Neeta Sawant WP-10765 OF 2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 10765 OF 2012

Bank of Maharashtra ….. Petitioner

: Versus :

1. Mrs. Gunwanti Kashinath Zarkar

(deceased through legal heirs)

1A. Purushottam Kashinath Zarkar

2. Estate Of�cer, Bank of Maharashtra ….Respondents

WITH

WRIT PETITION NO. 10766 OF 2012

Bank of Maharashtra ….. Petitioner

: Versus :

1. Shri. A. B. Satardekar

(deceased through legal heirs)

1A. Smt. Suhita Arjun Satardekar

1B. Shri. Parashar Arjun Satardekar

2. Estate Of�cer, Bank of Maharashtra....Respondents

Mr. Amandeep Singh with Mr. Abhijit Ranjan, Ms. Ritika Yerra i/by

Chittaranjan Shah, Kay Legal and Associates LLP for the Petitioner.

Mr. Rajesh Parab for the Respondent No.1.

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CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.

JUDG. RESD. ON : 31 August 2026

JUDG. PRON. ON : 16 September 2026.

JUDGMENT:

1) The Petitioner-Bank has �led these Petitions challenging the

judgment dated 1 September 2012 passed by the Learned Judge, City Civil

Court, Mumbai allowing Misc. Appeal Nos. 74 of 2012 and 75 of 2012 and

setting aside the eviction orders dated 16 May 2012 passed by Respondent

No.2-Estate Of�cer in Eviction Case Nos.3 of 2007 and 7 of 2008.

Facts in Writ Petition No. 10766 of 2012:

2) Petitioner is a nationalized Bank incorporated under the

Bombay Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970.

There was a old structure located at Gadkari Chowk, Gokhale Road, Dadar

(West) Mumbai-400 028. One Mr. Arjun Satardekar was the monthly

tenant in respect of Room No.3 in the said chawl structure. It appears that

the Bank of Maharashtra acquired the said chawl structure and became

the owner thereof. The Petitioner-Bank a �led Suit against the tenant-

Arjun Satardekar before the Small Causes Court under the Bombay Rent,

Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Bombay Rent Act) for

eviction of the tenant. The suit was apparently dismissed and tenancy and

possession of the tenanted premises continued with Mr. Arjun Satardekar.

The Bank thereafter decided to redevelop the chawl by construction of a

building and accordingly an agreement was executed on 18 December

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Neeta Sawant WP-10765 OF 2012

1982 between the bank and the tenant-Arjun Satardekar in which the

Bank agreed to provide premises in the new building and to accommodate

the tenant temporarily during the redevelopment process. Accordingly,

the old structure was demolished, and a new building was constructed

and new premises were allotted to Mr. Arjun Satardekar being Room No.1

on the �rst-�oor, admeasuring 240 sq.ft comprising of one room and a

kitchen, bathroom, WC and loft (tenanted premises). After death of Mr.

Arjun Satardekar, his legal heirs are occupying the tenanted premises.

3) The Bank terminated the tenancy by serving notice on the

legal heirs of Arjun Satardekar and thereafter initiated eviction

proceedings before the Estate Of�cer under the provisions of the Public

Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (PP Act). The

Estate Of�cer allowed the application by order dated 16 May 2012 and

directed the Respondents to vacate possession of the tenanted premises.

4) Aggrieved by the order passed by the Estate Of�cer,

Respondents �led Misc. Appeal No. 74 of 2012 in the City Civil Court at

Mumbai. By judgment and order dated 1 September 2012, the City Civil

Court has allowed the Misc. Appeal and has set aside the eviction order

passed by the Estate Of�cer. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 1

September 2012 passed by the City Civil Court in Misc. Appeal No.74 of

2012, the Petitioner-bank has �led Writ Petition No. 10766 of 2012.

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Facts in Writ Petition No. 10765 of 2012:

5) This Petition also involves creation of tenancy in the same

building in which Shri. Dattatray Raut was the original tenant in respect

of Room No.2A. The Bank had �led the suit for eviction of the tenant

under the Bombay Rent Act on the ground of bona�de requirement before

the Small Causes Court, which was dismissed. Since Bank desired to

redevelop the chawl structure by constructing a building thereat, an

Agreement dated 19 March 1981 was executed between the Bank and the

wife of the original tenant-Smt. Janabai Raut. Under the agreement, the

tenant agreed to handover possession of the old, tenanted premises for

the purpose of reconstruction of the building and the Bank agreed to re-

induct the tenant into the new premises admeasuring 200 sq.ft BUA

comprising of one room, kitchen, bathroom and WC ( tenanted

premises). After reconstructing the building, the tenant was re-inducted

into the tenanted premises on monthly rent of Rs.30/-.

6) The Bank terminated the tenancy by serving notice dated 3

December 2007. The Bank thereafter initiated eviction proceedings under

the PP Act before the Estate Of�cer. By order dated 16 May 2012, the

Estate Of�cer allowed the application �led by the Bank and directed the

Respondents to vacate the tenanted premises. Aggrieved by the order

dated 16 May 2012, the original respondent �led Misc. Appeal No.75 of

2012 before the City Civil Court at Mumbai. By judgment and order dated

1 September 2012, the City Civil Court allowed the Appeal and set aside

the eviction order dated 16 May 2012 passed by the Estate Of�cer. The

Petitioner-Bank has �led Writ Petition No. 10765 of 2012 challenging the

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Neeta Sawant WP-10765 OF 2012

judgment and order dated 1 September 2012 passed by the Learned Judge,

City Civil Court in Misc. Appeal No.75 of 2012 by which the eviction order

dated 16 May 2012 passed by the Eviction Of�cer is set aside.

Submissions

7) Mr. Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner-

Bank submits that the City Civil Court has erred in allowing the Appeals

preferred by the Respondents and in setting aside the eviction orders. He

submits that Respondents do not enjoy the bene�t of protected tenancy

either under the Bombay Rent Act or under the Maharashtra Rent Control

Act, 1999 (MRC Act). That they are mere monthly tenants whose tenancy

can be validly terminated by issuing notice under Section 106 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TP Act). He submits that the issue of non-

application of provisions of the Rent Act and permissibility to evict

tenants under the provisions of the PP Act is now well settled by the

judgment of the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India

Versus. Vita

1

. He relies on judgments of this Court in Vishwas

Krishnarao Gangurde since deceased through his legal representatives

Versus. Bank of India

2

and Life Insurance Corporation of India Versus.

Abhishek Vasant Chavan

3

. Mr. Singh further submits that in Writ

Petition No. 10765 of 2012, the City Civil Court has grossly erred in

holding that the agreement executed with the tenant contemplated grant

of any permanent alternative accommodation. He submits that the tenant

in that case is merely inducted as a monthly tenant and there was no

1 2025 SCC Online SC 2772

2 WP NO. 6715 of 2021 decided on 26 February 2026

3 CRA No. 24 of 2022 decided on 3 July 2026.

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Neeta Sawant WP-10765 OF 2012

creation of perpetual lease. That the City Civil Court has also erred in

assuming that permanent tenancy was created through a registered

agreement. That the concerned agreement has not been registered.

8) Mr. Singh further submits that in both the cases, the Bank

never intended to create perpetual tenancy/lease. That since protection

under Rent Act is not available to the tenants, Bank is entitled to

terminate the tenancy. That upon termination of tenancy, the occupation

of Respondents is rendered unauthorized and therefore the Estate Of�cer

has rightly exercised the jurisdiction under the provisions of the PP Act.

9) Mr. Singh further submits that the City Civil Court has

erroneously recorded a �nding of res judicata. He submits that mere

dismissal of earlier suit by the Small Causes Court on assumption of

protected tenancy on bona�de grounds cannot be a bar on Estate Of�cer

exercising jurisdiction under the PP Act. That under the PP Act,

Petitioner-Bank is not even required to establish bona�de requirement

once the occupation is proved to be unauthorized. He therefore prays for

setting aside the impugned orders passed by the City Civil Court.

10) Per contra, Mr. Parab, the learned counsel appearing for the

Respondents in both the petitions, opposes them. He submits that the

City Civil Court has rightly set aside the impugned eviction orders. That

Respondents are not trespassers or unauthorized occupants of the

premises. That they are lawful tenants way before the old structure/chawl

was purchased by the Bank. That Banks suits for bona�de requirement

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were dismissed. The Bank has acknowledged and accepted the right of the

Respondents to occupy the premises and has executed sp eci�c

agreements with the Respondents. That the Agreements are in the form

of allotment of PAAs while redeveloping the building. That the Bank has

clearly represented to the Respondents that they are entitled to

permanently occupy the premises in the new building which are virtually

like ownership. He submits that, by adopting a shortcut method under the

PP Act, the Bank is seeking to evict the Respondents from the premises.

Thus, the Respondents are lawful tenants and not merely unauthorized

occupants. He relies on judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Nusli

Neville Wadia Versus. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.

4

to contend that

lawful tenants cannot be evicted by having recourse to the provisions of

the PP Act. He also relies on Circular issued by the Government of India

on 30 May 2022 directing that the provisions of PP Act cannot be enforced

for the purpose of eviction of lawful tenants. Mr. Parab accordingly prays

for dismissal of the petitions.

Reasons and Analysis

11) Respondents/original tenants were inducted in the premises

in the old structure/chawl. The Bank had apparently initiated eviction

proceedings against the tenants of both the premises in the year 1965. In

respect of the tenant-Arjun Satardekar, R.A.E. Suit No. 8017 of 1965 was

�led in the Small Causes Court at Mumbai- seeking recovery of possession

of the premises on the ground of bona�de requirement. The suit was

dismissed by judgment and decree dated 25 August 1970. The decree has

4 2006 3 MH.L.J. 713

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attained �nality as the Petitioner-Bank did not challenge the same.

Similarly, qua the tenant-Dattatray Vishnu Raut, R.A.E. Suit No. 4432 of

1965 was �led, which was also dismissed on 25 August 1970 and the

decree passed in that Suit has also attained �nality.

12) The Petitioner-Bank wanted to redevelop the old

structure/chawl and accepted the right of the tenants to occupy their

respective premises, it therefore decided to make an arrangement for re-

induction of the tenants in the new building. Accordingly, two

agreements were executed with the tenants of both the premises. The

agreement dated 19 March 1981 was executed with Janabai Vishnu Raut

which is an unregistered agreement. Under that agreemen t, the

Petitioner-Bank agreed to induct the said tenant in new premises in the

building on the rent of Rs.30/- per month. Clause 8 of the agreement

dated 19 March 1981 reads thus:

8. The party of the One Part shall charge the rent at Rs. 30/- per month

for an area of 200 Square Feet inclusive of all permitted increases during

the material time when the party of the One Part will put the party of

the Other Part in possession of the new �at. In the event, the rateable

value of the new �at is assessed in excess of Rs. 30/- per month as rent

for the purpose of assessing the same under Section 162(2) and 167 of

the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the party of the One Part shall

not be entitled to claim any taxes or increases of taxes on account of the

rateable value so determined and �xed in excess of Rs. 30/- per month,

as the party of the One Part shall charge the rent in respect of the new

�at at Rs. 30/- per month inclusive of all permitted increases on the day

when they hand over the possession to the party of the Other Part.

However, the Tenant shall bear the electricity charges of the new �at as

per the individual electric meter and water charges on prorata. The party

of the One Part shall provide the separate water meter for the new �at to

be allotted by them to the party of the Other Part.

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13) So far as the tenant-Arjun Satardekar is concerned, a

registered agreement was executed with him by the Bank on 18 December

1982. In the agreement executed with Arjun Satardekar, the Bank

somehow used the expression ‘permanent alternative accommodation’ at

several places throughout the agreement. Clause 1 of the Agreement

reads thus :

1. That the Landlords shall construct at their own costs a new building

on the Plot of land bearing Cadastral Survey No. 1549 in Town Planning

Scheme No. IV of Mahim Division situated at Gokhale Road (North),

Gadkari Chowk, Dadar, Bombay-400 028 as per the Plans sanctioned by

the Bombay Municipal Corporation under their sanction No. EB/4378/A

of 3- 7- 82 by demolishing the existing structure after �rst providing

temporary alternative accommodation to the Tenant till the completion

of the new building and then shall provide and allot the permanent

alternative accommodation as mentioned in clause No. 2 below to the

Tenant in the newly constructed building.

14) However, though the expression ‘permanent alternative

accommodation’ has been repeatedly used in the agreement, the same

ultimately creates tenancy in respect of the new premises. This is clear

from Clauses 2 and 3 of the Agreement which read thus:

2. The Landlords shall provide to the Tenant aroom by way of permanent

alternative accommodation admeasuring 240 sq.ft. of built up area at the

monthly rent of Rs. 30/- (Rupees Thirty only) in the new building on the

rear side of the �rst Floor

3. The Tenant shall shift within eight days of receipt of the intimation

from the Landlords to the temporary alternative accommodation bearing

Room No. 8 provided by the Landlords in the existing structure near the

chawl to be demolished on the same terms of tenancy and on the same

amount of rent charged for the premises in his occupation at present. It

is agreed that the tenancy rights of the Tenant shall continue to exist till

the room by way of permanent alternative accommodation as agreed is

allotted to the Tenant as stated in Clause 2 above.

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15) While deciding Misc. Appeal No.75 of 2012 in the case of

Smt. J.V. Raut (Smt. Gunvati K. Zarkar), the learned Judge has

inadvertently copied the observations made in the judgment rendered in

Misc. Appeal No. 74 of 2012 in the case of Arjun Satardekar relating to

existence of a registered agreement and use of the words ‘permanent

alternative accommodation’. However, this inadvertent error while

deciding Misc. Appeal No. 75 of 2012 need not be over emphasized for

setting aside the order passed in Misc. Appeal No. 75 of 2012 on that

count alone. There are better reasons to set aside both the judgments and

orders passed by the City Civil Court.

16) One of the issues involved before the City Civil Court was

about applicability of provisions of PP Act to the premises in the light of

provisions of MRC Act. In both the judgments, the issue has been

answered in favour of the Bank by holding as under:

24. The fourth issue is regarding whether the Public Premises Act will

apply or the Maharashtra Rent Control Act to the present case.

It is correctly held by the Estate Of�cer that the Public Premises Act will

override the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. Hence, it has been rightly

held that the Public Premises Act applies to the present case.

17) Thus, the City Civil Court has held that the provisions of PP

Act would prevail over the provisions of MRC Act. Under Section 2(g) of

the PP Act, the term ‘unauthorised occupation’ has been de�ned as

under:

“unauthorised occupation”, in relation to any public premises, means

the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority

for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any

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person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of

grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to

occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason

whatsoever.

18) Thus, occupation by a person of the public premises (i)

without authority for such occupation and (ii) upon expiry or

determination of such authorization, becomes unauthorized occupation.

In the present case, it cannot be contended that occupation of the

premises by the Respondents is without authority. However, it is the

contention of the Bank that the authority has been terminated by

issuance of notices dated 3 December 2007 and that therefore occupation

of the premises is unauthorised. The City Civil Court has however not

considered this aspect while setting aside the eviction orders. Once it is

held by the City Civil Court that the provisions of Maharashtra Rent

Control Act do not apply to the Respondents, the authority to terminate

the lease/tenancy by issuance of notice under Section 106 of the TP Act

must be recognised.

19) On the issue of non-applicability of provisions of the MRC

Act and provisions of PP Act prevailing over the MRC Act, the law is now

well settled by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India

Versus. Vita in which it is held that the judgment in Suhas H. Pophale

vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and its Estate Of�cer

5

is in

con�ict with the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment in Ashoka

Marketing Ltd. And Another vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors.

6

and of

Three Judge bench decision in M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company vs.

5 2014 4 SCC 657

6 1990 4 SCC 406

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Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr.

7

. The Apex Court held in

paragraphs 12 and 13 in Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Vita as

under:

12. In view of the foregoing discussion, reasons and analysis, the

following positions of law emerges,

(a) In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Ashoka

Marketing and the three-Judge Bench decision in M/s. Jain Ink, the view

taken in Suhas H. Pophale which is a two-Judge Bench decision, is

palpably incorrect and unjusti�ed. Suhas H. Pophale cannot and does

not hold the �eld.

(b) Since, the propositions laid down in Suhas H. Pophale runs contrary

to the decisions laid down by the Benches of larger strength in Ashoka

Marketing and M/s. Jain Ink , the same is bad in law.

(c) The ratio decidendi by the Bench of larger strength is binding on the

Bench of the smaller strength, irrespective of the fact whether the

judgment by the Bench of the larger strength is apriori or posterior, in

point of time.

(d) A Bench of the smaller strength cannot mark a departure from the

decision of the Bench of larger strength, so as to vary the ratio of the

Bench of larger strength, in guise of explaining the decision of the larger

Bench.

(e) It was not permissible for the two Judge Bench in Suhas H. Pophale to

interpret the statutes and lay down propositions in con�ict with what

was laid down by the Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing and by a

three-Judge Bench in M/s. Jain Ink, when the set of material facts in the

background of the controversy dealt with, were similar.

(f) In laying down the propositions incongruent to and contrary to the

law laid down in Ashoka Marketing, the Bench in Suhas H. Pophale

disregarded the principle of stare decisis and violated the well settled

law of precedent.

13. As a sequitur, this Court reiterates the propositions of law laid in

Ashoka Marketing

(i) Both categories of statutes namely, the PP Act 1971 on one hand, and

the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947, Maharashtra Rent Control Act,

7 1980 4 SCC 435

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1999, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and similar Rent Con trol

Legislations, on the other hand, are special laws. Therefore, in order to

determine as to which Act will apply in case of con�ict, reference has to

be made to the purpose and policy underlying the two enactments and

the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the re levant

provisions therein. Keeping in view the object and purpose underlying

both the enactments, that is, the PP Act 1971 and the Rent Control Acts,

the provisions of the PP Act 1971 shall override the provisions in the

Rent Control Legislations.

(ii) The PP Act 1971 and the State Rent Control Acts are special

enactments in themselves. Rule generalia specialibus non derogant will

not apply. Having regard to the purpose, policy and legislative intent of

the PP Act 1971, the same would prevail over the State Rent Control

Acts in respect of eviction of ‘unauthorised occupants’ of ‘public

premises’ as de�ned in Section 2(g) of the Act.

(iii) The provisions of PP Act 1971, to the extent they cover the premises

falling within the ambit of Rent Control Act, override the provisions of

the Rent Control Act.

(iv) A person in unauthorised occupation of ‘Public Premises’ under

Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control

Act.

(v) In cases where the tenanted premises are claimed to be governed by

the State Rent Control Act and the same have also become ‘Public

Premises’ within the meaning in Section 2(e) of the PP Act 1971, for

their unauthorised occupation, the PP Act 1971 will have the

application.

(vi) The statutory machinery envisaged under the PP Act 1971, could be

activated for recovery of possession of public premises by any

Government or public entity mentioned in the de�nition.

(vii) The PP Act 1971 will apply to the tenancies which may have been

created and in existence either before coming into force of the Act or

which may have been created subsequent to coming into the force of the

Act.

(viii) Two conditions must be satis�ed for the applicability as above.

Firstly, the tenanted premises must fall within the purview of de�nition

under Section 2(e) of the PP Act 1971. Secondly, the premises should

have been in unauthorised occupation.

(ix) Termination of tenancy of ‘Pubic Premises’ by issuing notice under

Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is one of the modes

which would render the occupation of the tenant unauthorised, post the

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date speci�ed in such notice. This would hold true in respect of

tenancies created before or after coming into force of the PP Act 1971.

(x) Invocation and applicability of the provisions of the PP Act 1971 is

not dependent upon the aspect of possession. What is material is the

occupation of the premises which has become unauthorised occupation.

The occupation is a continuous concept.

(xi) The propositions enunciated in Suhas H. Pophale2 , as noticed in

paragraph 3.3.6 of this judgment, do not, in our considered view, state

the correct position of law. The observations made therein, with great

respect, are not in consonance with the settled legal principles and runs

contrary to the principle of stare decisis and stand overruled to that

extent.

20) Thus, it is no more res-integra that a person in unauthorized

occupation of public premises cannot invoke the protection of either the

Bombay Rent Act or the MRC Act.

21) The learned Judge of the City Civil Court has apparently got

swayed by the fact that the words ‘Permanent Alternate Accommodation’

are used in one out of the two agreements, which is also registered (Arjun

Satardekar). However, the agreement executed in favour of the tenant-

Arjun Satardekar did not contemplate conversion of tenancy rights into

ownership rights. The relationship between the parties continued to

remain that of landlord and tenant. Even after being put in possession of

the tenanted premises in the new building, Mr. Satardekar continued to

be a monthly tenant and remained liable to pay rent of Rs. 30/- per

month. There is no dispute that the rent is paid after execution of the

agreement and is being paid even today. Thus, mere use of the word

‘permanent alternative accommodation’ in the registered agreement

executed in favour of Mr. Satardekar did not put him in a better position

than that of Janabai Raut. In both cases, the occupants continued to

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remain mere tenants. Once they ceased to enjoy protection under the

MRC Act, their monthly tenancies became terminable by issuing a notice

under Section 106 of the TP Act. In my view, therefore, the tenants have

been lawfully terminated by the Petitioner-Bank in absence of any

protection under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.

22) Dismissal of earlier eviction suits �led under the provisions

of the Bombay Rent Act cannot have any effect on the eviction orders.

Therefore, the �ndings recorded by the Learned Judge of the City Civil

Court about applicability of principle of res-judicata are clearly faulty. The

Estate Of�cer has rightly held that bona�de requirement is a continuous

cause. Multiple suits are �led on bona�de requirement and mere

dismissal of an earlier suit �led on the basis of bona�de requirement at

that time cannot preclude landlord from bringing fresh suit based on

subsequent bona�de requirement. This position is recognized by this

Court in Vishwas Krishnarao Gangurde in which it is held in paragraph

17 of the judgment as under:

17. So far as the last ground of bona�de requirement of Bank of India is

concerned, I am unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the

Petitioner that the �nding recorded by the Small Causes Court on the

issue of bona�de requirement of Bank of Karad would operate as res-

judicata for the Estate Of�cer while deciding the requirement of Bank of

India. No doubt, the Small Causes Court rejected the ground of bona�de

requirement of Bank of Karad. However, bona�de requirement is a

continuous phenomenon and even if requirement at a particular point of

time is rejected, the same does not mean that bona�de requirement can

never arise again in future. Therefore, the principle of res-judicata

would not apply to a case involving continuous injury within the

meaning of Section 22 of the Limitation Act.

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23) As a matter of fact, the inquiry into existence of any bona�de

requirement is not even required in the facts and circumstances of the

present case. The PP Act does not envisage any protection to the

occupants of public premises unlike the provisions of Section 13 of the

Bombay Rent Act or Section 16 of the MRC Act. It is not necessary for the

owner of the premises to establish any ground for seeking eviction of the

occupant from the public premises. Occupation of public premises can

only be under express authority and only for so long as such authority

continues to subsist. The moment the authority comes to an end, the

occupation is automatically rendered unauthorised. In that sense, it was

not even required for the Petitioner to establish any bona�de

requirement. The authority to occupy the premises is terminated by

issuance of notices by the Bank. The moment the authority is terminated,

the occupation becomes unauthorised. In my view, therefore an inquiry

into the aspect of bona�de requirement was quite unnecessary and it is

not necessary to delve any further into that aspect.

24) Here, the short issue is whether Respondents are entitled to

protection of their tenancy under the Bombay Rent Act or the MRC Act

and if the answer to the question is in the negative, whether their

occupation becomes unlawful upon termination of the tenancy? The City

Civil Court has held that the notice terminating the tenancy issued under

Section 106 of the TP Act is invalid and that agreements executed with

the tenants need to be canceled before taking steps against them. These

�ndings are recorded in paragraph 16 of the judgment as under:

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16. It is pertinent to note that the said agreement was entered into

between the bank and the mother of this appellant on 19.03.1981 and

have agreed that the parties will be governed by the provisions of

Bombay Rent Act. Of course the Public Premises Act came into picture in

the year 1971. However, the said agreement is still in existence due to

which, mere notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for

terminating the tenancy of this appellant would not be valid. It has to be

observed here that the said agreement dated 19.03.1981 will have to be

cancelled before taking steps against this appellant. Hence, I hold that

the tenancy of this appellant has not been validly terminated. Hence, I

answer point no. 1 in the Negative.

25) Thus, the City Civil Court has proceeded on a footing that

because agreement dated 18 December 1982 provides for protection

under Bombay Rent Act, so long as the agreement subsists, the Bombay

Rent Act protection would also continue. As observed above, the issue is

no longer res-integra and the judgment of the Apex Court in Life

Insurance Corporation of India Versus. Vita puts to rest the entire

controversy about protection of Rent Control Legislation in relation to

premises governed by the provisions of the PP Act. The learned Judge of

the City Civil Court did not have the bene�t of the law declared by the

Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India Versus. Vita when the

impugned judgments were delivered. Now it is clear that tenancies

created in favour of the two premises cannot enjoy protection under the

MRC Act. Therefore, the tenancies could be validly terminated by issuing

notices under Section 106 of the TP Act. Here the authority to occupy the

premises is validly terminated and occupation is rendered unauthorised.

26) In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgment and

orders passed by the City Civil Court are clearly unsustainable and are

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         PAGE  NO.  17  of  18               

  16 September 2026

Neeta Sawant WP-10765 OF 2012

liable to be set aside. Respondents can be granted time of 6 months to

vacate the premises and make alternate arrangements for their residence.

27) I accordingly proceed to pass the following order:

(i) Judgment and orders dated 1 September 2012 passed

by the City Civil Court in Misc. Appeal Nos. 74 of 2012

and 75 of 2012 are set aside.

(ii) Eviction orders dated 16 May 2012 are con�rmed.

(iii) Respondents shall have time of 6 months to vacate and

handover possession of the premises to the Petitioner.

(iv) In the facts and circumstances of the case however, the

Respondents shall not be liable to pay any damage rent

for occupation of the premises post termination of

their tenancies upto the period of 6 month henceforth

or vacation of the premises, whichever is earlier.

28) With the above directions, both the petitions are allowed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]

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         PAGE  NO.  18  of  18               

  16 September 2026

NEETA

SHAILESH

SAWANT

Digitally signed by

NEETA SHAILESH

SAWANT

Date: 2026.09.16

19:30:33 +0530