12 of 22

New Delhi, that part-payment of US$21,000 was received in its bank

account at Nehru Place, and that the outstanding amount of

US$10,511.09 was payable there.

36. These averments disclose a material territorial connection with

Delhi. As explained in A.B.C. Laminart (supra), the place where a

contract is made or performed, including the place where money

under the contract is expressly or impliedly payable, may constitute

part of the cause of action. At this stage, it is unnecessary to determine

conclusively whether the sale contract was formed at New Delhi. The

pleaded obligation to make payment at New Delhi, supported by the

receipt of part-payment there, is sufficient for the purposes of the

present Application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC.

37. The learned Commercial Court did not separately examine this

cause of action. Having concluded that the claims against Defendant

Nos. 3 and 4 were governed by the 1993 Act, it proceeded to return

the entire Plaint. The pleaded territorial connection with Delhi arising

from the sale transaction required independent consideration before

such an order could be passed.

CLAIMS ARIS ING FROM THE TRANSPORTATION

ARRANGEMENT

38. The Plaintiff's contention that the Multimodal Transport

Documents have no bearing on the Suit cannot, however, be accepted.

The plaint contains allegations concerning delivery of the first

consignment without surrender of the original House Bill of Lading,

retention and rerouting of the second consignment, delay in

transportation, and charges raised by Defendant No. 3 for freight and

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 13 of 22

allied services. These claims arise directly from the transportation

arrangement.

39. The learned Commercial Court was therefore correct in

examining the 1993 Act. Its error lay in treating the entire body of

claims against Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 as falling within Section 13.

That provision concerns liability of the multimodal transport operator

for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the consignment and from

delay in delivery, subject to the statutory conditions contained therein.

The connection of a dispute with the same consignment does not bring

every claim concerning freight, detention, demurrage, lien or other

charges within Section 13.

40. The claim for unpaid sale consideration stands on a different

aspect. It arises from the buyer‟s obligation under the sale transaction

and does not change its character because the Plaintiff also alleges

collusion on the part of Defendant Nos. 3 and 4.

41. This Court is therefore unable to sustain the finding of the

learned Commercial Court insofar as it treats all claims and prayers

against Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 as falling within Section 13 of the

1993 Act. The transportation-related claims may engage the

multimodal transport contract and the statutory regime, but the legal

basis of each claim must be identified before the applicable

jurisdictional provision can be determined.

42. The existence of a branch office of Defendant No. 3 at

Mahipalpur does not, without the requisite connection with the cause

of action, conclude the issue of territorial jurisdiction. Under the

Explanation to Section 20 CPC, where a corporation has its principal

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 14 of 22

office at one place and a subordinate office at another, the latter

assumes jurisdictional significance in respect of a cause of action

arising at that place. The position was explained by the Supreme

Court in Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Co.

6

and reiterated

in New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.

7

.

SECTION 25, CLAUSE 23 AND THE STIPULATION IN THE TAX

INVOICE

43. Section 25 of the 1993 Act

8

does not designate Mumbai as the

exclusive forum. It recognises more than one jurisdictional connecting

factor, including the principal place of business of the defendant, the

place where the multimodal transport contract was made, provided the

defendant has a place of business, branch or agency at such place, the

place where the goods were taken in charge or delivered, and any

other place specified in the contract and evidenced by the Multimodal

Transport Document.

44. Defendant No. 3 admittedly has its principal place of business

at Mumbai. Mumbai is therefore a competent forum under Section

25(a) for an action arising from the multimodal transport contract. It is

unnecessary for the present Appeal to determine whether the other

6

(1991) 4 SCC 270

7

(2004) 4 SCC 677

8

25. Jurisdiction for instituting action.—Any party to the multimodal transport contract may

institute an action in a court which is competent and within the jurisdiction of which is situated

one of the following places, namely:—

(a) the principal place of business, or, in the absence thereof, the habitual residence, of the

defendant; or

(b) the place where the multimodal transport contract was made, provided that the defendant has a

place of business, branch or agency at such place; or

(c) the place of taking charge of the goods for multimodal transportation or the place of delivery

thereof; or

(d) any other place specified in the multimodal transport contract and evidenced in the multimodal

transport document.

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 15 of 22

connecting factors relied upon by Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are also

attracted.

45. The learned Commercial Court also relied upon Clause 23

appearing on the reverse of the Multimodal Transport Documents as

specifying Mumbai Courts. The copies of those documents available

on record in the paper books, however, are barely legible and do not

permit the text of that particular clause to be read with sufficient

certainty as to what that clause makes out. The finding that Clause 23

confers exclusive jurisdiction upon Mumbai Courts cannot therefore

be sustained on the present record. This does not affect the conclusion

that Mumbai is a competent forum under Section 25(a).

46. Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 further rely upon the words “SUBJECT

TO MUMBAI JURISDICTION” printed on the Tax Invoice dated

27.05.2019. The invoice was raised after the dispute concerning the

consignments had arisen, and the Plaintiff itself challenges the

demand contained therein. In R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree

Vallabh Glass Works Ltd.

9

, the Supreme Court declined to give

exclusionary effect to a jurisdiction endorsement where the

circumstances did not establish that the otherwise competent forum

had been excluded. No material has been shown at this stage to

establish that the stipulation printed on the Tax Invoice was accepted

by the Plaintiff as an exclusive forum-selection agreement. It can

therefore neither determine the forum for the entire Suit nor govern

the separate sale transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant Nos.

1 and 2.

9

(1993) 2 SCC 130

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 16 of 22

THE COMPOSITE NATURE OF THE SUIT

47. The next question is whether the territorial connection of the

sale-side cause of action with Delhi, coupled with joinder of the

transportation-related claims, is sufficient to sustain the entire

composite Suit before the learned Commercial Court.

48. The answer is in the negative. Order I Rule 3 and Order II Rule

3 of the CPC permit joinder of parties and causes of action in the

circumstances contemplated therein, but do not enlarge the territorial

jurisdiction of the Court. An independently founded cause of action

must possess its own jurisdictional foundation.

49. In Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi

10

, and Dabur India Ltd. v.

K.R. Industries

11

, the Supreme Court considered composite suits

involving causes of action governed by different jurisdictional

foundations. The decisions recognise that jurisdiction over one

substantive cause of action does not extend to an independent cause

for which the requisite territorial connection is absent.

50. The five-judge Special Bench of this Court in Carlsberg

Breweries A/S v. Som Distilleries and Breweries Ltd.

12

, also

recognised the distinction between joinder of causes of action and

territorial jurisdiction. Though disparate causes of action may

permissibly be joined, such joinder cannot confer jurisdiction upon a

Court in respect of a cause of action which it could not otherwise

entertain.

10

(2006) 9 SCC 41

11

(2008) 10 SCC 595

12

2018:DHC:7876-DB

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 17 of 22

51. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Nilesh

Girkar v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd.

13

, does not alter this

conclusion. There, the alleged infringement arose from

communication of the same copyrighted work through an OTT

platform accessible within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned

Commercial Court at Saket, and the grievances against the several

participants were found to be interconnected. In the present case, the

claim for payment of the sale consideration and the claims arising

from carriage, delivery, retention and related charges stem from

separate legal relationships. The allegation of concerted conduct does

not erase the independent legal basis of those obligations.

52. Accordingly, the territorial connection pleaded in relation to the

sale transaction cannot, through joinder, furnish territorial jurisdiction

over an independent transportation-related cause of action which

otherwise lacks the requisite connection with Delhi.

WHETHER THE ENTIRE PLAINT NEEDS TO BE NECESSARILY

RETURNED

53. The conclusion that the Court at Delhi may lack territorial

jurisdiction over some of the transportation-related causes of action

does not, however, determine what must happen to the Plaint as a

whole.

54. Order VII Rule 10 CPC does not contemplate return of selected

causes of action contained in a Plaint. At the same time, the presence

of a cause which the chosen Court cannot entertain does not invariably

13

2025:DHC:8281-DB

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 18 of 22

require return of the entire Plaint if the Suit can lawfully be brought

into a maintainable form.

55. In Paragon Rubber Industries v. Pragathi Rubber Mills

14

, the

Plaintiff had instituted a composite suit comprising claims under the

Copyright Act and the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. The Court

at Kottayam had jurisdiction over the copyright claim but not over the

other independent cause of action. The High Court permitted

amendment of the Plaint so that the suit could continue in respect of

the claim over which that Court possessed jurisdiction.

56. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with that course. It

recognised that permitting amendment, so as to retain a cause of

action maintainable before the chosen Court, was a permissible

exercise of discretion and avoided unnecessary multiplicity of

proceedings.

57. Paragon Rubber (supra) does not dilute the requirement that

each independent cause of action must possess its own territorial

foundation. Nor does it lay down an invariable requirement that an

opportunity to amend must precede every Order returning a Plaint. It

recognises amendment as a course available to the Court in an

appropriate case where a cause of action can validly remain before the

chosen forum.

58. The learned Commercial Court did not consider that course.

After holding that the claims against Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 were

governed by the 1993 Act, it treated the claims against the Defendants

14

(2014) 14 SCC 762

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 19 of 22

as inseparable and directed return of the whole Plaint. In these

circumstances, where the Plaint discloses a distinct sale-side cause of

action having a pleaded territorial connection with Delhi, it would

have been appropriate to consider whether the Plaintiff could, by

amendment or election, retain before the learned Commercial Court at

Delhi the claims which it wished to pursue there.

59. The transportation-related causes of action must be examined

on their own jurisdictional foundation, the jurisdiction available in

respect of the sale-side cause of action does not extend to them

through joinder.

60. Nor is this Court determining, in Appeal, which causes of

action or reliefs the Plaintiff must retain or abandon. That choice must

first be made by the Plaintiff, and any proposed amendment would fall

for consideration by the learned Commercial Court after hearing

Defendant Nos. 3 and 4.

61. It is also unnecessary to decide whether Mumbai is competent

to entertain the entire composite Suit in its present form. The principal

place of business of Defendant No. 3 establishes jurisdiction at

Mumbai for an appropriate action arising from the multimodal

transport contract. Whether the independent claims against Defendant

Nos. 1 and 2 can also be entertained there was not separately

examined by the learned Commercial Court and need not be decided

in the present Appeal.

62. This Court holds that the proper course is therefore to set aside

the return of the Plaint and restore the Suit. The Plaintiff may, if so

advised, seek amendment or make an appropriate election so as to

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 20 of 22

retain before the learned Commercial Court the causes of action which

it contends are maintainable there. Whether or not such a course is

adopted, the objection to territorial jurisdiction shall thereafter be

determined in accordance with the findings recorded herein.

CONCLUSION & DIRECTIONS :

63. The Plaint combines claims arising from the sale transaction

with claims arising from the subsequent multimodal transportation

arrangement. On the averments contained in the Plaint, the sale-side

cause of action discloses a material territorial connection with Delhi.

The transportation-related claims, however, must independently

satisfy the requirements governing territorial jurisdiction.

64. The learned Commercial Court was correct in examining the

Multimodal Transportation of Goods Act, 1993 in relation to the

transportation-related claims, but erred in treating the entire body of

claims against Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 as falling within Section 13

and, on that basis, directing return of the entire Plaint. In the

circumstances of the present case, it ought also to have considered

whether the Plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to seek

amendment or make an election before the Suit was displaced in its

entirety.

65. Accordingly, the present Appeal is allowed in the following

terms:

65.1. The Orders dated 09.10.2024 and 17.12.2024 passed in CS

(Comm.) No. 203/2019 titled “Umendra Exports Private Limited v.

Four Cubes Investments Ltd. and Ors.” are set aside.

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 21 of 22

65.2. CS (Comm.) No. 203/2019 and the Application filed by

Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 under Order VII Rule 10 CPC shall stand

restored to the file of the learned Commercial Court.

65.3. The Plaintiff shall be at liberty, within four weeks from the date

fixed for appearance before the learned Commercial Court, to move

an appropriate application seeking amendment of the Plaint or to make

such election as it may be advised.

65.4. If such an application is filed, Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 shall be

afforded an opportunity to respond. The learned Commercial Court

shall decide the application and thereafter determine the objection to

territorial jurisdiction in respect of the Plaint as it then stands, in

accordance with law and in light of the findings recorded herein.

65.5. If the Plaintiff does not seek amendment or make an election,

the learned Commercial Court shall determine the objection to

territorial jurisdiction in respect of the Plaint as it stands, in

accordance with the findings recorded herein. If the Plaint, whether

amended or otherwise, includes an independent cause of action over

which that Court lacks territorial jurisdiction, it shall pass an

appropriate order concerning the Plaint in accordance with law.

65.6. The Plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are directed to appear

before the learned Commercial Court on 06.10.2026.

65.7. The Registry shall transmit the Trial Court Record, if received

in the present Appeal, forthwith. If the Plaint or any original

documents were physically returned to the Plaintiff pursuant to the

FAO (COMM) 96/2025 Page 22 of 22

Order dated 17.12.2024, the same shall be placed back on the record

of the learned Commercial Court on the date fixed for appearance.

66. It is clarified that this Court has expressed no opinion on the

merits of the claims, including the allegations of fraud, collusion,

breach or liability, or upon the validity of the monetary demands

raised by either side. Nor has this Court decided whether any cause of

action which may no longer form part of the Suit at Delhi can be

pursued before another forum, or the effect of limitation,

relinquishment or any other procedural objection upon such

proceedings. Those questions are left open to be considered, if and

when they arise, in accordance with law.

67. The present Appeal, along with the pending application, is

disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

ANIL KSHETARPAL , J.

SHAIL JAIN, J.

SEPTEMBER 28, 2026

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