

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MP (M) No. 2606 of 2025

Reserved on: 25.2.2026

Date of Decision: 3.3.2026.

Jai Chand

...Petitioner

Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh

...Respondent

Coram

Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.

For the Petitioner : Mr Prashant Sharma,
Advocate.

For the Respondent/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 47 of 2025, dated 6.4.2025, registered at Police Station, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act), 1985.

¹ Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2. It has been asserted that the police arrested the petitioner on 6.4.2025 for the possession of 1.853 kilograms of charas. The allegations against the petitioner are false. The prosecution has not collected any evidence to connect him to the commission of crime. The investigation is complete, and the charge sheet has been filed before the Court on 19.8.2025. The trial is likely to take some time to conclude, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police were checking the vehicles at Parsola on 5.4.2025 at 8.20 PM. They signalled the driver of the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-92A-0203 to stop. The driver stopped the vehicle. The person sitting beside the driver tried to conceal something after seeing the police. The police became suspicious and associated Pankaj Kumar as an independent witness. The driver identified himself as Dupal Singh, and the person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Jai Chand (the present petitioner). The police searched the vehicle and

recovered four packets wrapped with khaki tape. The police checked the packets and found 1.853 kilograms of charas. The police seized the charas and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. As per the report of analysis, the recovered substance was confirmed to be an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 4.6.2025, and the case was listed for consideration on 25.11.2025. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence if released on bail and would intimidate the witnesses. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

4. I have heard Mr Prashant Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

5. Mr Prashant Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The petitioner was not aware of the contents of the packets. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in *Amar Nath Vs. State of H.P. 2025:HHC:22851* in support of his submission.

6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was present in the vehicle from which the recovery of a commercial quantity of charas was made. The rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case, and the petitioner has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Pinki v. State of U.P.*, (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: -

(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

56. In *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be

liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

8. *Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, "The Criminal Prosecution in England" (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]*

9. *Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance." (emphasis supplied)*

57. In *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

"8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable

apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

58. This Court in *Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh*, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)

59. In *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan*, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the

case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

60. In *Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee*, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

“9. ... It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

- (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;*
- (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;*
- (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;*
- (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;*
- (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;*
- (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;*
- (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and*
- (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)*

XXXXXXXX

62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is *Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar*, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (*Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar*, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and *Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar*, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (*Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar*, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170], SCC p. 511, para 35)

“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.”
(emphasis supplied)

9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

10. The status report shows that the petitioner was found sitting on the passenger seat. He tried to conceal

something after seeing the police, which led to the search of the vehicle and recovery of the charas. *Prima facie*, the conduct of the petitioner in pushing the contraband after seeing the police shows that he was aware of the contents of the packets, and that is why he had tried to conceal them after seeing the police. Further, he was travelling in the vehicle from which the recovery was effected. In *Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874*, the contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed:

“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle.

20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession.

21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.

22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term that assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the *Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52]* to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes.

23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.

24. As noted in *Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194: 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756]*, possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control.

25. The word “possession” means the legal right to possession (see *Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)]*). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See *Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966: (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)]*.)

26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.

27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been

established. It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”

11. Therefore, *prima facie*, the petitioner was in possession of the charas, and the burden would shift upon him to show that his possession was not conscious as per Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act.

12. In *Amar Nath* (supra), the petitioner was driving the taxi and the recovery was effected from the luggage of the passenger. This Court held that a taxi driver cannot be held liable for the possession of the contraband by the passenger. In the present case, the vehicle was not a taxi, and the conduct of the petitioner, *prima facie*, shows his involvement. Therefore, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case.

13. The police had recovered 1.853 kilograms of charas, which is a commercial quantity. Hence, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case.

14. Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It reads as follows:

“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. –

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—

(a) Every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable.

(b) No person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19, section 24, or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond unless—

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.”

15. This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another* (2018) 13 SCC 738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was observed:

“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain offences enumerated under the said Section. They are:

- (1) In the case of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 19,
- (2) Under Section 24,
- (3) Under Section 27A and
- (4) offences involving a commercial quantity.

8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment.

- (1) The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such an offence;
- (2) that person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.”

16. This position was reiterated in *State of Kerala Versus Rajesh*, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:

“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the application for bail moved by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In *Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors.*, (1999) 9 SCC 429, it has been elaborated as under: -

"7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused commits the murder of

one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in *Durand Didier vs Chief Secy. Union Territory of Goa*, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:

24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and a deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine.

8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless

the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely,

(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and

(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended."

20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the commission of an offence under the Act unless the two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application, and the second is that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail operates.

21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The

reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case at hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that, in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”

17. A similar view was taken in *Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan*, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:

“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are:

- (i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and
- (ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of such an offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe” that the person is *not* guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court in *Shiv Shanker Kesari* [*Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari*, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)

“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The expression means something more than *prima facie* grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the

accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief contemplated, in turn, points to the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged.

8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.

‘7. ... *Stroud's Judicial Dictionary*, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.’

[See *MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497]*, SCC p. 504, para 7 and *Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532]*]

10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not, which depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See *Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]*

11. The court, while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not

called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.” (emphasis supplied)

23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has *not* committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.”

18. It was held in *Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346*, that bail cannot be granted without complying with the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed:

4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which, *inter alia*, provides that no person accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid down therein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application; and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any such offence while on bail.

15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is reproduced hereinbelow:—

“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable.-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)-

(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable.

(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A, and also for offences involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.”

16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no person accused of an offence involving trade in a commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released on bail unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

19. It was held in *State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo*, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was observed:

“5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1) (b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus:—

“37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.”

6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing the said enactment after repealing the then-existing laws relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in the acts themselves read thus:—

“An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected therewith.”

In the decision in *Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadaliev Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549*, the three-judge bench of this Court considered the provisions under Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used therein. This Court held that it means something more than the *prima facie* grounds and that it contemplates substantial and probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the provision would require the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify

satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence.

As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b) (ii) of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail it was held therein that they are cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the 'reasonable grounds', as referred to above.

7. In the decision in *State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC 122*, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by this Court to be followed while considering an application for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act. Further, it was held that in case one of the two conditions thereunder is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would operate.

8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the consistent view of this Court that while considering the application for bail made by an accused involved in an offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is a *sine qua non* for granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act, cannot be avoided while passing orders on such applications.”

20. In the present case, the petitioner was *prima facie* found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas. There is nothing on record to show that he would not indulge in the

commission of an offence if released on bail. Hence, he has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act and is not entitled to bail.

21. It was submitted that the bail is a Rule and Jail is an exception, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner, as he is *prima facie* involved in the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act involving the commercial quantity. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif*, (2024) 11 SCC 372: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3848 that in cases under the NDPS Act involving the commercial quantity, the negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception. It was observed at page 381:

“Compliance with the mandate under Section 37

9. There has been a consistent and persistent view of this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence is punishable with a minimum sentence of ten years, the accused shall generally not be released on bail. *Negation of bail is the rule, and its grant is an exception.* While considering the application for bail, the court has to bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are mandatory in nature. The recording of findings as mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the said Act.”

22. No other point was urged.

23. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

24. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge

3rd March, 2026
(Chander)