

  
**HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN**  
**BENCH AT JAIPUR**

S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17624/2025

Professor Ramesh Chandra S/o Shri Sunder Lal, Aged about 68 years, R/o Vice Chancellor House, Maharaja Surajmal Brij University, Chak Sakitara, Kumher, District Bharatpur (Rajasthan).

----Petitioner

Versus

1. The Chancellor, Maharaja Suraj Mal Brij University, Bharatpur, Address Governor House, Civil Lines, Jaipur (Rajasthan).
2. State of Rajasthan, through Chief Secretary, Government of Rajasthan, Government Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj).

----Respondents

---

For Petitioner	:	Major R.P. Singh Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ashish Poonia Advocate, Ms. Aanchal S. Rathore Advocate, Ms. Rituraj Kaur Bhullar Advocate & Mr. Prashant Chandra Advocate.
For Respondents	:	Mr. Rajendra Prasad Senior Advocate (Advocate General) assisted by Mr. Tanmay Goyal Advocate, Mr. Sheetanshu Sharma Advocate, Ms. Harshita Thakral Advocate & Ms. Dhriti Laddha Advocate.

---

**HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA**

**Judgment**

**REPORTABLE**

<b>Date of conclusion of arguments</b>	<b>::</b>	<b>11.02.2026</b>
<b>Date on which judgment was reserved</b>	<b>::</b>	<b>11.02.2026</b>
<b>Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced</b>	<b>::</b>	<b>Full Judgment</b>
<b>Date of pronouncement</b>	<b>::</b>	<b>17.02.2026</b>

1. Petitioner has filed the present writ petition with following prayers :

*"It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct:  
(i) to declare the Sub Section (1) of Section 11A, MSBU Act, 2012 unconstitutional being vague, ambiguous, arbitrary, and conferring un-canalized power to the Chancellor to*

*remove a Vice-Chancellor in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India;*  
*(ii) to quash and set aside the impugned Order dated 11.11.2025 (Annexure-23) terminating the petitioner and directing the Respondents to allow the Petitioner to function on the post of Vice Chancellor, Maharaja Surajmal Brij University, Bharatpur with all consequential benefits*  
*(iii) also to quash and set aside the impugned Order dated 28.03.2025 (Annexure-1) suspending the petitioner and direct the Respondents to allow the Petitioner to function on the post of Vice Chancellor, Maharaja Surajmal Brij University, Bharatpur with all consequential benefits, and*  
*(iv) to pass any other appropriate order, direction in favor of the humble Petitioner in the interest of justice and in the circumstances of the present case."*

2. Since vires of Section 11-A (1) of the Maharaja Surajmal Brij University Act, 2012 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the MSBU Act, 2012') was also questioned by the petitioner, therefore, the writ petition was listed before the Division Bench of this court on 16.12.2025. However, during hearing before the Division Bench, the petitioner did not press his challenge to vires of Section 11-A (1) of the MSBU Act, 2012, therefore, the Division Bench passed following order:

*"Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner upon instructions submits that the challenge made in the present petition is vires to Section 11-A (1) of the Maharaja Surajmal Brij University Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as MSBU Act 2012) is not pressed.*  
*Considering that the order which is under challenge is to be examined by the Single Bench of this Court.*  
*The petition is therefore ordered to be listed before the Single Bench on 08.01.2026."*

3. Consequently, the matter was listed before the Single Bench for consideration of the challenge to the suspension order dated 28.03.2025 and the subsequent termination order dated 11.11.2025 passed by the Chancellor of the University. The petitioner further prayed for reinstatement with consequential benefits.

4. It has been contended by the petitioner in memo of writ petition that he was a distinguished biomedical scientist and academic administrator. After following the procedure

contemplated in Section 11 of the MSBU Act, 2012, on the basis of recommendation of selection committee followed by the consultation with the State Government, he was appointed as Vice-Chancellor of Maharaja Surajmal Brij University, Bharatpur (in short "MSBU") on 08.03.2023 issued by the Chancellor for a term of three years. During his tenure, acting upon State directives to verify credentials of affiliated colleges, petitioner constituted committees to inspect and review the status of certain colleges, including Shri Ganga Saran Women's College and S.N. College, Halena. The inspection and subsequent high-level committee reports found serious deficiencies in infrastructure and compliance and recommended for withholding or cancelling affiliation in accordance with the MSBU Act, 2012 and the MSBU (Affiliation of Colleges) Rules, 2015. Acting thereon, the University initiated de-affiliation proceedings.

5. Subsequently, complaints were made by representatives of the concerned colleges to the Hon'ble Governor/Chancellor. On 01.01.2025, the matter was referred to the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, who constituted a two-member committee, one member of which was alleged to have a conflict of interest. The petitioner objected to the constitution and jurisdiction of the said committee. Thereafter, on 07.03.2025, a four-member committee was constituted by the Chancellor under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 to inquire into complaints against the petitioner.

6. On 28.03.2025, the petitioner was placed under suspension by order of the Chancellor under Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 in consultation with the State Government. The

petitioner contended that no show cause notice or opportunity of hearing, as mandated by the proviso to Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012, was granted prior to suspension. He further alleged that no review of suspension was undertaken and even salary and emoluments of the petitioner during the suspension period were not released in terms of Section 11A(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012.

7. It is further contended by the petitioner that one enquiry report dated 11.06.2025 containing 87 pages was subsequently supplied to the petitioner, directing him to file his representation/ reply within a period of three days, however, on his request the time was further extended to 10 days. Thereafter, the petitioner filed detailed reply/ representation against the enquiry report raising objections with regard to procedure as well as explaining each and every point of the enquiry report. While the matter was pending and after the petitioner had filed a writ petition on 10.11.2025 challenging his suspension, he was served with order dated 11.11.2025, thereby removing him from the office of vice-chancellor.

8. The petitioner has challenged both suspension order dated 28.03.2025 and removal order dated 11.11.2025 on the grounds of violation of statutory procedure, breach of principles of natural justice, non-speaking order, suffering from malafides and colourable exercise of power and the petitioner pleaded infringement of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

9. In order to oppose the writ petition, the respondents filed reply to the writ petition categorically denying all the allegations and it was stated that the petitioner was appointed as

Vice Chancellor on 08.03.2023. Upon receipt of several complaints alleging serious financial irregularities and abuse of office, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, who submitted a report dated 05.03.2025 finding prima facie substance in the allegations. Consequently, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 28.03.2025 under Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 after consultation with the State Government.

10. Thereafter, a four-member committee constituted under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 conducted a detailed enquiry and submitted its report dated 11.06.2025, holding prima facie proved allegations relating to non-compliance with statutory provisions, misuse of university funds, irregular payments, overpayment to contractual employees, disobedience of State Government directions, favouritism in allocation of work, and violation of the Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement Rules, 2013. Copy of enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner and he was also afforded opportunity of personal hearing. His written reply as well as oral submissions were duly considered. The reply/ representation was further again sent for comments to the concerned Divisional Commissioner, who reiterated his findings in report dated 19.09.2025. While following the process, after consultation with the State Government, the Chancellor, in exercise of powers under Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012, passed order dated 11.11.2025 removing the petitioner from the post of Vice Chancellor. It is submitted that the removal order was passed strictly in accordance with statutory provisions and after full compliance with principles of natural

justice. The suspension order consequently ceased to operate being merged in the removal order.

11. The respondents in their reply denied the allegations that the removal was summary, arbitrary, non-speaking, or actuated by malice. It is contended that adequate opportunity of hearing was granted, the statutory procedure was followed, and the decision was based on material available on record. The petitioner's claim for salary beyond subsistence allowance during suspension is stated to be untenable.

12. Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that the impugned termination order is ex facie illegal, arbitrary and violative of statutory safeguards embodied under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012. It was emphasised by the learned Senior Counsel that that the present writ petition raises issues of grave constitutional and statutory importance touching upon the autonomy of a statutory University, the limits of the Chancellor's supervisory jurisdiction, the mandatory safeguards embodied under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012, and the inviolable principles of natural justice flowing from Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the petitioner has not merely sought reinstatement for a short residual tenure; rather, in addition to that he insisted upon restoration of institutional propriety and exposed vindication of the rule of law.

13. While reiterating the content of writ petition learned Senior Counsel submitted that the petitioner is an internationally acclaimed biomedical scientist, educationist, and institution builder of high repute. His pioneering contributions in anticancer drug

discovery, authorship of over 400 research publications, guidance of more than 100 doctoral scholars, and receipt of distinguished international honours such as the J. William Fulbright Scholarship and the Rockefeller Biotechnology Career Award reflect his academic stature. He has served as Founder Director of the Institute of Nano Medical Sciences at the University of Delhi, Vice-Chancellor of Bundelkhand University, Member of the Planning Commission (U.P.), President of the Indian Chemical Society and Non-Official Director of a Government of India enterprise. These credentials demonstrate that the impugned action is institutionally disproportionate and legally untenable when tested on the touchstone of fairness and legality.

14. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in the instant case although no definite charges against the petitioner were ever framed or served upon him, copies of alleged "several complaints" were not supplied to him, no statements of the witnesses were recorded, nor was he given reasonable opportunity of hearing; yet the impugned removal order dated 11.11.2025 nevertheless records a finding that the charges imposed upon the petitioner stood proved. Thus, the entire exercise is vitiated for gross violation of principles of natural justice.

15. Learned Senior Counsel asserted that Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012, which forms the basis of the impugned action, provides a carefully structured mechanism for removal of a Vice-Chancellor. The provision mandates that removal can be ordered only after making detailed inquiry, and no order shall be made unless the Vice-Chancellor has been given a "reasonable opportunity" of defence. The second proviso to Section 11A(1) of

the MSBU Act, 2012 uses explicitly clear language that “no order shall be made unless...” which makes it essentially mandatory in nature and admits no deviation or dilution. The alleged opportunity given to the petitioner before removal was nothing but an eye-wash or empty ritual, hence, the action taken by the Chancellor stands vitiated for non-compliance with a statutory safeguard. Learned Senior Counsel relied upon judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of **Khem Chand vs. Union of India & Others, AIR 1958 SC 300, Pepsu Road Transport Corporation vs. Lachhman Dass Gupta & Another, (2001) 9 SCC 523, Oryx Fisheries Private Limited vs. Union of India & Others, (2010) 13 SCC 427, Union of India & Others vs. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78, Anil Gilurker vs. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Another, (2011) 14 SCC 379, Anant R. Kulkarni vs. Y.P. Education Society & Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515, Committee of Management, Kisan Degree College vs. Shambhu Saran Pandey & Others (1995) 1 SCC 404, State of U.P. vs. Shatrughan Lal & Another (1998) 6 SCC 651, Dewan Singh vs. State of Haryana & Another (1976) 3 SCC 638 and Dr. Umrao Singh Choudhary vs. State of M.P. & Another (1994) 4 SCC 328** in order to emphasise that the expression “reasonable opportunity” has quite wide amplitude and it cannot be construed in a narrow sense either as an illusory formality or a mechanical compliance. When the statutory provision makes it mandatory to provide reasonable opportunity before taking any punitive action against the incumbent, then it should be meaningful and purposeful exercise by framing definite charges, supplying relied

upon documents/ material, as well as the opportunity to put forward defence and evidence to prove his innocence.

16. Learned Senior Counsel categorically argued that the illegality is further compounded by the fact that the Divisional Commissioner ostensibly initiated as an inquiry under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 and such provision of the MSBU Act, 2012 empowers the Chancellor to order an inquiry into the affairs of the University; however, it was impermissibly converted into a disciplinary proceeding against the Vice-Chancellor under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012. Learned Senior Counsel firmly stated that Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 is supervisory, University centric and general in nature; it does not contemplate personal disciplinary action against an Vice-Chancellor. The transformation of a general administrative inquiry into a disciplinary proceeding for removal, without following the procedural safeguards of Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012, amounts to a colourable exercise of power and circumvention of mandatory statutory requirements.

17. Learned Senior Counsel highlighted that the factual background demonstrates that the petitioner was acting strictly within his statutory authority in matters of affiliation and de-affiliation under the MSBU (Affiliation of Colleges) Rules, 2015, pursuant to directives issued by the Government of Rajasthan to verify credentials of affiliated colleges, the petitioner constituted expert committees comprising distinguished academicians. Their reports revealed serious infrastructural and academic deficiencies in certain colleges, including Shri Ganga Saran Women's College and S.N. College, Halaina. Acting upon these reports and in

conformity with statutory provisions, the University issued show cause notices and recommended withdrawal of affiliation. These actions were grounded in academic standards and regulatory compliance.

18. Learned Senior Counsel further added that instead of addressing these deficiencies through the University's statutory framework, the Office of the Chancellor, by letter dated 01.01.2025, directed the Divisional Commissioner to inquire into the de-affiliation decisions. The Divisional Commissioner has no statutory role under the MSBU Act in matters of affiliation. The subsequent constitution of a two-member committee by the Divisional Commissioner, including Shri Hemant Mahawar, an individual allegedly connected with the concerned college, has further vitiated the process. The petitioner had already objected to this appointment citing conflict of interest. Even a reasonable apprehension of bias renders the proceedings void, therefore, carrying on enquiry of such nature against the petitioner was against fundamental principles of fairness.

19. Learned Senior Counsel reiterated that the four-member committee constituted on 07.03.2025 for enquiry under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 did not conduct any independent audit or inspection as mandated. The records would reveal, that the committee members never personally visited the University, and the report was effectively prepared by an interested officer. Even otherwise, the findings and conclusions of the enquiry report do not lead to any logical conclusions, as each conclusion ends with the observation that recovery of certain amounts under a particular head is expected from the concerned

officials. Thus such findings of the Enquiry Committee cannot be read against the petitioner so as to make it as foundation so as to take the harshest action of removal of the petitioner.

20. While referring the provisions of Section 11A(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012, it was submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the statutory violation was aggravated by the non-payment of salary and emoluments during suspension, whereas Section 11A(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 unequivocally mandates that during suspension the Vice-Chancellor shall continue to receive the emoluments to which he was otherwise entitled. Despite repeated representations, the petitioner's salary has been withheld. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the chronology of events further indicate malafide intent, which makes the entire decision making process a nullity and non-est.

21. Learned Senior Counsel emphasised that the Committee headed by the Divisional Commissioner was supposed to confine its enquiry in relation to de-affiliation proceedings initiated by the University in respect of its two affiliated colleges, however, the Committee enlarged the scope of enquiry and has touched altogether different arena, which was manifestly beyond the scope of enquiry. Hence, on the basis of such enquiry report, as per principles of legal fairness and transparency, no action ought to have been taken against the petitioner.

22. While pressing the above submissions, learned Senior Counsel further argued that the action impugned herein further undermine the autonomy of the University, which is a statutory body created with academic, administrative and financial independence. Executive interference through officers not

contemplated under the Act erodes institutional independence and sets a dangerous precedent for higher education governance. The Vice-Chancellor, acting under statutory rules to enforce academic standards, cannot be penalised merely because such enforcement affects private interests.

23. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the enquiry report, while drawing adverse conclusions against the petitioner, ultimately rests its findings on broad observations that he failed to maintain financial discipline and control, and did not ensure timely conduct of the University's regular activities. It is contended that such conclusions are not only generalized but also overlook the prevailing administrative circumstances under which the petitioner was functioning.

24. It was argued that during the relevant period, the crucial statutory posts of Registrar and Financial Controller remained vacant. These positions are entrusted with primary responsibility for maintaining financial propriety, supervising accounts, ensuring compliance with statutory and regulatory norms, and overseeing day-to-day administrative functioning. Despite repeated communications and reminders addressed to the State Government for filling up these key posts, no appointments were made. Consequently, the institutional mechanism necessary for financial oversight and procedural compliance was itself deficient.

25. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in the absence of duly appointed officers entrusted with financial and administrative control, the burden cannot be singularly fastened upon the Vice-Chancellor. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held

personally liable for alleged procedural lapses or administrative delays which were occasioned by systemic deficiencies beyond his control. At best, such circumstances may reflect institutional constraints rather than individual misconduct or deliberate omission.

26. It was further submitted that the impugned removal order dated 11.11.2025 has no reference of justifications and explanations submitted in the reply/representation submitted against enquiry report dated 11.06.2025, thus not only the principles of natural justice have been flagrantly violated, but it also makes it clear that the impugned order is wholly non-speaking and unreasoned. A non-speaking order affecting civil consequences is per se arbitrary, whimsical and lacks any transparency in the impugned action.

27. Learned Senior Counsel also urged that in a similar matter, namely **Dr. Balraj Singh vs. Chancellor, Sri Karan Narendra Agriculture University, Through its Secretary and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Raj 5229**, Co-ordinate Bench of this High Court while interpreting the *pari materia* provision of Sri Karan Narendra Agriculture University, Jobner Act, 2013 has observed that the enquiry under Section 9 was for visitation and inspector power of the Chancellor and cannot be used to punish the Vice-Chancellor. It has been held that the although provisions of the Act authorises the Chancellor to remove vice Chancellor but it is expected of the Chancellor to act in accordance with rider placed under law. Every action has to be in conformity with the principles of natural justice particularly when specifically provided under the law. If the Chancellor intended to initiate any enquiry,

then obviously he cannot act as if he is a controlling administrative office of the Vice-Chancellor.

28. Learned Senior Counsel also heavily relied upon the interim order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at principal Seat Jodhpur in **Dr. Arun Kumar vs State of Rajasthan & Others (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16709/2025)** and submitted that the said order, though not binding, carries persuasive value and reflects the reasoning adopted by the Coordinate Bench while interpreting analogous issue arising from *pari materia* provisions of the Swamy Keshwanand Rajasthan Agriculture University Bikaner Act, 1987. Learned Counsel submitted that while passing interim order dated 16.10.2025 the Coordinate Bench has observed that the enquiries contemplated under Section 9 and Section 19-A (having similar provision as of Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012 applicable in the present case) of the Act of 1987 are governing different fields. Enquiry under Section 9 is University centric and not individual centric, hence, cannot be made basis to remove the Vice Chancellor. As per learned Senior Counsel in the above interim order, the Coordinate Bench also observed that the procedure for removing the Vice Chancellor is almost identical to disciplinary proceedings, which must have been followed by the Enquiry officer. By rendering the proceedings and order of removal prima facie against the principles of natural justice, the Co-ordinate Bench had stayed the operation of removal of the Vice Chancellor.

29. In conclusion, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the process of selection and appointment of a Vice-Chancellor is rigorous and distinct from an ordinary appointment. It involves a

comprehensive evaluation of the candidate's efficiency, competence, integrity, academic credentials and administrative acumen at multiple levels by an expert body. Therefore, once a person is duly appointed as Vice-Chancellor, he cannot be removed prior to completion of his tenure in a casual or slipshod manner. Such removal must be founded on cogent and substantial reasons, strictly in accordance with the governing statutory provisions, sufficient to form a lawful and reasoned opinion regarding his lack of fitness or suitability to continue in office. However, in the present case, the impugned termination dated 11.11.2025, passed in a casual manner, is apparently ultra vires the MSBU Act, 2012 violative of mandatory procedural safeguards, vitiated by bias and conflict of interest, reflective of colourable exercise of power, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21, as well as destructive of University autonomy. According to learned Senior Counsel, the petitioner had merely enforced statutory standards regarding affiliation and was victimised at the behest of certain colleges. The impugned order is, therefore, liable to be quashed with direction for reinstatement and consequential benefits.

30. *Per contra*, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents submitted that the impugned actions are fully supported by statutory authority and were taken in the larger interest of the University and its students. It was contended that Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 confers wide discretion upon the Chancellor to act either on the report of the State Government or "otherwise" if it appears that the Vice-Chancellor has committed willful omission, abuse of powers or acted in a

manner detrimental to the University. The present writ petition is wholly misconceived, not maintainable either in law or on facts, and deserves outright dismissal.

31. Learned Advocate General further submitted that Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 clearly delineates the circumstances under which the Chancellor may remove a Vice-Chancellor, namely where he willfully omits or refuses to carry out the provisions of the Act, abuses the powers vested in him, or where his continuance is detrimental to the interest of the University. The provision also mandates consultation with the State Government and an inquiry prior to removal. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate how the impugned order of removal is either arbitrary or against the provisions of the Act.

32. Learned Advocate General contended that the petitioner was appointed as Vice-Chancellor by His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan and Chancellor under Sections 11(3) and 11(7) of the MSBU Act, 2012 for a tenure of three years or until attaining the age of seventy years. However, during his tenure, several complaints were received alleging serious financial irregularities, abuse of power, irregular payments, overpayment to contractual employees, disobedience of State Government directives, violation of University statutes and causing financial loss to the University by contravening the Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement Rules, 2013. Considering the gravity of these allegations, a preliminary inquiry was entrusted to the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, who submitted a report dated 05.03.2025 finding prima facie substance in the allegations. In view of the preliminary findings, and in contemplation of a detailed inquiry, the Chancellor,

in consultation with the State Government and in exercise of powers under Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012, placed the petitioner under suspension vide order dated 28.03.2025. The suspension was thus neither mechanical nor arbitrary, but a conscious decision taken after prima facie satisfaction based on material on record.

33. Learned Advocate General submitted that in exercise of powers under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012, a four-member committee headed by the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur was constituted on 07.03.2025 to conduct a detailed inquiry into the affairs of the University in light of the complaints received. The committee conducted a comprehensive inquiry and submitted its report on 11.06.2025.

34. Learned Advocate General drew indulgence of this court over the report dated 11.06.2025 and further submitted that the report, on a cumulative reading of its findings, prima facie reflects serious deficiencies in the petitioner's efficiency, integrity, and administrative capacity to continue to hold the office of Vice-Chancellor. The instances recorded therein indicate lapses in adherence to statutory provisions and established procedures, irregular exercise of administrative and financial powers, and failure to ensure institutional discipline and regulatory compliance. Such findings not only raise concerns regarding procedural impropriety but also cast doubt on the petitioner's ability to discharge the high responsibilities attached to the post with the requisite transparency, accountability, and integrity. In that view of the matter, the conclusions drawn in the report suggest that the

petitioner's continuance in office would not be conducive to the effective and lawful administration of the University.

35. After receipt of the inquiry report, the petitioner was furnished with a copy of the report and was granted a personal hearing vide communication dated 10.07.2025. He submitted a detailed written reply on 15.07.2025, which was duly considered. He was also afforded personal hearing on 17.07.2025. Thereafter, his reply was forwarded to the Divisional Commissioner for further examination. Upon reconsideration, the Divisional Commissioner submitted a further report dated 19.09.2025 reaffirming that the serious allegations stood prima facie established. Thus, the principles of natural justice were meticulously complied with at every stage. The petitioner was not condemned unheard; rather, he was afforded ample and sufficient opportunities to defend himself.

36. Upon consideration of both inquiry reports and after due consultation with the State Government, as evident from communication dated 03.11.2025, the Chancellor, in exercise of statutory powers under Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012, passed the order dated 11.11.2025 removing the petitioner from the post of Vice-Chancellor. The order was passed on the basis of substantive material and after compliance with statutory procedure. It cannot be termed as arbitrary, non-speaking, or passed in haste. The suspension order had been passed in March 2025, and the removal order came only after a detailed inquiry process extending over several months.

37. Learned Advocate General emphatically refuted the allegations of bias and improper constitution of the inquiry

committee. Learned AG clarified that the committee was constituted by order of the Chancellor under statutory authority. No material has been placed on record by the petitioner to substantiate allegations of biasness. Hence, bald and unsubstantiated allegations cannot invalidate a statutory inquiry conducted by senior administrative officers.

38. Learned Advocate General further submitted that after the removal order dated 11.11.2025, the suspension order dated 28.03.2025 ceased to have independent existence. Therefore, challenge to the suspension order has become infructuous. In any event, suspension pending inquiry is expressly authorized under the first proviso to Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012, and the petitioner cannot claim immunity from such statutory action.

39. With regard to salary and emoluments, it was submitted by the learned Advocate General that during suspension the petitioner was entitled only to subsistence allowance in accordance with applicable rules. In light of the serious financial irregularities found against him, his claim for full salary and benefits is wholly untenable.

40. Learned Advocate General categorically denied that there was any malice in law or fact, or any colourable exercise of power. The action taken was in discharge of statutory duty to protect the interest and integrity of the University. The dignity of the office of Vice-Chancellor cannot be used as a shield against accountability. When serious irregularities affecting public funds and institutional governance are found, the Chancellor is not only empowered but duty-bound to act in the larger interest of the University.

41. It was argued that credible complaints were received from affiliated colleges alleging arbitrary and non-transparent de-affiliation processes and accordingly an inquiry was initiated. The Divisional Commissioner submitted a detailed report running into 87 pages documenting irregularities in the petitioner's functioning, including deviation from UGC norms and non-consideration of representations.

42. It was further submitted that the writ jurisdiction ought not to be invoked to interfere in matters of university governance unless there is manifest illegality. Reliance was placed upon **State of U.P. & Others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Others, (1989) 2 SCC 505** to submit that judicial review is concerned with decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself.

43. Learned Advocate General submitted that the office of the Vice-Chancellor stands on an entirely different footing from that of an ordinary employee of the University. The Vice-Chancellor is the principal executive and academic authority of the institution, occupying a statutory office created by the Act itself. His appointment, tenure, powers, and removal are governed specifically by the provisions of the parent statute and not by the general service or disciplinary rules applicable to subordinate officers and staff of the University. Therefore, that the petitioner cannot invoke the protection of disciplinary rules framed for regular employees, as such rules do not govern the process of removal of the Vice-Chancellor.

44. Learned Advocate General further submitted that Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012 was consciously inserted by

the legislature by way of an amendment to provide a distinct and self-contained mechanism for suspension and removal of the Vice-Chancellor. The provision commences with a non obstante clause, thereby giving it overriding effect over any other inconsistent provisions of the Act or rules. Therefore, in the light of specific legislative design, the elaborate procedure contemplated for departmental enquiries against other employees is not attracted in the case of action taken under Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012. The field is wholly occupied by the special procedure prescribed therein.

45. The learned Advocate General further argued that the scope of Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012 is wide and purposive. Action thereunder is not confined merely to instances of proven misconduct involving positive wrongful acts. The provision expressly encompasses situations where the Vice-Chancellor "wilfully omits or refuses" to carry out the provisions of the Act or abuses the powers vested in him. Thus, culpable inaction, deliberate omission, failure to implement statutory mandates, or dereliction of duty would equally attract the jurisdiction of the Chancellor under Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012.

46. It was emphasised by learned Advocate General that the legislative intent is to ensure that the highest executive authority of the University remains accountable not only for acts of commission but also for acts of omission which undermine statutory compliance, institutional discipline, or the larger interests of the University. Hence, once material is available demonstrating either abuse of power or failure to discharge

statutory obligations, the competent authority is empowered to form an opinion and take appropriate action in accordance with Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012.

47. Learned Advocate General submitted that the expression "reasonable opportunity" employed in Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012 cannot be expanded or interpreted in a manner that defeats the legislative scheme of the provision. It is contended that the concept of reasonable opportunity is inherently contextual and its applicability varies with the nature of the statutory framework governing it, and the object sought to be achieved. There can be no straightjacket formula or universal procedural template applicable to all situations.

48. Learned Advocate General indicated that Section 11-A of the MSBU Act, 2012 is a special provision dealing exclusively with the removal of a Vice-Chancellor. The provision itself delineates the extent of procedural safeguard by stipulating that no order shall be passed unless the Vice-Chancellor is afforded a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action. The statute, however, does not contemplate or mandate a full-fledged departmental enquiry akin to those conducted under service rules applicable to regular employees, such as framing of formal charges, recording of oral evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, or adherence to technical rules of evidence. Learned Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgments delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of **Mohinder Singh Gill & Another vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Others (1978) 1 SCC 405**, **P.D. Agrawal vs. State Bank of**

**India & Others, 2006 (8) SCC 776 and Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India, 1990 (1) SCC 613.**

49. In response to the plea of vacancies of Registrar and Financial Controller raised by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, it was submitted by learned Advocate General that the existence of vacancies in certain posts cannot operate as a shield against lapses in governance, particularly when the statute vests supervisory and controlling powers in the Vice-Chancellor. It was argued that the Vice-Chancellor, being the principal executive and administrative authority of the University, is ultimately accountable for ensuring that the affairs of the institution are conducted in accordance with the Act, the Statutes, and the applicable financial rules. The administrative exigencies, including vacant positions, are not uncommon in public institutions. In such circumstances, it is incumbent upon the head of the institution to make appropriate interim arrangements, delegate responsibilities in accordance with law, or take corrective measures to prevent financial irregularities and administrative lapses. It was also submitted that the allegations in the enquiry report are not confined to mere technical lapses attributable to administrative vacuum, but relate to specific instances of irregular exercise of authority, non-compliance with statutory provisions, and decisions taken in deviation of prescribed procedures. Such actions also fall squarely within the domain of the Vice-Chancellor's own decision-making authority and cannot be attributed solely to the absence of subordinate officers.

50. Learned Advocate General seriously objected that the reliance placed by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner over

the judgment passed by learned Single Judge in the case of **Dr. Balraj Singh (supra)** is totally misplaced as the above judgment was further challenged by the Chancellor and the University before the Division Bench of this Court by way of filing **D. B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1284/2025 (Chancellor, Sri Karan Narendra Agriculture University & Another vs Dr. Balraj Singh & Another)**. As during the pendency of the appeal, the concerned petitioner Dr. Balraj Singh had already completed his tenure, therefore, after recording the submissions of the Advocate General on behalf of the appellants that the Single Judge had wrongly interpreted the provisions of the Sri Karan Narendra Agriculture University, Jobner Act of 2013, vide judgment dated 30.10.2025, the appeals were disposed of by the Division Bench leaving the question raised as open to be examined in appropriate case and that the order passed by the learned Single Judge shall not be treated as precedents in any other case.

51. Similarly, in relation to the interim order dated 16.10.2025 passed by learned Single Judge in the case of **Dr. Arun Kumar (supra)** relied upon by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, it was objected by learned Advocate General that firstly, an interim order does not carry any precedential value, nor even guiding force and secondly, he pointed out that the order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge was put to challenge by the respective Universities and the State Government by way of filing D.B. Special Appeals (Writ) no. 1621/2025, 1564/2025 and 1620/2025. In the above Appeals, vide order dated 01.12.2025, it was observed by the Division Bench of this Court that learned Single

Judge has granted final relief at the interim stage, hence, by staying the directions given by the learned Single Judge in para 15 of the order, the Division Bench of this Court has requested the learned Single Judge to decide the main petition expeditiously. However, the writ petition filed by Dr. Arun Kumar is still pending before the learned Single Judge and no final judgment has been delivered so far. Hence, interim order dated 16.10.2025, in the aforesaid circumstances, has lost all its persuasive or guiding force, if any.

52. In view of foregoing detailed submissions, learned Advocate General prayed for dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner.

53. Having heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned Advocate General for the respondents at length and perused the pleadings and material placed on record, this Court proceeds to examine the issue arising in the present writ petition, which fundamentally is that as to whether the termination order dated 11.11.2025 suffers from arbitrariness, violation of principles of natural justice or statutory non-compliance under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 or not ?

54. As the controversy in the present writ petition revolves around Section 11 of the MSBU Act, 2012, it would be appropriate to reproduce the same as under:

***"Removal of Vice-Chancellor.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, if at any time on the report of the State Government or otherwise, in the opinion of the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor wilfully omits or refuses to carry out the provisions of this Act or abuses the powers vested in him, or if otherwise appears to the Chancellor that the continuance of the Vice-Chancellor in office is detrimental to the interest of the University, the Chancellor may, in consultation with the State Government, after making such inquiry as he deems proper by order, remove the Vice-Chancellor:***

*Provided that the Chancellor may, in consultation with the State Government, at any time before making such order, place the Vice-Chancellor under suspension, pending enquiry:*

*Provided further that no order shall be made by the Chancellor unless the Vice-Chancellor has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him.*

*(2) During the pendency or in contemplation, of any inquiry referred to in sub-section (1) the Chancellor may, in consultation with the State Government, order that till further order-*

*(a) such Vice-Chancellor shall refrain from performing the functions of the office of the Vice-Chancellor, but shall continue to get the emoluments to which he was otherwise entitled:*

*(b) the functions of the office of the Vice-Chancellor shall be performed by the person specified in the order."*

55. After analysing the scheme of the Act of 2012, it can be observed that the Vice-Chancellor is not an ordinary employee of the University. He is a statutory functionary occupying the highest executive office under the MSBU Act, 2012. His appointment, powers, duties, and removal are governed exclusively by the MSBU Act, 2012. Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012, introduced by legislative amendment, provides a distinct and self-contained mechanism for suspension and removal.

56. Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 empowers the Chancellor, in consultation with the State Government and after making such inquiry as deemed proper, to remove the Vice-Chancellor if:

(a) he willfully omits or refuses to carry out the provisions of the MSBU Act, 2012;

(b) he abuses the powers vested in him; or

(c) his continuance in office is otherwise detrimental to the interest of the University.

57. The aforesaid provision begins with a non obstante clause and contains its own procedural safeguard requiring “reasonable opportunity” before removal. The legislative intent is thus clear that action against a Vice-Chancellor is to be governed by this special provision and not by general service rules applicable to other employees.

58. The first proviso to Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 expressly authorises the Chancellor to place the Vice-Chancellor under suspension pending inquiry. The suspension order dated 28.03.2025 was preceded by a preliminary inquiry report dated 05.03.2025 submitted by the Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, finding prima facie substance in the allegations of financial irregularities and administrative lapses. Suspension, at that stage, was not punitive, but preventive in nature. It is well settled that suspension pending inquiry does not require any opportunity of hearing. The material on record discloses that the Chancellor acted upon relevant material and in consultation with the State Government. No mala fides or extraneous consideration have been substantiated. Further, after issuance of the removal order dated 11.11.2025, the suspension order merged into the final order and ceased to have independent existence. Accordingly, the challenge to suspension has become academic.

59. The main thrust of arguments of behalf of the petitioner relates to alleged violation of principles of natural justice in the process culminating in removal. The record, however, reflects that a four-member inquiry committee under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 was constituted on 07.03.2025. After examining the

record, the committee submitted a detailed report on 11.06.2025 recording prima facie findings against the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner was supplied with the report alongwith a letter/ notice requiring him to file reply/ representation against the enquiry report while expressing in explicit terms that an action under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 was under contemplation. Admittedly time was granted to the petitioner to submit a reply/ representation against the enquiry report and on demand of the petitioner, reasonable and sufficient extension was also granted. It is also not disputed that the petitioner availed the opportunity and submitted a comprehensive written representation on 15.07.2025. He was also afforded personal hearing on 17.07.2025. His reply was reconsidered, and a further report after considering the reply of the petitioner was submitted on 19.09.2025, which also reaffirmed the findings given in earlier report. After conducting such exercise, consultation with the State Government was made on 03.11.2025; and only thereafter was the removal order dated 11.11.2025 issued. The above sequence demonstrates that notice, opportunity to submit explanation, and personal hearing were admittedly given to the petitioner prior to passing of removal order. Thus, the requirement of Section 11A(1) of the MSBU Act, 2012 stood complied with. The petitioner has not demonstrated any specific prejudice occasioned by the procedure adopted.

60. Another limb of such contention of the petitioner is that the expression "reasonable opportunity" under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 mandates a detailed departmental inquiry with formal charges, oral evidence, and cross-examination. In the light

of unambiguous language of the provision and the legislative intent, this Court is unable to accept such submission. The expression of "reasonable opportunity" is contextual. It cannot be equated mechanically with the elaborate disciplinary procedures applicable to civil servants under Article 311 of the Constitution of India or the relevant service rules. Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 does not prescribe framing of formal charges, examination of witnesses, or adherence to technical rules of evidence. It requires that the Vice-Chancellor be given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action.

61. In the case of **Mohinder Singh Gill & Another (supra)**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

*"57. We may not be taken to say that situational modifications to notice and hearing are altogether impermissible. They are, as the learned Addl. Solicitor-General rightly stressed. The glory of the law is not that sweeping rules are laid down but that it tailors principles to practical needs, doctors remedies to suit the patient, promotes, not freezes, life's processes, if we may mix metaphors. Tucker, LJ drove home this point when he observed in the Duke of Norfolk case:*

*"There are no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth.*

*....."*

62. In the case of **P.D. Agrawal (supra)**, Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:

*"39. .... To the principle/doctrine of audi alteram partem, a clear distinction has been laid down between the cases where there was no hearing at all and the cases where there was mere technical infringement of the principle. The Court applies the principles of natural justice having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. It is not applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. It is no unruly horse. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. (See Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 337 and State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi (2001) 6 SCC 667. See also Mohd. Sartaj v. State of U.P. (2006) 2 SCC 315.)."*

63. Similarly, in the case of **Charan Lal Sahu (supra)**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down following guidelines:

**"109.....** It was held that the phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of static and precise definition. It could not be imprisoned in the strait-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence, it was not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. This Court reiterated that audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected the administrative decision after post-decisional hearing was good.

**110.** The principles of natural justice have been examined by this Court in *Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398*, It was reiterated, that the principles of natural justice are not the creation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 is not the begetter of the principles of natural justice but their constitutional guardian. The principles of natural justice consist, inter alia, of the requirement that no man should be condemned unheard. If, however, a legislation or a statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes the application of any particular principle of natural justice then it requires close scrutiny by the court."

64. The judgments relied upon by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in the cases of **Khem Chand (supra), Pepsu Road Transport Corporation (supra), Union of India & Others vs. Gyan Chand Chattar (supra), Anil Gilurker (supra), Anant R. Kulkarni (supra), Committee of Management, Kisan Degree College (supra), State of U.P. vs. Shatrughan Lal & Another (supra), Dewan Singh (supra)** pertain largely to disciplinary proceedings against employees under service jurisprudence and Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The present case concerns removal of a statutory office-holder under a special provision containing its own

procedure, hence, the above judgments relied upon by the petitioner are distinguishable on account of distinct facts and altogether different statutory scheme. Importing the entire framework of departmental inquiry into Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 would defeat legislative intent. In the case of **Oryx Fisheries Private Limited (supra)**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a matter related to cancellation of registration certificate and found that the show cause notice was premeditated in nature and did not fulfil the parameters of fairness. As such, the facts and issue involved in the said case were quite different from the present case. As regards judgment of **Dr. Umrao Singh Choudhary (supra)** is concerned, in that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that principles of natural justice can be excluded either by express statutory provision or by necessary statutory implication. There cannot be any quarrel with such principle of law, however, when in the instance case, where Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 prescribes for reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action and such opportunity was apparently granted and availed by the petitioner, the above judgment also does not extend any help to the petitioner.

65. Even otherwise, the expression "reasonable opportunity" occurring in the proviso to Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012, which mandates affording such opportunity before removal of the Vice-Chancellor, cannot be read in isolation or construed in a rigid or mechanical manner. The said proviso has to be harmoniously interpreted with the substantive part of Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012, which empowers the competent

authority to act "as it deems proper." The legislative intent, therefore, is to confer a degree of discretion upon the authority concerned in determining the nature and extent of opportunity required to be afforded in the facts of a given case. Consequently, the requirement of "reasonable opportunity" does not, in all circumstances, necessarily entail the holding of a full-fledged disciplinary enquiry of the nature contemplated under the statutory disciplinary rules applicable to employees of the University for acts of misconduct. While such an enquiry may be warranted against other employees of the University in cases involving allegations of misconduct requiring evidentiary adjudication, the Statute does not mandate a detailed departmental enquiry as an invariable prerequisite for removal under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012. What is essential is that the Vice-Chancellor is made aware of the material against him and is afforded a fair and reasonable chance to respond thereto, in a manner consistent with the principles of natural justice and proportionate to the nature of the action proposed.

66. Argument raised on behalf of the petitioner that an inquiry under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 only confines to visitation power, and could not form basis for action under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 is also misconceived for the obvious reason that Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 permits action "on the report of the State Government or otherwise." The expression "otherwise" is of wide amplitude and authorizes the Chancellor to act upon any credible material forming basis of satisfaction. The inquiry conducted under Section 9(2) of the MSBU Act, 2012 was a fact-finding exercise into the affairs of the University. If such

inquiry revealed material indicating abuse of powers or wilful omission by the Vice-Chancellor, there is no statutory prohibition against acting upon it under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012. Even otherwise, record would reveal that while issuing notice dated 04.07.2025 alongwith enquiry report dated 11.06.2025 to the petitioner, it was made clear that on the basis of enquiry report action under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 would be under contemplation, hence, the petitioner was required to submit his reply/ representation accordingly. Hence, the assumption of the petitioner is totally unfounded and baseless. No provision has been shown on behalf of the petitioner, which restricts the source of material for forming opinion under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012.

67. This court finds that it is evident from the record that the inquiry report records instances of: (i) Irregular payments and overpayment to contractual employees; (ii) Violation of Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement Rules, 2013; (iii) Non-compliance with statutory provisions and governmental directions; and (iv) Administrative irregularities affecting institutional governance. This Court cannot sit as an appellate forum over factual findings. Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned with the decision-making process and not with reappreciation of evidence. Unless findings are perverse, based on no material, or vitiated by mala fides, the Court does not substitute its view. However, the petitioner has utterly failed to show any manifest illegality and perversity.

68. Needless to observe that the office of the Vice-Chancellor stands on a distinct footing and cannot be equated with

that of an ordinary employee of the University. The Vice-Chancellor occupies the highest academic and administrative position in the University and is entrusted with wide-ranging statutory, financial, and supervisory powers. Consequently, the standards of discipline, integrity, transparency, and administrative efficiency expected from a Vice-Chancellor are necessarily of a much higher degree. Mere distinction or eminence in the academic field, by itself, does not suffice to meet the requirements of the office, as the role involves complex administrative responsibilities, policy implementation, and governance of the institution. Academic excellence and administrative competence operate in different domains, and the latter assumes particular significance in the functioning of a University. Therefore, a Vice-Chancellor is required to satisfy more stringent and exacting parameters for holding the post, commensurate with the trust reposed in the office and the overarching objective of maintaining institutional integrity and effective governance.

69. This court does not find any merit in the petitioner's explanation resting upon vacant posts of Registrar and Financial Controller, which cannot absolve him of ultimate supervisory responsibility. As the principal executive authority, he is accountable for ensuring statutory compliance. Administrative vacancies cannot justify irregular exercise of power or financial deviation.

70. Although allegations of bias have been raised, yet they are in general terms without substantive material. It is settled preposition of law that mere assertion of conflict of interest is insufficient to invalidate proceedings conducted by a statutory

committee headed by a senior administrative officer. No cogent evidence of personal animus or malice in fact has been demonstrated. The chronology of events reveals that the inquiry process extended over several months and was not actuated by haste.

71. Petitioner has also alleged that the impugned order dated 11.11.2025 was non-speaking and unreasoned. In this regard it would be sufficient to observe that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the removal order dated 11.11.2025 must be read in conjunction with the inquiry reports and the entire record preceding it. Where an order is based upon detailed reports forming part of the record and known to the affected person, the order cannot be termed arbitrary merely because it is concise. The decision is supported by reasons reflected in the inquiry material.

72. Learned Senior Counsel placed heavy reliance over judgment of coordinate bench in the case of **Dr. Balraj Singh (supra)** as well as an interim order passed in the writ petition of **Dr. Arun Kumar (supra)**. For the reasons assigned by learned Advocate General and accordingly recorded here-in-above, it is abundantly clear that in the case of **Dr. Balraj Singh (supra)**, it has been expressly held by the Division Bench not to operate as precedent and question has been left open to be decided in an appropriate case. Similarly, the interim order passed in the case of **Dr. Arun Kumar (supra)** does not carry precedential value and has also been diluted by the Division Bench. Therefore, reliance upon them does not advance the petitioner's case.

73. It has also been vehemently argued by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the impugned orders are

adversely affecting the autonomy assigned to the University by the Statute. Needless to mention that autonomy of a University does not imply absence of accountability. The MSBU Act, 2012 itself vests supervisory powers in the Chancellor. Action taken in accordance with statutory mandate cannot be termed interference with autonomy.

74. As held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **State of U.P. & Others vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Others (supra)**, judicial review is concerned with legality of process, not with merits of decision. The scope of judicial review in such matters is limited to examining whether the authority had jurisdiction, whether the procedure prescribed by law was followed, whether principles of natural justice were observed, and whether the decision is vitiated by arbitrariness or perversity. In the present case, this court finds that Jurisdiction to pass impugned order existed with the Chancellor under Section 11A of the MSBU Act, 2012 and therefore, undisputedly order has been passed by the competent authority; as required consultation with the State Government was also undertaken. That apart, prior to passing of order a fact finding Inquiry was also conducted and after receiving findings of the Enquiry committee, opportunity to file reply/ representation against such finding was also granted to the petitioner followed by personal hearing. Thereafter, after forming opinion with regard to exercise of power, which is based on material on record, order dated 11.11.2025 was passed after consideration of the inquiry reports and the petitioner's responses. The sufficiency of evidence or correctness of conclusions lies outside the limited scope of judicial review. The record further

reveals that the Chancellor considered detailed findings indicating procedural irregularities in de-affiliation decisions, non-consideration of representations, and deviation from prescribed norms. Thus, this court does not find any procedural illegality, perversity, or mala fide in the entire decision making process.

75. On an overall consideration of the statutory scheme and the material on record, this Court is satisfied that the suspension order dated 28.03.2025 was within statutory competence; the removal order dated 11.11.2025 was passed after due inquiry and compliance with principles of natural justice; and the allegations of bias, mala fides and colourable exercise of power are unsubstantiated. Hence, no case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is made out. The writ petition filed by the petitioner is, accordingly, dismissed.

76. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(ANAND SHARMA),J