



**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

**CRM-M-17026-2025 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 16.9.2025**

Himank

.....Petitioner

Versus

State of Haryana and another

.....Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH

Present: Mr. Amit Chadha, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Kunwar Ranjan, Advocate and
Mr. Atin Chadha, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Ms. Saumya Ahluwalia, Sr. DAG, Haryana.

Mr. Sukhdeep Singh, Advocate
for respondent No. 2.

KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)

1. The instant petition has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS 2023 seeking quashing of FIR No. 339 dated 24.10.2024, under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, registered at Police Station Sector-56, District Gurugram (Annexure P-1) and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

2. The brief factual matrix relevant and essential for disposal of the present petition, is that a complaint No. 3383 dated 16.9.2024 moved by the complainant-respondent was received at Police Station Dwarka, New Delhi, wherein it was alleged that in January 2021, the complainant met the petitioner and they became good friends. She accepted the marriage proposal of the petitioner, and she thus engaged in physical relationship with him. On 29.10.2023, the petitioner along with his mother and two sisters came at her residence for finalizing their marriage, and told them to make



necessary arrangements for the marriage in January 2024. It is alleged that the petitioner told her to book a five star venue for *roka* ceremony, and also that he demanded jewellery for himself and his family members. He further told her that minimum Rs. 50.00 lacs should be spent on the marriage. When the complainant apprised the petitioner about their financial condition, he proposed the postponement of the marriage to November 2024 for the reason that his maternal aunt had passed away in November 2023. After the *roka* ceremony, in the first week of August 2024, the petitioner after requesting the parents of the complainant, took her to Ayodhya, and yet again made physical relations with her. However shortly after, the petitioner told her that because the gifts given in the *roka* ceremony were not expensive enough, therefore his family was quarreling with him. It was also alleged therein that a demand of an XUV-700 car was also raised by the petitioner. Thereafter on 01.9.2024, the petitioner informed her that his family was against their union, and he called off the marriage. On the basis of the above said complaint, a ZERO FIR was registered at Police Station Dwarka, Delhi. However, since the alleged occurrence pertained to District Gurugram, therefore, the said complaint was forwarded to District Gurugram, whereafter the present FIR was registered.

Submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner

3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case by the complainant to wreck vengeance, as her marriage with the petitioner which was scheduled for November 2024, was called off. It is submitted that the petitioner is a B-Tech Graduate, and was working as a Senior Manager at Pristyn Care Company, Gurugram in November 2020.



The complainant joined the said company in January 2021 as a Business Development Manager and she was reporting directly to the petitioner. After a few months, the parties developed a liking for each other, and started engaging in physical relations. It is highlighted by the learned senior counsel that at no point in time, any false assurance was given by the petitioner to the complainant for this purpose. Everything happened with the mutual consent of both the parties. Further, the explicit whatsapp chats (Annexure P-11) clearly show that it was the complainant who insisted upon the physical relations, and by no stretch of imagination can it be presumed from a perusal of the whatsapp chats that there was any kind of coercion or pressure upon the complainant.

4. Subsequently, talks of marriage of the two started. However, neither the petitioner nor his family members ever demanded any dowry. Rather the petitioner was financially supporting the complainant, who had left her job, and on numerous occasions gave money to the complainant in cash as well as through online transactions. The petitioner even paid the premium of Rs. 51,000/- of the health insurance policy of the parents of the complainant, and bore the expenses of dinner at their *roka* ceremony amounting to Rs. 50,000/-. Throughout the period of their relationship, the petitioner gave many gifts to the complainant, including airpods, phone, bags etc. besides cash, which shows the earnestness of the petitioner and his clean intentions. Copies of the screenshots of UPI transactions, insurance policy along with corresponding bank statement of the petitioner are annexed with the instant petition as Annexures P-2 to P-5.



5. In fact, at the time of the *roka* ceremony i.e. on 21.7.2024, the petitioner's family gave one gold diamond pendant set with tops and chain costing to Rs. 3,00,000/-, one bag worth Rs. 12,000/-, and cash of Rs. 15,000/-, among other gift items to the complainant's family, which are still lying in their possession. Reliance in this regard has been placed on Annexure P-6. It is submitted that subsequently, the complainant started putting pressure on the petitioner to separate from his family after marriage, to which the petitioner flatly refused. Ultimately due to irreconcilable temperamental differences, the family of the petitioner decided to call off the wedding, whereupon the petitioner was abused by the complainant and her brother. Subsequently, the present FIR was lodged by the complainant against the petitioner, wherein vide order dated 18.11.2024, the petitioner was granted the concession of anticipatory bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram.

6. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel that the petitioner had already paid the booking amount for the marriage, which was to be solemnized in November 2024 at Radisson Blu Hotel, New Delhi, among other things. It is submitted that the payment receipts, including that of booking make-up services, clearly show that the petitioner had the *bona fide* intention of marrying the complainant, which unfortunately had to be called off only due to fundamental disagreements and incompatible viewpoints between the parties. In conclusion, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel that there is no evidence on record that even remotely suggests that the relations between the petitioner and the complainant were made under the false promise of marriage. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 376(2)(n) IPC having not



been made out, continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner would tantamount to a gross abuse of process of law. In support of the submissions, reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in cases titled as (i) ***Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani versus State of U.T. and another, SLP (Crl.) No. 11642 of 2019*** (ii) ***Deepak Gulati versus State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675***, (iii) ***Sheikh Arif versus State of Maharashtra and another (2024) 4 SCC 463*** and (iv) ***Uday versus State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639***. Therefore, it is prayed that the instant petition be allowed and the present FIR be quashed.

**Submissions made by the learned State counsel as well as the counsel
for the complainant-respondent No. 2**

7. Per contra, the learned State counsel as also learned counsel for complainant-respondent No. 2 have vehemently opposed the present petition, since serious and specific allegations have been levelled against the petitioner. Learned State counsel submits that investigation is complete, and final report under Section 193(3) BNSS against the present petitioner stands presented before the learned Court concerned.

8. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 submits that the petitioner has deliberately concealed and suppressed the material facts. The petitioner since 2021, had exploited and repeatedly sexually assaulted respondent No. 2 on the false pretext of marriage, and induced her into an intimate relationship. In fact, the petitioner even humiliated respondent No. 2 on account of her physique, and also compelled her to leave her job in October 2023. Thereafter on 29.10.2023, the petitioner and his family members visited the house of respondent No. 2 for finalizing their marriage. However, they raised unreasonable and unlawful demands



pertaining to *roka* ceremony to which the family of respondent No. 2 had to concede. In compliance of the said demands, they even booked Polo Farms at New Delhi, for which an advance payment of Rs. 75,000/- was made. Reliance in this regard has been placed on Annexure R-2/1. Throughout the said relationship, the petitioner kept giving false reassurances to respondent No. 2 that he would marry her, however, when it came to taking any action, the petitioner kept dilly-dallying, but continued making physical relations with her. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner never intended to marry respondent No. 2, and even the talks of marriage and the small ceremonies performed were for show. Rather, after their *roka* ceremony, the petitioner started avoiding her, and ultimately called off the marriage by citing baseless and frivolous reasons, despite having no objections throughout their relationship.

9. It is submitted that the allegations levelled against the petitioner are grave and specific, substantiated with documentary evidence. All the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner herein are disputed question of facts, which can be determined only after the evidence is produced before the learned trial Court. It is, therefore, prayed that the present petition be dismissed

Inference(s) of this Court

10. Heard learned counsel on either side and perused the judicial record with their able assistance.

11. On 25.8.2025, respondent No. 2 appeared in person before the Court. Upon being suggested by the Court regarding exploring the possibility of mediation, respondent No. 2 expressed her unwillingness qua the same unequivocal terms.



12. Before proceeding to make an adjudication upon the present petition, it would be apposite to first discuss the dictum of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments dealing with the offence of establishing physical relations on the false pretext of marriage.

13. The Apex Court in case titled as '***Amol Bhagwal Nehul versus State of Maharashtra and another***', ***SLP (Crl.) No. 10044 of 2024***, has held as under-

“8. Having heard both sides in this case and after carefully considering the material on record, the following attributes come to the fore:

(a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear from the record that the consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 was obtained against her will and merely on an assurance to marry. The Appellant and the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 were acquainted since 08.06.2022, and she herself admits that they interacted frequently and fell in love. The Complainant/Respondent no. 2 engaged in a physical relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so without her consent, however she not only sustained her relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit him in lodges on two separate occasions. The narrative of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate with her conduct.

(b) The consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 as defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said to have been obtained under a misconception of fact. There is no material to substantiate “inducement or misrepresentation” on the part of the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise. Investigation has also revealed that the Khulanama, was executed on 29.12.2022 which the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had obtained from her ex-husband. During this time, the parties were already in a relationship and the alleged incident had already taken place. It is inconceivable that the Complainant had engaged in a physical relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of marriage, while she was already married to someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the Appellant.

(c) x x x x

(d) x x x x



9. *In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a folly³ to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC.*

10. *As demonstrated hereinabove, the ingredients of the offence under Sections 376 (2)(n) or 506 IPC are not established. The present case squarely falls under categories enumerated in Para 102(5) & 102(7) as identified by this Court in State of Haryana Vs Bhajan Lal (supra) for the exercise of powers u/s 482 CrPC by the High Court so as to prevent the abuse of process of law. Para 102 reads as under:*

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.



(3) *Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.*

(4) *Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.*

(5) *Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.*

(6) *Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.*

(7) *Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”*

11. *Taking into consideration that the Appellant is just 25 years of age, and has a lifetime ahead of him, it would be in the interest of justice that he does not suffer an impending trial and, therefore, the proceedings emanating from C.R. No. 490/2023 dt. 31.07.2023 are quashed at this stage itself.”*

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘**Nitin B. Nikhare versus the State of Maharashtra**’, **SLP (Crl.) No. 1889 of 2024**, has observed as under-

“5. On the other hand, the prosecution’s case is that the prosecutrix entered into a sexual relationship with the appellant solely for the reason that he had promised to marry her and this relationship continued for some time and was broken when the promise of marriage was not fulfilled. In other words, the main allegation of



the prosecutrix is that had it not been for the promise of marriage made by the appellant she would have never entered into a physical relationship with him and considering that this was done by cheating, the same amounts to rape.

6. *This Court in a catena of judgments has held that the mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. In order for the offence of rape to be made out, two conditions need to be satisfied i.e. that the promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that the false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.*

7. *From a perusal of the record, it is clear that this was a case of a consensual relationship from the beginning. Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted, it does not appear that the initial promise to marry was in bad faith. It was only the subsequent circumstances that prevented fulfilment of alleged false promise to marry. Resultantly, the relationship turned sour which has given rise to the present FIR. Further, in view of the material on record, we do not see this as a case where provisions of [Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes \(Prevention of Atrocities\) Act](#) can be attracted.*

8. *Hence, the entire criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant are nothing but an abuse of the process of law. In our opinion the High Court should have exercised its inherent power under [Section 482](#) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the proceedings.”*

15. Likewise, while making a reference to its previous judicial pronouncements, the Apex Court in the case of ‘**Rajnish Singh @ Soni versus State of U.P. and another**’, **SLP (Crl.) No. 8549 of 2023**’ concluded that unless it can be proved that the physical relationship culminated purely on the basis of an explicit promise of marriage, uninfluenced by any other factor, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact. The relevant paras of the said



judgment read thus-

“26. In the case of **Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra**, this Court held that to make a man, accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage, criminally liable, the physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and it must not be qualified by other circumstances or consideration. In a situation where the woman knowingly maintains the physical relationship for a prolonged period, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of alleged promise made by the accused to marry her.

27. In conclusion, the Court held that unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage and without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact. It was further held that even if it is assumed that a false promise of marriage was made to the complainant initially by the accused, the fact that the relationship continued for a period of nine long years would render the plea of the complainant that her consent for all these years was under misconception of the fact that the accused would marry her implausible.

28. In the case of **Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi)**, this Court observed that it is inconceivable that the complainant would continue to meet the accused or maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with him in the absence of voluntary consent on her part.

29. Testing the facts of the case at hand, on the touchstone of the above precedents, it is clear that the complainant, being a highly qualified major woman continued in a consensual intimate sexual relationship with the appellant over a period of 16 years. At some point in time, the relationship went sour leading to the filing of the FIR. No reasonable man would accept the version that the complainant allowed the accused to establish sexual relations with her over a period of 16 years purely under the misconception of marriage.

x x x x x

34. It is trite that there is a distinction between rape and consensual intercourse. This Court in **Deepak Gulati v. State of**



Haryana, differentiated between a mere breach of promise and not fulfilling a false promise and held that an accused will only be liable if the Courts concludes that his intentions are mala fide and he has clandestine motives. The relevant extract is reproduced hereinbelow: -

“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

...

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. [Section 90 IPC](#) cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very



beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (emphasis supplied)

35. *It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.*

36. *This Court in **Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka**, had quashed criminal proceedings on the ground that it is difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship, which continued for eight years, as ‘rape’ especially when the complainant therein had alleged that they lived together as man and wife. The relevant extract is reproduced hereinbelow: -*

“4. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is difficult to sustain the charges levelled against the appellant who may have possibly, made a false promise of marriage to the complainant. It is, however, difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight years, as “rape” especially in the face of the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as man and wife.” (emphasis supplied)

37. *Thus, by no stretch of imagination, can this Court be convinced that present is a case wherein the appellant is liable to be prosecuted for having sexually exploited/assaulted the complainant based on a false promise of marriage. The allegations of the complainant are full of material contradictions and are ex facie unbelievable. Throughout the prolonged period of 16 years, the complainant kept completely quiet about the alleged sexual abuse, meted out to her by the appellant until she learnt that the appellant had married another woman. Further in complete contradiction to the case setup in the FIR, the complainant has on many occasions portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant and thus, evidently, they lived together as man and wife. Additionally, the long gap of 16 years between the first alleged act of sexual intercourse, continued relations for one and a half decade till the filing of the FIR convinces us that it is a clear case of a love affair/live in relationship gone sour.”*

16. A gainful reference can also be made to the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘**Jothiragawan versus State REP. By the**



Inspector of the Police and another’, SLP (Crl.) No. 6821 of 2024,

wherein it was held that-

“11. We have already found that there is no promise of marriage to coerce consent from the victim for sexual intercourse; as forthcoming from the statements made by the victim. The promise if any was after the first physical intercourse and even later the allegation was forceful intercourse without any consent. In all the three instances it was the allegation that, the intercourse was on threat and coercion and there is no consent spoken of by the victim, in which case there cannot be any inducement found, on a promise held out. The allegation of forceful intercourse on threat and coercion is also not believable, given the relationship admitted between the parties and the willing and repeated excursions to hotel rooms.

12. On a reading of the statements made by the victim before the Police, both the First Information Statement and that recorded later on, we are not convinced that the sexual relationship admitted by both the parties was without the consent of the victim. That they were closely related and were in a relationship is admitted by the victim. The allegation is also of threat and coercion against the victim, to have sexual intercourse with the accused, which even as per the victim’s statement was repeated thrice in the same manner, when she willingly accompanied the accused to a hotel room. The victim had also categorically stated that after the first incident and the second incident she was mentally upset, but that did not caution her from again accompanying the accused to hotel rooms.

13. Having heard both sides in this case, we have absolutely no doubt in our mind that the criminal proceedings initiated against the present appellant are nothing but an abuse of process of the court. This is precisely a case where the High Court should have interfered in exercise of its inherent and extraordinary powers under [Section 482](#) of the Cr.P.C. These proceedings cannot go on. Hence, we direct that the proceedings initiated at the instance of the complainant which are presently going on before Sessions Judge (Mahila Court), Erode in S.C. No. 49 of 2022, be hereby quashed.”



17. The settled position of law, as can be evinced from a perusal of the afore referred judicial pronouncements, is that for attracting the offence of rape on the ground that consent was obtained on a false pretext of marriage, it must be established that the sexual relationship between the parties had been induced by a false promise of marriage from the very inception, and that the accused never had any intention of marrying the complainant. Similarly, for the mere reason that the relationship between a consenting couple could not culminate into marriage, cannot be made the basis of instituting criminal proceedings against a person. Trite to say that the Courts must, in each such case, carefully scrutinize whether the accused had the intention to actually marry the victim, or had made the false promise only with the *malafide* to satisfy his desire.

18. Reverting to the case in hand, it is the admitted position that the parties were in a long standing consensual relationship, and talks of marriage between their families also took place, subsequent to which even a roka ceremony was performed on 21.7.2024. The date of marriage between the parties was also fixed for November 2024. However, the same could not fructify due to irreconcilable differences that cropped up between the two sides. It is the case of respondent No. 2 that during the continuance of their relationship i.e. from August 2021 till August 2024, the petitioner, on numerous occasions, had established physical relations with her on the false pretext of marriage. However, respondent No. 2 has failed to bring on record any evidence, to prove that the relation between the two was not consensual, or that there was any intention of the petitioner to deceive respondent No. 2 into making physical relations with him on the false pretext of marriage. It is clear from the judicial record that the relationship between the petitioner and respondent No. 2, both well educated and mature adults, was consensual



from its very inception. Even if the case of respondent No. 2 is, *arguendo*, accepted, it does not appear that the promise to marry made by the petitioner was in bad faith. In fact, the parties were all set to get married, which unfortunately could not take place, leading to the relations between the parties and their families turning bitter, and the subsequent registration of the instant FIR. The present case is a classic example when criminal colour is given to a situation where a consensual relationship does not turn out in the manner desired by one party, which cannot be permitted to continue by the Courts, since the same tantamounts to gross abuse of process of law.

19. In view of the foregoing analysis of the facts of the present case done in light of the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court contained herein above, this Court deems this a fit case warranting the quashing of the present FIR and the resultant proceedings emanating therefrom against the petitioner.

20. As a corollary, the present petition stands allowed. FIR No. 339 dated 24.10.2024, under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, registered at Police Station Sector-56, District Gurugram (Annexure P-1), and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed qua the petitioner.

21. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

(KIRTI SINGH)
JUDGE

September 16, 2025
Gurpreet Singh

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No