As per case facts, this case involves challenges to the 2017 Notification and 2021 Office Memorandum (OM) issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, which enable post ...
2026 INSC 761 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Writ Petition (C) No. 1394 of 2023
Vanashakti .… Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
Union of India …. Respondent(s)
WITH
Writ Petition (C) No.118/2019
AND
Writ Petition (C) No.115/2024
SLP (C) No.8187/2025
Civil Appeal Nos.381-382/2025
Diary No.32452/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.38374/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.41575/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.42533/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.45781/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.46181/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.46353/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.46817/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.46844/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
2
Diary No.46855/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.47015/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.47366/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.47388/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.47856/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.47865/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.48098/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.48100/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.48359/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.48761/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.48909/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.49260/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.49463/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.49776/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.49811/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.49898/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.50416/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.52650/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.52763/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.52787/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.52852/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.54026/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.54031/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
3
Diary No.54342/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.54344/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.54361/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023, in Writ
Petition (C) No.118/2019, in Writ Petition (C) No.115/2024
Diary No.54363/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.54390/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.55328/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.55954/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.57022/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.57372/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
Diary No.58246/2025
Diary No.61358/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
MA No.1382 of 2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 4
SUBMISSIONS ............................................................................................ 7
VANASHAKTI-I AND THE REVIEW ............................................................ 12
QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION .......................................................... 22
ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 23
I. The Prior Environment Clearance Regime and its Development ..... 23
II. Consequence of Breach and the Scope for Regularisation.............. 34
III. Ex post facto clearance in the decisions of this Court .................... 41
IV. The 2017 Notification ................................................................... 49
V. The 2021 Office Memorandum ...................................................... 63
VI. Fate of ECs Already Granted and Applications Pending Consideration ... 74
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 75
4
J U D G M E N T
Joymalya Bagchi, J.
1. Delay condoned. Permission to file MAs is granted.
INTRODUCTION
2. In an anthropocentric world where man shapes nature to meet his
wants, this Bench is entrusted with the solemn duty to strike a
balance between an existential right of all living beings both present
and future to a pollution-free environment and an aspirational right
to development of a sixth of the world’s population. To discharge
such onerous responsibility, we need to examine the issue through
the prism of eco-centric proportionality which is best articulated in
the Gandhian vision:
“The world has enough for everyone's need,
but not enough for everyone's greed.”
3. Facts leading up to the present dispute are as follows:
(i) The Writ Petitions,
1 inter alia, challenge the notification dated
14.03.2017
2 and the office memorandum dated 07.07.2021
3
1
First, W.P.(C) No. 1394 of 2023 challenges the 2021 Office Memorandum as arbitrary and
ultra vires the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and seeks a restraint on the processing of
applications for ex post facto environmental clearance after 13.05.2018. Second, W.P.(C) No.
118 of 2019 challenges the 2017 Notification and seeks the identification of real estate
projects undertaken without prior environmental clearance, with consequential action and
damages. Third, W.P.(C) No. 115 of 2024 challenges both instruments and seeks a restraint
against any instrument permitting ex post facto environmental clearance.
2
Hereinafter ‘the 2017 Notification’.
3
Hereinafter ‘the 2021 OM’.
5
issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate
Change.
4 The impugned instruments enable appraisal and
grant of post facto environmental clearance
5 to projects which
violate the prior EC requirement under the EIA Notification,
2006.
6 The Civil Appeals
7 assail the judgment dated
30.08.2024 in Fatima v. Union of India,
8 whereby the Madras
High Court quashed the 2021 OM, along with another office
memorandum dated 19.02.2021,
9 with prospective effect. The
challenge is confined to the prospective operation of that
judgment. During the pendency of these proceedings, the State
of Tamil Nadu also challenged the decision in Fatima (supra) by
way of Civil Appeal No. 8253 of 2026. Vide order dated
26.05.2026, that matter was directed to be listed after
pronouncement of the judgment in the present proceedings.
10
(ii) The matters first came up for hearing before a two-Judge Bench
of this Court. The Bench vide interim order dated 02.01.2024
4
Hereinafter, ‘MoEFCC’.
5
Hereinafter, ‘EC’.
6
Hereinafter, ‘2006 Notification’.
7
By judgment dated 30.08.2024 in Fatima v. Union of India in WP(MD) No. 8866 of 2021 and
WP(MD) No. 11757 of 2021, a Division Bench of Madras High Court quashed the 2021 Office
Memorandum and another Office Memorandum dated 19.02.2021, but declared its judgment
prospective and protected pending applications. Civil Appeal Nos. 381-382 of 2025 are
directed against the prospective operation alone.
8
2024 SCC OnLine Mad 4514.
9
Office Memorandum dated 19.02.2021 bearing F. No. 19-27/2015-IA.III issued by the
MoEFCC. By this OM, the Ministry laid down the procedure for dealing with cases of violation
of the CRZ Notification, 2011, namely projects in the coastal zone commenced without prior
clearance.
10
Order dated 26.05.2026 in Civil Appeal No. 8253 of 2026 titled State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
v. Fatima & Anr.
6
stayed the operation of the 2021 OM.
11 By judgment dated
16.05.2025, the Bench struck down both instruments, holding
the grant of an ex post facto EC to be alien to environmental
jurisprudence. It restrained the Central Government from
issuing any similar instrument in the future.
12
(iii) Review was sought against the said judgment by the
Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (‘CREDAI’) and
was directed to be heard in open court. Oka J. having demitted
office, the then Chief Justice of India constituted a three-Judge
Bench comprising himself, Chandran J. and Bhuyan J., the
other member of the erstwhile Bench in Vanashakti-I, to hear
the review. By judgment dated 18.11.2025, the review Bench,
by a majority of 2:1 (Bhuyan J. dissenting), allowed the review
petition.
13 Vanashakti-I was recalled and the matters were
restored to their file and number, whereupon they were placed
before this Bench.
11
Interim order dated 02.01.2024 was passed in W.P.(C) No. 1394 of 2023. Later, two
clarificatory orders dated 02.02.2024 and 17.12.2024 were passed protecting expansion
applications where prior EC existed before 07.07.2021, made under provisions other than
the 2021 OM.
12
Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 718 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1139 (Oka and Bhuyan
JJ.), hereinafter ‘Vanashakti-I’.
13
Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India v. Vanashakti, 2025 INSC 1326 : 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 2474 (Gavai C.J., Chandran and Bhuyan JJ.), hereinafter ‘the Review order’.
7
SUBMISSIONS
4. Submissions were advanced at length by the parties. Written
submissions have also been filed on behalf of various States as well
as project proponents. The arguments advanced for and against the
validity of the impugned notification and the OM are summarised
in the paragraphs that follow.
5. The petitioners, represented by Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan,
Shri Sanjay Parikh, Shrishti Agnihotri and other learned counsel,
have vehemently argued that the 1994 Notification and, more
particularly, the 2006 Notification envisage a prior EC for specified
projects. The word ‘prior’ was expressly incorporated in the 2006
Notification, making a prior environmental impact assessment the
sine qua non of the clearance regime under the law. They refer to
paragraphs 2, 6 and 7 of the notification,
14 which require the
authorities to apply their mind to the environmental impact of a
project before it is commenced, particularly at planning and siting
stage. The notifications articulate the precautionary principle,
giving legislative acknowledgment to the environmental
jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Vellore Citizens’ Welfare
14
Under the 2006 Notification, prior EC is mandatory before any construction work or
preparation of land, except work to secure the land (Clause 2). Clause 6 requires an
application before the commencement of any activity, and Clause 7 prescribes the four stages
of screening, scoping, public consultation and appraisal.
8
Forum v. Union of India.
15 Beyond the statutory framework, the
grant of an ex post facto EC also violates Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution. It arbitrarily forecloses the right of affected persons
to meaningful participation through public consultation. It imperils
the right to a clean and healthy environment. The notifications fell
for interpretation in Common Cause v. Union of India
16 and Alembic
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati,
17 where this Court in no
uncertain terms laid down that a post facto EC is an anathema to
environmental law.
6. That ratio, the petitioners submit, was not differed from in
Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India,
18 Pahwa Plastics (P) Ltd. v.
Dastak NGO,
19 and D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control
Board.
20 Post facto ECs were granted in those cases in their
peculiar facts, to do complete justice between the parties. They
further submit that the observations of Gavai C.J. in the Review
order do not correctly interpret the aforesaid decisions. In any
event, such observations are not the ratio of the Review order as
15
Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647, ¶¶ 13 and 14. In
proceedings against the discharge of untreated effluents by tanneries in Tamil Nadu, this
Court held that the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle are essential
features of sustainable development and part of the environmental law of the country.
16
Common Cause v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 499 (decided 02.08.2017).
17
Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati, (2020) 17 SCC 157 (decided 01.04.2020).
18
Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 615 (decided 09.12.2021).
19
Pahwa Plastics (P) Ltd. v. Dastak NGO, (2023) 12 SCC 774 (decided 25.03.2022).
20
D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board, (2023) 20 SCC 469 (decided
22.09.2022).
9
the concurring Judge restricted his concurrence to the ground that
Vanashakti-I needed to be reviewed.
7. With regard to the 2017 Notification, the petitioners contend that
it was expressly a one-time measure. The notification, they point
out, opened a narrow window of six months within which projects
in breach as on date of its issue i.e. 14.03.2017, could apply for EC
upon complying with strict norms of damage assessment,
remediation and community augmentation. When it was
challenged in Puducherry Environment Protection Association v.
Union of India,
21 the learned Additional Solicitor General undertook
before the Madras High Court that it was a one-time measure, and
it was on that undertaking alone that the challenge was disposed
of. The window, they emphasize, was extended only once, until
13.04.2018, by the order of the High Court in Appaswamy Real
Estates Ltd. v. Puducherry Environment Protection Association.
22
8. Critiquing the 2021 OM, the petitioners submitted that the
instrument is ostensibly clothed as a standard operating procedure
formulated in terms of the NGT’s order dated 24.05.2021 in Tanaji
21
Puducherry Environment Protection Association v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad
7056 (decided 13.10.2017), hereinafter, ‘Puducherry’, ¶ 4(i). The statement was treated as an
undertaking of the Central Government in ¶ 4(n).
22
Appaswamy Real Estates Ltd. v. Puducherry Environment Protection Association, 2018 SCC
OnLine Mad 1283 (order dated 14.03.2018).
10
B. Gambhire v. Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra.
23 In
effect, it is a post facto sanction regime running parallel to the prior
sanction mandate of the 2006 Notification. It is neither
circumscribed by a cut-off date nor tailored to a narrow amnesty
window intended to secure compliance through remedial measures.
Its scope erodes the 2006 Notification, and it could not have been
issued in exercise of the delegated powers under Section 3 of the
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986
24. An ex post facto regime is
also arbitrary, for it treats violators on par with compliant
proponents, encourages a course of ‘violate first, regularise later’
and violates the right to a clean environment guaranteed under
Article 21.
9. Per contra, respondents led by learned Solicitor General Tushar
Mehta and learned Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati
appearing for the Union of India, along with Shri Abhishek Manu
Singhvi for State of Telangana, Shri P. Wilson for State of Tamil
Nadu and other learned counsel, contend that the observations in
Common Cause (supra) must be understood contextually. The
declaration that an ex post facto EC is alien to environmental
jurisprudence does not rule out such clearances upon stringent
23
Tanaji B. Gambhire v. Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine NGT
961 (National Green Tribunal, Western Zone, O.A. No. 34 of 2020, order dated 24.05.2021).
24
Hereinafter, ‘1986 Act’.
11
conditions in appropriate cases. The 2017 Notification was such a
measure. It gave non-compliant projects an opportunity to apply
for EC upon adhering to stringent damage assessment and
remediation, and was thereby directed to control and abate
environmental pollution within the scope of Section 3 of the 1986
Act. Neither the Act nor the 2006 Notification lays down the
consequences of breach, that is, the manner in which erring
proponents who have commenced activities without a prior EC are
to be dealt with. To fill this lacuna, the NGT in Tanaji B. Gambhire
(supra) directed that a proper Standard Operating Procedure be
laid down for the grant of EC in such cases, addressing the gap
between the binding law and the practice being followed. The 2021
OM was formulated in compliance with that direction and
constitutes a graded regulatory response. It provides for the
stoppage of prohibited activities along with prosecution and
penalty. It requires permissible activities to be assessed on the anvil
of the polluter pays principle, through damage assessment and a
remedial action plan. Finally, it permits only such projects which
meet the threshold of sustainable development. The OM thus seeks
to supplement, and not supplant, the 2006 Notification.
10. The respondents draw sustenance from Electrosteel (supra), Pahwa
(supra) and D. Swamy (supra) to show that restoration of the status
12
quo ante in every case was neither envisaged by the 2006
Notification nor conducive to the abatement of pollution, and they
strenuously argue that the Review order unequivocally endorses
this position. With regard to public projects such as hospitals and
roads, the learned Solicitor General further argued that the greater
public interest in sustaining such projects must be borne in mind
on proportionality principles. The project proponents, also press
their interlocutory applications and submit that their projects are
otherwise permissible in law. Some of them involving substantial
public investment proceeded amidst regulatory uncertainty, while
others have completed the process and await only the grant of
clearance. It is urged that such projects ought to be considered
under the 2021 OM regime like the projects already cleared. They
contend that there is no disunity among the Judges on the
reviewing Bench on this point, referring to paragraph 55 of the
opinion of Bhuyan J.
25
VANASHAKTI -I AND THE REVIEW
11. In Vanashakti-I the validity of the two impugned instruments first
fell for adjudication, and both instruments were struck down in the
25 The Review, per Bhuyan J., ¶ 55: “The applicant in Miscellaneous Application (Diary) No. 46855 of
2025 represented by the learned Solicitor General of India, Mr. Tushar Mehta, only seeks a clarification
and a declaration that the benefit of protection extended to the ECs already granted under the 2017
Notification in Vanashakti should apply to the project of the applicant also. ... I am of the considered
opinion that the concerns of the individual applicants are capable of being accommodated by way of
appropriate clarification and/or modification of paragraph 35 of the Vanashakti judgment. For that, the
entire judgment in Vanashakti is not required to be recalled.”
13
first round. Oka J., speaking for the Bench, held that the object of
protecting the environment and abating pollution had already been
achieved by the 2006 Notification. The object of the 2017
Notification, in contrast, “appears to be to protect the industries and
entities which violated” it.
26 The notification was held to be
completely in violation of the law laid down in Common Cause
(supra) and Alembic (supra). In view of that settled law, even a ‘one-
time measure’ or ‘one-time relaxation’ was illegal. Such measures
added to pollution and infringed the right to live in a pollution free
environment guaranteed by Article 21.
27 Those who had proceeded
without clearance were not illiterate persons. They were companies,
real estate developers, public sector undertakings and mining
industries who had knowingly committed illegality, and no equity
arose in their favour.
28
12. As to the 2021 OM, the Bench held that the instrument was in
substance retrospective. Though it avoided the expression “ex post
facto” and stipulated that a clearance would take effect only from
the date of its grant, these devices could not disguise the fact that
the OM operated to regularise projects which had been commenced
without prior EC. It was held that the OM “does not refer to exercise
26
Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶ 19.
27
Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶ 20.
28
Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶ 23.
14
of any power under the 1986 Act or the 1986 Rules”.
29 The Bench
also found the OM objectionable on other grounds. The OM
extended to projects commenced after 14.03.2017, which even the
2017 Notification did not permit. It was inconsistent with the
solemn undertaking recorded by the Madras High Court in
Puducherry (supra) that the 2017 Notification was clearly and
certainly only a one-time measure.
30 Court held that the
Government was bound to abide by that undertaking in letter and
spirit. Section 15 of the 1986 Act was further read to imply that
“even if the penalty is paid by the project proponent, it will not
regularise the project”. The offending construction, whether under
way or complete, therefore had to be stopped and demolished.
31 On
these findings, both instruments were struck down as violative of
Articles 14 and 21. The ECs already granted were left undisturbed.
The Central Government was restrained from issuing any
instrument providing for an ex post facto EC in any form.
32
13. The Review order recalled Vanashakti-I. The lead opinion of Gavai
C.J. records four grounds for recalling the judgment. Chandran J.
concurred upon a narrower footing, which is considered separately.
29
Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶ 29. Also, Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, hereinafter, ‘Rules’.
30
Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶¶ 21 and 30.
31
Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶ 27: “even after the payment of penalty, if the project is under
construction, the same has to be stopped and demolished and even if operation has already
commenced, the same has to be stopped and demolished.”
32
Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶¶ 35 and 36.
15
First, the lead opinion found that Vanashakti-I had not correctly
followed Common Cause (supra), Alembic (supra) and Electrosteel
(supra). Vanashakti-I had relied upon the paragraphs of those
decisions declaring an ex post facto EC alien to environmental
jurisprudence, but the paragraphs in which the relief was moulded
were not brought to its notice. In Common Cause (supra), mining
operations carried on without EC were suspended, yet the
leaseholders were permitted to apply for clearance and to resume
upon its grant and full payment of compensation, so that the
decision was no precedent against the grant of an ex post facto EC.
In Alembic, the clearances granted after the projects were complete
were left undisturbed, the directions of the NGT for their revocation
and for closure of the units were set aside on proportionality, and
costs were imposed instead. Electrosteel (supra) went further.
Vanashakti-I noticed paragraph 72 of that decision, which holds
the requirement of an EC to be non-negotiable, but paragraphs 73
to 87 were not brought before it. It was there that this Court first
held in terms that the 1986 Act does not prohibit an ex post facto
EC, a holding later followed in Pahwa (supra) and D. Swamy
(supra), and on that basis declined to close a running plant which
had shifted its site without prior clearance, permitting it instead to
regularise its operations by obtaining the requisite clearances. The
omitted paragraphs 73 to 87, in view of the lead opinion, “would
16
have had a direct bearing” on the judgment and “could have
persuaded it to take a different view”.
33
14. Secondly, Vanashakti-I was held per incuriam. The coordinate
Bench decisions in Pahwa (supra) and D. Swamy (supra), in which
the two instruments had been upheld, were not brought to its
notice, and the law laid down by it was found to be in conflict with
them. Relying upon the authorities on judicial discipline,
34 the lead
opinion reiterated that a Bench of two Judges is bound by the
earlier judgment of another Bench of two Judges, and that if it is
not in agreement with that judgment, the only option available to it
is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The same discipline
governed the finding in paragraphs 74 and 75 of Electrosteel. If the
Bench in Vanashakti-I considered that finding did not lay down the
correct position of law “the only option available to the Court was to
refer the matter to a larger Bench”.
35
15. Thirdly, it found the reading of Section 15 in Vanashakti-I to be
erroneous, for the provision “deals with the aspect of penalty alone.
Neither does it permit nor prohibit the regularization of the underlying
33
The Review, ¶¶ 88 to 94 and ¶ 121. Vanashakti-I had relied upon ¶ 125 of Common Cause,
¶¶ 12, 21 and 23 of Alembic and ¶ 72 of Electrosteel. The paragraphs not brought to its notice
were ¶ 10, ¶ 188(5) and ¶ 227 of Common Cause, ¶¶ 24 to 43 of Alembic and ¶¶ 73 to 87 of
Electrosteel. The expressions quoted are from ¶¶ 121 and 101 respectively.
34
Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1, Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union of India, (2020)
4 SCC 1 (Constitution Bench), and Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi,
(2025) 3 SCC 95.
35
The Review, ¶¶ 94 and 122. The holding of per incuriam is at ¶ 96.
17
project”.
36 It was observed that Section 15 is a penal provision
which fixes the punishment for the contravention. It does not
dictate the regulatory consequence of the breach, that is, whether
the offending project is to be demolished, closed, restricted to a
permitted level or allowed to continue pending a fresh appraisal.
That consequence is to be gathered from the scheme of the Act, the
notifications and the general principles of environmental and
administrative law, and not read into a penalty provision.
16. Fourthly, it weighed the consequences of the judgment under
review. Public projects worth nearly twenty thousand crore rupees
faced demolition. Twenty-four Central projects of about Rs. 8,293
crore and twenty-nine State projects of about Rs. 11,168 crore were
pending, among them a 962-bed AIIMS hospital in Odisha, a
greenfield airport at Vijayanagar in Karnataka and common
effluent treatment plants. These projects were otherwise
permissible in law and awaited only the formal grant of clearance,
stalled by the interim stay ordered by this Court on 02.01.2024.
Their demolition followed by reconstruction upon a fresh EC would
create more pollution than it prevented.
17. The lead opinion drew reinforcement from two recent decisions of
this Court. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Pankaj
36
The Review, ¶ 100.
18
Babulal Kotecha,
37 the century-old Khajuria Lake in Mumbai had
been filled and converted into a recreational park at public expense.
This Court declined to order its restoration. It opined that undoing
the park would require felling of the mature trees which had grown
upon it and squander the public funds spent on it. Thus,
restoration would be more harmful for the environment than the
original conversion, becoming “a classic case of counterproductive
remedial intervention”.
38 In Bindu Kapurea v. Subhashish Panda,
39
officials of the Delhi Development Authority had felled trees for
hospital approach roads in the teeth of an order of this Court. Even
so, demolition was refused and compensatory afforestation over
185 acres was directed instead, for the works were complete. Court
noted that “the die is cast, and what is done cannot now be
undone”.
40 From these decisions the lead opinion drew a singular
idea. Where the offending work stands complete, remediation is not
an end in itself. A remedy that inflicts greater harm upon the
environment and the public than the wrong it seeks to undo is itself
counterproductive. In such cases, the corrective measure lies in
37
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Pankaj Babulal Kotecha, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
1263. Khajuria Lake in Kandivali (West), Mumbai, a water body over a century old, had been
filled and converted into a recreational park at public expense. This Court declined to direct
its restoration, holding at ¶ 17 that demolition would cause greater ecological harm than the
original transformation.
38
Kotecha (supra), ¶ 17, as extracted in the Review, ¶ 132.
39
Bindu Kapurea v. Subhashish Panda, 2025 INSC 784. Officials of the Delhi Development
Authority had felled trees for approach roads to a public hospital in contravention of this
Court’s order dated 09.05.1996. This Court declined demolition and directed compensatory
afforestation over 185 acres, holding at ¶ 26 that the works were complete and irreversible.
40
Bindu Kapurea (supra), ¶ 26, as extracted in the Review, ¶ 137.
19
safeguards and recompense, not in restoration of status quo ante.
It was therefore concluded that the present case called for a
balanced approach in line with Lafarge Umiam Mining (P) Ltd. v.
Union of India,
41 Alembic (supra) and Electrosteel (supra). In each
of those cases the offending establishment was spared closure and
permitted to continue its operations upon terms imposed by this
Court. Lafarge (supra) had permitted the mining to continue upon
deposits and strict safeguards. Alembic (supra) had exacted
compensation of Rs. 10 crore from each erring unit. Electrosteel
(supra) had left the plant running while its application for a revised
clearance was decided. For the aforesaid reasons, the lead opinion
concluded that Vanashakti-I must be recalled.
42
18. Chandran J. concurred upon a narrower ground. In His Lordship’s
view, Electrosteel, Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra) could not per se
be held to take a divergent view from Common Cause and Alembic
(supra). The later decisions adverted to the earlier ones and while
reaffirming the principle, undertook the same balanced approach.
Vanashakti-I failed to notice the balancing approach in Common
Cause, Alembic and Electrosteel (supra) as well as the power
conferred by the 1986 Act, and its attention was not drawn to
41
Lafarge Umiam Mining (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 338 (three-Judge Bench,
decided 06.07.2011), considered in Section V below.
42
The Review, ¶¶ 105 to 127. The projects and figures appear at ¶¶ 105 and 108 to 111, and
the conclusion at ¶ 127.
20
Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra).
43 Crucially, His Lordship confined
his concurrence to the question whether review was warranted. He
forbore from pronouncing upon the validity of the 2017 Notification
or the 2021 OM, leaving those questions open for the Bench
rehearing the matters.
19. Bhuyan J., in his dissent, opined that no case for review had been
made out.
44 The relief moulded in the cited cases was granted in
their peculiar facts under Article 142 of the Constitution. It could
not unsettle the principle those cases declared, for directions under
Article 142 are not the ratio of any judgment. In His Lordship’s
view, it was the trilogy of Electrosteel, Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra)
that was per incuriam the binding declaration in Common Cause
and Alembic (supra). The precautionary principle lies at the core of
environmental law and cannot be given short shrift by recourse to
the reparative polluter pays principle. The principle of non-
regression forbids the rolling back of existing levels of
environmental protection. The declaration of validity in D. Swamy
(supra), His Lordship noted, had been made without any challenge
to the instruments or adjudication upon them. And the 2021 OM,
issued more than three years after the window under the 2017
43
The Review, per Chandran J., ¶¶ 7 and 8. The possibility of reconciliation appears in ¶
7(IV) and the reservation upon the validity of the two instruments in the opening of ¶ 7.
44
The Review, per Bhuyan J., ¶¶ 1, 3 and 51.
21
Notification had closed, was superfluous and could at best be read
as a procedure for the applications made within that window.
45
20. It remains to fix the compass of the present rehearing. Those
opposing the petitions urged that the observations in the lead
opinion upon the validity of the two instruments conclude the
matter. Those supporting them urged that this Bench is not bound
by those observations as a fresh hearing before a coordinate Bench
would become an empty formality.
21. In our view, the review was allowed upon two grounds alone, that
Vanashakti-I failed to notice the paragraphs in which Common
Cause, Alembic and Electrosteel (supra) moulded the relief, and that
it did not consider the coordinate Bench decisions in Pahwa and D.
Swamy (supra). The recall did not, and could not, rest upon a
conclusive pronouncement on the merits. Where a Bench speaks
through more than one opinion, the binding ratio lies in the points
on which the Judges concurring in the result agree.
46 Chandran J.
concurred upon those two grounds alone and expressly left the
merits open. The ratio of the Review order therefore travels no
further than the two grounds of recall. The observations of the lead
45
The Review, per Bhuyan J., ¶¶ 27, 36, 41 to 50 and 57.
46
Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 18 SCC 1 : 2024 INSC 835, ¶¶
142 and 143 (nine-Judge Bench): where a Bench speaks through more than one opinion, the
ratio is culled from the greatest common measure of agreement amongst the Judges
concurring in the result.
22
opinion upon the nature, scope and validity of the two instruments
go beyond those grounds and do not bind this Bench. The Review
order merely recalled Vanashakti-I and provided a clean slate for a
fresh and independent consideration of the matters in issue. The
validity of the 2017 Notification and the 2021 OM thus falls to be
determined afresh in accordance with law.
QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION
22. The dialectical discourse gives rise to the following points for
consideration.
i. Whether the 1986 Act read with the 2006 Notification
mandates a prior environmental clearance, and if so, what
consequence follows upon its breach?
ii. Do Common Cause and Alembic conflict with Electrosteel,
Pahwa and D. Swamy, or can the two lines of authority be
reconciled?
iii. Is 2017 Notification a valid statutory measure under the 1986
Act and the Rules?
iv. Whether the 2021 OM, issued upon NGT’s direction in Tanaji
B. Gambhire, is ultra vires the 1986 Act, the Rules and the
2006 Notification?
23
v. Whether prospective quashing of OMs dt. 07.07.2021 and
19.02.2021 in Fatima (supra) was justified?
vi. What will be the fate of the ECs already granted and pending
applications under the 2017 Notification and the 2021 OM?
ANALYSIS
I. The Prior Environment Clearance Regime and its Development
23. The aforesaid questions are interlinked, for each turns upon the
nature of the EC regime under the 1986 Act and the 2006
Notification. It would therefore be convenient to consider them
together, beginning with the legal framework itself. India was a
signatory to the Stockholm Declaration of June 1972, by which the
world community resolved to protect and improve the human
environment for present and future generations. The 1986 Act was
enacted to give effect to that resolve. Section 3(1) confers upon the
Central Government the power to take all such measures as it
deems necessary or expedient for protecting and improving the
quality of the environment and for preventing, controlling and
abating environmental pollution. Section 3(2)(v) enables the Central
Government to restrict the areas in which industries, operations or
processes shall not be carried out, or shall be carried out subject
24
to safeguards. Section 5 vests in the Central Government the power
to issue binding directions to any person, officer or authority,
including directions for the closure, prohibition or regulation of any
industry, operation or process. Rule 5(3)(d) of the 1986 Rules
prescribes the manner of exercise of the power under Section
3(2)(v), upon prior publication of a draft and the consideration of
objections. Every measure taken under these provisions must
answer to the object of the Act, namely the protection of the
environment and the abatement of pollution.
24. Alongside the statute, the Courts wove the substantive principles
of environmental law into the law of the land, as facets of the right
to a clean and healthy environment under Article 21 of the
Constitution. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,
47 in the backdrop of
the Bhopal gas disaster, when oleum gas escaped from a Delhi
plant, this Court propounded the rule of absolute liability for
hazardous enterprises. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh
Wood Products,
48 it invoked the principle of inter-generational
equity to strike down the indiscriminate licensing of katha units,
47
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395, ¶ 31. Upon the escape of oleum gas from
a unit of Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries in Delhi, a Constitution Bench held that an
enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry owes an absolute and
non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results from its activity.
48
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Products, (1995) 6 SCC 363. The indiscriminate
approval of new katha units based on khair wood was held contrary to the National Forest
Policy and to inter-generational equity, for “the present generation has no right to deplete all
the existing forests and leave nothing for the next and future generations”.
25
holding that the present generation has no right to deplete all the
existing forests and leave nothing for the next and future
generations. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of
India,
49 where untreated effluent from chemical plants had
poisoned the soil and wells of a village in Rajasthan, it applied the
polluter pays principle to charge the polluter with restoring the
environment it had degraded. In Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum
(supra), prompted by the discharge of untreated effluent by
tanneries in Tamil Nadu, it settled the precautionary and polluter
pays principles as part of the law of the land, inhering in
sustainable development. The public trust doctrine followed in M.C.
Mehta v. Kamal Nath,
50 where the flow of the river Beas had been
diverted to protect a private motel. It was held that State is a trustee
of its rivers and forests and not their proprietor. The thread binding
these decisions is constitutional as each drew its colour from Article
21, reinforced by what Article 48A asks of the State and Article
49
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (1996) 3 SCC 212, ¶¶ 65 to 67.
Chemical units at Bichhri in Udaipur district had discharged untreated toxic effluents and
sludge, poisoning the soil and the ground water, and this Court held that the power to take
all measures under Sections 3 and 5 includes the power to impose the cost of remedial
measures upon the offending industry, applying the polluter pays principle.
50
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388, ¶ 34. The flow of the river Beas had been
diverted to protect a motel of Span Motels, and this Court held that the State, as a trustee of
all natural resources meant for public use, had breached the public trust by leasing the
riverbed to private management.
26
51A(g) of the citizen. The right to pollution free water and air was
read into the right to life in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar.
51
25. The 2006 Notification, preceded by the EIA Notification dated
27.01.1994,
52 gives expression to the precautionary principle at the
only meaningful stage when precaution is possible before the harm
occurs. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 3(1) and
3(2)(v) of the 1986 Act read with Rule 5(3)(d) of the Rules, the
Ministry first issued the 1994 EIA Notification, which introduced
the requirement of prior EC. It directed that the expansion or
modernisation of any activity, or any new project listed in its
Schedule, “shall not be undertaken in any part of India unless it has
been accorded environmental clearance”.
53 The mandate was one of
prior clearance although the word ‘prior’ was not employed. The
2006 Notification, which superseded it, placed the matter beyond
doubt. It employs the word ‘prior’ at numerous places and forbids
“any construction work, or preparation of land by the project
management except for securing the land”, before clearance is
accorded.
54 Under Para 7 of the 2006 Notification, environment
clearance is the culmination of a four-stage process. Screening
51
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598, ¶ 7. In a petition complaining of the
discharge of slurry from washeries into the river Bokaro, this Court held that the right to life
under Article 21 includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and air.
52
Hereinafter “1994 Notification”.
53
EIA Notification dated 27.01.1994, S.O. 60(E). The direction is quoted in Alembic (supra),
¶ 21.
54
Paragraph 2 of the 2006 Notification.
27
determines whether a project of Category ‘B’
55 requires an impact
assessment study at all. Scoping settles the terms of reference for
that study. During public consultation persons likely to be affected
by a project, which has not yet altered their environment, are
heard. Appraisal then weighs the likely impacts, the objections
raised and the mitigation proposed, before the project is permitted.
Every stage is, by design, anterior to the activity, for each is directed
to a judgment upon impacts that lie in the future and remain, at
that stage, preventable.
26. Breach of the prior EC regime carries penal consequences under
Section 15 of the 1986 Act. Before the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of
Provisions) Act, 2023, the commencement of an activity without
prior clearance was an offence punishable with imprisonment of up
to five years, or with fine of up to Rs. 1 lakh, or with both.
56 With
effect from 01.04.2024, the amendments replaced criminal
55
Under the 2006 Notification, Category ‘A’ projects require clearance from the Central
Government and Category ‘B’ projects, being of lesser potential impact by the thresholds fixed
in the Schedule, from the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority. Upon screening,
Category ‘B’ projects are classified as ‘B1’, requiring an impact assessment study, or ‘B2’,
requiring none.
56
Prior to 01.04.2024 Section 15, Environment Protection Act, 1986 read as follows:
Section 15 Penalty for contravention of the provisions of the Act and the Rules, Orders
and Directions: (1) Whoever fails to comply with or contravenes any of the provisions of this
Act, or the rules made or orders or directions issued thereunder, shall, in respect of each such
failure or contravention, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five
years or with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with both, and in case the failure
or contravention continues, with additional fine which may extend to five thousand rupees for
every day during which such failure or contravention continues after the conviction for the first
such failure or contravention.
(2) If the failure or contravention referred to in sub-section (1) continues beyond a period of one
year after the date of conviction, the offender shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to seven years.”
28
prosecution with a regime of civil penalties for contraventions of the
Act and the rules, orders and directions made under it,
57 a change
which bears directly upon violations of the prior clearance
requirement under the 2006 Notification. A proponent who
commences construction or operation without prior EC is now
liable under Section 15 of the 1986 Act, where no separate penalty
is provided, to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 15 lakh, with an
additional Rs. 10,000 for every day of continuing contravention.
Where the violator is a company, Section 15A raises the minimum
to Rs. 1 lakh, subject to the same ceiling and with an additional Rs.
1 lakh per day of continuing violation. Where the contravention is
57
Section 15 of Environment Protection Act, 1986, as substituted by the Jan Vishwas
(Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 reads as follows:
Section 15 Penalty for contravention of provisions of Act, rules, orders and
directions.—
(1) Where any person contravenes or does not comply with any of the provisions of this Act or
the rules made or orders or directions issued thereunder for which no penalty is provided, he
shall be liable to penalty in respect of each such contravention which shall not be less than ten
thousand rupees but which may extend to fifteen lakh rupees.
(2) Where any person continues contravention under sub-section (1), he shall be liable to
additional penalty of ten thousand rupees for every day during which such contravention
continues.
15A. Penalty for contravention by companies.—
(1) Where any company contravenes any of the provisions of this Act, the company shall be
liable to penalty for each such contravention which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but
which may extend to fifteen lakh rupees.
(2) Where any company continues contravention under sub-section (1), the company shall be
liable to additional penalty of one lakh rupees for every day during which such contravention
continues.
15B. Penalty for contravention by Government Department.—
(1) Where contravention of any of the provision of this Act has been committed by any
Department of the Central Government or the State Government, the Head of the Department
shall be liable to penalty equal to one month of his basic salary: Provided that he shall not be
liable for such contravention, if he proves that the contravention was committed without his
knowledge or instructions or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention.
(2) Where any contravention under sub-section (1) is attributable to any neglect on the part of,
any officer, other than the Head of the Department, the officer shall be liable to penalty equal
to one month of his basic salary: Provided that he shall not be liable for the contravention, if he
proves that he exercised all due diligence to avoid such contravention.
29
by a Government Department, Section 15B renders the Head of the
Department, or any officer whose neglect caused it, liable to a
penalty of one month’s basic salary, subject to a due diligence
defence. Criminal consequences are reserved by Section 15F for
default, which makes failure to pay a penalty within ninety days an
offence punishable with imprisonment of up to three years, or with
fine of up to twice the penalty, or with both. In the case of
companies, persons in charge of the business and officers whose
consent, connivance or neglect is established may also be
proceeded against. Breach of the prior EC framework is thus now
an enforceable statutory contravention attracting escalating civil
penalties, with prosecution reserved for their non-payment.
27. However, neither the Act nor the notification states what is to
become of the offending project itself, that is, whether it must be
demolished and status quo restored, or if it may be allowed to
continue, and upon what terms. Upon that silence, as will be seen,
much of the present controversy turns.
28. The silence was compounded by lax implementation and rampant
violations. Industrial, mining and construction activities were
commenced, expanded or completed without prior clearance, and
the Government answered the defaults with a succession of
executive instruments which sought to cure the breach after the
30
event. Under the 1994 regime, the deadline for obtaining clearance
was repeatedly extended by circulars, the last in the series being
the circular dated 14.05.2002, which permitted units already in
production to cure their default by an ex post facto clearance.
58 The
same course was attempted under the 2006 Notification through
the Office Memoranda dated 16.11.2010, 12.12.2012 and
27.06.2013. Clearance which the notification mandated before the
commencement of the activity was thus sought to be granted after
the violation had occurred.
29. The OMs of 2012 and 2013 were then quashed by the National
Green Tribunal in S.P. Muthuraman v. Union of India,
59 in
proceedings concerning construction projects which had
commenced, and in some cases substantially proceeded without
prior clearance. The Tribunal held that the 2006 Notification
proceeds upon an anterior assessment of environmental impact.
The OMs, though styled as guidelines, directly varied the
substantive law in force and were “potently destructive of the
Notification of 2006”.
60 They vested in the authorities an unguided
discretion, both in the processing of applications and in the
58
That circular was struck down by the National Green Tribunal (Western Zone) by judgment
dated 08.01.2016 in Rohit Prajapati v. Union of India. It was the appeal against that judgment
which culminated in Alembic (supra).
59
S.P. Muthuraman v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine NGT 169 (judgment dated
07.07.2015).
60
Muthuraman (supra), ¶ 78.
31
condonation of violations already committed. The Tribunal
deprecated the recurring character of the indulgence in the
following words: “Repetitive condonation of violation of law would
only aim at encouraging violators to flout the law repeatedly ... The
doctrine of necessity does not operate on the axis of illegality and
violations.”
61 The two OMs were declared ultra vires the 1986 Act
read with the 2006 Notification and were quashed.
62
30. In S.P. Muthuraman (supra), NGT established that an executive
instruction could not bend the notification. What followed was an
amending instrument of the same rank. The 2017 Notification, S.O.
804(E) dated 14.03.2017, was issued in exercise of the powers
under Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the 1986 Act read with Rule
5(3)(d) of the Rules, upon prior publication of a draft on 10.05.2016
and the consideration of objections. Its recitals record the receipt
of proposals for projects which had started work, expanded
production or changed the product mix without prior clearance. It
refers to the decisions of the High Court of Jharkhand and the
Tribunal and states the object of the measure, to bring the non-
compliant within the discipline of the environmental laws “rather
than leaving them unregulated and unchecked, which will be more
61
Muthuraman (supra), ¶ 81.
62
Muthuraman supra), ¶ 163.
32
damaging to the environment”.
63 The process was to deter violation
and to compensate adequately the pecuniary benefit of the violation
and the damage to the environment. In substance, the notification
offered an amnesty, closed at both ends. Only projects in violation
as on its date were eligible, and they could apply within six months
alone. The Madras High Court in Puducherry (supra) disposed of
the challenge to the notification upon the statement of the learned
Additional Solicitor General, made on instructions and treated as
an undertaking of the Central Government, that the notification
“shall clearly and certainly be only a one-time measure”.
64 The
window was later extended by thirty days, until 13.04.2018, upon
the orders of the High Court in Appaswamy Real Estates Ltd.
(supra).
31. Four years later, in Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra), the National Green
Tribunal considered a challenge to the grant of an ex post facto EC
by SEIAA, Maharashtra to a completed construction project. It was
contended that even though the proponent had changed the scope
of the project to include residential buildings, flats and shops, post
facto EC was granted without requiring demolition or payment of
assessed compensation. By order dated 24.05.2021, the Tribunal
directed the Ministry to lay down a proper standard operating
63
Recitals 9 to 11 of the 2017 Notification. The words quoted are from Recital 11.
64
Puducherry (supra), ¶ 4(i).
33
procedure for the grant of EC in such cases of violation, so as to
address the gap between the binding law and the practice being
followed.
65 In purported compliance, the Ministry issued the 2021
OM on 07.07.2021, an administrative order by a Joint Secretary
styled as ‘Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Identification
and handling of violation cases under EIA Notification 2006’.
32. The 2021 OM along with OM dated 19.02.2021 came to be
challenged before the Madras High Court in Fatima (supra). By
judgment dated 30.08.2024, the Division Bench held that although
the 1986 Act does not explicitly prohibit ex post facto EC, it
contains no enabling provision for it either.
66 The 2006 Notification
mandates a prior clearance, and where the legal requirement is
‘prior’ it cannot ordinarily be satisfied post facto, consistent with
the principle in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd.
67
The Court noted that such clearances have been consistently
deprecated and can be countenanced only in exceptional
circumstances. It held that the 2021 OM made the exception a
routine, across-the-board affair. The vice was aggravated by the
fact that this was not a one-time corrective measure, but part of a
65
The direction is recorded in the recitals of the 2021 OM and is quoted in D. Swamy (supra),
¶ 30.
66
Fatima (supra), ¶ 26(i). The powers under Sections 3 and 5 of the 1986 Act, it was held,
can be used only for protecting the environment and abating environmental pollution and
cannot be used for nullifying the 2006 Notification which makes prior EC imperative.
67
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264 (Constitution Bench).
34
series of executive instruments by which the exception had
hardened into a “new normal”.
68 Since powers under Sections 3 and
5 of the Act may be exercised only to protect the environment and
abate pollution, they could not be invoked through executive
instructions to neutralise the prior EC mandate under the 2006
Notification. The Court did not rest its conclusion on any breach of
the undertaking in the Puducherry matter, recognising that Pahwa
and D. Swamy (supra) had held that a statement of counsel cannot
denude the authority of its power to amend. It accordingly quashed
the 2021 OM and OM dated 19.02.2021, but made the judgment
prospective, protecting applications already filed.
69 The Division
Bench thus drew the critical distinction between an exceptional
corrective measure and a standing regime.
II. Consequence of Breach and the Scope for Regularisation
33. The mandatory character of the prior EC requirement, and the
consequence that follows upon its breach, must be ascertained
from the scheme of the statute itself. The question which arises is
when a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner
68
Fatima (supra), ¶ 26(v). The impugned OMs, by making ex post facto EC “a routine across
the board affair”, converted what should be an exception into “a rule/norm” through “a
barrage/slew of instructions which have been issued one after the other in succession making
it a ‘new normal’”.
69
Fatima (supra), ¶¶ 26(xxi)(c), 28 and 29(i). Applications for ex post facto EC already made
were permitted to be carried to their logical end untrammelled by the judgment, prospective
overruling being invoked only as a “buttressing factor”.
35
and prescribes the consequence of non-compliance as prosecution
or civil penalty, does such scheme admit to retention of deviant
state of affairs or restoration of status quo ante is the only option.
The inquiry turns upon twin considerations. One, whether the
prescription of law is mandatory and if so, are the express
consequences of its breach exhaustive yielding to no further
incidental consequences like restoration, status quo ante and the
like. Answer to these issues lies upon the subject matter in which
the regulatory prescription operates, its importance and nexus to
the object of the Act and whether the express consequences wholly
address the damage caused by the breach.
34. An analysis of the Act and the 2006 Notification shows that the
prior EC requirement is mandatory. The 2006 Notification
articulates the vital precautionary principle and aligns itself with
the object of the Act by ensuring a graded response to sustainable
development prior to commencement of such activity impacting
environment. Text of the notification and its core philosophy which
may be loosely termed as ‘look before you leap’ and the prescribed
consequences namely prosecution (now, civil penalty)
unequivocally point in one direction namely its mandatory import.
35. Having held the prior EC regime under the 2006 Notification as
mandatory, the next and more intriguing question is to determine
36
the scope and ambit of the consequences of its breach. The
unamended law prescribed a stricter consequence of prosecution
and imprisonment which since 2024 has been altered to civil
penalty. We are unable to accept that such decriminalisation by
itself would alter the mandatory character of prior EC regime in the
2006 Notification which remains founded on precautionary
principle, is couched in imperative terms and prescribes civil
penalty for its breach.
36. Respondents argue the law having prescribed the consequences of
the breach, the same needs to be treated as exhaustive and no
additional consequence in the form of demolition, dismantling and
restoration of status quo ante can be read into the law. Contrarily,
petitioners point out that every act done in breach of a mandatory
prior EC is void ab initio, that the wrongdoer can never enjoy the
fruits of his own wrong and that nothing short of demolition and
restoration of the status quo ante will suffice. Whether the
unauthorised act is void, or merely unlawful and capable of
regularisation, is a question of construction. In Asha John
Divianathan v. Vikram Malhotra
70, this Court dealt with Section 31
70
Asha John Divianathan v. Vikram Malhotra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 147, ¶ 32 (three-Judge
Bench holding a gift of immovable property by a foreign national without the previous
permission of the Reserve Bank under Section 31 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
1973 to be void: “the requirement of taking ‘previous’ permission of RBI before executing the
sale deed or gift deed is the quintessence; and failure to do so must render the transfer
unenforceable in law”). Contrast Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1
37
of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, which required
‘previous’ permission of the Reserve Bank before a transfer of
immovable property. Relying on the express word “previous
permission”, this Court held such requirement as mandatory and
the offending act, namely, the sale deed transferring property as
void ab initio. The prior EC scheme under the 2006 Notification
carries similar import. The words “prior EC” and the precautionary
principle that it encapsulates coupled with its proximate and live
link to the object of the 1986 Act make prior EC a non-negotiable
pre-requisite. Consequences of its breach, namely prosecution or
presently civil penalty is of punitive character reinforcing the
mandatory import but the Act and the Notification are silent with
regard to the usufruct of the wrongful act for which penal
consequences are so prescribed. We are unable to subscribe to the
view that such silence would permit a wrongdoer to continue
enjoying the usufructs of his wrongdoing. Prosecution/penalty
punishes the wrongdoer for the breach. Its imposition cannot be a
justification to condone a void act committed in violation of a
mandatory provision of law. Such an interpretation would in effect
make the prior EC regime directory by purging a void act on the
touchstone of prosecution or civil penalty, as the case may be.
SCC 264, ¶ 63 (Constitution Bench reading Section 29 of the same Act, which omits the word
“previous”, as admitting of an ex post facto permission).
38
Given this situation, we are inclined to hold that the 1986 Act read
with 2006 Notification prescribing prior EC is mandatory and its
breach apart from attracting prosecution/penalty would by
necessary implication lead to restoration of status quo ante
extending to closure, demolition, remediation of environmental
damage and recovery of costs.
37. This brings us to another pivotal question germane to the matter
in issue. Does the scope and ambit of Section 3, a delegating
provision, permit the Central Government to carve an exception to
the mandatory prior EC regime?
38. Section 3 empowers the Central Government to protect and
improve the quality of the environment and to prevent, control and
abate environmental pollution. The words ‘‘control’’ and ‘‘abate’’ are
of the widest import. As this Court has long held, the term ‘control’
is of a very wide connotation and amplitude and includes a large
variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to achieve
the powers vested in the authority concerned.
71 In the present
71
See Corpn. of City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra, (1981) 2 SCC 714, ¶ 4 (holding the power of
supervision and control over municipal servants to include the incidental power of
suspension pending inquiry, the Court affirming that “the term ‘control’ is of a very wide
connotation and amplitude and includes a large variety of powers which are incidental or
consequential to achieve the powers vested in the authority concerned”). See also Chief Justice
of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34, ¶ 40 (holding the control vested in the High Court
over the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 to be “exclusive in nature, comprehensive in
extent and effective in operation”, comprehending a wide variety of incidental and
consequential powers).
39
context such a power includes not only prevention of pollution but
also repair of the mischief already caused, as held in Indian Council
for Enviro-Legal Action (supra). There, chemical units at Bichhri in
Udaipur manufacturing ‘H’ acid, an intermediate used in the
making of dyes, had discharged untreated toxic effluent and
dumped sludge in the open, poisoning the soil, aquifers and well
water of the village. The question was whether the cost of restoring
the environment could be visited upon the offending industry in
proceedings under Article 32. This Court held that even if it could
not itself award damages against a private concern, it could direct
the Central Government to determine and recover that cost.
Sections 3 and 5, read with the wide definition of ‘environment’ in
Section 2(a) of 1986 Act, clothe the Central Government with all
such powers as are necessary or expedient for protecting and
improving the quality of the environment, including the power to
direct removal of the offending condition, to undertake remedial
measures and to recover the costs from the offending industry.
39. If ‘control’ envisages whatever is incidental or consequential to the
end it serves, the power to control pollution under Section 3 is not
exhausted in the prohibitory rule of prior clearance. It also enables
the Central Government to deal with the consequences of breach,
provided the response is directed towards environmental
40
protection, damage assessment, remediation, restitution and
deterrence. A violation-management mechanism, in that limited
sense, may bring errant units back within the regulatory fold, not
by excusing the breach but by subjecting them to appraisal,
penalty, environmental compensation, remediation and future
compliance.
40. The aforesaid point is reinforced by the subsequent amendment of
Section 15 of the 1986 Act by the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023. By
substituting prosecution with a civil penalty, Parliament relaxed
the rigours of the consequence but did not amend or repeal the
requirement that EC must be obtained before the activity
commences. So long as the 2006 Notification continues to use the
expression “prior”, its compliance remains mandatory. The
architecture of the 2006 Notification remains intact and its
mandatory character unsullied. What the amended statutory
scheme supplies is a relaxed legislative space. The altered scheme
reinforces the view that Section 3 vests the delegatee Government
with the power to amend the prior notification, so that, in
appropriate cases, a breach need not invariably result in
dismantling, demolition or closure, but may instead be addressed
through penalty, remediation, restitution and future compliance.
41
III. Ex post facto clearance in the decisions of this Court
41. At this stage, it may be apt to recount the manner in which this
Court has dealt with regularisation issues arising from breach of
the 1994 and 2006 Notifications. The earliest relevant decision is
Lafarge (supra), where a mining project that had proceeded on a
clearance later found to be defective was permitted to continue
upon a fresh environmental clearance and an ex post facto forest
clearance. A three-Judge Bench upheld the grant of both the EC
and the FC. In doing so it announced the standard by which such
a decision is to be judged. “The time has come for us to apply the
constitutional ‘doctrine of proportionality’ to the matters concerning
environment as a part of the process of judicial review ... the Court
should review the decision-making process to ensure that the
decision of MoEF is fair and fully informed, based on the correct
principles, and free from any bias or restraint. Once this is ensured,
then the doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’ in favour of the decision-
maker would come into play.”
72 Tested on that standard it was held
that there had been no suppression of material facts by the
proponent and that MoEF had taken requisite care and caution to
protect the environment.
73 The mining was permitted to continue
upon deposits of Rs. 55 crore and strict remedial safeguards.
72
Lafarge (supra), ¶ 119.
73
Lafarge (supra), ¶ 114.
42
42. Electrotherm (India) Ltd. v. Patel Vipulkumar Ramjibhai
74 proceeded
on a similar footing. A clearance for the expansion of a steel plant,
granted without a fresh public hearing, was held invalid and
improper. Yet the Court declined to close the plant, which had been
built in the meanwhile. It converted the requirement of public
consultation from pre-decisional to post-decisional instead. Lafarge
(supra) and Electrotherm (supra) thus share a common signature,
a preference for continuance over cessation where special equities
exist. The equity lay in a valid initial clearance in the one, and in
substantial compliance in the other. Neither lays down that
continuance follows upon the mere payment of compensation. And
Electrotherm (supra) must be read in its own setting. Where a
project stands built and operational, a subsequent hearing is
ordinarily reduced to a formality. The affected population cannot
reverse an environmental change that has already occurred.
43. Both were cases in which a clearance existed but was found
procedurally deficient, not cases in which the activity had
commenced without any clearance whatever. Common Cause
(supra) dealt with a graver case of mineral extraction without or in
excess of clearance, devastating the forests and the tribal
habitations of the region. The Ministry, the Court observed, had
74
Electrotherm (India) Ltd. v. Patel Vipulkumar Ramjibhai, (2016) 9 SCC 300, ¶ 19.
43
over the years been cajoling the leaseholders into compliance rather
than using the stick. Its soft approach, however, could not become
an escapist excuse for non-compliance with the law.
75 The
leaseholders argued that a clearance, once granted, should relate
back to the date of the application, and that the very availability of
an ex post facto clearance signalled that a prior EC was not
mandatory. The argument was rejected in terms that have since
become the locus classicus of the subject. A prior EC is necessary.
The grant of an ex post facto clearance would be detrimental to the
environment and could lead to its irreparable degradation. The
concept of a retrospective clearance is alien to environmental
jurisprudence, under EIA 1994 and EIA 2006 alike, and an EC
comes into force not earlier than the date of its grant.
76 Yet the
declaration must be read alongside the relief the Court actually
moulded. The mining leases operating without clearance were
suspended and they were allowed to apply for the requisite
clearances and to move the Court upon obtaining them.
Compensation at one hundred per cent of the price of the mineral
illegally extracted was directed to be recovered, and the
leaseholders were permitted to restart their operations upon
75
Common Cause (supra), ¶ 108: “the MoEF was, in a sense, cajoling the mining leaseholders
to comply with the law and EIA 1994 rather than use the stick ... That the MoEF took a soft
approach cannot be an escapist excuse for non-compliance with the law or EIA 1994.”
76
Common Cause (supra), ¶ 125.
44
compliance and full payment.
77 It is trite that the ratio of a case
cannot be read as a statute and must be understood in its factual
matrix.
78 The word ‘jurisprudence’ in the declaration takes in the
scheme of the law as it then stood, the Act, the Rules and the two
notifications. That scheme contained no amending provision
accommodating an ex post facto clearance. The declaration
therefore must be read with reference to the regime as it then stood,
unamended, and under which nothing short of the status quo ante
would answer.
44. Alembic (supra) is, in this respect, kindred with Common Cause.
The circular dated 14.05.2002, which permitted units operating
without clearance under the 1994 regime to obtain clearance after
the event, was held to be an administrative instruction not
traceable to Section 3 of the 1986 Act. It diluted the statutory
mandate of prior clearance and could not amend delegated
legislation. That principle applies equally to the 2006 Notification.
The Court, however, again moulded relief. While striking down the
circular, it declined to revoke clearances or close units which had
operated for years and had since obtained clearances, and instead
77
Common Cause (supra), ¶ 10, ¶ 188(5) and ¶ 227.
78
Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills, (2002) 3 SCC 496: observations in
judgments are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of a statute, and
must be understood in the context of the facts in which they were made.
45
imposed compensation of Rs. 10 crore on each unit in exercise of
Article 142.
45. Electrosteel (supra) addressed the fate of a running steel plant
which had shifted from the site for which clearance had been
granted. The Court affirmed that compliance with EC requirements
is non-negotiable, but held that the 1986 Act does not itself prohibit
ex post facto environmental clearance. Such approval, however,
was confined to exceptional cases, to be granted only in accordance
with law and in strict conformity with applicable rules, regulations
and notifications. In the facts of the case, this Court declined to
permit closure of the steel plant for want of a prior EC and directed
its application for post facto EC to be decided in accordance with
law, having weighed the consequences of closure, namely the loss
of employment for the workmen of the erring plant and the
contribution of such an establishment to the national economy.
The deviant industry remained liable to heavy penalty and
restoration costs under the polluter pays principle.
46. The two impugned instruments themselves first came to be
considered by this Court in Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra), though
neither of them was under challenge in those proceedings. In
Pahwa (supra), units manufacturing formaldehyde and employing
about eight thousand workers had been set up upon consents
46
granted by the Haryana State Pollution Control Board. The Board
itself believed that no EC was required for such units. By the time
the matter reached this Court, the Expert Appraisal Committee had
scrutinised their applications for clearance, found them eligible and
recommended the grant of terms of reference. Setting aside the
closure ordered by the Tribunal, this Court declared the 2017
Notification to be a valid statutory notification, issued in the same
manner as the notifications of 1994 and 2006.
79 The power of
amendment rests upon Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,
1897, and may be exercised from time to time having regard to the
exigency. The instrument struck down in Alembic (supra) was an
administrative circular. The instrument before the Court was
delegated legislation of the same rank as the notification it
amended, and Alembic (supra) was distinguished on that very
ground. The undertaking recorded in Puducherry (supra) was held
to be no fetter. Words in a judgment cannot be read in the manner
of a statute, and a statement of counsel cannot prevent the
authority from amending a notification as per the procedure
prescribed by law.
80 The 2021 OM was held to have been issued “in
79
Pahwa (supra), ¶¶ 31-32, reiterated in
79
D. Swamy
79
(supra), ¶ 22: “The Notification of 2017
is a valid statutory notification issued by the Central Government in exercise of power under
Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the EP Act read with Rule 5(3)(d) of the EP Rules in the same
manner as the EIA Notification dated 27-1-1994 and the Notification dated 14-9-2006.” On
the power of amendment, see
79
D. Swamy
79
(supra), ¶ 23, following Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd.
v. State of U.P., (2011) 3 SCC 193.
80
D. Swamy (supra), ¶¶ 35-36, and Pahwa (supra), ¶ 47. Alembic was distinguished in Pahwa
(supra), ¶ 61.
47
pursuance of the statutory notification of 2017 which was valid”,
and upon that view the interim stay of the OM by the Madras High
Court was held to be in error.
81 D. Swamy (supra) reiterated these
propositions in relation to a common bio-medical waste treatment
facility, which had begun operating before clearance was stipulated
for such facilities at all. Its closure, the Court held, would itself be
against the public interest, for the operation of such a facility
prevents pollution.
82
47. There is, however, one step in that reasoning from which we must
respectfully depart. The 2021 OM does not trace its source to the
2017 Notification. Its own recitals invoke the direction of the
Tribunal in Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra). It is a bare administrative
instruction complete in itself, and not an extension of the 2017
Notification. The window under that notification had in any event
closed on 13.04.2018, more than three years before the OM was
issued. To the extent that Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra) read the
2021 OM as issued in pursuance of the 2017 Notification, and
proceeded upon its validity on that footing, they do not, with
respect, lay down the correct law.
81
Pahwa (supra), ¶ 48, reiterated in D. Swamy (supra), ¶ 37. The 2021 OM is considered in
Pahwa (supra), ¶¶ 40-41, and in D. Swamy (supra), ¶¶ 30 to 32. The interim order dated
15.07.2021 of the Madras High Court staying the 2021 OM, reported as 2021 SCC OnLine
Mad 12936, was held to be in error in Pahwa (supra), ¶ 48.
82
D. Swamy (supra), ¶ 50. Clearance was stipulated for common bio-medical waste treatment
facilities by the insertion of Entry 7(da) into the Schedule to the 2006 Notification with effect
from 17.04.2015.
48
48. Save to the limited extent indicated above, these decisions do not
collide. Common Cause and Alembic (supra) declare the norm that
a prior EC is mandatory. Yet each of those decisions itself moulded
the consequence of breach, withholding demolition and closure
upon terms of compensation and compliance. Lafarge,
Electrotherm, Electrosteel, Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra) operate at
that stage of consequence, and none of them holds that a prior EC
is not the rule. Electrosteel (supra) affirmed the rule in terms. It
then answered a question the earlier cases had no occasion to face,
the fate of a standing establishment, and resolved it upon a
weighing of consequences. Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra) answered
a question Alembic (supra) never faced, whether the Central
Government may amend its own notification, and considered the
impugned instruments for the first time. The declaration in
Common Cause (supra) and Alembic (supra), thus governs the
regime as it stood, unamended. The validity of any amendment is
governed, inter alia, by the tests of reasonable classification and
proportionality. The aforesaid decisions must be read in their
unique factual matrix subject to the following clarifications. The
observation in Electrosteel (supra) that the 1986 Act does not
prohibit an ex post facto clearance is incorrect as it fails to take
into consideration the mandatory character of the unamended
49
2006 Notification. Similarly, Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra) are not
good law to the extent said authorities uphold the validity of the
2021 OM on a mistaken premise that it was issued in pursuance
of the 2017 Notification.
49. In light of the above discussion, we proceed to examine the validity
of the two impugned instruments.
IV. The 2017 Notification
50. The first impugned instrument is the 2017 Notification, issued by
the MoEFCC on 14.03.2017. It is delegated legislation, made in
exercise of the powers vested in the Central Government under
Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the 1986 Act read with Rule 5(3)(d) of
the Rules. Its making followed the procedure prescribed for such
legislation. A draft was published in the Official Gazette, objections
were invited under Rule 5(3) and duly considered, and the
notification once made was laid before both Houses of Parliament.
A dialogue with stakeholders thus preceded its issuance and
parliamentary oversight followed it. Through the notification the
Ministry created an appraisal process for projects operating
without prior EC as on its date, in violation of the 2006 Notification.
51. The 2017 Notification therefore carved an exception into the prior
EC regime of the 2006 Notification whose mandatory character has
50
already been established. While dealing with prior EC under the
1994 and 2006 Notifications, this Court in Common Cause (supra)
held that the “concept of an ex post facto or a retrospective EC is
completely alien to environmental jurisprudence including EIA 1994
and EIA 2006”.
83 That declaration must, however, be read in the
context of the scheme then before the Court. It is not a principle of
universal application that puts a clog on the power of the delegatee
authority to amend the notification itself. The notification was in
fact upheld as a one-time measure by the Madras High Court in
Puducherry (supra), upon an undertaking to that effect given by the
learned Additional Solicitor General. In Pahwa (supra) and D.
Swamy (supra) this Court held that the undertaking could not
militate against the power of the Central Government under Section
21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to amend an earlier notification
in the like manner,
84 a position the Madras High Court itself
reiterated in Fatima (supra). The 2017 Notification thus stands on
the same plane as the 2006 Notification, both being delegated
legislation, and could alter or amend it, provided the alteration bore
a legitimate nexus with the object of Section 3 of the 1986 Act,
83
Common Cause (supra), ¶ 125.
84
“21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders,
rules or bye-laws.—Where, by any Central Act or Regulations a power to issue notifications,
orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the
like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary
or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued.”
51
namely “protecting and improving the quality of the environment and
preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution”.
52. The exception so carved is in the nature of an amnesty. It draws
projects in breach of the prior EC mandate back within the
regulatory framework, upon adequate deterrence, rather than
leaving them unchecked. Such a course is open because the parent
Act, as seen earlier, is silent on restoration of the status quo ante,
so that the precautionary principle stands as the rule and a
bounded amnesty may stand as the exception. Since the prior
clearance regime gives effect to the right to a wholesome
environment under Article 21 and rests upon that principle, any
such exception must satisfy two distinct constitutional inquiries.
The first is the test of reasonable classification under Article 14,
which asks whether the measure treats differently placed project
proponents as though they were alike, or selects among them upon
an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus with the object of
the Act. The second is proportionality, which asks whether the
inroad made into the prior clearance regime is justified by a
proportionate reconciliation of the right to a clean environment vis-
à-vis the right to development, more specifically in the
environmental context, the right to sustainable development, both
52
traceable as unenumerated rights under Article 21
85 as well as
Article 19(1)(g).
53. A project proponent who has complied with the law by obtaining
prior environmental clearance does not stand on the same footing
as one who has commenced construction, expansion or operation
in breach of that mandate. Nor do all violators form one
homogeneous class. A violator whose project serves an overriding
public interest, protects innocent third-party interests, maintains
an essential public utility or itself advances an environmental
object may be placed in a class different from a violator whose
project serves only private commercial gain. The differentia must
be drawn from the object of the 1986 Act. A class defined merely by
the fact that the project is otherwise permissible, or by the
proponent’s willingness to pay compensation, bears no rational
nexus with that object. It only places the errant proponent
substantially on par with the law-abiding one.
85
N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 362, ¶ 25. In a challenge to the clearances for
the Tehri dam project, it was held that “Right to environment is a fundamental right. On the
other hand, right to development is also one. Here the right to ‘sustainable development’
cannot be singled out. Therefore, the concept of ‘sustainable development’ is to be treated as
an integral part of ‘life’ under Article 21.” See also The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp
Mody, 2025 INSC 347, ¶ 17, where, in appeals against NGT orders halting road development
under the Auroville Master Plan, the right to development through industrialisation was held
to claim priority under Articles 14, 19 and 21 alongside the right to clean environment under
Articles 14 and 21, sustainable development striking a golden balance between the two rights,
and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1, ¶ 298, per Sikri J., where, in the
challenge to the Aadhaar Act, 2016, two competing rights traceable to Article 21 were weighed
and it was held that neither may be given automatic precedence over the other.
53
54. Once the classification survives Article 14, the measure must still
pass the test of proportionality. On one side lies the right to a clean
and healthy environment, secured through the prior EC regime and
the precautionary principle. On the other lies the right to
sustainable development, not as a vested right of the wrongdoer to
continue an unlawful project, but as a larger public interest which
may, in a proper case, justify controlled continuance subject to
assessment, remediation, deterrent compensation and future
compliance. The right to development, therefore, enters the balance
only at the level of public interest and cannot be reduced to the
private commercial interest of the defaulting proponent.
55. Proportionality also governs how narrowly the exception must be
bounded, a point illuminated by the treatment of amnesty schemes
in other fields of law. Such schemes are rare exceptions which erase
the consequences of a breach of law, and must subserve a larger
public interest that justifies the inversion of the rule of law. In
taxation, immunity schemes for undisclosed wealth have been
upheld in deference to legislative wisdom in economic policy, as
held in R.K. Garg v. Union of India,
86 but their legitimacy depends
upon their being exceptional and finite. The Voluntary Disclosure
of Income Scheme of 1997 was sustained in All India Federation of
86
(1981) 4 SCC 675.
54
Tax Practitioners v. Union of India
87 only upon the Union’s
assurance, recorded by the Court, that it was a one-time measure
that would not be repeated.
56. The same limits appear in town planning. The statutory
regularisation of unauthorised construction has been upheld only
as a one-time measure to cure a historically accumulated
breakdown of enforcement, as in Consumer Action Group v. State of
Tamil Nadu, (2000) 7 SCC 425, while Friends Colony Development
Committee v. State of Orissa, (2004) 8 SCC 733 warned that
compounding, intended as an exception, has unfortunately become
the rule, and that deliberate violations by professional builders
must be dealt with sternly. Most recently, Rajendra Kumar Barjatya
v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad
88, held that regularisation
schemes are to be brought out only in exceptional circumstances,
as a one-time measure for residential houses, and only after a
detailed survey of land use, environmental impact, resource
availability, proximity to water bodies and the larger public interest,
for delay, the cost of construction and official laxity cannot shield
illegal construction from action. A measure of this kind may correct
a past default but may never become a parallel and permanent
route that circumvents the regime it professes to restore. A valid
87
(1998) 231 ITR 24 (SC).
88
2024 INSC 990.
55
amnesty measure is thus exceptional in character, finite in
duration and confined to its class.
57. The reason for such a high threshold lies in the nature of
regularisation itself, for it cannot restore an unspoilt environment.
At its highest it can compensate for a loss already suffered and
provide for remedial measures in the time to come. But some
environmental injuries cannot be compensated in money. The
harm done to biodiversity, particularly to rare and endangered
species, or the large-scale displacement of indigenous people, may
inflict irreparable injury upon a habitat and upon lives long before
any remedial measure can take effect. Such cases call for deeper
scrutiny, and an industry is not regularised merely because the
polluter will pay. Sometimes, on the other hand, the activity itself
is one of environmental or public necessity, such as a common bio-
medical waste treatment facility or a plant generating solar or wind
energy in mitigation of climate change. In such cases the public
interest in continuance weighs more heavily on the scale, alongside
an exacting assessment of the damage and effective remediation.
58. In either case the fulcrum is the public interest. Breach of the prior
clearance mandate cannot, by itself, generate an equity in favour of
the violator, nor can the mere financial loss of the proponent supply
a reason to relax the mandate. The question of continuance arises
56
only where a supervening public interest enters the balance. That
interest may lie in the protection of innocent third parties who had
no role in the violation, such as homebuyers who have invested
their savings in the project, workmen whose livelihood depends
upon it, or the public at large where the activity performs an
essential public, environmental or infrastructural function. In such
cases, the consequence of breach is not determined mechanically
by demolition alone. It must be moulded so that enforcement of the
prior clearance regime does not visit disproportionate hardship
upon persons who were not responsible for the illegality, while still
preserving deterrence through stringent appraisal, remediation,
compensatory liability and, where necessary, refusal of the
offending portion. The exception is therefore not founded upon
indulgence to the wrongdoer, but upon the need to reconcile
environmental enforcement with a demonstrable public interest.
59. That is precisely the course this Court has taken where a completed
project was found in violation of environmental norms, and the
decisions disclose the reason in each. In the cases already
discussed, the indulgence in Lafarge (supra) rested upon a revised
clearance hedged with safeguards, in Alembic (supra) upon the
disproportionality of revoking, years later, clearances obtained
upon the government’s own circular, in Electrosteel (supra) upon
57
the economic contribution and employment of a running steel plant
which ought not to be closed upon a mere technicality, in Pahwa
(supra) upon the regulator’s own misconception whose price would
have been paid by the workmen, and in D. Swamy (supra) upon the
fact that the facility regularised, a common bio-medical waste
treatment plant, itself abates pollution. In Goel Ganga Developers
India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India
89, a project built in excess of built-
up area permitted by the EC was not demolished, in order to protect
the interest of innocent third-party purchasers many of whom had
occupied the premises. Deterrence was preserved instead by
imposing damages of one hundred crore rupees or ten per cent of
the project cost, whichever was higher. The developer was
prohibited from further construction along with directions to
refund the investment with interest at nine per cent per annum. In
Keystone Realtors Pvt. Ltd. v. Anil V. Tharthare,
90 a residential
project expanded beyond the prescribed threshold had been
completed, so that undoing it would have served no one. The Court
upheld the deposit of one crore rupees and directed an expert
committee to bring the project’s impact as close as possible to that
contemplated in the clearance. Similarly, in Babulal Kotecha
(supra) restoration of the lake filled and converted into a public
89
(2018) 18 SCC 257.
90
(2020) 2 SCC 66.
58
park was refused because undoing the park would have required
felling the mature trees grown upon it, wounding the environment
afresh while healing nothing, and in Bindu Kapurea (supra) the
construction of road being complete, restitution was beyond reach,
and the Court exacted compensatory terms instead, for a remedy
that cannot restore may still make the polluter pay. Most recently,
in M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India,
91 the Court recalibrated its own
blanket direction to place power lines underground across the
habitat of the Great Indian Bustard, because the direction collided
with the competing environmental imperative of promoting solar
energy to mitigate climate change, and neither goal could be
sacrificed at the altar of the other.
60. In each of these decisions the indulgence rested upon an identified
supervening public interest, such as the protection of homebuyers
or workmen or the benefit of the environment itself, and in each it
was hedged with deterrent damages, refusal of the offending
portion or supervised remediation. None of them holds that a
proponent may build first and then claim regularisation upon the
strength of the completed construction.
91
M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 280, ¶¶ 53 and 60. In proceedings for the
protection of the Great Indian Bustard, it was held that “While balancing two equally crucial
goals - the conservation of the GIB on one hand, with the conservation of the environment as
a whole on the other hand - it is necessary to adopt a holistic approach which does not
sacrifice either of the two goals at the altar of the other”.
59
61. These decisions indicate that, in the field of post facto clearance,
the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle are not
antagonists between which the law must make an absolute and
invariable choice. A measured regularisation may, in a given case,
better serve the abatement of pollution that is the ultimate object
of the 1986 Act. It compels a true assessment of the damage, exacts
remediation from the polluter, protects those who would be ruined
by demolition and draws the violator into the discipline of the Act.
The choice is therefore not the binary one between condonation and
demolition. It is the reconciliation, upon the facts, of competing
imperatives, regularisation being kept to a narrow, time-bound,
reasoned and supervised window. By these standards, and by the
tests of reasonable classification and proportionality, the 2017
Notification must now be judged.
62. The terms of the 2017 Notification bear out the compliance
character which these principles demand. It stipulates that the
process shall serve as a deterrent to violation and that the
pecuniary benefit of the violation and the damage to the
environment shall be adequately compensated for. To that end it
places no cap on environmental damage, preserving the authority’s
full capacity to assess compensation at a level both reparative and
deterrent. The clearance in violation cases may be processed only
60
at the Central level. It must be granted upon evaluation by the
sectoral Expert Appraisal Committee even where the project falls in
Category B, so that such cases are withdrawn from ordinary State
level appraisal. The assessment of ecological damage and the
preparation of the remediation and resource augmentation plans
must be undertaken by a laboratory notified under the Act,
accredited by the National Accreditation Board for Testing and
Calibration Laboratories, or belonging to an institution of the
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. Finally, the measure
is closed at both ends, eligibility being confined to projects in
violation as on its date and applications to a window of six months.
These are the features of a narrow corrective measure confined in
time and in class.
63. So tested, the 2017 Notification is valid, but within narrow limits
alone. It survives the test of reasonable classification. It does not
place every violator on par with a law-abiding proponent, for it
subjects violation cases to centralised appraisal, ecological damage
assessment, remediation, resource augmentation and
compensatory liability. Nor does it create an open class of future
violators, both eligibility and duration being closed.
64. The Notification also satisfies proportionality. Its purpose is proper,
for it draws subsisting violations into assessment, remediation and
61
compliance rather than leaving them unregulated. Its terms bear a
rational connection with that purpose. Its closed eligibility date and
limited window satisfy necessity, because a narrower measure
could not have addressed existing violations while preventing the
exception from becoming a standing alternative to prior clearance.
Finally, the balance is preserved only because the measure is
exceptional, time-bound, centrally appraised and remedial in
character. A scheme that permitted regularisation upon no more
than payment of compensation, without a closed class, a limited
window and a supervening public interest, would stand on a
different footing. By its breadth and want of an end, it would
supplant the prior clearance regime under the 2006 Notification
and render nugatory the precautionary principle on which that
regime rests.
65. The petitioners also assail the notification upon the principle of
non-regression. The challenge is misplaced. The principle operates
not as a binding mandate whose breach is by itself a ground of
invalidity but as a guiding principle drawn from non-binding
international law. In Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India,
92
Chandrachud J. referred to the 13 principles of the Environmental
Rule of Law adopted in the IUCN World Declaration while holding
92
(2019) 15 SCC 401.
62
that the NGT had erred in taking an indulgent view of defects in a
prior EC. That Declaration is neither a binding treaty nor
customary international law. It entered the discourse through soft
law and is of persuasive character alone. Such principles may
temper an executive measure but cannot fetter the power to amend
or supersede an earlier notification under Section 21 of the General
Clauses Act so long as the object of the parent Act is preserved. Nor
is the principle consistently honoured in international practice.
Developed countries, though bearing a greater measure of
historical responsibility, have resiled from binding treaty
commitments previously undertaken by them. The United States,
historically the largest carbon emitter, withdrew from the Paris
Agreement with effect from 27.01.2026 and by a presidential
memorandum dated 07.01.2026 directed its withdrawal from the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change itself. A
principle of persuasive value cannot be read to deny a nation the
sovereign power to recalibrate its environmental measures. To do
so, even as the developed world retreats from its binding
commitments, would turn common but differentiated
responsibilities into an unequal and discriminatory burden upon
developing nations. A corrective measure so confined in duration,
which exacts remediation and secures compliance, cannot be
condemned for non-regression or for breach of Article 21, being
63
aligned to that very object, the preservation of the environment
through control and abatement of pollution.
66. We hold the 2017 Notification to be a valid delegated measure
engrafting a narrowly tailored time-bound violation-management
scheme based on proportionality and reasonableness without
upsetting the foundations of the prior environmental clearance
regime founded on the precautionary principle.
V. The 2021 Office Memorandum
67. The second impugned instrument is the 2021 Office Memorandum,
an executive instruction issued on 07.07.2021 by the MoEFCC,
purportedly in compliance with the direction of the National Green
Tribunal in Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra) that a Standard Operating
Procedure be laid down for the grant of EC in cases of violation.
Under the Office Memorandum, a project not permissible for
clearance is liable to be demolished or closed. A permissible project
is to remain closed until clearance is obtained, and such EC is to
be granted only after assessment of ecological damage and
preparation of plans for remedial measures and augmentation of
natural and community resources, stated to be in line with the
polluter pays principle. A completed project is to be appraised as if
it were a new proposal and, if found permissible, granted clearance
64
effective from the date of its issuance. The compensation is fixed at
one per cent of the project cost, together with 0.25 per cent of the
turnover during the period of violation where operations have
commenced, and is halved where the violation is self-reported. The
Office Memorandum does not prescribe any cut-off date or identify
any class of eligible projects.
68. The challenge to the 2021 Office Memorandum is founded, at the
threshold, on the source of power. It is contended that the Office
Memorandum, being an executive instruction, could not alter,
amend or dilute the 2006 Notification. Reliance is placed on
Vanashakti-I, where it was observed that the Office Memorandum
does not relate to exercise of any power under the 1986 Act or the
Rules. The proposition of law underlying the contention is
indisputable. Administrative instructions may supplement the
statutory rules and notifications where they are silent on a
particular matter, but they cannot amend, supersede, dilute or
travel inconsistently with the statutory scheme already in force.
93
93
Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910, ¶ 7 (Constitution Bench). In a
writ petition by an officer of the Indian Police Service challenging his supersession in
promotion to the selection grade posts of Inspector General and Additional Inspector General
of Police in Rajasthan, the statutory rules being silent on the principles of promotion to
selection posts, it was held that “It is true that Government cannot amend or supersede
statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular
point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not
inconsistent with the rules already framed”.
65
Where there is a conflict, statutory rules and notifications must
prevail.
94
69. For similar reasons, the other OM dt. 19.02.2021 permitting post
facto CRZ clearance being an administrative order could not have
amended the CRZ notification requiring prior clearance and was
rightly quashed prospectively in Fatima (supra).
70. The learned Additional Solicitor General further argued that the
2021 OM permitting post-facto EC occupies only a narrow
interstitial space left unaddressed by the 2006 Notification.
According to her, the 2006 Notification is silent as to the
consequences of its breach, and the impugned 2021 OM was issued
to occupy that limited unoccupied field of regularisation pursuant
to the direction of the NGT in Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra). On this
formulation, it was submitted that the 2021 OM operates only as a
supplement to the 2006 Notification and does not run counter to
it. To assess the validity of this proposition, the two instruments
must be examined in juxtaposition.
94
Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine 69. Teaching
faculty of an ESIC medical college claimed promotion upon two years of service under the
Dynamic Assured Career Progression Scheme contained in an office memorandum of the
Central Government, though the ESIC (Medical Teaching Faculty Posts) Recruitment
Regulations, 2015 required five years. It was held that “In the event of a conflict between an
executive instruction, an office memorandum in this case, and statutory regulations - the
latter prevail”.
66
Feature 2006 Notification (prior
clearance regime)
2021 Office Memorandum
(post facto regularisation)
Source and
character
A delegated legislation
under Sections 3(1) and
3(2)(v) of the 1986 Act
read with Rule 5(3)(d),
preceded by the draft
notification S.O. 1324(E)
dated 15.09.2005 and the
consideration of
objections.
Executive instruction issued
by an officer of the Ministry.
Its SOP and penalty
(paragraphs 10 to 12) recite
no exercise of the
notification-making power
under Section 3(2)(v) read
with Rule 5(3)(d). Only the
power to issue directions
under Section 5 is invoked,
and that only to identify
violations (paragraph 13).
Point in time Operates before the
activity commences. Prior
clearance under
paragraph 2 is a
condition precedent to
any construction or
preparation of land,
except securing the land.
Operates after the activity
has been commenced or
completed. The appraisal
under paragraph 11, Step 3
is of a project already built.
Screening
and scoping
Screening (Stage 1, Form
1) and scoping (Stage 2,
Terms of Reference within
sixty days), under
paragraph 7, are
antecedent to and govern
the activity.
No genuine screening or
scoping is feasible. Under
paragraph 11, Step 3(B) the
Committee appraises the
completed project “as if it
was a new proposal”, the
67
Feature 2006 Notification (prior
clearance regime)
2021 Office Memorandum
(post facto regularisation)
determinants having already
been altered.
Siting and
alternatives
Form 1 and the EIA
report (Appendix III)
require examination of
alternative sites,
technology and layout
before approval.
No alternative site can be
examined. The project
stands where it has been
built.
Public
consultation
Mandatory for Category A
and B1 projects before
the decision (Stage 3,
paragraph 7, Appendix
IV), when objections may
still shape or defeat the
project.
Ex ante consultation is
impossible. Under
paragraph 11, Step 3(B)(vii)
the Committee “may insist
upon” a hearing, at best a
post-mortem upon a settled
state of affairs.
Nature of
assessment
Prospective and
preventive. Assesses the
likely impact of the
activity against an
undisturbed baseline.
Retrospective (paragraph
11, Step 3). Assesses only
the damage already caused,
not the comparative harm of
removal.
Monetary
consequence
None as a price of
clearance. Clearance
follows a clean prior
appraisal.
A penalty under paragraph
12 (one per cent of project
cost plus 0.25 per cent of
turnover during the
violation period, halved
where self-reported), with a
remediation bank guarantee
68
Feature 2006 Notification (prior
clearance regime)
2021 Office Memorandum
(post facto regularisation)
(paragraph 11, Step
3(B)(viii)). A foreseeable,
fixed proportion of cost.
Duration
and class
A permanent statutory
regime of general
application.
Open-ended with no cut-off
date unlike the six-month,
fixed-date window of the
2017 Notification.
Effect of
clearance
Permission to begin a
project not yet begun
(grant of prior EC under
paragraph 8).
A clearance “effective from
the date of issue” (paragraph
11, Step 3(B)(iv)) upon a
project already begun.
71. This comparison exposes a glaring incompatibility between the
2006 Notification and the 2021 OM. The former rests on the
premise that environmental impact assessment must precede the
first irreversible act on site. The latter operates at the opposite end
of the timeline, beginning after the very act prohibited by the 2006
Notification has taken place. By the time the appraisal under the
2021 OM begins, the project is not a proposal awaiting scrutiny but
an existing fact on the ground. The Appraisal Committee is asked
to appraise it “as if it was a new proposal”, but that fiction cannot
restore the setting in which a new proposal is meant to be
examined. There is no genuine screening or scoping left, no
alternative site to compare and no public consultation that can still
69
shape the environmental impact of the project. The OM changes
the contours and dynamics of assessment, namely what is to be
assessed, along with the criteria for the grant of EC under the 2006
Notification. Therefore, the OM supplants the 2006 Notification and
does not merely supplement it.
72. Unlike the 2017 Notification, the 2021 OM abysmally fails the
proportionality test. The former confined its appraisal of violator-
applicants to a time-limited window. The latter has no cut-off date
and no finite class. It therefore converts an exceptional violation-
management response into a permanent parallel route, allowing a
proponent to commence first and seek appraisal later upon
payment of the stipulated costs. Upon the proportionality
framework set out above, the instrument fails at the tests of
rational connection and necessity. A measure unlimited in time and
class, hedged with a capped and foreseeable compensation, travels
beyond what the object of compliance requires and loses its nexus
with the abatement of pollution.
73. An amnesty-regularisation scheme, as held above, is an exception,
not a right. A proponent who has built in breach stands upon no
footing of entitlement, and the departure can be justified only by a
supervening public interest, never that of the proponent. Even
then, such a departure must be effected through a measure
70
authorised by, and answerable to, the law from which it departs.
The 2021 Office Memorandum meets neither requirement. It is not
so authorised, being an executive instruction and not a notification.
And in allowing every permissible industry to be regularised upon
no more than meagre compensation, it fails the test of reasonable
classification noticed earlier. It selects no class upon any
supervening public interest, and the only differentia it knows is the
permissible character of the project. Permissibility of the activity is
a lower threshold as compared to supervening public interest. It
only asks whether the project could have been considered had the
law been obeyed but does not explain why a project built in breach
should be preserved despite the breach. It thus equates the
compliant and the defiant, treats unequals as equals and to that
extent offends Article 14. It yields to a principle of ‘pollute and then
pay’ rather than to sustainable development. A project must
survive upon its own strength, and not because the polluter has
paid.
74. The 2021 OM also cannot derive legitimacy from the NGT’s
direction in Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra), which it invokes as its
warrant. The Tribunal directed only that “a proper SOP be laid down
for grant of EC in such cases so as to address the gaps in binding
71
law and practice being currently followed”.
95 That direction must be
read in context. The Tribunal was considering what the regulator
ought to do after a violation had already occurred, in light of
decisions where completed constructions received calibrated, case-
specific relief rather than wholesale demolition. It was authorising
a procedure for identifying violators, assessing damage and
securing remediation within the discipline of the prior clearance
regime. It does not authorise, and could not have authorised, an
open-ended mechanism for regularising violations yet to occur, and
that too by an administrative instruction. Its object was to plug
enforcement gaps in the existing regime, not to supplant it by a
standing ex post facto dispensation.
75. The decriminalisation of the offence does not improve the position.
The Jan Vishwas amendments, as observed earlier, are confined to
the penal consequences of breach. They cannot and do not
authorise an administrative instruction to convert a mandatory
prior clearance regime into a perpetual post facto clearance
mechanism. A lax implementation regime, coupled with a
regularisation scheme unlimited in time and subject to capped
environmental compensation at a flea-bite level, renders the prior
EC regime otiose, in fact and in law.
95
Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra), order dated 24.05.2021, extracted in D. Swamy (supra), ¶ 30.
72
76. A further concern arises where the State is itself the project
proponent and has violated the prior EC regime without
justification. In such a case, the preserver of the rule of law is seen
violating the law. The urgent need to fix accountability has now
been statutorily addressed in the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023, which
inserted Section 15B, making the Head of the Department liable in
cases of breach. Any violation regularisation mechanism must
further that legislative intent by fixing accountability and imposing
individual costs, upon inquiry, on the officers responsible for
wanton and unjustified violation. Future amnesty schemes, if any,
should provide effective deterrent measures against individual
public servants, including disciplinary action and personal liability
for environmental damage, wherever the State or its
instrumentalities, as project proponents, violate the prior EC
regime.
77. In light of the above discussion, we hold the 2021 OM to be invalid
and quash it with prospective effect. We do so using our powers
under Article 142, taking into account two distinct reasons. First,
considerable legal uncertainty prevailed regarding the validity of
the impugned instruments and the processing and grant of ECs
under them. By an interim order dated 02.01.2024, this Court
initially stayed the operation of the 2021 OM. Thereafter, by orders
73
dated 06.01.2025 and 19.02.2025, this Court permitted processing
of applications already made for grant of ex post facto EC under the
2021 OM but withheld the final grant until further orders. On
16.05.2025, Vanashakti-I quashed both the 2017 Notification and
the 2021 OM. In paragraph 35, the Bench extended the benefit of
the ECs already granted under both instruments but did not extend
such benefit to the pending applications. On 18.11.2025, the
Review order recalled Vanashakti-I. Although Bhuyan J. did not
agree with the majority to allow the review, in paragraph 55 of his
dissenting opinion he opined that an accommodation could be
made for individual project proponents whose applications were
pending, by modification/clarification of paragraph 35 of
Vanashakti-I.
96 Post the Review order, the MoEFCC by OM dated
20.01.2026 directed that all applications pending under the 2017
Notification and the 2021 OM be processed, the final grant
remaining subject to further orders of this Court.
78. Second, supervening public interest is involved in several projects
which have already been undertaken or substantially progressed in
96
The Review, per Bhuyan J., ¶ 55. The applicants in Miscellaneous Application (Diary) No.
46855 of 2025 and Miscellaneous Application (Diary) No. 52650 of 2025, along with several
similar applicants, sought a clarification and a declaration that the benefit of protection
extended to the ECs already granted under the 2017 Notification in Vanashakti-I should apply
to their projects also. Bhuyan J. opined: "I am of the considered opinion that the concerns of
the individual applicants are capable of being accommodated by way of appropriate
clarification and/or modification of paragraph 35 of the Vanashakti judgment. For that, the
entire judgment in Vanashakti is not required to be recalled."
74
reliance upon the prevailing regulatory position. These include the
AIIMS Medical College and Hospital building in the State of Odisha,
the Centre of Excellence for Cancer Diseases in Tamil Nadu, several
medical colleges, Vijayapura Airport in Karnataka, slum
rehabilitation projects and irrigation projects intended for drought-
prone areas. Unless the 2021 OM is prospectively overruled,
projects already undertaken would have to be undone adversely
affecting the overarching public purpose they serve.
VI. Fate of ECs Already Granted and Applications Pending
Consideration
79. As we have quashed 2021 OM prospectively, in order to do complete
justice between the parties we issue the following directions with
respect to the ECs already granted or pending consideration under
the 2017 Notification/2021 OM:
a. ECs granted to project proponents under the 2017 Notification
and the 2021 OM till date shall remain valid, unless otherwise
challenged on merits.
b. All pending applications made by project proponents under the
2017 Notification or the 2021 OM shall be taken to their logical
conclusion in accordance with law.
75
c. Any application dismissed, returned or delisted solely with
reference to the stay order dated 02.01.2024 and/or the
judgment in Vanashakti-I may be reconsidered by the
authority concerned in light of the observations made in this
judgment, particularly the prospective quashing of the 2021
OM.
d. No fresh application for grant of EC under the aforesaid
instruments shall be entertained.
e. The government is restrained from issuing administrative
orders in future for grant of EC in respect of projects which
have commenced in contravention of the prior EC regime
under the 2006 Notification.
CONCLUSION
80. We hold as follows:
(i) The prior EC regime under the 2006 Notification is
mandatory and unless amended by an appropriate
notification, would not accommodate grant of post facto EC
or retention of projects where constructions have
commenced or processes begun without a valid EC.
76
(ii) The observations in Common Cause (supra) and Alembic
(supra) that ex post facto EC is alien to environmental
jurisprudence must be seen in the statutory context in
which they were made, namely the 1986 Act and the clear
and unequivocal words “prior environmental clearance” in
the 2006 Notification. They do not place a clog on the power
of the Central Government to issue an appropriate narrowly
tailored amnesty notification in supervening public interest
as an exception to the 2006 Notification.
(iii) The decriminalisation of the regulatory contraventions
under the 1986 Act through the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023
reinforces our conclusion that the Central Government has
ample power under Section 3 to issue appropriate
notifications formulating amnesty schemes with regard to
such classes or categories of non-compliant projects whose
sustainability is necessary to subserve larger public interest.
(iv) While Common Cause (supra) and Alembic (supra) deal with
the normative state of law prevailing then, Pahwa and D.
Swamy (supra) deal with the consequences of breach of the
prior EC regime in light of the 2017 Notification/2021 OM.
Their ratios must be read in the context of their respective
factual matrices and not treated as statutes having universal
77
application. We further hold that Electrosteel (supra) was
decided in the facts of the case and the observation therein
that the 1986 Act and the 2006 Notification accommodate
grant of ex post facto EC ignores the mandatory character of
the prior EC requirement and does not lay down a correct
interpretation of either the Act or the Notification.
(v) We approve the observations in Pahwa and D. Swamy with
regard to the 2017 Notification and hold that the said
amending notification is a valid narrowly tailored and time-
bound delegated legislation traceable to Section 3 of the
1986 Act read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
(vi) The 2021 OM is an administrative order and envisages a
perpetual regime for grant of EC to projects undertaken
without prior EC. It substantially alters the nature of
enquiry as well as the criteria for grant of EC under the 2006
Notification. 2021 OM thereby supplants an earlier
delegated legislation through an administrative instruction,
which is impermissible in law. Even otherwise, being a
perpetual amnesty scheme applicable to all permissible
projects, it fails to lay down an intelligible differentia for
selection of projects for grant of post facto EC having rational
nexus to supervening public interest and is thereby ultra
78
vires the object of 1986 Act, namely preservation of
environment through a balanced approach between
precautionary principle and sustainable development. Given
these circumstances, the OM does not satisfy the test of
proportionality and reasonableness and is violative of
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Thus, the 2021 OM
is quashed but with prospective effect, keeping in mind the
prevailing confusion with regard to validity of the impugned
instruments and supervening public interest. Consequently,
we overrule Pahwa (supra) and D. Swamy (supra) to the
extent they incorrectly treat the 2021 OM as valid and
traceable to the 2017 notification.
(vii) All ECs granted under the 2017 Notification or the 2021 OM
shall remain valid unless individually assailed in accordance
with law.
(viii) All applications for grant of EC made under the impugned
instruments, whether they remain pending or stand
dismissed solely with reference to the stay order dated
02.01.2024 and/or the judgment in Vanashakti-I, shall be
dealt with in terms of the directions in paragraph 79 of this
judgment.
79
(ix) No further application for grant of ECs under the 2017
Notification and the 2021 OM shall be entertained. Central
Government is also restrained from passing administrative
orders in future to grant ex post facto ECs to projects which
commenced in violation of 2006 Notification, save and except
by way of a valid notification in exercise of powers under
section 3 of the 1986 Act.
(x) It is clarified that our directions shall not constrain the
powers of this Court to grant ex post facto EC under Article
142 to do complete justice in appropriate cases.
81. With these directions,
(i) Writ Petitions and Miscellaneous Applications are disposed
of.
(ii) Civil Appeal Nos.381-382 of 2025, challenging the prospective
operation of Madras High Court judgment in Fatima (supra),
are dismissed.
(iii) The appeal filed by the State of Tamil Nadu against the
judgment in Fatima, being C.A. No.8253 of 2026, may be
disposed of in light of the findings and observations in this
judgment.
80
(iv) Pending Interlocutory Application (s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
SLP (C) No.8187 of 2025
82. The SLP assails the judgment dated 19.03.2025 passed by the
Bombay High Court in Writ Petition (L) No. 8110 of 2025, whereby
the closure of a mall was upheld. Since the challenge is not
confined to a prayer for post facto EC under the 2017 Notification,
but also raises other grounds, the matter is factually
distinguishable. Accordingly, the Registry is directed to de-tag the
matter and list it before appropriate Bench for hearing as per Rules.
………....................CJI
(SURYA KANT)
…………………………….J.
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
…………………………….J.
(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 29, 2026.
Legal Notes
Add a Note....