

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

2025:PHHC:173537



CRM-M-10028-2024

Akash Walia

...Petitioner

V/s

State of Haryana and another

...Respondents

Reserved on : 02.12.2025**Date of Pronouncement: 12.12.2025****Date of Uploading : 12.12.2025****CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL**Present: Mr. Fateh Saini, Ms. Sangeeta Sharma, Ms. Harshdeep Kaur
and Ms. Neetu Rana, Advocates for the petitioner.

Mr. Tarun Aggarwal, Additional Advocate General, Haryana.

Mr. Abhinav Sood, Mr. Arshbir and Mr. Nitesh Jhanjaria,
Advocates for respondent No.2.

SUMEET GOEL, J.

1. Taking exception to the order dated 31.12.2023 (hereinafter referred to as '*impugned order*'), passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ambala (hereinafter referred to as '*concerned Magistrate*'), the petitioner (herein)-complainant has sought for quashing of the said order. In essence, the petitioner (herein) has sought for setting-aside/cancellation of the regular bail granted to respondent No.2 (herein) in FIR No.485 dated 26.12.2023 registered under Sections 195-A/506 of IPC (Section 201 of IPC added later on) at Police Station Mullana, District Ambala (hereinafter referred to as '*FIR in question*').

2. The *FIR in question* was registered on the basis of complaint moved by the petitioner-complainant alleging therein that few days ago, his maternal uncle Devender Walia, resident of village Thakurpura, had a

dispute with the persons, details whereof had been mentioned in the complaint. Accordingly, a case (i.e. FIR No. 0068 dated 26/11/2023) was registered at Police Station Naraingarh. Thereafter, on the same day, accused Vinod Walia got registered an FIR No. 585 against the complainant/petitioner, his uncle and his family. The said Vinod Walia, who earlier worked in the police and is now a lawyer and the other accused had been threatening the complainant, his family and relatives since the aforesaid incident. The complainant-petitioner further alleged that for the last several days, some unknown persons had been following him. As per the complainant, he worked at Cooperative Bank, Laha and even there some unknown persons were trying to track him. On 21.12.2023, at around 9:30 A.M., the complainant alleged that he received calls on the Facebook Messenger from an account named Karan Walia. At 10:21 AM, the complainant further received another call on his mobile number XXXXXXXXXX. According to the complainant, the caller claimed to be speaking from USA and said he was a gangster associated with Rishabh Walia. He threatened the complainant and said that unless he compromises in the case filed against Vinod and Rishabh, he would get him and his family killed. The complainant further alleged that the caller had claimed connections with the Sampant Nehra and Monu Rana gangs. He further threatened that he would get the complainant killed before his birthday and wedding anniversary. However, the complainant recorded the said conversation with the help of using another mobile phone. During this call, the accused Rishabh Walia was also present on the conference call. On 22.12.2023, the complainant again received calls on his Facebook Messenger at 08:04 AM and 10:10 AM. The complainant alleged that he

believed that the accused had some links with the gangsters and intended to harm him and his family. The complainant claimed that the call details and records of Anil, Rahul, Shekhar and the other accused be checked and thoroughly investigated. On these set of allegations, the *FIR in question* was got registered.

3. The relevant part of the *impugned order* reads thus:

“Police file perused Along with the remand paper furnished by the IO concerned. As per the police file, complainant Akash gave a complaint to the police which is in a typed way, a printed complaint and the careful perusal of this complaint it is clear that there is only threat qua the compromise of the FIR registered. So, question of adding Section 195-A IPC nowhere arises. Here it is necessary to discuss Section 195-A IPC which says

“whoever threatens another with any injury to his person reputation or property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intend to cause that person to give false evidence shall be liable for Section 195-A IPC”

Careful perusal of the complaint given by the complainant arid the whole file of the police, nowhere Court is able to understand how the false evidence is given by the accused So why the police added Section 195-A IPC is the reason known to the police himself.

Here it is necessary to discuss Section 195-A CrPC also which says

“A witness or any other person may file a complaint in relation to an offence under Section 195-A of the Indian Penal Code”.

So, this is a procedural section which provides the procedure when there is an allegation under Section 195-A IPC. It clearly says that a complaint need to be made by the person when witnesses are threatened etc. Here in the present FIR nowhere the perusal of the remand papers and the while police file, it is clear that there is any threaten to any witness and the evidence. Hence, question of adding the Section 195-A by the police is the reason known to the police himself.

Thus, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the accused further in judicial custody. Hence, without commenting on the merits of the case, accused Reshab Walia is admitted to bail on his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.30,000/- with one surety in the like amount.

Requisite bonds furnished which are accepted and attested. Accused be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.”

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two fold submissions.

Firstly, learned counsel has urged that the *concerned Magistrate*, who has afforded regular bail to respondent No.2 (herein) by way of *impugned order*, is a relative of the respondent No.2. In this regard, it has been iterated that the *concerned Magistrate* even took a leave from the Court to attend the Bhog ceremony of the brother of father of respondent No.2 (herein). To buttress this aspect, learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to a complaint made to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of this Court, on the administrative side, copy whereof has been appended as Annexure P-6 with the instant petition. Learned counsel has further referred to an affidavit of the petitioner dated 25.04.2025 (forming part of records of present petition), relevant whereof reads thus:

“3. That it is stated that petitioner has already moved a complaint (Annexure P-6) against JMIC, Ambala "XXXX alongwith affidavit on 15.01.2024, on the grounds that XXXX is cousin sister of accused Rishab Walia/respondent no. 2 herein. Further stated therein that Vinod Walia (i.e. father of accused Rishab Walia) on the Bhog ceremony of death of his brother namely Anil Walia on 20-12-2023, where XXXX took leave from the Court and attended the rites which taken place at their native place Fatehpur Pundri (Kaithal). Anil Walia was the real brother of Vinod Walia and was the son of the maternal uncle of Mr. Shyam Walia, who is father of X X X X, Judge. All these Walia families are residents of Fatehpur Pundri, District Kaithal.

4. That aforesaid complaint was referred to Ld. District and Session Judge, Ambala for inquiry, in which, several respectable persons from Fatehpur Pundri were called to join inquiry who submitted their affidavit and also recorded their statements to the effect that father of accused namely Vinod Walia is real Bua's son of Sh. Shyam Walia who is father of XXXX, Judge.

Thereafter, the said inquiry report conducted by Ld. District and Session Judge, Ambala sent to the concerned office/branch of this Hon'ble Court.

5. That in order to get said inquiry report, petitioner filed RTI Applications before RTI Branch of this Hon'ble Court vide application dated 05.07.2024 and 11.07.2024 respectively, however, same has not been provided by sending the reply to the effect that the complaint of the petitioner is pending consideration in which, no final order has been passed yet.”

Secondly, it has been urged that the concerned Magistrate has erred in granting regular bail to the respondent No.2 in the factual matrix of the FIR in question. It has been argued that the concerned Magistrate has held that the Section 195-A of Cr.P.C. is a procedural Section but, actually, the offence invoked against the petitioner is under the said Section 195-A of IPC, which is a substantive offence by itself. Learned counsel has further urged that respondent No.2 (herein) ought not to have been granted regular bail, especially at that stage, since the investigation of the FIR in question was still in progress at that juncture & release of respondent No.2 on regular bail has effectively jeopardized the investigation. It has been further urged that the repeated threat(s) are being extended to the petitioner at the instance of the respondent No.2 (herein), on which ground alone, the regular bail afforded to the respondent No.2 (herein) deserves to be cancelled.

On the strength of these submissions, learned counsel has entreated for cancellation/setting-aside of the regular bail granted to respondent No.2 (herein) as also for undertaking suitable action(s) against the concerned Magistrate.

5. Upon being called, the State has filed reply dated 25.11.2024 delineating therein the factual aspect(s) of the *lis*. Thereafter, a compliance report dated 19.05.2025 by way of affidavit of Suresh Kumar, Deputy

Superintendent of Police, Barara, District Ambala has been filed by the State of Haryana, relevant whereof reads thus:

“8. That on perusal of the contents of the statements made by the witnesses, it has been revealed that XXXX is the distant relative of Respondent no.2 Rishab Walia. Further on the basis of investigation and on perusal of the statements of the witnesses, it has been revealed that, "The elders of Reshab Waliai is son of Vinod Walia had come and settled in village Fatehpur district Kaithal from village Ghannaura district Baghpat (UP) about 50-60 years ago and Reshab Walia son of Vinod Walia and his uncle Sushil Walia son late Ranjeet Singh have been living in Ambala city with their respective families for about 30-40 years from their village Fatehpur district Kaithal and XXXX (then JMICA Ambala) is daughter Shyam Lal of village Fatehpur district Kaithal and people of her family also live in this village. And Reshabh Walia's family is from Gotra Bhulla and XXXX family is Suliyan. From the families of both sides, XXXX and Reshabh Walia are not real brothers and sisters, and XXXX grandmother is the aunt of Reshabh Walia's father Vinod Walia in long term relations, whereas XXXX and Reshabh Walia are not real brothers and sisters but are distant relatives (cousins)”

Learned State counsel has raised submissions in tandem with the above reply and compliance report.

6. Upon being called upon, an affidavit dated 16.09.2025 has been filed by respondent No.2, in response to the petition, relevant whereof reads thus:

“4. That in compliance with the aforesaid order, I most respectfully submit that I am not related in any manner whatsoever to X X X X, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambala, who had granted bail to me vide order dated 31.12.2023 in FIR No.485 dated 26.12.2023.

5. That I further submit that I have been born and brought up at Ambala City and have been residing here for the last 40 years with my family, and I have no link, connection, or relationship of any kind with the said Judicial Officer.

6. That the affidavit submitted by the petitioner and the state is false and concocted.”

Raising submissions in tandem with the said affidavit, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 has urged that the regular bail has been afforded to respondent No.2 (herein) on merits of the *lis* and the same ought not to be interfered by this Court. Learned counsel has urged that the respondent No.2 (herein) has been falsely implicated into the *FIR in question*. Learned counsel has further urged that, in any case, pursuant to the regular bail having been granted *vide impugned order*, investigation into the *FIR in question* stands culminated and challan (charge-sheet) has been filed and trial is underway. Learned counsel has urged that there is no specific/clear instance of respondent No.2 having misused the concession of regular bail. Further, learned counsel has urged that respondent No.2 (herein) is not a relative of the *concerned Magistrate* who has afforded the concession of regular bail to him. On the strength of these submissions, dismissal of the present petition is entreated for.

7. Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to record herein that this Court had, *vide order* dated 06.11.2025, elicited (in sealed cover) comments from the *concerned Magistrate* & had also asked the Registrar - General of this Court to produce (in sealed cover) the proceedings/status of any inquiry being conducted on the administrative side by this Court regarding the complaint etc. made by the petitioner (herein). The comments from the *concerned Magistrate* as also the details of the inquiry on the administrative side were received (in sealed cover) and the same have been perused by this Court and thereafter resealed.

8. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have perused the record with their assistance.

9. The prime issue for determination in the petition in hand is as to whether the *impugned order*, vide which the respondent No.2 (herein) was afforded the concession of regular bail, ought to be quashed/set-aside.

10. The *first* aspect of the *lis* in hand which is required to be delved into is the rival submissions regarding the *concerned Magistrate*, who has afforded regular bail to the respondent No.2 (herein), being a relative of the said respondent No.2. This aspect of the *lis* merits exacting scrutiny because of it being of the gravest jurisprudential import, inasmuch as it directly implicates aspersions of judicial bias/prejudice, which strike at the very root of the administration of justice and the fundamental principle(s) of judicial impartiality.

10.1. The constitution of judiciary as a distinct, separate and a vital third pillar organ of the State is premised upon the climactic objective of serving a paramount purpose, to provide a dispassionate and neutral forum for the adjudication and definitive resolution of *lis* before it. The constitution of Judiciary, as a distinct/separate organ is the *linchpin* of the rule of law, ensuring that the adjudication is done *sine ira et studio* i.e. without anger and passion and is inherently free from any taint of biasness or personal predilection. The '*principle of neutrality*' is so profound, that it constitutes one of the two cardinal tenets of Natural Justice (*audi alteram partem* being the other), which finds its most eloquent reflection in the legal maxim *Nemo Debet Esse Judex in Propria Causa* i.e. no man ought to be a Judge in his own cause.

A Judge having personal stake/interest in the subject matter or the outcome, howsoever small, is viewed by the law with inherent suspicion, as it adversely compromises the integrity of judicial process. For

example if a person holding the scales (of justice) has a finger on one of the pans, the weighing process is not only flawed but is rendered a legal nullity and the decision so arrived at is *non est* in law. The Judge, must at all times, be a figure beyond all reasonable reproach, demonstrating an absolute lack of interest in the subject matter as well as the result/outcome. Pertinently the evolution and expansion of this *rule against bias* have been assiduously chronicled in a Three Bench *dicta* of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in a case titled as ***Krishnadatt Awasthy vs. State of M.P., 2025(7) SCC 545***, relevant whereof reads as under:

“25. *The principle of nemo iudex causa sua found its origin in English law. In Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal, (1852) 3 HLC 759, the House of Lords in a case concerning pecuniary interest observed that the rule against bias extends not only to actual bias but also to the appearance of bias. This principle was later extended to other forms of interest in R v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 KB 256 where it was held that ‘even a suspicion that there has been improper interference with the course of justice’, would lead to the vitiation of proceedings. Lord Hewart noted that it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. Lord Denning in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) v Lannon, (1969) 1 QB 577 noted that, ‘if right minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a ‘real likelihood of bias’ on his part, he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision does not stand’. It was further held that ‘there must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or chairman as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side at the expense of the other.’*

26. *The emphasis on ‘likely or probable’ as noted by Lord Denning, was considered in R v Gough¹⁵ (for short “Gough”) where the Court shifted the focus to the possibility of bias rather than its probability. The test articulated in Gough(supra), was whether there was a ‘real danger of bias’ rather than a ‘real likelihood’ of bias. It prioritised the court’s assessment of bias over the perception of a fair-minded and informed observer emphasising that the court ‘personifies the reasonable man’. This test was criticised in other common law jurisdictions for veering*

away from the public perception of bias. The House of Lords modified the said test in Porter v Magill, (2002) 1 All ER 465 and pronounced as under:

“The Court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased, it must then ask whether those circumstances would lead to a fair minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the Tribunal was biased.””

10.2 This principle has been given statutory imprimatur by the legislature as contained in Section 479 Cr.P.C./525 BNSS, which explicitly proscribes a Judge/Magistrate from presiding over a case in which he/she possesses personal/proprietary interest.

Section 479 of Cr.P.C., 1973 reads thus:

“479. Case in which Judge or Magistrate is personally interested. — *No Judge or Magistrate shall, except with the permission of the Court to which an appeal lies for his Court, try or commit for trial any case to or in which he is a party, or personally interested, and no Judge or Magistrate shall hear an appeal from any judgment or order passed or made by himself.*

Explanation.— A Judge or Magistrate shall not be deemed to be a party to, or personally interested in, any case by reason only that he is concerned therein in a public capacity, or by reason only that he has viewed the place in which an offence is alleged to have been committed or any other place in which any other transaction material to the case is alleged to have occurred and made an inquiry in connection with the case.”

This statutory provision has been retained, in *verbatim*, in BNSS of 2023 *albeit* as Section 525 thereof.

Pertinently, the statutory proscription contained in Section 479 Cr.P.C/525 BNSS, is with respect to the stage of committal for trial and trial only, however, the same ought to be interpreted as a reflection of the legislative intent to give statutory force to the cardinal legal maxim *nemo judex causa sua*. The proscription, therefore, will apply with equal vigour

and uncompromising strictness to all the proceedings, inquiries, process conducted under the code, including the bail proceedings.

11. The credibility of justice administration system and judicial institutions is premised not merely on the effective enforcement of letter of law, but also on the fact that judicial process is inherently fair and is devoid not only of any prejudice(s)/bias but also of any perception of prejudice(s)/bias. This philosophy is captured in the immortal observation of Lord Chief Justice Hewart in the landmark case of *R v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy*, [1924] 1 KB 256:

‘Justice must not only be done, but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’

The trust and fidelity of common populace in the functioning of judicial institutions is the non-negotiable lifeblood of the justice delivery system, *sine qua non* for which is, that the adjudication/outcome is perceptibly free from even a shadow of prejudice/bias. The *litmus test* for bias hinges on an objective standard: Whether a right-minded/reasonable individual, fully apprised of the facts, would come to a conclusion that, due to any pecuniary/personal interest either in the subject matter or the outcome, there existed a *‘real likelihood/apprehension of bias’* on the judge’s part. If this *‘real likelihood/apprehension of bias’* is shown to exist; even if the decision were otherwise factually accurate and legally impeccable; the consequent adjudication is deemed vitiated *in toto*, and stands *non est* in law. *Ergo*, it is the taint of perceived partiality/bias/prejudice and not necessarily the existence of actual judicial malice which acts as the fatal flaw.

While ruminating a claim of bias/prejudice, a Judge must assess, not only his/her subjective capacity to remain uninfluenced but also critically gauge the objective perception of impartiality that his involvement casts upon the proceedings. To fail this latter test, is to risk eroding the public confidence in the justice administration system, an outcome, far graver than a mere procedural error. As to the determination of the likelihood of bias, what is relevant is the *'reasonableness of the apprehension of bias/prejudice'* in that regard in the mind of a reasonable man. The proper approach for a judge is not to undertake a subjective self-assessment of their own state of mind; i.e. asking, *"Am I biased?"*, but rather to apply an objective test that considers the perspective of the litigants or the public. The focus must be on whether, having regard to all the circumstances, a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility or a reasonable apprehension of bias.

11.1. There is yet another *nay* momentous aspect of the matter which craves attention.

When the supervisory jurisdiction of a higher court is invoked through an aspersion of judicial bias/prejudice on the part of a presiding officer, it mandates the most exacting and objective scrutiny. The rigorous assessment is essential because while the protection of judicial impartiality is fundamental to the rule of law, judges especially the judicial officers must simultaneously be safeguarded against frivolous and factually unsupported imputations of biasness/prejudice. The High court must diligently ensure that a judicial officer is not compelled to succumb to duress from disgruntled litigants, deploying specious or calumnious accusations, as a means to manipulate the legal process or avoid an unfavorable outcome.

Thus, any plea asserting bias must be substantiated by concrete and cogent material, going far beyond a mere expressions of a litigant's unacceptability or unpalatability of a judicial decision, thereby precluding a fishing and roving inquiry in a presiding officer's motives. If an inquiry is initiated on such frivolous accusations, it will *well-nigh* yield anarchy in the adjudicatory process. The unscrupulous litigants will indulge themselves in Court/forum hunting which tendency needs to be curbed with an iron hand. If such latitude is to be allowed to the litigants, that they need not face the proceedings in a court they do not feel comfortable in, it would lead to an *infinite regress* to find a conducive one, by raising false aspersions on impartiality of the presiding officer. An age old adage, which met with approval from the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reads thus:

"...It has also to be remembered that the lower judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under a psychological pressure with all the contestants and their lawyers almost breathing down their necks-more correctly up to their nostrils. They do not have the benefit of a detached atmosphere of the higher courts to think coolly and decide patiently. Every error, however gross it may look, should not, therefore, be attributed to improper motive..."

12. The factual *milieu* of the case in hand; especially the specific stand of the petitioner that the *concerned Magistrate* is a relative of the respondent No.2 (herein) – accused, the compliance report dated 19.05.2025 filed by State of Haryana, the preliminary inquiry report by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Ambala (which has been produced before this Court in sealed cover) & the proceedings pertaining to inquiry on the administrative side of this Court (produced before this Court in sealed

cover) as well as the comments (produced before this Court in sealed cover) of the concerned Magistrate; indubitably tend to reflect that the *concerned Magistrate* and the respondent No.2 (herein) – accused are relatives, though apparently distant ones.

A fact that cannot be lost sight of is that a Judge/Magistrate may possess remote or highly attenuated collateral consanguinity with a litigant, the existence of which may remain genuinely unknown to the concerned Judge/Magistrate. Notwithstanding this *bona fide* ignorance, the threshold for evaluating the potential existence of perception of biasness/prejudice is the objective standard of the reasonably informed and prudent person. Where the Judge/Magistrate is conscious of or apprised of such a connection, which has the potential of creating apprehension of biasness/prejudice in the minds of a reasonable person, the paramount duty of judicial propriety compels an immediate and *sua sponte* exercise of recusal from the proceedings.

The peculiar factual conspectus of the case in hand as also the material available before this Court, unequivocally reflect that the *concerned Magistrate* was conscious of her consanguinity with the respondent No.2. When scrutinized through the objective of a prudent and reasonable individual, this factum inexorably leads to the conclusion that a manifest apprehension of partiality, constituting *bias-in-law*, is decipherable on part of the *concerned Magistrate*, rendering the *impugned Order*, untenable *ab initio*. The gravity of this legal infirmity is exacerbated by the fact that the *impugned Order* was pronounced by the *concerned Magistrate* while sitting in vacation roster. *Ergo*, in all the fairness, the *impugned order* deserves to be set-aside on this score.

13. The *second* aspect of the *lis* in hand as emerging from the submission of the rival counsel is as to whether the *impugned order* deserves to be set-aside/quashed on merits thereof.

13.1. There is no gainsaying that the cancellation/setting-aside of a bail order is conceptually different from the issue of grant of a bail. The Court dealing with the plea for cancellation/setting aside of bail, must adopt a posture of judicial deference by exercising restraint and reluctance to intercede with an order wherein the concession of bail has been extended. Only where a demonstrable and material contravention of the imposed condition(s) has been shown; or where the order *per se* is shown to be patently illegal, manifestly perverse, or predicated extraneous and irrelevant consideration; the order extending the concession of bail, ought to be interfered with. In the facts and circumstances of the case in hand; especially the nature of the offence(s) alleged against the respondent No.2 – accused as also the conspicuous absence of any substantial material hinting towards the respondent No.2 having misused the concession of bail; this Court does not find any good ground to interfere on merits of the *impugned order*. Further, the *impugned order* was passed on 31.12.2023 and thus the respondent No.2 – accused is on regular bail for the last about two years. The challan (charge-sheet) was presented *qua* the FIR in question on 27.08.2024, the concerned trial Court framed charges on 28.01.2025 and trial is stated to be undergoing. These factors, in favour of the respondent No.2, impels this Court not to interfere with the *impugned order* on this score.

14. In view of the above rumination, this Court finds that the *impugned order* must be set aside, solely, on account of it being tainted by

an inherent *bias-in-law*. Nevertheless, this Court cannot overlook the considerable lapse of time since the regular bail was granted to the respondent No.2. To now cancel the bail so granted, with *immediate effect*, would, in the considered view of this Court, constitute miscarriage of justice and would be incongruous with the broader cause of equity and fairness that the judicial system is bound to uphold. Keeping in view the entirety of the factual matrix of the case in hand, this Court is not inclined to *forthwith* set-aside/cancel the regular bail granted to respondent No.2- accused, especially at this stage.

15. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:

- (i) The *impugned order* is quashed and the regular bail granted to respondent No.2 (herein) is set-aside/cancelled.
- (ii) The respondent No.2 is directed to cause appearance before the CJM/Duty Magistrate, Ambala on or before 23.12.2025. He shall continue to remain on bail, on the bonds etc. furnished by him earlier, till 23.12.2025. In case he so causes appearance and files a plea for grant of regular bail, the same shall be positively decided on the same day. In case respondent No.2 does not so cause appearance, said CJM shall take requisite steps to secure his presence and send him to custody, as per law.
- (iii) The plea by the petitioner for taking suitable action(s) against the *concerned Magistrate* is declined, for the *nonce*, as the matter is being ruminated upon on the administrative side by this Court.

- (iv) This order shall not be construed to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the trial.
- (v) Pending application(s), if any, shall also be disposed of.

(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

December 12, 2025
Ajay

Whether speaking/reasoned:	Yes
Whether reportable:	Yes