Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:42797 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT

SHIMLA

FAO(MV) No.34 of 2014

Reserved on: 14.09.2026

Date of decision: 01.10.2026

Date of uploading on website:

01.10.2026

________________________________________________

United India Insurance Company Ltd. …..Appellant.

Versus

Prem Lata & others …..Respondents.

________________________________________________

Coram

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge.

1

Whether approved for reporting?

________________________________________________

For the appellant: Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, Senior

Advocate, with Mr. Ishan

Sharma, Advocate.

For respondents No. 1 & 2: Mr. Pranshul Sharma, Advocate

For respondent No. 3. Mr. V.B. Verma, Mr. Aditya

Thakur and Mr. Mukul Sharma,

Advocates.

Respondent No. 4 ex parte.

Sushil Kukreja, Judge.

The instant appeal has been maintained by

appellant-United India Insurance Company Ltd., who was

respondent No. 3 before the learned Tribunal below

(hereinafter referred to as the appellant/Insurance Company)

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:42797 )

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under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short

‘the Act’) against impugned award, dated 02.08.2013,

passed in MAC Petition No. 56-S/2 of 2011, whereby learned

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-I, Solan, District Solan, H.P.

(hereinafter referred to as “the learned Tribunal below”),

allowed the claim petition preferred by the

petitioners/claimants (respondents No. 1 and 2 herein).

2. The facts giving rise to the instant appeal are that

petitioners/claimants, i.e., Prem Lata and Dalip Chand

preferred a claim petition under Section 166 of the Act,

before the learned Tribunal below, on account of death of

their son Chanchal Kumar. The petitioners averred that the

deceased was aged about 28 years and was employed as

Senior Business Executive in USV Ltd. at Shimla. The

monthly salary of the deceased was Rs.30,958/-. On

16.09.2011 the deceased was riding on his motor cycle,

bearing registration No. HP-28B-0357, from Saproon

towards Ajni. Respondent No. 2-Som Dutt, who was driving

offending vehicle, bearing registration No. HP-64-4193,

came from Anji side in a rash and negligent manner on

wrong side and struck against the motorcycle of the

deceased at Rabon. The petitioners further averred that

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after the accident respondent No. 2 fled away from the spot.

While the deceased was being shifted to the hospital, en

route he died. As per the petitioners, the accident took place

due to the rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 2.

The petitioners, being the parents of the deceased were

wholly dependent on him and thus entitled for compensation

from respondents No. 1 to 3, i.e., owner, driver and insurer of

the offending vehicle.

3. Respondents No. 1 and 2 filed their replies,

wherein they averred that the claim petition was not

maintainable, as the petitioners had suppressed material

facts and they have no locus-standi to file the claim petition.

They further averred that the petition was bad in the eyes of

law. On merits, it was admitted that the accident took place

on 16.09.2011 near Rabon, but they denied that the accident

took place due to the rash and negligent driving of

respondent No. 2, rather, it was averred that the due to the

rash and negligent driving of the deceased himself, the

accident took place. The replying respondents specifically

averred that the deceased was coming from the wrong side

of the road and he struck his motorcycle against the alleged

offending vehicle. It was averred that in case the learned

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Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the claimants were

entitled to just and reasonable compensation, then the same

was liable to be paid by respondent No. 3-Insurance

Company (insurer), as the offending vehicle was insured

comprehensively with respondent No. 3.

4. Respondent No. 3-Insurance Company also filed

its reply, wherein it was averred respondent No. 2, being

driver of the offending vehicle, was not having an effective

and valid driving licence and this fact was within the

knowledge of respondent No. 1. It was further averred that

the offending vehicle was not having valid registration

certificate, goods permit and fitness certificate at the time of

the accident, thus there was breach of not only the insurance

policy, but breach of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.

As per the replying respondent, it cannot be saddled with the

liability to pay compensation to the petitioners on behalf of

respondents No. 1 and 2. It was also averred that the

accident took place due to contributory negligence of the

deceased himself, as he was driving his vehicle at a very

high speed and in a rash and negligent manner. It was

further averred that the amount of compensation claimed by

the claimants was highly inflated and exaggerated.

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5. On 02.08.2012 the learned Tribunal below had

framed the following issues for consideration and

adjudication:

“1. Whether the accident was result of rash and

negligent driving of the offending vehicle in

question by respondent No. 2 and the

deceased died in the said accident? OPP

2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative,

whether the petitioners are entitled to

compensation? If so, to what amount and

from whom? OPP

3. Whether the petition is not maintainable?

OPR

4. Whether the petitioners have no locus-standi

to file the present petition? OPR

5. Whether the driver of the offending vehicle

in question was not having valid and

effective driving licence at the time of

accident? If so, its effect? OPR-2

6. Whether the vehicle was being plied in

violation of terms and conditions of the

insurance policy? If so, its effect? OPR-3

7. Whether the offending vehicle did not have

valid registration certificate, route permit

and fitness certificate at the time of

accident? If so, its effect? OPR-3

8. Whether the accident was the result of

negligent of deceased himself? If so its

effect?

9. Relief.”

6. After the parties led their evidence and after

hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the claim petition

was allowed by the learned Tribunal below and

petitioners/claimants (respondents No. 1 and 2 herein) were

held entitled for compensation of Rs.19,75,878/- from the

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respondents, which was to be paid by respondent No. 3-

Insurance Company, on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2,

being insurer of the offending vehicle alongwith costs of the

petition and with pending and future interest at the rate of 7%

per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of

actual payment.

7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied, appellant-

Insurance Company, preferred the instant appeal against the

impugned award dated 02.08.2013, with prayer to allow the

instant appeal by quashing and setting-aside the impugned

award.

8. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended

that the learned Tribunal below has awarded exorbitant and

excessive amount of compensation which cannot be

sustained in law. He further contended that the learned

Tribunal below has erred in increasing the annual income of

the deceased by 50% for future prospects without there

being any specific and definite evidence for arriving at such

conclusion, as such he prayed that the instant appeal be

allowed and the impugned award be quashed and set-aside.

9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the claimants

contended that since the learned Tribunal below has failed to

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apply the proper multiplier and also failed to award certain

amounts under the conventional heads, therefore, the

compensation amount deserves to be enhanced.

10. I have heard the learned counsel for the

appellant-Insurance Company, learned counsel for

respondents No. 1 and 2 (petitioners/claimants), learned

counsel for respondent No. 3 (owner of the offending vehicle)

and carefully examined the entire records.

11. It is not in dispute that deceased-Chanchal

Kumar, who was the son of the petitioners, died in a motor

accident due to the rash and negligent driving of respondent

No. 2 (respondent No. 4 herein), driver of the offending

vehicle. Now, the question which arises for consideration

before this Court is to what amount of compensation the

petitioners, being the parents of the deceased, are entitled to

claim from the respondents.

12. In the instant case, it has come in evidence on

record that the deceased was working as Senior Business

Executive in USV Ltd., Shimla. Shri Parmod Kumar, Senior

Business Executive of the Company, appeared in the

witness-box as PW-3, and deposed that the deceased was in

permanent job. He also placed on record the salary

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certificate of the deceased, Ex. PW-3/A, as per which, he

(deceased) was getting monthly salary of Rs.30,958/-. No

evidence to the contrary has been placed on record by the

respondents, therefore, the learned Tribunal below has

rightly taken the monthly income of the deceased as

Rs.30,958/-. The deceased, at the time of his death, was 28

years of age and was unmarried.

13. The learned Counsel representing the

claimants/petitioners contended that since learned Tribunal

below has failed to apply the proper multiplier and also failed

to award certain amounts under the conventional heads, i.e.

loss of estate and filial consortium, this Court while

exercising power under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC may proceed

to award the same in favour of the claimants. On the other

hand, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, while

seriously opposing the aforesaid prayer made on behalf of

the claimants, contended that since no cross-appeal ever

came to be filed on account of claimants/petitioners No. 1 to

6, this Court has no power to award an extra

amount/enhance the amount already awarded by the learned

Tribunal below in the instant proceedings.

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14. In Ningamma & anr. vs. United India Insurance

Company Limited - (2009) 13 SCC 710, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court held that section 166 of the MV Act deals with "just

compensation" and even if in the pleadings no specific claim

was made, a party should not be deprived from getting "just

compensation". The relevant para of the aforesaid

judgment, for the sake of ready reference, is extracted

hereunder:

“34. Undoubtedly, Section 166 of the MVA deals with “just

compensation” and even if in the pleadings no specific

claim was made under Section 166 of the MVA, in our

considered opinion a party should not be deprived from

getting “just compensation” in case the claimant is able

to make out a case under any provision of law.

Needless to say, the MVA is beneficial and welfare

legislation. In fact, the court is duty-bound and entitled

to award “just compensation” irrespective of the fact

whether any plea in that behalf was raised by the

claimant or not.”

15. In National Insurance Company Limited Versus Pranay

Sethi & others, (2017) 16 SCC 680, a Constitution Bench of

the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the compensation has to

be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness

and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such

determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can

never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree

of proximity to arithmetical precision on the basis of materials

brought on record in an individual case. Para-55 of the

judgment is reproduced as under:

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“55. Section 168 of the Act deals with the concept of “just

compensation” and the same has to be determined on

the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and

equitability on acceptable legal standard because such

determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It

can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an

acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical precision

on the basis of materials brought on record in an

individual case. The conception of “just compensation”

has to be viewed through the prism of fairness,

reasonableness and non- violation of the principle of

equitability. In a case of death, the legal heirs of the

claimants cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the

compensation granted cannot be an apology for

compensation. It cannot be a pittance. Though the

discretion vested in the tribunal is quite wide, yet it is

obligatory on the part of the tribunal to be guided by the

expression, that is, “just compensation”. The

determination has to be on the foundation of evidence

brought on record as regards the age and income of the

deceased and thereafter the apposite multiplier to be

applied. The formula relating to multiplier has been

clearly stated in Sarla Verma (supra) and it has been

approved in Reshma Kumari (supra). The age and

income, as stated earlier, have to be established by

adducing evidence. The tribunal and the Courts have to

bear in mind that the basic principle lies in pragmatic

computation which is in proximity to reality. It is a well

accepted norm that money cannot substitute a life lost

but an effort has to be made for grant of just

compensation having uniformity of approach. There

has to be a balance between the two extremes, that is, a

windfall and the pittance, a bonanza and the modicum.

In such an adjudication, the duty of the tribunal and the

Courts is difficult and hence, an endeavour has been

made by this Court for standardization which in its

ambit includes addition of future prospects on the

proven income at present. As far as future prospects

are concerned, there has been standardization keeping

in view the principle of certainty, stability and

consistency. We approve the principle of

“standardization” so that a specific and certain

multiplicand is determined for applying the multiplier

on the basis of age.”

16. In Ranjana Prakash & Ors. vs. Divisional manager

and Ors. (2011) 14 SCC 639, it has been held that to do

complete justice between the parties, the amount of

compensation can be enhanced by an Appellate Court while

exercising powers under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, even if the

respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections.

Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:42797 )

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Relevant para of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:

“7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 CPC

which enables an appellate court to pass any order

which ought to have been passed by the trial court and

to make such further or other order as the case may

require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal

or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the

appellate court to enable it to do complete justice

between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can

however be pressed into service to make the award

more effective or maintain the award on other grounds

or to make the other parties to litigation to share the

benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a

larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants

seeks compensation against the owner and the insurer

of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only

against the owner, on an appeal by the owner

challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make

the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the

compensation, along with the owner, even though the

claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief

against the insurer…….”

17. Thus, in view of the aforesaid judgment passed

by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court while exercising power

under Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC can proceed to make such

further or other order which ought to have been passed in

order to do complete justice between the parties even in

those cases, where no cross appeals/cross-objections have

been filed.

18. In Sarla Verma & others vs. Delhi Transport

Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121, the Apex Court, on

the question of deduction towards the personal and living

expenses of the deceased held that, the personal and living

expenses of the deceased should be deducted from his

monthly income, to arrive at the contribution to the

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dependents. Where the deceased was married, the

deduction towards personal and living expenses of the

deceased should be one-third where the number of

dependent family members is 2 to 3; one-fourth where the

number of dependent family members is 4 to 6; and one-fifth

where the number of dependent family members exceeds 6.

In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as

personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a

bachelor would tend to spend more on himself.

19. In the instant case, since the deceased was

bachelor, therefore, 50% of his income is required to be

deducted towards personal and living expenses, in view of

the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla

Verma’s case (supra). However, the learned Tribunal below

has erroneously increased the annual income of the

deceased by 50% for future prospects as in National

Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi & others, (2017) 16

SCC 680, it has been held that while determining the income,

in case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary

and below the age of 40 years, an addition of 40% of the

established income to the income of the deceased towards

future prospects should be made. Paras 59.4 of the said

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judgment read as follows:

“59.4 In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed

salary, an addition of 40% of the established income

should be the warrant where the deceased was below

the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the

deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and

10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to

60 years should be regarded as the necessary method

of computation. The established income means the

income minus the tax component.”

20. Therefore, while considering Rs. 30,958/- as the

monthly income of the deceased and by addition of 40% as

future prospects as deceased being self employed and 28

years of age, the income of the deceased comes out to Rs

43,341/- per month (Rs 30,958/- + Rs.12,383/-). Thus, after

the deduction of 50% of the income towards the personal

expenses of the deceased, his contribution to family comes

out to Rs 21670/- per month and his annual contribution

comes out to Rs.2,60,040/- ( Rs. 21670/- x 12).

21. In Sarla Verma’s case (supra), it has further been

held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the multiplier to be

used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table

above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok

Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative

multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25

years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17

for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40

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years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years,

then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11

for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65

years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years. The relevant portion of the

aforesaid judgment is as under:

“42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should

be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above

(prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok

Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative

multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to

25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that

is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15

for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for

46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five

years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60

years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70

years.”

22. The learned Tribunal below has erroneously

applied the multiplier of “7” by taking into consideration the

age of petitioner No. 2-Shri Dalip Singh, who was the father

of the deceased, whereas in view of the law laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), the

age of the deceased should have been made basis for

applying the multiplier. Para 59.7 of the said judgment reads

as under:

“59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis for

applying the multiplier.”

23. In the case on hand, since the deceased was 28

years of age, as such by applying the multiplier of ‘17’ as per

the settled law, the compensation under the head, loss of

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dependency is re-fixed as Rs 44,20,680/- (2,60,040/- x 17).

24. Now, coming to the last aspect, i.e., the amount

under conventional heads. In Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that for the conventional

heads, namely, “Loss of Estate”, “Loss of Consortium” and

“Funeral Expenses” amount of compensation is fixed as

Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively and

the aforesaid figures quantified by the Apex Court have to be

enhanced on percentage basis, at the rate of 10%, in a span

of every three years. The relevant portion of the aforesaid

judgment is as under:

“52. … … …It seems to us that reasonable figures on

conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of

consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000,

Rs.40,000 and Rs.15,000 respectively. The principle of

revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But

the revisit should not be fact centric or quantum-

centric. We think that it would be condign that the

amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on

percentage basis in every three years and the

enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of

three years. We are disposed to hold so because that

will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.”

25. In Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs.

Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram & others, reported in (2018) 18

Supreme Court Cases 130, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid

down that consortium is not limited to spousal consortium

and it also includes parental consortium as well as filial

consortium. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment

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reads as under:

“21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi

dealt with the various heads under which compensation

is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is

loss of consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a

compendious term which encompasses “spousal

consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial

consortium”. The right to consortium would include the

company, care, help comfort, guidance, solace and

affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family.

With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual

relations with the deceased spouse:

21.1. Spousal consortium is general defined as rights

pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which

allows compensation o the surviving spouse for loss of

“company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of

the other in every conjugal relation”.

21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon

the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental

aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance

and training”.

21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to

compensation in the case of an accidental death of a

child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes

great shock and agony to the parents and family of the

deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose

their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for

their love affection, companionship and their role in the

family unit.

22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing

norms about the status and worth of actual

relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have

recognized that the value of a child’s consortium far

exceeds the economic value of the compensation

awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most

jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded

compensation under loss of consortium on the death of

a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a

compensation for loss of love, affection, care and

companionship of the deceased child.”

26. While placing reliance upon the judgment passed

by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunita & ors. vs. United India

Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors., 2025 SCC Online SC 1464, had

enhanced the compensation under the conventional heads @

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10% after a span of every three years w.e.f. the year 2017 and

held as follows:

“20. Regarding the monthly income of the deceased, we

concur with the view taken by the Courts below in

assessing the same to be Rs.12,000/- per month, for

there being no error therein. Hence, in awarding

compensation which is just and fair, we are inclined to

increase the amount awarded under the conventional

heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium, and

funeral expenses by 10% adverting to the settled

principle of law laid down by this Court in National

Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, that such amount

should be revised every three years.”

27. Accordingly in view of the law laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi’s as well as Sunita’s

case (supra), by enhancing the compensation under the

conventional heads @ 10%, after every three years from the

year 2017, the petitioners are entitled to loss of estate at

Rs.19,965/- funeral expenses at Rs.19,965/- the petitioners,

being parents of the deceased, are entitled to Rs.53,240/-

each on account of loss of love and affection. Accordingly,

the total amount of compensation comes out as under:

Head Amount

(i) Loss of dependency Rs.44,20,680/-

(ii) Funeral expenses Rs.19,965/-

(iii) Loss of estate Rs.19,965/-

(iv) Love and affection Rs.1,06,480/- (Rs.53,240/-

Payable to each of

the petitioners)

Total compensation awarded Rs.45,67,090/-

28. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove,

the impugned award, passed by the learned Tribunal below,

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is modified to the aforesaid extent and the instant appeal is

disposed of in the above terms. The remaining terms of the

impugned award, including the interest component as well as

the apportionment amongst the claimants, shall remain the

same.

Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s)

disposed of.

( Sushil Kukreja )

Judge

1

st

October, 2026

(virender)