Environmental Clearance, Ex Post Facto EC, 2017 Notification, 2021 OM, Environment Protection Act 1986, Precautionary Principle, Polluter Pays Principle, Sustainable Development, Article 142, Supreme Court
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Vanashakti Vs. Union of India

  Supreme Court Of India Writ Petition (C) No. 1394 of 2023
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Case Background

As per case facts, this case involves challenges to the 2017 Notification and 2021 Office Memorandum (OM) issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, which enable post ...

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Document Text Version

2026 INSC 761 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Writ Petition (C) No. 1394 of 2023

Vanashakti .… Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

Union of India …. Respondent(s)

WITH

Writ Petition (C) No.118/2019

AND

Writ Petition (C) No.115/2024

SLP (C) No.8187/2025

Civil Appeal Nos.381-382/2025

Diary No.32452/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.38374/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.41575/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.42533/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.45781/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.46181/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.46353/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.46817/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.46844/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

2

Diary No.46855/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.47015/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.47366/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.47388/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.47856/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.47865/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.48098/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.48100/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.48359/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.48761/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.48909/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.49260/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.49463/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.49776/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.49811/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.49898/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.50416/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.52650/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.52763/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.52787/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.52852/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.54026/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.54031/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

3

Diary No.54342/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.54344/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.54361/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023, in Writ

Petition (C) No.118/2019, in Writ Petition (C) No.115/2024

Diary No.54363/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.54390/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.55328/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.55954/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.57022/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.57372/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

Diary No.58246/2025

Diary No.61358/2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

MA No.1382 of 2025 in Writ Petition (C) No.1394/2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 4

SUBMISSIONS ............................................................................................ 7

VANASHAKTI-I AND THE REVIEW ............................................................ 12

QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION .......................................................... 22

ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 23

I. The Prior Environment Clearance Regime and its Development ..... 23

II. Consequence of Breach and the Scope for Regularisation.............. 34

III. Ex post facto clearance in the decisions of this Court .................... 41

IV. The 2017 Notification ................................................................... 49

V. The 2021 Office Memorandum ...................................................... 63

VI. Fate of ECs Already Granted and Applications Pending Consideration ... 74

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 75

4

J U D G M E N T

Joymalya Bagchi, J.

1. Delay condoned. Permission to file MAs is granted.

INTRODUCTION

2. In an anthropocentric world where man shapes nature to meet his

wants, this Bench is entrusted with the solemn duty to strike a

balance between an existential right of all living beings both present

and future to a pollution-free environment and an aspirational right

to development of a sixth of the world’s population. To discharge

such onerous responsibility, we need to examine the issue through

the prism of eco-centric proportionality which is best articulated in

the Gandhian vision:

“The world has enough for everyone's need,

but not enough for everyone's greed.”

3. Facts leading up to the present dispute are as follows:

(i) The Writ Petitions,

1 inter alia, challenge the notification dated

14.03.2017

2 and the office memorandum dated 07.07.2021

3

1

First, W.P.(C) No. 1394 of 2023 challenges the 2021 Office Memorandum as arbitrary and

ultra vires the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and seeks a restraint on the processing of

applications for ex post facto environmental clearance after 13.05.2018. Second, W.P.(C) No.

118 of 2019 challenges the 2017 Notification and seeks the identification of real estate

projects undertaken without prior environmental clearance, with consequential action and

damages. Third, W.P.(C) No. 115 of 2024 challenges both instruments and seeks a restraint

against any instrument permitting ex post facto environmental clearance.

2

Hereinafter ‘the 2017 Notification’.

3

Hereinafter ‘the 2021 OM’.

5

issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate

Change.

4 The impugned instruments enable appraisal and

grant of post facto environmental clearance

5 to projects which

violate the prior EC requirement under the EIA Notification,

2006.

6 The Civil Appeals

7 assail the judgment dated

30.08.2024 in Fatima v. Union of India,

8 whereby the Madras

High Court quashed the 2021 OM, along with another office

memorandum dated 19.02.2021,

9 with prospective effect. The

challenge is confined to the prospective operation of that

judgment. During the pendency of these proceedings, the State

of Tamil Nadu also challenged the decision in Fatima (supra) by

way of Civil Appeal No. 8253 of 2026. Vide order dated

26.05.2026, that matter was directed to be listed after

pronouncement of the judgment in the present proceedings.

10

(ii) The matters first came up for hearing before a two-Judge Bench

of this Court. The Bench vide interim order dated 02.01.2024

4

Hereinafter, ‘MoEFCC’.

5

Hereinafter, ‘EC’.

6

Hereinafter, ‘2006 Notification’.

7

By judgment dated 30.08.2024 in Fatima v. Union of India in WP(MD) No. 8866 of 2021 and

WP(MD) No. 11757 of 2021, a Division Bench of Madras High Court quashed the 2021 Office

Memorandum and another Office Memorandum dated 19.02.2021, but declared its judgment

prospective and protected pending applications. Civil Appeal Nos. 381-382 of 2025 are

directed against the prospective operation alone.

8

2024 SCC OnLine Mad 4514.

9

Office Memorandum dated 19.02.2021 bearing F. No. 19-27/2015-IA.III issued by the

MoEFCC. By this OM, the Ministry laid down the procedure for dealing with cases of violation

of the CRZ Notification, 2011, namely projects in the coastal zone commenced without prior

clearance.

10

Order dated 26.05.2026 in Civil Appeal No. 8253 of 2026 titled State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

v. Fatima & Anr.

6

stayed the operation of the 2021 OM.

11 By judgment dated

16.05.2025, the Bench struck down both instruments, holding

the grant of an ex post facto EC to be alien to environmental

jurisprudence. It restrained the Central Government from

issuing any similar instrument in the future.

12

(iii) Review was sought against the said judgment by the

Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (‘CREDAI’) and

was directed to be heard in open court. Oka J. having demitted

office, the then Chief Justice of India constituted a three-Judge

Bench comprising himself, Chandran J. and Bhuyan J., the

other member of the erstwhile Bench in Vanashakti-I, to hear

the review. By judgment dated 18.11.2025, the review Bench,

by a majority of 2:1 (Bhuyan J. dissenting), allowed the review

petition.

13 Vanashakti-I was recalled and the matters were

restored to their file and number, whereupon they were placed

before this Bench.

11

Interim order dated 02.01.2024 was passed in W.P.(C) No. 1394 of 2023. Later, two

clarificatory orders dated 02.02.2024 and 17.12.2024 were passed protecting expansion

applications where prior EC existed before 07.07.2021, made under provisions other than

the 2021 OM.

12

Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 718 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1139 (Oka and Bhuyan

JJ.), hereinafter ‘Vanashakti-I’.

13

Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India v. Vanashakti, 2025 INSC 1326 : 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 2474 (Gavai C.J., Chandran and Bhuyan JJ.), hereinafter ‘the Review order’.

7

SUBMISSIONS

4. Submissions were advanced at length by the parties. Written

submissions have also been filed on behalf of various States as well

as project proponents. The arguments advanced for and against the

validity of the impugned notification and the OM are summarised

in the paragraphs that follow.

5. The petitioners, represented by Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan,

Shri Sanjay Parikh, Shrishti Agnihotri and other learned counsel,

have vehemently argued that the 1994 Notification and, more

particularly, the 2006 Notification envisage a prior EC for specified

projects. The word ‘prior’ was expressly incorporated in the 2006

Notification, making a prior environmental impact assessment the

sine qua non of the clearance regime under the law. They refer to

paragraphs 2, 6 and 7 of the notification,

14 which require the

authorities to apply their mind to the environmental impact of a

project before it is commenced, particularly at planning and siting

stage. The notifications articulate the precautionary principle,

giving legislative acknowledgment to the environmental

jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Vellore Citizens’ Welfare

14

Under the 2006 Notification, prior EC is mandatory before any construction work or

preparation of land, except work to secure the land (Clause 2). Clause 6 requires an

application before the commencement of any activity, and Clause 7 prescribes the four stages

of screening, scoping, public consultation and appraisal.

8

Forum v. Union of India.

15 Beyond the statutory framework, the

grant of an ex post facto EC also violates Articles 14 and 21 of the

Constitution. It arbitrarily forecloses the right of affected persons

to meaningful participation through public consultation. It imperils

the right to a clean and healthy environment. The notifications fell

for interpretation in Common Cause v. Union of India

16 and Alembic

Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati,

17 where this Court in no

uncertain terms laid down that a post facto EC is an anathema to

environmental law.

6. That ratio, the petitioners submit, was not differed from in

Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India,

18 Pahwa Plastics (P) Ltd. v.

Dastak NGO,

19 and D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control

Board.

20 Post facto ECs were granted in those cases in their

peculiar facts, to do complete justice between the parties. They

further submit that the observations of Gavai C.J. in the Review

order do not correctly interpret the aforesaid decisions. In any

event, such observations are not the ratio of the Review order as

15

Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647, ¶¶ 13 and 14. In

proceedings against the discharge of untreated effluents by tanneries in Tamil Nadu, this

Court held that the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle are essential

features of sustainable development and part of the environmental law of the country.

16

Common Cause v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 499 (decided 02.08.2017).

17

Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati, (2020) 17 SCC 157 (decided 01.04.2020).

18

Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 615 (decided 09.12.2021).

19

Pahwa Plastics (P) Ltd. v. Dastak NGO, (2023) 12 SCC 774 (decided 25.03.2022).

20

D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board, (2023) 20 SCC 469 (decided

22.09.2022).

9

the concurring Judge restricted his concurrence to the ground that

Vanashakti-I needed to be reviewed.

7. With regard to the 2017 Notification, the petitioners contend that

it was expressly a one-time measure. The notification, they point

out, opened a narrow window of six months within which projects

in breach as on date of its issue i.e. 14.03.2017, could apply for EC

upon complying with strict norms of damage assessment,

remediation and community augmentation. When it was

challenged in Puducherry Environment Protection Association v.

Union of India,

21 the learned Additional Solicitor General undertook

before the Madras High Court that it was a one-time measure, and

it was on that undertaking alone that the challenge was disposed

of. The window, they emphasize, was extended only once, until

13.04.2018, by the order of the High Court in Appaswamy Real

Estates Ltd. v. Puducherry Environment Protection Association.

22

8. Critiquing the 2021 OM, the petitioners submitted that the

instrument is ostensibly clothed as a standard operating procedure

formulated in terms of the NGT’s order dated 24.05.2021 in Tanaji

21

Puducherry Environment Protection Association v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad

7056 (decided 13.10.2017), hereinafter, ‘Puducherry’, ¶ 4(i). The statement was treated as an

undertaking of the Central Government in ¶ 4(n).

22

Appaswamy Real Estates Ltd. v. Puducherry Environment Protection Association, 2018 SCC

OnLine Mad 1283 (order dated 14.03.2018).

10

B. Gambhire v. Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra.

23 In

effect, it is a post facto sanction regime running parallel to the prior

sanction mandate of the 2006 Notification. It is neither

circumscribed by a cut-off date nor tailored to a narrow amnesty

window intended to secure compliance through remedial measures.

Its scope erodes the 2006 Notification, and it could not have been

issued in exercise of the delegated powers under Section 3 of the

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986

24. An ex post facto regime is

also arbitrary, for it treats violators on par with compliant

proponents, encourages a course of ‘violate first, regularise later’

and violates the right to a clean environment guaranteed under

Article 21.

9. Per contra, respondents led by learned Solicitor General Tushar

Mehta and learned Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati

appearing for the Union of India, along with Shri Abhishek Manu

Singhvi for State of Telangana, Shri P. Wilson for State of Tamil

Nadu and other learned counsel, contend that the observations in

Common Cause (supra) must be understood contextually. The

declaration that an ex post facto EC is alien to environmental

jurisprudence does not rule out such clearances upon stringent

23

Tanaji B. Gambhire v. Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine NGT

961 (National Green Tribunal, Western Zone, O.A. No. 34 of 2020, order dated 24.05.2021).

24

Hereinafter, ‘1986 Act’.

11

conditions in appropriate cases. The 2017 Notification was such a

measure. It gave non-compliant projects an opportunity to apply

for EC upon adhering to stringent damage assessment and

remediation, and was thereby directed to control and abate

environmental pollution within the scope of Section 3 of the 1986

Act. Neither the Act nor the 2006 Notification lays down the

consequences of breach, that is, the manner in which erring

proponents who have commenced activities without a prior EC are

to be dealt with. To fill this lacuna, the NGT in Tanaji B. Gambhire

(supra) directed that a proper Standard Operating Procedure be

laid down for the grant of EC in such cases, addressing the gap

between the binding law and the practice being followed. The 2021

OM was formulated in compliance with that direction and

constitutes a graded regulatory response. It provides for the

stoppage of prohibited activities along with prosecution and

penalty. It requires permissible activities to be assessed on the anvil

of the polluter pays principle, through damage assessment and a

remedial action plan. Finally, it permits only such projects which

meet the threshold of sustainable development. The OM thus seeks

to supplement, and not supplant, the 2006 Notification.

10. The respondents draw sustenance from Electrosteel (supra), Pahwa

(supra) and D. Swamy (supra) to show that restoration of the status

12

quo ante in every case was neither envisaged by the 2006

Notification nor conducive to the abatement of pollution, and they

strenuously argue that the Review order unequivocally endorses

this position. With regard to public projects such as hospitals and

roads, the learned Solicitor General further argued that the greater

public interest in sustaining such projects must be borne in mind

on proportionality principles. The project proponents, also press

their interlocutory applications and submit that their projects are

otherwise permissible in law. Some of them involving substantial

public investment proceeded amidst regulatory uncertainty, while

others have completed the process and await only the grant of

clearance. It is urged that such projects ought to be considered

under the 2021 OM regime like the projects already cleared. They

contend that there is no disunity among the Judges on the

reviewing Bench on this point, referring to paragraph 55 of the

opinion of Bhuyan J.

25

VANASHAKTI -I AND THE REVIEW

11. In Vanashakti-I the validity of the two impugned instruments first

fell for adjudication, and both instruments were struck down in the

25 The Review, per Bhuyan J., ¶ 55: “The applicant in Miscellaneous Application (Diary) No. 46855 of

2025 represented by the learned Solicitor General of India, Mr. Tushar Mehta, only seeks a clarification

and a declaration that the benefit of protection extended to the ECs already granted under the 2017

Notification in Vanashakti should apply to the project of the applicant also. ... I am of the considered

opinion that the concerns of the individual applicants are capable of being accommodated by way of

appropriate clarification and/or modification of paragraph 35 of the Vanashakti judgment. For that, the

entire judgment in Vanashakti is not required to be recalled.”

13

first round. Oka J., speaking for the Bench, held that the object of

protecting the environment and abating pollution had already been

achieved by the 2006 Notification. The object of the 2017

Notification, in contrast, “appears to be to protect the industries and

entities which violated” it.

26 The notification was held to be

completely in violation of the law laid down in Common Cause

(supra) and Alembic (supra). In view of that settled law, even a ‘one-

time measure’ or ‘one-time relaxation’ was illegal. Such measures

added to pollution and infringed the right to live in a pollution free

environment guaranteed by Article 21.

27 Those who had proceeded

without clearance were not illiterate persons. They were companies,

real estate developers, public sector undertakings and mining

industries who had knowingly committed illegality, and no equity

arose in their favour.

28

12. As to the 2021 OM, the Bench held that the instrument was in

substance retrospective. Though it avoided the expression “ex post

facto” and stipulated that a clearance would take effect only from

the date of its grant, these devices could not disguise the fact that

the OM operated to regularise projects which had been commenced

without prior EC. It was held that the OM “does not refer to exercise

26

Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶ 19.

27

Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶ 20.

28

Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶ 23.

14

of any power under the 1986 Act or the 1986 Rules”.

29 The Bench

also found the OM objectionable on other grounds. The OM

extended to projects commenced after 14.03.2017, which even the

2017 Notification did not permit. It was inconsistent with the

solemn undertaking recorded by the Madras High Court in

Puducherry (supra) that the 2017 Notification was clearly and

certainly only a one-time measure.

30 Court held that the

Government was bound to abide by that undertaking in letter and

spirit. Section 15 of the 1986 Act was further read to imply that

“even if the penalty is paid by the project proponent, it will not

regularise the project”. The offending construction, whether under

way or complete, therefore had to be stopped and demolished.

31 On

these findings, both instruments were struck down as violative of

Articles 14 and 21. The ECs already granted were left undisturbed.

The Central Government was restrained from issuing any

instrument providing for an ex post facto EC in any form.

32

13. The Review order recalled Vanashakti-I. The lead opinion of Gavai

C.J. records four grounds for recalling the judgment. Chandran J.

concurred upon a narrower footing, which is considered separately.

29

Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶ 29. Also, Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, hereinafter, ‘Rules’.

30

Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶¶ 21 and 30.

31

Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶ 27: “even after the payment of penalty, if the project is under

construction, the same has to be stopped and demolished and even if operation has already

commenced, the same has to be stopped and demolished.”

32

Vanashakti-I (supra), ¶¶ 35 and 36.

15

First, the lead opinion found that Vanashakti-I had not correctly

followed Common Cause (supra), Alembic (supra) and Electrosteel

(supra). Vanashakti-I had relied upon the paragraphs of those

decisions declaring an ex post facto EC alien to environmental

jurisprudence, but the paragraphs in which the relief was moulded

were not brought to its notice. In Common Cause (supra), mining

operations carried on without EC were suspended, yet the

leaseholders were permitted to apply for clearance and to resume

upon its grant and full payment of compensation, so that the

decision was no precedent against the grant of an ex post facto EC.

In Alembic, the clearances granted after the projects were complete

were left undisturbed, the directions of the NGT for their revocation

and for closure of the units were set aside on proportionality, and

costs were imposed instead. Electrosteel (supra) went further.

Vanashakti-I noticed paragraph 72 of that decision, which holds

the requirement of an EC to be non-negotiable, but paragraphs 73

to 87 were not brought before it. It was there that this Court first

held in terms that the 1986 Act does not prohibit an ex post facto

EC, a holding later followed in Pahwa (supra) and D. Swamy

(supra), and on that basis declined to close a running plant which

had shifted its site without prior clearance, permitting it instead to

regularise its operations by obtaining the requisite clearances. The

omitted paragraphs 73 to 87, in view of the lead opinion, “would

16

have had a direct bearing” on the judgment and “could have

persuaded it to take a different view”.

33

14. Secondly, Vanashakti-I was held per incuriam. The coordinate

Bench decisions in Pahwa (supra) and D. Swamy (supra), in which

the two instruments had been upheld, were not brought to its

notice, and the law laid down by it was found to be in conflict with

them. Relying upon the authorities on judicial discipline,

34 the lead

opinion reiterated that a Bench of two Judges is bound by the

earlier judgment of another Bench of two Judges, and that if it is

not in agreement with that judgment, the only option available to it

is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The same discipline

governed the finding in paragraphs 74 and 75 of Electrosteel. If the

Bench in Vanashakti-I considered that finding did not lay down the

correct position of law “the only option available to the Court was to

refer the matter to a larger Bench”.

35

15. Thirdly, it found the reading of Section 15 in Vanashakti-I to be

erroneous, for the provision “deals with the aspect of penalty alone.

Neither does it permit nor prohibit the regularization of the underlying

33

The Review, ¶¶ 88 to 94 and ¶ 121. Vanashakti-I had relied upon ¶ 125 of Common Cause,

¶¶ 12, 21 and 23 of Alembic and ¶ 72 of Electrosteel. The paragraphs not brought to its notice

were ¶ 10, ¶ 188(5) and ¶ 227 of Common Cause, ¶¶ 24 to 43 of Alembic and ¶¶ 73 to 87 of

Electrosteel. The expressions quoted are from ¶¶ 121 and 101 respectively.

34

Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1, Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union of India, (2020)

4 SCC 1 (Constitution Bench), and Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi,

(2025) 3 SCC 95.

35

The Review, ¶¶ 94 and 122. The holding of per incuriam is at ¶ 96.

17

project”.

36 It was observed that Section 15 is a penal provision

which fixes the punishment for the contravention. It does not

dictate the regulatory consequence of the breach, that is, whether

the offending project is to be demolished, closed, restricted to a

permitted level or allowed to continue pending a fresh appraisal.

That consequence is to be gathered from the scheme of the Act, the

notifications and the general principles of environmental and

administrative law, and not read into a penalty provision.

16. Fourthly, it weighed the consequences of the judgment under

review. Public projects worth nearly twenty thousand crore rupees

faced demolition. Twenty-four Central projects of about Rs. 8,293

crore and twenty-nine State projects of about Rs. 11,168 crore were

pending, among them a 962-bed AIIMS hospital in Odisha, a

greenfield airport at Vijayanagar in Karnataka and common

effluent treatment plants. These projects were otherwise

permissible in law and awaited only the formal grant of clearance,

stalled by the interim stay ordered by this Court on 02.01.2024.

Their demolition followed by reconstruction upon a fresh EC would

create more pollution than it prevented.

17. The lead opinion drew reinforcement from two recent decisions of

this Court. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Pankaj

36

The Review, ¶ 100.

18

Babulal Kotecha,

37 the century-old Khajuria Lake in Mumbai had

been filled and converted into a recreational park at public expense.

This Court declined to order its restoration. It opined that undoing

the park would require felling of the mature trees which had grown

upon it and squander the public funds spent on it. Thus,

restoration would be more harmful for the environment than the

original conversion, becoming “a classic case of counterproductive

remedial intervention”.

38 In Bindu Kapurea v. Subhashish Panda,

39

officials of the Delhi Development Authority had felled trees for

hospital approach roads in the teeth of an order of this Court. Even

so, demolition was refused and compensatory afforestation over

185 acres was directed instead, for the works were complete. Court

noted that “the die is cast, and what is done cannot now be

undone”.

40 From these decisions the lead opinion drew a singular

idea. Where the offending work stands complete, remediation is not

an end in itself. A remedy that inflicts greater harm upon the

environment and the public than the wrong it seeks to undo is itself

counterproductive. In such cases, the corrective measure lies in

37

Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Pankaj Babulal Kotecha, 2025 SCC OnLine SC

1263. Khajuria Lake in Kandivali (West), Mumbai, a water body over a century old, had been

filled and converted into a recreational park at public expense. This Court declined to direct

its restoration, holding at ¶ 17 that demolition would cause greater ecological harm than the

original transformation.

38

Kotecha (supra), ¶ 17, as extracted in the Review, ¶ 132.

39

Bindu Kapurea v. Subhashish Panda, 2025 INSC 784. Officials of the Delhi Development

Authority had felled trees for approach roads to a public hospital in contravention of this

Court’s order dated 09.05.1996. This Court declined demolition and directed compensatory

afforestation over 185 acres, holding at ¶ 26 that the works were complete and irreversible.

40

Bindu Kapurea (supra), ¶ 26, as extracted in the Review, ¶ 137.

19

safeguards and recompense, not in restoration of status quo ante.

It was therefore concluded that the present case called for a

balanced approach in line with Lafarge Umiam Mining (P) Ltd. v.

Union of India,

41 Alembic (supra) and Electrosteel (supra). In each

of those cases the offending establishment was spared closure and

permitted to continue its operations upon terms imposed by this

Court. Lafarge (supra) had permitted the mining to continue upon

deposits and strict safeguards. Alembic (supra) had exacted

compensation of Rs. 10 crore from each erring unit. Electrosteel

(supra) had left the plant running while its application for a revised

clearance was decided. For the aforesaid reasons, the lead opinion

concluded that Vanashakti-I must be recalled.

42

18. Chandran J. concurred upon a narrower ground. In His Lordship’s

view, Electrosteel, Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra) could not per se

be held to take a divergent view from Common Cause and Alembic

(supra). The later decisions adverted to the earlier ones and while

reaffirming the principle, undertook the same balanced approach.

Vanashakti-I failed to notice the balancing approach in Common

Cause, Alembic and Electrosteel (supra) as well as the power

conferred by the 1986 Act, and its attention was not drawn to

41

Lafarge Umiam Mining (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 338 (three-Judge Bench,

decided 06.07.2011), considered in Section V below.

42

The Review, ¶¶ 105 to 127. The projects and figures appear at ¶¶ 105 and 108 to 111, and

the conclusion at ¶ 127.

20

Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra).

43 Crucially, His Lordship confined

his concurrence to the question whether review was warranted. He

forbore from pronouncing upon the validity of the 2017 Notification

or the 2021 OM, leaving those questions open for the Bench

rehearing the matters.

19. Bhuyan J., in his dissent, opined that no case for review had been

made out.

44 The relief moulded in the cited cases was granted in

their peculiar facts under Article 142 of the Constitution. It could

not unsettle the principle those cases declared, for directions under

Article 142 are not the ratio of any judgment. In His Lordship’s

view, it was the trilogy of Electrosteel, Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra)

that was per incuriam the binding declaration in Common Cause

and Alembic (supra). The precautionary principle lies at the core of

environmental law and cannot be given short shrift by recourse to

the reparative polluter pays principle. The principle of non-

regression forbids the rolling back of existing levels of

environmental protection. The declaration of validity in D. Swamy

(supra), His Lordship noted, had been made without any challenge

to the instruments or adjudication upon them. And the 2021 OM,

issued more than three years after the window under the 2017

43

The Review, per Chandran J., ¶¶ 7 and 8. The possibility of reconciliation appears in ¶

7(IV) and the reservation upon the validity of the two instruments in the opening of ¶ 7.

44

The Review, per Bhuyan J., ¶¶ 1, 3 and 51.

21

Notification had closed, was superfluous and could at best be read

as a procedure for the applications made within that window.

45

20. It remains to fix the compass of the present rehearing. Those

opposing the petitions urged that the observations in the lead

opinion upon the validity of the two instruments conclude the

matter. Those supporting them urged that this Bench is not bound

by those observations as a fresh hearing before a coordinate Bench

would become an empty formality.

21. In our view, the review was allowed upon two grounds alone, that

Vanashakti-I failed to notice the paragraphs in which Common

Cause, Alembic and Electrosteel (supra) moulded the relief, and that

it did not consider the coordinate Bench decisions in Pahwa and D.

Swamy (supra). The recall did not, and could not, rest upon a

conclusive pronouncement on the merits. Where a Bench speaks

through more than one opinion, the binding ratio lies in the points

on which the Judges concurring in the result agree.

46 Chandran J.

concurred upon those two grounds alone and expressly left the

merits open. The ratio of the Review order therefore travels no

further than the two grounds of recall. The observations of the lead

45

The Review, per Bhuyan J., ¶¶ 27, 36, 41 to 50 and 57.

46

Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 18 SCC 1 : 2024 INSC 835, ¶¶

142 and 143 (nine-Judge Bench): where a Bench speaks through more than one opinion, the

ratio is culled from the greatest common measure of agreement amongst the Judges

concurring in the result.

22

opinion upon the nature, scope and validity of the two instruments

go beyond those grounds and do not bind this Bench. The Review

order merely recalled Vanashakti-I and provided a clean slate for a

fresh and independent consideration of the matters in issue. The

validity of the 2017 Notification and the 2021 OM thus falls to be

determined afresh in accordance with law.

QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION

22. The dialectical discourse gives rise to the following points for

consideration.

i. Whether the 1986 Act read with the 2006 Notification

mandates a prior environmental clearance, and if so, what

consequence follows upon its breach?

ii. Do Common Cause and Alembic conflict with Electrosteel,

Pahwa and D. Swamy, or can the two lines of authority be

reconciled?

iii. Is 2017 Notification a valid statutory measure under the 1986

Act and the Rules?

iv. Whether the 2021 OM, issued upon NGT’s direction in Tanaji

B. Gambhire, is ultra vires the 1986 Act, the Rules and the

2006 Notification?

23

v. Whether prospective quashing of OMs dt. 07.07.2021 and

19.02.2021 in Fatima (supra) was justified?

vi. What will be the fate of the ECs already granted and pending

applications under the 2017 Notification and the 2021 OM?

ANALYSIS

I. The Prior Environment Clearance Regime and its Development

23. The aforesaid questions are interlinked, for each turns upon the

nature of the EC regime under the 1986 Act and the 2006

Notification. It would therefore be convenient to consider them

together, beginning with the legal framework itself. India was a

signatory to the Stockholm Declaration of June 1972, by which the

world community resolved to protect and improve the human

environment for present and future generations. The 1986 Act was

enacted to give effect to that resolve. Section 3(1) confers upon the

Central Government the power to take all such measures as it

deems necessary or expedient for protecting and improving the

quality of the environment and for preventing, controlling and

abating environmental pollution. Section 3(2)(v) enables the Central

Government to restrict the areas in which industries, operations or

processes shall not be carried out, or shall be carried out subject

24

to safeguards. Section 5 vests in the Central Government the power

to issue binding directions to any person, officer or authority,

including directions for the closure, prohibition or regulation of any

industry, operation or process. Rule 5(3)(d) of the 1986 Rules

prescribes the manner of exercise of the power under Section

3(2)(v), upon prior publication of a draft and the consideration of

objections. Every measure taken under these provisions must

answer to the object of the Act, namely the protection of the

environment and the abatement of pollution.

24. Alongside the statute, the Courts wove the substantive principles

of environmental law into the law of the land, as facets of the right

to a clean and healthy environment under Article 21 of the

Constitution. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,

47 in the backdrop of

the Bhopal gas disaster, when oleum gas escaped from a Delhi

plant, this Court propounded the rule of absolute liability for

hazardous enterprises. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh

Wood Products,

48 it invoked the principle of inter-generational

equity to strike down the indiscriminate licensing of katha units,

47

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395, ¶ 31. Upon the escape of oleum gas from

a unit of Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries in Delhi, a Constitution Bench held that an

enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry owes an absolute and

non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results from its activity.

48

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Products, (1995) 6 SCC 363. The indiscriminate

approval of new katha units based on khair wood was held contrary to the National Forest

Policy and to inter-generational equity, for “the present generation has no right to deplete all

the existing forests and leave nothing for the next and future generations”.

25

holding that the present generation has no right to deplete all the

existing forests and leave nothing for the next and future

generations. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of

India,

49 where untreated effluent from chemical plants had

poisoned the soil and wells of a village in Rajasthan, it applied the

polluter pays principle to charge the polluter with restoring the

environment it had degraded. In Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum

(supra), prompted by the discharge of untreated effluent by

tanneries in Tamil Nadu, it settled the precautionary and polluter

pays principles as part of the law of the land, inhering in

sustainable development. The public trust doctrine followed in M.C.

Mehta v. Kamal Nath,

50 where the flow of the river Beas had been

diverted to protect a private motel. It was held that State is a trustee

of its rivers and forests and not their proprietor. The thread binding

these decisions is constitutional as each drew its colour from Article

21, reinforced by what Article 48A asks of the State and Article

49

Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (1996) 3 SCC 212, ¶¶ 65 to 67.

Chemical units at Bichhri in Udaipur district had discharged untreated toxic effluents and

sludge, poisoning the soil and the ground water, and this Court held that the power to take

all measures under Sections 3 and 5 includes the power to impose the cost of remedial

measures upon the offending industry, applying the polluter pays principle.

50

M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388, ¶ 34. The flow of the river Beas had been

diverted to protect a motel of Span Motels, and this Court held that the State, as a trustee of

all natural resources meant for public use, had breached the public trust by leasing the

riverbed to private management.

26

51A(g) of the citizen. The right to pollution free water and air was

read into the right to life in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar.

51

25. The 2006 Notification, preceded by the EIA Notification dated

27.01.1994,

52 gives expression to the precautionary principle at the

only meaningful stage when precaution is possible before the harm

occurs. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 3(1) and

3(2)(v) of the 1986 Act read with Rule 5(3)(d) of the Rules, the

Ministry first issued the 1994 EIA Notification, which introduced

the requirement of prior EC. It directed that the expansion or

modernisation of any activity, or any new project listed in its

Schedule, “shall not be undertaken in any part of India unless it has

been accorded environmental clearance”.

53 The mandate was one of

prior clearance although the word ‘prior’ was not employed. The

2006 Notification, which superseded it, placed the matter beyond

doubt. It employs the word ‘prior’ at numerous places and forbids

“any construction work, or preparation of land by the project

management except for securing the land”, before clearance is

accorded.

54 Under Para 7 of the 2006 Notification, environment

clearance is the culmination of a four-stage process. Screening

51

Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598, ¶ 7. In a petition complaining of the

discharge of slurry from washeries into the river Bokaro, this Court held that the right to life

under Article 21 includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and air.

52

Hereinafter “1994 Notification”.

53

EIA Notification dated 27.01.1994, S.O. 60(E). The direction is quoted in Alembic (supra),

¶ 21.

54

Paragraph 2 of the 2006 Notification.

27

determines whether a project of Category ‘B’

55 requires an impact

assessment study at all. Scoping settles the terms of reference for

that study. During public consultation persons likely to be affected

by a project, which has not yet altered their environment, are

heard. Appraisal then weighs the likely impacts, the objections

raised and the mitigation proposed, before the project is permitted.

Every stage is, by design, anterior to the activity, for each is directed

to a judgment upon impacts that lie in the future and remain, at

that stage, preventable.

26. Breach of the prior EC regime carries penal consequences under

Section 15 of the 1986 Act. Before the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of

Provisions) Act, 2023, the commencement of an activity without

prior clearance was an offence punishable with imprisonment of up

to five years, or with fine of up to Rs. 1 lakh, or with both.

56 With

effect from 01.04.2024, the amendments replaced criminal

55

Under the 2006 Notification, Category ‘A’ projects require clearance from the Central

Government and Category ‘B’ projects, being of lesser potential impact by the thresholds fixed

in the Schedule, from the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority. Upon screening,

Category ‘B’ projects are classified as ‘B1’, requiring an impact assessment study, or ‘B2’,

requiring none.

56

Prior to 01.04.2024 Section 15, Environment Protection Act, 1986 read as follows:

Section 15 Penalty for contravention of the provisions of the Act and the Rules, Orders

and Directions: (1) Whoever fails to comply with or contravenes any of the provisions of this

Act, or the rules made or orders or directions issued thereunder, shall, in respect of each such

failure or contravention, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five

years or with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with both, and in case the failure

or contravention continues, with additional fine which may extend to five thousand rupees for

every day during which such failure or contravention continues after the conviction for the first

such failure or contravention.

(2) If the failure or contravention referred to in sub-section (1) continues beyond a period of one

year after the date of conviction, the offender shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term

which may extend to seven years.”

28

prosecution with a regime of civil penalties for contraventions of the

Act and the rules, orders and directions made under it,

57 a change

which bears directly upon violations of the prior clearance

requirement under the 2006 Notification. A proponent who

commences construction or operation without prior EC is now

liable under Section 15 of the 1986 Act, where no separate penalty

is provided, to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 15 lakh, with an

additional Rs. 10,000 for every day of continuing contravention.

Where the violator is a company, Section 15A raises the minimum

to Rs. 1 lakh, subject to the same ceiling and with an additional Rs.

1 lakh per day of continuing violation. Where the contravention is

57

Section 15 of Environment Protection Act, 1986, as substituted by the Jan Vishwas

(Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 reads as follows:

Section 15 Penalty for contravention of provisions of Act, rules, orders and

directions.—

(1) Where any person contravenes or does not comply with any of the provisions of this Act or

the rules made or orders or directions issued thereunder for which no penalty is provided, he

shall be liable to penalty in respect of each such contravention which shall not be less than ten

thousand rupees but which may extend to fifteen lakh rupees.

(2) Where any person continues contravention under sub-section (1), he shall be liable to

additional penalty of ten thousand rupees for every day during which such contravention

continues.

15A. Penalty for contravention by companies.—

(1) Where any company contravenes any of the provisions of this Act, the company shall be

liable to penalty for each such contravention which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but

which may extend to fifteen lakh rupees.

(2) Where any company continues contravention under sub-section (1), the company shall be

liable to additional penalty of one lakh rupees for every day during which such contravention

continues.

15B. Penalty for contravention by Government Department.—

(1) Where contravention of any of the provision of this Act has been committed by any

Department of the Central Government or the State Government, the Head of the Department

shall be liable to penalty equal to one month of his basic salary: Provided that he shall not be

liable for such contravention, if he proves that the contravention was committed without his

knowledge or instructions or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention.

(2) Where any contravention under sub-section (1) is attributable to any neglect on the part of,

any officer, other than the Head of the Department, the officer shall be liable to penalty equal

to one month of his basic salary: Provided that he shall not be liable for the contravention, if he

proves that he exercised all due diligence to avoid such contravention.

29

by a Government Department, Section 15B renders the Head of the

Department, or any officer whose neglect caused it, liable to a

penalty of one month’s basic salary, subject to a due diligence

defence. Criminal consequences are reserved by Section 15F for

default, which makes failure to pay a penalty within ninety days an

offence punishable with imprisonment of up to three years, or with

fine of up to twice the penalty, or with both. In the case of

companies, persons in charge of the business and officers whose

consent, connivance or neglect is established may also be

proceeded against. Breach of the prior EC framework is thus now

an enforceable statutory contravention attracting escalating civil

penalties, with prosecution reserved for their non-payment.

27. However, neither the Act nor the notification states what is to

become of the offending project itself, that is, whether it must be

demolished and status quo restored, or if it may be allowed to

continue, and upon what terms. Upon that silence, as will be seen,

much of the present controversy turns.

28. The silence was compounded by lax implementation and rampant

violations. Industrial, mining and construction activities were

commenced, expanded or completed without prior clearance, and

the Government answered the defaults with a succession of

executive instruments which sought to cure the breach after the

30

event. Under the 1994 regime, the deadline for obtaining clearance

was repeatedly extended by circulars, the last in the series being

the circular dated 14.05.2002, which permitted units already in

production to cure their default by an ex post facto clearance.

58 The

same course was attempted under the 2006 Notification through

the Office Memoranda dated 16.11.2010, 12.12.2012 and

27.06.2013. Clearance which the notification mandated before the

commencement of the activity was thus sought to be granted after

the violation had occurred.

29. The OMs of 2012 and 2013 were then quashed by the National

Green Tribunal in S.P. Muthuraman v. Union of India,

59 in

proceedings concerning construction projects which had

commenced, and in some cases substantially proceeded without

prior clearance. The Tribunal held that the 2006 Notification

proceeds upon an anterior assessment of environmental impact.

The OMs, though styled as guidelines, directly varied the

substantive law in force and were “potently destructive of the

Notification of 2006”.

60 They vested in the authorities an unguided

discretion, both in the processing of applications and in the

58

That circular was struck down by the National Green Tribunal (Western Zone) by judgment

dated 08.01.2016 in Rohit Prajapati v. Union of India. It was the appeal against that judgment

which culminated in Alembic (supra).

59

S.P. Muthuraman v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine NGT 169 (judgment dated

07.07.2015).

60

Muthuraman (supra), ¶ 78.

31

condonation of violations already committed. The Tribunal

deprecated the recurring character of the indulgence in the

following words: “Repetitive condonation of violation of law would

only aim at encouraging violators to flout the law repeatedly ... The

doctrine of necessity does not operate on the axis of illegality and

violations.”

61 The two OMs were declared ultra vires the 1986 Act

read with the 2006 Notification and were quashed.

62

30. In S.P. Muthuraman (supra), NGT established that an executive

instruction could not bend the notification. What followed was an

amending instrument of the same rank. The 2017 Notification, S.O.

804(E) dated 14.03.2017, was issued in exercise of the powers

under Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the 1986 Act read with Rule

5(3)(d) of the Rules, upon prior publication of a draft on 10.05.2016

and the consideration of objections. Its recitals record the receipt

of proposals for projects which had started work, expanded

production or changed the product mix without prior clearance. It

refers to the decisions of the High Court of Jharkhand and the

Tribunal and states the object of the measure, to bring the non-

compliant within the discipline of the environmental laws “rather

than leaving them unregulated and unchecked, which will be more

61

Muthuraman (supra), ¶ 81.

62

Muthuraman supra), ¶ 163.

32

damaging to the environment”.

63 The process was to deter violation

and to compensate adequately the pecuniary benefit of the violation

and the damage to the environment. In substance, the notification

offered an amnesty, closed at both ends. Only projects in violation

as on its date were eligible, and they could apply within six months

alone. The Madras High Court in Puducherry (supra) disposed of

the challenge to the notification upon the statement of the learned

Additional Solicitor General, made on instructions and treated as

an undertaking of the Central Government, that the notification

“shall clearly and certainly be only a one-time measure”.

64 The

window was later extended by thirty days, until 13.04.2018, upon

the orders of the High Court in Appaswamy Real Estates Ltd.

(supra).

31. Four years later, in Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra), the National Green

Tribunal considered a challenge to the grant of an ex post facto EC

by SEIAA, Maharashtra to a completed construction project. It was

contended that even though the proponent had changed the scope

of the project to include residential buildings, flats and shops, post

facto EC was granted without requiring demolition or payment of

assessed compensation. By order dated 24.05.2021, the Tribunal

directed the Ministry to lay down a proper standard operating

63

Recitals 9 to 11 of the 2017 Notification. The words quoted are from Recital 11.

64

Puducherry (supra), ¶ 4(i).

33

procedure for the grant of EC in such cases of violation, so as to

address the gap between the binding law and the practice being

followed.

65 In purported compliance, the Ministry issued the 2021

OM on 07.07.2021, an administrative order by a Joint Secretary

styled as ‘Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Identification

and handling of violation cases under EIA Notification 2006’.

32. The 2021 OM along with OM dated 19.02.2021 came to be

challenged before the Madras High Court in Fatima (supra). By

judgment dated 30.08.2024, the Division Bench held that although

the 1986 Act does not explicitly prohibit ex post facto EC, it

contains no enabling provision for it either.

66 The 2006 Notification

mandates a prior clearance, and where the legal requirement is

‘prior’ it cannot ordinarily be satisfied post facto, consistent with

the principle in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd.

67

The Court noted that such clearances have been consistently

deprecated and can be countenanced only in exceptional

circumstances. It held that the 2021 OM made the exception a

routine, across-the-board affair. The vice was aggravated by the

fact that this was not a one-time corrective measure, but part of a

65

The direction is recorded in the recitals of the 2021 OM and is quoted in D. Swamy (supra),

¶ 30.

66

Fatima (supra), ¶ 26(i). The powers under Sections 3 and 5 of the 1986 Act, it was held,

can be used only for protecting the environment and abating environmental pollution and

cannot be used for nullifying the 2006 Notification which makes prior EC imperative.

67

Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264 (Constitution Bench).

34

series of executive instruments by which the exception had

hardened into a “new normal”.

68 Since powers under Sections 3 and

5 of the Act may be exercised only to protect the environment and

abate pollution, they could not be invoked through executive

instructions to neutralise the prior EC mandate under the 2006

Notification. The Court did not rest its conclusion on any breach of

the undertaking in the Puducherry matter, recognising that Pahwa

and D. Swamy (supra) had held that a statement of counsel cannot

denude the authority of its power to amend. It accordingly quashed

the 2021 OM and OM dated 19.02.2021, but made the judgment

prospective, protecting applications already filed.

69 The Division

Bench thus drew the critical distinction between an exceptional

corrective measure and a standing regime.

II. Consequence of Breach and the Scope for Regularisation

33. The mandatory character of the prior EC requirement, and the

consequence that follows upon its breach, must be ascertained

from the scheme of the statute itself. The question which arises is

when a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner

68

Fatima (supra), ¶ 26(v). The impugned OMs, by making ex post facto EC “a routine across

the board affair”, converted what should be an exception into “a rule/norm” through “a

barrage/slew of instructions which have been issued one after the other in succession making

it a ‘new normal’”.

69

Fatima (supra), ¶¶ 26(xxi)(c), 28 and 29(i). Applications for ex post facto EC already made

were permitted to be carried to their logical end untrammelled by the judgment, prospective

overruling being invoked only as a “buttressing factor”.

35

and prescribes the consequence of non-compliance as prosecution

or civil penalty, does such scheme admit to retention of deviant

state of affairs or restoration of status quo ante is the only option.

The inquiry turns upon twin considerations. One, whether the

prescription of law is mandatory and if so, are the express

consequences of its breach exhaustive yielding to no further

incidental consequences like restoration, status quo ante and the

like. Answer to these issues lies upon the subject matter in which

the regulatory prescription operates, its importance and nexus to

the object of the Act and whether the express consequences wholly

address the damage caused by the breach.

34. An analysis of the Act and the 2006 Notification shows that the

prior EC requirement is mandatory. The 2006 Notification

articulates the vital precautionary principle and aligns itself with

the object of the Act by ensuring a graded response to sustainable

development prior to commencement of such activity impacting

environment. Text of the notification and its core philosophy which

may be loosely termed as ‘look before you leap’ and the prescribed

consequences namely prosecution (now, civil penalty)

unequivocally point in one direction namely its mandatory import.

35. Having held the prior EC regime under the 2006 Notification as

mandatory, the next and more intriguing question is to determine

36

the scope and ambit of the consequences of its breach. The

unamended law prescribed a stricter consequence of prosecution

and imprisonment which since 2024 has been altered to civil

penalty. We are unable to accept that such decriminalisation by

itself would alter the mandatory character of prior EC regime in the

2006 Notification which remains founded on precautionary

principle, is couched in imperative terms and prescribes civil

penalty for its breach.

36. Respondents argue the law having prescribed the consequences of

the breach, the same needs to be treated as exhaustive and no

additional consequence in the form of demolition, dismantling and

restoration of status quo ante can be read into the law. Contrarily,

petitioners point out that every act done in breach of a mandatory

prior EC is void ab initio, that the wrongdoer can never enjoy the

fruits of his own wrong and that nothing short of demolition and

restoration of the status quo ante will suffice. Whether the

unauthorised act is void, or merely unlawful and capable of

regularisation, is a question of construction. In Asha John

Divianathan v. Vikram Malhotra

70, this Court dealt with Section 31

70

Asha John Divianathan v. Vikram Malhotra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 147, ¶ 32 (three-Judge

Bench holding a gift of immovable property by a foreign national without the previous

permission of the Reserve Bank under Section 31 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,

1973 to be void: “the requirement of taking ‘previous’ permission of RBI before executing the

sale deed or gift deed is the quintessence; and failure to do so must render the transfer

unenforceable in law”). Contrast Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1

37

of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, which required

‘previous’ permission of the Reserve Bank before a transfer of

immovable property. Relying on the express word “previous

permission”, this Court held such requirement as mandatory and

the offending act, namely, the sale deed transferring property as

void ab initio. The prior EC scheme under the 2006 Notification

carries similar import. The words “prior EC” and the precautionary

principle that it encapsulates coupled with its proximate and live

link to the object of the 1986 Act make prior EC a non-negotiable

pre-requisite. Consequences of its breach, namely prosecution or

presently civil penalty is of punitive character reinforcing the

mandatory import but the Act and the Notification are silent with

regard to the usufruct of the wrongful act for which penal

consequences are so prescribed. We are unable to subscribe to the

view that such silence would permit a wrongdoer to continue

enjoying the usufructs of his wrongdoing. Prosecution/penalty

punishes the wrongdoer for the breach. Its imposition cannot be a

justification to condone a void act committed in violation of a

mandatory provision of law. Such an interpretation would in effect

make the prior EC regime directory by purging a void act on the

touchstone of prosecution or civil penalty, as the case may be.

SCC 264, ¶ 63 (Constitution Bench reading Section 29 of the same Act, which omits the word

“previous”, as admitting of an ex post facto permission).

38

Given this situation, we are inclined to hold that the 1986 Act read

with 2006 Notification prescribing prior EC is mandatory and its

breach apart from attracting prosecution/penalty would by

necessary implication lead to restoration of status quo ante

extending to closure, demolition, remediation of environmental

damage and recovery of costs.

37. This brings us to another pivotal question germane to the matter

in issue. Does the scope and ambit of Section 3, a delegating

provision, permit the Central Government to carve an exception to

the mandatory prior EC regime?

38. Section 3 empowers the Central Government to protect and

improve the quality of the environment and to prevent, control and

abate environmental pollution. The words ‘‘control’’ and ‘‘abate’’ are

of the widest import. As this Court has long held, the term ‘control’

is of a very wide connotation and amplitude and includes a large

variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to achieve

the powers vested in the authority concerned.

71 In the present

71

See Corpn. of City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra, (1981) 2 SCC 714, ¶ 4 (holding the power of

supervision and control over municipal servants to include the incidental power of

suspension pending inquiry, the Court affirming that “the term ‘control’ is of a very wide

connotation and amplitude and includes a large variety of powers which are incidental or

consequential to achieve the powers vested in the authority concerned”). See also Chief Justice

of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34, ¶ 40 (holding the control vested in the High Court

over the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 to be “exclusive in nature, comprehensive in

extent and effective in operation”, comprehending a wide variety of incidental and

consequential powers).

39

context such a power includes not only prevention of pollution but

also repair of the mischief already caused, as held in Indian Council

for Enviro-Legal Action (supra). There, chemical units at Bichhri in

Udaipur manufacturing ‘H’ acid, an intermediate used in the

making of dyes, had discharged untreated toxic effluent and

dumped sludge in the open, poisoning the soil, aquifers and well

water of the village. The question was whether the cost of restoring

the environment could be visited upon the offending industry in

proceedings under Article 32. This Court held that even if it could

not itself award damages against a private concern, it could direct

the Central Government to determine and recover that cost.

Sections 3 and 5, read with the wide definition of ‘environment’ in

Section 2(a) of 1986 Act, clothe the Central Government with all

such powers as are necessary or expedient for protecting and

improving the quality of the environment, including the power to

direct removal of the offending condition, to undertake remedial

measures and to recover the costs from the offending industry.

39. If ‘control’ envisages whatever is incidental or consequential to the

end it serves, the power to control pollution under Section 3 is not

exhausted in the prohibitory rule of prior clearance. It also enables

the Central Government to deal with the consequences of breach,

provided the response is directed towards environmental

40

protection, damage assessment, remediation, restitution and

deterrence. A violation-management mechanism, in that limited

sense, may bring errant units back within the regulatory fold, not

by excusing the breach but by subjecting them to appraisal,

penalty, environmental compensation, remediation and future

compliance.

40. The aforesaid point is reinforced by the subsequent amendment of

Section 15 of the 1986 Act by the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023. By

substituting prosecution with a civil penalty, Parliament relaxed

the rigours of the consequence but did not amend or repeal the

requirement that EC must be obtained before the activity

commences. So long as the 2006 Notification continues to use the

expression “prior”, its compliance remains mandatory. The

architecture of the 2006 Notification remains intact and its

mandatory character unsullied. What the amended statutory

scheme supplies is a relaxed legislative space. The altered scheme

reinforces the view that Section 3 vests the delegatee Government

with the power to amend the prior notification, so that, in

appropriate cases, a breach need not invariably result in

dismantling, demolition or closure, but may instead be addressed

through penalty, remediation, restitution and future compliance.

41

III. Ex post facto clearance in the decisions of this Court

41. At this stage, it may be apt to recount the manner in which this

Court has dealt with regularisation issues arising from breach of

the 1994 and 2006 Notifications. The earliest relevant decision is

Lafarge (supra), where a mining project that had proceeded on a

clearance later found to be defective was permitted to continue

upon a fresh environmental clearance and an ex post facto forest

clearance. A three-Judge Bench upheld the grant of both the EC

and the FC. In doing so it announced the standard by which such

a decision is to be judged. “The time has come for us to apply the

constitutional ‘doctrine of proportionality’ to the matters concerning

environment as a part of the process of judicial review ... the Court

should review the decision-making process to ensure that the

decision of MoEF is fair and fully informed, based on the correct

principles, and free from any bias or restraint. Once this is ensured,

then the doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’ in favour of the decision-

maker would come into play.”

72 Tested on that standard it was held

that there had been no suppression of material facts by the

proponent and that MoEF had taken requisite care and caution to

protect the environment.

73 The mining was permitted to continue

upon deposits of Rs. 55 crore and strict remedial safeguards.

72

Lafarge (supra), ¶ 119.

73

Lafarge (supra), ¶ 114.

42

42. Electrotherm (India) Ltd. v. Patel Vipulkumar Ramjibhai

74 proceeded

on a similar footing. A clearance for the expansion of a steel plant,

granted without a fresh public hearing, was held invalid and

improper. Yet the Court declined to close the plant, which had been

built in the meanwhile. It converted the requirement of public

consultation from pre-decisional to post-decisional instead. Lafarge

(supra) and Electrotherm (supra) thus share a common signature,

a preference for continuance over cessation where special equities

exist. The equity lay in a valid initial clearance in the one, and in

substantial compliance in the other. Neither lays down that

continuance follows upon the mere payment of compensation. And

Electrotherm (supra) must be read in its own setting. Where a

project stands built and operational, a subsequent hearing is

ordinarily reduced to a formality. The affected population cannot

reverse an environmental change that has already occurred.

43. Both were cases in which a clearance existed but was found

procedurally deficient, not cases in which the activity had

commenced without any clearance whatever. Common Cause

(supra) dealt with a graver case of mineral extraction without or in

excess of clearance, devastating the forests and the tribal

habitations of the region. The Ministry, the Court observed, had

74

Electrotherm (India) Ltd. v. Patel Vipulkumar Ramjibhai, (2016) 9 SCC 300, ¶ 19.

43

over the years been cajoling the leaseholders into compliance rather

than using the stick. Its soft approach, however, could not become

an escapist excuse for non-compliance with the law.

75 The

leaseholders argued that a clearance, once granted, should relate

back to the date of the application, and that the very availability of

an ex post facto clearance signalled that a prior EC was not

mandatory. The argument was rejected in terms that have since

become the locus classicus of the subject. A prior EC is necessary.

The grant of an ex post facto clearance would be detrimental to the

environment and could lead to its irreparable degradation. The

concept of a retrospective clearance is alien to environmental

jurisprudence, under EIA 1994 and EIA 2006 alike, and an EC

comes into force not earlier than the date of its grant.

76 Yet the

declaration must be read alongside the relief the Court actually

moulded. The mining leases operating without clearance were

suspended and they were allowed to apply for the requisite

clearances and to move the Court upon obtaining them.

Compensation at one hundred per cent of the price of the mineral

illegally extracted was directed to be recovered, and the

leaseholders were permitted to restart their operations upon

75

Common Cause (supra), ¶ 108: “the MoEF was, in a sense, cajoling the mining leaseholders

to comply with the law and EIA 1994 rather than use the stick ... That the MoEF took a soft

approach cannot be an escapist excuse for non-compliance with the law or EIA 1994.”

76

Common Cause (supra), ¶ 125.

44

compliance and full payment.

77 It is trite that the ratio of a case

cannot be read as a statute and must be understood in its factual

matrix.

78 The word ‘jurisprudence’ in the declaration takes in the

scheme of the law as it then stood, the Act, the Rules and the two

notifications. That scheme contained no amending provision

accommodating an ex post facto clearance. The declaration

therefore must be read with reference to the regime as it then stood,

unamended, and under which nothing short of the status quo ante

would answer.

44. Alembic (supra) is, in this respect, kindred with Common Cause.

The circular dated 14.05.2002, which permitted units operating

without clearance under the 1994 regime to obtain clearance after

the event, was held to be an administrative instruction not

traceable to Section 3 of the 1986 Act. It diluted the statutory

mandate of prior clearance and could not amend delegated

legislation. That principle applies equally to the 2006 Notification.

The Court, however, again moulded relief. While striking down the

circular, it declined to revoke clearances or close units which had

operated for years and had since obtained clearances, and instead

77

Common Cause (supra), ¶ 10, ¶ 188(5) and ¶ 227.

78

Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills, (2002) 3 SCC 496: observations in

judgments are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of a statute, and

must be understood in the context of the facts in which they were made.

45

imposed compensation of Rs. 10 crore on each unit in exercise of

Article 142.

45. Electrosteel (supra) addressed the fate of a running steel plant

which had shifted from the site for which clearance had been

granted. The Court affirmed that compliance with EC requirements

is non-negotiable, but held that the 1986 Act does not itself prohibit

ex post facto environmental clearance. Such approval, however,

was confined to exceptional cases, to be granted only in accordance

with law and in strict conformity with applicable rules, regulations

and notifications. In the facts of the case, this Court declined to

permit closure of the steel plant for want of a prior EC and directed

its application for post facto EC to be decided in accordance with

law, having weighed the consequences of closure, namely the loss

of employment for the workmen of the erring plant and the

contribution of such an establishment to the national economy.

The deviant industry remained liable to heavy penalty and

restoration costs under the polluter pays principle.

46. The two impugned instruments themselves first came to be

considered by this Court in Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra), though

neither of them was under challenge in those proceedings. In

Pahwa (supra), units manufacturing formaldehyde and employing

about eight thousand workers had been set up upon consents

46

granted by the Haryana State Pollution Control Board. The Board

itself believed that no EC was required for such units. By the time

the matter reached this Court, the Expert Appraisal Committee had

scrutinised their applications for clearance, found them eligible and

recommended the grant of terms of reference. Setting aside the

closure ordered by the Tribunal, this Court declared the 2017

Notification to be a valid statutory notification, issued in the same

manner as the notifications of 1994 and 2006.

79 The power of

amendment rests upon Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,

1897, and may be exercised from time to time having regard to the

exigency. The instrument struck down in Alembic (supra) was an

administrative circular. The instrument before the Court was

delegated legislation of the same rank as the notification it

amended, and Alembic (supra) was distinguished on that very

ground. The undertaking recorded in Puducherry (supra) was held

to be no fetter. Words in a judgment cannot be read in the manner

of a statute, and a statement of counsel cannot prevent the

authority from amending a notification as per the procedure

prescribed by law.

80 The 2021 OM was held to have been issued “in

79

Pahwa (supra), ¶¶ 31-32, reiterated in

79

D. Swamy

79

(supra), ¶ 22: “The Notification of 2017

is a valid statutory notification issued by the Central Government in exercise of power under

Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the EP Act read with Rule 5(3)(d) of the EP Rules in the same

manner as the EIA Notification dated 27-1-1994 and the Notification dated 14-9-2006.” On

the power of amendment, see

79

D. Swamy

79

(supra), ¶ 23, following Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd.

v. State of U.P., (2011) 3 SCC 193.

80

D. Swamy (supra), ¶¶ 35-36, and Pahwa (supra), ¶ 47. Alembic was distinguished in Pahwa

(supra), ¶ 61.

47

pursuance of the statutory notification of 2017 which was valid”,

and upon that view the interim stay of the OM by the Madras High

Court was held to be in error.

81 D. Swamy (supra) reiterated these

propositions in relation to a common bio-medical waste treatment

facility, which had begun operating before clearance was stipulated

for such facilities at all. Its closure, the Court held, would itself be

against the public interest, for the operation of such a facility

prevents pollution.

82

47. There is, however, one step in that reasoning from which we must

respectfully depart. The 2021 OM does not trace its source to the

2017 Notification. Its own recitals invoke the direction of the

Tribunal in Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra). It is a bare administrative

instruction complete in itself, and not an extension of the 2017

Notification. The window under that notification had in any event

closed on 13.04.2018, more than three years before the OM was

issued. To the extent that Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra) read the

2021 OM as issued in pursuance of the 2017 Notification, and

proceeded upon its validity on that footing, they do not, with

respect, lay down the correct law.

81

Pahwa (supra), ¶ 48, reiterated in D. Swamy (supra), ¶ 37. The 2021 OM is considered in

Pahwa (supra), ¶¶ 40-41, and in D. Swamy (supra), ¶¶ 30 to 32. The interim order dated

15.07.2021 of the Madras High Court staying the 2021 OM, reported as 2021 SCC OnLine

Mad 12936, was held to be in error in Pahwa (supra), ¶ 48.

82

D. Swamy (supra), ¶ 50. Clearance was stipulated for common bio-medical waste treatment

facilities by the insertion of Entry 7(da) into the Schedule to the 2006 Notification with effect

from 17.04.2015.

48

48. Save to the limited extent indicated above, these decisions do not

collide. Common Cause and Alembic (supra) declare the norm that

a prior EC is mandatory. Yet each of those decisions itself moulded

the consequence of breach, withholding demolition and closure

upon terms of compensation and compliance. Lafarge,

Electrotherm, Electrosteel, Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra) operate at

that stage of consequence, and none of them holds that a prior EC

is not the rule. Electrosteel (supra) affirmed the rule in terms. It

then answered a question the earlier cases had no occasion to face,

the fate of a standing establishment, and resolved it upon a

weighing of consequences. Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra) answered

a question Alembic (supra) never faced, whether the Central

Government may amend its own notification, and considered the

impugned instruments for the first time. The declaration in

Common Cause (supra) and Alembic (supra), thus governs the

regime as it stood, unamended. The validity of any amendment is

governed, inter alia, by the tests of reasonable classification and

proportionality. The aforesaid decisions must be read in their

unique factual matrix subject to the following clarifications. The

observation in Electrosteel (supra) that the 1986 Act does not

prohibit an ex post facto clearance is incorrect as it fails to take

into consideration the mandatory character of the unamended

49

2006 Notification. Similarly, Pahwa and D. Swamy (supra) are not

good law to the extent said authorities uphold the validity of the

2021 OM on a mistaken premise that it was issued in pursuance

of the 2017 Notification.

49. In light of the above discussion, we proceed to examine the validity

of the two impugned instruments.

IV. The 2017 Notification

50. The first impugned instrument is the 2017 Notification, issued by

the MoEFCC on 14.03.2017. It is delegated legislation, made in

exercise of the powers vested in the Central Government under

Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the 1986 Act read with Rule 5(3)(d) of

the Rules. Its making followed the procedure prescribed for such

legislation. A draft was published in the Official Gazette, objections

were invited under Rule 5(3) and duly considered, and the

notification once made was laid before both Houses of Parliament.

A dialogue with stakeholders thus preceded its issuance and

parliamentary oversight followed it. Through the notification the

Ministry created an appraisal process for projects operating

without prior EC as on its date, in violation of the 2006 Notification.

51. The 2017 Notification therefore carved an exception into the prior

EC regime of the 2006 Notification whose mandatory character has

50

already been established. While dealing with prior EC under the

1994 and 2006 Notifications, this Court in Common Cause (supra)

held that the “concept of an ex post facto or a retrospective EC is

completely alien to environmental jurisprudence including EIA 1994

and EIA 2006”.

83 That declaration must, however, be read in the

context of the scheme then before the Court. It is not a principle of

universal application that puts a clog on the power of the delegatee

authority to amend the notification itself. The notification was in

fact upheld as a one-time measure by the Madras High Court in

Puducherry (supra), upon an undertaking to that effect given by the

learned Additional Solicitor General. In Pahwa (supra) and D.

Swamy (supra) this Court held that the undertaking could not

militate against the power of the Central Government under Section

21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to amend an earlier notification

in the like manner,

84 a position the Madras High Court itself

reiterated in Fatima (supra). The 2017 Notification thus stands on

the same plane as the 2006 Notification, both being delegated

legislation, and could alter or amend it, provided the alteration bore

a legitimate nexus with the object of Section 3 of the 1986 Act,

83

Common Cause (supra), ¶ 125.

84

“21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders,

rules or bye-laws.—Where, by any Central Act or Regulations a power to issue notifications,

orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the

like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary

or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued.”

51

namely “protecting and improving the quality of the environment and

preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution”.

52. The exception so carved is in the nature of an amnesty. It draws

projects in breach of the prior EC mandate back within the

regulatory framework, upon adequate deterrence, rather than

leaving them unchecked. Such a course is open because the parent

Act, as seen earlier, is silent on restoration of the status quo ante,

so that the precautionary principle stands as the rule and a

bounded amnesty may stand as the exception. Since the prior

clearance regime gives effect to the right to a wholesome

environment under Article 21 and rests upon that principle, any

such exception must satisfy two distinct constitutional inquiries.

The first is the test of reasonable classification under Article 14,

which asks whether the measure treats differently placed project

proponents as though they were alike, or selects among them upon

an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus with the object of

the Act. The second is proportionality, which asks whether the

inroad made into the prior clearance regime is justified by a

proportionate reconciliation of the right to a clean environment vis-

à-vis the right to development, more specifically in the

environmental context, the right to sustainable development, both

52

traceable as unenumerated rights under Article 21

85 as well as

Article 19(1)(g).

53. A project proponent who has complied with the law by obtaining

prior environmental clearance does not stand on the same footing

as one who has commenced construction, expansion or operation

in breach of that mandate. Nor do all violators form one

homogeneous class. A violator whose project serves an overriding

public interest, protects innocent third-party interests, maintains

an essential public utility or itself advances an environmental

object may be placed in a class different from a violator whose

project serves only private commercial gain. The differentia must

be drawn from the object of the 1986 Act. A class defined merely by

the fact that the project is otherwise permissible, or by the

proponent’s willingness to pay compensation, bears no rational

nexus with that object. It only places the errant proponent

substantially on par with the law-abiding one.

85

N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 362, ¶ 25. In a challenge to the clearances for

the Tehri dam project, it was held that “Right to environment is a fundamental right. On the

other hand, right to development is also one. Here the right to ‘sustainable development’

cannot be singled out. Therefore, the concept of ‘sustainable development’ is to be treated as

an integral part of ‘life’ under Article 21.” See also The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp

Mody, 2025 INSC 347, ¶ 17, where, in appeals against NGT orders halting road development

under the Auroville Master Plan, the right to development through industrialisation was held

to claim priority under Articles 14, 19 and 21 alongside the right to clean environment under

Articles 14 and 21, sustainable development striking a golden balance between the two rights,

and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1, ¶ 298, per Sikri J., where, in the

challenge to the Aadhaar Act, 2016, two competing rights traceable to Article 21 were weighed

and it was held that neither may be given automatic precedence over the other.

53

54. Once the classification survives Article 14, the measure must still

pass the test of proportionality. On one side lies the right to a clean

and healthy environment, secured through the prior EC regime and

the precautionary principle. On the other lies the right to

sustainable development, not as a vested right of the wrongdoer to

continue an unlawful project, but as a larger public interest which

may, in a proper case, justify controlled continuance subject to

assessment, remediation, deterrent compensation and future

compliance. The right to development, therefore, enters the balance

only at the level of public interest and cannot be reduced to the

private commercial interest of the defaulting proponent.

55. Proportionality also governs how narrowly the exception must be

bounded, a point illuminated by the treatment of amnesty schemes

in other fields of law. Such schemes are rare exceptions which erase

the consequences of a breach of law, and must subserve a larger

public interest that justifies the inversion of the rule of law. In

taxation, immunity schemes for undisclosed wealth have been

upheld in deference to legislative wisdom in economic policy, as

held in R.K. Garg v. Union of India,

86 but their legitimacy depends

upon their being exceptional and finite. The Voluntary Disclosure

of Income Scheme of 1997 was sustained in All India Federation of

86

(1981) 4 SCC 675.

54

Tax Practitioners v. Union of India

87 only upon the Union’s

assurance, recorded by the Court, that it was a one-time measure

that would not be repeated.

56. The same limits appear in town planning. The statutory

regularisation of unauthorised construction has been upheld only

as a one-time measure to cure a historically accumulated

breakdown of enforcement, as in Consumer Action Group v. State of

Tamil Nadu, (2000) 7 SCC 425, while Friends Colony Development

Committee v. State of Orissa, (2004) 8 SCC 733 warned that

compounding, intended as an exception, has unfortunately become

the rule, and that deliberate violations by professional builders

must be dealt with sternly. Most recently, Rajendra Kumar Barjatya

v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad

88, held that regularisation

schemes are to be brought out only in exceptional circumstances,

as a one-time measure for residential houses, and only after a

detailed survey of land use, environmental impact, resource

availability, proximity to water bodies and the larger public interest,

for delay, the cost of construction and official laxity cannot shield

illegal construction from action. A measure of this kind may correct

a past default but may never become a parallel and permanent

route that circumvents the regime it professes to restore. A valid

87

(1998) 231 ITR 24 (SC).

88

2024 INSC 990.

55

amnesty measure is thus exceptional in character, finite in

duration and confined to its class.

57. The reason for such a high threshold lies in the nature of

regularisation itself, for it cannot restore an unspoilt environment.

At its highest it can compensate for a loss already suffered and

provide for remedial measures in the time to come. But some

environmental injuries cannot be compensated in money. The

harm done to biodiversity, particularly to rare and endangered

species, or the large-scale displacement of indigenous people, may

inflict irreparable injury upon a habitat and upon lives long before

any remedial measure can take effect. Such cases call for deeper

scrutiny, and an industry is not regularised merely because the

polluter will pay. Sometimes, on the other hand, the activity itself

is one of environmental or public necessity, such as a common bio-

medical waste treatment facility or a plant generating solar or wind

energy in mitigation of climate change. In such cases the public

interest in continuance weighs more heavily on the scale, alongside

an exacting assessment of the damage and effective remediation.

58. In either case the fulcrum is the public interest. Breach of the prior

clearance mandate cannot, by itself, generate an equity in favour of

the violator, nor can the mere financial loss of the proponent supply

a reason to relax the mandate. The question of continuance arises

56

only where a supervening public interest enters the balance. That

interest may lie in the protection of innocent third parties who had

no role in the violation, such as homebuyers who have invested

their savings in the project, workmen whose livelihood depends

upon it, or the public at large where the activity performs an

essential public, environmental or infrastructural function. In such

cases, the consequence of breach is not determined mechanically

by demolition alone. It must be moulded so that enforcement of the

prior clearance regime does not visit disproportionate hardship

upon persons who were not responsible for the illegality, while still

preserving deterrence through stringent appraisal, remediation,

compensatory liability and, where necessary, refusal of the

offending portion. The exception is therefore not founded upon

indulgence to the wrongdoer, but upon the need to reconcile

environmental enforcement with a demonstrable public interest.

59. That is precisely the course this Court has taken where a completed

project was found in violation of environmental norms, and the

decisions disclose the reason in each. In the cases already

discussed, the indulgence in Lafarge (supra) rested upon a revised

clearance hedged with safeguards, in Alembic (supra) upon the

disproportionality of revoking, years later, clearances obtained

upon the government’s own circular, in Electrosteel (supra) upon

57

the economic contribution and employment of a running steel plant

which ought not to be closed upon a mere technicality, in Pahwa

(supra) upon the regulator’s own misconception whose price would

have been paid by the workmen, and in D. Swamy (supra) upon the

fact that the facility regularised, a common bio-medical waste

treatment plant, itself abates pollution. In Goel Ganga Developers

India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India

89, a project built in excess of built-

up area permitted by the EC was not demolished, in order to protect

the interest of innocent third-party purchasers many of whom had

occupied the premises. Deterrence was preserved instead by

imposing damages of one hundred crore rupees or ten per cent of

the project cost, whichever was higher. The developer was

prohibited from further construction along with directions to

refund the investment with interest at nine per cent per annum. In

Keystone Realtors Pvt. Ltd. v. Anil V. Tharthare,

90 a residential

project expanded beyond the prescribed threshold had been

completed, so that undoing it would have served no one. The Court

upheld the deposit of one crore rupees and directed an expert

committee to bring the project’s impact as close as possible to that

contemplated in the clearance. Similarly, in Babulal Kotecha

(supra) restoration of the lake filled and converted into a public

89

(2018) 18 SCC 257.

90

(2020) 2 SCC 66.

58

park was refused because undoing the park would have required

felling the mature trees grown upon it, wounding the environment

afresh while healing nothing, and in Bindu Kapurea (supra) the

construction of road being complete, restitution was beyond reach,

and the Court exacted compensatory terms instead, for a remedy

that cannot restore may still make the polluter pay. Most recently,

in M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India,

91 the Court recalibrated its own

blanket direction to place power lines underground across the

habitat of the Great Indian Bustard, because the direction collided

with the competing environmental imperative of promoting solar

energy to mitigate climate change, and neither goal could be

sacrificed at the altar of the other.

60. In each of these decisions the indulgence rested upon an identified

supervening public interest, such as the protection of homebuyers

or workmen or the benefit of the environment itself, and in each it

was hedged with deterrent damages, refusal of the offending

portion or supervised remediation. None of them holds that a

proponent may build first and then claim regularisation upon the

strength of the completed construction.

91

M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 280, ¶¶ 53 and 60. In proceedings for the

protection of the Great Indian Bustard, it was held that “While balancing two equally crucial

goals - the conservation of the GIB on one hand, with the conservation of the environment as

a whole on the other hand - it is necessary to adopt a holistic approach which does not

sacrifice either of the two goals at the altar of the other”.

59

61. These decisions indicate that, in the field of post facto clearance,

the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle are not

antagonists between which the law must make an absolute and

invariable choice. A measured regularisation may, in a given case,

better serve the abatement of pollution that is the ultimate object

of the 1986 Act. It compels a true assessment of the damage, exacts

remediation from the polluter, protects those who would be ruined

by demolition and draws the violator into the discipline of the Act.

The choice is therefore not the binary one between condonation and

demolition. It is the reconciliation, upon the facts, of competing

imperatives, regularisation being kept to a narrow, time-bound,

reasoned and supervised window. By these standards, and by the

tests of reasonable classification and proportionality, the 2017

Notification must now be judged.

62. The terms of the 2017 Notification bear out the compliance

character which these principles demand. It stipulates that the

process shall serve as a deterrent to violation and that the

pecuniary benefit of the violation and the damage to the

environment shall be adequately compensated for. To that end it

places no cap on environmental damage, preserving the authority’s

full capacity to assess compensation at a level both reparative and

deterrent. The clearance in violation cases may be processed only

60

at the Central level. It must be granted upon evaluation by the

sectoral Expert Appraisal Committee even where the project falls in

Category B, so that such cases are withdrawn from ordinary State

level appraisal. The assessment of ecological damage and the

preparation of the remediation and resource augmentation plans

must be undertaken by a laboratory notified under the Act,

accredited by the National Accreditation Board for Testing and

Calibration Laboratories, or belonging to an institution of the

Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. Finally, the measure

is closed at both ends, eligibility being confined to projects in

violation as on its date and applications to a window of six months.

These are the features of a narrow corrective measure confined in

time and in class.

63. So tested, the 2017 Notification is valid, but within narrow limits

alone. It survives the test of reasonable classification. It does not

place every violator on par with a law-abiding proponent, for it

subjects violation cases to centralised appraisal, ecological damage

assessment, remediation, resource augmentation and

compensatory liability. Nor does it create an open class of future

violators, both eligibility and duration being closed.

64. The Notification also satisfies proportionality. Its purpose is proper,

for it draws subsisting violations into assessment, remediation and

61

compliance rather than leaving them unregulated. Its terms bear a

rational connection with that purpose. Its closed eligibility date and

limited window satisfy necessity, because a narrower measure

could not have addressed existing violations while preventing the

exception from becoming a standing alternative to prior clearance.

Finally, the balance is preserved only because the measure is

exceptional, time-bound, centrally appraised and remedial in

character. A scheme that permitted regularisation upon no more

than payment of compensation, without a closed class, a limited

window and a supervening public interest, would stand on a

different footing. By its breadth and want of an end, it would

supplant the prior clearance regime under the 2006 Notification

and render nugatory the precautionary principle on which that

regime rests.

65. The petitioners also assail the notification upon the principle of

non-regression. The challenge is misplaced. The principle operates

not as a binding mandate whose breach is by itself a ground of

invalidity but as a guiding principle drawn from non-binding

international law. In Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India,

92

Chandrachud J. referred to the 13 principles of the Environmental

Rule of Law adopted in the IUCN World Declaration while holding

92

(2019) 15 SCC 401.

62

that the NGT had erred in taking an indulgent view of defects in a

prior EC. That Declaration is neither a binding treaty nor

customary international law. It entered the discourse through soft

law and is of persuasive character alone. Such principles may

temper an executive measure but cannot fetter the power to amend

or supersede an earlier notification under Section 21 of the General

Clauses Act so long as the object of the parent Act is preserved. Nor

is the principle consistently honoured in international practice.

Developed countries, though bearing a greater measure of

historical responsibility, have resiled from binding treaty

commitments previously undertaken by them. The United States,

historically the largest carbon emitter, withdrew from the Paris

Agreement with effect from 27.01.2026 and by a presidential

memorandum dated 07.01.2026 directed its withdrawal from the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change itself. A

principle of persuasive value cannot be read to deny a nation the

sovereign power to recalibrate its environmental measures. To do

so, even as the developed world retreats from its binding

commitments, would turn common but differentiated

responsibilities into an unequal and discriminatory burden upon

developing nations. A corrective measure so confined in duration,

which exacts remediation and secures compliance, cannot be

condemned for non-regression or for breach of Article 21, being

63

aligned to that very object, the preservation of the environment

through control and abatement of pollution.

66. We hold the 2017 Notification to be a valid delegated measure

engrafting a narrowly tailored time-bound violation-management

scheme based on proportionality and reasonableness without

upsetting the foundations of the prior environmental clearance

regime founded on the precautionary principle.

V. The 2021 Office Memorandum

67. The second impugned instrument is the 2021 Office Memorandum,

an executive instruction issued on 07.07.2021 by the MoEFCC,

purportedly in compliance with the direction of the National Green

Tribunal in Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra) that a Standard Operating

Procedure be laid down for the grant of EC in cases of violation.

Under the Office Memorandum, a project not permissible for

clearance is liable to be demolished or closed. A permissible project

is to remain closed until clearance is obtained, and such EC is to

be granted only after assessment of ecological damage and

preparation of plans for remedial measures and augmentation of

natural and community resources, stated to be in line with the

polluter pays principle. A completed project is to be appraised as if

it were a new proposal and, if found permissible, granted clearance

64

effective from the date of its issuance. The compensation is fixed at

one per cent of the project cost, together with 0.25 per cent of the

turnover during the period of violation where operations have

commenced, and is halved where the violation is self-reported. The

Office Memorandum does not prescribe any cut-off date or identify

any class of eligible projects.

68. The challenge to the 2021 Office Memorandum is founded, at the

threshold, on the source of power. It is contended that the Office

Memorandum, being an executive instruction, could not alter,

amend or dilute the 2006 Notification. Reliance is placed on

Vanashakti-I, where it was observed that the Office Memorandum

does not relate to exercise of any power under the 1986 Act or the

Rules. The proposition of law underlying the contention is

indisputable. Administrative instructions may supplement the

statutory rules and notifications where they are silent on a

particular matter, but they cannot amend, supersede, dilute or

travel inconsistently with the statutory scheme already in force.

93

93

Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910, ¶ 7 (Constitution Bench). In a

writ petition by an officer of the Indian Police Service challenging his supersession in

promotion to the selection grade posts of Inspector General and Additional Inspector General

of Police in Rajasthan, the statutory rules being silent on the principles of promotion to

selection posts, it was held that “It is true that Government cannot amend or supersede

statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular

point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not

inconsistent with the rules already framed”.

65

Where there is a conflict, statutory rules and notifications must

prevail.

94

69. For similar reasons, the other OM dt. 19.02.2021 permitting post

facto CRZ clearance being an administrative order could not have

amended the CRZ notification requiring prior clearance and was

rightly quashed prospectively in Fatima (supra).

70. The learned Additional Solicitor General further argued that the

2021 OM permitting post-facto EC occupies only a narrow

interstitial space left unaddressed by the 2006 Notification.

According to her, the 2006 Notification is silent as to the

consequences of its breach, and the impugned 2021 OM was issued

to occupy that limited unoccupied field of regularisation pursuant

to the direction of the NGT in Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra). On this

formulation, it was submitted that the 2021 OM operates only as a

supplement to the 2006 Notification and does not run counter to

it. To assess the validity of this proposition, the two instruments

must be examined in juxtaposition.

94

Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine 69. Teaching

faculty of an ESIC medical college claimed promotion upon two years of service under the

Dynamic Assured Career Progression Scheme contained in an office memorandum of the

Central Government, though the ESIC (Medical Teaching Faculty Posts) Recruitment

Regulations, 2015 required five years. It was held that “In the event of a conflict between an

executive instruction, an office memorandum in this case, and statutory regulations - the

latter prevail”.

66

Feature 2006 Notification (prior

clearance regime)

2021 Office Memorandum

(post facto regularisation)

Source and

character

A delegated legislation

under Sections 3(1) and

3(2)(v) of the 1986 Act

read with Rule 5(3)(d),

preceded by the draft

notification S.O. 1324(E)

dated 15.09.2005 and the

consideration of

objections.

Executive instruction issued

by an officer of the Ministry.

Its SOP and penalty

(paragraphs 10 to 12) recite

no exercise of the

notification-making power

under Section 3(2)(v) read

with Rule 5(3)(d). Only the

power to issue directions

under Section 5 is invoked,

and that only to identify

violations (paragraph 13).

Point in time Operates before the

activity commences. Prior

clearance under

paragraph 2 is a

condition precedent to

any construction or

preparation of land,

except securing the land.

Operates after the activity

has been commenced or

completed. The appraisal

under paragraph 11, Step 3

is of a project already built.

Screening

and scoping

Screening (Stage 1, Form

1) and scoping (Stage 2,

Terms of Reference within

sixty days), under

paragraph 7, are

antecedent to and govern

the activity.

No genuine screening or

scoping is feasible. Under

paragraph 11, Step 3(B) the

Committee appraises the

completed project “as if it

was a new proposal”, the

67

Feature 2006 Notification (prior

clearance regime)

2021 Office Memorandum

(post facto regularisation)

determinants having already

been altered.

Siting and

alternatives

Form 1 and the EIA

report (Appendix III)

require examination of

alternative sites,

technology and layout

before approval.

No alternative site can be

examined. The project

stands where it has been

built.

Public

consultation

Mandatory for Category A

and B1 projects before

the decision (Stage 3,

paragraph 7, Appendix

IV), when objections may

still shape or defeat the

project.

Ex ante consultation is

impossible. Under

paragraph 11, Step 3(B)(vii)

the Committee “may insist

upon” a hearing, at best a

post-mortem upon a settled

state of affairs.

Nature of

assessment

Prospective and

preventive. Assesses the

likely impact of the

activity against an

undisturbed baseline.

Retrospective (paragraph

11, Step 3). Assesses only

the damage already caused,

not the comparative harm of

removal.

Monetary

consequence

None as a price of

clearance. Clearance

follows a clean prior

appraisal.

A penalty under paragraph

12 (one per cent of project

cost plus 0.25 per cent of

turnover during the

violation period, halved

where self-reported), with a

remediation bank guarantee

68

Feature 2006 Notification (prior

clearance regime)

2021 Office Memorandum

(post facto regularisation)

(paragraph 11, Step

3(B)(viii)). A foreseeable,

fixed proportion of cost.

Duration

and class

A permanent statutory

regime of general

application.

Open-ended with no cut-off

date unlike the six-month,

fixed-date window of the

2017 Notification.

Effect of

clearance

Permission to begin a

project not yet begun

(grant of prior EC under

paragraph 8).

A clearance “effective from

the date of issue” (paragraph

11, Step 3(B)(iv)) upon a

project already begun.

71. This comparison exposes a glaring incompatibility between the

2006 Notification and the 2021 OM. The former rests on the

premise that environmental impact assessment must precede the

first irreversible act on site. The latter operates at the opposite end

of the timeline, beginning after the very act prohibited by the 2006

Notification has taken place. By the time the appraisal under the

2021 OM begins, the project is not a proposal awaiting scrutiny but

an existing fact on the ground. The Appraisal Committee is asked

to appraise it “as if it was a new proposal”, but that fiction cannot

restore the setting in which a new proposal is meant to be

examined. There is no genuine screening or scoping left, no

alternative site to compare and no public consultation that can still

69

shape the environmental impact of the project. The OM changes

the contours and dynamics of assessment, namely what is to be

assessed, along with the criteria for the grant of EC under the 2006

Notification. Therefore, the OM supplants the 2006 Notification and

does not merely supplement it.

72. Unlike the 2017 Notification, the 2021 OM abysmally fails the

proportionality test. The former confined its appraisal of violator-

applicants to a time-limited window. The latter has no cut-off date

and no finite class. It therefore converts an exceptional violation-

management response into a permanent parallel route, allowing a

proponent to commence first and seek appraisal later upon

payment of the stipulated costs. Upon the proportionality

framework set out above, the instrument fails at the tests of

rational connection and necessity. A measure unlimited in time and

class, hedged with a capped and foreseeable compensation, travels

beyond what the object of compliance requires and loses its nexus

with the abatement of pollution.

73. An amnesty-regularisation scheme, as held above, is an exception,

not a right. A proponent who has built in breach stands upon no

footing of entitlement, and the departure can be justified only by a

supervening public interest, never that of the proponent. Even

then, such a departure must be effected through a measure

70

authorised by, and answerable to, the law from which it departs.

The 2021 Office Memorandum meets neither requirement. It is not

so authorised, being an executive instruction and not a notification.

And in allowing every permissible industry to be regularised upon

no more than meagre compensation, it fails the test of reasonable

classification noticed earlier. It selects no class upon any

supervening public interest, and the only differentia it knows is the

permissible character of the project. Permissibility of the activity is

a lower threshold as compared to supervening public interest. It

only asks whether the project could have been considered had the

law been obeyed but does not explain why a project built in breach

should be preserved despite the breach. It thus equates the

compliant and the defiant, treats unequals as equals and to that

extent offends Article 14. It yields to a principle of ‘pollute and then

pay’ rather than to sustainable development. A project must

survive upon its own strength, and not because the polluter has

paid.

74. The 2021 OM also cannot derive legitimacy from the NGT’s

direction in Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra), which it invokes as its

warrant. The Tribunal directed only that “a proper SOP be laid down

for grant of EC in such cases so as to address the gaps in binding

71

law and practice being currently followed”.

95 That direction must be

read in context. The Tribunal was considering what the regulator

ought to do after a violation had already occurred, in light of

decisions where completed constructions received calibrated, case-

specific relief rather than wholesale demolition. It was authorising

a procedure for identifying violators, assessing damage and

securing remediation within the discipline of the prior clearance

regime. It does not authorise, and could not have authorised, an

open-ended mechanism for regularising violations yet to occur, and

that too by an administrative instruction. Its object was to plug

enforcement gaps in the existing regime, not to supplant it by a

standing ex post facto dispensation.

75. The decriminalisation of the offence does not improve the position.

The Jan Vishwas amendments, as observed earlier, are confined to

the penal consequences of breach. They cannot and do not

authorise an administrative instruction to convert a mandatory

prior clearance regime into a perpetual post facto clearance

mechanism. A lax implementation regime, coupled with a

regularisation scheme unlimited in time and subject to capped

environmental compensation at a flea-bite level, renders the prior

EC regime otiose, in fact and in law.

95

Tanaji B. Gambhire (supra), order dated 24.05.2021, extracted in D. Swamy (supra), ¶ 30.

72

76. A further concern arises where the State is itself the project

proponent and has violated the prior EC regime without

justification. In such a case, the preserver of the rule of law is seen

violating the law. The urgent need to fix accountability has now

been statutorily addressed in the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023, which

inserted Section 15B, making the Head of the Department liable in

cases of breach. Any violation regularisation mechanism must

further that legislative intent by fixing accountability and imposing

individual costs, upon inquiry, on the officers responsible for

wanton and unjustified violation. Future amnesty schemes, if any,

should provide effective deterrent measures against individual

public servants, including disciplinary action and personal liability

for environmental damage, wherever the State or its

instrumentalities, as project proponents, violate the prior EC

regime.

77. In light of the above discussion, we hold the 2021 OM to be invalid

and quash it with prospective effect. We do so using our powers

under Article 142, taking into account two distinct reasons. First,

considerable legal uncertainty prevailed regarding the validity of

the impugned instruments and the processing and grant of ECs

under them. By an interim order dated 02.01.2024, this Court

initially stayed the operation of the 2021 OM. Thereafter, by orders

73

dated 06.01.2025 and 19.02.2025, this Court permitted processing

of applications already made for grant of ex post facto EC under the

2021 OM but withheld the final grant until further orders. On

16.05.2025, Vanashakti-I quashed both the 2017 Notification and

the 2021 OM. In paragraph 35, the Bench extended the benefit of

the ECs already granted under both instruments but did not extend

such benefit to the pending applications. On 18.11.2025, the

Review order recalled Vanashakti-I. Although Bhuyan J. did not

agree with the majority to allow the review, in paragraph 55 of his

dissenting opinion he opined that an accommodation could be

made for individual project proponents whose applications were

pending, by modification/clarification of paragraph 35 of

Vanashakti-I.

96 Post the Review order, the MoEFCC by OM dated

20.01.2026 directed that all applications pending under the 2017

Notification and the 2021 OM be processed, the final grant

remaining subject to further orders of this Court.

78. Second, supervening public interest is involved in several projects

which have already been undertaken or substantially progressed in

96

The Review, per Bhuyan J., ¶ 55. The applicants in Miscellaneous Application (Diary) No.

46855 of 2025 and Miscellaneous Application (Diary) No. 52650 of 2025, along with several

similar applicants, sought a clarification and a declaration that the benefit of protection

extended to the ECs already granted under the 2017 Notification in Vanashakti-I should apply

to their projects also. Bhuyan J. opined: "I am of the considered opinion that the concerns of

the individual applicants are capable of being accommodated by way of appropriate

clarification and/or modification of paragraph 35 of the Vanashakti judgment. For that, the

entire judgment in Vanashakti is not required to be recalled."

74

reliance upon the prevailing regulatory position. These include the

AIIMS Medical College and Hospital building in the State of Odisha,

the Centre of Excellence for Cancer Diseases in Tamil Nadu, several

medical colleges, Vijayapura Airport in Karnataka, slum

rehabilitation projects and irrigation projects intended for drought-

prone areas. Unless the 2021 OM is prospectively overruled,

projects already undertaken would have to be undone adversely

affecting the overarching public purpose they serve.

VI. Fate of ECs Already Granted and Applications Pending

Consideration

79. As we have quashed 2021 OM prospectively, in order to do complete

justice between the parties we issue the following directions with

respect to the ECs already granted or pending consideration under

the 2017 Notification/2021 OM:

a. ECs granted to project proponents under the 2017 Notification

and the 2021 OM till date shall remain valid, unless otherwise

challenged on merits.

b. All pending applications made by project proponents under the

2017 Notification or the 2021 OM shall be taken to their logical

conclusion in accordance with law.

75

c. Any application dismissed, returned or delisted solely with

reference to the stay order dated 02.01.2024 and/or the

judgment in Vanashakti-I may be reconsidered by the

authority concerned in light of the observations made in this

judgment, particularly the prospective quashing of the 2021

OM.

d. No fresh application for grant of EC under the aforesaid

instruments shall be entertained.

e. The government is restrained from issuing administrative

orders in future for grant of EC in respect of projects which

have commenced in contravention of the prior EC regime

under the 2006 Notification.

CONCLUSION

80. We hold as follows:

(i) The prior EC regime under the 2006 Notification is

mandatory and unless amended by an appropriate

notification, would not accommodate grant of post facto EC

or retention of projects where constructions have

commenced or processes begun without a valid EC.

76

(ii) The observations in Common Cause (supra) and Alembic

(supra) that ex post facto EC is alien to environmental

jurisprudence must be seen in the statutory context in

which they were made, namely the 1986 Act and the clear

and unequivocal words “prior environmental clearance” in

the 2006 Notification. They do not place a clog on the power

of the Central Government to issue an appropriate narrowly

tailored amnesty notification in supervening public interest

as an exception to the 2006 Notification.

(iii) The decriminalisation of the regulatory contraventions

under the 1986 Act through the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023

reinforces our conclusion that the Central Government has

ample power under Section 3 to issue appropriate

notifications formulating amnesty schemes with regard to

such classes or categories of non-compliant projects whose

sustainability is necessary to subserve larger public interest.

(iv) While Common Cause (supra) and Alembic (supra) deal with

the normative state of law prevailing then, Pahwa and D.

Swamy (supra) deal with the consequences of breach of the

prior EC regime in light of the 2017 Notification/2021 OM.

Their ratios must be read in the context of their respective

factual matrices and not treated as statutes having universal

77

application. We further hold that Electrosteel (supra) was

decided in the facts of the case and the observation therein

that the 1986 Act and the 2006 Notification accommodate

grant of ex post facto EC ignores the mandatory character of

the prior EC requirement and does not lay down a correct

interpretation of either the Act or the Notification.

(v) We approve the observations in Pahwa and D. Swamy with

regard to the 2017 Notification and hold that the said

amending notification is a valid narrowly tailored and time-

bound delegated legislation traceable to Section 3 of the

1986 Act read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.

(vi) The 2021 OM is an administrative order and envisages a

perpetual regime for grant of EC to projects undertaken

without prior EC. It substantially alters the nature of

enquiry as well as the criteria for grant of EC under the 2006

Notification. 2021 OM thereby supplants an earlier

delegated legislation through an administrative instruction,

which is impermissible in law. Even otherwise, being a

perpetual amnesty scheme applicable to all permissible

projects, it fails to lay down an intelligible differentia for

selection of projects for grant of post facto EC having rational

nexus to supervening public interest and is thereby ultra

78

vires the object of 1986 Act, namely preservation of

environment through a balanced approach between

precautionary principle and sustainable development. Given

these circumstances, the OM does not satisfy the test of

proportionality and reasonableness and is violative of

Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Thus, the 2021 OM

is quashed but with prospective effect, keeping in mind the

prevailing confusion with regard to validity of the impugned

instruments and supervening public interest. Consequently,

we overrule Pahwa (supra) and D. Swamy (supra) to the

extent they incorrectly treat the 2021 OM as valid and

traceable to the 2017 notification.

(vii) All ECs granted under the 2017 Notification or the 2021 OM

shall remain valid unless individually assailed in accordance

with law.

(viii) All applications for grant of EC made under the impugned

instruments, whether they remain pending or stand

dismissed solely with reference to the stay order dated

02.01.2024 and/or the judgment in Vanashakti-I, shall be

dealt with in terms of the directions in paragraph 79 of this

judgment.

79

(ix) No further application for grant of ECs under the 2017

Notification and the 2021 OM shall be entertained. Central

Government is also restrained from passing administrative

orders in future to grant ex post facto ECs to projects which

commenced in violation of 2006 Notification, save and except

by way of a valid notification in exercise of powers under

section 3 of the 1986 Act.

(x) It is clarified that our directions shall not constrain the

powers of this Court to grant ex post facto EC under Article

142 to do complete justice in appropriate cases.

81. With these directions,

(i) Writ Petitions and Miscellaneous Applications are disposed

of.

(ii) Civil Appeal Nos.381-382 of 2025, challenging the prospective

operation of Madras High Court judgment in Fatima (supra),

are dismissed.

(iii) The appeal filed by the State of Tamil Nadu against the

judgment in Fatima, being C.A. No.8253 of 2026, may be

disposed of in light of the findings and observations in this

judgment.

80

(iv) Pending Interlocutory Application (s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

SLP (C) No.8187 of 2025

82. The SLP assails the judgment dated 19.03.2025 passed by the

Bombay High Court in Writ Petition (L) No. 8110 of 2025, whereby

the closure of a mall was upheld. Since the challenge is not

confined to a prayer for post facto EC under the 2017 Notification,

but also raises other grounds, the matter is factually

distinguishable. Accordingly, the Registry is directed to de-tag the

matter and list it before appropriate Bench for hearing as per Rules.

………....................CJI

(SURYA KANT)

…………………………….J.

(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)

…………………………….J.

(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)

NEW DELHI;

JULY 29, 2026.

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